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UADD

WS 18124-18129

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JOHNSON'S PROSPECTS: UAR AMBASSADOR, WASHINGTON, REPORTS DISCUSSION WITH NORWEGIAN AMBASSADOR

FR Washington: Ambassador

22 Dec 63

TO Cairo: KHARGIA

Msg Nr: 412

[Parts 1-6 of a 7-part message]((A))

The Norwegian Ambassador to Washington visited me and the conversation dealt with the domestic situation in America and some aspects of the international situation and the situation in the Middle East.

II. He said:

- The world had suffered a great loss in KENNEDY's It appeared to him that the killer was not a party to a conspiracy but was a blind fanatic nourished by the radical milieu of the state where he lived.
- B. He added that he had accompanied JOHNSON for four days during his visit to Norway as KENNEDY's Vice President and that he had noted the following: [Part 2]

JOHNSON was practical-minded. He was not good at listening. He was an expert in American domestic affairs but had not handled foreign affairs very much. He was impatient and quick-tempered; nevertheless, he added that his assumption of the presidency had changed his disposition.

C. He said that JOHNSON would be the presidential candidate of the Democratic Party in the coming election campaign and that the Republicans had not yet decided on a serious rival who could beat him. He said that he thought that JOHNSON would win in the coming presidential election. [Part 3]

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D. He stated that their conjecture in Oslo was that JOHNSON would continue to pursue KENNEDY's foreign policy, particularly with regard to trying to reach an understanding with the Russians and calming the tension of the cold war, although it was not unlikely that his methods in this would be somewhat different from KENNEDY's. Nevertheless, he said that JOHNSON's job would not be easy since he was facing problems in South America and NATO and Southeast Asia and the Middle East. He said that KHRUSHCHEV appeared to be more anxious than the Americans [Part 4] for an understanding with Washington because of numerous domestic problems and his dispute with Peking and the presence of opposition to him in Russia and some of the Communist nations. He said that KHRUSHCHEV had to continue his policy of truce for many reasons.

He stated that the policy of truce might change for unexpected reasons, such as KHRUSHCHEV's death, etc.

He said that he thought that Labor would win in the elections in Britain. He noted that they would continue the policy of <u>rapprochement</u> with the Soviets. He pointed out that the Laborites would strive [Part 5] for a further <u>rapprochement</u> with West Germany and said that their policy would be progressive with regard to racial discrimination and colonial problems.

III. When I was asked about conditions in the Middle East and our relations with America, I explained the development of our relations with America and friendly nations over the past years and how this development had led to results which were rewarding to all. I went into detail about the period of transition through which some of the nations of the Middle East are passing and the conditions which had resulted and said that tendentious propaganda was giving a [Part 6] false interpretation to the events of the Middle East. I discussed our domestic policy which is based on economic development in conformity with practical and [1 wd G] methods, and the state and development of the country and what we had achieved in this regard in the roughest circumstances. I explained our foreign policy based

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on working for peace, stability and co-operation with all friends, replacing disputes with understanding and dealing with disputes by peaceful means. [Part 7] . . .

((A)) Part 7 not yet readable.

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