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The United States Senate

R1124

Report of Proceedings

3/10/77
EE

Hearing held before

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

Tuesday, September 9, 1975

Washington, D. C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over
to the Committee for destruction)

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C O N T E N T S

TESTIMONY OF

PAGE

Bronson Tweedy

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(The above exhibits were retained by counsel.)

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EXECUTIVE SESSION

Tuesday, September 9, 1975

United States Senate,
Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with respect to
Intelligence Activities,
Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:15 p.m.,
in Room 443, Russell Office Building, Senator Walter F.
Mondale presiding.

Present: Senator Mondale (presiding).

Also present: Rhett Dawson and Frederick Baron,
Professional Staff Members.

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1 Senator Mondale. Do you swear the testimony you are
2 about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
3 but the truth, so help you God?

4 Mr. Tweedy. I do.

5 Mr. Baron. Mr. Tweedy, are you aware that you have
6 the right to counsel here today?

7 Mr. Tweedy. I am.

8 Mr. Baron. And are you appearing voluntarily here
9 today without counsel?

10 Mr. Tweedy. I am.

11 (At this point, the hearing was removed to Room 608,
12 Carroll Arms Hotel.)

13 Mr. Baron. Are you also aware that all of your
14 Constitutional rights are intact before the Committee, includ-
15 ing your Fifth Amendment rights?

16 Mr. Tweedy. I am.

17 Mr. Baron. Mr. Tweedy, are you aware that you have
18 the right to cease answering questions at any time and
19 consult with an attorney?

20 Mr. Tweedy. Yes. I gather that was implicit in what
21 you said in the Senator's office.

22 Mr. Baron. It was.

23 Now, that we are no longer in the Senator's presence
24 I would like to make it clear to you that you are under no
25 obligation to continue testifying, although the Committee

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would obviously appreciate it if you would.

Are you willing to do so?

Mr. Tweedy. I have no intention of not cooperating.

Mr. Baron. And you are willing to continue to testify to the truth as best you can?

Mr. Tweedy. Indeed I will.

Mr. Baron. Perhaps we should begin by putting on the record a bit of your background in Agency activities leading to the point at which you assumed the position as Chief of the African Division.

TESTIMONY OF BRONSON TWEEDY

Mr. Tweedy. I came aboard the Agency in the first of May, 1947 and after training was sent to Switzerland. I returned in 1950 and did a series of desk jobs in what was known as the Central European Division, I guess, and went through a number of different assignments at that time, until May of 1953 when I went out as Chief of Station to ¹⁵⁻¹⁴Vienna, Austria. I was there until the middle of 1956 and returned very briefly to the States, went to ¹⁵⁻¹London as Deputy Chief of Station there. I took over as Chief of Station there in the middle of 1958 and was then replaced by Frank Wisner, in ¹⁵⁻¹London early in October 1959, and I took over the African Division I should think somewhere around between the 15th and 18th of November 1959.

That brings me up to date.

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1 Mr. Baron. And how long did you serve as Chief of
2 the African Division?

3 Mr. Tweedy. Until September of '63.

4 Mr. Baron. In that position did you consult frequent
5 with people in policy-making positions at the State Department?

6 Mr. Tweedy. Well, as I was explaining to you as we
7 were strolling around, the simple answer to that is yes.
8 These consultations would take many, many different forms.

9 On the Congo, for example, the State Department
10 obviously was just as involved as practically the rest of the
11 U.S. Government and they had a Congolese task force. I
12 would attend their meetings or a representative of mine would
13 attend their meetings. They took place almost daily,
14 sometimes I guess even more than once daily.

15 Mr. Baron. During what period of time?

16 Mr. Tweedy. Oh, Lord, from the time the Congo thing
17 really hotted up, and I am talking then particularly under the
18 Kennedy Administration, when Mennen Williams organized the
19 task force and Wayne Fredericks was his deputy; those meet-
20 ings were State's meetings, they weren't CIA meetings, they
21 weren't meetings primarily to discuss the CIA policy, but
22 we had to be there to maintain, to keep abreast of what the
23 policy was.

24 Mr. Baron. If we could focus our attention on the
25 period between the independence of the Congo in June of '60
and the announcement of the death of Lumumba in February of '61.

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1 Mr. Tweedy. Was that the month of his death?

2 Mr. Baron. The month the death was announced.

3 As you know, there is a lot of mystery surrounding his
4 death and the probable cause of his death. AS far as the U.S.
5 investigation was concerned it was January 17 or perhaps
6 January 18, 1961.

7 Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

8 Mr. Baron. What was the nature of your contact with
9 the State Department during that period of time?

10 Mr. Tweedy. My recollection of this is far less
11 Congo and far more general, as I was mentioning to you as
12 we strolled, and particularly my talks with Jim Penfield, to
13 whom Joe Satterswate was dedicated.

14 Joe Satterswate, who was Assistant Secretary for
15 African Affairs, and Penfield and I were colleagues in Vienna
16 together. He had the minister. But we did a great deal of
17 talking together about CIA deployment in Africa. I was
18 forming a division both at home and abroad and I had a lot
19 of things to negotiate with him. ³² ~~about State cover for~~

20 ~~stations~~ and he naturally had his views on a lot of the things
21 we wanted to do, and we spent a great deal of time arguing
22 these things out, making arrangements and so on and so forth.

23 To be frank with you, I have far less recollection about
24 intimate policy talks on places like the Congo with that
25 particular group than I did after 19-what, the beginning of

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1 the Kennedy Administration.

2 Mr. Baron. It was during the Kennedy Administration
3 that the large scale paramilitary operations in the Congo were
4 geared up.

5 Mr. Tweedy. All that happened then, absolutely.

6 Mr. Baron. Do you remember discussions with Livingstone
7 Merchant in the State Department before the turn of Adminis-
8 trations?

9 Mr. Tweedy. I knew Livingstone Merchant but specific
10 discussions with him I really do not recall, no. Later on
11 I remember having a couple of meetings along with Mr. Rusk.

12 Mr. Baron. Did any of those meetings concern Lumumba?

13 Mr. Tweedy. No, Mr. Rusk, I think they exclusively
14 concerned Portuguese Africa.

15 Mr. Baron. Do you remember having any meetings alone
16 with Herter, Secretary Herter, about Lumumba?

17 Mr. Tweedy. I am not sure I have had a meeting with Mr.
18 Herter.

19 Mr. Baron. Did you have any meetings with Secretary
20 Herter or Douglas Dillon or Livingstone Merchant?

21 Mr. Tweedy. Never met Mr. Dillon.

22 Mr. Baron. About Congolese affairs?

23 Mr. Tweedy. Never met Mr. Dillon and I do not recall
24 having met with Livingstone Merchant on the Congo. I may
25 have done so but I really don't recall, I had very little

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1 professional contact with Mr. Merchant. I knew him mostly
2 slightly socially.

3 Mr. Baron. When you met regularly with Mr. Satterswater
4 or Mr. Penfield did you discuss Lumumba with them?

5 Mr. Tweedy. I am sure we discussed Lumumba in the
6 sense of which would be all the time, assessing the situa-
7 tion, assessing where Lumumba was heading, where the Congo
8 was heading. I did this with, you know, almost all of the
9 African situations, individual African country situations.

10 We would spend a great deal of time, their points of
11 view, our point of view, our perspective, their perspective,
12 but never as an action matter that I can recall.

13 Mr. Baron. Was the assassination of Patrice Lumumba
14 ever contemplated or raised in those meetings?

15 Mr. Tweedy. Never.

16 Mr. Baron. Did you meet regularly in this period
17 between Congolese independence and the announced death of
18 Lumumba with people at the NSC level or people in the White
19 House?

20 Mr. Tweedy. I don't recall so at all. For example, if
21 President Eisenhower had an African representative the same
22 way President Kennedy later had, then I can't recall who he
23 was. President Kennedy had two. The first name escapes
24 me. He later went on down to South Africa as Ambassador
25 and one that I saw most of for a considerable period of

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1 time was Carl Kazen, recently retired head of the School of
2 Advanced Studies in Princeton.

3 Mr. Baron. During the Eisenhower Administration did
4 you have direct contact with Gordon Gray or Andrew Goodpaster
5 with reference to Congolese affairs.

6 You are shaking your head and we have to put it on
7 the record.

8 Mr. Tweedy. I am alsmot convinced that the answer is
9 no. I am just thinking. I know Gordon Gray quite well. I
10 don't recall ever having policy discussions with him at all,
11 nor General Goodpaster. I think the answer is certainly no.

12 Mr. Baron. You mentioned to me earlier that you had
13 attended only two National Security Council meetings in your
14 memory and that those two meetings were both long after the
15 death of Lumumba, is that correct?

16 Mr. Tweedy. I can only imagine that they must have been
17 because this was well into the Kennedy Administration. I
18 wouldn't be able to put any dates on it now.

19 Mr. Baron. It was during the directorship of John
20 McCone at CIA?

21 Mr. Tweedy. Yes, that is without question. And
22 McBundy was at the meetings. Yes, it must have been
23 well after the death of Lumumba, maybe even the following
24 year.

25 Mr. Baron. During the latter part of the Eisenhower

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1 Administration when events in Congo were heating up, after
2 Congolese independence, what was the general atmosphere in
3 the State Department and at the CIA in relation to Lumumba,
4 the general attitude toward Lumumba?

5 Mr. Tweedy. Well, I think you would have to start by
6 saying what was the general assessment of the situation in
7 the Congo. Lumumba was really sort of the last thing you
8 came down to.

9 The worry in WASHINGTON about the situation in the
10 Congo was that here was the largest geographical expression
11 in Africa that threatened to go up in smoke, up because the
12 Kremlin was about to march in and take it over, not because
13 it was about to break up tribally and do all the things that
14 those African countries in their early years were at least
15 vulnerable to. The only trouble with the Congo was if it
16 happened there the side effects would have been infinitely
17 greater than, of course, if it had happened anywhere else.

18 Mr. Baron. What would those side effects have been?

19 Mr. Tweedy. All one could do was assess those, but it
20 would have set a precedent, for example, the neighboring
21 country by which great store was set by the West was Nigeria
22 and if the same infection crossed that border one was afraid
23 that this would go up in smoke and that in effect there
24 was a possibility of the continent disintegrating before it
25 really had had a chance to get under way under its own aegis.

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1 This was the concern.

2 Mr. Baron. Were these political side effects only
3 that were being taken into account or were there also
4 fears for American business interests in the Congo that
5 were part of the side effects?

6 Mr. Tweedy. Insofar as my assessments were concerned,
7 and those of the Agency and any conversations I can recall
8 with the State Department, American business was just not a
9 great factor.

10 If you want to talk about business, the big factor, of
11 course, was Katanga and eventually when Tachombe threatened to
12 succeed resulting in the great involvement of both the U.N. and
13 the U.S. in the Congo affair, the fear there was that if you
14 put together the Congo without Katanga it was like construct-
15 ing a Cadillac and purposely omitting the gas station.

16 Mr. Baron. That is because Katanga is the home of
17 most of the natural resources that are in the Congo.

18 Mr. Tweedy. That is the only thing that keeps that
19 country going.

20 Now, I don't say there weren't a lot of economic con-
21 siderations in back of that but these were political
22 economic concerns much more than anything parochial, but is
23 what was going to happen to U.S. business was not a factor inso-
24 far as I recall.

25 Mr. Baron. So the primary concern was for political

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1 stability in Africa.

2 Mr. Tweedy. Yes, political stability in Africa. In
3 a quick phrase you put your foot right on that.

4 Mr. Dawson. During the summer of 1960 you mentioned
5 earlier that in the time frame you did not think the
6 Kremlin was ready to march in there, as that was a fear with
7 you but --

8 Mr. Tweedy. I don't mean to say this was nothing that
9 anybody was worried about but it was not the primary concern.

10 Mr. Dawson. But there was significant Soviet interest
11 in infiltrating and taking advantage of the situation in the
12 Congo?

13 Mr. Tweedy. I think it would be much more accurate
14 to say it was our assumption, we were not privy to Soviet
15 intentions with respect to Africa, which I suspect in those
16 days like a great many other things about African culture
17 round the globe were ill informed at that point, and un-
18 doubtedly seeking their own policies in Africa just the way this
19 country was. It was obviously a worry.

20 Mr. Baron. Was it also our assumption if the Soviets
21 moved into the Congo they would move on the side of Lumumba?

22 Mr. Tweedy. Oh, yes, I think there would have been
23 little doubt in our minds that that would have been the case.

24 Mr. Baron. And is it also true that the general perception
25 at the Agency and in the State Department was that Lumumba

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1 posed the threat in the Congo beyond the mere threat of
2 political instability because of his closeness to the Soviets
3 or his willingness to accept aid from the Soviets?

4 Mr. Tweedy. It made the cheese more binding but I
5 don't think we had any information indicating there was
6 any close umbilicus between the Soviets and Lumumba but it
7 was potentially there.

8 Mr. Baron. And that potential --

9 Mr. Tweedy. This increased one's nervousness about the
10 situation.

11 Mr. Baron. In your capacity as Chief of the African
12 Division to whom did you report and from whom did you receive
13 orders?

14 Mr. Tweedy. Well, the normal chain of command was
15 through DDD, Dick Bissell and --

16 Mr. Baron. Would you meet regularly with Richard
17 Bissell during this period of time?

18 Mr. Tweedy. Regularly would be a big word. Not
19 necessarily that often. We might talk on the phone. To
20 say that I saw him all the time, how often I don't know. It
21 would go in fits and starts, undoubtedly but --

22 Mr. Baron. In formulating actions to be taken in the
23 Congo, would you consult with Bissell before you undertook
24 any major operation.

25 Mr. Tweedy. Well, depending on what you mean by

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1 major operation. Major operation per se, if you are not
2 talking about just intelligence operations, call for in-
3 structions and formalization either inside the Agency or out-
4 side.

5 Mr. Baron. So any major covert action would be
6 formulated in consultation not only with Bissell but with the
7 DCI, Allen Dulles at that time, and probably higher levels
8 than that.

9 Mr. Tweedy. I suppose the DCI, if Bissell felt that
10 was necessary, and, of course, he used to talk to the
11 DCI without my being present, and undoubtedly certain instruc-
12 tions I would receive from time to time undoubtedly stem from
13 conversations that Bissell would have had with the DCI and
14 funnelled down to me.

15 I didn't always know who talked to whom before I re-
16 ceived instructions.

17 Mr. Baron. So if you received an instruction from
18 Richard Bissell as DDP you would proceed to implement that
19 instruction on the assumption it was fully authorized above
20 the level of DDP?

21 Mr. Tweedy. I think I would proceed with it on the
22 basis that he was authorized to give me instructions
23 and it was up to him to bloody well know what he was empowered
24 to tell me to do.

25 I couldn't run his affairs for him to that extent, but

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1 by and large I reckon the Agency worked and that was the way
2 it was set up to work and that is the way it worked, but to
3 say every time Bissell talked to me he always talked to
4 Allen Dulles first I would think is nonsense.

5 Mr. Baron. You didn't consider it your duty to question
6 Bissell about the source of authority for some covert action
7 he was asking you to undertake?

8 Mr. Tweedy. I would have never hesitated to do if
9 I felt that it was necessary to do so.

10 I can't recall having done so. He and I used to have
11 disagreements philosophically on operations. We were very
12 good friends and I never had any hesitation about telling him
13 when I thought he didn't make any sense but --

14 Mr. Dawson. Could you describe that philosophical
15 difference, or is it describable?

16 Mr. Tweedy. Well it varied a lot. I think Dick was
17 by and large inclined to feel that almost anything was
18 possible, you know, in the clandestine service, if they put
19 their minds to it, and my view was this wasn't the case.

20 Mr. Dawson. Thank you.

21 Mr. Baron. Did you ever discuss the question of
22 assassinating Lumumba with Richard Bissell?

23 Mr. Tweedy. Yes, this was the way the whole thing
24 came up in the first instance. I can't remember how it came
25 up except undoubtedly we had a conversation.

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Mr. Baron. Do you recall when it came up?

Mr. Tweedy. No, I don't. It obviously must have come up, I assume, what, the fall of 1960. But I have no way of putting a date to it.

Mr. Baron. And what was said during that discussion or perhaps I should backtrack first and ask whether this was one discussion or a series of discussions?

Mr. Tweedy. Oh, we must have discussed it more than once. I think it came up in the sense that Dick would have said we probably better be thinking about whether it might ever be necessary or desirable to get rid of Lumumba, in which case we presumably should be in position to assess whether we could do it or not successfully.

Mr. Baron. Do it, meaning carry off an assassination?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes, but it was never discussed with him in any other sense but a planning exercise, but a planning exercise which, in other words, never were we instructed to do anything of this kind. We were instructed to ask whether such a thing would be feasible and to have the Chief of Station be thinking along those lines as well.

Mr. Baron. So, in effect you were asked to move ahead at least as far as developing the capability to carry off an assassination if an order should be given?

Mr. Tweedy. Well, or to examine the potential for doing that.

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1 Mr. Dawson. I know that you have indicated you
2 won't be able to put a precise date to this conversation
3 with Bissell or conversations with Bissell, but maybe we can
4 narrow it down a little bit.

5 Would you assume that it would be after the proclama-
6 tion of the Congolese independence on June 30, 1960?

7 Mr. Tweedy. Oh, yes.

8 Mr. Dawson. Would you assume it would be before
9 Lumumba's being put into U.N. protective custody on
10 September 15, 1960?

11 Mr. Tweedy. I think it must have been, yes. I
12 didn't realize he had gone into custody that early.

13 Mr. Baron. So then it would be sometime during the
14 summer or early fall of '60?

15 Mr. Tweedy. What happened to Lumumba after that?

16 Mr. Baron. He was in protective custody at the United
17 Nations force from mid-September until late November and
18 it was in late November that he left to go traveling
19 towards Stanleyville and he was captured by Mobutu's troops
20 at that point in very early December and from early December
21 until mid-January he was in the custody of the Congolese in
22 prison and then it was in mid-January 1961 that he was
23 flown from a prison in Tysville to Katanga where his death
24 was announced shortly thereafter.

25 Mr. Tweedy. That I recall. I have got to assume it

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1 was sometime after September 15th. I don't know.

2 Mr. Baron. When you say "after" --

3 Mr. Tweedy. After you put September 15 the day he
4 came under. The only thing is I have no recollection that
5 it would have happened as early as, say, early August or
6 early September.

7 Mr. Baron. It was in August or early September that
8 Lumumba was Premier of the Congo?

9 Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

10 Mr. Baron. And there was obviously a struggle for power
11 between Lumumba and Kasavubu going on.

12 Mr. Dawson. I guess the crucial question.

13 Mr. Tweedy. You have really got me at this point.

14 Mr. Dawson. It would be whether or not you would have
15 considered the plan had he been in U.N. protective custody.
16 If you assume that would be the case, then I don't think
17 any more precision in the date would necessarily be productive.

18 Mr. Treedy. My whole recollection of the thing would
19 be that only purpose of the exercise would have been to have
20 a plan when he was in nobody's custody.

21 Mr. Baron. That would have been before --

22 Mr. Tweedy. That is the only thing that makes sense
23 to me, September, because --

24 Mr. Baron. Well, I will go on.

25 In a moment I will show you some cable traffic that

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1 went back and forth between headquarters and the Congo after
2 he was in U.N. custody to see if that refreshes your recollec-
3 tion about the general attitude with regard to Lumumba at
4 that time.

5 Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

6 Mr. Baron. But, you are saying now, that it would
7 only make sense to you that --

8 Mr. Tweedy. In retrospect nothing makes sense to me
9 but --

10 Mr. Baron. -- that this initial consideration of the
11 feasibility of the assassination of Lumumba between Bissell
12 and yourself?

13 Mr. Tweedy. I should have thought that would have
14 been during the period when he was in effect in power. I
15 should have thought, but the record may prove me wrong.

16 Mr. Baron. Did you have any discussion with Bissell
17 where he indicated that his own consideration of the assassina-
18 tion of Lumumba had moved beyond the realm of possibility to
19 an actual plan that he was prepared to carry out or taking
20 steps to carry out.

21 Mr. Tweedy. I cannot recall a conversation with
22 Bissell wherein effect he said, let's move from A to B or C
23 to D or something like this. I do not recall that. My
24 recollection of the whole interval when this was under con-
25 sideration was that it was a planning interval and at no point

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1 can I recall that I even felt it was imminent that somebody
2 would say go, (a) we never came up with a plan that was
3 go-able. or anything really very close to it. It was
4 always my assumption that at the time anything like this should
5 occur there would have been some kind of real focus on the
6 problem at probably a very considerable policy level within
7 the Agency at which somebody would have said something
8 more about it and it never occurred to me I would get a call
9 or Bissell would ask me to come down to his office and say
10 go to it.

11 Nor were we ever in position where he said that I would
12 merely implement plan so-and-so. We never got that far.

13 Mr. Baron. You didn't have any action plans for
14 assassination of Lumumba that you had prepared or were aware
15 of?

16 Mr. Tweedy. No. Planning, yes, but nothing that ever
17 got anywhere.

18 Mr. Baron. What kind of planning was done?

19 Mr. Tweedy. It was mostly the kind of thing where one
20 asked the Chief of Station to keep in mind what sort of
21 access one might ever have had to Lumumba for whatever purpose.
22 It was this kind of thing, as best I recollect.

23 Mr. Baron. Did you send cables raising the question of
24 gaining access to Lumumba for the purpose of assassinating
25 him?

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1 Mr. Tweedy. I suspect that was the first cable that
2 ever went out. In other words, the first cable that ever
3 went out to Larry Hedgman. He must have realized, he would
4 have been perfectly clear on his end, the way one's minds were
5 running even though it was purely a contingency.

6 Mr. Baron. I am sorry. I don't think I understood
7 that.

8 You say the first cable that went out.

9 Mr. Tweedy. That was the first way that Hedgman was
10 ever advised that there was any thinking of that kind in
11 Washington, was via our cable. I am sure he wasn't back in
12 the States over anything of this kind.

13 Mr. Baron. Today you distinctly remember a cable sent?

14 Mr. Tweedy. I think I remember that much more distinct-
15 ly than anything I remember in the last few minutes that it
16 was a cable which asked him to be thinking of that.

17 Mr. Baron. That was pursuant to your conversation
18 with Mr. Bissell?

19 Mr. Tweedy. That was.

20 Mr. Baron. Did you send that cable or Mr. Bissell
21 send that cable.

22 Mr. Tweedy. It probably would have been a cable I
23 would have written and probably released by him.

24 Mr. Baron. Do you know what was in that cable?

25 Mr. Tweedy. God knows, I don't.

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Mr. Baron. For the effect of the language in the cable?

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Mr. Tweedy. The effect of the language in the cable

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would be to get Hadgman to be thinking along these lines.

4

Mr. Dawson. Would you describe the purpose?

5

Mr. Tweedy. It would have been the eventuality that we

6

might wish to get rid of Mr. Lumumba personally.

7

Mr. Dawson. Is that language you think might have

8

been used or that is how you think it might have been done?

9

Mr. Tweedy. I couldn't even start to reproduce the

10

cable.

11

Mr. Baron. Did you send a number of such cables to

12

the Chief of Station?

13

Mr. Tweedy. I imagine there were a few over a period

14

of time. It was not an intensive correspondence as I

15

remember it.

16

Mr. Baron. It wouldn't be the normal practice to

17

have an intensive correspondence on such a sensitive subject,

18

would it?

19

Mr. Tweedy. I don't know. It is the only time I ever

20

had one but I have had very sensitive subjects, operationally

21

sensitive subjects that I have dealt with in extensive

22

cables over a very long period of time, but nothing of this

23

nature whatsoever.

24

Mr. Baron. Were these cables from headquarters to

25

the Chief of Station in Leopoldville sent in a specially

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1 restricted channel?

2 Mr. Tweedy. Yes, all sensitive cables are sent in
3 various types of restricted channels I am sure you aware.

4 Mr. Baron. This channel even more tightly held and
5 closely restricted than the normal cable traffic that would
6 flow to the Chief of Station?

7 Mr. Tweedy. That would be a very fair statement,
8 yes.

9 Mr. Baron. Do you know whether the cable included in-
10 structions to destroy it after reading it?

11 Mr. Tweedy. That wouldn't have been normal.

12 Mr. Baron. Would you assume that on a subject like this
13 such an instruction would have been given?

14 Mr. Tweedy. It would really be up to the Chief of
15 Station, I think. It would be up to the Chief of Station
16 what was in the cable and the degree to which he felt he
17 needed to maintain a record for quick reference purposes in
18 the future.

19 But, he was perfectly capable of keeping a file
20 which would be accessable only to him and the station and
21 if he was sure of his own security within the station I don't
22 think this would have been a problem for him, but to answer your
23 question I don't know what Hedgman himself did.

24 Mr. Baron. What kind of response did you receive from
25 Hedgman or from the Chief of Station in Leopoldville?

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1 Mr. Tweedy. It was a serious answer. I can't do
2 better than that. It was a serious answer. It wasn't argu-
3 mentative, I guess it started to discuss, not the pros and
4 cons of policy, at least I don't recall it did, but what it
5 was that he might be able to do. It was a disciplined reply
6 to an instruction from headquarters.

7 Mr. Baron. Did he mention any specific means that
8 he had of gaining access to Lumumba?

9 Mr. Tweedy. I don't recall now. I don't recall. I
10 think he said it was certainly not beyond the question that
11 means could either be developed or might arise but I certainly
12 do not recall that he came up with any very specific ideas in
13 the first instance. On that I am afraid I am terribly hedgy.

14 Mr. Baron. At the time that you were requesting the
15 Chief of Station to report back on means of gaining access
16 to Lumumba for the purpose of eliminating him, was this
17 access made any more explicit in terms of the kind of
18 personal access that would be needed?

19 Mr. Tweedy. I am sure that must have been covered
20 at some point, i.e., in perhaps a series of types of accesses.

21 Mr. Baron. Would this be access to shoot him or would
22 this be access to his personal food or drink or toiletries?

23 Mr. Tweedy. I suppose all those types of things might
24 have been considered.

25 Mr. Baron. But this was not access in the sense of --

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24

1 finding a way to sneak inside the U.N. guard to simply
2 snatch Lumumba from custody, this was clearly access to assassin-
3 ate him, is that correct?

4 Mr. Tweedy. That would certainly be my recollection.
5 Kidnapping was never a factor that I recall at all or even
6 considered, at least I don't remember it.

7 Mr. Baron. In your discussions with Richard Bissell
8 about the prospect of assassinating Lumumba, did he mention to
9 you that he had had similar discussions with Justin O'Donnell?

10 Mr. Tweedy. I was reminded of Justin O'Donnell's
11 role in all this. As you may recall, when I talked to you
12 and Mr. Wides, and until you reminded me I had forgotten
13 that Justin O'Donnell played any role whatsoever and now
14 that it has been brought to my recollection I recall it.
15 I recall it almost in detail.

16 I remember being told that he had expressed reservations
17 or disagreement or refusal to participate to Bissell and I
18 think my response to you was if he said that I would believe
19 him but I didn't recall it.

20 Mr. Baron. Did Richard Bissell ever indicate to you
21 that he had asked Justin O'Donnell to go to the Congo to
22 assassinate Lumumba?

23 Mr. Tweedy. Well, he must have indeed have told me
24 that he was going to ask O'Donnell to go to the Congo to
25 examine the thing on the ground, but I don't recall him ever

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25

1 saying, I am going to send O'Donnell to the Congo to knock
2 off Lumumba, not in those words.

3 Mr. Baron. When you say examine the thing on the ground
4 you mean he would send O'Donnell to the Congo to take a
5 first-hand look at the means?

6 Mr. Tweedy. Yes, conceivably I suppose this all
7 might have resulted in a climax there but at least my recollec-
8 tion certainly was never that he told me that I am sending
9 O'Donnell to the Congo to knock off Lumumba in those words
10 but that he, I am sure the philosophy was that if anything
11 was done you would want to keep it as separate from the
12 station as possible and thus a man from the outside.
13 It was Bissell's idea that O'Connell might be the man.

14 Mr. Baron. The man from outside?

15 Mr. Tweedy. Outside the station.

16 Mr. Baron. The CIA station in the Congo?

17 Mr. Tweedy. Right.

18 Mr. Baron. That such a man would be necessary to
19 carry out an assassination operation if one were to be mounted?

20 Mr. Tweedy. That if one was mounted it would
21 obviously be desirable to do it under auspices which would
22 protect the security of the station or involvement of the
23 station.

24 That I am sure was the philosophy behind it.

25 Mr. Baron. But it is your recollection that O'Donnell,

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1 was sent to the Congo to assess the possibility for
2 assassinating Lumumba rather than to mount some sort of kid-
3 napping plan to draw Lumumba out from the U.N. guard and put
4 him in the hands of Congolese authorities?

5 Mr. Tweedy. That is certainly my recollection but I
6 would not want to put too high a value on it. I
7 just don't recall kidnapping as a factor is all.

8 Mr. Baron. Did Richard Bussell ever mention to you that
9 lethal biological agents had been developed in the CIA
10 laboratories for possible use in the Congo to assassinate Lumum-
11 ba? Or they were available for such use?

12 Mr. Tweedy. I think that it would be closer that TSD
13 probably had the capability or had the agent or whatever it
14 was. When I say agent I mean chemical agent. I suspect I
15 heard that, yes.

16 Mr. Baron. Would this have been under Sidney Gottlieb's
17 auspices or direction in TSD?

18 Mr. Tweedy. If he was Chief of TSD at the time it would
19 have been. I don't recall. Was he? I think he was.

20 Mr. Baron. Did Richard Bissell ever indicate to you
21 directly that Sidney Gottlieb was involved in developing
22 poisons that might be used for assassination?

23 Mr. Tweedy. I don't recall that at all.

24 Mr. Baron. In your discussions with Bissell, about
25 the feasibility of an assassination operation, did poisons

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1 come up as one means that was being considered and which
2 the Chief of Station should explore?

3 Mr. Tweedy. I am sure it must have. After all,
4 there are not many ways of doing it. Shoot a man, poison
5 him, of course you could, I suppose, stab him or something
6 like that. But basically you are talking about a contingency
7 plan which I assume has the best possibility of protecting the
8 involvement of the U.S. Government and if you want to do it
9 in a manner which would be as distant, if that is the right
10 word, as possible, I think poison would then stand high on the
11 list of possibilities.

12 Mr. Baron. Did the Chief of Station ever make a
13 response to you via cable which indicated that he was ex-
14 ploring means of gaining access to Lumumba for the possible
15 use of poisoning -- purpose of poisoning him.

16 Mr. Tweedy. I am sure he must have done that. I
17 don't recall specifically, but that effect is what he was
18 charged to do in the first instance, examine the possibilities.

19 I would be very surprised if Hedgman didn't come back
20 and in effect comment on this but the nature of his comments
21 I really don't recall.

22 Mr. Dawson. When you and Bissell had your conversa-
23 tions, whatever time it was, concerning this matter, did he
24 mention to you that he had approval or direction from highest
25 authority to undertake to assassinate Lumumba?

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1 Mr. Tweedy. I don't recall that, no. I guess I was under
2 the impression when he talked to me that -- I don't know
3 whether this is fair or not -- I honestly don't know what
4 my impression was at the time whether this was something that
5 Bissell had in effect sucked out of his own thumb as a
6 contingency plan which he then raised with higher authority, and
7 because it was contingency planning I don't think at that
8 stage I was particularly concerned. But to answer the
9 question I just don't know.

10 Mr. Dawson. You stated earlier you knew Gordon
11 Gray very well.

12 Mr. Tweedy. I didn't say that. I have known Gordon
13 Gray far better since than I did then. I knew Gordon Gray
14 very slightly indeed then, and I am not sure I ever had a --
15 while he was in office -- that I ever had a personal conversa-
16 tion with him. I have seen a lot of him since he was on the
17 President's Board.

18 Mr. Dawson. That answers my question.

19 Mr. Baron. Richard Bissell never made a representation
20 to you one way or the other as to whether he had approval from
21 any authority higher than DDP for this consideration of
22 assassinating Lumumba?

23 Mr. Tweedy. No, I do not recall so.

24 Mr. Baron. Did Richard Bissell ever indicate to you
25 that he was directly in contact with the Chief of Station in

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1 Leopoldville or that he had means of dealing directly with
2 the Chief of Station in Leopoldville without going through
3 you?

4 Mr. Tweedy. He always said that any DDP, of course,
5 that has the capability, and right, it was never my impression
6 that he was using it and going around me, no. But that he
7 did, but he might have done it, I wouldn't gainsay it, he
8 certainly had the right and capability to go into it.

9 Mr. Dawson. Can we go into how the right was able to be
10 exercised?

11 Mr. Tweedy. All he had to do was send a cable. He
12 could establish his own channel to Leopoldville with his own
13 set of slugs which would exclude the Chief of African Division.
14 He has the right to do that.

15 Mr. Baron. It would not be improper for a DDP to send
16 a cable or messenger to the Chief of Station in another
17 country?

18 Mr. Tweedy. I wouldn't comment on the appropriateness.
19 He obviously had the authority. My relationships with
20 Bissell were such that I do not believe it.

21 I never had the impression that he ever had any inten-
22 tion or desire to go around me on matters of this kind.

23 Mr. Dawson. Who else other than the DDP or DCI
24 would have such authority?

25 Mr. Tweedy. I don't know.

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1 Mr. Baron. Would the President?

2 Mr. Tweedy. Yes, but he would probably have to come
3 to the Agency to find out how to do it. I imagine the Presi-
4 dent could send a personal representative, I am damn sure he
5 would have no way of knowing how to send a cable out there.
6 He would make a muck of it if he did.

7 Mr. Baron. Did you learn at any point that lethal bio-
8 logical substances were actually in the custody of the Chief
9 of Station in Congo?

10 Mr. Tweedy. This was mentioned when I talked to you and
11 Mr. Wides and my answer was that I don't recall it, but that
12 it was perfectly possible for them to be sent there.

13 Mr. Baron. How would they have been sent?

14 Mr. Tweedy. They could have been sent one or two ways,
15 they would have been sent through the pouch with the whole
16 thing wrapped in and addressed in such manner that it would be
17 opened only by the Chief of Station or somebody coming out
18 by hand of officer or hand of somebody either way it could be
19 done.

20 Mr. Baron. Do you have any knowledge of a messenger
21 from CIA headquarters having to go to the Congo to provide
22 the Chief of Station in the Congo with instructions to carry
23 out the assassination of Lumumba, if possible, and also pro-
24 vide him with the tools to carry out such an assassination,
25 namely, poisons and medical equipment for administering them?

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1 Mr. Tweedy. No, I do not.

2 Mr. Baron. Let me represent to you that we have
3 testimony from the Chief of Station in the Congo at that
4 point that he had received a cable from headquarters saying that
5 a messenger would arrive in the Congo and would be
6 someone that he would recognize and this messenger would give
7 him instructions that he was to carry out.

8 Did you ever know of such a cable being sent to the
9 Congo?

10 Mr. Tweedy. I should be very surprised if I didn't,
11 but I certainly have no recollection of it whatsoever.

12 Mr. Baron. And the Chief of Station further testified
13 that shortly after receiving such a cable he received a visit
14 from Signey Gottlieb who arrived in Leopoldville and
15 made himself known to the Chief of Station, the Chief of
16 Station said that he immediately recognized Gottlieb as an
17 officer of the Agency, and as the messenger that this
18 cable referred to.

19 Subsequently, the Chief of Station said he had meetings
20 with Dr. Gottlieb in his apartment in Leopoldville where Dr.
21 Gottlieb gave him instructions that he said came from the
22 headquarters to carry out the assassination of Lumumba and
23 Dr. Gottlieb also, according to the Chief of Station, gave
24 him lethal biological substances and medical equipment with
25 which to administer them.

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1 Were you aware of that chain of events?

2 Mr. Tweedy. That sounds far more definitive than any-
3 thing I have any recollection of at all.

4 If I understand what you said was, ^{leader} Gottlieb would have
5 left instructions with the Chief of Station which would have
6 empowered the Chief of Station at the conclusion of their
7 conversations, to go out and assassinate Lumumba, without any
8 further recourse or reference to headquarters?

9 Mr. Baron. That is --

10 Mr. Tweedy. If that is the case I don't believe it.

11 Mr. Baron. That is the essence of the testimony that
12 the Chief of Station although he did say that he was not anxious
13 to carry out an assassination mission. He didn't think it was
14 practical or wise and he probably would have gone back
15 to headquarters to consult with them if he thought he
16 was in a position to move immediately to carry out the assass-
17 ination plan, but it was his opinion that the policy decision
18 had been made and that he had authority to move ahead
19 although he doubted --

20 Mr. Tweedy. My recollection doesn't go anywhere near
21 that far.

22 Mr. Dawson. He checked that authority by immediately
23 cabling back to headquarters saying, this guy has made himself
24 available to me as well as he has delivered something and
25 has told me that he had the approval of the highest authority

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1 in the land to order me to do what he so ordered, which got
2 another cable back through the specially slugged cable saying
3 yes, what he told you is correct.

4 Mr. Tweedy. I don't recall that, which surprises
5 me, because once again I would be very surprised, I wouldn't
6 have been privy to those.

7 Mr. Baron. If a request such as the plan Mr. Dawson
8 outlined had been sent from the Congo to headquarters and it
9 were in more narrow cryptic terms, for instance, if it had
10 said simply I have seen your messenger and received instruc-
11 tions and request confirmation that I am to carry them out,
12 would that refresh your recollection as to whether you had
13 seen such a cable?

14 Mr. Tweedy. I can't be at all sure it will refresh
15 my recollection but if you and Hedgman say that such a cable
16 was sent, I am not going to gainsay it.

17 Mr. Baron. Would that be the manner in which
18 confirmation for such a sensitive operation would be requested?

19 Mr. Tweedy. I don't know because I never saw one be-
20 fore or since but it sounds highly reasonable to me. This
21 is the way, this would be the way I should have thought any
22 two sensible people would confer on sensitive matters when
23 each knew that the other knew exactly what he was talking
24 about and, of course, you don't have to use unnecessary words
25 but beyond the likelihood of this I can't say that is what

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1 Mr. Dawson. This leaves us with one or two alter-
2 natives, either the Chief of Station who has appeared and
3 testified although not necessarily reluctantly, but certainly
4 reluctantly as to substance of his testimony, is not telling
5 us the truth, or he is telling us the truth and you were not
6 privy to what was going on.

7 Mr. Tweedy. Or I literally don't recall it. This is my
8 problem. I will tell you quite frankly with these things --

9 Mr. Dawson. It is 15 years ago.

10 Mr. Tweedy. I really am having trouble with this. I
11 had to be reminded of so many things about the things that
12 I recall the most vividly about all my African experiences
13 were basically the things I was basically concerned with all
14 the time which was putting this division together and the
15 rest of it.

16 When it comes to operational detail I start getting
17 fuzzy and you would have thought with something like thinking
18 about Mr. Lumumba in these terms, that I would have gone to
19 bed and got up thinking about Lumumba, I can assure you this
20 wasn't the case.

21 I spent days in a row not even giving Lumumba one
22 single bloody thought. This is my problem.

23 Mr. Dawson. Let's try to jog your memory on this.

24 Do you recall any time during that period of any dis-
25 cussions of the use of Dr. Gottlieb whatsoever as a courier?

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1 Mr. Tweedy. No.

2 Mr. Dawson. All right.

3 Mr. Tweedy. But if he went as a courier, I will bet
4 I knew it, but I don't recall it.

5 Mr. Baron. Having heard this story, would it be your
6 assumption it is more likely to be true than not?

7 Mr. Tweedy. Well, I put it purely this way.

8 Mr. Baron. I am asking you for your expert opinion
9 here as someone experienced.

10 Mr. Tweedy. Expert opinion.

11 Mr. Dawson. You had been the person responsible for
12 promoting this Chief of Station or at least appointing him
13 Chief of Station, I assume?

14 Mr. Tweedy. That in actual fact isn't true. His
15 appointment was already in the works when I came aboard and
16 I had met Hedgman in London on his previous assignment which,
17 if I remember correctly, was in Brussels and he came to Lon-
18 don to discuss an operational matter with me which had
19 nothing whatsoever to do with that and we had a very good
20 discussion. It was only, I think, when I got back to
21 headquarters as it were, took up the reins after the division
22 that I learned that he had been appointed Chief of Station
23 in the Congo, a decision with which I took absolutely no
24 exception whatsoever, but as a number of assignments may be
25 made before I came they had to be they couldn't wait for me

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1 to get the word.

2 Mr. Dawson. Have you ever had any occasion to doubt
3 his veracity or integrity?

4 Mr. Tweedy. I have not.

5 I think when I say yes to your basic question, it would
6 be that I would trust his memory and I certainly trust his
7 integrity.

8 Mr. Baron. We don't question it.

9 Mr. Tweedy. All of this happened pretty much the way
10 you gave it to me.

11 Mr. Baron. That would be your --

12 Mr. Tweedy. The aspect of it I find very difficult to
13 believe it that at any time headquarters said on receipt of
14 these instructions, go ahead and do it. This I find very
15 difficult to -- I do not recall and I find difficult to believe
16 and I believe implicitly the reaction he gave you which was,
17 reaction, that if he found it not feasible he sure as
18 hell would have referred again to headquarters before he did
19 it.

20 Mr. Baron. Why did you find it difficult to believe
21 such an instruction would have been given?

22 Mr. Tweedy. That way I would have said in such a
23 matter of this kind, headquarters would have wanted to have a
24 last word up to the last minute.

25 Not one of these things that ^{Gottlieb} ~~Gottlieb~~ runs off to the

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1 Congo and by the time he has found Hedgman, given his instruc-
2 tions and all of which could have been four or five or six
3 days later and Hedgman in turn had found a way to do it
4 even then set about his leisure to do it or without further
5 reference to headquarters that is not the way my organization
6 has ever run operations.

7 Mr. Baron. Was it likely at all that ^{Scheider} Dr. Gottlieb
8 would have gone off on his own with these poisons to the
9 Congo to deliver them to the Chief of Station?

10 Mr. Tweedy. I should have said quite impossible.

11 Mr. Baron. Without an instruction from the DDP at
12 least?

13 Mr. Tweedy. That is quite impossible.

14 Mr. Baron. Would ^{Scheider} Dr. Gottlieb have proceeded to the
15 Congo in the way the organization normally worked if the
16 DCI had tasked him directly with such a mission?

17 Mr. Tweedy. I am afraid I don't quite understand.

18 Mr. Baron. If the DCI had given ^{Scheider} Dr. Gottlieb an
19 instruction to go to the Congo and deliver poisons to the
20 Chief of Station would he have done it without consulting
21 with the DDP?

22 Mr. Tweedy. I suppose so.

23 But I don't believe it. I don't believe it ever happened.

24 To answer your question, I suppose if anybody got a
25 personal private instruction from the DCI, and was instructed

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1 to proceed without reference to anybody else he would pre-
2 sumably go ahead and do so.

3 Mr. Baron. But, because the feasibility of this
4 assassination of Lumumba had been discussed, this was not such
5 a tightly held subject that the DDP would have been circum-
6 vented?

7 Mr. Tweedy. DDP as far as I was concerned was the
8 person with whom the division first discussed the matter on-
9 tirely. I don't recall ever having discussed it with Allen
10 Dulles. I am sure when I say I am sure I assume Bissell dis-
11 cussed it with Allen Dulles but, this was never a matter
12 which was between the DCI's office and the Leopoldville
13 station insofar as I was aware, and to this day I don't
14 believe it ever was.

15 Mr. Baron. Just to clarify something we talked about
16 earlier when I think we were jumbling two questions together,
17 it is your expert opinion, expert in the sense of your knowl-
18 edge of the Agency, and your opinion as a participant at that
19 time that the testimony, the basic testimony we have received
20 about poisons being delivered to the Congo by ^{Colonel} Dr. Gottlieb with
21 instructions to use them in the assassination of Lumumba,
22 if possible, would be true testimony?

23 Mr. Tweedy. Only way I can answer that question, Mr.
24 Baron, is to say I see not the slightest reason and do not
25 believe that you would have been lied to on this point.

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1 But, there is nothing in my experience with the Agency
2 which would really bear on that point whatsoever.

3 Mr. Baron. Did you travel to the Congo shortly
4 before the independence of the Congo was declared?

5 Mr. Tweedy. That was my first visit to the Congo as I
6 recall, it was two weeks before independence. I made a
7 long trip through Sub-Saharan Africa which culminated in
8 a drive from Kampala to Sambura and I flew from Sambura, I
9 guess, to Albertville and from Albertville to Leopoldville
10 and that is the first time I ever saw Leopoldville.

11 Mr. Dawson. Do you know whether Mr. Hedgman was
12 there at that time?

13 Mr. Tweedy. Mr. Hedgman I am almost sure was
14 not. His predecessor was there. He had many children, I
15 can't remember his name.

16 Mr. Baron. And you left the Congo before
17 independence was declared.

18 Mr. Tweedy. Yes, I was only there for, I suppose I
19 was there for four or five days and I thought I was going to
20 end my whole tour there and whole trip there but eventually
21 I had to go up to the Ivory Coast to settle an unexpected
22 problem.

23 Mr. Baron. For the record would you agree with me
24 that independence was declared about June 30, 1960?

25 Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

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1 Mr. Baron. Did you make another trip during which
2 you visited the Congo at some point before the death of
3 Lumumba?

4 Mr. Tweedy. Yes, well, it is this one that I regurgi-
5 tated finally which must have been as near as the early
6 part of December and which had started with a visit to Rome
7 in the latter part of November, followed by a trip to Nairobi
8 followed by a brief visit to South Africa, then I think Congo,
9 then briefly Brazzaville and home via Europe.

10 Mr. Baron. And this meeting in November '60 in
11 Rome was a meeting of African --

12 Mr. Tweedy. South - Northern African Station Chiefs.
13 The Maghreb and these would have been chiefs of stations of
14 Morocco, Algeria, Libya, ||||

15 Mr. Baron. And the Congo?

16 Mr. Tweedy. No.

17 Mr. Baron. So the Congo Chief of Station would not
18 normally have been --

19 Mr. Tweedy. If he came up he must have come up to see
20 Bissell.

21 Mr. Baron. Richard Bissell was traveling with you on
22 this --

23 Mr. Tweedy. No.

24 Mr. Baron. -- tour to Rome and Nairobi?

25 Mr. Tweedy. He called the meetings. The whole purpose

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1 of the exercise was that he wanted to meet a large number of
2 our new Chiefs of Stations in Africa and rather than make a trip
3 around Africa, which he hardly had time, he used a device
4 which we often used, which is to hold regional meetings at
5 a central point to which these people could have ready access
6 and, therefore, it was easy for people on the north Mediter-
7 ranean littoral or South Mediterranean littoral to proceed to
8 Rome, and the same way it was easy for East African Station
9 Chiefs to proceed to Nairobi, and he had the meetings there,
10 each one two or three days, I suppose.

11 Mr. Baron. Did the Chief of Station in the Congo
12 attend the meeting in Rome?

13 Mr. Tweedy. I am sure he would not. In other words,
14 if he saw Bissell he would have merely come to Rome and have
15 seen him, but he would have had no reason whatsoever, in
16 fact it would have been ridiculous for Bissell to invite a
17 man who didn't belong in the North African meetings and merely
18 raised the question whether Hedgman was there.

19 Mr. Baron. What region in the CIA organization chart
20 would the Chief of Station in the Congo belong to?

21 Mr. Tweedy. We change around there. We had in
22 those days, we had the North African branch, we had the
23 East African branch, we had a Southern African branch, which
24 included South Africa, Rhodesia, probably Portuguese Africa,
25 maybe the Congo in those days. Later on the Congo was sort

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1 of Sui Generis but in that early time I suspect it
2 fell down in Southern Africa but I am not absolutely sure.
3 It might have fallen just in French-speaking West Africa.

4 We always had a French West Africa, an English-speaking
5 West-Africa.

6 Mr. Baron. We have received testimony from the Chief
7 of Station in the Congo at that point that he did come to
8 Rome to meet with Richard Bissell and he believes that he also
9 met with yourself and Mr. Karamessines at Mr. Karamessines'
10 house.

11 Mr. Tweedy. I doubt if he saw Mr. Karamessines. It
12 would only be because Mr. Karamessines was host as Chief of
13 Station in Rome. But I am sure he was not discussing any
14 policy problems with Mr. Karamessines who had absolutely no
15 jurisdiction over them in those days whatsoever.

16 Mr. Baron. That was his testimony, but it was incidental,
17 but if, as he has testified, that he met with Mr. Bissell and
18 yourself, you wouldn't dispute that testimony?

19 Mr. Tweedy. Absolutely not.

20 Mr. Baron. And that would be due to the intensity of
21 activity in the Congo at this point and the intensity of
22 concern over that activity?

23 Mr. Tweedy. Absolutely. It was obviously becoming more
24 and more of a commitment of both the U.S. Government and
25 thus the agency. I think leaving Lumumba entirely aside this

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1 was the main reason that I am sure I went to the Congo
2 at that point was the fact that it obviously was going to become
3 a major personnel drain, if you like, on the Division
4 and a major commitment both at headquarters and in the
5 field, thus it was important I sort of look the thing over.

6 Mr. Baron. Having refreshed your recollection about
7 this meeting between the Chief of Station and Mr. Bissell and
8 yourself in Rome, do you recall what was discussed when you
9 were together?

10 Mr. Tweedy. I can only assume that some of the things
11 that we discussed by cable traffic were discussed.

12 The other thing I am sure must have been discussed was
13 what I would call the general assessment of the Congolese
14 situation and what the station might be required to do, thus
15 the sort of support headquarters was going to have to give
16 the Station.

17 Mr. Baron. Was there any discussion of the assassination
18 of Lumumba or the prospect of --

19 Mr. Tweedy. I would be immensely surprised if it
20 wasn't discussed but I don't recall in what context it was
21 discussed. In fact, I don't believe it wasn't discussed.
22 It was after all on the agenda, as it were, at least I
23 assume it was, at that point.

24 Mr. Baron. The prospect of assassinating Lumumba con-
25 tinued to be on the agenda of the Agency until the point that

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1 Lumumba was actually dead?

2 Mr. Tweedy. I don't recall. You probably are much more
3 knowledgeable on that than I am. I don't recall when in
4 effect we no longer considered it or it no longer was a
5 factor. I just don't remember.

6 Mr. Baron. But, just now you were assuming that that
7 would have the case?

8 Mr. Tweedy. If it was still on, it was still on
9 the agenda, inevitably we must have discussed it. If it was
10 off the agenda then no, but I honestly don't remember.

11 Mr. Baron. Let me show you now some cable traffic
12 between the agency and Leopoldville which consists of a
13 series of cables that begins shortly before Lumumba was placed
14 into U.N. custody, then continues after he was placed in U.N.
15 custody.

16 In an attempt to refresh your recollection about the
17 attitude at the Agency toward Lumumba after he was in U.N.
18 custody --

19 Mr. Tweedy. Okay.

20 Mr. Baron. -- the first cable which we will mark Tweedy
21 Exhibit 1 is dated August 26, 1960, from Leopoldville to the
22 Director.

23 (The document referred to was
24 marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 1 for
25 identification.)

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1 Mr. Tweedy. That is the way all cables were addressed.
2 I see he sent one specifically to DCI.

3 Mr. Baron. Off the record.

4 (Discussion off the record.)

5 Mr. Baron. On the record.

6 Let's turn back now.

7 I believe while we were off the record and examining this
8 cable closely you corrected me, Mr. Tweedy, on the fact that
9 this cable was not sent from Leopoldville to the Director but
10 rather it was sent from headquarters to Leopoldville; is
11 that correct?

12 Mr. Tweedy. Correct.

13 Mr. Baron. And it appears to you from the designation
14 "Allen W. Dulles", at the top of the telegram, that this was
15 a personal message signed off by the DCI himself to the Chief
16 of Station.

17 Mr. Tweedy. Correct. As I said, he might not have
18 drafted it but it certainly would have been his sign off.

19 Mr. Baron. And let me direct your attention to
20 the portion of the cable that says in high quarters here it is
21 the clear-cut conclusion that if LLL continues to hold high
22 office the inevitable result will at best be chaos and at
23 worst pave the way to a Communist takeover of the Congo with
24 disastrous consequences for the prestige of the U.N. and for
25 the interests of the Free World generally.

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1 Consequently we conclude that his removal must be an
2 urgent and prime objective and that under existing conditions
3 this should be a high priority of our covert action.

4 Now, do you believe that LLL refers to Lumumba?

5 Mr. Tweedy. I do.

6 Mr. Baron. And why would three L's have been used in
7 the cable?

8 Mr. Tweedy. I don't know.

9 Mr. Baron. Would that be a standard way of making sure
10 that at least one of the L's was clear in transmission?

11 Mr. Tweedy. I honestly don't know.

12 Now, that isn't the normal way to do it at all. I
13 honestly don't know how. His name was Patrice.

14 Mr. Baron. But it is nonetheless your opinion that
15 LLL does refer to Lumumba?

16 Mr. Tweedy. I do indeed.

17 Mr. Baron. Does this accord with your general sense
18 of the policy toward Lumumba at that time at the Agency and at
19 State Department?

20 Mr. Tweedy. It accords much more with my recollection
21 of our attitude toward the potentially disastrous situation
22 in the Congo than it does on his personally, but he obviously
23 was always in the background.

24 Mr. Baron. Where the cable says we conclude that his
25 removal must be an urgent and prime objective and that under

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1 existing conditions this should be a high priority of out
2 covert action, close quotes, -- is that consistent with the
3 policy towards Lumumba as you recall it?

4 In other words, that Lumumba's removal was a prime objec-
5 tive of the covert actions of the Agency.

6 Mr. Tweedy. We would have given our eye teeth to have
7 Lumumba not the head of the Congolese state, certainly I would
8 agree with that.

9 Mr. Baron. As Exhibit 2, let's turn to a cable dated
10 September 16, 1960.

11 (The document referred to was
12 marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 2
13 for identification.)
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1 Mr. Baron. This contains references to the fact that
2 "the station was flooded with reports re outcome Mobutu coup".

3 And the cable goes on to discuss the fact that U.N.
4 troops had interfered with Congolese troops and prevented
5 them from arresting Lumumba.

6 Now, this cable was sent to the CIA headquarters
7 from Leopoldville one day after Lumumba sought protective
8 custody from the United Nations and two days after the Mobutu
9 coup where Mobutu took over the government.

10 In the cable as it has been sanitized by the Agency
11 it now reads:

12 "Station advised two moderate Congolese politician
13 try work with key Congolese contact in effort eliminate
14 Lumumba. Fear U.N. protection will give Lumumba opportunity
15 to organize counterattack. Only solution is remove him
16 from scene soonest".

17 WAs that the attitude of the Agency at this point,
18 as far as you understood it, that the fact that Lumumba
19 was in U.N. protective custody did not eliminate him as a
20 threat in the Congo?

21 Mr. Tweedy. I don't really recall but I think the
22 chances are that we feared that U.N. protective custody
23 might very well result in his early release or his ability still
24 to control matters. I should think that is very probable.

25 Mr. Baron. And that is the reason why there would be

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1 this fear of counterattack organized by Lumumba while he was
2 protected by the U.N. --

3 Mr. Tweedy. Yes, that is probably true.

4 Mr. Baron. As Exhibit 3 let's turn to a cable dated
5 September 20, 1960, which is sent -- off the record.

6 (The document referred to was
7 marked Tweedy Exhibit 3 for
8 identification.)

9 (Discussion off the record.)
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Mr. Baron. Back on the record.

Although the top of this cable does not indicate where the cable was sent to and from, because we don't have the cover sheet for the cable, you have indicated to me by looking at the designations that this cable must have been sent from Leopoldville to headquarters, is that correct, Mr. Tweedy?

Mr. Tweedy. That is correct.

Mr. Baron. Let me direct your attention to paragraph 7 which says:

"Station checking recurring reports of Kasavubu Lumumba reconciliation. Kasavubu denies Bolikango failed deny possibility of Lumumba entering new government, possibly as vice Premier. Believe some substance to rumor but will do best prevent if Lumumba allowed even minor role he most apt come out on top".

Does that indicate to you that the Chief of Station in the Congo at this point continued to be extremely concerned that Lumumba should not be allowed even a minor role in the government of the Congo?

Mr. Tweedy. That is what it says.

Mr. Baron. Next, as Exhibit 4, we have a cable dated January 19, 1961.

(The document referred to was marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 4 for identification.)

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1 Mr. Baron. This was sent from the Congo to --

2 Mr. Tweedy. Sent from Elizabethville to Leopoldville info
3 headquarters, information headquarters.

4 Mr. Baron. So that headquarters would have received
5 a copy of this cable sent by the base chief in Elizabethville
6 to the Station Chief in Leopoldville?

7 Mr. Tweedy. Right.

8 Mr. Baron. And paragraph 1 of this cable says:

9 "Thanks for Patrice. If we had known he was coming
10 we would have baked a snake".

11 Do you have an independent recollection of this
12 cable?

13 Mr. Tweedy. Yes, of course I do, for the simple reason
14 of that phrase, which is another way of saying, a lighthearted
15 way of saying, on the part of Elizabethville Lumumba arrived
16 in Kutanga and he had no idea he was coming.

17 Mr. Baron. . So this cable does not indicate that there
18 was any connection between the CIA and Lumumba's eventual death,
19 the actual causes of his death in Kutanga?

20 Mr. Tweedy. Will you say that again? I am not quite
21 sure I understood that.

22 Mr. Baron. Does that cable indicate in any way that
23 the CI was knowledgeable of the actual causes of Lumumba's
24 death at the point when it occurred?

25 In other words, that they were connected to the people

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1 who caused his death?

2 Mr. Tweedy. I must say I have a hard time following the
3 question. This means that Lumumba arrived under the Congo-
4 lese auspices in Kutanga and that Elizabethville, the base at
5 Elizabethville didn't know he was coming, our base, didn't
6 know very much, didn't presumably know very much about what
7 occurred, and reported very briefly on what they had heard.

8 Mr. Baron. Let me put the question in context.

9 On January 17, Lumumba had been flown to Kutanga?

10 Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

11 Mr. Baron. And later United Nations investigations con-
12 cluded that it was the 17th or perhaps the 18th that Lumumba
13 was actually killed in Kutanga.

14 I was asking you before whether this cable would indi-
15 cate that the United States would have been involved in
16 bringing about the death of Lumumba?

17 Mr. Tweedy. I would have thought that it merely in-
18 dicates that this part of the Agency, i.e., Elizabethville
19 had no idea he was coming, knew nothing about his fate
20 except these few phrases that he put down here and would imply
21 although it certainly doesn't say so, that he was adding a
22 little information to what was perhaps an enormously ignorant
23 Leopoldville which, of course, is the fact of the matter.
24 We didn't know how all this was occurring and were not able
25 to follow the event except after the event.

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1 Mr. Baron. Was the CIA connected in any way to the
2 events that immediately led to Lumumba's death?

3 Mr. Tweedy. None whatsoever.

4 Mr. Baron. CIA was not involved in a plot to fly
5 Lumumba from his previous place of imprisonment in Tysville
6 out to Kutanga where the authorities were known to be so
7 hostile to him that he would probably meet his death there?

8 Mr. Tweedy. The fate of Lumumba in the end was purely
9 an African event.

10 Mr. Baron. At what point did you learn of Lumumba's
11 death?

12 Mr. Tweedy. I suspect probably about the time that the
13 world did. No one had a beat on this.

14 Mr. Baron. You had no advanced warning that Mobutu in-
15 tended to fly Lumumba to Katanga?

16 Mr. Tweedy. Not that I recall, and I am sure the cable
17 traffic would reflect it if I had.

18 Mr. Baron. Mr. Tweedy, do you recall an asset who was
19 sent from Europe, where he had been recruited by **Arnold** 03
20 **Silver**, to the Congo in the fall of 1960?

21 Mr. Tweedy. I think I was reminded of this when I talked
22 to you and Mr. Wides a couple or so months ago.

23 Mr. Baron. This would be an asset who went by the
24 cryptonym of QJWIN.

25 Mr. Tweedy. So I was reminded then, which was a cryptonym

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1 I didn't remember at all, whereas I do remember quite a number
2 of cryptonyms when reminded of them.

3 Mr. Baron. Aside from the cryptonym, do you recall ⁰³
4 there was an asset who had been recruited by Arnold Silver in
5 Europe and who was sent to the Congo to perform some mission
6 in November and December of 1960?

7 Mr. Tweedy. I was generally reminded of it by that
8 conversation with you and Mr. Wides but I will confess that
9 my recollection doesn't go any further than that.

10 But unlike some of the things I have been reminded
11 of, I think recalled that asset of ⁰³ Arnold Silver had been
12 involved. That is just as about as deep as my recollection
13 goes.

14 Mr. Baron. Let me see if I can refresh your recollection.
15 first, by relating to you the testimony of Justin O'Donnell
16 who said that he did make use of QJWIN in the Congo as
17 a kind of "alter ego" of his, a general operative of his.

18 Does that remind you at all of the nature of the
19 mission that QJWIN had in the Congo?

20 Mr. Tweedy. No, it doesn't.

21 Mr. Baron. Have you heard the phrase executive ac-
22 tion?

23 Mr. Tweedy. In the newspapers.

24 Mr. Baron. During your tenure as a CIA official you
25 never heard the phrase executive action discussed as part of

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a CIA program or plan.

Mr. Tweedy. No. Only in bureaucratic Washington terms of executive action.

Mr. Baron. Meaning administrative action?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware of any project at CIA to develop the capability of carrying off an assassination of a foreign leader, if required?

Mr. Tweedy. Will you repeat that?

Mr. Baron. Were you aware that the CIA had a project which operated under the cryptonym ZRRIFLE to develop the means, pardon me, to develop the capability of carrying out assassinations if required?

Mr. Tweedy. You mean just generically?

Mr. Baron. Yes.

Mr. Tweedy. No.

Mr. Baron. Aside from the discussions that you had with Richard Bissell about the feasibility of assassinating Lumumba, did you participate in any other discussions at the Agency about assassination capabilities?

Mr. Tweedy. Never.

Mr. Baron. Did you bring anyone else connected with the Agency into the discussion of the feasibility of assassinating Lumumba, other than the Chief of Station in Congo?

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1 Mr. Tweedy. The only other person who was aware of it
2 was my deputy.

3 Mr. Baron. That would be?

4 Mr. Tweedy. Glenn Fields. He was aware of it in that
5 sense.

6 Mr. Baron. Did he take any action in relation to that
7 plan or consideration?

8 Mr. Tweedy. No; just he was in matters of this kind he
9 would have been my alterego but he was aware of it, that is
10 all.

11 Mr. Baron. Do you know William Harvey?

12 Mr. Tweedy. Sure, I know Bill Harvey well. Haven't
13 seen him in a long while.

14 Mr. Baron. And were you aware that William Harvey
15 was in contact with ⁰³Arnold Silver to develop the standby
16 capability for carrying out assassinations?

17 Mr. Tweedy. I don't know anything about it whatsoever.

18 Mr. Baron. Did you at any point talk with William
19 Harvey about any CIA activity in the Congo?

20 Mr. Tweedy. Not that I remember.

21 Mr. Baron. Let me show you a document now that we will
22 Mark Exhibit 5.

(The document referred to was
marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 5 for
identification.)

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1 Mr. Baron. This is a dispatch from the Chief of
2 KUTUBE/D, which I believe is --

3 Mr. Tweedy. That is Staff D.

4 Mr. Baron. In the Foreign Intelligence Division, is
5 that correct?

6 Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

7 Mr. Baron. Written to the Chief of Station in ¹²⁻¹⁰ ~~Dakar~~
8 and Chief of Station in Luxemburg through Chief AF and
9 Chief WE.

10 Would Chief AF have been yourself, Chief of the African
11 Division?

12 Mr. Tweedy. What is the date?

13 Mr. Baron. The date is November 2, 1960.

14 Mr. Tweedy. I would have been.

15 Mr. Baron. And William Harvey would have been Chief of
16 KU2D?

17 Mr. Tweedy. I suppose he was then. He certainly was
18 Chief of Staff D, in which case he could have, that is
19 what he would have been then.

20 Mr. Baron. Mr. Tweedy, while we have been off the
21 record you have had a chance to review this document and
22 tell me some things about it I would like to repeat on the
23 record.

24 First of all, on this copy of the document there is
25 typed the words Danuel M. Pressland, under the space for

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1 officer's signature, and you said to me a moment ago that
2 you are almost 100 percent sure that that is the pseudonym
3 of William Harvey, is that right?

4 Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

5 Mr. Baron. And you were just pointing to --

6 Mr. Tweedy. Chief of ID. You told me he was Chief
7 of ID at the time. He certainly was Chief of ID. You told
8 me he was Chief of ID then, I put those two together
9 and say I am pretty sure my recollection is Pressland was
10 Harvey, I can't swear to it, but I am virtually sure.

11 Mr. Baron. And do you have any independent recollec-
12 tion of the subject matter that is discussed in this document?

13 Mr. Tweedy. None at all. It doesn't ring a bell
14 at all.

15 Mr. Baron. Even after reviewing the document
16 do you have any recollection of what QJWIN's mission in the
17 Congo would be, would have been?

18 Mr. Tweedy. No.

19 Mr. Baron. You said that such a memo --

20 Mr. Tweedy. You told me he was going out there to
21 work with O'Donnell and when O'Donnell went out there I
22 guess he was going to look into a number of things for
23 headquarters and the Station pertaining to Congolese matters.
24 When I say I guess I am in effect asking you because I don't
25 recollect by any means what the full auspices of O'Donnell's

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1 visit to the Congo were and you said that Mr. QJWIN
2 was going out as sort of his caddy, if you like, he was going
3 to work for him and act as his general assistant.

4 Mr. Baron. That was the way Mr. O'Donnell described
5 it, although in this lengthy memo which apparently precedes
6 the dispatch of QJWIN to the Congo there is no mention of Mr.
7 O'Donnell.

8 Mr. Tweedy. This I don't think necessarily has anything
9 to do with O'Donnell's mission whatsoever. This, I think, is
10 generic mission, seems to indicate that he is going to
11 muck around with Corsicans. I don't recall Corsicans, I
12 know O'Donnell in the Congo at all.

13 Mr. Baron. Would this kind of dispatch have been
14 written by the Chief of Staff D without consultation with the
15 Chief of the African Division?

16 Mr. Tweedy. He did consult, that is to say, he wrote
17 the dispatch. I haven't read the whole thing but I gather
18 from this -- you see there is also a reference here. I don't
19 know what the reference is about. But I gather that Dakar is
20 brought into this activity because they wanted to act in a
21 support capacity to this headquarters activity.

22 Mr. Baron. You don't have any recollection of a mission
23 in Dakar Senegal about this time that headquarters was con-
24 cerned with?

25 Mr. Tweedy. No, I surely don't. On the contrary.

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1 Mr. Baron. Would it have been proper for the Chief of
2 Staff D to arrange an operation in the Congo directly without
3 going through the African Division although keeping the
4 African Chief informed?

5 Mr. Tweedy. Well, the two are mutually exclusive.
6 You can't have one without the other. To answer your first
7 question, it would be quite improper and wouldn't have occurred
8 that the Chief of Staff D was operating in an African Station
9 without the African Division being informed. This, however,
10 makes it amply clear that that was not the case, the African
11 Division was informed. In what depth in terms of terms of
12 headquarters purposes I don't know but it would have been
13 sufficient for Harvey to have done what he did and coordinate
14 this with the Division and if the Division had perceived
15 any objection or saw any problems they would have raised it
16 before the dispatch went out.

17 Also I noticed Dakar is also invited to find problems
18 with this, if it did, and say so.

19 Mr. Baron. What kind of missions generally would
20 Staff D have been carrying out in Africa at this time?

21 Mr. Tweedy. Well, you know what the role of
22 Staff D was.

23 Mr. Baron. This would be obtaining codes by surrepti-
24 tious entry.

25 Mr. Tweedy. This is in effect the obtaining of signals

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1 intelligence by whatever means, yes, absolutely.

2 Mr. Baron. Would it be surprising to you that QJWIN might
3 have been used in some manner in connection with an assassina-
4 tion plot against Lumumba and have been directed or supervised
5 by William Harvey without your knowledge?

6 Mr. Tweedy. It would have surprised me exceedingly and
7 would today. To put it differently, I am sure it didn't occur.

8 Mr. Baron. After reading this memo, you told me a
9 moment ago that you thought this might indicate that QJWIN
10 was being recruited for ZRRIFLE activities.

11 Mr. Tweedy. Well, you mentioned ZRRIFLE, which frankly
12 I hadn't heard before. This sounds as if he was going to
13 have some kind of generic assignment. I merely put those
14 two together but I know nothing about it at all.

15 Mr. Baron. The dispatch says, "In view of the extreme
16 sensitivity of the objective for which we want him to perform
17 his task, he was not told precisely what we want him to do."

18 Do you have any knowledge of what it was precisely that
19 QJWIN was asked to do?

20 Mr. Tweedy. I do not.

21 Mr. Baron. Then, on page 3 of the dispatch it says:

22 "The operation we have in mind is too sensitive
23 to risk blowing it in this phase and the search for assets
24 must be conducted with truly" -- which is underscored --
25 "minimum risk".

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1 asset. Only time would have told how major it would have
2 been. He was thought qualified to perform one of a variety
3 of things in the Congo by Hedgman.

4 Mr. Baron. Would one of those things for which he was
5 qualified have been an assassination mission against Lumumba?

6 Mr. Tweedy. As I told you previously, told you and Mr.
7 Wides previously, absolutely not, for the simple reason he was
8 basically dispatched, assessed and dealt with by the balance
9 of the Division, not by me personally, Glenn Fields person-
ally, and he was in effect a station as set mounted by the
Division.

11 The Division knew nothing about the balance of this
12 thing.

13 Mr. Baron. You are saying that Division personnel out-
14 side of yourself and Glenn Fields would not have known --

15 Mr. Tweedy. To my knowledge.

16 Mr. Baron . -- would not have known that the assassina-
17 tion of Lumumba was being considered?

18 Mr. Tweedy. Considered at all, that is correct.

19 Mr. Baron. And --

20 Mr. Tweedy. If they did learn of it I never knew
21 that they learned of it and certainly never learned of it
22 through me or Fields.

23 Mr. Baron. The fact that you left the recruitment and
24 training of this asset to other people in the Division than

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1 yourself and Fields would indicate to you that he wasn't
2 being considered at that point for an assassination mission?

3 Mr. Tweedy. I will put it differently. As far as
4 I know he was never considered for an assassination mission
5 at all.

6 He thought he was presumably being sent out for deeds
7 of daring in the PM field and began to talk rather lusty when
8 he arrived, but I think he was soon put straight.

9 Mr. Baron. PM is paramilitary operations?

10 Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

11 Mr. Baron. Let me show you a document we will mark
12 Exhibit 7, dated December 17, 1960, which is a cable to
13 the headquarters, marked to Director from Leopoldville dealing
14 with WIROGUE on an approach he made to agent QJWIN.

15 (The document referred to was
16 marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 7
17 for identification.)
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1 Mr. Tweedy. Yes, I know that. This is the one we dis-
2 cussed two months ago and this happens all the time.

3 Mr. Baron. We are referring specifically to QJWIN's
4 report that "WIROGUE had offered him \$300 per month to par-
5 ticipate in intel net and be member" -- I am sorry -- "member
6 'execution squad'".

7 Mr. Tweedy. Yes; I remember all of this as a result
8 of your having previously brought it to my attention and I
9 recall it, it was a typical example of an agent or asset
10 full of piss and vinegar exceeding his brief and he was
11 certainly put back on the track very early on.

12 But in this business do not confuse execution squad
13 with anything to do with the assassination of Lumumba or any-
14 thing else. It had nothing to do with that.

15 Mr. Baron. You are saying even though you would
16 assume that Mr. Hedgman's testimony about poisons coming to
17 the Congo and instructions to carry out an assassination
18 coming to the Congo was true, the approach that WIROGUE made
19 to QJWIN was probably not a part of that mission.

20 Mr. Tweedy. It was quite specifically not a part of
21 that mission. There was a chapter of accidents. You have
22 seen it happen, I have seen it happen, a thousand times be-
23 fore, two people who are peripherally involved in the same
24 thing and run into each other and one smells something on the
25 other.

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Mr. Baron. Again, why are you so sure that this would not have been connected in any way to the assassination mission?

Mr. Tweedy. I thought I made that clear because this man went out up to a point through what I would call the open channel, it was developed by the Division, giving training by the Division and was sent out. This had nothing to do whatsoever with the other thing and wouldn't have been handled that way.

Mr. Baron. Could he have been instructed by Mr. Hedgman, after he got to the Congo, that he was to undertake recruitment of assets for participation in an assassination mission as part of his general duties in the Congo?

Mr. Tweedy. It is purely a speculative question. He could have been but Hedgman would also have been required and would have told headquarters what he was doing with him. That was not the purpose for his being sent. The purpose for which he was sent out was unspecific at the time, generally in the PM field.

Mr. Baron. Did this report create a flap at headquarters at the time when the cable was sent?

Mr. Tweedy. No, not at all.

Mr. Baron. It would have been considered a fairly usual --

Mr. Tweedy. It is not.

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Mr. Baron. -- example of free wheeling by an operative?

Mr. Tweedy. It is the sort of thing that can happen.

What you want to do is put a stop to it. But no great problem.

The problem must have lasted 30 minutes.

Mr. Baron. Have you ever discussed events in the Congo with Sidney Gottlieb?

Mr. Tweedy. Have I ever discussed events in the Congo with Sidney Gottlieb?

I can only assume I must have seen Sid during this period, during this period, but I don't recall any discussions. In fact, if there had been any discussions with Sidney Gottlieb on the Congo it would have been at that time.

Mr. Baron. Why would that be so?

Mr. Tweedy. Otherwise Sidney Gottlieb would have had no interest in the Congo.

Mr. Baron. So you mean if there had been any discussions between yourself and Sidney Gottlieb it probably would have --

Mr. Tweedy. It would have surrounded these events.

Mr. Baron. The development of lethal biological substances in his laboratory?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes, sir. Not necessarily that, because I think that would have been Sidney Gottlieb's business as to what he developed in his laboratory. My only interest presumably would have been was there anything in his inventory

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that could possibly be used if we ever wanted to use something.

Mr. Baron. You might have had at least an exploratory conversation with him on that subject?

Mr. Tweedy. I would be surprised if I didn't.

Or perhaps Bussell had a conversation with him and then I followed it up, something like that. I would suspect that probably the first conversation would undoubtedly have been held between Dick Bissell and Sidney Gottlieb but this is merely what I would suspect was the way it occurred.

I don't say that that is the way it occurred. But other than that no conversation with ^{Sidney} Sidney Gottlieb on the Congo at all.

Mr. Baron. I am at the end of my questions on specific facts concerning the Congo during this period of time leading up to Lumumba's death which, as you know, is the narrow subject of our inquiry right now, and first of all I want to say that I appreciate tremendously and know that the Committee is appreciative and grateful for your testimony here today. It is a difficult subject. It is only one narrow aspect of what the Committee is undertaking, and unpleasant, but unnecessary aspect to assemble.

I wonder if you have any facts that you would like to add to the record that you think are necessary to put our discussion today into context?

Mr. Tweedy. I think the strongest recollection about

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my period as Chief of the African Division and the Congo -- let's leave the balance of Africa out -- and U.N. and U.S. involvement in the Congolese matter, that I have never seen an element of the Agency so totally involved in a matter which clearly had the highest policy approval. I am not talking about Lumumba, I am talking about the Congo.

Mr. Baron. There was an extreme sense of urgency at that time?

Mr. Tweedy. Not only an extreme sense of urgency, the U.S. was supporting the U.N., the Agency was supporting the U.S. Government, the U.S. Government requests. What the Agency was doing was very closely coordinated appropriately with any organs of government that need to be covered, mostly State, the White House. I must say the Executive Department was very much working as a team during these days. Again forget Lumumba. I am now talking the whole Congo action. And I never felt that anything we were doing was wandering off into left field or that I didn't know the way the White House was thinking about things, or the State Department was thinking about things, and the National Security was thinking about things, and I have no reason to believe they ever felt that they didn't know how CIA was thinking about things. It was an extraordinarily close thing.

I remember Mennen Williams trying to form a Congo club. When I retired from the African Division I was

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1 given a little thing for a watch chain, if I had one,
2 which would be a member of the Congo Club, and it was rather
3 typical of the way the government worked on this thing and I
4 personally felt excellent advised that the U.S. was absolutely
5 right to support the U.N. on this. I think it could have been
6 a total disaster if Kutanga had been allowed to succeed,
7 and although Mobutu was acting like an ass now, that is
8 Africa for you, but on the whole that country has done pretty
9 well and I consider we had a considerable role in giving it
10 a chance to move the way it has.

There are going to be ups and downs with the things
but that is the way it is. I feel very strongly about it.

Does that somewhat answer your question,
does that help?

Mr. Baron. I simply wanted to give you a chance.

Mr. Tweedy. I felt that very strongly and no other assign-
ment that I have ever had was this kind of government team
and cooperation ever really required because we weren't
engaged or I wasn't engaged in that kind of activity.

Mr. Baron. Is this government team efforts that you are
talking about one that was primarily put together to carry
out the paramilitary activities in the Congo in the
latter part of the 60's, '62, '63.

Mr. Tweedy. It was put together to preside over what-
ever activity the United States Government felt it needed

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1 to be engaged in in the Congo. This included such things as
2 purely policy questions of what the Ambassador to the U.N.
3 might say to the Secretary General of the U.N. or what the
4 President might want to say conceivably I suppose to the
5 Chief of the Belgium state on such matters. Everything
6 certainly didn't just involve what CIA was going to be
7 involved in. It was the whole policy ball of wax with res-
8 pect to the Congo which obviously had many ganglia and which
9 the CIA part and paramilitary activity was just a bit.

10 Mr. Baron. Did this high degree of organization and
11 intensity of concern begin sometime after the death of Lumumba
12 or had it gotten rolling?

13 Mr. Tweedy. I think --

14 Mr. Baron. After the Congolese independence?

15 Mr. Tweedy. I think the U.S. Government was thoroughly
16 seized with the intimate problem and danger of a disintegrating
17 Congo that started in the earliest days of independence
18 and continued and, of course, when the Tschombe-Kutanga
19 thing became a fact of life, which is basically why the U.N.
20 was there, then, of course, that was it.

21 In other words, I would say that U.S. involvement, U.S.
22 concern, merely moved with the events, as anybody could read
23 them in the press just continued and continued, but one thing
24 was perfectly clear, was that the U.S. was quite determined
25 to see this thing through. Nothing had been clearer than

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the way President Kennedy presided over those two meetings. He was annoyed by the Congo and irritated by it and he was worried that he had to spend so much bloody time on it, but he was damn well determined to see the thing through and he was continually goosing his staff to do just that, but in support of the U.N. We weren't going to do it all by ourselves. It couldn't have been clearer.

Mr. Baron. All right, as I mentioned before, the Committee is interested in your wisdom on policy-making and analysis in the intelligence community generally and there may be other members of the Committee staff that would like to call upon you to testify on other subjects because of your long experience in Agency activities.

But I want to thank you now for your complete cooperation and the tremendous amount of information that you have provided on this one subject that has been very helpful?

Mr. Tweedy. Thank you, Mr. Baron. I can assure you anything I can do to help the Committee in other areas I will be glad to do it and if I don't think I can help because I don't think I know enough about the subject I will just say so, otherwise I am not afraid to put my two bits in.

Mr. Baron. As far as your two bits goes, we would be interested in your two bits worth on policy recommendations in general, institutional, critique or suggestions for change or any kind of recommendations that you would care to make.

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1 and we will take that up at some point in the future. But
2 you have obviously had a good deal of experience at the policy
3 level in the Agency and we like to take advantage of that.

4 That is all, thank you.

5 Mr. Tweedy. All right, than you very much.

6 (Whereupon, at 3:55 p.m., the hearing was concluded.)
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