

28 January 1963

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Spec. Gyp  
minutes*

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Cuba

The Executive Committee met on Friday, January 25th, and approved the new policy as outlined by the Coordinator.

Decisions bearing on covert operations were reached as follows:

1. The Special Group will have the responsibility of continuing review of the program for infiltration of covert intelligence agents. Progress will be regularly checked with the Group. Higher authority made a particular point of saying that, although the objective of "intensified covert collection" is approved, nonetheless, CIA should not feel it is under pressure to "get good men killed" in the process. In other words, the advantages to be gained from intensified collection must be continually weighed against the risks. This will be done by the Special Group.

2. The Attorney General expressed great interest in the extent to which key members of the Brigade will be brought into planning and current operations. He thought that they should be thoroughly consulted on plans for intelligence teams and he indicated that he will personally keep an eye on progress in this regard.

3. The use of propaganda balloons was disapproved at this time. It apparently was not clear as to exactly how far CIA should go in maintaining its current capability for launching balloons.

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At Mr. Bundy's suggestion I had a long talk with Cottrell on Saturday, the 26th. We discussed in particular the method of operation with the Brigade. I pointed out some of the security aspects that would have to be watched, but expressed the opinion that a workable method of operation could be devised so that the Brigade leaders could provide motivation and could feel a sense of participation, without having to bring them so closely into the details of target areas, dispatch, commo, etc., as to constitute a security hazard. I cited the Agency's experience with the NTS as a possible guideline in this regard. We agreed that after Mr. FitzGerald returns from Panama, about the first of February, the three of us should discuss this matter further.

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EYES ONLY**

8 February 1963

**MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD**

**SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 8 February 1963**

**PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Gilpatric, Mr. McCone, Mr. Hilsman,  
and Mr. FitzGerald**

1. Agent Operations in Cuba

Mr. FitzGerald discussed with the Group the CIA paper of 6 February which recommends a total of five maritime infiltration/exfiltration operations during the next thirty days.

He emphasized that these black operations are entirely of an intelligence nature and that they should be viewed only as a supplement to intelligence coverage accomplished by other means. In the latter connection, the point was made that information obtained by agents of this type can contribute to the targeting of aerial reconnaissance sorties and can assist in making the process of photo interpretation more meaningful.

Mr. FitzGerald also emphasized that the teams now proposed are comprised of only one to three agents. He noted that the agents available are particularly well motivated, and that those whose primary motivation was toward action rather than intelligence have been weeded out.

The consensus of the Group was that while agent operations of this type cannot be considered as a primary or major source of intelligence, nonetheless this type of operation is consistent with U.S. objectives in the Cuba situation and that approval of these five should be recommended.

(These missions were approved by higher authority, 9 February 1963)

2. <sup>98</sup> Subsidy to Venezuelan Newspaper

Mr. McCone reported on financial arrangements which have been made in connection with subsidy of the Venezuelan newspaper, which

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*V/mc*

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[ was approved at the meeting of 31 January 1963. He said that Agency funds on deposit with the Morgan Guaranty, which will serve as collateral against the bank's loan to the new entrepreneur of this newspaper, would draw interest at 4%, while the purchaser will pay the commercial rate of 6%. The Chairman expressed satisfaction with this arrangement.]

*Thomas A. Parrott*  
Thomas A. Parrott

**Distribution**

- Mr. Johnson
- Mr. Gilpatric
- Mr. McCone

**SECRET  
EYES ONLY**

*V/mc*

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EYES ONLY

28 February 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 28 February 1963

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone

Colonel Steakley was present for Items 1-3

1. <sup>98</sup> Reconnaissance - DOD Monthly Forecast

The Group had no objection to the BOW TIE missions as planned. Mr. McCone alluded, however, to the unexplained military activity that is going on in eastern China, and asked about the capability of BOW TIE to check on this. It was pointed out that the BOW TIE program consists of comparatively shallow penetration which would probably not reach the kind of military target Mr. McCone had in mind. Accordingly, Colonel Steakley was asked to confer with COMOR to find out whether requirements exist for deeper penetration in the area, and if so to bring in an appropriate proposal to the Special Group.

In connection with project AMOS, Mr. Johnson read a message from Lord Home to the Secretary of State. Home said that while the RAF and the Air Ministry will be glad to have the advantage of the intelligence resulting from the mission, nonetheless this represents a departure from the previous pattern of flights in the area. Additionally, the flight will, according to Home, go closer to the coast than the RAF is allowed to go. He was willing to agree to the mission, provided it was not viewed as establishing a precedent, and on the stipulation that Secretary Rusk personally accepts the risk entailed. Mr. Johnson said that Secretary Rusk is willing to accept this risk.

The Group approved AMOS, subject to check by Mr. Bundy with higher authority, and on the understanding that the Group will have a chance to take a last look at it shortly before the scheduled date of 19 March. Colonel Steakley was also asked to report to the Group on the results of the mission. (This mission was later approved by higher authority.)

In this connection, Mr. McCone commented on the great importance of obtaining intelligence on the Soviet low-level SA-3 system. The Group agreed that this is a high-priority requirement, in order to ]

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[provide a basis for estimating accurately the chances for successful low-level penetration of the USSR. Mr. McCone will arrange to have a USIB paper prepared on this subject.]

The Group noted the DESOTO destroyer voyage, which will now include a courtesy call at Djakarta.

Colonel Steakley told the Group that CINCLANT has tried out the MELON PATCH photography missions, operating under the ten mile restriction which was laid on by the Special Group at its meeting of 31 January. It is now apparent to CINCLANT that adequate photography of the desired areas cannot be obtained at that distance. The Group agreed that the ten mile restriction should remain in force. In coming to this conclusion they made the point that in case of real need for this type of coastal intelligence, there would be adequate time to obtain it after an emergency actually was in effect; and further, any such information collected now would have to be up-dated before operations could be mounted based on it.

The revised RED DOG missions, to be flown in C-47's, and the proposal to fly some BRASS KNOB missions from the Canal Zone, were approved.

Colonel Steakley was asked to give the Group a report on the results obtained from the last mission into the Sea of Okhotsk.

Colonel Steakley told the Group that the JCS will make no recommendation on low-level coverage of Laos (ABLE MABEL) until after the results of the Agency effort explained below.

The Group made a point of saying that although the time is not now propitious for covering the COMOR priority targets in Cuba with low-level flights, it may well prove desirable to do this on fairly short notice. Therefore this matter should be kept under constant review by operating elements.]

2. Reconnaissance - CIA Monthly Forecast <sup>98</sup>

Mr. McCone told the Group that the weather has suddenly opened up over North Vietnam and that the mission to cover that area, via Laos, which was approved by the Special Group on 17 January, will actually be launched tonight. He said that after this is completed the airplane will be ferried to Taiwan in accordance with the discussion at the meeting of the 25th of February, transiting Laos on the way. Mr. McCone also reported on the recent successful GROSBEAK mission.]

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3. Removal of Soviet Troops <sup>98</sup>

Mr. McCone said that we still do not know very much about the removal of Soviet troops from Cuba. Mr. Bundy stated that the official government position is that available information is insufficient to justify any change in the estimated figures of Soviets on the island. He added that no change can be made in these figures without specific approval by higher authority.]

4. Testimony on Cuba

Mr. McCone commented on the difficulties encountered by officials who are required to testify before Congressional committees on the Cuban situation, in light of the propensity of these committees to question witnesses on statements made by other officials. Mr. Bundy recognized that this is a problem and said that in an attempt to alleviate it he has had several documents brought together. These include a compendium of the President's remarks on the subject; the DCI's report to the Killian Committee; a report by Assistant Secretary Martin; and most recently, the CIA-prepared paper on subversion in the hemisphere. He added that the basic responsibility for coordinating public statements rests with the Secretary of State.

5. Italy - Status Report on Election Operation <sup>98</sup>

The Group noted that this project is progressing, but is still in its early stages.]

6. Chile - Proposed Political Action <sup>98</sup>

The Group approved the proposal dated 25 February, subject to approval by higher authority. (This was later granted.)]

7. Agency Operations in Latin America <sup>98</sup>

Mr. Gilpatric inquired as to the feasibility of mounting intelligence or other operations against selected military personnel in Latin America. Mr. McCone said that some of this is being done but that he will have it studied further.]

8. Progress on Cuban Operations

Mr. McCone told the Group that none of the five agent operations approved by the Group on the 8th of February has been successful. He noted that there have been a number of aborts due to weather,

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failure of equipment, and failure of rendezvous plans. He said that efforts are continuing to carry out these operations successfully, but indicated some unhappiness with the results to date and the prospects of success. He alluded particularly to the qualities of the agent personnel.

*Thaparrott*  
Thomas A. Parrott

**Distribution**

Mr. Johnson  
Mr. Gilpatric  
Mr. McCone

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**EYES ONLY**

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EYES ONLY

14 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS OF THE SPECIAL GROUP

SUBJECT: Approval of Cuba Papers

All members of the Special Group have now approved the following memoranda from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs:

- a. "Covert Propaganda to Stimulate Passive Resistance and Low-Risk, Simple Sabotage," 8 March 1963.
- b. "Proposed Infiltration/Exfiltration Operations in Cuba - 15 March 1963 to 15 April 1963," 11 March 1963.

*Tom Parrott*  
Thomas A. Parrott

Distribution

Mr. Johnson  
Mr. Gilpatric  
Mr. McCone

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EYES ONLY

26 March 1963

## MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 26 March 1963

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone.

Dr. Scoville, Mr. McMillan, and Colonel Steakley were present for Items 1-5.

Mr. Lundahl was present for Item 1.

Mr. FitzGerald was present for Item 5.

1. Low-Level Reconnaissance, Cuba <sup>98</sup>

In connection with the USIB recommendation for resumption of low-level coverage of Cuba, Mr. Lundahl showed the Group examples of the additional information that can be obtained from low-level photography as contrasted with high-level coverage. This had to do particularly with identification of materiel, spotting of personnel, etc.

Mr. McCone emphasized that low-level coverage would give us additional information on the numbers of Soviet troops and possibly on Soviet intentions, and similar subjects, but that it would not represent a qualitative shift in the body of intelligence available. It would not reveal anything that would be of major security interest to the U.S. and which could not be picked up by high-level coverage.

Mr. McCone also referred to the progress of certain negotiations which have been holding up active consideration of low-level photography. He said that there are differences of opinion among people closest to this situation as to what the effect of resumption of such photography actually might be on the negotiations.

Mr. Gilpatric said that Defense is not convinced of the urgency of this proposition and would not favor it at this time, unless others feel that there is an overriding political reason for undertaking the project. He said that he would prefer to see this capability reserved for identifying the type of threat that we might otherwise not be aware of, or used at a time when there was some political advantage to be gained by low-level flights. ]

See special minutes  
for additional item

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[ Mr. Johnson said that the Secretary of State does not believe that there is any foreign policy reason for mounting the operation at this time, and in fact the Secretary and other high officials in the Department feel that from a policy point of view it would be inadvisable now.

The Group then agreed that the resumption of low-level coverage would not be recommended at this time, but that it would be kept under weekly review.]

2. [ Reconnaissance, Indonesia 98

The Group noted the intelligence justification for this proposal and the political objections to it, and the Chairman agreed to discuss it with higher authority as an example of a situation where clear-cut differences of interest exist. He said that if there was any doubt from that quarter he would have all the principals participate in further discussion with higher authority. (The proposal was later disapproved by higher authority.)]

3. [ Peripheral Reconnaissance Operations 98

a. Colonel Steakley gave the following brief reports on a number of peripheral missions:

(1) The ELINT coverage of the Sea of Okhotsk produced good results. He said that this area is now so well covered with radars that consideration should probably be given as to whether the rules requiring an abort in case of an AI lock-on should be relaxed.

(2) The AMOS mission, directed against SA-3's in the Baltic, did not result in any ELINT take from the radars associated with the SA-3's. He said that some question now arises as to whether these weapons are in fact SA-3's or perhaps a later generation of the SA-2.

(3) A DESOTO destroyer mission off the Soviet Maritime Provinces resulted in Soviet instructions to shut down their radars when the ship approached.

b. The Group approved four missions (UNA, DANIEL, FLOYD and GEORGE) using new ASD-1 equipment. This includes two in the Baltic area, one in the Black Sea, and one flying from England to the Black Sea.]

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4. ELINT Balloons

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Dr. Scoville gave the Group details of the operation in the Sea of Japan, employing balloons against TALL KING radars. He said that the results indicate that perhaps these radars are not as efficient as we had thought, but that further analysis is proceeding.]

5. Covert Operations, Cuba

a. Procedures

Noting that the shipping sabotage paper of 19 March had not been considered by the Cottrell committee as a body, the Special Group asked that such proposals be considered in that way before submission to the Special Group. In passing the recommendations to the Special Group it should be indicated what the position of the various Cottrell members was, just as is done in the case of political projects coordinated with State and the ambassador. Each member of the Cottrell committee would see to it that his own agency staffed the paper in the normal way for submission to the Special Group.

b. Sabotage of Shipping

The substance of the 19 March paper was then considered. Mr. McCone raised a question as to exactly what the U.S. objective now is in this and related fields, and questioned in addition whether we may be trying to manage exile groups too closely.

There was some discussion as to the actual value of carrying out the proposed sabotage, that is whether enough damage could be done to hurt the Castro regime seriously. The consensus of the Group seemed to be that activity of this kind should not be undertaken if it could be expected to yield only small gains, but that if its effect would be really significant then that would be a different matter.

Considerable doubt was expressed about the proposal for sinking and setting fire to ships. None of the members felt that there was any particular objection to the use of abrasives or other damaging materials.

The proposal was then remanded for group consideration by the Cottrell committee. This committee is asked to look at the proposal in relation to everything else that is going on or is under serious consideration, in order to assess its true potentiality. Mr. FitzGerald was authorized to modify the proposal to the extent

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of considering possible unilateral action as opposed to using an exile group as a cutout. Mr. Bundy will explore exactly what the feeling of higher authority is with respect to relations with exile groups.

c. Additional Programs

Mr. Johnson mentioned the activities of the NTS, which has been broadcasting in Russian to the Soviet troops over Radio Caribe in the Dominican Republic. Mr. FitzGerald agreed to add this to the possibilities listed under radio broadcasting.

Mr. Johnson questioned the extent to which proposition b., involving inciting Cubans to commit aggressive acts against Soviet personnel, is in accord with current objectives.

On the matter of propaganda balloons, most members of the Group felt that these might be useful in connection with the particular target mentioned - the May Day concentration which is expected in Havana. Mr. Johnson had some reservations which he wanted to check out further in the Department. It was agreed that should State take a favorable view, then the matter would be presented to higher authority.

As to the request for Defense training facilities, Mr. Gilpatric asked that Mr. FitzGerald discuss the needs with Secretary Vance. Mr. FitzGerald said that the principal requirement which cannot be met in CIA facilities is adequate space for weapons training. Members of the Group recalled that the objection to the use of Defense facilities at the time it was presented during the MONGOOSE period, was that this would make it difficult, if not impossible, to deny official U.S. involvement. Mr. Bundy said that he saw no objection if the purpose was to train Cubans for eventual open hostilities, but thought that in this case the objective might be better achieved by having them undergo regular U.S. Army training. The other members agreed.

  
Thomas A. Parrott

Distribution

Mr. Johnson  
Mr. Gilpatric  
Mr. McCone



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..... **CORONA**      **IDEALIST** .....

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4 April 1963

## MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 4 April 1963

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Gilpatric, Mr. McCone, Mr. Hughes

Dr. Scoville and Colonel Steakley were present for  
Items 1 and 2.

Commander Yates was present for Item 1.

1. DOD Peripheral Reconnaissance 96

The DOD monthly forecast of peripheral reconnaissance activities was noted. Special note was taken of mission ULCER GULCH, which all members approved. Consideration of YANKEE PASHA was deferred for at least a week because of certain points raised by the Secretary of State. Mr. Bundy said that he himself would normally have no objection to this operation but that conditions at the moment make it inadvisable to go ahead at this precise time.

Colonel Steakley was asked to brief the Group on the special navigational safeguards which would be used in the YANKEE PASHA operation, at a later meeting when Mr. Johnson could be present.

Commander Yates briefed the Group on certain submarine operations. Mr. Gilpatric undertook to assure himself that adequate procedures exist for notifying members of the Special Group and other key officials in the event of an untoward incident.]

2. Reconnaissance Missions, Far East 98

Mr. McCone briefed the Group on the results of two recent missions. He pointed out that there are now no authorizations outstanding for high-performance reconnaissance in the Far East.

The recommendations in the NRO paper for the Special Group, dated 4 April, were approved with the exception of 7. b (Laos), which was deferred for later consideration. Mr. McCone agreed to mention these approvals to higher authority, but it was felt that no further formal approval was required.]

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[All members of the Group expressed their interest in getting on with plans for resuming FALCON missions. It was noted that one of the principal problems in this area is the question of a base. It was agreed that we should probably approach this from the point of view of obtaining a standby agreement with the Indian Government to permit staging in and out of that country. Dr. Scoville said that a message had gone out to the field on this point last night. The Chairman asked that word be sent to the Ambassador that high-level interest in this proposition does exist in Washington.]

3. [Status Report on Italian Elections <sup>98</sup>]

CIA's paper of 1 April was noted.]

4. [Low-Level Reconnaissance, Cuba <sup>98</sup>]

The Group took no action on this subject.]

5. [Covert Subsidy for Kong Le <sup>98</sup>]

At Mr. Hughes' suggestion, it was agreed that CIA should look into the possibilities of a covert payment to Kong Le.]

6. Cuban Operations

The Group recommended approval of the following papers from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs:

- a. Sabotage of Shipping, 19 March, as amended by a memorandum from the Deputy Coordinator, 2 April 1963.
- b. Russian Language Broadcasts, 2 April 1963.
- c. Propaganda Inciting Cubans within Cuba to Attack Soviet Troops, 2 April 1963.

Mr. Bundy and Mr. FitzGerald will obtain final approval from higher authority.

*Tom Parrott*  
Thomas A. Parrott

Distribution

Mr. Johnson  
Mr. Gilpatric  
Mr. McCone

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**EYES ONLY**

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**EYES ONLY**

9 April 1963

**MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS OF THE SPECIAL GROUP****SUBJECT: Status of Approvals for Covert Actions, Cuba**1. Propaganda Inciting Cubans to Commit Acts Against Soviet Troops

Approved by higher authority, on the understanding that the propaganda will be non-attributable to the United States.

2. Sabotage of Cuban-Owned Shipping

This was approved by higher authority. It was noted that the suggestion for external explosive charges had been deleted from the proposal approved by the Special Group last week. (This will be considered along with other suggestions in an over-all sabotage paper, in accordance with decisions reached at the special meeting of 3 April.)

3. Soviet Language Broadcasts

The Radio Liberty proposition has been approved, with the understanding that there will be no "opening fanfare" in connection with the inauguration of the program; if a ceremony is unavoidable it must be played in a low key. The proposal for a Unidad Revolucionaria program is disapproved. The suggestion for intrusion on Radio Moscow broadcasts is disapproved.

4. Leaflet Balloons

This proposal has been disapproved by higher authority.

*Taparott*  
Thomas A. Parrott

## Distribution

Mr. Johnson  
Mr. Gilpatric  
Mr. McCone

**SECRET**  
**EYES ONLY**

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EYES ONLY**

11 April 1963

**MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD****SUBJECT:** Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 11 April 1963**PRESENT:** Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. McCone

Dr. Scoville, Colonel Ledford and Colonel Steakley were present for Items 1 - 3.

Mr. FitzGerald was present for Item 4.

1. Reconnaissance, Northern Laos 98

It was agreed that the proposal for this coverage, which was contained in the NRO paper of 4 April and which was deferred last week, should be approved.

Mr. McCone mentioned the difficulties which have arisen with Sarit, noting particularly that he is unwilling to give permission for the renewed use of Takhli until certain Thai officials return to Bangkok from Paris, which will be around the 20th of this month. Mr. McCone mentioned the possibility of basing the aircraft in the Philippines or Taiwan, if the Takhli possibility should fall through completely.

The DCI said that if it proves impossible to mount missions designed to cover the Sino-Indian border, then three will be required for Laos and North Vietnam. If on the other hand the Sino-Indian missions are run, then only two additional ones would be required to cover Laos and North Vietnam, since some of the area could be covered in the process of the Sino-Indian coverage.

Mr. Bundy will clear these proposals with higher authority.]

2. Coverage of Sino-Indian Border Area 98

Dr. Scoville reported on the difficulties encountered in obtaining Indian approval for staging aircraft through that country, stressing the fact that the chief of the intelligence service will not be available in India until the 16th of this month, and no decision can be expected before then. He said that the time before the onset of the monsoon season is getting short. Dr. Scoville said that efforts are continuing to get staging approval from the Indians, as well as approval from the Thais to base in Takhli.]

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3. Inadvertent Overflights by Reconnaissance Aircraft

Colonel Steakley distributed a memorandum listing the four inadvertent overflights of Soviet territory by U.S. reconnaissance aircraft, since January 1961.

He commented that in previous years the rate of such incidents was considerably higher. Mr. Bundy asked him to provide for the Group in the next week or so a recapitulation of such incidents, going back to approximately 1949.

Colonel Steakley said that both CINCPAC and the Joint Reconnaissance Group believe that the incident of 10 April, when an ELINT aircraft flew over one of the Kuriles, appears to represent a violation of established procedures and instructions. CINCPAC has asked for a full report.

Mr. McCone questioned the efficacy of the system of advising Special Group members of such incidents. Colonel Steakley said that a procedure has been specified and he undertook to provide a copy to Mr. Parrott for the information of the Group. He said that he would take special measures to make sure that these instructions are followed.]

4. Cuban Operations

Mr. FitzGerald expanded orally on the paper of 9 April, giving a summary of the recent results in the agent infiltration program, and outlining proposals in this field for the next month. The Group approved this projection. In response to a question about the status of Manolo Ray's people, Mr. FitzGerald said that CIA was in touch with him from time to time, and that any plan he has to offer for activity against Cuba will be sympathetically received, but that he has not to date come up with any such proposal.

The comments from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, dated 11 April, on the three papers being considered at today's meeting were noted. The Group requested that these comments be withdrawn and destroyed for security reasons. With specific reference to the comment that a proposed sabotage action should not be carried out on the target date of the 20th or 21st of April, Mr. FitzGerald pointed out that this date had been set before the status of the Donovan negotiations was known. He said that of course no activity of this kind would be allowed to interfere with those negotiations at this stage.

There then ensued a lengthy discussion of the entire question of sabotage. The Group agreed that the papers before it were responsive to requests which had been levied on CIA to come up with general and specific proposals. On the other hand, all members of the Group recognized that a searching examination must be undertaken in the light

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of all pertinent factors, to determine whether we wish to change the present policy. It was agreed that in order to provide a firm basis for judgment, we must get a clearer picture of capabilities, of the prospects of success, the extent of benefits to be gained from successful operations, the dangers of repercussions and of reprisals, etc., etc.

With respect to external operations to be mounted by exile groups, it was agreed that this sort of activity poses a real dilemma. Particularly in view of the recently-enunciated policy toward exile raids, it becomes increasingly difficult to disavow plausibly responsibility for such acts. The U.S. is thus placed in the position of either appearing to be ineffective in controlling the exiles or of bearing the onus of active involvement in the operations.

Mr. McCone expressed great skepticism about the desirability of proceeding with sabotage operations, to include training, until an over-all policy is made clear on steps to be taken to assure the removal of Soviet troops and on the problem of Castro. He also commented on the ineffectiveness of Cuban agents and the fact that they would undoubtedly talk if captured. Mr. FitzGerald confirmed the second point, but felt that these particular Cubans are perhaps more effective than the usual run.

It was decided that probably Friday, the 19th of April, a presentation should be made to higher authority at which time all responsible individuals should have an opportunity to express their views. A paper will be prepared, outlining: a proposed broad program for sabotage as well as examples of specific operations; a sense of the scale of activity which could reasonably be expected and the benefits from it; an estimate of what could be achieved by the use of internal assets; possible repercussions; and how such activity would fit into overall policy. CIA is to coordinate with State in the preparation of this paper.

5. Annexes to Internal Defense Plans <sup>98</sup>

The Colombia annex was noted. In view of the fact that the basic IDP for Bolivia had earlier been remanded for revision by the Special Group (CI), the covert annex for that country was held over until the overt plan is considered by the CI Group.]

6. North Vietnam Operations <sup>98</sup>

The monthly report was noted and approved.]

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18 April 1963

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MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 18 April 1963

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone

The Attorney General, General Taylor, Mr. Murrow, and Mr. FitzGerald were present for Item 1.

1. Cuban Operations

Mr. FitzGerald said that in view of the postponement of the meeting tentatively set for tomorrow with higher authority, the proposed sabotage actions for April will be cancelled and two caching operations, in Pinar del Rio and Matanzas, will be substituted. The Group approved this.

Mr. FitzGerald told the Group that in view of the negative decision on balloons, he was proposing to dismantle the capability, which is expensive to keep in being. He said that if it were desired to start the program up at any time after dismantling, it would take about three months. A number of members of the Group felt that in a real crisis balloons could be of considerable value. Accordingly, it was agreed that balloons and helium should be stockpiled, with the idea that if a situation should arise in which balloons would be useful, launching could be accomplished by a U.S. vessel, without worrying too much about attribution under those circumstances. In commenting on his opposition to the earlier proposition, Mr. Murrow said that he believes that balloons can be useful as a part of an integrated program.

The Group then turned to discussion of the papers from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs dated April 16th, 17th, and 18th. It was noted that there had not been time for adequate staffing of these papers and that the principals had not been able to examine them carefully. In this connection, Mr. McCone said that he wanted the Office of National Estimates of CIA to review the papers, in light of their estimative content. It was thus agreed that the papers should be staffed and sharpened up for presentation at next week's meeting. Mr. Johnson suggested that a possible format might be to produce one paper which would be prefaced by the guidelines currently contained in the Coordinator's paper of April 18th. This would be followed by a summary of sabotage capabilities and the pros and cons of various types, and then recommendations.

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Mr. Bundy and Mr. McCone expressed some doubts as to whether we are in a position to decide major problems of this type until we have a clearer picture of what the over-all policy toward Cuba is likely to be for the next six months to a year and a half. Mr. Bundy pointed out that the noise level which would be involved in many of these proposals would be considerably more than it has been to date, and he felt that we must decide whether we are willing to accept this. He added that he did not feel that such a development would necessarily be bad, but it would certainly be different from the low-level activities prevailing now. He was not sure whether, or to what extent, it would be possible to embark on the activities proposed in the Coordinator's papers, without a drastic change in U.S. policy. In this connection, Mr. Johnson said that he particularly likes the proposals for supporting internal resistance operations, since these will not generate a high noise level.

Mr. FitzGerald pointed out that the paper of April 17th, on a "Maximum Covert Action Program" consists basically of sabotage and harassment, plus support to Cuban exile groups and individuals who may be responsive to our advice but certainly not to our command. He mentioned some of the difficulties that would flow from supporting one group and not others. Mr. McCone said that if such groups become active, it will be obvious that they have U.S. support because it is well known that they do not have adequate assets now. He and Mr. Bundy agreed that, despite the fact that some Central American governments might be used as cutouts, the U.S. would be blamed for their activities and this must be clearly recognized before embarking on such a course. They felt additionally that we must be sure that such a program would contribute to over-all policy objectives.

Mr. McCone and Mr. FitzGerald referred to the CIA estimate that time is running in favor of Castro, and Mr. FitzGerald said that some of these activities are designed to slow down or possibly stop the trend of events in his favor.

It was noted that the program for shipping sabotage, which has already been approved, is in process of possible implementation. It was agreed that this process should not be interrupted.

2. Reconnaissance of Laos 98

A COMOR paper, suggesting that certain targets in Southern Laos be included in the proposed missions for Northern Laos, was distributed and no objection was expressed to it. Mr. Bundy noted that he had not yet had an opportunity to clear the original proposal with higher authority.]

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EYES ONLY

Ymc

**SECRET  
EYES ONLY**

25 April 1963

**MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD**

**SUBJECT:** Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 25 April 1963

**PRESENT:** Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone.

Dr. Scoville and Colonel Steakley were present for Items 1-4.

Mr. FitzGerald was present for Items 1-5.

Mr. Jorgensen was present for Item 3.

Mr. Tweedy was present for Item 6.

- 1. <sup>96</sup> Forecast of NRO Activities for May

This forecast was noted.]

- 2. Reconnaissance of Laos and Vietnam <sup>98</sup>

Mr. McCone referred to a paper prepared by the JCS at the request of the Secretary of Defense, outlining a possible schedule of reconnaissance missions over Laos and Vietnam, which seemed to Mr. McCone to be unduly heavy. Mr. Gilpatric explained that the paper had been drawn up as an annex to a draft contingency plan, and was responsive to a direct request from the Secretary of Defense to indicate a sizeable capability for high-level reconnaissance for intelligence purposes. Mr. Gilpatric added that it is clearly understood that such activity would not represent a "show of force," and that the latter would require low-level activity. Mr. McCone agreed with this point and emphasized the unusual sensitivity of any high-level reconnaissance of denied areas.

Mr. Gilpatric assured the Group that these plans are all of a contingency nature and that at this point they are by no means approved.]

- 3. Proposed "Feint" Operations, GROSBEAK <sup>98</sup>

Mr. Jorgensen summarized the paper of the 22nd of April. He said that these proposals are frankly regarded as experimental.]

**SECRET  
EYES ONLY**

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**SECRET**  
**EYES ONLY**

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[ Colonel Steakley said that from the JCS point of view, such feints might represent a tactical advantage, in that they could divert enemy defenses from actual operations. On the other hand, the JCS procedures are designed so as not to be provocative in connection with peripheral and BOW TIE missions. He felt that this proposal, which is frankly designed to be provocative, could have the effect of inducing quicker and more intensive reaction to the JCS flights.

On the understanding that the feint activities would be closely coordinated with military missions in the area, it was agreed that the proposed program should be tried for the month of May. At the end of this period, a report on the results will be made to the Special Group.]

4. Low-Level Reconnaissance, Cuba 98

The DCI said the USIB unanimously reaffirmed yesterday the priority intelligence requirements for low-level coverage of Cuba. Mr. Bundy added that there is high-level interest in reviewing this situation.

Mr. Johnson said that in the view of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the State Department, the Soviets would interpret a resumption of low-level flights as an indication of the adoption by the U.S. of a harder line toward Cuba. More significantly, Ambassador Thompson is very much opposed to such resumption at this time; he feels that this could result in a reduction in the rate of withdrawal of Soviet troops or a Soviet decision to withdraw none at all in the future, and it might affect Soviet policy in Laos in a manner adverse to U.S. interests. The importance of the Harriman mission with respect to this last proposition was noted. Mr. Johnson said we should know the results of the Harriman mission in a day or two.

It was agreed that the matter would be discussed with higher authority this afternoon.]

5. Proposed New Policy and Program toward Cuba

Mr. McCone opened the discussion of this topic by pointing out that the overt and multilateral pressures now being applied to Cuba are useful; on the other hand, while they will slow Castro down they will not hurt him critically, and the interest of our allies in maintaining such pressures will almost certainly erode as time passes. Similarly, any sabotage program can hurt the Castro government, but not lethally; and in order to be effective at all, it must be done on

**SECRET**  
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2/mc

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a continuing basis and cannot be subjected to a stop-and-go treatment. The DCI went on to say that any such activity is bound to be attributed to the United States and if we are to carry through with it, we must be prepared to accept the accompanying noise level. He said that a sabotage program will not be entirely beneficial to U.S. interests; on the minus side, there is the fact that this will complicate the running of intelligence operations and it could result in Cuban retaliation. Additionally, Mr. McCone said he is not in favor of extreme types of sabotage such as complete destruction of crops, contamination of water supplies, etc. He would prefer open intervention to this kind of thing.

The DCI said that the combination of economic and other pressures with sabotage activities, might provide a feasible climate for a successful attempt to fragment the Castro organization. He foresaw the possibility of such fragmentation leading to assumption of power by a military dictatorship, which would probably be friendly to the U.S. In this connection, Mr. FitzGerald said that we have a line on certain high-ranking officers who are not entirely sympathetic to the regime. He pointed out, however, that a major operational obstacle to capitalizing on this situation is the difficulty of persuading individual Cubans of this type to place their trust in each other. In addition, we will have to be able to assure them that the U.S. will be sympathetic to possible successors to the present government, even though such people may have been former Castro supporters.

Mr. FitzGerald touched on the proposed support to selected Cuban exile groups, for autonomous operations, as being one of the key points of the possible new program. He made the point that there is no use in the U.S. trying to deny that it backs such operations, since it will be accused of this in any case, and the accusations will be generally believed; further, such a posture is not detrimental to U.S. interests. Mr. Bundy agreed with this point. He added, however, that a "scenario" will have to be worked out, clearly indicating who in the government should respond to accusations in this field and what in general they should say.

Mr. Bundy questioned a statement in the paper to the effect that covert action which might be used as a pretext for overt military intervention is ruled out. Mr. McCone and Mr. FitzGerald said that the purpose of this statement was to indicate that the covert program is not specifically directed toward the end of providing such a pretext, but that it is not intended to preclude such a situation if it should turn out to be desirable at some time in the future.

Mr. FitzGerald then described a number of possible sabotage operations. In this connection, he pointed out that the paper contains a proposal for the placing of limpets, carrying suitable delay mechanisms, on the outside of Cuban ships so as to explode at sea.

**SECRET**      **EYES ONLY**

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EYES ONLY

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He noted that Secretary Vance does not particularly like this proposition because of the possibility that the explosions would be attributed to torpedoes. While recognizing the validity of Mr. Vance's argument, Mr. Gilpatric felt that this risk was acceptable.

The Chairman summed up the preliminary reactions of the Group to the proposals as follows:

- a. The proposition for dealing with selected exile groups is a good one, but the method of dealing with them will have to be more carefully defined.
- b. There is no objection to limpets, subject to further technical studies.
- c. Surface attacks on Cuban ships do not appear particularly attractive, nor do shore-based attacks of a similar nature.
- d. Externally mounted hit-and-run attacks against land targets appear worthwhile. The operations in this category which can be run in May, will be discussed with higher authority. Refineries and power plants seem to be particularly good targets. Operations of this kind will be especially valuable if done in conjunction with other resistance activities.
- e. Internal resistance should be stimulated, again in conjunction with related operations.

6. Covert Action, Congo

The CIA paper of 19 April was approved with little discussion. The Chairman said that his only concern was whether we are committed to spending money at this rate forever. Mr. Tweedy said first that if the Adoula government should fall, it would probably be in the U.S. interest to support a successor government in a somewhat similar way and, secondly, he pointed out that there are no firm commitments made, although of course the recipients do come to expect a subsidy.

Mr. Bundy said he would mention this project to higher authority.

7. Final Status Report, Italian Election Project

Mr. McCone ran over the highlights of the prognostication for the Italian elections, as summarized in the CIA paper of the 22nd of April. He noted that virtually all the allocated money will have been passed by this time. Mr. Bundy said that the CIA forecast is generally consistent with reports he has had from Italian sources.

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8. British Guiana

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Mr. McCone said that representatives of CIA and of MI-6 are scheduled to meet on the 30th of April and the first of May. They will consider: an up-to-date assessment of the situation; a proposed British operational plan; alternative proposals if this plan proves not feasible; identification of Indians who might provide alternative leadership to Jagan; the division of operational responsibility; and an inventory of operational assets.

The DCI said it is estimated that a continuation of the current strike would require expenditures on the order of \$10,000 a day. The Group felt that if this could result in the defeat of Jagan, it would be well worth it. Accordingly, Mr. McCone undertook to look into the situation immediately and to assure that support for the strike is not cut off, pending a broader decision. He said he might see James Fulton of MI-6, during his forthcoming trip to Europe, to coordinate views.

*Thomas A. Parrott*  
Thomas A. Parrott

Distribution

Mr. Johnson  
Mr. Gilpatric  
Mr. McCone

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**SECRET**  
**EYES ONLY**

*Spec. Grp File*

26 April 1963

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP**

**SUBJECT: Proposed New Covert Policy and Programs Toward Cuba**

As a follow-up to yesterday's Special Group discussion on the proposed new covert policy and programs toward Cuba, the following decisions have been made:

On Item 1. of the summary from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, dated 19 April, additional planning and consultation is approved. This will include further refinement of the Rules of Engagement (in this connection, also see the minutes of yesterday's meeting); an assessment of the capabilities of specific groups; and an estimate of the scale and scope of activities which selected groups could carry out successfully.

Item 2.a. of the above-mentioned paper is approved. To the extent possible, it is desired that the Special Group be informed in advance of specific proposals under this heading. It is recognized that this will in many cases not be feasible.

Item 2.b. is disapproved.

Further planning for individual elements of Item 2.c. is approved, with the understanding that targets will be justified in terms of their usefulness rather than with regard to the noise level they might generate. Specific operations will be referred back through normal channels (i.e., the Special Group in the first instance) for final approval before execution.

Item 2.d. is approved.

*Tom Parrott*  
Thomas A. Parrott

**Distribution**

Mr. Johnson  
Mr. Gilpatric  
Mr. McCone

**SECRET**  
**EYES ONLY**

SECRET  
EYES ONLY

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missions (both contained in papers from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs dated 7 May).

There was no objection by the Group to any of the infiltration/exfiltration operations. This approval includes the seven CIA operations, the infiltration of a radio operator in support of the U.S. Army, and approval of rendezvous opportunities which may arise without adequate time to bring them to the Group. The Group also noted Mr. Cheever's description of a proposed exfiltration to be carried out by the MRR, with some support by CIA.

With regard to the two sabotage missions, Mr. Cheever said that he thought the chances were excellent of carrying them out successfully. He said, however, that the critical problem would arise the following morning, when sea and air interception might well take place. He emphasized that under the circumstances that could be expected in the aftermath of such sabotage, the Cubans might well disregard any territorial limits in the course of hot pursuit of the saboteurs. He added, in answer to questions, that there is no doubt that Cubans would recognize these operations as being externally mounted, and that the agents would certainly talk if captured.

Mr. Cheever mentioned three possible operational plans which might minimize the danger of capture by Castro forces, but emphasized that these were by no means operationally well-designed nor was he recommending them, and further that they did not come within any existing policy approvals.

The feeling of the Group was that the damage that could be done to the Cuban economy by successful execution of either of these missions was not sufficient to outweigh the disadvantages. The Group recognized that the responsible CIA operators feel themselves under obligation to continue to develop suitable proposals, and they thought that CIA should be encouraged to keep on doing this. The difficulty of maintaining agent morale in the face of continued inaction was recognized. Mr. Cheever was commended for his frank and explicit outlining of the pros and cons.

#### 4. Cuba - NTS Broadcasts

Mr. McCone and Mr. Cheever said that CIA does not object to the Department of State's proposal to subsidize NTS broadcasts from the Dominican Republic, addressed to Soviet troops in Cuba. They pointed out that this concurrence is subject to the caveats that the Agency will be unable to accept responsibility for monitoring and control of



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the content of the broadcasts, and that contact with the NTS will have to be made through its headquarters in Frankfurt, rather than directly with the U.S. representative of the NTS. With these understandings, the proposal was approved.

5. Political Action, Bolivia 98

The CIA paper of 3 April 1963 on the above subject was approved.]

6. Air Proprietary, East Africa 98

The CIA paper of 3 May 1963 on the above subject was approved.]

7. Intelligence on Cuba

Mr. McCone said that he is concerned about gaps in U.S. intelligence on Cuba. He said that this leads him to favor resumption of low-level reconnaissance. The other members of the Group felt that under existing circumstances, this type of reconnaissance will not meet the needs that Mr. McCone perceives. Mr. Johnson suggested that penetrations of the Cuban Government would be more productive in trying to assess Castro's possible intentions.

*Thomas A. Parrott*  
Thomas A. Parrott

Distribution

Mr. Johnson  
Mr. Gilpatric  
Mr. McCone

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EYES ONLY

2/mc

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EYES ONLY

9 May 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 9 May 1963

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, Mr. McCone

Dr. Scoville was present for Items 1 and 2.

Captain Dankworth was present for Item 1.

Mr. Cheever was present for Items 3 and 4.

1. Peripheral Reconnaissance 98

The Group approved operation YANKEE PASHA, which had been originally presented at the meeting of 4 April and deferred at that time, with the understanding that the aircraft would not approach the Soviet coast closer than 15 miles.]

2. Reconnaissance of the Sino-India Border 98

With particular reference to an incoming message from Ambassador Galbraith, the Group noted that the Indians had refused to grant staging rights in India or to allow refueling over that country. In light of this, all members of the Group felt that plans for these missions should be shelved for the time being. Mr. McCone noted that the aircraft now at Takhli will, therefore, depart before the 17th of May, the date on which SEATO exercises begin.

The Group specified that in conveying the decision to the Indians it should be made perfectly clear that the standdown is due to their own view of the urgency of such coverage, not to any reluctance on our part.

(The point was made that in the meeting of the CI Group, just concluded, an allegedly improved road network south of Tchepone, in Laos, had been mentioned. The CI Group had felt that harder intelligence should be obtained on this network. Dr. Scoville undertook to make sure that this target is highlighted in planning for additional high-performance coverage of Laos.)]

3. Cuba - Proposed Agent Operations

Mr. Cheever outlined in some detail the infiltration/exfiltration operations proposed for 15 May to 15 June, and the two possible sabotage

2/mc

6 June 1963

## MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 6 June 1963

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric (Items 1-7), and  
Mr. McCone

Colonel Steakley was present for Items 1 and 2.  
Mr. Lundahl was present for Item 2.  
Mr. George Miller was present for Item 5.  
Mr. FitzGerald was present for Item 7.  
Mr. Karamessines was present for Items 8 and 9.

1. DOD Reconnaissance 98

With respect to the two PAYSTATION missions which were deferred last week, the Group decided that the 12-mile proposal should be scrapped and that the 30-mile one should be flown for ELINT only.]

2. Reconnaissance of Cuba 98

Mr. Lundahl showed the Group sample pictures from the two PEG LEG missions of 5 June.

Mr. McCone said that before making any recommendation as to further missions of this kind, he wished to have the USIB consider the matter. In the meantime CIA and DIA are analyzing the results.

Mr. Lundahl and Colonel Steakley raised the question of the advisability of including some color film in future missions. The Group felt this kind of thing should be left to the best judgment of the operators.]

3. Far East Reconnaissance 98

Mr. McCone reported that two out of the existing four authorizations for high-performance reconnaissance of China have been exhausted. It was agreed that the "bank" should be restored to the original four.

It was noted that no further requirements now exist for this type of reconnaissance of Laos, but there are some targets remaining in North Vietnam.]

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4. Reconnaissance of the Middle East 98

Mr. McCone reported that the British will probably not approve the request to use an RAF base on Cyprus for high-performance coverage of Middle East areas. He said that the feasibility of using Wheelus is being explored and that a new recommendation will be forthcoming to the Group.]

5. ELINT Collection 98

Mr. Miller briefed the Group on ELINT projects QARAGE (Cuba) and MOONBEAM (Japan). No objection was voiced to either proposal.]

6. Channels to Castro

The Group discussed various possibilities of establishing channels of communication to Castro. All members of the Group agreed that this is a useful endeavor. Mr. Bundy cautioned that of course Castro should not be made privy to any official U.S. positions, while Mr. McCone emphasized the necessity of keeping any such approach entirely secret so far as the public is concerned. It was agreed that proposals of this kind which are particularly unusual, would be discussed with the Special Group in advance.

7. Cuba Operations

Mr. FitzGerald briefed the Group on the results of infiltration/exfiltration operations during May, and on proposals for the coming month. The latter were approved.

8. Italy, Assessment of Results of Election Operation 98

Mr. Karamessines discussed with the Group the results of the recent Parliamentary elections in Italy, and the effect of the election project, so far as can be ascertained. He elaborated on the CIA paper of 4 June.]

9. Italy, Proposed Aid to PSI Autonomists 98

Mr. Karamessines briefed the Group further on the proposal to give aid to Nenni and his autonomist group of the PSI, as outlined in the CIA paper of 1 June.]

98

[The Group agreed to recommend approval of this project to higher authority. Mr. Bundy will take this up on Monday, June 10th. He suggested that in the meantime all necessary preliminary alerting be accomplished, so that Nenni can be informed in the event of favorable action, before the meeting of the PSI Central Committee on June 12th.]

*Yapantt*  
Thomas A. Parrott

Distribution

Mr. Johnson  
Mr. Gilpatric  
Mr. McCone

*VMC*

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20 June 1963

## MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 20 June 1963

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Gilpatric, Mr. McCone, and Mr. Hughes.

Colonel King was present for Item 3.

Mr. Colby was present for Item 4.

Mr. Critchfield was present for Item 6.

1. Reconnaissance of Southeast Asia 98

Mr. McCone reported that all high-performance missions scheduled for this area had been held up during the past week, due to bad weather.]

2. Sabotage Program, Cuba

In connection with the new Cuba sabotage program approved yesterday, Mr. McCone suggested that CIA make a report to the Special Group every two weeks. The Group agreed with this procedure. They felt that such a report need not be in written form nor very elaborate, and that it should consist of a briefing on activities during the preceding period and those planned for the next one. Mr. Bundy commented that keeping the Group informed in this way constitutes protection to the operators, since all agencies concerned are thereby given a continuing feeling of just what is going on.

3. Haiti - Political Action 98

The CIA paper of 17 June was approved. Mr. McCone said he has some reservations about the quality of any possible replacements for Duvalier, but agreed that it is necessary to take some action in order to prevent Haiti eventually going very far to the left. Colonel King, in support of the paper's recommendations, said that in his opinion we have no feasible alternatives but to cooperate with Bosch in attempting to unseat Duvalier, and that if this is not done we are likely to end up with a far worse situation.

Mr. Hughes told the Group that the State Department shares the reservation about the quality of alternatives, but it also recognizes the necessity of taking some action. He said the Department is principally worried about the possibility that the U.S. hand in any such operation might be revealed.]

2/mc

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[Colonel King cautioned that we will not be in a position to know how many useful exiles can be recruited until we give it a try. Mr. McCone and Colonel King said that probably the most promising way in which the desired objective can be obtained is eventually to accomplish the defection of significant elements of the Army, the Palace Guard, etc.]

4. Monthly Report on North Vietnam Operations

Mr. Colby gave a report on results of operations during the past month, and those planned for the immediate future.

5. Congo - Training of Special Army Unit 98

The Group approved the State-CIA proposal to hold the Congo paramilitary project, originally approved on 29 November 1962, in abeyance.]

6. Iraq - Soviet Materiel Objectives and Related Problems 98

The Group approved the recommendations contained in CIA's paper of the 19th of June.

Mr. McCone pointed out that this sort of action could conceivably lead into considerably broader activities, and emphasized that the proposal immediately at hand is carefully limited. The Group agreed that approval of these recommendations does not imply any sort of commitment to additional actions.]

7. Plans for Immediate Future 96

Mr. Bundy asked Mr. McCone to act as Chairman of the Special Group next week, if he wishes to have a meeting. During the time that the Presidential party is away, DOD peripheral flights, particularly in the European area, should be carefully screened.]

*Thomas A. Parrott*  
Thomas A. Parrott

Distribution

Mr. Johnson  
Mr. Gilpatric  
Mr. McCone

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EYES ONLY

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[that the U.S. government stands behind previously-expressed commitments to ensure that India does not use its own increased military strength to mount an attack on Pakistan.

It was agreed that State and Defense should draft a paper for higher authority, outlining this proposed approach to the Pakistan government, with a CIA representative participating in the drafting of the paper to the extent necessary to assure that the intelligence interests and the views of the Special Group are adequately reflected.]

*Tom Parrott*  
Thomas A. Parrott

- Distribution
- Mr. Johnson
- Mr. Gilpatric
- Mr. McCone

*Ymc*



SECRET  
EYES ONLY

27 June 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 27 June 1963

PRESENT: Mr. McCone, Mr. Johnson, and Mr. Gilpatric.

Colonel Steakley was present for Items 1-3.  
Mr. FitzGerald was present for Item 5.

98

1. British Suggestion Regarding Reconnaissance Flights

The Group reviewed the message received from the British Foreign Office through the British Embassy, suggesting that during the period of the Harriman-Hailsham visit to Moscow reconnaissance flights be suspended, as well as the suggested draft reply presented by Mr. Johnson. The Group approved the language of the reply, the gist of which was that while appreciating the UK suggestion, we do not find it possible to agree to suspend all such flights. We believe that most of them have virtually no risk, and that to cancel all of them would break a routine long familiar to the Soviets; we might then find it difficult to resume. However, we undertake to screen with particular care all flights scheduled during the period of this visit, so as to reduce selectively to a minimum those which might be regarded by the Soviets as sensitive.

In the course of the discussion of these messages, the members of the Group agreed that probably the British motive in making the suggestion is to provide a political gesture that would be apparent to the Soviets. From this point of view, the pattern of DOD peripheral flights was examined and the conclusions were that: (a) Particularly sensitive flights are scheduled sporadically. Therefore, no isolated definite pattern in any one area that would be noticed by the Soviets if cancelled and that would provide political impact on Soviet leaders, can be identified. (b) A world-wide stand-down during the period of the visit could accomplish this purpose, but would be undesirable for the reasons set forth in Mr. Johnson's draft. (c) Peripheral flights in particularly sensitive areas (i.e., Baltic Sea, Black Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk) are subject to Soviet reaction in the form of identification intercept by fighters. However, it is believed that these have become sufficiently routine so they are not brought to the attention of high levels of

See special minutes  
for additional items.

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[the Soviet government. (d) In the case of the Sea of Okhotsk, however, no flights will be scheduled during the visit. Baltic flights will be very carefully reviewed. Black Sea flights should not require cancellation. In general, all flights around the Soviet periphery will be subject to special review during this period.]

2. NRO Forecast 98

The NRO monthly forecast for July was approved.]

3. Use of Chinese Pilots in Southeast Asia 98

The NRO paper of 25 June, proposing the substitution of Chinese Nationalist pilots for Americans for the high-performance coverage of North Vietnam and Laos, was discussed.

Mr. Johnson said that the State Department's view is that if Chinese Nationalist missions out of Taiwan are so scheduled as to cross over the border into North Vietnam from time to time, they have no real objection (on the understanding that the cover story would be that the pilot had strayed off course.) On the other hand, the Department is unable to concur in any deep penetration into the southern part of North Vietnam, or into Laos. The latter country is considered particularly sensitive in this respect.

In light of the State position, the Group agreed to proceed as at present with the modifications suggested by Mr. Johnson.]

4. Spain - Labor Program 98

The CIA paper of 21 June was approved as presented.]

5. Cuba - Infiltration/Exfiltration Operations

Mr. FitzGerald briefed the Group on the results of the previous month's operations.

Mr. McCone called particular attention to the continuing buildup of fast patrol boats in the Cuban inventory, and said that in light of this we must begin to draw contingency plans for alternate methods of delivery of agents and supplies against the eventuality that the patrol boats may become too great a hazard. He suggested the possibility of such means of delivery as submarines.

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EYES ONLY

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Mr. McCone went on to say that continuing reports are now being received, alleging the existence of various exotic items of materiel in Cuba. No one report appears to stand up, but he has directed that all such reports for the past ninety days be examined in total context, so as to see whether on this basis any possible pattern might emerge. Mr. McCone added that he personally feels very uneasy about the situation in Cuba.



Thomas A. Parrott

**Distribution**

Mr. Johnson  
Mr. Gilpatric  
Mr. McCone

SECRET  
EYES ONLY

WE

11 July 1963

## MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 11 July 1963

PRESENT: Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. Johnson, ~~Mr. Giddens, Mr. Gandy~~  
Mr. William Bundy and Mr. McCone

Colonel Steakley was present for Item 1.  
Mr. R. Jack Smith was present for Item 2.  
Mr. FitzGerald was present for Items 2 and 3.  
Mr. Colby was present for Items 4 and 5.

1. Peripheral Reconnaissance 98

The Group approved the agreement reached last week between State and the JRC on the handling of certain possibly sensitive operations during July. Specifically, REX 1 and 2 were approved with the understanding that the nearest point to the Kuriles would be 15 miles instead of 14, at the northern end of the track. URBAN and RAY were approved, in light of the fact that overt flight plans will be filed.

It was noted that the Chiefs had already deferred operations YANKEE PASHA, VERNE and THOMAS at least until after completion of the Harriman mission.

Of the three new missions presented by JRC, RED DOG/HAWKEYE and the special photographic operation in European Turkey were approved as presented. Mission RAINHAT-Track 2 was approved with the stipulation that the nearest point to the target country will be 12 miles rather than 10.

The British note concerning proposed reconnaissance of the Soviet Northern Fleet (British name, Operation BARGOLD) was discussed. Colonel Steakley stated that the standard British restrictions on such operations are that no aircraft will approach closer than a quarter of a mile or will go under 500 feet, but he said that we have been unable to determine whether the current restrictions, mentioned in the British note, are more stringent than this. He told the Group that U.S. rules provide for no harassing action and for no flights below 2000 feet (this height limit being primarily because of flight safety, in view of the expected presence of British aircraft at a lower level). The Group felt there is no objection to overflying Soviet vessels under these conditions, despite the apparent British ban on this for their own aircraft.]

V/MC

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[State will inform the British Minister that we propose to proceed in this manner.]

## 2. Cuba - Status of Soviet Personnel and Materiel

Mr. McCone reminded the Group that he had asked for a review of intelligence reports on the situation inside Cuba over a 90-day period, so as to see whether any possible pattern might emerge. He said this review is just now being completed, it having involved examination of 30,000 to 40,000 separate reports. He expects a draft to be available to him by Monday or Tuesday. This will probably take the form of an Agency memorandum, but DIA will be asked to review it.

The Chairman said that the Cuban situation will be of great importance in connection with Governor Harriman's negotiations; accordingly, he asked that an informal reading on the results of this review be made available as soon as possible, before a formal paper is fully completed.

Mr. Smith then summarized CIA's latest views on the status of Soviet personnel and equipment. He said that there is insufficient evidence on which to base any change in the current estimate of 12,000 to 13,000 Soviet troops. He said that it appears the Soviets are now engaged in training Cubans for eventual transfer of Soviet equipment to them. No combat equipment has been seen leaving Cuba, since last fall.

Mr. Smith added that the equipment which was seen leaving on 6 July appears on close examination by photo interpreters to be communications and generator vans, rather than missile guidance equipment.

Mr. McCone said that the <sup>8</sup>[Japanese] Ambassador to Cuba has expressed his conviction that some offensive Soviet missiles still remain in Cuba. CIA and State will debrief the Ambassador on this point today.

## 3. Cuba - Agent Operations

Mr. FitzGerald told the Group about two additional infiltration/exfiltration operations which were carried out in the last days of June, after his last report. He then mentioned highlights of proposals for the next month. These proposals, as presented in the Coordinator's paper of 9 July, were approved.

- 3 -

Mr. McGeorge Bundy said that by the 26th of July the Harriman negotiations in Moscow might have reached a crucial stage; he asked how flexible are the sabotage operations planned for that day (as explained by Mr. FitzGerald to the Standing Group on Tuesday). He said he was not suggesting that any change in the basic guidance for sabotage operations is indicated, but it is evident that in times of particular sensitivity all potentially provocative activities should be subject to review.

In this connection, Mr. FitzGerald said that because of light factors these operations could not be run any later than July 28th, in this month's moon period. He pointed out that if it should appear that it would be advisable for political reasons to postpone the operations until the August dark-of-the-moon period, then as much advance notice as possible should be given the agents, in order not to damage their morale unduly. It was agreed that by the time of next week's Special Group meeting it should be possible to make some kind of judgment about the possible progress of the Harriman talks, and that a decision could be made at that time whether or not to postpone these particular operations.

4. Vietnam - Monthly Status Report

Mr. Colby outlined the results of the past month's agent operations. In summary, he said that he believes the covert propaganda activities are beginning to catch on, but that so far there is not a great deal of tangible result to report in the sabotage field.

5. Tibet - Status Report 98

Mr. Colby expanded briefly on the paper of the 8th of July, on the status of projected Tibetan agent operations. He emphasized that the trainees will be sent back to India in the very near future, and that discussions will then take place jointly with the Indians as to details of overland infiltration into Tibet. Planning for air drops of agents is being deferred until sufficient operational intelligence can be built up to permit reasonable decisions.]

6. Guatemala - Covert Annex (Revised) to Internal Defense Plan 98

This annex was noted by the Group. Particular attention was called to the agreed assessment that the Arevalo threat no longer exists.]

*Thomas A. Parrott*  
Thomas A. Parrott

Distribution

Mr. Johnson  
Mr. Gilpatric  
Mr. McCone

*2/10*

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18 July 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 18 July 1963

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone

Colonel King was present for Item 2.  
Mr. FitzGerald was present for Item 3.  
Mr. Sheldon was present for Item 4.

1. Reconnaissance

98

Mr. McCone reported that during the last week no high-performance missions were flown in the Far East, due to bad weather.]

2. Haiti - Political Action

96

Mr. McCone and Colonel King reported that the following changes have taken place in the Haitian picture since the Special Group approved, on June 20th, the proposal to reach a covert understanding with President Bosch on the use of Haitian exiles in the Dominican Republic. The developments are:

a. It has been demonstrated that these exiles are of very little use, because of insecurity, lack of cohesive purpose or of adequate leadership, etc.

b. President Bosch has now decided that he is unwilling to allow such an exile force to use his country as a base for military operations against Duvalier.

c. Duvalier's own capabilities have improved greatly, due to such things as: the widespread purge of potentially-dissident Army officers; clearance of the border areas; and, most recently, the elimination of the Barbot brothers.

Colonel King said that everyone concerned with the project agrees that Duvalier must be removed in some manner or other. However, in light of the factors mentioned above, operating elements have concluded that the existing plan is unworkable, and that it is best to switch to a different kind of operation. This would include in the first instance, training of selected exiles in intelligence collection, in communications, and in cross-border operations. Such training]

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[could be given at a base in the Continental U.S. or in Puerto Rico; support and facilities may be required from DOD. The long-range objectives would be to establish a clandestine organization capable of gathering intelligence and eventually building up and arming an effective opposition in Haiti; to establish friendly relations with, and if necessary, support individuals capable of playing a constructive role in a future Haitian government; to encourage and support individuals and organizations who are both anti-Duvalier and anti-Communist; and to attempt to spread dissension among Duvalier advisers and to subvert some of them.

Colonel King emphasized that the \$200,000 already approved would cover the training activities, but that it is impossible to estimate now how much the subversion operations might require, if suitable opportunities should be identified.

The Group agreed to recommend this new course of action to higher authority.

(There was no objection by higher authority to the program as presented, in the light of the changed conditions.)

3. Cuba - Sabotage Operations

Mr. FitzGerald was asked to reschedule tentatively for the middle of August the special operations planned for the 26th of July, in light of the negotiations going on in Moscow. Mr. Bundy cautioned that it is entirely possible that by the middle of August the negotiating process might have gone into another phase which would make it necessary to cancel the operation once more.

4. Technical Installations - Pakistan 98

The Group considered the CIA paper of 17 July, with attachments, which outlined the difficulties which have been encountered recently in getting the Pakistani government to go along with expansion of our special intelligence facilities in that country. Mr. McCone emphasized his feeling and that of the USIB as a whole, that any wasting of this asset would represent a very serious loss to the intelligence community.

After some discussion the Group agreed that the best method of approach is to make it entirely clear in presenting the proposed three-year MAP program to Pakistan authorities that the maintenance and expansion of U.S. intelligence facilities at Peshawar is an essential part of the bargain. It can also be reaffirmed to Ayub at that time

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EYES ONLY

15 August 1963

## MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 15 August 1963

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone.

Mr. FitzGerald and Mr. Cheever were present for Items 1, 2 and 5.C.

Dr. Whelan, Colonel Ledford, and Mr. Cunningham were present for Items 3 and 4.

1. A Non-Violent Program to Inhibit Free World and Neutral Trade with Cuba

The operational proposal dated 12 August, was approved by the Special Group, with the two changes in wording made by the State Department. Mr. FitzGerald pointed out that to make this operation convincing, a "big bang" on a Cuban ship will be carried out before the operation is implemented. He further pointed out that in paragraph 2.a. of the paper, the reference to "real ... sabotage" applied to Cuban shipping only. Item 2.c. in the operational proposal was thought to be of low priority and is to be placed at the bottom of the list.

2. Cuba - Support of Autonomous Anti-Castro Groups

Mr. FitzGerald recommended that the paper dated 13 August be submitted at this time for discussion only rather than decision by the Special Group. This recommendation was made because the members of the Group had not been given sufficient time to study the proposal. The paper had been presented in hasty fashion because CIA had received reports that the exile group in question was beginning to scatter and prepare for an operational program not influenced by CIA.

There was some discussion of the effects of using a British island for launching these operations and as to the desirability of striking Cuban shipping on the high seas. Decision on this operation was deferred until the next meeting.

See special minutes  
for additional items

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3. Defensive Armament for GROSBEAK Aircraft

The Special Group approved the paper of 11 August as presented, subject to confirmation that the sidewinder heat-seeker missile, already compromised, would not lead to a security problem should a GROSBEAK plane be lost.]

4. GROSBEAK Overflight of Laos 98

The proposal was approved to overfly Laos in order to fulfill COMOR requirements for radar order of battle information in support of current and future missions.]

5. Miscellaneous Items 98

A. Mr. McCone briefly described the current status of Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RadLib). He stated that he hoped there would be no change in the State Department policy with respect to the radios because of the extensive commitments, international agreements, and political implications in RFE and RadLib. Mr. McCone indicated that there appeared to be a feeling in some quarters of the Department of State that, because the U.S. may be entering a period of "detente" with the Soviet Union, efforts should be made to reduce the causes of tension and conflict. Since the two radios are major irritants to the Soviets, CIA should, therefore, modify or reduce some of these activities. The Special Group opined that this was not the time to change U.S. policy with respect to RFE and RadLib. Mr. Johnson said he would look into this further.

B. The matter of the Soviet attempt to establish a consolidated headquarters at Lietzenburger Strasse in West Berlin, was raised by Mr. McCone. He opposed such a development for the following reasons:

- (1) The formation of such a headquarters would lay the groundwork for future Soviet claims to an equal footing with the U.S. in West Berlin.
- (2) Its establishment would severely handicap CIA operations against the USSR target in West Berlin.
- (3) Such a center would improve on the USSR's ability to concentrate its operations against Western targets.
- (4) It would in effect increase Soviet prestige in West Berlin.]

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[Mr. Bundy stated he was aware of the problem and believed that the British who had been reluctant to support the position of the U.S. and the French, now concurred that a refusal to the Soviets should be made. This concerted action, it was believed by the Group, would succeed in preventing the Soviets from establishing such a consolidated headquarters.]

C. Mr. FitzGerald reported that recent discussions held with Artime have indicated that he is somewhat disgusted with Luis Somoza who has not behaved sensibly, but that he does have respect for his brother, General Anastasio Somoza, with whom he can deal more rationally. Artime will make greater use of Costa Rica in order to decrease his operational commitments in Nicaragua and increase his security.]

*Paul Eckel*  
Paul Eckel

**Distribution**

Mr. Johnson  
Mr. Gilpatric  
Mr. McCone

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EYES ONLY

*1/11/54*

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EYES ONLY

8 August 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 8 August 1963

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and General Carter

Mr. FitzGerald was present for Item 1.

Mr. Herbert was present for Item 2.

Mr. Baird was present for Item 3.

1. Cuba - Infiltration/Exfiltration Operations

Of the 13 Cuban operations approved by the Special Group, 2 are to be externally-mounted sabotage operations which will be subject to possible reconsideration up to 12 August 1963. The other 11 operations approved are designed to meet the need for expanded intelligence collection activities and to develop viable internal resistance organizations.

Mr. FitzGerald made a special report on Luis Somoza's conversations with exile leaders. Somoza wants the Cuban exiles to begin aggressive harassment operations against Castro and indicated that the Nicaraguan government was willing to give them a base as well as support, including military aid. Somoza intimated that this may result in Castro's launching an offensive against Nicaragua. If this occurs, Somoza would expect U.S. protection and possibly intervention. Mr. FitzGerald further stated that Manuel Artime, leader of the Movement for Revolutionary Recovery, would be in the U.S., at which time all aspects of his program would be examined. In order to avoid unfavorable complications with Somoza, two operational changes will be suggested:

a. Artime should concentrate on getting resistance started inside Cuba and de-emphasize armed attack and external sabotage.

b. Artime should shift the main weight of his operations to Costa Rica. There should be no break, of course, between Artime and Somoza.

In this connection Mr. Johnson raised the Costa Rican Foreign Minister's question regarding Artime. It was agreed that Mr. FitzGerald would work out the language of the reply with Mr. Cottrell, giving as

See special minutes  
for additional items

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much encouragement to Costa Rica's support of Arttime as possible without showing his activities.

General Carter mentioned the eagerness of William D. Pawley to implement an operational plan against Cuba, purportedly designed to create a situation which might ultimately require U.S. intervention. The consensus of the Special Group was that an independent operation organized by Pawley, would not be desirable. Efforts should be made to bring him into CIA's current operational thinking.

Mr. FitzGerald also reported that the Attorney General had sent Mr. Harry Ruiz Williams to the Agency to present a plan which turned out to be a series of 4.2 mortar attacks on the Cuban coast mounted from Guatemala. It was agreed that such attacks, in addition to being impractical logistically, would also tend to give substance to the "Somoza plan" and therefore should be discouraged.

2. Bolivia - Covert Action 98  
The CIA paper of 2 August was approved.]

3. CIA Training Activities 98

Mr. Matthew Baird, Director of CIA's Training Activities, made an oral report on CIA's counterinsurgency training and courses. Mr. Baird emphasized that ever since the establishment of the Office of Training in January 1951, CIA has concentrated on the covert aspects of training. It has not duplicated in any way courses offered by the Department of Defense, the Foreign Service Institute or universities. During fiscal 1963, CIA sent over 2000 students to 1275 courses at 166 government and educational institutions. In addition, during the same year, CIA trained 4214 students in 432 runnings of 64 different courses, all directly or indirectly relating to counterinsurgency.

Mr. Baird said that strong emphasis has always been placed on resistance operations and guerrilla and paramilitary activities. The method of instruction in CIA is based on case studies of current operations. CIA trained, during fiscal 1963, 150 junior officers (with a drop out of less than four per cent) and gave instruction to 174 foreign personnel in counterinsurgency, or directly related fields.

Mr. Bundy raised the question as to how CIA courses were inspected. General Carter replied by pointing out that these courses are continuously inspected by the Inspector General, the President's Board of Consultants, and the Deputy Director, Plans, who heads up the clandestine services.]

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[The consensus was that Central Intelligence was meeting its counterinsurgency training obligations and that because of the covert character of the training, an inspection team external to CIA was probably not desirable.]

*Paul Eckel*  
Paul Eckel

Distribution

- Mr. Johnson
- Mr. Gilpatric
- General Carter

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*VAC*

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EYES ONLY

29 August 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 29 August 1963

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and General Carter

Colonel Steakley was present for Items 1 and 2.  
Mr. Cheever was present for Item 3.

1. Monthly Reconnaissance Forecasts 98

a. NRO

The NRO forecast for September was approved as presented, with one exception. This had to do with the second Laos/North Vietnam flight, which had been requested in order to "replenish the bank." Mr. Johnson asked that he be briefed on the results of previous reconnaissance in this area so that he could weigh the value of the product against the political risk involved.

It was noted that this procedure will not delay operations, since one approval remains outstanding for Laos/North Vietnam.

b. DOD

The DOD September forecast was approved with the exception of the proposed trip of the USS THOMASON. Mr. Johnson objected to the proposal to transit the Kita Uruppu Suida Passage. He said that the Department is in favor of continuing to exercise our rights of free navigation in the Sea of Okhotsk; but the projected voyage of the hydrographic ship REHOBOTH satisfies this requirement. Further, U.S. merchant shipping does transit the Passage. In view of these considerations, he did not believe it desirable at this time to send a U.S. warship on this route. The Group concurred with Mr. Johnson's position.

General Carter said that in view of certain other indications recently received, YANKEE PASHA is considered by the intelligence community to be even more urgent than before.

Mr. Johnson raised a question about the mission of the USS STATEN ISLAND in the Chukchi Sea, asking whether the objective could not be met by staying 15 miles from shore rather than 12. Colonel ]

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[Steakley explained that the mission of the ship is to obtain information on hydrographic "stations" located 12 miles out and that the restriction suggested would not enable the vessel to accomplish this. Mr. Johnson then concurred.

Colonel Steakley briefed the Group on certain sensitive reconnaissance operations.

Colonel Steakley gave a brief summary of the deployment of MIG fighters in the China coastal areas. He said that as of now there are no MIG-21's in the area, the MIG complement consisting of 17's and 19's. He saw no need to revise any of the projected BOW TIE missions because of these fighters.]

2. Negotiations for Indian Base

98

The Group noted the report from New Delhi that the Indian Intelligence Service finds itself unable to give assurances to the Prime Minister about the security of personnel on the projected temporary base at Char Batia, and that approval for use of this base has, therefore, been withheld.

Mr. Gilpatric and General Carter pointed out that the DIA is anxious to have the Sino-Indian border area covered, because this has not been done since January. General Carter said that he had intended to have the USIB reassess the priority of this requirement at its meeting yesterday, but that other matters had made it impossible to bring it up.

The Group felt that this should be discussed with USIB next week. They agreed, however, that in the absence of a really persuasive case for the priority of the requirement, it would be inadvisable to attempt to run the operation once more out of Takhli without Indian assistance. They felt that other things being equal, it would be preferable to revert to the original proposal of having a permanent Indian base available in December.]

3. Cuba

a. The Group then turned to consideration of the paper from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs dated 12 August 1963, "Support of Autonomous Anti-Castro Groups." In answer to questions, Mr. Cheever said that the project for support of Commandos L would be useful but not essential. He felt that the economic damage which this group might inflict would probably be comparatively minor. On the other hand there would be some psychological advantages to be gained, and also such operations would serve to keep the Cuban security forces busy.

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In view of the personal interest expressed by Mr. McCone in the project when it was tabled at the meeting of 15 August, it was agreed that no decision should be made until after the DCI's return.

b. Mr. Cheever briefed the Group on the successful disposal of the contaminated sugar which has been in Puerto Rico.

c. Mr. Cheever discussed the "After Action Report" on the two sabotage operations conducted the middle of August. Mr. Johnson commented on the amount of materiel that had been left behind at the site of one of these operations, and asked whether it is possible that the Cuban agents did this deliberately, in order to involve the United States. Mr. Cheever acknowledged this possibility, but felt that it had simply been a question of "green troops" behaving in this manner their first time under fire.

The Chairman asked that an estimate be prepared, assessing Castro's probable reaction to this sabotage. He also asked Mr. Cheever to see that the Attorney General is briefed on the results of the operations.

4. <sup>98</sup> Costa Rica - Re-establishment of Institute for Political Education

The CIA paper of 26 August was approved as presented.]

5. <sup>98</sup> GROSBEAK Armament

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o the Chinese  
GROSBEAK aircraft  
verification that  
al can, therefore,]

*Taparott*  
Thomas A. Parrott

Distribution

Mr. Johnson  
Mr. Gilpatric  
General Carter

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EYES ONLY

5 September 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 5 September 1963

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone.

Mr. FitzGerald was present for Items 1 and 2.  
Mr. Colby was present for Items 3-5.

1. Cuba - Agent Operations

Mr. FitzGerald commented on several reports from inside Cuba, which indicate that the morale of the people was raised considerably as a result of the Santa Lucia and Casilda sabotage operations. He cautioned that some of these reports might be somewhat overdrawn, but it appears certain that the sabotage did have a beneficial effect in this way.

He then discussed with the Group the general philosophy of these operations, and plans for the future within the capabilities of the available agents. Among other things, he pointed out that there is a limited number of targets on or near the coast and that the most attractive ones are, at the same time, the most difficult to attack; the available teams are not yet ready for assignments of this difficulty. On the other hand, smaller and more vulnerable targets are being selected. It is proposed to hit a lumber mill in September.

Mr. FitzGerald went on to say, in connection with the scope and pace of these operations, that it would not be desirable to knock out all available targets in the near future, even if it were possible to do so. This is because this type of attack is designed to stimulate resistance inside Cuba, apart from whatever intrinsic value it might have.

The Group agreed with the approach. They felt that the reaction to the two missions in August was most satisfactory and that it is essential to keep this sort of thing up, selecting a limited number of worthwhile targets. Mr. Bundy commented particularly on the silence that had been maintained by the agents, which has resulted in the noise level being of a different character than might have been expected otherwise. Mr. FitzGerald was authorized to proceed with a relatively soft target, such as a lumber mill.

See special minutes  
for additional items

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There were some questions as to the feasibility of having somewhat larger teams, but Mr. FitzGerald pointed out that that is not practicable now. Mr. Bundy suggested that special attention be given to electric power installations to the extent that adequate assets are available for that purpose. He also noted that the two August operations had been carried out in a professional and sophisticated manner, which leads naturally to the accusation of Agency sponsorship. He urged that to the extent possible attempts be made to vary the method, for example by launching the attack from the shore side rather than from the sea, as Mr. FitzGerald had previously said will be the case with the lumber mill. Mr. Bundy felt that in this way the "CIA signature" might be blurred.

The Group then discussed the paper prepared by the Board of National Estimates, on possible Castro reaction to sabotage operations. No issue was taken with the conclusions of this paper, but there was some discussion as to how the Soviets would react to any requests made of them by Castro to assist him in combatting sabotage. In this connection, Mr. McCone called attention to the increasing currents of tension between the USSR and Cuba.

Mr. FitzGerald then summarized the results of last month's infiltration/exfiltration operations and those proposed for next month.

2. Cuba - Support of Autonomous Anti-Castro Group

The Group then turned to further discussion of the paper from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs dated August 13, on the subject of Comandos L.

In response to objections stated at earlier meetings to the use of a British base, Mr. FitzGerald said that it would be feasible to take off from a point in the northern Bahamas, rather than from one of the keys very near Cuba. This would considerably reduce the dangers of hot pursuit.

Mr. Johnson said that purely apart from the British problem, whether or not such a change in location would alleviate it, he does not feel that the type of activity proposed accomplishes the agreed objective of reaching internal resistance elements.

The Chairman, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone all felt that support of this group in the manner outlined, should be considered as action additional to that designed to contact the resistance. Further, they felt that it would be perfectly feasible, and in fact necessary, to avoid any involvement with the British in this matter. It was finally

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decided that Mr. Bundy would discuss the proposal with higher authority, noting the reservations expressed by Mr. Johnson. In the event of favorable reaction by higher authority, Mr. Bundy will talk further to Mr. Johnson.

Mr. McCone said that he would like to see more activity of this general nature and asked whether this could be accomplished if larger numbers of Cuban personnel were obtained. Mr. FitzGerald replied that the problem is not numbers, but the degree of training and competence. In this connection, he noted that the Arttime group should be ready to go in November.

3. Interdiction Operations Along Route 7 98

Mr. Colby briefed the Group in detail on the successful interdiction of Route 7 in Laos by a thousand-man force of Meos, in early August. He pointed out that the success achieved could be attributed to adequate operational intelligence, security, size of the group, and the support of the Parus.]

4. North Vietnam Status Report Number 7 98

Mr. Colby touched on the highlights of agent activity in North Vietnam during August, and on plans for similar activity during the coming month.]

5. Operations in Denied Areas of the Far East 98

Mr. Colby said that a review has been made of experience with agent operations in the denied areas of the Far East, including North Korea, China, Tibet and North Vietnam. He said that as a result of this review, serious doubts have arisen as to the results that can be expected from small teams, either in intelligence or in action. He said that he proposes to discuss with the DCI in the near future, certain changes in the method of operation in such areas. This might take the form of concentrating on developing a spirit of resistance rather than on a search for resistance elements or on carrying out minor sabotage. It might also involve much larger groups of people. In this connection, he pointed to the success of the thousand-man operation against Route 7.]

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Mr. Gilpatric noted that the Wheeler report, recommending the use of South Vietnamese nationals for activities of this nature in North Vietnam, is to be discussed next week with the Joint Chiefs. Mr. McCone suggested that the Chiefs should be briefed by Mr. Colby.

*Y. Parrott*  
Thomas A. Parrott

- Distribution**  
Mr. Johnson  
Mr. Gilpatric  
Mr. McCone

*YAC*

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24 October 1963

**MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD**

**SUBJECT:** Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 24 October 1963

**PRESENT:** Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone

Mr. Helms was also present.

Mr. FitzGerald and Mr. Cheever were present for Items 2-3.

1. United States Evaluation Board (USEB) 98

Mr. Helms reported that the USEB was established in 1950 by a National Security Council Intelligence Directive. The Board was required to perform certain functions in connection with U.S. cover and deception programs. Membership on the Board was limited to the Service Departments, FBI, CIA, JCS, and the Department of State.

According to Mr. Helms the USEB has not met in recent years. However, it was agreed by the Special Group that its functions had considerable significance and should be continued. Since USEB was originally organized only to deal in the military sphere, it was recommended by Mr. Helms that a new directive be written and coordinated, which would encompass all national deception programs, and be submitted to the Special Group for approval. It was also determined that the new USEB would report to the Special Group.

Is this  
the proper  
place?  
Why not DCI?

2. Cuba - Forecast of CIA Sabotage Operations

The proposed sabotage operations for November through January was noted by the Group. The operation plan against petroleum storage facilities in Niquero was deleted and an operation against a sawmill located at Canate in Northern Oriente Province, was substituted. Specific operational proposals for November will be submitted to the Special Group for approval at the next meeting.

3. Cuba - Proposal for Air Strikes Against Cuban Targets

This operational proposal was deferred by the Special Group pending an estimate to determine the Cuban reaction to an air strike on the Santiago refinery, and specifically what effect it might have on the U.S. reconnaissance operation. CIA will prepare the estimate.

See special minutes  
for additional items

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- 4 -

4. Cuba - Reappraisal of Previous Proposals for Support of Autonomous Anti-Castro Groups

Mr. Fitzgerald informed the Group that CIA is dropping its earlier proposal to support Comandos L, due to the crackdown on exile raids by various U. S. and British government agencies. He recommended that a plan of "selective relaxation" be adopted, designed to relax current stringent controls on selected anti-Castro groups in order to avoid all raids being charged to CIA.

The suggestion is that the "selective relaxation" be accomplished by authorizing CIA to tell appropriate U.S. enforcement agents that certain activities are of interest to CIA and should not be molested. CIA would not actually get involved but would simply screen these groups to permit some freedom of movement on the part of the better ones. This would be without the knowledge of the groups.

Mr. Johnson raised the question of difficulties of controlling exile groups should any group succeed in engaging in activities not to the liking of the U.S. Government. This possibility was admitted.

Mr. Fitzgerald cited the Manolo Ray group as one group which a "selective relaxation" would assist. This autonomous group is receiving financial and limited logistic assistance from CIA, and desires to mount an infiltration operation from Florida. He has good connections in Cuba and should be urged to proceed. Mr. Bundy stated he was not enthusiastic about Ray operating from U.S. territory. Mr. Bundy stated he would discuss this proposal with higher authority.

5. Cuba - Infiltration Operation

Mr. Fitzgerald reported that one of the small boats used in the 21 October infiltration operation reached Mexico and is in the hands of local authorities, friendly to us. There were three persons on board, one dead, one injured, and the other all right.

The fate of the second small boat is unknown. The mother ship which escorted the two small boats was attacked, but evaded its attackers and escaped. There is a possibility that some team or boat crew members may have been captured and if so, a "show trial" may be expected.

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6. Proposal to Form and Support a Political Action Committee on Religious Freedom in the USSR

This project was not approved as proposed. It was agreed that the concept was sound but there should be further exploration as to

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whether private capital could not be used instead of government funds. The project was referred back to CIA with the suggestion to explore whether the World Council of Churches or the National Council of Protestants and Jews might be interested in obtaining and contributing funds for carrying out the aims set forth in the paper.]

7. Cyprus - Political Action

95

This operation was approved although the Special Group members agreed that until after the elections there should be no new effort to initiate operational activity among the Greek veterans.]

8. Vietnam - Coup Plotting

Mr. McCone expressed his fear that the top U.S. diplomatic and military officials in Saigon are becoming too involved in conversations between General Don and Consin. Such involvement could destroy Consin's usefulness and involve Ambassador Lodge and General Harkins in operations difficult to deny.

The Special Group authorized the sending of a coordinated message to Lodge and Harkins emphasizing (a) the setting up of a more secure system of contacts with General Don and other Vietnamese military; (b) the preparation of an E-bassy assessment of General Don's status, the group he represents and future plans; (c) the tightening of control over the Don/Consin meetings.

Special Group members agreed that they should firm up their policy thinking with respect to Vietnam before Ambassador Lodge returns to Washington, and then hear what Mr. Lodge has to say on what courses of action should be taken.

(Signed)

Paul Eckel

**Distribution**

Mr. Johnson  
Mr. Gilpatric  
Mr. McCone

**SECRET  
EYES ONLY**

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EYES ONLY

6 November 1963

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of the Special Meeting of the Special Group,  
5 November 1963

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Vance, and Mr. McCone.

The Attorney General, Mr. Helms, Mr. Cheever, Dr. Wheelon,  
and Colonel Steakley were present for Items 1 and 2. The  
Attorney General and Mr. Helms were present for Item 3.

1. Cuba - Sabotage Operation in Southeast Pinar (No. 3105).

Mr. Helms briefed the Group on the background of the mission and on events leading up to the infiltration attempted on 21-22 October. On the basis of available information, the best estimate is that Castro's security forces penetrated the reception committee and laid a trap which resulted in the capture of some personnel.

The subsequent press coverage of this affair renders the further operational use of the mother ships REX and LIDA to be undesirable in the immediate future.

2. Cuba - Infiltration/Exfiltration Operations

Mr. Cheever presented a low-key sabotage operation, No. 3111, against a warehouse and pier on the north coast of Cuba. This activity is to be carried out by a small commando team which will land on the pier and the warehouse.

Mention was made by Mr. Cheever of some problems with British patrols which have unwittingly exposed some of CIA's operations. Mr. Bundy stated that he would mention this to the British Ambassador and CIA would follow up on a service-to-service level in order to prevent further unnecessary incidents.

In addition, the Special Group tentatively approved two other operations. These are No. 3112, a sabotage operation against a sawmill located in northern Oriente Province and No. 3115, the infiltration of a radio operator to provide communications for a ratline.

Mr. Bundy has placed the above three operations on a "fail safe" basis pending concurrence in each case by higher authority.

See special minutes  
for additional items

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### 3. Cuba - Peace Feelers

Mr. Bundy stated that it has come to the attention of the White House that Castro would like to have a talk designed to bring about some kind of "arrangement" with the U.S. To hear what Castro has to say and to know on what basis he might wish to negotiate would be of some use to the U.S. Mr. Bundy suggested that for this initial talk Mr. William Attwood, currently on the staff of Mr. Stevenson at the United Nations, might be a likely candidate since Mr. Attwood has been in touch with Mr. Carlos Lechuga Hevia, the Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations. Also, Attwood has a fairly friendly relationship with Castro based on previous acquaintance.

In the Group discussion which followed it was thought inadvisable to allow Mr. Attwood, while on the UN staff, to get in touch with Castro. The suggestion was made that he might be removed from his official UN status and then go to Cuba for the ostensible purpose of writing an article for Look magazine. In this way it might be learned how badly Castro might want a detente with the United States.

It was suggested by Mr. Helms that it might be profitable to "war game" this problem and look at it from all possible angles before making any contacts.

A further suggestion was made by Mr. Bundy that Dr. Rene Vallejo Ortiz, Castro's aide and personal physician, might be flown to Mexico with Castro's proposals and discuss them with the U.S. Ambassador in Mexico City.

The Attorney General emphasized that as a prelude to all this the U.S. must require some fundamental steps such as the end of subversion in Latin America and removing the Soviet troops in Cuba before any serious discussion can take place about a detente.

Mr. McCone stated that it might be possible to use again Mr. James Donovan who is known to have excellent relationships with Dr. Vallejo. Vallejo might be flown to the UN for such talks or better still Donovan could go to Cuba.

It was decided by the Special Group members not to try to reach a firm decision at this time but to study the problem for several days and attack it again.

*Paul Eckel*  
Paul Eckel

#### Distribution

Mr. Johnson  
Mr. Gilpatric  
Mr. McCone

~~SECRET~~  
EYES ONLY

**SECRET  
EYES ONLY**

6 November 1963

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP****SUBJECT: Cuban Operations**

At a special meeting of the Special Group on 5 November, it tentatively approved, subject to higher authority concurrence, three Cuban operations scheduled for implementation on 8, 10, and 13 November. On 6 November higher authority disapproved all Cuban operations scheduled to be run into Cuba before 12 November. The two operations dated 8 and 10 November are therefore disapproved.

*Paul Eckel*  
Paul Eckel

**Distribution**

Mr. Johnson  
Mr. Gilpatric  
Mr. McCone

**SECRET  
EYES ONLY**

**SECRET  
EYES ONLY***Noted by  
DDCI*

12 November 1963

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD****SUBJECT: Cuban Operations**

A meeting was held this morning with higher authority on the above subject. Present were: Mr. Rusk, Mr. McNamara, Mr. Robert Kennedy, Mr. Bundy, Mr. McCone, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, Mr. Vance, General Taylor, Mr. Helms, Mr. FitzGerald, Mr. Cheever, and Mr. Shackley.

Mr. McCone gave a brief summary of recent developments inside Cuba. He stated that the military is generally loyal to Castro. There have been some disorders but not very extensive. Castro's internal security forces appear to be well organized. He has developed a system of informers which is becoming increasingly effective. The economic situation is deteriorating largely because of the enforcement of economic sanctions, and Hurricane "Flora" although its damage was not as great as originally thought. The Soviets appear to be continuing the gradual withdrawal of personnel from Cuba although recently 1,000-2,000 troops have come in. There now seems to be a kind of "Soviet MAAG" program concerned mainly with training Cubans in all types of military activity including the handling of missiles. There has been some removal of the more sophisticated types of electronic equipment. Some new tanks have arrived in Cuba, estimates run from 25 to 50.

Mr. FitzGerald reported on Cuban operations under six main headings: (a) Covert Collection, (b) Propaganda, (c) Economic Denial, (d) Disaffections in the Military, (e) Sabotage and Harassment, and (f) Support of Autonomous Anti-Castro Groups.

(a) Covert Collection. Mr. FitzGerald pointed out that inside Cuba CIA has three kinds of agent activities: (1) "singleton" (2) collection nets, and (3) agents involved in "black net" operations. While there is encouraging improvement in the geographical spread of these agents, there is still, understandably, a fairly heavy concentration of agents in the Havana area.

A question was raised as to how many agents in all of these activities have been lost. Mr. FitzGerald said that in the neighborhood of 25 had been either captured or killed in the past year.

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The reasons for these casualty figures are the increasing effectiveness of Castro's internal security forces and discovery brought about when agents try to obtain food. No matter how good the documentation, an outsider in a community is viewed with suspicion.

(b) Propaganda. The activities of CIA in this field are the mailing of leaflets and radio broadcasts. Some 30-40,000 leaflets per month have been mailed and during a day there are 32 hours of programs emanating from seven different stations. It is believed that there is a very excellent listening public. The programs appeal to people in a wide variety of jobs and professions. There is some jamming but it is spasmodic and generally confined to Havana.

(c) Economic Denial. Mr. FitzGerald reported that the U.S. economic denial program is contributing to Cuba's declining economy. Mention was made that the economic denial program would be more effective if the Canadians were willing to cooperate. Up to now they have not gone along with U.S. efforts, and they are supplying many items essential to Cuban economy. The UK and Spain are continuing to deal in certain types of goods required by the Cubans. Commodities going into Cuba in 1962 from the free world reached \$101 million. While this represents less than in 1961 the amount is still too high.

(d) Disaffections in the Military. While the military is loyal to Castro as has been noted there are indications that some leaders would like to break with the regime but lack courage and opportunity. Mr. FitzGerald commended a CIA-DIA task force which prepared a report covering some 150 Cuban military leaders. Out of this figure there are some 45 which look interesting from CIA's operational viewpoint. Mr. FitzGerald reported that CIA is in touch with three persons who are in the military or who have highly placed contacts in such circles. The aim is to use these three individuals to establish contact with military personnel inside Cuba. The principal aim is to get military leaders who have become disenchanted with the Castro regime to dare to talk and plot Castro's downfall with each other.

(e) Sabotage and Harassment. Mr. FitzGerald mentioned four successful sabotage operations against a power plant, oil storage facilities, a sawmill, and an underwater demolition operation against a floating crane in one of Cuba's harbors. It is believed that the publication of these successful sabotage activities in the Cuban press has tended to raise appreciably the morale of the people. Also, such sabotage continues to keep pressure on the Castro regime and adds to the growing economic problems facing the country.

(f) Support of Autonomous Anti-Castro Groups. The question was asked from where would the autonomous groups operate. Mr. FitzGerald replied that they would operate from outside U.S. territory. He mentioned

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two bases of the Artime group, one in Costa Rica and the other in Nicaragua. Also it was hoped that the autonomous group under Manolo Ray would soon get itself established in a working base, possibly Costa Rica. Mr. FitzGerald said that much could be accomplished by these autonomous groups once they become operational.

A question was asked as to what decisions remain to be made. Mr. FitzGerald replied that we were looking for a reaffirmation of the program as presented, including sabotage and harassment. When asked what was planned in sabotage for the immediate future, he said that destruction operations should be carried out against a large oil refinery and storage facilities, a large electric plant, sugar refineries, railroad bridges, harbor facilities, and underwater demolition of docks and ships. The question was also raised as to whether an air strike would be effective on some of these principal targets. The consensus was that CIA should proceed with its planning for this type of activity looking toward January.

The State Department raised questions with respect to sabotage activities in Cuba. The thought was advanced that there may be a relationship between such hit and run attacks on Cuba and the delay of American convoys en route to Berlin. A further question was posed as to the over-all importance to the United States of sabotage operations, especially since it is so difficult to keep them from being directly attributable to the U.S. It was thought that the hit and run type effort might in fact invoke loss of support inside Cuba and may even result in bringing more Soviet troops back into Cuba. Somehow the U.S. must pin responsibility for these activities on Castro. The U.S. in fact must be ready to retaliate when it can be fairly well established that Castro is attempting with arms, money and men to foment Communist uprisings in any Latin American country.

The consensus was that since CIA's sabotage operation is in the main low cost and since it does worry the Castro regime, denies him some essential commodities, stimulates some sabotage inside Cuba and tends to improve the morale of the Cubans who would like to see Castro removed, CIA should proceed with those operations planned for the coming week end (November 15 through 17).

The view was expressed that CIA, in connection with the Department of Defense, should concentrate on attempting to catch Castro red-handed delivering arms to Communist groups in Latin American countries. It was determined that during the next 90 days from this date an attempt would be made by means of air patrols and surface ships to identify ships carrying arms for Castro to Latin American countries. It was hoped that a ship with Cuban arms could be picked up. Conversations are to be

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EYES ONLY

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initiated by the Secretary of the Navy with CIA to map out a three-month operation against Cuban shipping. It was also determined that the Colombian and Venezuelan governments should be asked to join with the U.S. in developing a joint patrol designed to identify ships carrying weapons from Cuba destined for revolutionary groups in Latin American countries.

*Paul Eckel*  
Paul Eckel

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EYES ONLY

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15 November 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP

SUBJECT: Minutes of the Special Group Meeting, 14 November 1963

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone.

General Taylor and Dr. MacMillan were present for Item 1.  
Mr. FitzGerald was present for Items 2 and 3.

98

1. U.S. Support of Foreign Paramilitary Forces

General Taylor proposed that an ad hoc group be formed consisting of a representative from CIA, Department of State, and Department of Defense to review U.S. programs involving support of foreign paramilitary forces. The countries given in the following list have internal security problems and all have received U.S. support for paramilitary organizations:

- |           |           |
|-----------|-----------|
| Bolivia   | Iran      |
| Brazil    | Iraq      |
| Colombia  | Cambodia  |
| Ecuador   | Thailand  |
| Venezuela | Laos      |
| Peru      | Indonesia |
| Guatemala | Pakistan  |

The Special Group approved General Taylor's recommendation. Mr. Bundy suggested that the agencies concerned make recommendations for membership on the ad hoc committee to the Secretary of the Special Group. This committee will arrange for reviewing programs in the above-mentioned countries and prepare briefings, reports, and recommendations for Special Group action.

2. Cuba - Modification of Revised Schedule of Proposed Infiltration/Exfiltration Operations for the Month of November 1963.

Approval was granted by the Special Group for the following:

- Operation No. 31111: The exfiltration of a previously-infiltrated agent.
- Operation No. 3711: The exfiltration of two members of an existing resistance net.

See special minutes  
for additional items

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Operation No. 31110: A sea rendezvous with Cuban fishermen for the purpose of establishing a ratline into Cuba.

Operation No. 31112: An exfiltration operation to be accomplished by members of the DRE using MRR-owned vessels.

3. Cuba - CIA Request for Department of Defense Support of Autonomous Operations.

Operation approved.

4. Laos - Review of the Total CIA Program. 98  
The paper on the above subject was noted by the Special Group.]

5. Tibet - Status Report. 98  
The paper on Tibetan operations was submitted by Mr. McCone to the Special Group for information. Since the paper was concerned with collecting intelligence no Special Group action was required.]

6. North Vietnam - Monthly Report No. 10. 98  
This report was noted by the Special Group.]

*Paul Eckel*  
Paul Eckel

- Distribution  
Mr. Johnson  
Mr. Gilpatric  
Mr. McCone

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EYES ONLY

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EYES ONLY

December 1963

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of the Special Group Meeting, 6 December 1963

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone.

Also present were Mr. Helms and Mr. Cheever.

Cuban Operations.

Mr. Cheever briefed the Special Group on Cuban operations proposed for December. Approvals were granted for the following:

Operation No. 3121: The infiltration of agents for the purpose of establishing a base on an off-shore key for a ratline.

Operation No. 3113: The infiltration of a team, including a radio operator, designed to establish operational contacts with Cuban military personalities.

Operation No. 3114: The infiltration of an agent into and exfiltration of agents out of an existing internal net.

Operation No. 3122: The placing of a 3,000-pound cache of arms, ammunition, and demolitions in support of an existing internal resistance organization.

Operation No. 3123: The infiltration of a team to further develop an existing ratline.

Operation No. 3117: An underwater demolition operation designed to sink or damage a Kronstadt or other Cuban patrol vessels while in anchorage.

Operation No. 3124: The placing of a 100-150 pound cache of radios and weapons on the northern coast of Cuba.

Operation No. 3126: The infiltration and subsequent exfiltration of a team which will attempt to establish contacts for the development of a ratline.

The two sabotage operations, No. 3125, against a sugar central, and No. 3116, against the transformer yard of an electric power plant, were deferred by the Group for further discussion at its next meeting.

*Paul Eckel*  
Paul Eckel

## Distribution

Mr. Johnson  
Mr. Gilpatric  
Mr. McCone

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EYES ONLY

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EXEMPT FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

5 December 1963

CE  
WJ

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP**

**SUBJECT: Cuban Operations**

Special Group members approved by telephone on 5 December the following:


- a. Operation No. 3711, the exfiltration of three members of an existing resistance net.
- b. Operation No. 3118, the infiltration of a five-man team for the purpose of sabotaging a railway bridge.
- c. Operation No. 31110, the establishment of a ratline into Cuban ports.

(Signed)

**Paul Eckel**

**Distribution**

- Mr. Johnson
- Mr. Gilpatric
- Mr. McCona



EXEMPT FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION