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Folder 7

Background

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(SSC)

In April 1935, the Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities published their Final Report (Part II) which in essence faulted the CPTA and to some extent for its error of omission in not informing the Warren Commission of the Agency's ongoing plots against the revolutionary government in Cuba and its attempts on the life of ^{the} premier, Fidel Castro. The Committee's report is ~~dated~~ on pages 6-7 of its Findings but one paragraph succinctly sums up their position.

P7
Part II
have

"Senior CPTA officials also should have realized that their agency was not utilizing its full capability to investigate Oswald's pro-Castro and anti-Castro connections. They should have realized that CPTA operations against Cuba, particularly operations involving the assassination of Castro, needed to be considered in the investigation. Yet, they duped their subordinates to conduct an investigation without telling them of these vital facts. These officials, whom the Warren Commission relied upon for expertise, advised the Warren Commission that the CPTA had no

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0002413 evidence of a foreign conspiracy?

SSC Strong by the Senate criticism and the "ripple effect" that Book V ~~has~~ accounted in the media, the CIA prepared a comprehensive report in 1977 designed to answer at least within the Agency, the critical questions posed in the Final Report. However, even the 1977 Report tacitly recognizes the inadequacy of the CIA's response to the Warren Commission's quest for all relevant information. ["Relevancy" is of course, the "buzzword" upon which both the Senate and Agency each base their position ^{on the importance} of the anti-Castro plots to the Commis work.] On page 10 of the Agency's Conclusions, the 1977 Report acknowledges that:

"While one can understand today why the Warren Commission limited its inquiry to normal avenues of investigation, it would have served to reinforce the credibility of its effort had it taken a broader view of the matter. CIA, too could have considered in specific terms what most saw in general terms -- the possibility of Soviet or Cuban involvement ^{in the assassination (JFK)} because of tensions of the time.

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..... The Agency should have

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P 10
1977 ~~Final~~
Report

taken broader initiatives, than,
as well."

It is not the purpose of
this analysis to detail ~~and~~ the
conflicting viewpoints of the SSC and CPTA
with regard to the significance
of the CPTA's Castro ~~unwarranted~~
attempts and to resolve ~~the parties~~
controversy as to ~~the operations~~ ^{the parties} importance.
~~Rather~~ I stated this paper seeks
to present a comprehensive
review of all the facts, drawn from
a variety of sources, of organized
Cubans' involvement or potential
involvement in CPTA operations
against Cuba during 1960-63.
Certain influences and conclusions
~~the~~ will then be drawn upon
the nature, scope, and motivation
~~of the operations~~ of the syndicate
participants in the operations.

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Examination of documents found in
CIA plots to assassinate - Fall 1962

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Washington
The genesis of the ~~plot~~ at the
the general syndicate & the CIA attempt
to assassinate Castro is by the 1967
Insight Bureau Report as covering
during a conversation between the
Deputy Director of Plans, ~~John~~ Richard
Bissell, and the Director of the Office of
Security, Colonel Stephen R. Remick.
[1967-18 Apr. 0. ; Informant p 74-18 Apr. 1967]

Remick arranged the specific task
of tracking the night walk to
"eliminate or minimize" Castro, to
James "Big Ben", O'Connell, who was
the chief of the Operations Support Division
of the Office of Security. Both men
agreed that Robert F. Mahon +
who had been previously employed
by the Agency in several sensitive areas
operations, would be contacted for
assistance the following season.

[Mahon's CIA history and relationship to O'Connell
are detailed on pp 74-75, Informant Report]
Although Mahon and O'Connell differ
as to who initially brought up
John Ressler's name for consideration
there was a meeting between Mahon
and Ressler at the Bureau Daily Meeting
in the Agency in early September 1968
[Informant Report 75-5]

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[Comment: Mahon seems the

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logical person to have thought
of and contacted Roscoe for several
years. In an office of some size
on 22 Morgan, making attempts there
to a memo to the DCP dated
19 November 1970 which mentions the
Morgan operation. Paragraph 5 states
that "Mr. Morgan advised that he
had met one John Roscoe on
several occasions while working for
depos. He only knew from secondary
sources to understand that he was
given to understand that he was
a high ranking member of the
organization and contacted all the
Morgan, advised that of Roscoe
was in fact a member of the
organization. He was giving
the information to the other group
making into the other group.

0002182 in file
[Comment]
the initial information of the initial
Morgan - Roscoe FBI file and was
in Roscoe's will in 1957. See Roscoe
in alleged telephone call in 1957. See Roscoe
[Comment]
in file.

0002182 in file
[Comment]
the initial information of the initial
Morgan - Roscoe FBI file and was
in Roscoe's will in 1957. See Roscoe
in alleged telephone call in 1957. See Roscoe
[Comment]
in file.

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Rosselli, although apparently skeptical at first, agreed to a meeting in New York City with Mahon and Council to discuss further details.

[Dutane Report p76; Office of Society memo from Morgan file, dated 19 Nov. 1970]

Although the Dutane Report places the meeting as the Playa Hotel on 14 Septem 1960, Rosselli recalled that the ~~event~~ discussions took place during Castro's visit to the United Nations which began on September 18, 1960.

[Comment]

Tony de Varona admits going to NY at the time of Castro's visit, but it is unlikely that he was in contact with Rosselli at this time or [Festival of de Varona, that his visit had an assassination motivation]

According to a 19 Nov. 1970 memo to the D.C.I., it was at this September meeting in New York City, that Rosselli "agreed to introduce him (Mahon) to a friend, 'Sam Cold', who knew the Cuban crowd."

[Comment:]

The timing of the introduction of both ~~Frank~~ (Cold) and Traffante ("Joe") is ~~an~~ important to the analysis of the "true" role of the mob in the Castro assassination plots. Randy

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77 to the 1967 I. G. Report, the ~~entry~~
of bianca took place ^① during the
week of 25 September 1960:
[1967 I. G. Report, p. 18]

In contrast, the SSC Inform
Report at p. 76, does not ~~mention~~
data concerning ^{for} bianca's initial appearance ~~to~~
~~it was~~ "cutting" prior to October
18." (p. 76) because of conflicting
~~testimony~~ evidence between the
1967 I. G. September date and Mahon's
Senate testimony which set the introduction
in ~~at~~ November 1960. As a compromise, the
Inform Report reasoned that bianca
had been introduced to the Mahon
"prior to October 18" because the
Las Vegas wiretap account in October
30, 1960, and (2) ~~the~~ DDP Bissell had
received an FBI memo dated 18 October
1960 which revealed an FBI FLSur
quoting bianca as discussing her
involvement in an assassination
plot against Castro ^② [FBI memo, dated
18 Oct 1960 from Horrocks Bissell; Inform
Report, p. 79]

[Comment: 0002184
Each ~~of~~ dual reasons listed in the
Inform Report on p. 77 are subject to
critical analysis which will be
dealt with separately ~~in the below~~.]

[Comment: ~~SECRET~~
Although the 1967 I. G. Report stated

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COR-

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Comment

~~Conflicts~~ Conflicts appear also on a ~~variety~~ ^{several} of minor joints surrounding the September 1965 maps in N.Y.C. and Miami. For instance:

11) Did Rosselli know from the beginning that ~~that~~ the operation was CDT?

a) O'Connell stated that Mahan told Roselli that they were representing international business interests whereas Roselli testified that Mahan told him that O'Connell was CIA (Intern Regs p 70)

Also, footnote 1 on p. 26 indicates that Roselli told O'Connell "about 3 weeks after the New York meeting", which is during the Miami involvement of Porcuna, that "I am not kidding, I know what you work for".

The importance of Roselli's recognition
of CFA ~~is~~ ^{SECRET} information is that it is
doubtful if Brannan and Trappento

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could have been ending
they could be sure of
protection. This theme of
disregard more fully
that he would not
summarize in "agent of
bad. much of what the
natural under... (Rosell);

of Jan 17, 1971 (4) which
could have been
known?

team, however, had direct
of the CIA investment. The CIA
had apparently themselves
for his coverage against
It is alleged source for
article was Rosell and
we have I, it is another
of service. It is another
with all source, and
degree upon Rosell, to depend in my
3) the alleged "source"

in the "source" by making
"source" identification of
"source" and the "source"
secret. That is all

Sunday supplement (Lauds) which purports
to contain individual notices of persons
greatly and I suppose, thus ~~being~~ the
showing. Mathew and I would ~~be~~ the

nature of the people with whom
 they were dealing, it is a matter of
 every matter to ascertain fairly
 management for the month of April
 and November. It would appear
 that ~~the~~ O'Connell and others

will arrange for an expert
fact reason for continuing
the operation after the information
of Fred & the top Master in the
United States. I cannot withhold that
his discovery was after "me".

more up to our own in it" which
is difficult to fathom since the question
was in the very same stage and not
quite as different as would be
met. Apparently March 1941, although the
reason, the exact stuff inscants it could not find the exact reason. In the paper
T. H. I.

The operation in which I of
 the operation ~~with~~ the
 as to the notice which was
 be played by the "old" and "new"
 in ~~the~~ the me - day of day
 place of the operation.

through the
house as playing a "boy" note.

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MEMO, 7/29/75, p. 34) and discussed
his job as "to locate arms in
California, enforce new laws
concerning the movement, conceal
stolen property, (concerning part to
that of a "made up" man's record
by the ~~subcommittee~~ "Hearings"
In latter records record a meeting
from Geneva, murder group
they before Records Service
to open for question J. Rinaldi
characterization of Giovanni, not
as much as in United to
the alleged ~~movement of Giovanni~~
"knowledge of the Italian word "not
the 19 Nov 1970 memo - would
Testimony in statement
in Phase I is even more turned by the
available evidence. The 1907 L-6 Report and
Senate Internal Report ~~the~~ state that "
"good" identified "Joe" to make
as a man who would serve
as a courier to Cuba and
make arrangements there "to report
p. 19; Internal Report, p. 775. To
support the description of informant
as a courier" the ~~1907 L-6 Report~~

Senate
due to her

17
Internal Report dated 8.19.75
1907 L-6 Report in stating that
"At that time, the security group
were still operating in Cuba
and I estimate was making
regular trips between Miami
and Havana on specific missions"
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Comment

probably

there's unsupportable action

was contrary to the evidence available through official government records. As an example, State Department files reflect that ^{in 1959} Tamm was not for a passport in October 1959 and received that document in Havana on February 1, 1960. (see Tamm's file, State Dept. from Tamm, 1960). ~~Account~~ No records available to the Committee from DHS, State Department or FBI record any later 1960 travels even though the Bureau and State maintained close surveillance on Tamm during the period. In his Committee testimony, Tamm ~~stated~~ that he made two trips to Cuba after his release from prison in August 1959 and placed three separate pictures ^{in 1959} or three months after his release. Tamm, pp 4-53, Oct. 1973. His testimony has some degree of validity in that all of the known records with either cloud or covering on the subject dated him in the Tampa-Miami area consistently ~~in 1959~~ during the pre-Tamm Big game.

By the form of the Senate testimony of ~~Robert~~ Tamm, Tamm was not dissimulated to a great

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even below Giancana's ^{from "courier"} had been reduced to a mere "translator" and was needed only to facilitate communication between Rosselli and the Cubans who had been recruited for the actual assassination. In the Trafficante and Rosselli 1977 and 1977 Congressional appearances dove tailed well but remain in contradiction to the ~~my~~ facts as they were being reported in 1983 of the principals.

Comment:

The Senate testimony of Rosselli and Trafficante needs to be outlined ~~separately~~ with a view to contrasting the "courier" or "interpreter" role. My memory is that the Senate did not vigorously cross examine either man on this discrepancy nor did ~~they~~ the Tribune Report "hint" at the problem.

Once the actors had been assembled for the launching of the enterprise, a discussion began as to the method ~~of~~ to be employed to accomplish the goal. The Agency took the simplistic, straight forward approach of shooting Castro but this ~~plan~~ ^{SECRET} was rejected.

0002182
by Bincana. In a Comment
to its 1967 Report, the Inspector
General noted that "Bincana
was flatly opposed to the use
of firearms. He said that no one
could be recruited to do the job
because the chance of survival
and escape would be negligible.
Bincana stated a preference for
lethal pill that could be put
into Castro's food and drink.
Trafficante (Joe; the courier) was
~~in touch~~ in touch with a disloyal
Cuban official with access to
Castro and presumably of a sort
that would enable him to
surreptitiously poison Castro. The
gangsters named their man
inside as Juan Ota, who was
then office Chief and Director General
of the Office of the Prime Minister
Castro. The gangster said that
Ota had once been in a position
to receive backpacks from the
gangster's contacts but had since
lost that source of income and
needed the money. [F.B. Report, p 25]

Comment

Comment - found above
The observations of the 1967 F.O.
Report ~~has~~ are ~~of~~ extremely significant
in several respects. First, the person
pill ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~not~~ ^{SECRET} ~~permanently~~ ^{original}
uncanned, not the ~~being~~; a print

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which is crucial to the final conclusion presented below. Secondly, Trappanese is identified as ~~providing~~ ^{providing} having access to, and providing the assassin in Cuba which is in consistent with his self-serving role description of "infiltrator." His ability to recruit Ota apparently ~~is~~ was directly tied to his former gambling empire associations which formed a constant pattern for all his ~~illegal~~ conduct for Trappanese both during and after his Cuban days. [See Trappanese profile.]

Comment

role Speculation concerning Ota's rise during the Agency's 1977 Report when it was forced to address a problem raised by an April 23, 1975 article, concerning Frank Stugin, written by Paul Marshall of the New York Daily News. Stugin was quoted as saying, "The third (assassination) scheme involved planting a bomb in Castro's office. I had access to the Prime Minister's office," Stugin said, "I knew Fidel's private secretary, Juan Ota. I recruited him to work with the Embassy." ^{SECRET} ~~Trappanese~~ ^{Trappanese} ~~was~~ ^{was} his link to the

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writer of the 1977 Report was the fact that Ota's name had surfaced in connection with a Castro assassination plot, before revelation of the CIA-Mafia connection by the Senate Intelligence Committee. The Report references news stories linking Stugis with Trappento and with a "gambler partner" of Trappento, Norman Rothman. (See Rothman Papers). Coupled with Stugis' ^{alleged} past relationships, is the allegation that Stugis had a role in ~~the~~ inspecting the gambling casinos in Cuba on behalf of the Castro government and could have developed an interest with Ota in running gambling "high roller".

A second aspect of Muskie's ~~the~~ news series concerned a claim by Maura Jorony that she had acted on behalf of Stugis in 1960 in attempt to poison Castro when he dined with the 18 April 1960 FBI memorandum in Domonca's electronically surveilled curriculum in which he stated that "the assassin had arranged with a girl, not further described, to drop a 'pill' ^{SECRET} some drink or food of Castro". (Memo, Huns to DCI, SA, DDA, 10/1/60)

The sentence continues advanced
in the 1977 Report are as follows?

It is obvious that many lines of speculation can be developed, not the least of which is that the Agency did not know the full extent of syndicate activities...

Additional considerations:

1. Criminal syndicates may well have had some independent activities of its own activity prior to C.I.A. involvement in late 1960. Also, could have been Agency when C.I.A. withdrew from in 1962 April.
2. Syndicate operators could have had contacts such as those in New York Daily News story in 1975 and 1976.
3. Frank Sturgis seems to have had contacts with, but not a member of syndicate. Could well have been used by the syndicate.
4. Sturgis has not been a reliable source. He probably knew Ortiz in Cuba but he was outside Cuba when Ortiz assumed role of assassin.

If there was an earlier operator w/ Ortiz, it was not C.I.A.; could have been earlier operators of syndicate. Sturgis could have been or been involved in syndicate operation, or picked up gossip from Miami in 1965 after Ortiz killed him.

Neither the 1967 I-C Report
or the SSC Interim Report can

pinpoint the precise date on which
the Agency processed the poison pills
which O'Connell delivered to Rosselli
{ Interim Report, p 80. The chain of
custody, according to the 1967 I-C-
Report ~~was~~ was for the lethal
pills to be delivered from Rosselli
to Truffante. Although the next
intervening steps remain a
mystery, Rosselli reports to O'Connell
that the pills had been delivered to
Data in Cuba in late February - early
March 1961. { Interim Rpt, p 27; Interim Rpt p 80

Comment:

The Senate Interim Report reported
the version of Joe Shimon ~~whose~~
~~story~~ whose memory was that the
money and pills for the operation were
delivered at a meeting at the Fontainebleau
Hotel on March 12, 1961 attended by
"Mahan, Rosselli, Truffante, and the
Cubans". { Interim Rpt p 15. Shimon's
~~memory~~ story is filled with
verid ~~extra~~ details which are documented
on p 2 of the Report, but his credibility
is subject to serious question as
his account is not shared by
anyone else connected with the plan
and nor is his relationship with

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0002198 Roselli, broncano, or Trafficante appear as "copy" as he would lead me to believe.

It is also apparent that Shimon was a source for Fidel's column of January 19, 1961, which fixed the date of the passage of the garrison at the Fountainebleau ^{by Roselli} as March 13, 1961, and contained the report that Castro became ill a few ~~days~~ weeks later.

The real problem with Shimon's story is that the pills were returned to the CIA for a few weeks because Ota could or would not, attempt the poisoning; a fact apparently unknown to Shimon before his "leak" to Truman and his Senate testimony.]

Comment

One additional fact concerning Ota's inability to carry out the mission ties in with the final thesis of this report. Ota "lost" his position in Castro's office on 26 January 1961, while ~~the~~ planning for the operation was still going on in Miami and Washington.

It would seem though, that the gangster did know that Ota had already lost his access to Castro [see 1967 ~~Int.~~ Report p. 27]

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With the failure of Ortiz
to produce the desired results,
the project was at a standstill.
until, once again, Santo Trappante
assumed command. Russell Fox
commented that "Trappante believed
a certain leading figure in
the Cuban exile movement ~~might~~ might
be able to accomplish the mission."
Σ ~~File~~ 1967 DC Lpt, p 29; Daken Rpt p 8.

Comment:

The wild leader was, of course
Tony de Varna, ~~who was~~
who was the subject of speculation
in an FBI memorandum of 11 Jan 1961
associating him with receiving financial
aid from American gangsters for
anti-Castro activities which were
the CIA operation.

At the time of his introduction
into the CIA mob plots, de Varna was already
being funded by the Agency through
the Revolutionary Front and was already
involved in CIA planning for the
Bay of Pigs invasion which was
imminent.

Daken de Varna was also ^{being} ~~used~~
by Mike McKernan whose advisory
agency was ~~engaged~~ ^{engaged} in
promoting Varna's image in
collaboration with McKernan's firm

in 1960-61

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Completing the picture of support for Valenza is the promotional efforts of the Dins and Eddie Cellini, Mchany ad Lumsby Museum, ancient, who were reportedly working through a Washington DC, public relations firm, Edward & Moss and Associates. Moss had previous CPTA associations and was supposed acting as a conduit for funds supplied by the Cellini benefactors with the understanding that this group would have "privileged treatment" in the "Cuba of the Future". Attempts to verify these reports were unsuccessful. [1967 F.B.I. Report]

P. 38 J

The largely influence
 using the Cullini brothers as a
 "front" is particularly interesting
 in light of Varona's admission
 that Jorge Pujol arranged a
 meeting in Miami on ~~the~~ ^{my} ~~160~~ ¹⁶⁰ wherein ^{my} largely offered to
 ferociously "back" Varona's
 efforts to ~~remain~~ ^{SECRET} "educate"
 the Cuban people about Castro,
 which may be a euphemism for
 anti-Castro plots. I see Varona's

the largest influence
down is that first the
movement came, and then
the center began to move
upon the whole, and so
the had the potential of
groups who were in a
informative form, and
was indispensable, de
to permit both the
government and support
to the future or
I see Union testing
quite both rough
no many of making
the 7 rings around
that he in several
in several matters, but
of which, "made" from
which confirmed to some
claimed that the 1900
movement for the
movement in view of
on the side of the

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O'Connell that ~~the~~ Trafficante would provide the replacement for the ill-fated, Juan Orta who had escaped to the Venezuelan Embassy in April 1961.

Comment: ^{Paralleling} ~~Paralleling~~ the situation at the Senate hearings July 1975 when Rosselli's depiction of Trafficante's role ~~changed~~ changed from ~~his~~ his "counsel" ~~character~~ ^{character} in 1960 as reported by the Agency to conform to Trafficante's "interpreter" state ment, in the recent interview with Genser who agrees with Trafficante's Committee testimony ^{with de Vanna} he was an ^{with de Vanna} ~~interpreter~~ ^{with de Vanna} ~~interpreter~~ for Rosselli. ~~and~~ the net result in both instances is to minimize Trafficante's exposure (See C.F. Fonzi interview with Genser, May 3, 1978 and Trafficante testimony, Oct 7, 1977)

~~However, the meeting with~~
~~Vanna came to pass, the~~
~~ambiguity~~
If ~~ambiguity~~ exists as to the ^{ambiguity} introduction of de Vanna into Phase one of the Castro assassination plot, more ~~clear~~ ~~ambiguity~~ confusion surrounds de Vanna's ~~as~~ actual participation prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion. The I & Report indicates that de Vanna attempted a second person run before the Cuban invasion that Rosselli was positive that only one

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attempt, (Ortas) was made. He was also positive that he delivered both pills, money and supplies to de Vanna which is corroborated by O'Connell ~~report~~ during 1961. The conflict is resolved by the Senate in specifying that only one pre-Bay of Pigs attempt was made, and that... (de Vanna) was the contact in the United States who arranged for... [Ortas]... to administer the poison.

Comment

There appears to be no factual way to resolve de Vanna's initial contribution to the poison attempts especially since Vanna denies ever having received poison pills from Roselli or Bay involved in any attempt on Castro's life at any time. (See Vanna transcript)

Comment

The Agency was aware of the possible dangers inherent in having de Vanna participate in the mob's plot while on Embassy list put on the Residency Board. However, "Steph" ^{was} ~~later~~ ^{to} end his participation in the syndicate plan but [they] were apparently ineffective. (See I.C. Report, p 32)

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success in carrying out their part of the bargain struck in 1960 with the Agency.

Fact. In Phase One, Rosselli et al had demonstrated their ability to execute the contract on Castro by naming their source who was, in fact, in a position close to Castro to succeed. In contrast, the details of the matter operated and the ability of the ~~person~~ ^{personne} assassin was deliberately vague. After ~~Harry~~ Harry met Rosselli in Miami in April 1962, Harry reported that "the manner in which the actual material was to be introduced into Castro's fold [which involved] an asset of someone who had access to someone in a ^{restaurant} frequented by Castro." By June 1962 after the Vienna had received money and munitions from the JMWAVE station and had personally sent the goods into Cuba, ~~the~~ "Rosselli" reported to Harry on 21 June that Vienna had dispatched a team of three men to Cuba. Just what they were supposed to do is pretty vague. Harry said that they appeared to have no specific plan for killing Castro. They were to recruit others who might be used in such a scheme. If an opportunity to kill Castro presented itself, they or the persons they recruited were to make the attempt -- perhaps using the pills. Harry never heard

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work for Pearson and did have
that Anderson had met them &
assessing acquaintance with Morgan.
Morgan and Taylor with
a copy of a cc

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their names or anything about them"
 [1967 DO. Report p51]

Comment

As the 1967 DO author correctly observed, Harvey's tale of the "favorite restaurant" personifying opportunity ~~was the same story that~~ Edwards was familiar in that Edwards had decided precisely the same plan. The fact that Vauma related the exact modes operandi to Harvey as he had discussed with Edwards in Phase One (circa 1960-mid 1961) leads to the possibilities that:

- (1) Harvey was correct in assuming that he was taking over an ongoing operation in April 1962 or
- (2) the plot had been underway since before, during, and after the Bay of Pigs and prompted the CDA to provide logistical support and future protection against the Justice Department; or
- (3) de Vauma was simply making up a story for the Agency to gain ^{their} financial backing or in response to directives from organized crime.

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Second

the cast of unknown

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character changed. Harvey had insisted that "Mambo" and someone be dropped from the operation which "Rosselli" readily assented to. Traffante's "in person" role was assumed by "Mambo", a mysterious "Cuban who spoke Italian" and who sometimes used the name "Bambino" and today.

Comment

"Mambo" introduction into one of the most sensitive C.I.A. covert actions in history without any attempt ^{by the Agency} to check his background or to ascertain his identity is extraordinary. Yet, the Agency apparently went blithely to bed ~~to~~ ^{with these} of the top hoodlums in the United States without doing any basic background security investigation.

Although the R.F.B. Report characterizes Mambo as "Rosselli's man", it is probable that this individual was ~~never~~ drafted by Traffante who had provided all the Cuban personnel previously used in the attempts and who still possessed, in 1962, the most complete network of Cuban allies in Miami and Cuba.

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and Roselli occurred in Washington
D.C. in June 1963. when he was
Harvey's ~~first~~ overnight guest. And
their meeting ostensibly was not directly
related to any assassination plots.

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the available evidence suggests that ~~the~~ the three which is tacitly accepted by the Agency on 15 1977 National Intelligence Report wherein it states that "it is probable that CIA simply found itself involved in providing additional resources for independent operations that the syndicate itself had under way. In a ~~short~~ ^{short} way, may have been piggy-backing on the syndicate, and, in addition to its material contributions, was also supplying an area of official sanction: 1977 Feb 19th 6208 The above evidence is as follows: 1. FBI memo 18 Oct 1960 re Lawrence Estate;

Lawrence reportedly advised those present that Castro's assassination would occur in November, however, he allegedly indicated that he had already met with the assassin to discuss three reasons... Lawrence claimed that everything has been predicted for the killing, and that the assassin had arranged with a girl, not further identified, to drop a pill in some drink or food of Castro: 1977 Feb 19th 6197

Amount
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State of
Although the number of meetings between Martin, Oswald, and Lee Harvey

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are subject to different interpretation,
it is clear that no plans were
developed between the parties ~~by~~
until sometime after October 6, 1960
the date of the ^{FATS} intercepted conversation
Biancana.

The grim pile, prepared by the
CFT at Biancana's request, were
not ready for delivery until late
February - early March 1961, so that it
is difficult to see how Biancana's
November 1960 assassination plot
could be a part of the CFT operation.
Rather, it appears that the mob had
its own plan in progress, using
a mixture of Castro, to accomplish the
deed, when the CFT fortuitously
happened along to offer its support.

The mob was then in a perfect
position. If their ~~present~~ private
plot actually worked and Castro died,
then the Syndicate had enormous
Machinist potential against the CFT
which it could exercise at the
opportune moment. However, if their
~~plot~~ back-fired, then their position
would be that they were
only attempting to violate the
wishes of their Government.

Additional Comment

The actions of Biancana's
"hired hand", Richard Cain ~~can~~
~~not~~ raise some interesting
possibilities. Given Cain's admission

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to the FBI that he had ~~been~~ joined the Chicago Police Department and Sheriff's office while on ~~bonhomie~~ payroll. Cain's approach to ~~offer~~ the CPTA Chicago office in the fall of 1960 to volunteer ~~his services~~ information on the Cuban community appears ~~as a little more than~~ ^{coincidental}. Then when FBI files disclose that he is planning to go to Cuba for Life magazine (and me stay), and to "bug" influential Cubans in Havana ostensibly for ~~st-~~ Buden Prio (second stay) the coincidence becomes more suspect. The suspicion is that Cain was being sent by someone to supervise the poisoning attempt on Fidel Castro. Cain called me the "arranger" when Buden refused to ~~in the FBI~~ ^{in the FBI} Oct 16, 1960 or he could be the contact man for the operation.

I tie in memo on Cain with Salinas' view which ~~is~~ ^{is} strongly supported by the evidence, that Cain was the "missing second man" in the Los Vegas writing of Oct 30, 1960. [Makue needs to be quoted on this point]

Cain continued to "volunteer" information and assistance to the CPTA during 1961-1963. In August 1963, he offered information on the DRP Student Directory in Chicago to that office of the Agency. In ~~volunteering~~ ^{volunteering} Cuba

SECRET

0002213

was the former head of the Directorate
in Cuba when he was a major
in the former in deposing Batista.

In September 1963, Cain reported
to the Chicago office of the CIA that
DRB was in a deal to purchase
a large arms shipment. He was
told by the Agency to "get out
of the picture" ~~with~~ a directive
which is subject to several interpretations
including the fact that the CIA
was a willing participant in the deal.

Again on November 27, 1963, Cain
now the chief investigator for Cook
County Sheriff's office, gave the Agency
some information that Oswald was
in ~~Cuba~~ Chicago in Sept 1963 with
the Fair Play for Cuba Committee and
had purchased the ~~massacre~~
up in March 1963.

2. Recruitment of ~~the potential~~ ^{the potential} Assassins

In locating the ~~potential~~ ^{potential} poisoner,
In locating the ~~potential~~ ^{potential} poisoner,
Garcana spoke of a "girl" who
was close to Castro while the
individual recruited for the CIA pills
was Juan Orta, a secretary in
Castro's Prime Ministry.

The identity of the "girl" referred
to by Garcana can never be ascertained
but Trafficante was clearly in the
best position to recruit ~~at least one~~
one of Castro's Cuban ministers due to
his multifaceted contacts in the
Cuban gambling and prostitution circles

SECRET

SECRET

0002214

It was common for American
to have Cuban mistresses and
Traffickers, Rothman, and Tora
will typical examples. Also, one
told the Committee that Castro was
accustomed to arriving at the Ma
Hotel (owned by Mike McManis) centered
on a regular basis to visit one
of his paramours. Thus, it was
have been relatively easy for Tora
to have arranged for a young
women to service Castro and to
attempt to poison him.

L. Marina Torrey is a confidante
witness to say the least, and her
potential as an assassin recruited
of Frank Stugins has been previously
discussed. However, one certainly
point is that she was also Castro's
Torrey's mistress and, there can
have been solicited to activate
the poison plot. Unfortunately, Torrey
is totally uncooperative but Torrey
was not asked about her relationship
with Torrey in Cuba so that we
do not know the dated match.
Comment

Juan Orta, the man identified
to the Agency as the gangster's contact
in Castro's inner circle, was presumably
involved by Traffickers, but to date
former receipt of gangster "handshake"
One fact is extremely bothersome
however, in attempting to gauge the
depth of the move seemingly in wrong
Orta to execute the assassination plan.
According to the SECRET FO Report L-1422

[The page contains dense, illegible handwritten cursive script covering most of the surface.]

SECRET

0002216

by the C.F.'s organization, funding
and material support could, one imag-
ine be afforded by the Agency although
at least it would combine to that
through the post office, parcel
and "press."

Thus is the loose structure of
Chapel II in terms of the ambivalence
nature of the supernatural nature of nature
the lack of identity of the self and
unconscious, the simple nature of
Henry upon Roubin and not that without
even actually they would not, the group
is actually to contribute Roubin.

[illegible]

SECRET

the Government.
~~is not~~ Despite the warnings

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

rescued 0002217 business sense in
continuing the paramilitary attempts
against Castro in a substantive way.
There still was a percentage in
"stringing the Agency along." First, there
was no expense to the syndicate
because the Agency was providing full
logistical support for Vietnam. Second,
there was the mounting pressure
from the ~~Joint~~ FBI and Justice Department
which had to be blunted, if possible.
No better weapon to accomplish this
goal could be found than to use
one agency (CIA) against another (FBI).
A brief look at the record shows the
employment of ~~this~~ strategy ~~at~~ at moments
of crisis for those who participated in
the plots.

1. Robert Mahon

- Quasi-official committee subpoena
in 1966 [Intern Report, p 79, note 3; ^{Internal Edward P. Morgan}
- solidification of position with
CIA and with Hughes Department
[Hughes was definitely told of the project by Mahon
in Nov. 1960, and was himself involved in an
alliance with the CIA which in fact, occurred
later when Mahon was Hughes' principal agent?]
[Intern Report, p 75, note 2; Mahon Senate testimony?]
- Dispute with Hughes; See memo 20 May 1971
on office of security file on Edward P. Morgan

2. John Roselli

- evading criminal prosecution [Intern
Report, p 85, note 4]
- use in ~~several~~ legal moves in March 1971 to
attempt to reduce sentence
- ~~was~~ attempt to delay deportation
hearing with DWS which included

0002218

Jack Anderson's journal intervention
with PRS (See Indian Interview, and
CFA Russell's file; ~~re~~ CFA office
of Security file re Edward P. Morgan)

3. Sam Biancari

- October 1960 wiretap in Las Vegas
where Biancari got Mollie to "take the heat"
for him by blaming the tap was a
result of the CFA plots.

- Early 1962, interview with FNU
Farrell of INS re possible deportation
[See Tab C, Russell CFA file,
stating that inf. L. Swab, Osborn, Peyton
Locca, & Houten know]

- attempts to ward off FBI surveillance
in 1963 & 1967 [F.G. Report p 129]

- Conversation with Sam Pupoff
on 3 May 1967. Sam comments that
Russell and Biancari have CFA
'over a barrel' because of "that operation".
He said that he doubted that the FBI
would be able to do anything about either
Russell or Biancari because of their
previous activities with your people. 11
[1967 F.G. Report p 131]

SECRET

SECRET

Notes re Jack Anderson
"Castro Retaliation" theory

0002219

March 3, 1967 }
March 7, 1967 } Drew Pearson Office

Source:

1967 I.B. Report:

1) It is quite likely that Rosselli is
the source, Morgan the channel, and
Anderson and Pearson the recipients
(p 120)

- We may now assume that
Pearson's story is not patched together
from bits and pieces picked up
here and there. His ultimate source
Rosselli, knows more about certain
details than we do, and he evidently
has talked (p 120)

21
- Impact

The Rosselli - banum contact in Las
Vegas in March is particularly disturbing.
It lends substance to reports that
Castro had something to do with the
Kennedy assassination in retaliation
for US. Attempts on Castro's life. We do
not know that Castro actually tried to
retaliate, but we do (CIA emphasis) know that
there were such plots against Castro.
Unhappily, it now appears that banum
may also have been this (p 121)

SECRET

- Mahmud

does have good reasons for not wanting
the story aired further. Unfortunate publicity
might cause him to lose his lucrative

SECRET

Chief, Taylor. There might be some value to be gained from conducting this suggestion that he appears

Wagon and pickup Remelt and map district

The Reason story, article is near currency so much as to be, includes one detail that is not found in that Two: the three-man team

comment

Not usually with version was involved in that one also, he may have begun the 3 man team initially and not Remelt on the camp in that two of Remelt just didn't mention the 3 man team to Moore or Oswald during phase I

comment

In figuring out where motives for a link to Reason, Agency makes the pattern point - If motivation was what the source was seeking, he would be left covered by getting it by a direct approach to CIA to help 29123 some Agency CIA figure on where motive, they think that Remelt is drinking in much and the whole to Morgan who is also drinking and really to be seen at Reason's

SECRET

comment

Don Reason has not yet, as far as we know, used any of the last garden: the story of the pills

032221

and the fact of the State Dept. meeting,
GOC 22232 P 1275
Comment

SECRET

See p 112 wherein "Drew Pearson
claims to have a report that there
was a high-level meeting at the
Dept of State at which plans for the
assassination were discussed."

I-b speculates that Pearson is
talking about the 10 September meeting of
the Special Group (Seymour) which was
attended by Harvey. (p 12)
E R F K was not present

2. Other Sources

a) Memo re 15 Feb 1972

DCP aware that Rosselli
was going to expose plots. He "decided
to ignore his threats and take a
calculated risk as to the consequences
that may occur with the disclosure
of his story. This was subsequently done
by Rosselli or someone in his office
furnishing Jack Anderson details of the
incident."

(Memo in office of Security File re Major)

3. Memo: 20 May 1971

Subject: Internal

Mr. ^{He} Chase (former CIA & now with Internal)
said Mahen & Anderson together on some
oil mix deal. ... Recent exposure of
Anderson re Mahen oil on the Cuban
Revolution was a deliberate exposure
inspired by Robert Mahen using
his son Peter, as an intermediary.

SECRET

Beane: they in that make pretty
thought that such pretty would
"scare them off" (i.e. fight in a war
CIA stuff & influence things)

-Morgan making peace & cutting
through points that they had better
take it easy on. Making business
of his part in contact with CIA
& men in Saudi. He is making

4. Memo 19 Nov 1972

7. Hay had contact with Beane
in November - December 1962 and January
1968 following Beane's conversion.
- 17 Nov 1970

Morgan had made and from
the USIA. He agreed Beane
that Beane had deposited and
would then stay. They should
agree that and Beane agreed.
Morgan further stated that he
was not too sure about my
subject as it differed from general.

5. 19 Dec. 1967

-Surrey conversion suggested by Hay
on Beane's behalf to get CIA involvement
directly or at least through Beane
and not just Beane. Beane was
- Call from Beane. Beane was
October 6. Hay. Beane was
Hay had done for Beane with
Sen. long Beane 22 May 1967

Roselli:

- Also, the Director (Mahan) had sent Harry a news clipping re Agency use of Bincon (probably the Bryant 1943 Chicago story of Sandy Smith)

Roselli said the leak came from Senator Kennedy's office when Kennedy was still Attorney General.

6. Memo 28 April 1967

- J. Connell sent to Las Vegas to find out source of Bincon story

- Mahan admitted telling Morgan some of the Phase P operation due to Agency delaying on long committed subpoenas

- Mahan visibly upset over Morgan going to Pearson and asked if he (Mahan) had been identified as the "client" by Morgan because he was afraid of the publicity of his relationship with Hughes, with Roselli.

- Mahan denied knowing latter phase of inman & said he had no knowledge of operation after April 1962

- Roselli met Morgan through Kent Reenspan in the 1950s

- Mahan recalled that Morgan and Roselli met with Bincon in Las Vegas during March 1967. Under the ~~system~~ impression that Roselli sought legal advice from Morgan but did not know the circumstances

- Roselli under pressure from FBI during hearings had a 99 yr old grandmother

- Believed Morgan had done some

SECRET

From the
Room of the Secretary

James G. H.

15 Jan 1977

0002225

Memo is requested by Dalt City
investigation for information on
B. Eaban

1. a. Ramon Dom Esteyne
6. Roberto Masferrer Regal
- c. Luciano Nieves

Al Jose de la Torre

c. Jose Quintana

c. Juan Antonio Cortijo

9. Rafael Artime

10. MATH

2. Two of the 3 Culture mentioned in

Rodriguez (SSCP) testimony.

Two names mentioned in a 9/10

1970 office of Security memo

v. No background investigation done on
Rodriguez or Francisco

" Separate contacts, dual and indirect
between Rodriguez Agency through my contacts

approx. 1971.

13. I would have along from information

by Dalt City.

Office of Security has no record

produced 1 year later. Further down very little

been involved or Cuban agents in whom was

during term of his death

SECRET

0002225

Waver

c. Released in March 1965 after serving
approx 16 months of a 20 yr sentence
for anti-white plot; went to prison
briefly where he was of interest to media
- August 1963 entered US
- Nov 1965 to Jan 1966 of equivalent
interest to DD

Shannon

He is mentioned in the John R. ...
file are personal friend of R. ... 27
is further noted that Shannon from R. ...
last nature & extent of this effort/ ...
although Shannon

38 August 1970 report by S/H Edward
c. R. ... Alexander ...
- Cuban contacts of R. ...
1. ...
was an official of the ...
circa 1960-61 and was a contact of
Santo Domingo. Data was apparently solely
by ... to make the ...
2. Tony ...
when ... not ...
in ... the ...
...
SECRET

assets of his m to carry out the mission
 Varona also reportedly used his sm. inlets
 to assist him in this effort but there is
 no identifying info in regard to the mission.
 3. Roselli had a man, also presumably a
 Miami, known to Harvey as "Maceo",
 who also used the names Garcia Gomez
 and Godoy. Harvey was unable to
 identify Maceo, who was described as
 Cuban who spoke Italian.

517-339-3523. F. No info in regard to death or
 recall threats against Roselli or
 Cuban in G1 or Miami, Bureau - Tracy
 SUMM, or MURPHY inc/

3. Memo 15 Feb 1972

4. This Agency was aware that Roselli
 intended to expose his participation in the
 plot should we not intervene on
 his behalf. The DCT decided to
 ignore his threats and take a calculated
 risk as to the consequences that might
 result from his story. The mission
 subsequently done by Roselli or someone
 on his behalf furnishing details of the
 details of the incident.

0002229

Memorandum 20 May 1971

Subject: Inter Tel

Magan had been engaged by Bayan Tol to push the Makin efforts. (H. Pearce from Army and Inter Tel now, said Magan may raise to certain High officials, that they had better take it easy on Makin because of his past involvement w/ LIT.

I told Southard - in 1942-44 was in touch w/ Makin & simultaneously working out details of a non official cover arrangement w/ Aircraft Div & High Tech.

For past several years Magan had been paid much.

In May 10, 1971 Mr. Pearce said Makin & Androm are involved together in some oil field deals. I would like to see this & all other such smaller matters to trace the source & disprove if facts. Recent exposure by Pearson re Makin's role in the Cuban Revolution was a deliberate exposure instigated by Robt. Makin using his son Peter as an intermediary. Pearce's theory is that Makin prob. that such publicity would 'scare them off'. The Inter Tel staff is aware of a series of contacts & meetings between Peter Makin and John Androm or a number of his staff.

SECRET

19 Nov 1978

For: D C I
 Subj: Roselli, Johnny

2. In Sept 1960, Mr. Richard M. Bissell approached Col. Sheffeld Edwards to discuss if the office of Security had assets that may assist in a sensitive mission requiring guerrilla-type action. The mission target was Fidel Castro.

5. Mr. Mahan advised that he had met one J R on several occasions while working for the CIA. He met Mahan from casually thru clients, but was given to understand that he was a "high ranking member of the 'syndicate' and controlled all of the old money Mahan on the spot."

Mahan seemed that, if R was in fact a member of the club, he undoubtedly had connections back into the Cuban family contacts.

6. Mahan to approach R who knew Mahan as a per-
 ucia. hardly intimate & frequent.

7. Pitch made on 14 Sept 1960 at H/H/H Playa. His initial reaction was to avoid getting involved but, thru Mr's persuasion, he agreed to introduce him to a friend Sam Gold who knew the Cuban crowd. No money required or paid.

8. During the week of 25 Sept, Mahan introduced to Sam Stagg at the Fortainebleau. It was several weeks after his meeting w/ Sam and Joe, who was identified

SECRET

0002232

to him as a courier operating between Havana & Miami that he saw photos in Sunday "Supplement" of Parade

9. In discussing the possible methods of accomplishing this mission Sam suggested that they not resort to firearms but if he could be furnished some type of potent pill that could be placed in Castro's food or drink, it would be a much more effective operation. Sam indicated that he had a prospective nominee in the person of Juan Orta, a Cuban official who had been receiving back-bait payments from the guerrilla units, who still had access to Castro and was in a financial bind.

11. Joe delivered the pills to Orta. After several weeks of repeated attempts, Orta apparently got cold feet & asked out of the assignment. He suggested another candidate who made several attempts without success.

12. Joe then indicated that Dr. Gregory Shuman had become disinterested w/ the apparent ineffectual progress of the Orta and was willing to handle the mission thru his own resources.

13. He asked, as a prerequisite to the deal, that he may be given \$10,000 for organizational expenses & \$100 per consultation

SECRET

740000
SECRET

secret may R & K on circumstances may be
to make in court or not. At court proceedings
17. May 1962 Harry took over as Case
officer & it is not known by this office
whether R was used operationally from
that point on

0002233

17. Illegal entry Nov. 1947

18. 2 Dec 1948 R secretly of Farnham.

19. Harry reported to office of duty his
contacts w/ R in Nov - Dec 48 & Jan 1949.
It was his belief that John W. R. would
the Army for assistance in deportation
unless he actually faced deportation.
R expressed confidence that he would win
an appeal.

20. 17 Nov 1970.

Mahon called O Connell to advise
that Mahon's attorney, Ed Morgan, had
rec'd a call from Tom Wadden who stated
appeal exhausted & R faced deportation.

If someone did interfere on R's
behalf, he would make a complete
expose of his activities in Army.

21. 18 Nov 1970. DCF briefs & does
not to arrest R. Mahon was so
pleased of Agency's position & he was a
complete opponent w/ our stand. He further
advised that he was not concerned about
any publicity as it affected him personally.

Andrew H. Bell June 18, 1971

by attorney's school letter. Just team on a

SECRET

copy top; last of ref or last of March 1963
March 13, 1961 & advised expects to see
contact at Fontainebleau

- a few weeks before Oct 11

Feb 23, 1971

One he called on the radio from

San Francisco to line up a contact.

He confidentially also report that he had

"gambly in least and am in fact in the

Shump known in Cuba; however, the

the gangster with no direct part in the

massive in 1961.

News for record

19 Dec 1967

Telephone conversation Henry & Arnold Osborn
Dir of Security

the subject of our last London discussion

ie. P.R. the calling of the President was

myself him; I should not the Henry Jones

to consider any possible information on

this matter

3. Henry indicated that he thought the

policy of "sitting tight" would be slightly

but that he felt it would be a simple

matter for the Dir to see Henry personally

& determine an appropriate, timing for

what would see the Gmpe Dept. had.

Osborn - speculate Henry trying to

find out. Nothing was in press at Henry

SECRET

11 Dec 1947

1. Harry requested London meeting w/ British on 8th Dec. & Osborn on Dec 9th
2. 20 Nov 1947 R calls Harry. Who met him at Madison Hotel for 3 hrs.

27 Nov, they "bumped" into Joan England & Harry with R at "Mr. Watson."

28 Nov Spent 11 hours at British Embassy Club.

4. Harry to Harry, Country Club.

R in town to see Morgan re a

radio station in San Jose. Not

much interest when he brought.

-R said he had not seen Lawrence

since 1905 (English speaking & very

sympathetic to Harry)

- R d/n state or imply that he

wasn't help from Harry.

1. getting told Harry in London

meeting w/ Sir. Edwards in 1944 & Harry

meeting of "Grand Council" Walle & R

in Cal when he asked for help in future

7. Harry insists that he must have

status by case. If it is a good case,

the Harry tells the King about that

influence to have the matter "held" by

it is not a good case, that Harry would

get it & he will make it over.

10. Harry insistence on negotiation but

insist on negotiation to protect Harry

SECRET

SECRET

He had met the subject again in Hong
and the way we had handled his problem

8 Nov 1947

R. Harry is source

R could on Oct 2nd & 3rd. But

Harry agreed to answer R's query

- R wondered up Harry would not
do as much for him as it did for others.
R's Morgan knew what Harry did for others.
W) Son, long & had told Harry about this.

4 Oct 47

Robert & Harry at lunch.

- R quite vehement & bitter re
Makum in Harry Makum would "sell anyone
down the river to protect his name."

- Dr had seen Harry's new clothing
re Harry's furniture. R said look some
from Son. (usually type when R was still at

Psy. Org. Matter

28 April 47

Comment - Morgan allegedly contacted some high-level
officials in Govt indirectly he had a word
with him about an in government position.

~~12th March~~ would & said he had told Morgan
when Harry's clothing in Hong Kong.
2. Makum neverly upset & said of the
Makum's clothing in Hong Kong

SECRET

MS. A. 1. 10. I do not know the name of the
the only family known to me
the last of the family.
10. I do not know the name of the
the last of the family.
10. I do not know the name of the
the last of the family.

I. Clarendon had different ways of
 drinking, 19 yr old girl, I partly remember
 for father to marry. I partly remember
 for mother to have his friends.
 I. Clarendon had the same
 for mother & father. I partly remember
 for father to marry. I partly remember
 for mother to have his friends.
 I. Clarendon had the same
 for mother & father. I partly remember
 for father to marry. I partly remember
 for mother to have his friends.

for the winter here.
R & M upon in "Deepen small boat in"
March. Jim Caution in there. "It was Miller"
recognition that these individuals spent
some time together. He was with the
company that they sought light advice
from Magon that Jim found rather other
conclusion, "The first different copy of the
2000

[illegible]

with difficulty on this cold bridge on 27th Aug.

1002232

Sen Long Mahu
 S. Shonker, Long's personal atty, told him
 that Mahu would be away.

7 June 66

Mahu reported by Morgan is dead
 w/ St Louis atty, a personal friend of Long,
 re Mahu's appearance.

3. Fensterwald. had identified same
 names, etc by name to O Connell &
 Col. Edwards.

In the case of Sam, Ed Dubois
 & a couple of his technicians now aware
 of Mahu's tie-in w/ Francisco.

31 May 1966

Mahu asked if "Sam grant" was in
 the unit

12. Morgan had assured Mahu that he
 knew Long's personal atty who puts great
 influence on Long. They flew to St Louis
 & then the 3 men flew to D.C. & met
 w/ Long & Fensterwald. Fensterwald
 wanted Mahu as his "pal in the bar"
 so that Mahu clients have great app
 for T.V. Also that Mahu and Long
 enough to pull behind. Under Long
 13. Mahu client plan of Morgan & Fensterwald

SECRET

SECRET

Handwritten text, likely a signature or initials, located in the bottom left corner.

SECRET

1447 I.C. Post

P3

Each phase is a reflection of the other
governing Govt attitude toward the Cuban people
as seen in Acquisition

All of the administrative actions prior
to Aug 1960, in one private system,
were aimed not at the Cuban people
primarily, but in things that follow as by
shifting the system
August 1960 to present

Not agreement; mutual; necessity
of least some of participants as one aspect
of effort to create some economic conditions
April 1961 to April 1961

Major scheme began Aug 60 was
called off after BSR & assumed domestic
b) Late 1961 to Feb 1962

Particular scheme initiated in
early 1962 & would represent in one of the
late 1962 until mid 1963

After mutual action & collapse of first
phase, aggressive scheme began Aug 60; renewed
in April 1962; some finally terminated in early 1963

Dr. Pearson column of 2 March 1962
about a report of plan in 1963 to
be some early.
He also has info:
a) still kept meeting at which American down
b) team actually landed in Cuba w/ gifts

SECRET

0002243

5. I suspect that the following is an
outline of the thought
processes, which to my mind thought
that details would show how
obviously a division or new change
that of 1942.

1. The report appears that post
1942 there was no action in a quarter
thing

2. The report appears that post
1942 there was no action in a quarter
thing

3. The report appears that post
1942 there was no action in a quarter
thing

4. The report appears that post
1942 there was no action in a quarter
thing

5. The report appears that post
1942 there was no action in a quarter
thing

Reply - 1 reference

The Report Assesses the Situation

SECRET

0002245

Cable on Sept 7th says "BMLASH ~~every~~
totally spoiled but who will always
be a control problem.

... is best approached as a
chief conspirator allowed to recruit
his own cohorts among whom we
may then find persons susceptible
to long distance and covert action.

"Clearly, at that point, when BMLASH
was viewed as potentially important, he
was also viewed as a person of uncertain
loyalty, requiring careful but long
range development for whatever course
of action that might later ensue

APB-4 of SSC Summary and Findings, points
BMLASH as an admirable plot
& infers that Carter Sept 7th
speech might have been a result of leak
by BMLASH

p10 "The fact remains that whatever
views BMLASH/11 may have expressed, he
had no response from his CIA contacts
of any support for his proposals at that time

Fitzgerald meeting should be reported
high-power info w/ selective rights

SECRET

14 Nov AM WHIP reported that AMHS
 satisfied w/ policy considerations but unhappy
 over fact he had not been given
 technical assistance. He can understand
 why he had not been given "Cuban small piece
 of equipment which presents a small security
 problem"

Comment

In essence he [AMHS] was told
 there would be no U.S. support until after
 the fact, and then only if he was
 successful. While that may not seem
 a very realistic way in which to bring
 about the overthrow of a govt., it is
 directly relevant to the question of what
 AMHS/H/1 was told and what he understood.
 It is contrary to the statement in
 the SSC Final Report (p18) to the effect
 that it was not clear how
 AMHS/H/1 interpreted the put off by Fitzg.

After July 1964 FBI Report states that
 AMHS/H/1 unhappy with CIA regime and
 H.S. Kennedy had refused to support them

19 Nov 63 Fitzgerald "approved" telling
 AMHS/H/1 he would be given a
 cache inside Cuba. The cache

SECRET

SECRET

was undetermined
after this w/1. Mark 1st
after death of J.F.K., no release of 1723
No info at least the year
with CIA
"unaware of Mark 1st 1963 assassination
9/11

126

in the road
[Fido to mention you will meet
the book
Speculation - At least a piece of the
Army - At least a piece of the
indicate in. might have spaces
to see speculation that this is
military
Mark 1st. after "it is some
to delay for more military.
Request by Headquarters to not
allowing to enter.
19 Nov. Mark 1st with CIA at
could, if he requested it, indicate
high power after w/1 sec 2...

0002248

SECRET

SECRET

CIA House (sent in early 1961 & again in
early 1962) suggested that pills of
US. generally syndicate members... The 1961
pills absorbed & pills are absorbed.
These turned in April 1962 and
I generally up. To a Cuban wife later
Eda into in turn, had them sent to Cuba
May 1962. In June 1962, the wife
would that a team of 3 men had been
dispatched to Cuba & return for the woman.

... While the events showed by them
Cuban did occur & are subject to being
patched together as the complete
the indication of a direct, concrete relationship
among them is impossible.

Q 18: "During the month of 25 Sept 1960, Oswald
pills went to Miami where Oswald contacted
Rosen to 'Sami told' at a meeting in the
Fortham Hotel. 'Sami' said he had a man
whom he identified only as 'Joe', who would be
as a courier. Cuba & make arrangements there
pills would out 'Sami' to Oswald from
but I could not see not with 'Sami' or Joe

At that time the generally seems not
still operating in Cuba & therefore was making
under trip. Oswald & the man in question

SECRET

p. 24

Despite the decision that a person in charge
form would be most desirable, what was
actually prepared and delivered was a letter
in the form of small pills about the size
of a capsule.

00022527

(Comment - someone was fully
exposed to the use of poison. He said
that not one could be trusted to do the
job because the chance of accidental escape
would be negligible. Given that a reference
for a letter told that would be put into
letters and and sent. (See, the letter
was in touch with a physical letter
afford with some to letter and personally
of a sort that would enable him to smuggle
person letter. The gangster named them was
a man who was then after they and
Doctor would be able to get the letter from
the gangster and not with letter from
a position to receive letter from the
gangster without, and some of the same
of in some and made the money)

p. 27. Let tell - March 1961

to send the pills to Tony. Road
reported to I could that the pills had been
delivered to Tony. Data is understood
I have kept the pills for a couple of weeks
before giving them. According to the gangster,
Let get could tell his partner in 8 PM
cannot do

SECRET

SECRET

officer on 26 Jan. 1961, while getting for the
operation was still going on in Miami & Washington.
He took refuge in the Singapore Embassy
0002254 April, 1961....

... It would seem that, that the
gangster did know that Vita had already
sent his name to Castro.

p 30. The Cuban brothers were believed to be
in touch with Vanna. These men were
reported to have offered Vanna large sums
of money for his operations against Castro, with
the understanding that they would receive
privileged treatment "in the Cuba of the future".
Attempts to verify these reports were unsuccessful.

p 31. Traff approached Vanna and told him
that he had contacts who wanted to do a deal with
Castro & that they would pay big money for the
Commit.

Rosselli said as a loyal Italian he would do
whatever he could & would never divulge
the operation.]

p 31. R wrote deliver money to Vanna for expenses.
- O'Connell recalls 50,000; Edwards recalls
25,000; Pennington recalls 25,000

p 32 Rosselli gave the jobs and money to Vanna. Rosselli
dealt with ~~under~~ a pseudonym. Little
is known of the delivery channels beyond Vanna

SECRET

SECRET

p. 32 Stewart would mention about a contact who worked in a restaurant frequented by White.

0002255

p. 33 (C) Connell) believe that there were meeting gang in Boston April 1941 and before that he cannot now recall what. He agrees with Bill Harvey that when the operation was under way 1942, they first saw a "gang operation".

p. 34. O'Connell believe the most likely would be White, but he has no specific information showing same.

p. 49. Recall needed from T. T. in the first place as a means of establishing contacts inside Cuba. He did not tell them in the second place because he had. Wilson, Brown, it would be naive to assume that Recall did not take the precaution of informing higher up in the organization that he was working in a territory considered to be the source domain of someone who in the organization)

p. 50 June 1942 Harvey said they appeared to have no specific plan for killing Castro. They were to recruit other who might be used in such a manner. In an opportunity to kill Castro point out, they or the person they recruited wants make the attempt. ~~SECRET~~ perhaps using the rifle.

Harry never named their names or anything about them.

p. 52 Harry says Roselli wasn't badly hurt. He agreed with Harry that nothing was happening and that there was not much chance that anything would happen in the future.

p. 221 RFK - I trust that if you ever ^{try} to do business with organized crime - with gangsters you will let the Attorney General know before you do it. Houston quotes Edwards as replying that this was a reasonable request.

p. 64. The Attorney General's copy of the memo for the record of that meeting (May 62 by Edwards & Houston) is in Archives of the A.G.'s office.

p. 67. Chicago Sun-Times article of 16 August 1963 cites Justice Dept belief that Oswald never did any spying - merely pretended to go along "in the hope that the Justice Dept done to put him behind bars might be slowed or at least affected by his use of co-operation w/ another govt agency."

Trull puts his cooperation from 1959 to some time in 1960 - long before the above rebel invasion at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961. Reports McBain's bugging incident.

669 20 August 1943 Chicago Daily News

FBI agent talking from radio allegedly

Says:

Why don't you fellows leave me alone?
I'm one of you.

Green pointed as being approved by
CIA but obviously

0002258

669 D E from Confidential Source within the
Army Staff

refused to surrender to the, this date to take
- Cuba Island & he was put up on
- American of Hot Antine Place Rice, head
of Batista military in Havana
- DE quite upset from 21 May 1943 but
said a very good

"... Agency was normal contact in May
Cuba about in ~~1943~~ 1943 from program directed
against Cuban military action, with warning that
place for technical assistance in an American
attack. The unknown target John and wife
furnished in by Walter S. Sweeney, Cuban vice
officer, do not wholly support these conclusions.
The Agency should have direct and indirect
support for Cuba to Italy."

669 16 Sept 1943

"Cuba with Truman - I don't intend
to see the ~~secret~~ your found again?
when you should tell them," as they don't

make the trip; I want to get away from Götter's company!

pg 2. I am very sorry that, while Cuba was
convinced to do away with Wato, Cuba
was not willing to sacrifice the one she
always for Cuba. What Cuba really wants
was high-powered, advanced rifle w/a
effective range of hundreds of thousands
yards. Cuba found that in a desperate
situation (which she was) she was quite sure
that we could secure some technical
means of doing the job that would not
ultimately cause him to lose his own life in
the fog.

The Power Reason Story

a) Detailed Details

pg 4. Finally my name is not true. He was built on power
in great an enormous plot. He after it was over - He was not
the facts to be known then

b) These (3) would discuss with Wright in
Havana; one still in prison

will say 3 minutes. We do not
know this identifier which may
have helped to find, we have
no way that they were actually
disputed, nearly the answer
copy and reproduction they then
found by the team

Castro seemed enough at ~~that~~ ^{that} time. This report has come down
to beneath of F was ready to find in the bottom. Investigation. It
was also stated by Castello in
the Philippines under secret
investigation. We have no
independent corroboration of any sort. (No
that Camson met w/ Rosales
in Las Vegas March 1965)

0002260

SECRET

1977

9 May 1967

SECRET

Beaumont apparently to be used as a person
of known to John Oswald a CIA agent
& was to be used to assassinate Castro. Beaumont
alleges he has letters signed by CIA agents
or by Sen. RFK authorizing certain persons
to work with Beaumont for removal of Castro.
This memo is intended to record that
such letters never existed & therefore could
not be in Beaumont's possession.

0002261

SECRET

Request

SECRET

0002265

- Richard Cain aka Robert Scully Cain
Richard Scalpette
DOB OCT 1931 Chicago

FBI memo

- 21 Dec 1960 mob financing info
- 18 Jan 1961 identified individuals
- Identity of W1 ROOSE
- April 61 to April 62 matters
- ~~from~~ "something going on"
independent of Agency.
- RFT security called on 4 March 67
to obtain memo; already saw article
of 7 March 67
- 15 March 65
Bango in Madrid & claim group
in Cuba ready.
- Jailed in July 62
- 1 March 66 arrests in Cuba
Trial resumed after late fall 64 & early 65
w/ Airline meetings

SECRET

10 Jan 64 "Repin" Brucki Rums approach The White

SECRET

0002266

O'Connor's interview of Malone in May 1968

- Additional info on S.T. JR & SO contained in material previously shared for review on Sturgis

- Chicago Trib

Dec 28, 31, 1973

- Cain

- Fall 1960, contact in Chicago

- Summer 1961 Mexico City

- April 1962 Mexico City

- 4 June 62 departed

- 19 Aug 63 Chicago

- 26-30 May 63 Info - re Student Directory, Miami

- 12 Sept 63 DRE arms purchase

- told to get out of picture

- 1 May 1972 Disappears.

27 NOV 63

- Fair Play met in Feb 63 at 907

~~S. S. Spaulding~~ under direction Michael Criley

- LHO purchased rifle March 63

- Sturgis suspect LHO in Diego 1963 April.

SECRET

SECRET

6002267

1. Ramon Don Pesterey Dominguez
DOB 2 May or 5 Feb 1936
2. Rolando Magferrer Rojas
DOB 12 Jan 1918
3. Lucio Naves
4. Jose de la Torre
5. Jose Quintana
DOB 3 Oct 45 *replu grange*
6. Joaquin Antonio Ortega DOB 12 Jan 43

Edward Pierpont Morgan DOB 28 May 1913 St Louis

SECRET

SECRET

0002268

Morgan

Covert Security Clearance on 2 Feb 1951 for use as "cut out" re negotiations for School of Hollywood Ditt Studios & John Hoptwilleas.

Amended & Approved March 1951 to include Morgan's use in providing covert legal support for operations in the form of a "cut out"; legal advice transmission of funds in connection with DDO projects. ∴ DDO should make decision whether to release info.

Resumed

Resorts Int. #591 722
 Walker Groves OS file #473 865
 - assoc w/ Meyer Lansky
 - Corp. Grant Bahama Development Corp
 w/ Robert Whisnant (#633 974) and
 John P. Roulett (#639 997)

Cain

According to De Mar, Cain in Mexico 1961 into 1962
-1964-65-

SECRET

SECRET

JOHN F. BARNES
9 FEB 1978

0002269

7 - Mar - 35
St Paul, Minn
3642

Bradley Earl Ayers
Eglin AFB Fla.

April 12, 1971 Post

April 27, 1971 Post

Sunday April 18 1971

Class name? Daniel B. Williams

Paragon Air Service

Zenith Technical Enterprise - south
campus of MMU

Realtor; Harry, Robinson (Wp) Big John

Tracing sites

Palo Alto Key

Upper Key Camp

Card found in edge of Pegasus

Date 10 Aug 1964
Secrets Approval

Refined 23826 (DDP) (WH/SH)

Case No. 366085

Request For Personal Return

Serial No
366085

Nature

Separation Return to Parent SUC

12-15-64

Organizational Designations:
DDP/STAS Forward operator Station - JM WAVE
U.S. Field Office Paramilitary Branch Section 47
Reinstated C.R.C. Indiv. Pol. Orgs.

SECRET

ZR/RIFLE

All (cable) traffic being ZR/RIFLE to be delivered in sealed envelope to Chief FI/Dir. D, 1502 L Bldg only

- Personally approved of DD Plans

Harry
Chief FI/Dir. D

19 Feb 1962

To Harry re authorization of ATW for ZR RIFLE activities thru Dec 1962

Because of sensitive nature of this activity, accounts for funds will be of general category & of your certificate

2. Salary \$300 per yr; \$750 in addition to salary

3. Memo to be considered in lieu of report & constitute authorization for all travel per diem; operational & other expenses

4. Eyes only

Rich. D Helms.

Hand written notes

Morgan - Roselli - Mahan - Gamm

Machin Las Vegas

Morgan & Jack Hudson

1) Prior to Aug 60

2) Aug 60 to April 61 (B 60)

3) April 61 to late 61

4) late 61 to late 62 (Custom mistake error)

5) late 62 to mid 63

SECRET

Roselli of started in Sept 66
(Mahan to Roselli to Gracena)

to brief 7 May 67

Taylor became chairman of FCS
on 9 Aug 67

Rush, McNamee, Taylor, Bundy,
Gardner, Gilpatrick, Lamont,
Munn, McClure

Memo For Record

Rept at request of DCF; assigned
to F6 on 23 March 67

The one stayback been copy (to)
all notes, & other derived source material
destroyed 23 May 67.

Memo: Chief WTT (Dareen)

From: Dir of Security

Subject: WTT (Security Project)

Final account of memo reported on
a sensitive paper of interest to DD/P; chief WTT
& Dir of Security.

Disbursed.

25 Sept 1960 thru 70 Contact
6 Feb 1961

SECRET

6901.

SECRET

CGC2272

11 Feb 1961 To Rangel April 1961
31 Jan 1961
14 Feb 61 CMMO Rymum 1,043
26 Sept 1961
Thy
12 Feb 1961 993

Page 3
IO Rpt

e. Late 1962 until well into 1963

After missile crisis Oct 62 &
collapse of MONROVE, aggressive scheme
that was begun in Aug 1960; covered
in April 1962, was finally smashed Aug 1963
Two other plots were organized in 1963
but were impracticable & nothing came of them

P 7

b. 10 August 1962

Meeting of Special Group (Kymuntal)
wherein McNamara broached subject of
liquidation of Cuban leaders.

See (C)

Result - Project MONROVE named by
Lansdale

31 Jul 64

Discussed at Special Group of a Chamberlain
Serves memo of goal plot to kill Castro.
CIA had refused to fund. With no work.

Missing
page

and Deserter

P 2 Gonzalez Ballanterra

Press Release
9 March 1966

-prison of Castro for millions; not
forth to 40,000 people
-Jose ROBERTO, Alberto Blanco Ramon, Luis Tapia

now in ~~some~~ with own way.

SECRET

0002273

Late Sept 1940

Edwards, O'Connell, Bissell off plane
burglary; Edwards then brief
Allen Dulles & General Cabell.

Mahon called O'Connell & pointed out
Paradise room sking Gold & Joe
(Presumably last time, Mahon & O'Connell
know names)

Joe a courier to Cuba & make
arrangements there re entry to Gold

Traff making regular trips to Havana
10 Jan 59 - casino closed
13 Jan 59 - Castro announces it open
17 Feb 59 - Casino announces opening
30 Sept 61 - last casino closed

P23 Technical Chief TSD
4 approaches: (1) high tech like shellfish
poison to be administered via pin (Collier's Condition
Roosevelt's suit was supplied to Gary Powers
(2) bacterial material in liquid or (3) cigar
41 handwriting

P29 March April 1941

Roselli told O'Connell that Traff knew a
man high up in govt movement. (Vassar)
Rpt from ~~SECRET~~ suggest see Traff

000227A

SECRET

men various.
a 21 Dec 1968 FBI memo re gangster
financing Cuban activities to Neilson Clinton
b) 18 Jan 1961 memo re with these
scheme. I had hired Moss as a fund-raiser

CIA had contact in Man but no indication
of any involvement in Cuba.
Mach (957) for use in CB Domain as
consultant to Indian Embassy
Nov 62 by CIA staff under 28 M
a program for exploitation of gold fields

Roselle to deliver it to U.
very but Esterline says 10.1
communication as per secret m
Comment - V one of 5 sub
from a heavy wire
taken to end of
plan but hope

People will
1. 5.
2.
2.

[Handwritten signature]

20 RIFLE no lung symm.

- Free Refn is symm in 15m

- 20 RIFLE ~~STAIN~~ Refn what to Free Refn

2 RIFLE some midline white

Lots 1461 - Fairy 1462
 Fairy Much 42
 Fairy Much 102
 Fairy taken over there
 - Fairy was -
 came to throat of center operator

It was ~~sympathetic~~ unwelcomed - Nelson puts things in charge of Agency with that force

2 (hard copy version)
15 Nov 61 - Heavy rain, lightning &
22 EIT/17 to Cule; continued by EIT/22
to new syllable system

Helmer brought on general concept but
not on engineering value plot. AS ^{0.5} with assumed by Helmer are
in songs? Question I 'small quantity' and
ZERIFIT could be a +1D question
(2 tendency to develop a capability to enter system
& load map system)

Henry Bright by authority of Oscar
in Feb 1961 in connection with a general
study of capability for Executive action
Henry had strong knowledge of
US-105 (Arnold Silver) & Henry left before
last party's party was in to take
part of

6002275

LEADS

Phur 2

A number of his correspondents were

unreliable

(Several would be operators
and not any of assets being heavily
in 20 RIFES)

- Memo of May after the 1st Test

Final is a copy to Rome on 2 June
1963 to May FI/Staff had been

to May AT was no longer used & suspect

Month.

- Record (OLLA-1974, 24 April 64)

above information by a working station

on 21 April 64. There is no indication in the file that the EOE Admin

Copy of 20/12/64 / 03/12/64 (see above)

Records -

- No activity after 13 to 20 April

May not recall & as advised April 62.

- Edwards not contact w/ RFT

over the time working

- 14 May 62 - May will discuss &

indicated he was being sent to France as

May - took me a "young" man.

since he didn't plan for getting person

to a private letter informant the museum

was identical to those already known and as reported in other ones

- I would think "something going on"

from April 62 as not in mind

SECRET

0002277

April 8th 1962

- Harry met w/ Russell & O'Connell
- O'Connell pointed Mahan there
- 1 Harry says he would have recognized Mahan; saw him socially once or twice after 1947 when Harry came to Agony; not since '52 when Harry sent to Berlin.
- Edwards, ^{deliberately} ^{didn't} mention Mahan when he first ^{briefed} Harry

p45

O'Connell out of June 62 when he was assigned PCS to Okinawa

p47

18 April 62

O'Connell gets calls for Russell weekly w/ Harry in Miami

O'Connell says operations going on when Harry took it over altho he can't remember when it was started

Harry specified that Brian not to be brought in for 2nd phase & further Russell would appear.

Roselli right that Brian asked him what was going on; R replied "nothing" Brian - "Too bad"

p48

Macao - unlikely a Vassalito record known MAFED Macle who Harry probably would have known. Also, 15th clear Macao was "Roselli man"

Roselli connected to 2nd phase as a contact to Valencia.

SECRET

p 49. When the plans were given to [unclear] from [unclear]
Vama reported arms and equipment needed for
his end of the operation.

0002278

SECRET

April 1962

- a) explosives
- b) detonators
- c) 20.30 caliber
rifles
- d) 30 45 cal.
handguns
- e) 2 radios
- f) 1 boat radio

V requested arms & support & Roelli
passed word to Harry. With help
of Shaddy, chief of TMWHB,
about 5M of weapon & equipment.

Harry & Shaddy went U-Haul
& put truck in parking lot for
delivery to Miami, FL, or via son in law.
Harry & Shaddy set up watch on
do Roelli & Connell.

Shaddy not aware of plan.
250 May 62 - Roelli reported that the [unclear] in Cuba at the
restaurant reported used regularly by Castro.
June 62

V had ^{disposal} 3 men from to Cuba
Sept 1962

Harry saw Roelli in Miami on
7-11 Sept. Another 3 men from
of military men assigned to penetrate
Castro's body guard but never happened.
"Medicine" reported still in place and first team safe
Sept 62 - Jan 63

251
Military men
needed to
take off

Harry in Miami. 22 Dec - a [unclear]
& saw Roelli & Maco send [unclear]. Gave
Roelli 2700 to V for [unclear] of 3 military
men who never left FL in Feb 63

Delay due to
a) conditions in
b) not much [unclear]

Harry left word for Maco in
Miami 11-14 Feb that nothing new & looked
as if dead off. (Just how Harry left this
word for Maco is not clear)

SECRET

SECRET

0002279

Apri May 63

Helms approved a last meeting
w/ Harry Russell before Harry left
for Rome.

People who knew
Q55 Bruce Chiver (Harry defied 1962)
knew Harry meeting w/ gangster in
Reno in winter of '62

May 62

Sluf Edwards & Lawrence Houston brief
RFK "all the way". RFK agreed not to
pursue writing case but wanted to be
informed of Agency's deal w/ "gangster" again.
RFK asked for a memo of
the meeting via a phone call. Memo
prepared on 14 May 1962 by Edwards & Houston.
NO briefing of McLean, ^{Carson} Carter, or Helms.

RFK not told that Phase II had
begun; that V had put a bullet in the head.

On 14 May 62 Harry briefs Helms;
advises against briefing McLean & ^{Carson} Carter.
Writes Edwards that Russell
is not going to be used.

~~Comment~~

RFK's secretary called on 4 March 67
to obtain Edwards memo. He knew

SECRET

to
the
met a

at the
night
the
and
the

SECRET

10-11 Aug 62 ⁰³ SECRET

(Wainwright) ⁰³ Tepeduro & Cubela in
Copenhagen (Wainwright) used "massacre"
& Cubela insisted ⁰³ "eliminate"

14-23 Sept 62

⁰³ Cubela, Tepeduro, (Wainwright) &
(Earl Williams) from Madrid; met in Paris.
Cubela given S/W training &
supplies; shown a handwritten document.
Refused to be photographed.

(Williams) ⁰³ Cubela that no physical
elimination mission be given as a
request but he might do it on his
own initiative. Headquarters strongly counter that
no physical elimination mission be given Cubela.

5-8 Sept 63

Brasyl - met by (Wainwright) ⁰³
Tepeduro & Nestor Sanchez who became
case officer.

Cubela showed 2 S/W managers but
only 1 record. Official & postal censorship.
That night by Ramon Guin Day
AMTRANK-10 who was lady Miguel
DIAZ Isalgue (MICE-14) who had
been sent to recruit PU/PL

SECRET

14 Sept 63

From Brasyl Cubela flew to Paris
& was going to tell Castro after the fact

AMLSA SECRET

0002281

9 March 61 03 - Mexico City station
P28 (Jack Stewart) met w/ Cubela
in Mexico City; arranged by Carlos
Tepedino Amador, a long-time
friend. Cubela was (Stewart) from
Havana where he was once assigned.

Cubela and leader of D.R.
are like group of leftist students, signed in
1956 to fight Batista; Nestor Sanchez - case officer.

28 March 61

Both Cubela & Chik wanted to
defect; according to report of Miami Station.

Exfiltration called off as report
that Cuban police aware of Cubela's
desire to defect & his departure plans.
[Comment:]

First of 3 rumormongers within MIA; but
unknown if Cubela aware of report in Cuba.
Other two links are even more nebulous
15 Jan 62 14 Regent 61

Message from aviation station (get from) to
Tepedino that Cubela going to Paris &
wanted to talk to ^{under friend of Stewart's} No indication of any
military.

SECRET

15 Jan 62

Lucia F. Chevarria Branci told
an asset (HM contact-1) that Cubela going
to Helsinki & wanted to defect.

SECRET

Would stop in Paris to see Tepedino

0002283

27 June 1962

Tepedino approached FBI in Miami on 11 June with idea that Cubela wanted to defect. FBI sent a teletype memo to CIA since they knew Tepedino to be a CIA asset.

8 July 62

Tepedino dissatisfied w/ CIA handling of Cubela's "defection" in Paris in 61, so he contacted FBI. Stated his source of info on rumors for defection were R Chivarrias.

30 July - 6 August 62 '63

Wm Wainwright met w/ Tepedino a few times in NYC & both went to Helsinki, Cuba. Talked into being recruited in place of not defecting.

Cubela wanted to blow up oil refineries, kill Castro, Carlos Rodriguez, & Soviet Premier.

7-9 August 62

Meeting in Stockholm because Helsinki too risky. Cubela stated that he told 4 of his Cuban associates that he met Tepedino in Helsinki.

SECRET

SECRET

that he was taking a vacation,

0002286

3 Oct 63

Sandy arrives in Paris to meet
w/ Cuba who had written Tapeduo in
NY that he didn't want to continue.

CIA had to tell [French Govt] 24
[that contacts were for purposes of deflection,
French unilaterally keeping Cuba under surveillance.]

11 Oct 63 Sandy calls that Cuba
insisting on meeting w/ RFK; announced
Cuba going to try an attempt on Castro
even w/out U.S. support.

29 Oct 63

Fitzgibbon, U.S. SAs, go to Paris
& got approval from Helms.

Fitz states he told Cuba that
U.S. would have no part in attempt on
Castro's life.

Walters went from Sandy in company

14 Nov 63

19 Nov 63

Sandy memo states Fitz assumes
that Cuba would get cache of
rifles w/ scopes inside Cuba, on request

22 Nov 63

SECRET

Sandy arrives in Paris on Nov 22
after getting OK w/ ~~Robert Kennedy~~ as given

Sandy says Cuba accepted plan
but stated he would not take it to

Cuba with him. SECRET

0002287

Cubela asked for a cache of
arms to be placed at AMTRUNK is
L2 high-ground ref. w/ telescopic sights; 20 grenades; 2000
amm. to they left mufy, heard
JFK shot.

Sandy stated he rec'd an
OP in cable from Fitzgerald that loggery
is "off" but nothing in AMTRUNK file.

Cubela w/ a tank S/W with him to Prague
1 Dec 63

Cubela returning from Prague to Cuba
19 Feb 1964

JMWAVE to have 2 caches in
place in March.

Done on 17-21 March 64 on
AMTRUNK VIII

24 April 1964

Tegedino had been brief to
meet Carlos Jorge ROBLES many
who has message from Cubela.

097 3 May 64 - Robles says Cubela wanted a silencer
30 August 64

Artime record info thru Madrid
that a group of dissident members of Castro
regime want to ~~the~~ establish direct
contact. 7 Oct 64, Artime sends

Alberto BLANCO Romariz.

13 Nov. 64. SECRET

Artime agrees to talk to AMTRUNK-1
y it turns out he is contact man
for internal dissent group. Artime

SECRET

think if AM2AS#-1 is chief of ~~some~~ group we can forget about operation
4 Dec 64

Sandy prepares a memo for 6370 for
Arteme to maintain contacts w/ ~~some~~ group's reps in Bayam. Arteme does
6-7 Dec 64

Sandy meets Cubela in Paris & was
told going to continue his plans
told US. could not be involved.

10 Dec 64.

Arteme didn't know nor Cubela
that CIA in direct contact with each.
Rather SAS continued to put both
men together.

CIA didn't want to get silver
weapon on ~~the~~ Cubela's hands directly
but could do it. Thus Arteme-

27 Dec; 30 Dec (sublime)

Cubela & Arteme meet in ^{Madrid} Madrid.
Arteme reports to Sandy that Cubela
had requested a silver for FAT rifle
but Americans w/n gave him one.
Arteme to come up w/ silver or
different rifle in Cuba.

11 Feb 65

Cubela to receive pistol w/ silver
& Belgian FAT rifle w/ silver from
Arteme's ~~secret~~ ^{SECRET} Both weapons come
from ~~the~~ US & are now in Madrid.

~~Confidential~~

12 Feb 65

SECRET

Artemio has weapon delivered to Cubela
in Madrid.

4 March 65 - Cubela in Havana; source
is friend of Tepedino's who telegrams him

15 March 65

Rafael Garcia-Bango Director
arrives in Madrid from Cuba & informs
to a state officer.

Partly close friends of Cubela; & claims
to be on favor w/ group of people had
plenty to eliminate Castro.

Jack in July 62 for up. Traff.
as target for Cuban Hotel. Traff. - 4 m
knower name - link

June 1965

Victor ESPINOSA Hernandez, a former
PM trainee who was recruited as a MI
on 20 March 1961, contacted FAS new
FBT on 3 June 65.

Espinosa stated he had received
from a friend in Paris urging him
to meet w/ Alberto Blanes who had
message from Cubela who wanted it
to CIA

Message - Cubela in a position to
& would CIA & US Govt be willing to
pay "yes", for details on what he

SECRET

Cubela had wanted money on
on 1 Feb 65. Turned down & urgent

000229 I spoke to Fidel in Jan 64. He opened
the door to me but I did not have
the courage to tell him

(Comment)

Trial evidence confined to trip to
Europe in mid 64 & early 65 to meet
w/ Botkin. No mention of MacL at the
Nov 65 conference in Agony.

No hint of poison pen Nov 63.

Speculate

If full details would have come out,
Castro would have little to complain of.
& probably not to expect someone in power to tell.

2 high-level
unofficial meetings
where Castro
was usually
discussed

Special Group (August)

18 August 62 (probably one described by Pearson)
State: Dean Rusk, Alexei Johnson, Edwin
Martin, Richard Goodwin, Robt Hurwath
White House

Maxwell Taylor, McHenry Bundy (RFA absent)
Deputy:

McNamara, Belmont, Lemnitzer, Lunsdale
CIA - McCone Harry
USIA - Edward Munn, Donald Wilson
Secy - Thomas Parrot

Parrot's note & a memo annex
but McNamara & King would McNamara ~~recall~~
raising it & Munn's comment.

No one raised question McNamara
'Hearty agree' SECRET

Lunsdale wrote memo on 13 August
to Harry, Hurwath, Harris, & Wilson which

SECRET

Pratt's Review: not a high-level
mally was 10 Sept 42

Decided to forward Mather in May 47
a note a report:

- 1 - Mather thought Mather in Office?
- 2 - Mather Mather of Office 47 from Rood

0002293 or answer

3. Rood's started to Mather by Mather
- 4 - Mather suggests Rood's a Mather of Mather
- 5 - Rood's Mather Mather; Mather in Mather Mather "in Mather"

6 - Mather Mather, Rood's in Mather
in Mather. In Mather w/ Rood's; so was Mather
Our Mather that Mather Mather in Mather

in the Mather:

Pratt's Mather to Rood's a Mather Mather
Mather Mather Mather Mather source.

0002293

It is

0002293

Summary of 62 - Mather, Mather, Rood's
Mather Mather & Mather Mather Mather Rood's
be in Mather R.F. Mather Mather Mather
Mather Mather Mather Mather Mather Mather
Mather Mather Mather Mather Mather Mather
State Dept Mather Mather Mather Mather
Mather Mather Mather Mather Mather Mather

SECRET

Reference: Rood's Mather Mather Mather
Mather Mather Mather Mather Mather Mather

83 Rood's Mather
Mather Mather Mather Mather Mather Mather
Mather Mather Mather Mather Mather Mather
Mather Mather Mather Mather Mather Mather
Mather Mather Mather Mather Mather Mather

SECRET

Lumsdale memo argued shifting papers
for various subjects related to Cuban
operation. A portion excused from CIA
copy of memo was "involuntary elimination
of Lumsdale". Lumsdale repeatedly tried to
raise assumption of Castro w/ Harry over
next several weeks but Harry declined.

0002292

It hurt 5 people in Lumsdale's office
when MOW rose to Lumsdale intent on
assassination as part of it.

30 July 1964

303 Committee met in Situation Room
of White House.

McBryde Bundy, Vance, McLean, Thomas
Hughes & Des. Fitzgerald for a discussion
of Cuba.

~~Thomas~~ Peter Jennings as secy.

10 June 64 memo from DD/P to Don
re Mafia plot to assassinate Castro.

Price was 150,000 w/ 10,000 upsur.
Cuban exile: Jose Mario "Pepin" Bosch,
Bacardi Rum, to contribute 50,000. He opposed
JMWAVE for US participation. Refused to sign
19 August 64

DCT (McLean) to Bundy - re
FBI interview w/ all participants

SECRET

0002294

0002294

- a) Pearson has not yet used the pills & fact of State Dept meeting
- b) banum has not revealed full case; C/A should be promptly displayed when he does
- c) P needs to remain in custody & will be deported

Pearson stay in chds, 1 detail found
only in where the 3 men team.

9-6 Put in it best light - that there is no
silver mine in spreading the story

p 127. We do not know that Carter actually
tried to retaliate, but we do know
that there were such plots against Carter.
Unhappily, it now appears that many
may also have this.

9/29. Wilson reports that Tupper in garden Tampa. Roubini is
planning some work on his legs, very useful to
register ^{with police} form he is in form. None of
them would have connections about digging
in his GFA connections when he was pulled
by law enforcement authorities. Roubini has
already done it when the FBI was ready
him in 1963, Roubini agreed to do it on
his conversation with Thompson & Brown.

P. 13/1. Paper - 3 May 1967

Commented Bob ~~Wright~~ over a barrel

Tad A

SECRET

0002295

241 July 75 memo

Santos Trapp

4. ST desired person falls to agent who had access to Castro

When this attempt failed, T suggested another candidate (cancelled re BGP)

- Mahan formerly contact supervisor w/ Office of Security
- Russell's convictions

Nov 1967 - illegal entry

Dec 68 - Fugitive

Senate Staff 7-8-June 1975

Ad Hoc Staff

NO 838-75

9 June 75

4. Report to Maxwell Taylor made by Dick Bissell on 8-Dec 1971 DDO

(maybe on continuing the action capability)

5. Who is Torrella (yet another alleged Castro assassin) DDO

6. - WIRROUZI, operational aliases?

- who was (WIZARD 14) (John Stein's memo)

- 2 young officers who contacted WIRROUZI DDO

- want to know John Stein's all WIRROUZI + the by Walt Riker

SECRET

Memo

SECRET

5 May 1967

Subj. Wm K. Harvey

0002296

Missing

1. ~~Harvey~~^{Bill} Harvey contacted Paych to report to Paych some contact he had w/ "gangster" and offer his corp to FBI. He explained to Paych ---

16 May 67

Tab B ^{Stewart Edward Cohen} ^{from} ^{numbers} 7 April 77

Morgan associated w/ Agency circa 1951 as a lawyer "cut out" in matters of interest to DDO.

Stewart Pierpont Morgan

DOB 28 May 1913 St Louis

Richard Scully Cain

AKA - Richard Scalpette SS 357-22-333

1969 Texarkana Tex (Reg No. 17169-TT)

In May 1964 Boldin refused to testify before Warren Com. in absence of counsel George Howard.

SECRET

Chicago American for 26 Nov. 1963 in column Daily Day & Maggie's Day - rumor that assassination planned against FBI of Chicago group

SECRET

1 Sept 47 issue of life

Garrison a guest of Mario Marmon
a henchman of Marcello, as far as
Garrison denied knowledge of Marmon in
to Marcello.

TO Chief SRS
Sulge. Carr

9 Oct 1947

TAB

R

Info re meeting of Fair Play
under Richard Criley (A 346 116)

Source of info on Guillermo WSCB
who was 'in' of Horace Speeds (SAS)
leads obtained from Ralph PEREZ (44)
Speed WFC (199499)

WSCB recruit Cuban for Communist
Party in Chicago.

0002297

SECRET

File

7 Dec 1970 VCT for Doc of Secy

Ruselli, Jolly

9 Aug 1976

SECRET

Bird memo Subj: Jolly Rendi

0002298

Tab B & C

Added info re Traff, Ruselli, & Bremer contained in material previously released for review re Sturgis.

21 May 1975 Memo by Bruckner
re Arthur Ballitto & Fred Hamm and

1. 12 Jan 1961 memo to FBI re
recommend DuBois to act as atty whom
he will disclose

2. A Hay is James Cantillon per a
13 March 1961 report.

3. 22 May 61 FBI memo re interview
w/ Col. P. Swain who said he contacted
Mahan in fall of 1960 for use as a "cut-out"
for Havana. Havana gave any indication
to Mahan he would attempt to accomplish some
clandestine efforts in Cuba.

10 Jan 1974

Memo: Chief Warden Hampton Downer

Subj: Salvatore Brammanti & Richard Cain

Re Chicago Tribune Articles of 28 and 31

Dec. 1973

Richard S. Cain # 272141

DOB Oct 1931 in Chicago

SECRET

Left Rice Square in 1960; Accused
Lohnman.
a F.I. firm

CIA contacts

A. Fall 1960

SECRET

0002299

Cain initiated contact w/ Chicago office
& obtained info on Cuban cell groups in
Chicago area.

B. June 61

Contacted Lohnman of Chicago Field Office
re a Mr. Krougansky who was rep^{on} w/
President of Panama to investigate Commun.

C. Summer 61

Cain met in Mexico City by CIA staff
identity & purpose unknown

D. Oct 1961

Cain wrote to Lohnman from Panama
offering his services

E. April 1962

Cain makes unnamed visit to Agency
reps. William Scott & William Dean in Mexico City
says he had an investigative agency w/
branches in Chicago & LA which he used to
provide training to Mexican Govt Agents

F. 4 June 62

Reported from Mexico for lead re: Carlos
Garcia & informant a Mexican official
& writing

G. 19 August 63

met in Chicago at Lake Shore Drive Athletic
Club & Dolphin Club of Grace Speed W & H
Dev staff officer & Chief of Chicago DCD office.

SECRET

0002360

He would like to work overseas
for CIA

Cain worked for Costa City Shuff
& ~~was~~ in contact with Cubans in Chicago
area & would provide info on unknown
activities of Cubans particularly Paulino Sierra
H. 26-30 Aug 1963

Cain informed the Student Directory,
a Cuban exile group in Miami

- Miro Cordoyos informant in
purchasing arms

2 Sept 63 J. DRP people who had purchased
arms. (Hosac Speed) via Wallyton & Chicago
told Cain to get out of the picture
H. 1967.

FBI investigating Cain's arms w/ photo
& recommended CIA sever contact

L. 15 April 1972

Cain returned to Chicago from Mexico
City; then disappeared May 1972 saying he
was going to Latin America. Involved
in illegal arms deals (international) &
on various occasions stated he was CIA
M. 16 May 1972

FBI agent in Mexico City asked
Mexico City Station for traces on Cain

Eastern Airlines got ed. Cain as
Seymour who flew from Honduras. 5 May 1972

SECRET

SECRET

0002301

27 Nov 63

By Robt B. P. Lohman

1. Fair Play for Cuba Committee in Feb 63 met at 907 S. Spaulding Chicago under direction of Michael Wiley, Secy of Chicago Chapter. Assassination of President Kennedy
3. LHO questioned re: in March 1963
Shuff's office had not interviewed LHO at Feb meeting but strong suspicion he was in Chicago in April 1963 & responsible for firing the officers of UPT
4. Shuff's objective in late Feb 63 so had "officially" asked FBI re info on Fair Play for Cuba. If they developed anything definite they would notify inform FBI

~~Could not recall~~ "that early in 1963 the Chicago folks over again in U.S. for Fair Play"

15 August 63

Sandy Smith Chicago Sun Times following up a lead that he call C.H. re report Bureau would get info from Cuba but no info of value.

Said he did not show info to Ed Butthman but to someone in Butthman's office (justified)

SECRET

Buchenridge memo to Dad of request

1. Photos in Sec H of page 3 is contained in the 50 volume of material
2. Section B lists 3 American citizens. Contact is minimal
3. Quarter in Section C
B 1 is Arteme; Also used by Mafia in Castro operation

Detectives have already interviewed a couple who is related.

TAD C

1. Ramon Don Eustevy Dimonguy (shortly)
DOB 2 May or 5 Feb 1936
2. Rolando Masferrer Rojas family
DOB 12 Jun 1948
3. Luciano Nieves (shortly)
4. Jose de La Torrente (shortly)
5. Jose Quintana DOB 3 Oct 45
spotted a nephew by name to Raul
6. Joaquin Antonio Cortijo DOB 10 Jan 45
7. Manuel Arteme

TAB C

SECRET

0002303

14 March 1974

Meeting w/ Terry Hengner

Frank O'Malley referred Hunt to Bob Mullen of the Mullen Group.

- O'Malley knew Hengner is client of Mullen's; this information pushed up in course of a cordial relationship between O'Malley & Mullen in early 60's in connection with Full Cuba Committee.

Hunt & Mullen met in Paris during Marshall Plan

- when Mullen doubts that Hunt possible impact on civil placements caused consternation.

- Hunt approached O'Malley for an individual having access to information only available

- Thomas C. Amato apparently refused job.

- Houston

- Paul G. intervenes w/ Farrell of ISNS re possible deportation of Brancione

- ref people who knew well P. Inwood, Osborn, Angleton, Rocca, & Houston

SECRET

1977 Report

SECRET

0002304

AMTRUNK

Described to identify other war damaged
guaranteed in armed forces in Cuba.
Bart 63, Walter Antonio Moreno Lopez
& Enriquez, Cayetano Roberto Arvelo Hernandez
Plan to establish Centro.

Mexico report in April 1961 & aware of
George Volody, Cuban citizen of Cuban origin.
Including USSR & then in Cuban in Free Cuba
British Command. Manned Cuban & armed in
Miami, May 41.

Volody contacts Ted Syde & met with

Gordon & Heron (Stet). CFF design plan
to Miami Station set in Miami a AMTRUNK

Newly prepared pay for & by Sept 63
had 3 sources including Cuban

Memo in Oct 63 was received from

AMTRUNK due to indication. He was going to

appeal & JFC the Volody & Syde.

Had some contacts but no real action

capably; in 65 Cuban & May 1965.

Syde & Volody both British met in Cuba
in 1955-60

SECRET

Joe Ricardo Robert Nung

appeared again in Miami Dec 62

joined AMTRUNK, returned to Miami in 1965

SECRET

0002305

X in 65 to infiltrate his family. Arrested & given 30 yrs. but freed in 67.

Accusation RHPZ a Cuban agent as early as July 1963.

Possibly -

It might have been an ingenious Cuban plan from the beginning. Inf action was buying cables & some info & infiltration.

M.C.

NY Daily News 20-25 April 1975 by Paul Mackell, - quotes Sturgis on assassination attempts including using Juan data to bomb Castro. I recruited him to work w/ the embassy (US).

Sturgis' id of RHPZ, prior to its disclosure by external investigators, raises question as to what he knew.

Office of SecInt wrote memo on 1975 noting connection between Sturgis & RHPZ in 1960 citing FBI reports.

(made in conjunction w/ Daily News story)

Giancana in FBI memo 18 Oct 1960 indicated he had met w/ assassin-to-be. & pills in Castro's food or drink.

Since CIA pills not until Feb 1961, seems that mob had their own plan.

SECRET

- Loreng claims Sturgis would have in 1960

File

Sh...
work after

FBI

Person 14 August failed in

Other

May 1975

1. Contact Cuban while
was given a staff
Tried to enter Cuba 3 times

2. May 1977 Antonio Vucanic
On 3 occasions

he proposed to CIA.
In 1970 report he had made a proposal for
an AID employee but was refused in 1966

3. Agent Messer in
SECRET
3 of messages involved same group of

so probably same plan

0002308

1. 27 March 1961 AMBROSE 15

Plan to sabotage electric company in Havana & hit Castro at Sports Palace

2. 29 March 1961

same idea with offensive
mission on 30 March but no communication
assassination

3. 5 April 61

only mission for 50 men; would try
9 April but need military aid.

a) AMBROSE infiltrated several times
& finally executed 30 August 62 after May
62 arrest. Reported as some identity he was
CIA; & not mentioned in McBreven Book

b) AM COAX 11 ^{the} ~~both~~ persons in

c) AM PUB 11 touch w/ AMBROSE

d) AM PANIC 17 & mentioned in McBreven book, Drog
30 yr sentence

All 3 people sentenced prior to Bay P. &
none had assassination mission. Only
AMBROSE mentioned that!

06, 24

4. 4 June 61 [Moratori of Italian Embassy]
claimed he had plans for mission w/in
30 days after killing Fidel.

Reply was that info was
untrue & (Moratori) condemned.

06
SECRET

SECRET

5. 3 May 61

- from a member of Revolutionary
Recovery Movement saying they would try to
kill Fidel today" 0002309

- Reply was "Lay low"

- Maybe HMPUB /

Tab D

AMLAH

- Rejects notion that AMLAH a Cuban agent.

- No contact between August 1962 and
Sept 1963

- 7 Sept & 9 Sept cables indicate that
AMLAH is a "spoiled brat"; hopeless as intel
performer: but approach on chief conspirator
allowed to recruit his own cohorts."

p 3-4 Summary Findings
Book V leaves inference that Castro's
speech to Dan Harker after AMLAH leak
list CIA had not passed anything at that
time. D. & M. met until 3 Oct 63

Nov 19, 63 AMLAH told CIA officer
he was returning to Cuba. On 20 Nov
he was reported as delay until February
"if something untoward" AMLAH

p 26 SSC Final Rpt.

SECRET

On 24 Nov Mexico Station responded to a
Headquarters request for names of known
contacts of certain Soviet personnel in Mexico,

Purpose was to determine significance
LHO's contact w/ Soviet.

But in reference to contact between a member
of the Soviet embassy & a Cuban cultural
attache. NOT a report of a contact between
AMLAH/11 and the Soviet

"H" role - Chief did not know of
AMLAH/11 1963 associations w/ CIA

TABLE E

24 Nov 63 Subj: Cuban President's Attorney
Prosecutor of Ben Hernandez

28 Nov 1963 DIR 85657 (C/WH/3)
John Wilson - Hudson

29 Nov 63

Acting on FBP report, Agency reports Almeida
be turned over to Mexican authorities.

12 Dec 1963 CSCI-3/779,048 (C/WH/3)
Subj - Wilson, Carlos John

30 Jan 1964 CSCI-3/779,814 (CI/Sec)
Subj: Jack Ruby - LHO

SECRET

20 March 1964 CSCI-3/780/612 (SR/CD/R)
Photo of individual who resembles LHO

SECRET

10 June 1964 C S C I - 3/781,841 (C I / R & A)
Info re Ruby

6 Oct 64 C S C I - 3/6101446-64
U/ADUCT interview on 9 Sept 1964
His Comments on 7 Photos Forwarded 7/22

W C Doc. 1054 Ruby & Associates.

0002311

SECRET

result of an evolution in perception.
is Provocation ~~is~~ in it from
both Cuba & USSR from Bay of Pigs,
Minskino, 'stay with the army of US
Cuban program.

11. The SSC Find Rpt has failed to emphasize instead CIA operational activity against Cuba is requiring specific attention.

Review by Agency -

Persons ~~in charge~~^{in rep} know details of 1963
or 1964 operations for the most part are no
longer available. Primary reliance on records.

QTA has now conducted such a
review - looking at "the other end"
of a possible chain of evidence, which they
themselves could have started. This has
produced no new evidence pointing on the
assassination, altho' it has produced the basis
for new lines of speculation. In fact, the
review sometimes seemed to become
a futile exercise in trying to get
back to the prosecution they
rather than bring out & examine
evidence actually lying on the
assassination of Pres. Kennedy. To explain
sometimes became one of asking if this
activity (which was small amount)
could have provided clues to order
the assassination. See Quint Kennedy and

had Castro) learned of it. The SSC, in its Final Report, fell into this very trap, trying to make the AMLABH operation actually fit the thing for which the SSC's presentation seemed to be tailored!

Tab C

AMLABH

The Agency had only a tentative understanding with this man during Puro's tenured life, altho the SSC Final Report - in trying to prove its thesis -- has attempted to present it differently. Because the case is discussed so extensively in the SSC Final Report, it is treated in a separate context in the paper at Tab D. The key point is that prior to Puro's tenured death the relationship ~~was~~ with AMLABH was amorphous and without substance. Had Castro heard of it he could ~~not~~ claim only that there was a contact that had not developed to the point of an understanding.

p14 New Consideration on the Septuaginta Operation

In a series of stories by Paul Marshall in the New York Daily News, of April 20-25, 1974 it quoted Sturges as follows:

"I said Comintern scheme involved planting a bomb in Castro's office. I had

SECRET

across to the Prime Minister's office, Stager said. I know Fidel's private security man Orta. I recruited him to work with the Embassy (Russian embassy in Havana).

"He (Stager) has claimed on a number of occasions to have been an employee of CIA, although there is no record of any such relationship. He was in contact with some of the CIA Cuban employees in the Miami area, but had no direct relationships with the Agency.

Orta was the director of the Office of the Prime Minister, which gave him ^{access} ~~access~~ that would make it possible for him to pass lists. The plan failed because Orta lost his position, and with it his access, in late June 1961. This was prior to delivery of the poison pills to him in late February or early March 1961. Orta's role in this operation was over when he took refuge in the Venezuelan Embassy in Havana in April 1964. He was allowed to leave Cuba in October 1964 and settled in Miami in Feb. 1965.

and one 13 June 1974
Same news source discuss a possible relationship between Stager and Traffante, also mentioning a woman Traffante as a possible partner of Traffante. Office of Security wrote a memorandum in 1975; not by

SECRET

SECRET

0002316

a connection between Stamps and Rothman in 1960, citing FBI reports.

But even that Stamp's report to have had a role in gambling and on this availability due to his "lost profits." One could deduce that Stamp and Carter could have known one another because of their connection with the gambling activities as well as having contacts with the men heading the gambling operations.

From 1974 Stamp also reports claim by Marita (Marit) Loreng that she acted on behalf of Stamps in 1960 re poor pills in yard of poor claim.

Quotes - FBI memo on Beaumont. "This seems to confirm some job involving a woman to kill Castro with poor known, the timing of which does not fit the time frame known to CIA. While CIA had been given to various schemes, there were no CIA pills for delivery until February 1961. It suggests that the syndicate may have been moving ahead on its own."

SECRET

In fact it is possible that the already was involved in independent

SECRET

6002317

squadrons with the command signals
when first appeared prior to 13 of
in March 1961 to carry out the United
ambassadors. The 1967 DO Report says
to 1968 FBI reports that bear on this.
One of them, on 21 Dec. 1960, indicates
support by the command underground
for some of the Cuban exiles. The
other report, on 18 Jan. 1961,
suggests that Viana was one of the
giving that support, altho' this was
not confirmed.

To late in June 64 another group
plot in Miami area for 150,000.

I speculate that when Washington
in April 1962 can officers felt "there
was something already 'ongoing'."

It is possible that CFT simply
found itself involved in providing
additional resources for independent
operations that the syndicate already
had under way.

In a sense CFT may have been
"juggly" backing in the syndicate and
in addition to its material contribution
was also supplying an aura of official
sanction.

6020