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INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY

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INTERVIEW WITH: Sam Papich

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DATE-TIME-LOCATION: May 29, 1975; 9 a.m.; Carroll Arms

PRESENT: morning: John ELLIFF, Mike Epstein, John Bayly

afternoon: John ELLIFF, Burt Wides, John Bayly

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ON 5/5/94 *JB*

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Papich began with a brief summary of his experience in the FBI. During World War II and thereafter he ran certain operations in Latin America. In 1945-47, he ran counterintelligence operations in Brazil against the Communist Party of Brazil and bloc intelligence agents. In 1952 he became FBI liaison with CIA charged with coordinating and planning, including the development of sources. He also had special assignments overseas for Hoover.

Papich presented the following overview of the issues. He has a high respect and regard for the Soviet intelligence service, its efficiency, and effectiveness. He must be shown that their philosophy has changed since 1970. The pro of the U. S. intelligence community regarding KGB and GRU is very limited. In 1958, for example, the U. S. intelligence community had believed was good information on KGB structure. This had to be readily revised when new defectors and new operations succeeded in showing that the premises were false. Papich stated "they've taken us to the cleaners in the last few years". There is no estimate of how many Soviet illegals are in the United States. The old view was that illegals would aim at middle-class government and business positions. It has been discovered that they take jobs like dishwasher to develop an employment background. There is no knowledge of Soviet objectives. Illegals may do nothing for years so they can be tapped for the future. There may be 100, 500, or 5,000 of them. Some were sent in as early as the 20's and 30's. They are the Rudolph Abel-type. His network was never identified. Therefore, Papich is clearly unhappy with U. S. results in identifying Soviet operations in the United States.

Papich stated that he played a controversial "devil's advocate" role between the FBI and the CIA. He did not confer with Attorney General Mitchell after Helms called his name to Mitchell's attention. Papich assumes Helms wanted Mitchell to get a review of the history of FBI-CIA relations. Papich would not have gone to Mitchell without checking with other FBI officials.

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To understand decisions in 1966 or 1970 it is necessary to go back to World War II, according to Papich. President Roosevelt got the FBI into the foreign intelligence field in World War II. Overnight the FBI had to generate the capability to move into Latin America against the German espionage operation which included business covers, radio networks, and influence in Latin American governments. The FBI had no precedent or guidance. Assistant FBI Director Hugh Klegg conferred with the British in London for assistance. FBI agents went into Latin America first under business covers, then in the embassies, which was thin cover. The legal attaches established official liaison with local authorities. The FBI's role was primarily counterintelligence but some positive intelligence was gathered about the stability of governments. FBI agents learned on the job. Most of the information from headquarters was ridiculous until their experiences were reported back.

The OSS ran operations in Europe and Asia as well as Latin America. Donovan also ran undercover operations in the United States. See the book by Donald Downs. OSS had a very close relationship with MI 5 and MI 6. The British also ran operations in the United States in 1939-41. No one knows how many. They saw the FBI as neophytes knowing little about the business. The British developed closer relations to OSS than to FBI.

At first, Donovan and Hoover were friendly but Hoover received complaints of OSS operations in the United States, for example, the OSS bugging of the Spanish Embassy. Other complaints came from Latin America. The friction between Hoover and Donovan is important background for Hoover's view of the CIA. Donovan would recruit persons regardless of their background if he thought they had the capability to penetrate the access. The OSS use of Communists "shook the hell" out of Hoover, as did OSS discussions in Moscow of cooperation with the NKVD. Hoover would never work with Communists. Hoover saw CIA roots in OSS. Papich stressed that OSS had some great people, extremely capable and dedicated, but OSS had an element that Hoover would never buy.

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In 1943-45, the government began looking toward a worldwide intelligence system. The alternatives were the military, OSS, State, and FBI. FDR allegedly assured Hoover that he would be responsible for setting up the post-war system. Papich never saw any documents showing that Hoover wanted this job. The Latin American operation was successful but Hoover never understood or had a feel for the problems. He felt insecure. He never traveled outside the U. S., and only saw things from Washington, D. C.

Under President Truman, Hoover did not have a "warm" relationship with the President. When the Central Intelligence group was formed and the 1947 Act drafted, Hoover's attitude was mistrust and lack of confidence in the group creating CIA. They were a different type of people, not law-enforcement oriented. Ivy League students of foreign affairs did not speak Hoover's language.

Papich states it was a "blessing" that Hoover did not get the job. Hoover was "uncomfortable" when confronted with worldwide issues. He did not understand relationships and operations abroad. In the U. S., for instance, if Hoover had a problem with a police chief, he just cut off relations. He couldn't do that with foreign police. A foreign intelligence service cannot operate like a domestic intelligence agency.

In 1952, when Papich became FBI-CIA liaison, relationships between the agencies were a mess. Beedle Smith was CIA director. There were many flaps between FBI and CIA over CIA political and psychological warfare, especially regarding the funding of labor groups, student groups, and political parties. At the time of the 1947 Act, these techniques of "covert action" were the subject of tremendously heated battles between CIA and State. There were fewer flaps in the counterintelligence field.

In the field of political and psychological warfare operations, the CIA didn't want stereotyped people. The CIA was not disciplined and ignored jurisdictional agreements. It would contact a U. S. newsman about a

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possible assignment, the newsman would contact the FBI to ask what was going on, this would go to Hoover, who would raise hell with the CIA director. But Beedle Smith was tough. Communication between the FBI and CIA was almost non-existent by 1952.

Papich had no CIA counterpart since the CIA is so compartmented. He had contacts at all levels, exchanging ideas for operations. He would push CIA ideas in the FBI. Flaps would come up. He would stamp them out and say "get on with the job". The FBI was easier to control since it was centralized. Papich's relations with Hoover would go up and down. He frequently asked to go to the field -- and sometimes Hoover considered him there. But by the 1950's, most of the FBI's foreign intelligence talent had disappeared.

No formal consideration was within the FBI to limiting its role to law enforcement. Tolson probably thought it should. Hoover never expressed a desire to give up his intelligence job. Nobody, including Tolson, knew Hoover's reasons for doing what he did. He had his own conversations and contacts in the White House, Congress, and his personal sources. He knew what he was doing and had "a nose and ear for the political climate in Washington". This was true for "risky" operations.

Papich believes it would be disastrous to give both foreign and domestic intelligence duties to a CIA. While there would be advantages in coordinating fragmented sources, it is a risk to liberty, like a national police.

Papich did not recall any significant plan to improve coordination in 1958 when FBI joined USIB. FBI was part of the USIB predecessor group.

The CIA would suggest joint field operations but Hoover would rarely buy it. This was like his reluctance to join any operation with any other agencies. He thought the FBI should always have control, a commanding role. For example, Allan Dulles discussed the United Nations with Hoover. (S)

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He knew Soviet agents and other countries' agents were ~~in the Secretariat~~. Dulles stressed that there was little coverage or penetration ~~at the U.N.~~ The FBI "religiously observed" the ban on operating ~~in the U.N. compound~~. Papich was present when Hoover and Dulles met. When Hoover objected to the plan, Dulles dropped it. Another example: Angelton might be disturbed about our lack of information about KGB operations out of ~~the embassy~~. He would discuss with Papich how to penetrate the KGB.

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Friction would develop in "the gray area" of positive intelligence. For example, a top foreign official came to the United States for medical treatment. The CIA knew he was coming to the U. S. and wanted to know his relationship with Communists and wanted intelligence on the instability in the country. The CIA wants him surveilled to find out his contacts, what he's saying, and a wiretap or bug. The FBI would not do this since he was not an intelligence agent and not within FBI jurisdiction. The CIA would be upset. There were several cases like this, one involving a Bolivian ~~in the~~. Over the years, Papich sold Hoover on ~~these~~, but it was always a gray area. The National Coordination never worked with the FBI.

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In summary, the sources of friction were (1) the OSS experience, (2) political and psychological warfare by CIA, and (3) the CIA desire for positive intelligence gathering in the U. S.

There was no major issue regarding CIA's desire to develop "~~friends~~" in the U.S. Papich recalls no more than three to six instances of disagreement. The FBI never helped the CIA create an organization for deep cover. It never needed FBI help because it moved on its own. The CIA Office of Security advised Papich that they had a relationship with the National Student Association. This never gave the FBI a problem.

The Katzenbach report would not give the FBI problems but many good CIA contacts overseas went down the drain when contacts through student groups were curtailed. Papich believes that if these contacts

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had not been eliminated in 1967 the intelligence community could have dealt with the New Left later. The CIA would have had assets to assess the issues. Such questions involved New Left travels overseas and relationships with foreign agents.

The FBI and CIA did discuss developing a cover in the U. S. to get into China. Travelers gained very little. The immediate problem was the proposal for a joint approach. When Papich was there, it got no further than discussion. If the CIA did set up cover in the U. S., the FBI provided no support. However, if the CIA desired to use a company it would ask for a check of FBI files. Papich is not aware of any political organization created by the CIA, although it may have been done in the 50's or 60's. There was discussion of the FBI about creating its own group aimed at the CIA and discussion of whether or not to let the CIA know about it. There had to be coordination with CIA. Papich does not know if plans to create organizations were implemented. The decision would have been at Hoover's level.

FBI informant travel overseas was limited mainly to CPUSA members. The FBI would not tell CIA about informant trips to Moscow or Paris beforehand. The reason was that the CIA would have notified its field agencies that the informant's life should be protected. Instead, the FBI informed the CIA of the results upon the informant's return.

The FBI liaison section was made up of six or seven agents. Papich and Bill Creager handled the CIA. Creager dealt specifically with USIB, the Security Committee, the Interagency Defector Committee, and the Office of Security. Papich and Creager backed each other up in their respective areas. There were several liaison agents at the Pentagon. The liaison at State was Oren Bartlett. The other liaison agents were not so deeply involved in intelligence operations as was Papich. FBI liaison at NSA was Bill McDonnell, although Papich was also involved with NSA.

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Regarding FBI service and support to other agencies, Hoover was "goddamned careful". He was sensitive to any "risks" and thus any request for FBI support had to be established firmly. Hoover never responded "let them do it" within the United States. Hoover did not give other agencies any blessing or approval for questionable domestic activities such as the case of the Bolivian official mentioned above. (S)

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In both the FBI and the CIA, Papich stimulated interest in covering and recruiting people in the United States, for example embassy officials. The CIA wanted to use its sources to recruit foreign officials in the United States before the officials went home. These officials were not spies, therefore, when the CIA asked the FBI to recruit them, Hoover said no. This issue had its ups and downs, depending on the situation. Sometimes Papich did convince Hoover to let the CIA recruit a foreign official in the U.S. (S)

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Hoover treated State Department requests differently than CIA requests since he considered them to be requests from the Secretary of State rather than the DCI. On bugs or taps, Hoover was back-stopped because the issue went to the Attorney General. If NSA asked for help in getting codes, Hoover sometimes refused. He based his evaluation on the feasibility of the operation. Neither NSA nor State had their own capabilities and there was no formal discussion of their developing it. Papich stressed that Hoover treated State, CIA, and NSA each differently. (S)

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There were flaps in the 1950's when the CIA recruited without clearing with the FBI. The CIA asked for FBI wiretaps no more than five or six times. Papich was asked by FBI officials whether the CIA ever went to the Attorney General directly for wiretap authority. Papich says this may have happened, but not to his knowledge. Few Attorneys General would have stuck their neck out. It was a possibility with McCone and Robert Kennedy, where the relationship was unusually close. Papich says CIA wiretapping could only have happened once or twice since the FBI would have detected it most of the time. If it was done it would be through CIA (S)

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Office of Security, although that office had an excellent relationship with FBI. Allan Dulles would not have condoned it since he had great respect for the FBI. Papich believes the same is true of McCone and Helms. Papich also concedes the possibility of entries by the CIA, citing the independent operation conducted regarding the ~~Bolivian official~~. Hoover opposed going to CIA or NSA for technical support in a joint surveillance operation. The FBI would only ~~for equipment~~ for its own operation.

Regarding the memorandum of understanding between CIA and FBI, the general problem was developing sources in the United States among foreign officials; as many as 12,000 of them a year entered the United States. CIA tried to develop a source in the 50's. FBI involvement "off and on" and some thought a new FBI division would be needed for it. The FBI as constituted did not have trained personnel or capability to develop foreign targets. The CIA had this capability. Papich proposed that FBI permit CIA to recruit in the United States. CIA would advise FBI of its interest in a target, the purposes of the contact, and any results. If the FBI had no interest in the target, that is, an interest in a KGB contact for example, it would OK the CIA contact. FBI required that CIA furnish it any information relevant to its needs, that is regarding KGB contacts (the New Left was handled separately from the memorandum of understanding procedures).

Alan Belmont headed the FBI Intelligence Division before Sullivan. A capable administrator, he operated behind the scene, stayed out of politics, had good rapport with agents, and was able to handle Hoover. When Belmont retired, the FBI "lost a rudder". This was a crucial point in FBI history, with Hoover getting old. Belmont stressed to his subordinates the need to develop a strong case for any proposal going to Hoover. Once that case was ready, Belmont would push it hard, but Papich and Belmont did disagree on such matters as counter-intelligence operations against the KGB.

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Regarding the CIA and domestic dissidents, in the 50's the CIA's general attitude was not to investigate or surveil Americans overseas. FBI-CIA communications rarely involved U. S. citizen targets unless they clearly involved a KGB agent. In the 1960's, Papich recalls two early incidents of FBI requests for CIA coverage overseas. One was the Republic of New Africa, a black group with contacts with Communists and foreign radicals (note by Elliff -- the individual was Robert Williams?). The second was Stokely Carmichael, who traveled around the world. The FBI asked the CIA for coverage of Carmichael's contacts overseas but there were no results since the CIA had no capability. In retrospect, Papich thinks his importance was exaggerated.

Papich does not recall any case or interest of the CIA regarding Dr. King. The FBI levied no requests on the CIA regarding Dr. King. Papich recalls that the FBI thought a black Communist Party member had contacts with King. The assumption was the CPUSA was supported and financed by the Soviet Union. This influenced the FBI's view of the problem. There was no way the CIA could help abroad since the CIA had no penetration into the Communist Party in Russia. The CIA had little on the CPUSA links to the Soviet Union. It put little or no effort abroad into developing information on this. It was not a CIA priority. CIA was satisfied with FBI coverage of the Communist Party. If the KGB was using it for espionage or influence, the FBI would uncover it. The FBI would inform CIA of CPUSA activities. Regarding CPUSA, FBI determined that there was Soviet financial support into the 1960's. The FBI attitude as early as the 50's was that the CIA did not have the capability to discover CPUSA links to the Soviet Union. There were no leads for the CIA to explore in France, Czechoslovakia, etc. If a Communist Party member went to Rome or London, then FBI would ask CIA coverage, but the CIA gave it low priority and produced little. This led to FBI dissatisfaction with CIA, so FBI went through its legal attaches, who would contact foreign security services. Normally, the CIA was informed but sometimes the CIA was not notified if the FBI called it "an internal security" matter. Papich

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stresses that this is a problem. What is the difference between "internal security" and "counter-intelligence" and "positive intelligence"? FBI would use these distinctions as an excuse not to notify CIA.

Regarding the legal attaches, Papich was in Rio de Janeiro after World War II. The FBI had moved out when the CIA moved in, but Hoover wanted to have someone there anyway. Papich stayed a year but wanted out since he disliked doing only liaison work with local police and CIA. The legal attaches were never operations and dealt with foreign security police and criminal police. A major exception was ~~Mexico City~~ where, with CIA acquiescence, the FBI was operational. Its coverage was through sources going back to World War II and may still exist. The targets were criminals and CPUSA officials and the FBI was apprehending fugitives. The FBI did not cover the ~~Soviets~~.

There were six or seven legal attache offices from the 1950's until Papich left in 1970. Papich feels that if the FBI has legal attaches they should be closely coordinated with the CIA so that their assets and sources do not duplicate the CIA. A FBI man abroad can be useful to the intelligence community through his liaison with local police. Coverage in the counterintelligence field of a ~~Soviet officer~~ should be by the CIA. Coverage of a CPUSA member should be joint FBI-CIA. There never has been such coordination. The legal attache should be involved in operations through his liaison contacts.

Papich gave the following example: the CIA and ~~the French DST~~ have good liaison for counterintelligence coverage. If a joint ~~CIA-French~~ coverage target is coming to the U. S., the FBI legal attache should be involved ~~in France~~ to prepare for the transfer of coverage to FBI in the U.S. Papich sees the implications of this for the need to have a single counterintelligence agency. There would be advantages of centralization, communication, and security.

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When the legal attache asks a foreign intelligence service for coverage of an FBI target, it asks for any information rather than specifying the data. This is because foreign services may be penetrated by the KGB.

Papich knew nothing about the tap on Joseph Krafft in France or the "17 wiretaps".

Regarding "leak" cases, over the years back to Eisenhower and Kennedy, the White House did go through the roof. Hoover wanted to know one of these investigations and suspected a source would be a top official. Nothing would be done. For example, under President Kennedy the FBI did identify a top source of leaks, gave the information to Kennedy, and nothing was done. The security committee was created to deal with leaks. Each agency would handle its own, although the President could still order the FBI to enter the case.

Papich did not recall anything about Anna Chennault, but he did recall that during the Korean War there was a request of a top American citizen regarding those negotiations. Papich says he talked them out of it.

Regarding the CIA investigations of U.S. citizens, Papich recalls beginning to request CIA coverage of New Left travel abroad about 1967. He does not recall an FBI interest as early as 1965, at the time of the Hoover meeting at the White House on antiwar protests.

Papich did not know of the 1967 White House request to CIA nor did he know when Ober's unit was set up. He had no discussion with Ober on setting up his unit but he did know of its existence after it was established. The FBI was asking CIA about particular group leaders. The Bureau wanted to know if there was foreign money or guidance to antiwar leaders. These requests were directed to Ober (Papich did not know CIA project codewords). There was no CIA capability to cover antiwar contacts in Hanoi or Moscow. The CIA's attitude toward this new issue was similar to the old assumptions about the CPUSA.

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The accepted view at CIA was that it was important to determine if there was foreign support or sabotage training. After 1967, FBI-CIA contacts on this topic developed rapidly. There were few really valuable CIA results nor was much obtained through the FBI, the legal attaches, or informants going abroad.

Papich referred to the climate of press commentary, assassinations, allegations of sabotage plans, and bombings. There was "a potential for panic within the intelligence community" since no one had the coverage they thought they needed. Travel of U.S. antiwar leaders to Communist nations seemed important, although sometimes after inquiry the individuals were found not to be important. Therefore, time was spent on targets who should not have been targets but this was a new task.

Hoover did not understand the issue. He thought New Left CPUSA links were most important. Papich never thought the CPUSA responsible for development of the New Left or SDS. CPUSA did try to use the New Left. Hoover assumed the Soviets controlled CPUSA day to day. Some of his assumptions had been proved wrong. In World War II days, yes, the Soviets used CPUSA for recruitment. In the late 40's and 50's, the Soviets changed their policy, no longer using CPUSA for this purpose. Hoover was never convinced of this change. Papich recognized the possibility that there might be a reversal of Soviet policy regarding CPUSA but Papich's top concern has always been KGB penetration of CIA, FBI, NSA, etc., as well as the question of how good the double agents are.

Regarding the theory of KGB aims for using U.S. dissidents, the main problem was lack of knowledge. In the 40's and 50's, the FBI was confident of its knowledge of CPUSA and could assess its use to influence U. S. politics, but in the late 50's the Bureau's coverage of new groups was tremendously weak. The FBI recognized this. The CIA stressed it also for three reasons: (1) the increase in FBI requests for CIA information, (2) the White House requests, and (3) CIA officials own concern about inadequate coverage. The conclusion was that intelligence regarding people who went abroad was inadequate.

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Papich had no personal involvement with White House requests. There was discussion both in the FBI and between CIA and FBI on expanding coverage and development of sources. For example, does CIA have anybody who can have an entree into SDS? The Katzenbach report had limited the CIA to foreign sources or to U. S. students recruited abroad. Papich dealt mainly with Ober on this, but also with Angleton and Tom Karamenses (DDP). Papich believes anything Ober said and did reflected CIA policy from the top. The operation grew like Topsy. CIA compartmented it very tightly and Ober was very security conscious. In the FBI, W. C. Sullivan was concerned, shocked by the assassinations, riots, and bombings. He put on the pressure to find out what was behind it. He pressed Papich to pressure the

Regarding assassination, Sullivan was ultimately convinced and Belmont was convinced that Oswald acted alone. No one has answered the question of what Oswald did in the Soviet Union. Did he get any guidance? Why did they permit him to leave? Papich had frequent discussions with Dulles and the CIA regarding the Warren Commission although he thinks the formal FBI liaison was Jim Malloy. The question as to whether Oswald was a U. S. intelligence asset never arose. Critics at the time said the FBI should have surveilled Oswald. Papich recalls discussions of a plan to have a CIA or FBI man defect to Moscow but no such plan was ever implemented to his knowledge. It was not worth the risk. He does not know whether the CIA did it. He stresses that the FBI was not likely to use "nuts".

Regarding the Riha incident, Papich says this was not the reason for his retirement. Instead, there were problems with Hoover on operations and policy decisions. Papich was taking an aggressive stand on coverage of **Soviets.** (S)

Regarding McCone's proposal on expanded FBI coverage of **Soviets.** Papich stated that others in the CIA influenced McCone to press for more coverage. (S) McCone was aggressive. Papich pushed it too. This was the time of the Cuban missile crisis.

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Hoover would agree to expand on certain issues but proposals for major new operations went to PFIAB for support. Clifford was chairman. Papich doesn't know what Hoover said to Clifford, but the answer on the proposal was negative. The proposal involved more extensive and sophisticated electronic surveillance. This was at the time of discovery of microphones in the U. S. Embassy in Moscow, as well as an increase in the number of KGB attempts to recruit U. S. citizens abroad. He does not think COINTELPRO was developed as an alternative to this.

Hoover's rejection of McConaughy did influence CIA attitudes toward the FBI. CIA saw the FBI as not being "a clandestine agency". CIA's view was that FBI had to reject CIA proposals as illegal. When Papich lectured to CIA recruits he attempted to orient CIA to the FBI's limits. On the other hand, FBI did not understand CIA functions abroad.

Returning to the Riha incident, Papich stressed that he clashed with Hoover every year and that their relationship had declined steadily after 1966. By fall of '69, he saw his value as nil. In December '69, he decided to retire the following spring. In February 1970, while winding up his normal business, the Riha incident arose. Professor Riha disappeared from the university. There was faculty and press interest in Boulder, Colorado, and a Congressional inquiry came to FBI. But FBI opened no case or investigation. In March of 1970 the president of the University of Colorado came to a CIA man in domestic contact service in Boulder to inquire about the disappearance. The CIA man called two friends in the Denver FBI office. FBI agent agreed to contact Denver police and discovered that marital problems had led to the disappearance. CIA man told the university president what he learned from "reliable government sources". The president told the press. The local district attorney called the president and asked his source. The president went back to his CIA source. The CIA source then promptly contacted the CIA officer in Denver, who contacted the Denver FBI SAC. The CIA officer suggested that he and the SAC go to the district attorney to say that the original source was local police, but the SAC rejected the idea and

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wanted to know the identity of the FBI agent who gave the information. The CIA officer refused and there was a bitter clash. (Things like this had happened in the past. FBI field agents had contacted Papich and Papich had always told them to get on with the job.) The SAC sent a teletype to Hoover. Hoover said to Papich, go to Helms and get the identity of the FBI source. Helms called in the CIA man, who refused to identify him. Helms sent Hoover a letter saying this and said he was "taking the necessary administrative action". Hoover noted on this letter "discontinue liaison with CIA".

Papich then wrote a long letter of resignation to Hoover instead of his brief resignation note. He strongly appealed to Hoover to reconsider and keep communications open. He also raised serious questions concerning Hoover's past decisions. Hoover was not happy. Papich says there had been dozens of incidents like this before. He did not confer with anyone in the FBI about his letter. W. C. Sullivan was angry with Papich for stirring things up. (Papich says if it is OK with the FBI it's OK with him for the Committee to get the letter, although he considers it personal to Hoover. The letter reviews FBI-CIA relations.)

Regarding the 1966 cutbacks, Papich thinks it started with the Long Committee hearings on the Internal Revenue Service. After the Kennedy Administration, and especially under Attorney General Clark, there were cutbacks in electronic

coverage. This definitely affected CIA interest in the coverage of Soviets. CIA would prod the FBI on the coverage of embassies. CIA Technical Services Division only loaned equipment to FBI. He does recall a four-month joint experimental test of equipment in the Washington area. (S)

W. C. Sullivan saw Angleton and CIA directors at USIB meetings. Papich would discuss FBI-CIA problems with Sullivan. Papich stressed the need for microphone coverage. This was "a red flag" to Hoover. The obstacle was that entry operations were needed and could be detected. (S)

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Regarding the CIA and local police, the only thing Papich recalls is discussion of the CIA's relationship with New York City police. The purpose was not operations, but protection of CIA New York facilities. He was also aware of relationships between Washington, D. C., and suburban police for protection of CIA facilities and personnel. He knew that some CIA employees joined questionable groups and that the CIA was concerned about its personnel associating with radicals and protesters. The CIA Office of Security informed the FBI in 1967-1970 that it had developed from two to six sources to assess involvement of CIA personnel in protest groups. The information provided to the FBI from these sources about such groups was "crap". Papich was not involved in any meetings with CIA sources. He is not aware of any CIA activity regarding Women's Strike for Peace, nor was he aware of any CIA intelligence operations for the purpose of protecting CIA from violent demonstrations. CIA should have relied on FBI.

Bill Creager was succeeded as liaison with Office of Security by Fred Cassidy. They provided memoranda to the FBI Intelligence Division on all transactions with CIA. Creager kept Papich advised, especially of the potential for flaps and for successful operations. Papich believes Office of Security was restricted both in number of personnel and by CIA rules. It could claim a need to protect its own facilities and personnel but it didn't have significant capability. If it did, it would have been detected by the FBI.

Regarding the Dominican Republic in 1965, Papich recalls the fear of another Cuba by the President and the National Security Council. Johnson may have asked the FBI for help. An FBI agent from the office in San Juan, Puerto Rico, and possibly from Mexico City, were sent to the Dominican Republic. This was done with CIA approval and the joint effort was successful. There were no flaps. The FBI agent had sources all over Central America going back to World War II. Other FBI activities in the Caribbean grew out of the FBI's role in Havana before Castro, Jamaica, Miami, and San Juan. In all these areas the FBI's capability was based

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on personal relationships going back to World War II. In the late 1960's, the FBI went into El Salvador and Papich thought this was a waste of FBI manpower.

Regarding Cubans in Miami, there were many flaps with CIA. For example, CIA would attempt to recruit an exile for an operation in Cuba, the exile would ask the FBI about it, and Hoover would get mad. The FBI would not be informed about CIA cover companies screening exiles. The FBI investigated one cover company until it discovered the CIA cover. CIA tried to recruit FBI sources without checking out FBI. Papich is sure CIA "must have" used agents to cover local Miami Cubans. But FBI had excellent coverage and would protest when CIA took an interest in somebody FBI was investigating. There would be general protests to CIA to stay out of counterintelligence. Some problems were resolved locally with the FBI agent in charge. There was minimum FBI contact with CIA operations. Some names involved here are Freddy Frohbose, deceased; Bill Harvey; and a Fitzgerald. (S)

Regarding CIA counterintelligence against Cubans in New York, Papich said the policy was no counterintelligence by CIA. He has no recollection of CIA implication in anti-Castro Cuban illegal activities, but Papich admits he would have learned only if there was a flap.

Regarding CIA Domestic Operations Division, Papich formulated the 1966 agreement to ease FBI relationships. The problem, as noted earlier, was CIA desire to interview foreign officials in the U. S. for at the U. N. Hoover finally, reluctantly, agreed to the 1966 understanding. Papich warned CIA that if there were continuing flaps, Hoover would withdraw his agreement and "it would be my butt". There were flaps from 1966 to 1970 where Domestic Operations Division attempted to recruit and failed to advise FBI. If CIA was interested in a Soviet bloc intelligence service recruitment, FBI said no. If either Domestic Operations Division or the counterintelligence staff was interested in any Soviet in the U. S., they touched base with FBI. But they felt that if FBI had allowed them to recruit they could have succeeded. (S)

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Regarding postal intercept, CIA came up with the proposition, said they had entree, and desired it for positive intelligence. CIA did all the work. The focus was air mail to and from ~~Russia~~. CIA gave FBI the products where FBI had "stops" on persons of interest and also where other information might be of interest to FBI. It provided some leads to intelligence agents. Papich recalls a brief mail intercept in the early 1950's on the West Coast regarding ~~China~~. It was stopped after a new postmaster arrived. Papich stated that the New York operation was of greater benefit to the CIA for positive intelligence regarding ~~the Soviet Union~~. (S)

Papich recalls meetings with CIA and NSA on improv-
ing coverage, but not much worthwhile resulted. There was ~~COMINT~~ in the Miami area ~~DRing~~ and monitoring. The FBI would get leads for suspects. In CIA, Division D were the ~~COMINT~~ people. Papich recalls no other areas ~~for DRing~~ in the U. S. (S)

Regarding CIA Domestic Contact Service, FBI would get positive intelligence reports, for example, on an alien coming to the United States. The FBI was interested in his training in Russia as a possible source regarding Soviet intelligence activities. The CIA Domestic Contact Service would provide reports to FBI headquarters or the field on antiwar, Black Power, and protest groups. They got the information from faculty and students regarding future riots.

The Domestic Contact Service programs and priorities were set by the intelligence community, for example, gather whatever they can about missiles. The FBI would not task DCS. If DCS went into operations, FBI itself was upset. But DCS had good officers who would note potential for counter-intelligence use. There was no increase in DCS traffic regarding dissidents in 1967 to 1969.

The creation of DCS in 1947 worried Hoover, who feared an internal security role. It was set up by NSCID. Until the 1960's, there was no contact between FBI and the DCS at the field level. The procedure developed that if DCS wanted to interview

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an alien, a form was submitted by FBI. CIA then got FBI data on the alien and FBI had notice so it could protect any operation.

Regarding possible spies in foreign intelligence agencies, if the FBI discovers any it evaluates the potential for a double agent or the possibility of recruitment. FBI usually goes to the agency and tells them the situation to prevent access to sensitive information. Also, the agency can give FBI assistance. The CIA Office of Security is "paranoid" on this subject. It is very concerned if there is a report on a CIA employee associating with bloc nationals. Before telling the FBI, it would do as much as it could on its own so there would be something to discuss. In one case the CIA was absolutely convinced an employee was a spy, predicated on its analysts' conclusions from a photograph. FBI refused to move on the basis of this alone. There were other cases where FBI and CIA had different evaluations of evidence. It depended on what CIA gave FBI. CIA was "jumpier" than FBI.

If CIA did any electronic surveillance of its own employees, it never checked with FBI. The same was true for physical surveillance of its own employees. If the FBI had known, it would have raised hell, but it never came to FBI attention and there was no policy discussion of the subject. If the CIA wanted to do something with its own assets with Attorney General or White House approval, it would not check with FBI. But it would coordinate with FBI if it saw a risk that FBI would discover.

Papich recalls no CIA surveillance of newsmen. Papich adds his view that every newsman assigned to Moscow is useful to the KGB. A newsmen who may have been recruited by KGB in Moscow may become a target in the U. S.

Papich did not recall any problem of CIA activity "tainting" a criminal case. CIA would make sources available for criminal prosecutions.

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Regarding CIA Far East Division, Papich recalls proposals for developing cover in the U. S. for going overseas. Ober advised Papich of the development of sources in the U. S. to cover overseas targets. Papich would write a memo on the situation and provide any relevant FBI information. He also discussed with Ober giving FBI assets to CIA if they travel overseas. Papich stresses that FBI sources are sent overseas. He encouraged working through CIA but never got very far. Papich gives the example of an FBI source who went to Italy and reported back through CIA.

Ober asked FBI to use its sources to gather information on policy guidance, funding, and training of U. S. dissidents overseas. There was a large volume of communication covering names like Carmichael and leaders in domestic groups.

FBI told CIA that if there was ever an investigation regarding a possible U. S. crime, CIA must recognize the evidentiary rules. If there were prosecutions (very few), it was never necessary to disclose CIA data. CIA sources were not in a position to testify. Papich does not recall asking CIA if information sent to FBI from CIA might have originated with electronic surveillance overseas.

If Ober gave FBI information regarding domestic matters, FBI would ask for everything CIA knew about the sources. CIA memos would be very brief. Papich would insist on identification of the sources, since the FBI might want to use it. FBI did get access to sources, sometimes working through a CIA intermediary if source would not talk to FBI.

Papich recalls discussing creation of "notional" groups targeted at ~~China and Russia.~~ The program was not implemented before he left in 1970. It could have been explored in the FBI Intelligence Division but they would have come to Papich if CIA was needed. Papich discussed with Far East Division in CIA.

Regarding the several million dollar fund transfer to FBI, Papich recalls this was an effort of the entire intelligence community, including the White

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House, to acquire Soviet cable traffic. The money was for real estate and equipment. The FBI would run the operation to provide bloc traffic product to NSA. Papich was not directly involved, but he heard of it.

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Papich recalls discussion with Technical Services Division regarding secret inks, but he recalls no instance where TSD provided documents to FBI and he has no knowledge of any COINTELPRO-type use of CIA alias documentation or other document forging. If this had been done, it would have had to go through Papich.

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Papich knew nothing about Vesco.

On Ober memos to FBI, Papich recalls a code designation (possibly "ML") The purpose was so that when information came back to CIA from FBI it could be sent directly to Ober. The counter-intelligence staff had an office to log communications. The determination as to what FBI information would go to Ober was first based on Ober's request for specifics and second based on FBI criteria which considered whether there would be any possible CIA results. FBI would alert Ober regarding an individual and ask for any information generally about his overseas activity.

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Papich does not recall any CIA breaking and entering operations in the 1960's.

Regarding CIA security research staff, Papich recalled that it concentrated on developing counter-intelligence equipment. It also was "an Angleton-type" operation, doing research on penetration of the CIA. It also analyzed and evaluated the exposure to the agency of OSS personnel who might have been Communists or have had World War II Communist contacts. For example, in Germany until the mid-50's, CIA was vulnerable to recruitment by Communist intelligence. CIA brought in brilliant minds who might still have strong identification with their home countries in eastern and middle Europe.

Finally, Papich and Creager felt that "the guts of liaison" was with DDP on counterintelligence, not on their internal security problems. With Office of Security there was a small number of investigations overlapping FBI.

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