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## PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

## AGENDA FOR MEETING OF APRIL 23, 1963

- | ITEM          | TIME  | SUBJECT   |
|---------------|---|---|
| 1.            | 9:00 - 9:15                                     | The Chairman's Time   |
| <del>2.</del> | <del>9:15 - 10:15</del>                         | <del>Status Report on Prior Board Recommendations.</del><br><del>Mr. Russell Ash *</del>  |
| ✓ 3.          | 10:15 <sup>25</sup> - 10:45 <sup>11:15</sup>    | Discussions with the Director of Central Intelligence<br><u>Mr. John McCone</u><br><i>Mr. Johnson Kirkpatrick</i>   |
| ✓ 4.          | 10:45 <sup>11:15</sup> - 11:15 <sup>12:00</sup> | Current Intelligence and Covert Operational Activity Relating to Cuba<br><u>Mr. Sterling J. Cottrell, State Department</u><br><u>Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald, CIA</u><br><i>Mr. Bruce Clark, CIA</i>   |
| ✓ 5.          | 11:15 <sup>12:00</sup> - 12:15 <sup>12:55</sup> | Status Report on Developments Pertaining to the Defense Intelligence Agency<br><u>Lt. General Joseph F. Carroll, USAF,</u><br><u>Director, Defense Intelligence Agency</u><br><i>Gen. Wm Quinn, Col. Chas. Miller, Sgt. John Rife (all DIA)</i>                         |
| 6.            | 12:15 - 12:40                                   | Executive Session <i>(Time overlap)</i>   |
| 7.            | 12:45 <sup>55</sup> - 2:20 <sup>35</sup>        | Luncheon at the Metropolitan Club in Honor of Dr. Killian -- Host: Mr. Clark Clifford<br><i>(Ch. Mbra, Coyne, Ash, McCone + Bundy at luncheon.)</i>   |
| ✓ 8.          | 2:30 <sup>40</sup> - 3:00 <sup>10</sup>         | Status Report - National Reconnaissance Office<br><u>Dr. Brockway McMillan, Director, NRO</u>   |
| ✓ 9.          | 3:00 <sup>10</sup> - 4:00 <sup>30</sup>         | Developments Relating to the National Security Agency<br><u>Mr. John H. Rubel, Deputy Director, Research and Engineering, Department of Defense</u><br><u>Lt. General Gordon A. Flake, Director, National Security Agency</u> + <i>Col. Rich + Edwin Bartush (2:00)</i> |
| ✓ 10.         | 4:00 <sup>30</sup> - 5:00 <sup>05</sup>         | Intelligence Coverage of Foreign Diplomatic and International Organization Establishments and Personnel in the United States<br><u>Mr. Alan H. Belmont, Assistant Director, FBI</u><br><i>Mr. Miller</i>  |
| 11.           | 5:00 - 5:10                                     | Executive Session <i>(Time overlap)</i>   |

\*This item was not considered at the 4/23/63 meeting of the Board. In lieu thereof the Board discussed the DCI's report ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ on Cuba dated 4/15/63, following a briefing thereon by Mr. Coyne.

*All Board Members Present.*

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AGENDA (Continued)

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>
12.	5:15 - 5:25	Meeting with the President - Presentation of Commission to Mr. Clifford as new Board Chairman
13.	5:25 - End of Day 6:	Executive Session with the new Board Chairman

Addendum: Subsequent to the preparation of this agenda, the DCI submitted his comments on the recommendations (on Cuba and other subjects) which the Board made to the President at its last meeting. The DCI's comments are filed under Tab 14.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Meeting of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, April 23, 1963

The Board met at 9:00 a.m., April 23, 1963, in the Board's offices, Room 297, Executive Office Building, at the call of the Chairman, Dr. Killian. Present were Board members Doolittle, Murphy, Clifford, Gray, Baker, Pace, Langer and Land, and Messrs. Coyne and Ash.

Dr. Killian opened the meeting with the observation that when the DCI joined the Board meeting later in the day, Board members should be prepared to discuss with Mr. McCone the latter's April 15, 1963, submission to the President of comments in response to the 14 recommendations made in the Board's March 8 report on Cuba.

The Chairman asked Mr. Coyne to give the Board a brief oral summary of the DCI's April 15 submission to the President. Mr. Coyne did so by repeating for the information of the Board members the comments which he had provided to Mr. Bundy in a memorandum dated April 22, 1963, in response to Mr. Bundy's request that he be furnished Mr. Coyne's own reaction (not that of the Board) to the DCI's communication to the President.

Having heard Mr. Coyne's resume of his comments to Mr. Bundy on the DCI's report, Dr. Killian thought that the comments were sound and well presented, although Dr. Killian was of the view that

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Briefly referring to his visit to the NPIC quarters at the Naval Gun Factory, General Doolittle noted that the facility has considerable room for expansion and the activity is being carried on there under greatly improved conditions. The Department of Defense personnel contingent which is housed at the facility operates as a self-contained unit. Mr. Lundahl, Director of the NPIC, reports that although the facility does not possess sufficient manpower to handle a double load which might be imposed should two emergency situations occur simultaneously, he nevertheless feels that the space and equipment expansion now under way at the new quarters would accommodate the additional personnel who would be required in such a situation.

At the Chairman's request, Mr. Murphy briefly informed the Board concerning the meeting which he and Mr. Gray and Mr. Coyne had recently with Mr. Cord Meyer of CIA on the subject of covert action programs. Mr. Murphy pointed out that Mr. Meyer's briefing covered operations in Latin American countries, but the subject of Cuba was excluded inasmuch as that subject was to be covered at today's Board meeting. Mr. Murphy said the briefing consisted primarily of light touches including information on the China frontier situation. Nothing new was brought up with respect to Europe or the Middle East, Mr. Murphy said. The CIA briefing reflected the existence of positive evidence that the entourage of the Brazilian President Goulart is communist-penetrated. Mr. Murphy observed that this briefing had been presented by CIA at the request of Mr. Murphy and Mr. Gray, and it was Mr. Murphy's impression that the briefing was rather routine in nature, and therefore seemed to downgrade the importance which the Board attaches to the subject of covert action operations and requirements.

Dr. Land observed that from his experience, every time that secrecy is used as a cloak for an assumed efficient but sensitive operation, one may well later find on removal of the cloak that there was nothing there. Dr. Land thought that

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it is up to the Board to ascertain specifically whether the President desires that the Board go into covert action programs deeply, and if that is the President's wish then the Board should take steps to insure that it receives full and significant briefings from the agencies concerned. In this connection Mr. Clifford asked whether there was any limitation at all on the Board's right to know about these matters. Dr. Killian replied that there were no limitations and that this is well established.

Mr. Coyne informed the Board at this point about the telephone call which had been received from the Office of the DCI the preceding day, Mr. Kirkpatrick of CIA had conveyed the DCI's wish that the scheduled CIA briefing of the Board today on certain clandestine operations be conducted in the absence of Mr. Cottrell, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, who Mr. McCone understood was to join the Board meeting at the same time the CIA briefing was to be given. The basis for the DCI's request was the fact that certain aspects of the CIA briefing to be given on clandestine operations with respect to Cuba involve covert action operations which Mr. Cottrell is not privy to. Mr. Coyne noted that the Board's agenda had been revised to accommodate the DCI's request, although Mr. Coyne found the request to be somewhat surprising in view of the responsibilities which have been assigned to Mr. Cottrell by the White House for coordination for all matters relating to Cuba.

Mr. Gray observed that if at today's meeting the Board in fact received a full story concerning clandestine and covert actions being planned and executed under CIA auspices, this would certainly constitute a milestone in the Board's efforts along this line. Dr. Land thought the Board should take the position that unless the CIA briefing presents a full story, the briefers should be asked to continue until the Board has received a full picture. Mr. Clifford thought that the better procedure to follow would be for the Board to listen to the CIA briefing

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and to ask any questions which it may have during the course of the briefing, and if the Board still has unanswered questions at the conclusion of the briefing they should be compiled by the Board staff for discussion at the next meeting of the Board and pursued further with the DCI. The Board agreed with Mr. Clifford's suggestion. Mr. Murphy added that the Board should endeavor to ascertain the context of any over-all plan which the government has with respect to Cuba and under which the intelligence community is operating. Dr. Killian emphasized the desirability that on the occasion of the CIA briefing today, pertinent questions regarding Cuba should be pressed with the briefers. Mr. Clifford observed that if the Board does not receive sufficient information from CIA in these matters, it might be well to consider the alternative of the Board preparing itself for the conduct of a searching examination of appropriate CIA representatives who are knowledgeable in this area, and have a stenographic record prepared of the proceedings.

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At 10:15 a.m., the Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. McCone, joined the Board meeting, accompanied by Messrs. Kirkpatrick, Fitzgerald and Clark. Referring to events of the past twenty-four hours, the DCI expressed satisfaction that the U.S./Cuba prisoner exchange had included the return to the U.S. of the 3 senior CIA personnel who had been imprisoned in Cuba early in the Castro regime when they were caught in the act of bugging the Chinese Communist mission in Cuba. Mr. McCone said that the exchange which the attorney Donovan had worked out with Castro called for the release of 22 Americans in exchange for the return to Cuba of Molina (Castro body-guard) who was in the custody of New York authorities following the slaying of an Argentine girl in a night club, and the 3 Cubans who were under Federal indictment in New York on sabotage charges. The DCI said that he personally negotiated with Governor Rockefeller the release of Molina, and that the Attorney General handled the release of the other three Cubans.

In answer to a question from Mr. Murphy, the DCI stated that the terms of the exchange agreement were not of a nature to affect the conduct of present or future U.S. intelligence and covert action operations with respect to Cuba. Mr. McCone added that Castro did not seek any conditions other than the release of the 4 Cubans being held in the U.S. Mr. McCone thought it interesting that Castro had pressed for no conditions involving U.S. policy toward Cuba, and had sought no assurances regarding U.S. aerial surveillance, espionage operations, military policy, or anything else. Vallejo, Castro's assistant, told

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attorney Donovan to tell President Kennedy and Mr. McCone that Castro realizes that he must gain a rapprochement with the U.S., and Mr. McCone expressed the belief that in agreeing to the recent prisoner exchange Castro is seeking to retain a thread of contact with the U.S. as insurance in the event of a double-cross by the USSR. The DCI had no idea why he had been included in the message to be delivered by Donovan.

Mr. McCone pointed out that the attorney Donovan has become our only direct channel to Castro. However, Donovan has announced that his mission is ended and that with the completion of the recent exchange he had gone into Cuba for the last time (for one thing Donovan had to make the announcement to head off continued appeals by Cuban exiles in the U.S. to help obtain the release of numerous relatives still remaining in Cuban prisons). Therefore, Mr. McCone noted, if any future use is to be made of Donovan's entree to Castro, it would undoubtedly have to be on some basis other than prisoner releases.

Messrs. Kirkpatrick and Fitzgerald noted that apparently the Castro regime had not succeeded in connecting the 3 CIA personnel to employment with CIA.

Next, Mr. McCone turned to several matters which he wished to mention to the Board.

In the coordination field, the DCI informed the Board that the new NRO agreement is now in effect and working well. Plans and arrangements for the DIA's use of the NPIC are progressing. In the

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Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald of CIA (DD/P Area) exhibited a chart reflecting the following information concerning clandestine agents in Cuba as of April 1, 1963, and the intelligence reports which they had produced during the 12-month period ending April 1, 1963:

82 resident agents - 665 reports.

2 illegal teams - 77 reports.

29 legal travelers - 67 reports.

46 shipboard agents - 39 reports.

26 penetrations of Cuban installations - 192 reports.

In answer to questions raised by Board members, Mr. Fitzgerald elaborated upon the statistics displayed on the chart which he exhibited to the Board.

The "resident agents" are not third-country diplomats but are Cubans. As of March 1, 1962, there were 50 such agents in Cuba. Thereafter, 480 individuals were considered for possible use in this category. Of the number which were recruited, 34 resident agents in Cuba have been lost (one is known to have been executed, 27 are unaccounted for, 4 escaped after arrest). As of April 1, 1963 the total number of resident agents in Cuba is 82 as indicated previously by Mr. Fitzgerald.

With reference to the "illegal teams" of which there are 2 in Cuba, Mr. Fitzgerald stated that the teams consist of 2 men each, but that as many as 100 sub-agents have been developed by the teams. The recruitment and operation of the 2 teams are in the "black"; the teams were introduced by sea and their mission is primarily intelligence gathering. A principal intelligence mission is the obtaining of information concerning military aspects of the Soviet presence in Cuba. Also, Mr. Fitzgerald stated, the illegal teams are designed to create resistance networks among the Cuban population if possible, but the policy is not to pursue large-scale, dangerous activity of this sort. For the most part reports are received from members of the illegal teams in the form of secret writing messages dispatched

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in the regular mail by way of Mexico, and Mr. Fitzgerald stated in this connection that efforts are being made to equip the team members with additional radios (they have 4 agent-type radios now); and it is hoped that the team members will soon be equipped with radio units which are small in size (the transmitter and receiver together about the size of 2 cigarette cartons) and capable of medium speed transmissions for spans of only 60 seconds. Mr. Fitzgerald further informed the Board that there were 4 illegal agents in Cuba as of March 1, 1962, and in the 12-month period ending April 1, 1963, 45 agents were infiltrated, 32 were ex-filtrated, and 13 were lost, and as of April 1, 1963 there are in Cuba 4 agents comprising the 2 illegal agent teams.

With reference to the shipboard agents, Mr. Fitzgerald said that these agents are on board Cuban ships, of which there are only 19 operating outside of Cuban waters. With regard to penetrations of Cuban installations previously referred to, Mr. Fitzgerald stated that these involve Cuban diplomats and Cuban diplomatic installations abroad. He added that some 14 Cuban diplomats are providing information and 2 of these have furnished reports which are considered to be good. In answer to Mr. Murphy's question, Mr. Fitzgerald said that the only penetration of Castro's immediate entourage has been through Castro's younger sister. He added that the penetrations referred to included 12 of an audio surveillance nature. Referring again to the 665 intelligence reports which have been obtained from resident agents in Cuba, Mr. Fitzgerald said that these reports are heavily devoted to military subjects and a few of them have proved really worth while, as for example, during the October crisis when these reports served to pin-point MREB locations. On the economic side, it is reported that curtailed exports of special lubricating oil components gives the Cubans a serious problem in the operation of industrial machinery.

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At this point, Mr. Cottrell of the Department of State joined the Board meeting.

In answer to a question by Mr. Murphy, Mr. Fitzgerald said that the intelligence teams mostly confined their activities to intelligence gathering rather than covert action, although the teams do have the mission of creating "low-key" resistance and "subtle sabotage". Mr. Fitzgerald said that although CIA has no policy guidance for positive covert action programs of a specific sabotage nature, there is policy guidance for leaflet drops and radio propoganda, and an example of "subtle sabotage" would be the shorting out of a high tension power line by throwing a copper wire over it.

Mr. Fitzgerald stated that the Special Group approved the monthly plans of the CIA for infiltrations of illegal agents into Cuba, and thereafter the success of infiltrations is determined by such matters as weather conditions and the requirement for carrying out infiltrations in the dark of the moon. Mr. Coyne asked whether CIA was kept informed about U. S. Army infiltrations into Cuba, and Mr. Fitzgerald replied that while CIA received notice of such activity, none had occurred to his knowledge for the past 6 months.

Mr. Murphy asked whether there is available any evidence of organized resistance against the Castro regime within Cuba. Mr. Fitzgerald replied that while there is scattered resistance it is not organized. He recalled that in 1962 resistance organizations composed of students and other groups had been infiltrated by the Castro Security Service and after a time Castro rolled up the resistance groups and smashed them completely. The only resistance which is now active in Cuba is in the form of small bands.

Referring back to Mr. Fitzgerald's earlier comment that the CIA has no policy guidance with respect to the conduct of covert action programs in Cuba, Mr. Coyne

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inquired as to the function of Mr. Cottrell's Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee with respect to Cuba. In response to this question, Mr. Cottrell described his coordinating function, beginning with the point that the President had requested last January that coordination be supplied to the activities of the 6 or 7 U. S. agencies which were dealing with the 4 or 5 Cuban exile groups. The President directed that there be established a focal point for coordination of policy recommendations and execution of approved policies assigned for implementation by various U. S. agencies following decisions by the Executive Committee of the NSC with respect to Cuba. Having been given this coordinating responsibility, Mr. Cottrell named Secretary of the Army Vance and Mr. Helms of CIA to serve on the committee, with provision for drawing upon representatives of other agencies as might be required from time to time. Mr. Cottrell said that his committee is charged with coordinating policy with respect to Cuba, the objectives being to prevent Cuba from becoming a base of Soviet aggression, to prevent the overt export of military equipment from Cuba to other Latin American countries for communist purposes, to prevent the export of subversive activities to other Latin American countries from Cuba, and to seek the removal of the Soviet presence in Cuba. Mr. Cottrell went on to say that when CIA proposes covert actions with respect to Cuba, the Cottrell Committee considers the proposals and comments on them to the Special Group, and if a policy issue is involved in a given proposal the matter is referred to the Executive Committee of the NSC for decision.

Mr. Murphy asked Mr. Cottrell if he would state for the Board Mr. Cottrell's concept of what U. S. policy toward Cuba is today, for instance whether the policy is of a defensive or an offensive character. Mr. Cottrell answered by saying that in his opinion that the U. S. policy toward Cuba is not defensive, and as an indication of this he referred to the visit which he and Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach made to Nicaragua where a conference was held with officials of Central American countries concerning visa and other travel controls which might be

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improved or instituted for the purpose of restricting the travel of Castro's representatives in Latin American countries. In further describing the U. S. policy, Mr. Cottrell said that in his own view our government does not intend to invade Cuba except as a last resort, and our policy holds that the liberation of Cuba is the responsibility of the Cuban people themselves. However, Mr. Cottrell added, it is felt by a number of people that the time has long past when we might expect a successful popular uprising in Cuba against the Castro regime.

Mr. Gray asked whether the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Cuba would alter the point of view just mentioned by Mr. Cottrell to the effect that we cannot hope for a successful popular uprising in Cuba. Mr. Cottrell preferred that this question be answered by Mr. Fitzgerald who expressed the opinion that withdrawal of Soviet forces would not significantly affect the situation because of the strong internal security measures which are maintained by the Castro regime in Cuba.

Referring again to Mr. Fitzgerald's earlier statement that CIA is lacking in policy guidance on covert actions, Mr. Coyne inquired as to whether requests for such guidance had been made. Mr. Fitzgerald replied that a decision in this area is being sought this week. Mr. Cottrell observed that previously the government's prime objective had been to obtain the release of the 22 Americans imprisoned in Cuba, and now that this has been accomplished, Mr. Cottrell predicted that future operations would include low-level reconnaissance missions, increased sabotage operations, and intensified efforts to obtain OAS action. He added that inasmuch as the "noise level" is down it is hoped that aggressive programs may now be pursued. Mr. Cottrell also said that he believes the time has come to begin creating tensions in the Cuban area, and he noted that critics of the Administration have been charging that our government has fallen into a co-existence policy with respect to Cuba. In Mr. Cottrell's opinion Castro must feel that his recent release of the American prisoners will aid rapprochement efforts with respect to the U. S., and Castro probably hopes that he may now quietly go on building up his communist

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strength.

Next Mr. Bruce Clark of CIA (the DD/I Area) briefed the Board with respect to certain aspects of intelligence coverage of Cuba.

Mr. Clark stated that during the period February 15 to April 20, 1963 the Soviets have removed approximately 4,700 personnel from Cuba. CIA believes that most of the 4,700 Soviet personnel were military people because of their age and appearance and because there is little likelihood that the Soviets would be removing economic personnel from Cuba. CIA estimates that only 500 or 600 Soviets have arrived during this period, and CIA reasons that the 4,700 Soviets who have been withdrawn are military personnel who have completed tours of duty, including some entire logistic units. CIA estimates that this leaves in Cuba Soviet personnel totaling on the order of "12,000 plus". Mr. Clark said that the validity of the latter figure depends on the validity of the original estimated total of 17,500 Soviet personnel in Cuba, a figure which was arrived at on a strict table of organization basis, taking into account the estimated number of persons logically required to operate the equipment which has been observed in Cuba. In the opinion of Mr. Clark, the estimated figure of 4,700 Soviet withdrawals is far sounder than the previous estimate of 17,500 total personnel in Cuba.

Dr. Killian asked whether there is evidence of re-introduction of Soviet military personnel into Cuba and their deployment and concealment by means of camouflage. Mr. Clark said that in view of the redundancy of the high altitude coverage and the fact that nothing has been seen in photography since November 1962, evidence is to the contrary.

In answer to Mr. Murphy's question as to what Soviet personnel are presently doing in Cuba, Mr. Clark estimated that 7,500 are connected with SAM installations and activity, another 7,500 are in the category of military engineers, and 2,000 are engaged in naval operations. Mr. Clark indicated that Soviet personnel are

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scattered out over the island of Cuba and the greatest concentrations are the 2,500 to 4,000 Soviet personnel in the 4 major Soviet armored camps. In answer to Dr. Langer's question as to what the 2,500 to 4,000 personnel are doing, Mr. Clark stated that their main mission was probably the furnishing of training to Cuban military forces. Mr. Clark said that COMINT obtained this week confirms reports that Cuban pilots are receiving training in MIG-21's.

Noting that Mr. Fitzgerald had stated that CIA had 4 agents in Cuba in 1962 and now has 4 agents in Cuba in 1963, Mr. Clifford wondered whether efforts are being made through other Latin American countries to infiltrate clandestine agents in Cuba. Mr. Fitzgerald said that efforts are being made to develop agents from other Latin American countries to operate in Cuba. He added that while Mr. Clifford's recollection was correct concerning the constant figure of "illegal" agents in Cuba as of a year ago and at the present time, nevertheless there are approximately 87 "resident" agents in Cuba who are engaged in clandestine intelligence collection.

Messrs. Cottrell, Kirkpatrick, Fitzgerald and Clark departed the Board meeting at this point.

At 12:00 noon, the Board meeting was joined by General Carroll, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and by General Quinn and Colonel Gillis, members of General Carroll's staff.

General Carroll recalled that at a Board meeting last year he had discussed the status of the organization of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the responsibilities which had been assigned to DIA or were being considered for assignment to DIA. General Carroll said that at this time he would like to point out the present status of organization of the DIA and the responsibilities which have been recently assigned to it.

General Carroll pointed out that DIA has the responsibility for handling military intelligence requirements for the Department of Defense as a central

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figure for NSA was given as 20,000 in comparison with the UK total of 6,600 personnel engaged in this type of activity.

With respect to SIGINT collection on Cuba, General Blake informed the Board that in March 1961 there were 10 NSA intercept positions and 5 processing staff personnel working on Cuba, which was increased by February 1963 to 100 positions and 1,660 people. Mr. Clifford inquired as to whether any SIGINT which was obtained on Cuba entered into U. S. policy decisions during the October 1962 Cuba crisis. General Blake said that the policy makers were supplied with SIGINT on Soviet shipping to Cuba as early as the spring and early summer of 1962. Dr. Tordella added that also in the early summer of 1962 NSA was able to report on the SIGINT buildup of the Soviets in Cuba, and was able to provide information on defense communications networks as well as the plain text of communications sent by the Soviet Ambassador to his superiors in Moscow.

Mr. Murphy inquired as to whether NSA now has an ability to penetrate Soviet communications <sup>in</sup> to Cuba. Dr. Tordella stated that in spite of the short distance which separates Cuba from the U. S. the security precautions followed by the Soviets would not permit a hit-and-run commando type effort to pre-empt the communications equipment involved. General Blake had no suggestions to offer in response to Mr. Coyne's inquiry as to whether the NSA would like to extend its operations with respect to Cuba beyond those which are now programmed. General Blake did refer to efforts which are being made, through direction finding methods, to pin-point the location of the Soviet communications equipment in question, hopefully within the range of 1 mile. General Blake pointed out that the Russian SCRAMBLER system which is employed on 2 links running from Moscow to Havana, and which operates at the rate of 66 words a minute, may be approaching a solution on the part of NSA -- meanwhile, some traffic analysis is being obtained from it.

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Dr. Tordella mentioned that NSA is getting good results from its attack on SILVER, the Soviet government communications channel within Russia which handles approximately 40,000 messages a quarter. The exploitation of this break-through will be increased when NSA obtains 15 million dollars in additional equipment during the remainder of this year and next. Dr. Tordella said that NSA is on the verge of solving the Soviet COPPER system which is used by the Soviet Navy and feeds into the SILVER network. It is expected that NSA will solve the COPPER machine within a year.

Dr. Tordella said that the Soviet ALUMINUM SCRAMBLER system is approaching a 50% probable solution by NSA. This system has the greatest number of Soviet users, including those in Cuba and is of greatest interest to NSA. Dr. Tordella said that the Russian ALBATROSS system, utilizing a manual machine and which is also in use in Cuba, has been the subject of NSA attack since 1945 and during the last 7 months has shown promise of possible solution. He added that the Russian diplomatic cipher system involves the use of hand systems (one time pads) which were inaugurated in 1943, and which if properly used are purely random systems, and NSA has no hope whatsoever of reading this traffic.

Mr. Murphy asked whether the Russians are exploiting U. S. diplomatic traffic. Dr. Tordella said that he became confident that the Soviets were exploiting our diplomatic traffic in Moscow on the basis of compromising radiations emanating from the printer unit associated with U. S. encryption machines. Accordingly, Dr. Tordella succeeded in getting a ruling to prevent the use of such U. S. machines behind the Iron Curtain until this problem is resolved.

Dr. Killian asked for General Blake's estimate of the FOCUS project at Princeton University. General Blake said that he supports this effort because it brings outside scientific thinking into a security-closed effort, and this can

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