

**DISPATCH**

**SECRET**

PROCESSING

TO,	Chief, Special Affairs Staff	PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
INFO.		X	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
			NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
FROM	Chief of Station, JMWAVE		ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
			ABSTRACT	
			MICROFILM	

SUBJECT Operational/TYPIC/AMTRUNK  
Project AMTRUNK Operational Review

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

PRIORITY

ACTION: Request Headquarters decision on continuation or termination of Project AMTRUNK.

1. Attached herewith is an operational review of and progress report on the AMTRUNK team for the period of 4 through 31 March. Station views on the operation are summarized below.

2. The AMTRUNK operation has the following disadvantages or weaknesses:

*MP REND*

A. The AMTRUNKers admit to being anti-KUBARK and to be working "with" KUBARK now only because there was no other alternative if they were to accomplish their mission. In other words, these agents will cooperate with KUBARK only when it is to their advantage. It is believed that if the operation were to develop, control would diminish rather than increase in the advanced stages of the operation, since the need for KUBARK assistance will decrease as operational successes increase. It is believed that AMICE/27 would have no hesitation "selling out" the operation to any one of the major refugee political groups at any time that he felt it advantageous to do so. It is believed that, if he is not already doing so, he is most likely to collaborate with either the Segundo Frente del Escambray, headed by Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, or the MRP faction headed by Manuel Ray. In the meantime AMICE/27 will attempt to have his own way with the operation. He believes that he is receiving special attention because of his ZRMETAL connections, and he will not hesitate to go behind KUBARK's back to AMTRUNK/1, AMCAPE/1, and ODACID or higher authority, if the operation or KUBARK handling of the AMTRUNKS does not progress to his liking. Since AMTRUNK/1, according to AMCAPE/1, "masterminded" this operation in the first place, it may be assumed that the AMTRUNKS will withhold nothing from AMTRUNK/1.

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3 - C/SAS w/attchs.

*Excluded from Project AMTRUNK*

*Classification: 19-6-84/3*

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AMTRUNK/1 in turn may be expected to keep AMCAPE/1 fully informed.  
There is no KUBARK control over AMTRUNK/1 or AMCAPE/1.

B. This operation has a very high "flap potential" if any AMTRUNK agents are picked up by the opposition in Cuba. Not only will KUBARK stand to suffer, but ODACID will be tied directly in to the operation, as may also QKFLOWAGE, by whom AMTRUNK/1 is employed, and AMCAPE/1 and his newspaper. The latter could prove to be most embarrassing and should be fully recognized as a possibility, if not a probability, in the event any of the AMTRUNK team fall into Castro's hands.

NEW YORK TIMES

C. The security of this operation has certain questionable aspects. At least six people were told about the operation in varying degrees prior to the time the team was safehoused. Two of the agents, AMICE/27 and AMICE/14, did not satisfactorily resolve the question of their security during LCFLUTTER tests. It is believed that AMICE/27 is withholding information of an unknown nature from his KUBARK contacts. An undercurrent of friction has recently developed between AMICE/14 and AMTRUNK/3 which manifested itself in a fistfight on 29 March. This was precipitated by AMTRUNK/3 who called AMICE/14 the Cuban term for a homosexual, the ultimate insult to a Cuban. This in turn gives rise to the question whether AMICE/14, with a possible history of homosexual activity (see UFGA-8411), has made such an approach to AMTRUNK/3.

D. The commitments made to AMICE/27 or which AMICE/27 claims were made to him are a matter of concern to the Station. This is an area over which future misunderstanding or aggravation might easily develop.

E. The Phase I landing point appears highly risky. It is within five miles of a cruise missile site radar, and in an area frequently patrolled by sea.

RABEZ Nunez

F. This operation appears possibly competitive with AMLEO/3 operations aimed also at penetrating high military levels for the same purposes. Given the lack of control in the AMTRUNK operation, the possibility of the two operations crossing or targetting on the same individual will be present.

3. In examining the strengths of the AMTRUNK operation, the AMTRUNK group as a whole represents superior agent materiel. Three of the four have been outstanding in training. They appear to have a number of fairly well placed contacts on the inside whom they expect to be able to call on for assistance. Although they have been out of direct touch with a number of these contacts for periods ranging up to two years, this is frequently the case in this type of operation. The objective of the operation is worthwhile.

4. Based on the attached operational review and the advantages and disadvantages outlined above, it is the recommendation of JMWAVE Station that this operation be terminated at the earliest possible moment. Since this operation originated at the Headquarters level, it is requested that Headquarters advise JMWAVE as to its decision. In the meantime, training and planning will continue. If Headquarters' decision is to continue with the operation at this time, operational plans for Phase I and Phase II will be submitted as formulated.

END OF MESSAGE

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See DIR 31748

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31 March 1963

PROJECT AMTRUNK OPERATIONAL REVIEWI. STATUS REPORT ON TRAINING AND PROCESSING, 4-31 MARCH.

The AMTRUNK Team, consisting of AMICE/27, AMICE/14, AMTRUNK/2, and AMTRUNK/3 were safehoused on 4 March 1963 at Safesite #164 on Plantation Key. Andrew S. PARMERS, KUROAR instructor from headquarters, was already at the training site when the team was brought there by the two case officers, Irving N. PEGGINS and Hobart J. VANDEBORN. PARMERS remained at the safesite until 16 March during which time he conducted training in clandestine methods and techniques. This training included security, cover and compartmentation, clandestine communications, agent spotting, selection, recruitment and management, and operational planning and reporting. The training included group discussion and participation in a series of appropriate operational situations, several problems, and daily physical training. During this two week period, either PEGGINS or VANDEBORN visited the safesite every day, spending an average of two or three hours with the group in operational discussions and processing. During the week of 18 thru 23 March, both case officers spent a majority of the time with the group, debriefing them in detail on their operational contacts, working out operational details of their infiltration, and continuing their training on an informal basis. The week of 25 through 30 March was spent in PM-type training with emphasis on compass and map reading, including two night problems, and on weapons familiarization and firing. During the period under discussion the AMTRUNK group were all LCFLUTTERED, were assessed by the KUROAR assessment team, were given an initial series of immunizations, were issued clothing, were processed for alias documentation, were processed for disguises, and were further processed on cover and finance problems. The results of the LCFLUTTER examinations were sent to headquarters under cover of UFGA-8111, on 13 March 1963. Based on DIR 26430, no further LCFLUTTER is planned at the present time. Transmitted as attachment "A" to this dispatch is PARMERS report on his training of the AMTRUNK group, transmitted as attachment "B" are the results of the assessments of the AMTRUNK group, and transmitted as attachment "C" is the training report for the week of 25 March.

II. AMTRUNK MISSION OBJECTIVE

The project AMTRUNK Mission objective is to overthrow the existing Cuban government by means of a conspiracy among high level military and civilian leaders of the government culminating in a coup d'etat which will oust both Castro and

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the Communists from power. A secondary and subordinate mission is to determine the climate prevailing among the populace in Havana for organizing resistance elements capable of either passive or active sabotage. This secondary mission is exploratory in nature only, through the first phases of the project. In order to accomplish the foregoing missions, the operation has been split into two initial phases, which will be compartmented from each other. Phase One involves the black infiltration of AMTRUNK/2 and 3 on the north coast of Havana province. These two individuals plan to go into Havana for a period of approximately two weeks, and then exfiltrate black from the same point at which they infiltrated. Phase Two, involving AMICE/27 and AMICE/14, will consist of black infiltration through the keys area on the north coast of Matanzas. These two individuals will likewise go into Havana for a period of several weeks and then exfiltrate black. These two phases are discussed in detail in following paragraphs. Phase One and Phase Two are preliminary infiltrations designed to set up infiltration/exfiltration routes and to make initial contacts among certain select high level military figures in Havana. The following paragraphs discussing these phases are not designed to be operational plans. Detailed operational plans for each phase will be forwarded as developed.

### III. PHASE I.

#### A. AMTRUNK Personnel 08

1. AMTRUNK/2 is a (21) year old Cuban who is mature for his years, and in some degree experienced in clandestine operations. He attended (Catholic Social) University in Havana for two years, majoring in Social Studies. Prior to Fidel's takeover A/2 was allied to student elements of the Partido Autentico which upheld the constitution of 1940. He supported the revolution against Batista till it became apparent that Castro had cast his lot for a Communist regime. During his university years from 1959 to 1961 he was actively engaged in supporting anti-Castro groups with weapons and materials. Following the Playa Giron invasion a great many in the Havana underground were rolled up but A/2 avoided compromise. He continued in this work through 1961 and finally left Cuba via air in January 1962. Although A/2 does not consider himself an ally of KUBARK he has been cooperative throughout his training. He is a pensive individual who displays good judgement. His present attitude towards KUBARK appears to be one of "wait and see". In the meanwhile, he is conscientiously applying himself in preparation for his mission.

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2. AMTRUNK/3, a (22) year old Cuban, in contrast to A/2, is volatile, immature and impulsive. On the other hand he is quite loyal to A/2 and his quick wit is appealing to his fellow team members. He worked under A/2 in the underground as an action type, principally engaging in sabotage. His underground work began while he was in secondary school when in 1958 he supported the revolution against Batista. In late 1960 he sided with the counter-revolutionaries and began full time anti-Castro activities. After the crack down following the Bay of Pigs invasion he avoided detection and continued to engage in underground activities. Finally when the situation became hopeless he left Cuba by air for Miami in (August) 1962. While A/3 has performed satisfactorily in his training up to date, his performance falls far short of the other three members. A/3 feels KUBARK should only function as support for this operation and should not interfere in the actual plans of the operation. Fortunately his role in this operation is comparatively minor and he appears willing to comply with whatever A/2 decides. Nevertheless, direct control of A/3 offers problems in the future.

#### B. TASKS

1. Conduct black infiltration landing at Punta La Jijira (AMS 3785 I) and establish contact with the farm manager at (A/3's father's) farm in the (Galera) section (AMS 3885 III, Coords 993614). 08
2. Through contacts of A/3 obtain transportation for A/2 to Guanaba or Havana.
3. Although not definite, A/3 may remain at his (father's) farm and train assets in maritime reception and clandestine communications. Having completed this he would then be exfiltrated at Punta Jijira. 08
4. A/2 will go to Havana and obtain safehouse and operational support through his contacts.
5. A/2 will contact and develop two potential assets with high level connections within the Rebel Army.
6. A/2 will train support and operational assets in clandestine communications as well as arrange for transportation for his exfiltration.
7. Exfiltration of A/2 at Punta La Jijira or Puerto Escondido (AMS 3885 II).

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C. INFIL-EXFIL PLANS

1. The tentative date for the infiltration of A/2 and 3 at Punta La Jijira is 18 May<sup>24</sup> 1963. The infiltrates will make their way to [A/3's father's] farm one kilometer from the coast and from there A/2 will be provided with transportation to go to Guanabo or Havana.
2. The exfiltration of A/3 will occur three days after his infiltration. This arrangement, as yet, is not definite.
3. The exfiltration of A/2 is tentatively planned for 31 May 1963 at Punta La Jijira or Puerto Escondido. A/3 feels that Puerto Escondido would afford a more secure point for exfiltration but that a reconnaissance of the area would be necessary before final decision is reached. Prearranged telegram signal would indicate his preference.
4. The above dates fall within a favorable moon phase for maritime operations. In addition the infil-exfil schedule will allow for an extra margin beyond the 10 days which A/2 considers the minimum acceptable period of time to make his contacts.

D. OPERATIONAL ASSETS WITHIN CUBA

1. Following the successful infiltration of A/2 and 3 the <sup>24</sup> two men will work their way to a farm owned jointly by [A/3's father and Santos SUAREZ] located [1 kilometer] from the point of infiltration. <sup>06</sup> They will <sup>06</sup> make contact with the manager of the farm named [Pedro CRUZ]. [CRUZ] is (35 to 40) years of age, is married and has an elementary school education. He has no record of underground activity. A/3 will depend upon <sup>06</sup> [CRUZ] to make the following contacts in order to obtain transportation to Guanabo or Havana:
  - a. <sup>06</sup> [Roman HERNANDEZ] who lives a <sup>06</sup> few kilometers away in <sup>06</sup> [Sierra del Arzobispo]. [HERNANDEZ] owns a small farm and a <sup>06</sup> [butcher shop] in the area and also owns a truck. He is <sup>06</sup> [37 to 40] years of age, married with six or seven children. He was jailed for a brief period in the past for counter-revolutionary activities.
  - b. If [CRUZ] is unsuccessful in getting [HERNANDEZ]' truck <sup>06</sup> he will contact [Augusto MACHIN] who operates a farm next <sup>06</sup> to [A/3's father's] farm. He is (45-50) <sup>06</sup> years old, married, no children, wife's name is [Alicia] <sup>06</sup> He was the [mayor of Santa Cruz del Norte] in 1954. He owns a jeep.

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c. Another contact of A/3 is (Ramon CALZADILLE) age 21, single, 8th grade education. He provided support in the form of food and safehousing to underground workers in the past. His home address is (Corojo #1, Cotorro,) 08 Havana. He owns a (butcher) shop in the (Cotorro) section of Havana. Subject will be contacted by A/3 if he needs to be safehoused in Havana.

2. The following assets would be contacted by A/2 after arriving in Havana. They will be contacted in the order listed. Their function will be to provide safehouses and vehicles for A/2.

06, 08.

a. (Elsa Maria NEGRIN, 25) years of age, born in Havana. A/2 first met her when she was a student at the University of Havana majoring in Social Sciences. Presently she lives with her aunt in Havana and A/2 has maintained correspondence with her. She has helped previously in providing safehousing for the underground. She also has a car.

06, 08

b. (Pedro IGLESIAS Betancourt, age 55) born in 08 Havana. He is a 08 physician who lives and practices (medicine) in Havana. 06 IGLESIAS has helped A/2 in underground activities previously. He has a brother, two daughters and a son now residing in the U.S. His daughters live in New Jersey and were last seen by A/2 about six months ago. Subject was a member of the Partido Pueblo Cubano, an anti-Batista group, and was a professor of (medicine) 08 at the University of Havana up until 1961 when he resigned. (IGLESIAS) is also a close friend of (Elsa NEGRIN) 06

c. (Sergio MENDEZ) 06 age about (50) 08 born in Cienfuegos, a former (senator (1954)) as well as the former head of the 08 Railroad system in Cuba. Subject was originally a member of the Autentico Party and claimed to be a KUBARK confidante during Castro's takeover. 06 MENDEZ has an apartment and two cars and has previously helped A/2 in underground activities. He has a daughter who works for the government but is not sympathetic to the regime. The 08 husband of this daughter, however, works for (Che Guevara.) A/2 has maintained correspondence with (MENDEZ.)

d. (Isabel MENOCOL) 06 age about (35) 08 born in Havana, single. Subject is an (English) teacher who runs a small private 08 tutoring school in (English) 08 in Havana. She was A/2's 08 English teacher and offered support to the underground. 06 MENOCOL lives by herself, has an automobile and is a close friend of A/2 and his wife.



e. (Gloria BAMCIALBA) age (23-24) born in Havana, single, mother and father deceased. She attended the University of Havana and Villanova from 1959 to 1960. She became a close friend of A/2 during their student days in Havana. She has no record of underground work. She lives in (Guanabo Beach) during the summer. A/2 felt he might attempt to contact her if she was living at (Guanabo Beach) in order to safehouse A/3 there if necessary

3. The following two operational assets will be contacted by A/2 after he is safehoused in Havana. Their function will be to spot Army officers disaffected with the Castro Regime.

a. (Jorge VALS) age (late 30s early 40s) married. Subject holds the rank of (Captain) in the Rebel Army but is not presently on active duty. He was a friend of Castro's during the revolution and A/2 claims he still maintains some contact with Fidel. He also claims (VALS) has been working in a limited fashion against Fidel and was originally associated with the MRR and Monte Cristo groups. (VALS) primary interest has been trying to organize his friends within the Rebel Army against Fidel. A/2 feels (VALS) is a very discreet individual who has not been identified as an anti-Castro organizer by the G-2. A/2 claims to be a close friend of (VALS) and trusts him completely. A/2 saw and talked to (VALS) in 1962 prior to his flying out of PBRUMEN as a refugee.

b. (Jose DUARTE Oropesa) age early (40s) served in the U.S. Army during World War II. According to A/2, (DUARTE) was made commander of the 5th Military District by (Camilio Cienfuegos). Following the disappearance of (Cienfuegos) (DUARTE) was removed from the post and presently lives on an Army pension as well as royalties from property confiscated by the government. He said (DUARTE) started working against Castro within the MRP under Manuel RAY. For a time he was the (military) secretary of the MRP and became quite involved in plotting against Fidel. A/2 also stated that it was rumored at the time that (DUARTE) was working for the MRP that he was also a KUBARK agent. Eventually (DUARTE) was placed on a G-2 suspect list, but according to A/2 (DUARTE) was able to evade detection. Subject has good connections within the Rebel Army and revolutionary government. A/2 trusts this individual and has confidence in him as a potential operational lead in spite of conflicting reports which mention (DUARTE) as an opportunist.

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c. A/2 may also attempt to contact the following operational asset if he has an opportunity to make contact.

06 08  
(Lester RODRIGUEZ) age (late 30s early 40s,) married, former member of the Partido Pueblo Cubano. He fought with Raul Castro in the Sierra Cristobal Area. Following the Castro takeover he served as (head of) 08 one of the military zones within Havana province. Eventually he was given lesser assignments and A/2 thinks he 06 is now working (in INRA) in Oriente Province. He claims (RODRIGUEZ) assisted his underground group during 1961 by supplying trucks for transporting weapons and materials.

#### E. COVER AND COMMUNICATIONS

##### 1. Cover

A/2 will be issued documentation claiming he is an employee of a local brewery in Havana. A/3 on the other hand will be issued documentation as a bus driver within the city of Havana. Both will also be issued drivers licenses and additional items such as immunization certificates, Cuban receipts, etc. The two men will also be outfitted with disguises.

##### 2. Communications

Primary communications will be established through an SW system. Both men will be given SW instruction and will be issued accommodation addresses in Miami. This instruction and these addresses in turn will be passed on to the recruited assets in PBRUMEN for use as the operation develops. Pre-arranged signals will also be devised for use by the team via telegram to indicate their progress and confirm their place and time of exfiltration. Both members will also be given an OWVL system to provide them with quick instructions in case of an emergency.

#### F. OPERATIONAL AND SECURITY EVALUATION

1. The operational aspects of Phase I portrays a mission which has considerable potential but also considerable risk. The area of infiltration is within five miles of a cruise missile site and its accompanying radar. In addition boat patrols are known to work this portion of the coast at frequent intervals. Once infiltrated the team will not have to travel far before their first contact. However, A/3 is leary of staying at his 24 (father's farm) for any length of time and he does not want his 24 (father) to know of his presence in Cuba. For this reason the farm will not be able to serve as a safehouse. A/2 plans on leaving the farm the same day he lands. This presents the problem of what to do with A/3. On approach is to take A/3

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to Guanabo or Havana and safehouse him. This, however, may jeopardize the operation because A/3 lacks the maturity and patience necessary to stay put while A/2 goes about his business. He may take advantage of his visit to Havana to undertake a clandestine assignment on his own. When A/2 and 3 step ashore in Cuba, control will vanish. Fortunately A/2 has a sufficient resource of judgement to go about his business competently. Unfortunately A/3 gives no such indication. For this reason an attempt will be made to steer A/3 towards developing assets around his [father's farm] with maritime reception capabilities. 24

2. A/2, on the other hand, appears to have a sufficient number of supporting assets to provide for his safety while in Havana. However, he has not seen [VALS] and [DUARTE] for over a year. In addition both men are presently outside of the Cuban Army organization and this position may dampen their effectiveness in recruiting within the Army. Station reports on [DUARTE] conflict with A/2's evaluation of this man. While there is no evidence to verify that [DUARTE] is pro-regime, there has been a recent report on him from AMLEO/3 which claims [DUARTE] is an opportunist who might work for the highest bidder. A/2's rebuttal to these remarks is that [DUARTE] has assisted him in the past and when the chips were down he continued to aid him in his underground activities. This still leaves a question mark next to the worth of [DUARTE] which unfortunately can only be resolved by direct contact between him and A/2. There are other security implications which should be discussed in this evaluation. Both A/2 and A/3 cannot be considered truly security conscious. While safehoused A/2 wrote a letter to a contact in Miami which was to be transmitted by his case officer. The letter gave an indication that A/2 was seeking contacts in Havana and conveyed the impression that a trip was in the offing. A/2 has written several other letters not seen by his C Os which might have given the same impression. A/3 on the other hand talked quite freely about his operation to four friends in New York prior to coming to Miami and being safehoused. He explained that he was joining AMICE/27 and AMTRUNK/2 on an operation that would take them first to Miami and then to Cuba. Once there they would go to his [father's farm] and begin to make contacts. A/3 also stated that a man named [DUARTE] would be one of their contacts. This loose talk coupled with A/3's attitude that KUBARK exists only to serve him makes him a marginal candidate for this operation. However, if A/3 is exfiltrated three days after his entry into Cuba, the operation will gain his usefulness and eliminate some of the risk he presents.

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3. The above evaluation stresses the operational and security weaknesses in this operation. In contrast to these weaknesses are the positive considerations of this mission. A/2 has the intelligence, competence, and confidence to approach and recruit two assets with the potential for developing anti-regime operations at a high level within the Cuban Army. The results which these anti-regime activities can accomplish is a matter for conjecture but it appears that they carry potential. Nevertheless, if the operation continues, it will bear close watching in terms of security and control for these factors will jeopardize the operation as well as KUBARK's position if not properly contained.

#### IV. PHASE II

##### A. AMTRUNK PERSONNEL

1. AMICE/27, senior member of the AMTRUNK group, is a 41 year old PBRUMEN citizen from a wealthy high class family. His father, now deceased, was a prominent individual in law and politics and was at one time a senator. A/27 himself graduated from law school in Habana and was a practising lawyer. In 1959 he became legal adviser to Camilio Cienfuegos. Following the disappearance of Cienfuegos in October 1959, A/27 began to engage in counter-revolutionary activities. In May 1961, at which time he held the position of Under-Secretary of Public Works, he felt that his underground activities had come to the attention of the government and he took refuge along with his wife in the Venezuelan Embassy. He was given safe conduct from the Embassy to PBPRIME in late 1961. Subject is intelligent, articulate, and highly motivated. He has some experience in counter-revolutionary activities and has demonstrated an excellent capacity for learning clandestine techniques. He has a very large ego, and aristocratic pride, is very sensitive, and is quick to take offense. He is frank to state that he has a low opinion of KUBARK, that he is not a KUBARK agent and he deeply represents any implication that he is working for KUBARK. He states that he is working for the overthrow of the present regime in his own country and that he will accept KUBARK aid and advice but will not accept KUBARK control. His attitude although not hostile, is frequently critical, and he presents a difficult handling problem.

2. AMICE/14 is a 26 year old Cuban citizen who is also a law graduate of the University of Havana. He has been involved much of his adult life in clandestine activities. Subject arrived by small boat in June 1961 in PBPRIME. He is highly motivated, is intelligent and objective, and has a very highly developed security consciousness, developed from his counter-revolutionary experiences. From January to July 1961 he made four black infiltration/exfiltration trips to and from Cuba and PBPRIME, and has an excellent knowledge of the northern Marianas area. He is easy to work

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with and has evidenced little of the hostilities or anti-KUBARK feelings shown by AMICE/27<sup>08</sup>

- 08 3. AMTRUNK/4. Subject is a [49]<sup>08</sup> year old fisherman from the Cardenas area who took refuge in PBPRIME in February 1963. He had previously assisted A/14 in infils and exfils and will be used as a maritime guide.

#### B. TASKS

1. Make preliminary black maritime infiltration by small boat onto Cinco Leguas Key (AMS Map 4085 III) to contact individuals who formerly assisted AMICE/14 in infil-exfil operations.
2. Through contacts on Cinco Leguas Key, organize a ratline into the mainland, including making arrangements for transportation into Havana.
3. Through the mechanism established above, move to Havana and obtain safehousing and operational support.
4. Make all necessary arrangements for subsequent exfiltration and future infiltrations.
5. Approach and recruit two key individuals with contacts among important military figures.
6. Establish internal and external communications.
7. Exfiltrate from Phase II.

#### C. INFIL-EXFIL PLANS

It is tentatively planned to infiltrate AMICE/27, AMICE/14, and AMTRUNK/4 into the Cinco Leguas Keys area on or about 23 April. Subjects will take a small boat with silent motor into the Keys area and remain in the area for approximately three days, during which time they will remain black, keep the boat hidden in the mangroves, and contact individuals known to them on Cinco Leguas. They will make arrangements with contacts at that point to re-activate contacts of AMICE/14 on the mainland at Casualidad (Map 4085 III, Grid Square 1747) and contacts in the town of Marti and Cardenas. Plans will be worked out at this time with these contacts for a second infiltration in the latter part of May, at which time AMICE/27 and AMICE/14 will again go into Cinco Leguas and expect to be passed on through these contacts to Havana. Subjects will exfiltrate by small boat on or about 26 April and will be met by the parent craft in open water to the north of Cayo Cruz del Padre (Map sheet 4085 IV).

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D. OPERATIONAL ASSETS WITHIN CUBA

1. Cayo Cinco Leguas. This key is used for production of charcoal and salt. Residents are reported solidly anti-Communist. A/14 has two contacts here that he used previously for infils and exfils. One is "Tango" (Garcia Lezcana) 06. Tango is a brother of (Eustiquiano Garcia Lezcana (201-307338)) 06, 08 whom A/14 wanted to use as a guide in this operation, but who was already being utilized elsewhere. The other contact is the owner of the (Salina (salt drying beds)) 06. A/14 has not yet been able to recall this individual's name. 06
2. Finca Casualidad. This area is directly south of Cinco Leguas, on the mainland. Key contacts here are (Antonio 06 Garcia) (not related to Tango, above) and (Pablo Lopez) 06 both of whom have small farms in the area.
3. Town of Marti. Contact here is "Perico" LNU. Subject is about 50 years old, is employed by (INRA) 06 and has a jeep which was used previously by A/14 for operational purposes. 06
- 06 4. City of Cardenas. Contact is (Pedro Barbi) owner of the (Bate Marino restaurant). Subject is a close friend of A/14 who assisted him previously with transportation for maritime receptions. 06 (Barbi) would be used to take A/14 and A/27 to Havana. Owns a car.
- 08 5. City of Matanzas. A-14 has a friend here named (Carlos) 06 Pedraza who also assisted A/14 in underground activities in 1961. Subject is (60) 06 years old, married, and is a forman (of public works) in the city. Subject has a son (Carlos) 06 now in New York City. 06 (Pedraza) will be contacted for transportation to Havana. Owns a car.
- 06 6. Varadero. "Fifo" (Pineiro) 06 owns a car and was formerly a close friend of A/14. Subject was formerly active in the underground 06 and might be used by A/14 in the event he could not use (Barbi) or (Pedraza) 06 for obtaining transportation. 06, 08 (Pineiro) is the brother of the communist (Manolo Pineiro, aka "Barba Roja") but is reported to be anti-communist himself.
7. Havana 06
  - a. (Adolfina (Suarez) More) Subject is single and lives with her mother. Is friend of AMICE/27 (possibly mistress) and can be 06 used as safehouse keeper. Subject is 06 sister of (Rafael (Suarez) More) a (Commandante in the Navy) who, according to A/27, was at one time (chief of naval 06 operations.) His present assignment or location is unknown.

- 06
- b. (Manuel (Garcia) Sanchez) Is a close friend of A/14 and is uncle of (A/14's wife) 06 Can be used for operational support, a car, and safehousekeeping. Was formerly a Lt. in Oriente under (Calixto Garcia) 06 but no longer in army. A/14 believes he is now an administrator of some type of industry in Havana.
- 06
- c. (Maria Josefa (Isalgue)) Subject is aunt of A/14 and can be used as safehouse keeper. She is single, lives alone except for ten cats. Does not have a car. Was formerly a teacher but now has a pension and does not work.
- 06
- d. (Gonzalo (Lopez) de la Torre) Subject is a relative of A/27 and can be called on for ops support or safehousing. Subject has a car, is married, no children, is in his sixties.
- 06
- e. (Bebo (Orozco)) To be recruited by A/14 as his principal agent in Havana. Subject and A/14 previously worked together in the underground. 06 (Orozco) was in the Sierra with Castro and also fought in Camaguey. He resigned from the army in February 1959, although he has maintained many contacts within the army. Was one time active in the 06 Movimiento Democratico Martiano and was a friend of (Capt. Bernardo Corrales) who was shot by Castro in Pinar del Rio. Subject came to PBPRIME in April 1961 with A/14 to obtain arms and remained there 10 days, infiltrating back into Cuba without his absence having been known to the authorities. Was responsible for safehousekeeping (Vargas Gomez) 06 for nearly one month when authorities were searching for him. Will be used for intel collection and spotting on defectable army officers. He is also known to A/27, but not well. A/14 was last in touch with (Orozco) by letter about two months ago. 06
- f. Ramon (Guin) Diaz. Subject to be recruited by A/27 as principal agent. Would be used for operational intelligence and spotting among disaffected army officers. Would be kept entirely compartmented from (Orozco) 06 Guin is an army Comandante, now managing a large INRA farm complex outside of Havana. He is known to A/27 and A/14, both of whom believe he can be contacted safely. He is anti-Communist and is one of the group of Camilo Cienfuegos officers contacted by A/27 in early 1961 to join in an overthrow of the government.

06-defendant in CUBELA trial - in prison.

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g. Target personalities who are suspected of being disaffected and on whom A/27 and A/14 will attempt to gather information in Havana are as follows:

1. Comandante "Macho" Parra
2. Cdte. Oscar Guerra
3. " Jose Pinares
4. Capt. FNU Lawton
5. " Manuel Avila
6. Cmdte. Rene de los Santos
7. " Pedro Miret
8. Capt. Juan Nuiry
9. Cmdte. Rafael Suarez More
10. Capt. Fernando Fernandez Superville
11. Capt. FNU Guerra Matos
12. Capt. Sandy Olivares
13. " Jose Fernandez Alvarez

These names have all been checked through JMWAVE RI and in most cases also with AMLEO/3. In a majority of cases there appears to be some evidence to indicate the subjects may be disaffected. In the case of Jose Pinares however, it would appear that he is completely loyal to the regime. This information was passed on to A/27 and A/14. RI files were negative on Avila and Lawton.

E. COVER AND COMMUNICATIONS

AMICE/27 and AMICE/14 will live black during their entire stay in Cuba. They will be equipped with alias documentation and with disguises. Both of them have previously lived in the Havana area and know the city well. They will be trained in Secret Writing (SW) and will plan to train at least two and possible three agents in Havana in SW, prior to their own exfiltration. In addition, it is planned to train A/27 and A/14 in OWVL. At the time of infiltration, exfiltration plans will have been laid on with the agents. In the event that a change in time or location of exfiltration becomes necessary, an OWVL message could be sent to the agents. Any urgent and immediate message which might have to be sent by the agents during their short stay in Havana would be on a prearranged open code system by commercial telegram. Such a system will be worked out to cover several possible contingencies. Internal communications of whatever net is organized by A/27 and A/14 will be arranged by courier, cut-out, live and dead drops.

F. OPERATIONAL AND SECURITY EVALUATION

1. The LCFLUTTER examinations on both AMICE/27 and AMICE/14 were inconclusive. Although it is the opinion of both the case officers and the training personnel who have been in close contact with these individuals that both agents are

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highly motivated and strongly anti-communist, this point will remain basically unresolved since it is almost certain that A/27 would refuse a second LCFLUTTER examination if asked. It is believed that A/27 was withholding information during the LCFLUTTER and subsequently. The nature, seriousness, and possible consequences of this are as yet not clear.

2. A/27 has told at least two people something about this operation. Although he says that he did not give any details of the operation, he does admit to having discussed it in very general terms with two individuals whom he named at the time of the LCFLUTTER test. One of these is a friend of Gutierrez Menovo and one a friend of Vargas Gomez.

THERE SAME SUSPICION he was G-2 agent.

3. AMICE/27 has not seen his contacts in the army for the past two years. Although it is difficult to assess how well he knows various persons in the military about whom he speaks, it is the case officer's opinion that few of these contacts might be considered really close. AMICE/14 has been out of direct touch with his operational contacts since July 1961.

4. The infiltration into Cayo Cinco Leguas is dependent upon having a good guide in the boat. At this time, Phase II is awaiting the recruitment of AMTRUNK/4 as guide.

5. Control over AMICE/27 and AMICE/14 is basically lacking. Some control can be exerted through the implied threat of withholding support to the operation. Control however will remain tenuous at best and A/27 will continue to be a difficult handling problem.

6. On the positive side of the ledger is the calibre of the agents, both of whom are well educated, astute, and highly motivated. Both agents have experience in clandestine operations, particularly A/14 who has made a number of previous clandestine entries and exits and has many operational contacts. To date both have performed in a superior manner in training.

#### V. FUTURE PLANS

During the week of 1 through 6 April, the team will receive maritime instruction. During the week 8 through 13 April, they will receive SW training, possibly OWVL training, disguise training, and further operational planning sessions.

#### VI. COMMITMENTS

1. According to AMICE/27, the following principle, which he feels is a commitment from ODYOKE, was enunciated during his initial trip to ZRMETAL: "ODYOKE will recognize a new Cuban

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government which is anti-Communist and which operates on democratic principles; ODYOKE does not desire to impose a government of its own choice upon Cuba". A/27 has made a big point of discussing this "commitment". It is apparent that he intensely dislikes (or fears?) Batista and his followers. It is also apparent that in his mind he links Batista and KUBARK, and fears that KUBARK would back Batis-tianos in a post-Castro government.

2. All AMTRUNK group members think that they received a commitment while in ZRMETAL that ODYOKE would support their operational plan, with funds, training, logistical support, and technical assistance, but would leave control of the operation entirely in their hands. In other words, they are not working for ODYOKE or KUBARK in any sense. On this point they are very sensitive.

3. Another commitment which AMICE/27 claims to have discussed in ZRMETAL is that ODYOKE should give "official recognition" to members of a conspiracy which culminates in a successful coup d'etat, following the coup, in order that these individuals will not be treated as political criminals by a future regime. This means recognition of an individual's participation in the conspiracy, not a promise of recognition of a specific government formed by the conspirators themselves.

4. Discussion of the above "commitments" has been pressed several times by A/27. PEGGINS has not agreed to any of these commitments with A/27. However, A/27 feels that the commitments have already been made by ODYOKE in ZRMETAL. PEGGINS has told A/27 that he will report these "commitments" back to ODYOKE to determine if, in fact, ODYOKE considers them as commitments.

5. The only commitment made by JMWAVE through PEGGINS has been that if any of the AMTRUNK group were killed or captured while on the mission, their families in PBPRIME would be assisted for a "reasonable amount of time" financially. PEGGINS declined to state what that time would be or how much financial assistance would be involved.

6. One further negative commitment has been discussed between PEGGINS and A/27. PEGGINS has stated to A/27 that no commitment will be made at this time to support any internal group organized by the AMTRUNKS with weapons or explosives and that this extends specifically to no promise to support active sabotage with demolitions.

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