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Page:1

## JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

## IDENTIFICATION FORM

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## DOCUMENT INFORMATION

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TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM K. HARVEYDATE : 06/25/75  
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OPERATION MONGOOSE  
ROSELLI, JOHNNY  
CASTRO  
ASSASSINATION  
POISON PILLS  
CUBA  
MCCONE, JOHN  
CIA  
BISSELL, RICHARD  
WHITE HOUSE  
MAFIA  
ROWAN, DAN  
GIANCANA, SAMDOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT  
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OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :  
Box 245  
Folder 14-----  
[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

6/25/75

gyp

1

21 JUN 74  
Project ZRRIFLE

1. Identification: The purpose of Project ZRRIFLE is to spot, develop, and use ~~foreign~~ agent assets for Division D ~~for~~ operations. Agents will be spotted in several areas, including the United States, but ~~with~~ ~~out~~ for operational security reasons will probably not be used in their countries of residence. Present developmental activity is being conducted in the WE and EE areas, but it is anticipated that this will be extended to other division areas. The project will be operated against third-country installations and personnel.

2. Objectives: The objective of this project is ~~the procurement of~~ ~~information concerning~~ ~~in accordance with~~ requirements levied on the clandestine services, ~~by~~ ~~the National Security Agency~~. Since these requirements are subject to frequent revision, no listing of targets would be valid for the duration of the project. Specific operations will be mounted on the basis of need and opportunity. The project will be conducted by Division D with assistance from area divisions and stations as

3. Background:   
needed.

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3. Background: In response to the increasing requirements ~~for the procurement of~~ ~~information concerning~~ ~~in accordance with~~ ~~requirements~~, Division D in 1960 began the spotting of agent assets as a developmental activity. During the same

period requirements [redacted] became more refined and in many respects more sensitive. Because most stations are not equipped to conduct this type of operation and because of the desirability of completely centralized control over this entire effort, it was determined that Division D, [redacted] in direct contact with NSM on procurement requirements, could best conduct the activity. The ~~first~~ spotting activity, has now advanced far enough to justify removing from the OOA category.

#### 4. Operational assets:

(1) Personnel: QJWIN is under written contract as a principal agent, with the primary task of spotting agent candidates. QJwin was first contacted in 1958 through the Chief of the ~~Insourcing~~ ~~the Chief of Boston, Insourcing~~, in connection with an illegal narcotics operation into the United States. For a period of a year and a half he was contacted ~~in~~ & sporadically ~~for~~ ~~the~~ ~~Insourcing~~, in behalf of the Bureau of Narcotics. Files of this Bureau reflect an excellent performance by QJwin. On <sup>October</sup> ~~September~~ 1960,

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SECRET

3

Q Jinn annual salary :	\$ 7,200
Travel + ops expenses for Q Jinn + other agents & agent candidates :	2,000
Fees for services by and standby of agents and agent candidates :	2,000
Travel of staff employees & engaged in Zovifile activity :	2,500
Hire of safehouses, automobiles and other operational expenses :	1,000
	<hr/>
	\$ 14,700

Pay for agents on completion of jobs?

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4

1) Legal, ethical → morals, operational problems; political: non-attachability.

2) Our own experience (~~English~~) (+ effect on DDP) and experience w/ KGB (~~British, French, German, Italian~~) → require most professional, proven operationally competent, ruthless, stable, CE-experienced ops officers (few available), able to conduct patient search + adjust to pull back if instinct or knowledge tells him he should, <sup>with maximum high regard for operational security</sup> assessments are all-important.

3) Maximum security:

a. Kuba only (e.g., what does ~~Stargis~~ know?); no approach to other Govt. agencies

b. Within Kuba, one focal point for control, search, training, case officing, etc. - DDP authority in this focal point mandatory. DCI officially advised?

c. Max. security cable commo for innocuous cables only; no restrictions on travel; possibility of one-man overcast (Europe) control base with own (non-Station) commo. Word of mouth + no backfulness re trips

d. No PA's <sup>(except for search)</sup> or intermediaries; rigid case-officing, from start to finish.

e. No approach to officials of foreign govts.

f. No use of any agent who ever worked for a U.S. Govt. agency. Training by opposition would need <sup>IA</sup>.

g. Use of already tested assets (e.g.,

Maribel) in the search.

h. Stand-by list of Kubarbers who can

5

pass as foreigners.

- i. Pretext: ~~Metabolic~~ ~~secret~~; this established ~~is~~
- j. No discussions in stations. k. No "tegu" until ready to go, if at all.

4. Blackmail:

- a. No American citizens or residents or people who were obtained U.S. visas
- b. No chain of connectives: strictly person to person; singleton ops.
- c. No meeting any candidate in home territory.
- d. Exclude organization ~~criminals~~, those w/ record of arrests, those w/ metability of purpose as criminals.
- e. Staffers involved - selection.

5. Cover: planning should include provision for planning focus or checks in case of blow.

- 6. Testing of nominees essential: re following directions, security, blackmail.
- 7. Former resistance personnel a possibility.
- 8. Use nobody who has never dealt w/ criminals; otherwise will not be aware of pitfalls or consider factors such as freedom to travel, wanted lists, etc.

9. ~~Should have planning~~ ~~to~~ ~~blacktop~~ ~~then~~ ~~all~~

~~document~~ ~~to~~ ~~file~~ ~~in~~ ~~case~~ ~~of~~ ~~blacktop~~ ~~then~~ ~~all~~

~~a. file~~

- 10. Possible use of staffers for the action.
- 11. ~~to~~ ~~blacktop~~ ~~then~~ ~~all~~

Keeping of files.

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10) ~~Criteria~~ recommended. ~~by [redacted]~~

~~Mapes~~

11) Former resistance personnel offer possibilities. (ARS archives)

12) Period of testing, surveillance, etc. for each selected.

13) ~~Any~~ <sup>all</sup> subversive personnel involved should have some CE experience.

14) ~~Subversive~~ stable in ~~the~~

15) What are limits on team or individuals selected? No "team" until ready to go.

16) For Danger of standbys.

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
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
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red #1 - 25/1 - eye (action)  
"The Magic Button"



8

Paracatics Büro ~~X~~   
"for a lung" - RIS 201 cover

Button - Bankruptcy - No Star  
eyes - Jim A. / Contradict  
not a TSD problem  from U-2

Apply brakes

Last resort beyond last resort &  
a confession of weakness -  
- El Benefactor - assumption -

~~Example 3 "mray"~~  
Framework of ~~job~~   
Memo 

~~[Large redacted block]~~

~~[Redacted]~~ Year

REC-111

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Anesthesia -

26/1 - ~~[Redacted]~~ ~~[Redacted]~~ Matter -  
No file Review - ~~[Redacted]~~

1. Select proper open to run -

2. ~~[Redacted]~~

May 2

3. Security Rules

B-WHM-AS-3

4. ~~[Redacted]~~ level

~~[Redacted]~~ - Reser.

- 6. No [REDACTED]
- 7. No projects or papers except per cases.
- 8. Principal Agent - [REDACTED] -  
[REDACTED] Program Chief LCH -  
Ticket 1500 - from MB -  
mark spot regim. Staff at  
project - deo Diako
- 9. Disposal -
- 10. Targets who's names -  
Must know before  
we can spot -

11. Case officering

12. [REDACTED]

13. [REDACTED]

FdJ list - Remembers

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