

DDP 1-122

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT : Related Mission Directive for Mexico

1. Attached is the revised Related Mission Directive for Mexico.
2. Your approval is requested.

J. C. King
 J. C. King
 Chief, 4th Division

CONCUR:

WILLIAM S. H. NIXON

Chief, DDP/PA

Rayd George
 Chief, FI

J. H. Collins
 Chief, CA

L. H. Hester
 Chief, CI

APPROVED:

Richard Wilson
 Deputy Director (Plans)

3 JUL 1961

Date Approved

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RELATED MISSION DIRECTIVE FOR MEXICO

I. GENERAL PROVISIONS

- A. National Policy. The long-range national policy objectives of the U.S. Government toward Mexico are to reduce to an ineffectual level the influence of international Communism, to encourage democratic government, and to keep the Mexican government friendly and favorably inclined toward U. S. policies. Further guidance is given in the current CCB Regional Operations Plan for Latin America.
- B. Operational Emphasis. The Station's primary emphasis will continue to be placed on clandestine collection operations and covert action operations against the Sino-Soviet bloc, Cuban, and Communist elements in Mexico.
- C. Changes in the RMD. This basic policy instruction for activities in Mexico has been revised in light of the Station's last Annual Assessment of Progress Report and to reflect more accurately operational conditions, capabilities and direction. In view of the importance and threat presented by Communist Cuba to U. S. interests in Latin America, coverage of Cuban revolutionary activities in Mexico has been made a specific requirement under Priority A. Priority B objectives and tasks include refinements of desired efforts and also provide for covert action operations against Cuban targets in Mexico. The former task for production of motion pictures and their distribution has been deleted, as it is no longer a valid requirement; two former tasks pertaining to the possible use of foreign diplomats have been combined; a task to develop young potential political leaders (ZREAGER) has been added. Two previous Priority C objectives have been eliminated, as there is no established Mexican intelligence service, and the Station regularly reports on activities of the security services. Coverage of Chinese Communists has been raised to Priority B coincident with the elimination of the former Priority C section.
- D. Contingency Reporting. In addition to the specific objectives set forth in Section II, the Station will from time to time be called on to attempt to satisfy Intelligence

Guides and Intelligence Directives, but it is expected that these requirements be satisfied utilizing existing assets. Of particular interest on a continuing basis is information on: (a) any indications that Mexico may be used as a base for clandestine activity directed against the U. S. (CI Back Messages 83 and 115); (b) activities of non-bloc intelligence services, especially those that are potentially harmful to U. S. interests; (c) the plotting of revolutionary groups according to their current importance in attempts to overthrow the regimes of their respective Latin American countries; (d) the current alignment and activities of political forces with the potential for assuming control of the Mexican Government; (e) U. S. Communists residing in Mexico; and (f) the Spanish Communist group.

It will be noted that certain previous contingency reporting requirements have been amended as follows: The former levy for reporting on the stability of the Mexican Government has been changed to a more realistic and meaningful statement as reflected by (d) above. This modification is appropriate, as political changes in Mexico are most likely to occur within the framework of constitutionality. The previous charge for reporting on secret shipments of strategic materials from Mexico to bloc countries is no longer specifically required and has been deleted.

II. OBJECTIVES

PRIORITY A

1. Obtain information on Sino-Soviet bloc plans and activities in Mexico, including those of bloc intelligence services.
 - a. Continue and, where possible, increase physical and technical surveillance of bloc installations and residences.
 - b. Through controlled agent assets, identify and monitor the activities of bloc personnel; if conditions warrant, attempt recruitment or defection of bloc personnel.

- c. Continue CI operations against bloc intelligence personnel.
2. Seek to reduce and, if possible, eliminate Communist and leftist control or influence in key governmental and non-governmental organizations, political parties, mass media outlets, and other elements that influence public or official opinion and policies.
- a. Develop political action penetration agents in key functional groups, such as students, teachers and organized labor, in order to disrupt and reduce their capacity for carrying out action harmful to U. S. objectives and interests.
 - b. Expose and discredit illegal or subversive Sino-Soviet bloc activities and representatives in Mexico, as well as the activities and personnel of international and local Communist front organizations.
 - c. Identify, discredit, and if possible eliminate Communists and pro-Communists from strategic positions in government, educational institutions, state-controlled industrial and agricultural enterprises, labor unions, and student organizations.
 - d. Provide support and give guidance to individuals and organizations that can be induced to produce and disseminate anti-Communist, pro-Free World propaganda via radio, television, newspapers, or other media, and carry out political action operations against Communist or other anti-U. S. elements.
 - e. Identify, develop, and utilize important non-Communist political, business or civic leaders to carry out propaganda, economic or political actions against Communist influence and induce them to support views coinciding with U. S. Government policy interests.
 - f. Continue to support and guide anti-Communist youth and student organizations, publications or agents, and when necessary, develop additional assets in key schools in Mexico City and selected provinces.

- g. Develop and support covert press assets on the staffs of influential newspapers.
 - h. Develop access to individuals and organizations in the labor field and support non-Communist leaders and groups in key unions.
3. Obtain information on the organizational structure, key personnel, financing, covert plans and activities of the Communist Party of Mexico (PCM), Communist front organizations and groups, especially the Partido Popular Socialista (PPS), and non-Communist and/or anti-U. S. groups that may be susceptible to exploitation by International Communism.
- a. Exploit and extend existing penetrations in the PCM and the PPS.
 - b. Maintain penetrations of the PCM and seek to penetrate the anti-ENCINA wing of the PCM.
 - c. Develop and, if conditions warrant, recruit a key source in the Workers' University capable of monitoring cultural contacts between the University and bloc diplomatic installations.
 - d. Continue to monitor the activities of selected Communist-influenced labor unions and front groups through the penetration in the PPS; if conditions warrant, make selected recruitments in the unions or groups.
4. Continue to obtain information on Cuban Revolutionary activities in Mexico and support U. S. Government efforts against the CASTRO regime.
- a. Continue to conduct penetration operations of Cuban Embassy and induce defections of Cuban diplomats.
 - b. Recruit agents in Mexico for operational use in Cuba.
 - c. Secure support of high Mexican Government officials for the conduct of operations against Cuba.
 - d. Continue to provide operational support for activities

directed against the CASTRO regime in Cuba.

- e. Utilize propaganda media, political action assets, and other covert means to combat the influence of Cuban revolutionary ideologies in Mexico.

PRIORITY B

1. Combat ultra-nationalistic and anti-U. S. activities in Mexico, and propagandize the dangers of Communism.
 - a. Utilize existing media and political action assets to combat anti-U. S. propaganda or activities.
 - b. Utilize existing media and political action assets to prevent or negate collaboration between ultra-nationalists and Communists.
 - c. Utilize media and political action assets to prevent or negate the socio-economic and cultural penetration plans or activities of the Sino-Soviet bloc.
 - d. Spot and develop for future covert collaboration young local figures who show potential for political leadership and who may be influenced to become generally favorable to U. S. interests.
2. Obtain information on the secret intentions and activities of the Mexican Government in foreign affairs, particularly toward the U. S., the Sino-Soviet bloc, and Cuba.
 - a. Continue to develop and influence high level contacts in the Mexican Government, particularly the Office of the President and the Foreign Ministry.
3. Collect information on the Sino-Soviet bloc.
 - a. Continue penetration of airline and steamship offices and official government agencies to obtain advance information on travellers.
 - b. Recruit or obtain the willing collaboration of selected travellers to bloc countries, especially those who will remain in bloc countries for an extended period and who may be on scientific missions.

- c. Recruit third nationals and Latin American diplomats to be assigned or transferred to bloc countries.
 - d. Obtain communications intelligence on bloc diplomatic traffic.
4. Obtain information on the Chinese Communists in Mexico.
- a. Spot, assess and recruit or develop sources in the Chinese community.
 - b. Exploit the Gobernacion files on Chinese living in Mexico and effect penetration of the SHACP.