

21 January 1965

## MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO.

1. The DDP and Chief, SR met with Ambassador Thompson in his office to advise him of our plans to proceed to hostile interrogation in order to clarify the NOSENKO case. The DDP explained that while we had reached a firm conclusion late last year that NOSENKO was a provocateur and that hostile interrogation was in order, we decided to review these conclusions with representatives of the FBI. After some unavoidable delay, a series of meetings was held with the FBI at the level of Deputy Director for Security, Mr. William C. Sullivan. The findings of the FBI, which agreed generally with our own views, were formulated in a letter to the Director signed by John Edgar Hoover. A copy of this memorandum was shown to Ambassador Thompson by the DDP with the comment that the FBI and ourselves now have a common understanding on the case which was something both the DCI and the Director, FBI, agreed would be necessary.
2. DDP went on to say that we would hope to begin hostile interrogations in the near future but before we did, we wanted to discuss the case with Ambassador Thompson in light of the various contingencies which might arise during the course of these interrogations. DDP felt that it was preferable to advise Ambassador Thompson well in advance of our intentions so that if consultations with the State Department became necessary on a contingency basis, Ambassador Thompson would be in possession of the background. Ambassador Thompson first asked if we were sure that NOSENKO could not escape and turn himself into the Soviet Embassy. We told him that we had established him in a country house with a large security guard which we felt made escape improbable. Ambassador Thompson then asked if there was a possibility that NOSENKO might commit suicide. We said psychiatrists did not believe he was the type to do so and that our security surveillance was such that we were alert to this possibility and would try to prevent it. Ambassador Thompson also wondered if there had been any communications concerning NOSENKO from the

Soviet side. We replied there had been none since the confrontation last year following NOSENKO's arrival in this country. We then mentioned the attempts on several occasions by NOSENKO's wife and mother to contact him through the Embassy in Moscow but added that these attempts ceased in March 1964 and nothing has been heard from them since.

3. Ambassador Thompson then asked if NOSENKO had provided information which would discredit any American officials. We answered in the negative, pointing out that he had reported on former French and Canadian ambassadors. We later qualified the statement on Americans, pointing out that NOSENKO did provide information on a few Americans of lesser rank as well as private citizens.

4. The DDP then noted that after we reached a point of no return in our interrogations, we might decide that NOSENKO would have to be turned back. Ambassador Thompson expressed concern that the Soviets might use this action to discourage defections. We explained that when we came to the point that a turn-back appeared desirable, we would hope that a statement could be made by the U. S. Government which would establish NOSENKO as a provocateur. The DDP then described the AEJOYFUL case in brief terms to Ambassador Thompson, emphasizing the parallel planning and the possibility that a quadripartite statement by the governments might be considered. The DDP did note, however, that AEJOYFUL was in British hands and that they have the major responsibility even though we and other security and intelligence services had agreed on the handling of the case. The DDP then noted that in past cases where we had turned back people with intelligence backgrounds at their own request, the Soviets had not made publicity capital of these actions.

5. The earlier mention of our discussions with the FBI recalled to Ambassador Thompson some of the material on Soviet political issues which he has been receiving recently from the FBI. He commented that it was his very strong impression that the information was being fed to us by the Soviets. He said that it either consisted of information we already knew or that which the Soviets would not object to our having. He asked our views on this. The DDP com-

mented that it was the opinion of several officers in the *Clandestine Services* that some of these FBI sources were under Soviet control whereas the FBI believed them to be genuine.

6. In summing up our position on the NOSENKO case for Ambassador Thompson, the DDP referred to the kinds of information the Soviets had given up through NOSENKO. He made particular reference to the Johnson case and observed that if the Soviets were prepared to provide this kind of build-up to insure the success of NOSENKO's mission, it must then be very important to them. In conclusion, the DDP said that he would send a letter for the record to Mr. Hughes on the topic of NOSENKO to which Ambassador Thompson agreed.

David E. Murphy  
Chief, SR Division

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SECRET