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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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CLASSIFICATION: DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
S-E-C-R-E-T NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM
SUBJECT: WARNING TO PRESIDENT DIEM OF A POSSIBLE COUP D'ETAT ON NIGHT OF 1-2 AUGUST 1962
DATE OF INFO: 1 AUGUST 1962
PLACE & DATE: VIETNAM, SAIGON (1 AUGUST 1962)
APPRAISAL: SEE BELOW
REPORT NO.: TDCS DB-3/650,938
DATE DISTR.: 1 AUGUST 1962
PRECEDENCE: PRIORITY
REFERENCES: IN
FIELD REPORT NO.:
DUNCAN
KAYSEN
KILGUFF
PETERSEN
SCHLESINGER
TAYLOR
BELK

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS

SOURCE: PARAS 2-4: AN AMERICAN OBSERVER, FROM LIEUTENANT COLONEL NGUYEN VAN CHAU, CHIEF OF THE ARVN PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE SERVICE, STATED THAT HE HAD BEEN INFORMED THAT PRESIDENT NGO DINH HAD BEEN WARNED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A COUP D'ETAT OCCURRING ON THE NIGHT OF 1-2 AUGUST 1962. (SOURCE COMMENT: CHAU DID NOT NAME THE INDIVIDUAL FROM WHOM HE RECEIVED THE INFORMATION.)
PARAS 5-8: AN AMERICAN OBSERVER, FROM MAJOR LONG, AT AN MILITARY SCHOOL IN SAIGON, STATED THAT HE BELIEVED TO REPORT WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF HIS GOVERNMENT.
PARA 9: AN OFFICER OF THE PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY SERVICE (C), WHO IS BELIEVED TO REPORT WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF HIS GOVERNMENT.

HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: ALTHOUGH THE COUP D'ETAT DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT DID NOT OCCUR ON THE NIGHT OF 1-2 AUGUST 1962, THIS REPORT IS BEING DISSEMINATED SINCE IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED MIGHT EVOLVE INTO A PLAN FOR A FUTURE COUP AGAINST THE DIEM REGIME. SEE FIELD APPRAISAL IN PARAS 10 THROUGH 14.

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ONLY/NO DISSEM ABROAD

PAGE TWO

A.T.S.

DIVISION	ADMINISTRATIVE	GENERAL	SECURITY	TRAINING	RESEARCH	DEVELOPMENT	OPERATIONS	LOGISTICS	FINANCE	LEGAL	EXTERNAL AFFAIRS	INTERNAL SECURITY	DIVISION
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WHOM HE RECEIVED THE INFORMATION.)

[illegible]

3. CHAU ADDED THAT THE COUP WAS ALLEGEDLY BEING PLANNED BY A GROUP OF

REF 1-5 HIGGAL TACK. (SOURCE CONFIDENTIAL) REPORTED THAT WITHIN 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION
SENIOR ARVN OFFICERS LED BY ARVN CHIEF OF FIELD COMMAND MAJOR GENERAL DUONG

VAN MINH. CHAU ALSO STATED THAT HE BELIEVED THAT BRIGADIER GENERAL MAI HUU

HE BELIEVES THAT SIEN HOANG THAI HE AND BETA INVOLVED WITH ESTRELLA AND WITH XUAN, CHIEF OF THE QUANG TRUNG TRAINING CENTER, MIGHT ALSO BE INVOLVED. CHAU

LIST OF THE MEMBERS OF ALEXANDER (XUAN) LI'S SECTION 'RECOVER SERVICE' SERVED INDICATED THAT XUAN'S INVOLVEMENT WAS INTERFERENTIAL AND NOT EXPLICIT.

4. CHAU COMMENTED WITHOUT FURTHER EXPLANATION THAT THE FRENCH MIGHT A

BE INVOLVED. CHAU CONJECTURED THAT NOT MORE THAN TWO ARVN BATTALIONS WERE

WATSON BOY W/ BROTHER COULD REVEAL LEE DREW KECINE. WAS ALREADY VISITING IN INVOLVED. HE DID NOT EXPLAIN THE BASIS OF HIS CONJECTURE.

5. AT APPROXIMATELY 2200 HOURS ON 1 AUGUST, MAJOR LONG, CHIEF OF THE

INFORMED DID NOT CHECK ON THE NIGHT OF 1-5 WHETHER THE PERSON IS BEING CAPITAL REGION MILITARY SECURITY SERVICE (MSS) STATED THAT A CENTRAL TELE-

7. ~~FRYDSTADT'S~~ COMM. VOUCHER THE COM. DETAIL DESCRIBED IN THIS COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER OF THE GIA DINH PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT HAD INTERCEPTED

ON 1 AUGUST A VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST (VC) RADIO MESSAGE IN PLAIN TEXT ADDRESSED TO ALL

2: VN OFFICERS OF THE RESIDENTIAL SECURITY SERVICE (C) AND TO
TO THE VC SAIGON/CHOLON ZONE COMMITTEE INSTRUCTING ALL VC MILITARY UNITS TO BE

PREPARED FOR AN UPRISING AT MIDNIGHT ON 1 AUGUST. (SOURCE COMMENT - MAJOR

LONG DID NOT IDENTIFY THE ORIGINATOR OF THE MESSAGE.) (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT:)

REF ID: A66094
TDCS-3/518-127 REPORTED THAT ON 23 JULY 1962 THE VC IN THE SAIGON AREA WERE REINFORCED

ORDERED TO CEASE ALL TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AND TO PREPARE FOR A POSSIBLE COUP

D'ETAT.)
 0005 D'ETAT OF MICHIGAN OF T-S VANCE L 1905

6. MAJOR LONG ADDED THAT GENERAL XUAN HAD INFORMED THE VIETNAMESE

GOVERNMENT-ON-25-JULY-1962-THAT-HIS-INTELLIGENCE-SECTION-HAD-INTERCEPTED-A-
 REF ID: A66088

VC DOCUMENT INSTRUCTING VC PERSONNEL TO BE READY FOR AN UPRISING IN ABOUT ONE MONTH

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WEEK. (SOURCE COMMENT. MAJOR LONG DID NOT KNOW THE ORIGINATOR OR THE ADDRESSEE OF THE INTERCEPTED DOCUMENT, NOR DID HE STATE TO WHICH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT AGENCY GENERAL XUAN HAD REPORTED.)

MAJOR LONG ALSO REVEALED THAT AN MSS AGENT PENETRATION OF THE VC OF UNTESTED RELIABILITY HAD REPORTED ON 1 AUGUST THAT HIS VC SUPERIOR IN CHAU HIEP (THIRTY KILOMETERS WEST OF SAIGON) HAD INSTRUCTED HIM ON 31 JULY TO BE ALERT FOR A COUP, AND TO MEET HIS VC SUPERIOR IN SAIGON FOUR HOURS AFTER THE COUP BEGAN.

85. MAJOR LONG ALSO STATED THAT A HAND GRENADE HAD EXPLODED IN THE GO VAP AREA OF SAIGON ON THE NIGHT OF 1 AUGUST INJURING SEVEN VIETNAMESE WOMEN AND CHILDREN. (SOURCE COMMENT. THE RELEVANCE OF THE EXPLOSION TO A COUP ATTEMPT IS NOT CLEAR, BUT MAJOR LONG BELIEVED THAT THE EVENTS MIGHT BE CONNECTED.)

THE PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY SERVICE (SEPES) INTERCEPTED CODED RADIO MESSAGES ON 1 AUGUST ON UNUSUAL FREQUENCIES. THE TEXT OF THE MESSAGES WHEN DECODED WERE IN VIETNAMESE AND FRENCH, AND STATED THAT A COUP WOULD OCCUR ON THE NIGHT OF 1-2 AUGUST. ARVN UNITS HAVE BEEN ALERTED IN THE SAIGON AREA.

FIELD COMMENT: CHAU IS CONSIDERED TO BE A FAIRLY RELIABLE SOURCE, WHO HAS PREVIOUSLY STATED THAT OF ALL THE ARVN OFFICERS, GENERAL DUONG VAN MINH WAS THE MOST LIKELY TO LEAD A COUP ATTEMPT. GENERAL MINH HAS BEEN A VOCAL CRITIC OF THE DIEM REGIME INsofar AS DIEM'S EFFICACY AGAINST THE VC IS CONCERNED.

GENERAL MAI HUU XUAN, FREQUENTLY RUMORED TO BE A MEMBER OF VARIOUS COUP GROUPS,

S-E-C-R-E-T

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IS KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN DISSATISFIED WITH HIS PRESENT ASSIGNMENT AND TO HAVE HARBORED RESENTMENTS AGAINST DIEM FOR ALLEGED SLIGHTS, DESPITE THE FACT THAT DIEM PROMOTED HIM FROM COLONEL TO BRIGADIER GENERAL SEVERAL YEARS AGO. MAJOR LONG HAS EXHIBITED PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCE IN HIS PRESENT POSITION.

FIELD COMMENT. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT ALL OF THE INFORMATION PROCEEDED FROM A SINGLE SOURCE OR FROM TWO SOURCES AND THE VARIATION IN DETAIL WAS IN THE ORAL ACCOUNTS OF DIFFERENT SOURCES. THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION (CIO) WAS UNAWARE OF ANY POSSIBLE COUP SHORTLY AFTER MIDNIGHT ON 1-2 AUGUST. HOWEVER, AT APPROXIMATELY THE SAME TIME, THE NORMAL PRESIDENTIAL GUARD HAD ALREADY BEEN REINFORCED AND POLICE CHECK POINTS ALSO SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN REINFORCED. GIVEN THE ADVANCE ALERT BY THE GVN MILITARY AND SECURITY ELEMENTS, IT IS PROBABLE THAT ANY INTENDED COUP WOULD BE ABORTIVE.

FIELD COMMENT.

12. /AT 0200 ON 2 AUGUST, SAIGON WAS QUIET AND THERE WERE NO SIGNS APPARENT OF ANY COUP ATTEMPT, EXCEPT FOR THE ALERT OF SOME OF THE GVN ELEMENTS STATED IN PARA. 11.13. FIELD COMMENT. THE INTERCEPT OF A PLAIN-TEXT VC RADIO MESSAGE REFERRED TO IN PARA. FIVE IS NOT CONVINCING, AND RAISES THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE VC MIGHT BE ENGAGED IN A CONFUSION MANEUVER. SEPE'S CAPABILITY TO INTERCEPT AND DECODE A MESSAGE IN THE SAME DAY, AS REPORTED IN PARA. NINE, IS QUESTIONABLE.

C. FIELD DISSEM. STATE FOR CINCPC ARPAC PACAF PAFLT.

MEET (SCIENCE COVER) MYLOS FONG DID NOT KNOW THE ORIGINATOR OF THE VDDK2222

END OF MESSAGE

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