

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : PFIAB
RECORD NUMBER : 206-10001-10010
RECORDS SERIES : PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : PFIAB
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD MEETING
OF THE BOARD NOVEMBER 9, 1962
DATE : 11/09/62
PAGES : 10
SUBJECTS : AGENDA FOR NOVEMBER 9, 1962 MEETING
SUMMARY OF NOVEMBER 9, 1962 MEETING

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1B, 1C
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : ~~08/06/98~~ 08/01/2024
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

2025 Release under the President John F.
Kennedy Assassination Records
Collection Act of 1992

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

206-10001-10010

2025 Release under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

MEETING OF THE BOARD

NOVEMBER 9, 1962

206-10001-10010

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

AGENDA FOR MEETING OF NOVEMBER 9, 1962

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>
1.	9:00 - 9:30	The Chairman's Time - Executive Session
2.	9:30 - 10:15	Preliminary Review by Board Staff of Recent Cuban Developments <u>Mr. Patrick Coyne</u>
3.	10:15 - 10:30	Recent Discussions of Cuban Developments with the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Reconnaissance Office <u>Mr. Gordon Gray</u>
4.	10:30 - 11:00	Recent Photographic Intelligence Acquisitions <u>Mr. Arthur Lundahl, NPIC</u>
5.	11:00 - 12:00 <u>11:30 - 3:00</u>	Defense Intelligence Agency Activities Including DIA's Role in the Cuban Situation <u>Lt. Gen. Joseph Carroll, USAF, Director, DIA</u>
6.	12:00 - 12:30 <u>4:30</u> <u>5:15 - 5:55</u>	State Department Views on Recent Intelligence Developments Relating to Cuba <u>Mr. Thomas Hughes, Acting Director, Intelligence and Research, Department of State</u>
7.	12:30 - 1:30	Lunch - Room No. 21, Executive Office Building
8.	1:30 - 1:45	Status Report on CIA's Covert Operations <u>Mr. Robert Murphy</u>
9.	1:45 - 2:15 <u>3:00 -</u>	Review of the Recent Series of Soviet Nuclear Tests <u>Dr. Albert Wheelon</u> Office of Scientific Intelligence, CIA <u>Dr. Donald Chamberlain</u> Office of Scientific Intelligence, CIA
10.	2:15 - 2:30	Executive Session

NOT
TAKEN
UP

No Board book for this meeting.

DCI = 11:00
DIA = 11:30

~~TOP SECRET~~

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>
11.	2:30 - 4:00 11:00 - 12:55	Discussions with the Director of Central Intelligence Including Review of U. S. Intelligence Activities Relating to the Cuban and Berlin Situations <u>Mr. John McCone</u>
12.	4:00 - 4:15 4:30 - 5:15	Discussions with the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs <u>Mr. McGeorge Bundy</u>
13.	4:15 - 4:30	Board Review of U.S. Intelligence Activities in Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom <u>Mr. Coyne</u>
14.	4:30 - 5:00	Status Report on Implementation of Board Recommendations <u>Mr. Ash</u>
15.	5:00 - END	Discussion of Board Panel Assignments and Future Board Business <u>Board Personnel Only</u>

Due to absence from the country, Board members Langer and Pace will be unable to attend this meeting.

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

This document consists of 42 pages
No. 1 of 3 Copies, Series a

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Board Meeting of November 9, 1962 *file*

The Board convened in meeting at 9:00 a.m., on November 9, 1962, at the offices of the Board in the Executive Office Building. Dr. Baker presided as Acting Chairman in the absence of Dr. Killian. Board members Gray, Doolittle, Murphy and Clifford were present as were Mr. Coyne and the writer. (Messrs. Pace and Langer were out of the country at the time of this meeting. Illness prevented Dr. Land's attendance.)

Dr. Baker informed the Board that Messrs. Coyne and Ash had done a unique assembly of material for the Board's use in considering the intelligence aspects of the Soviet missiles buildup in Cuba. Dr. Baker expressed the view that the materials which had been assembled are far too complicated for the Board to consider in the course of only one day, and therefore the Board would look to Mr. Coyne and Mr. Gray for selective reporting to the Board concerning the highlights of the coverage which had been accomplished thus far in the Board's review of the Cuba situation.

Dr. Baker observed that the conflict involving Cuba is an intelligence conflict. The government does not know for sure the positions of anti-aircraft artillery units which are protecting the SA-2 sites in Cuba. Furthermore, intelligence is lacking on such elementary things as the support facilities which serve the SA-2 installations. Based on the intelligence which has been obtained, it appears that except for Moscow and Leningrad the island of Cuba is now equipped with the best air defense system in the world. It is possible that Cuba is now on the verge of insuring against invasion by reason of its possession of an assembly of the most dangerous armaments which have heretofore been collected in an area of that size. In the UN the United States is discussing inspection and surveillance proposals and positions which in Dr. Baker's view are a century out of date. Dr. Baker said that he does not know how much the President is aware of these things, but there is a serious proposal being discussed which would contemplate one or two inspections a month, whereas we well know that within 72 hours there can be made operational a most dangerous offensive capability.

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

Handle Via TALENT-KEYHOLE Channels

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

~~TOP SECRET~~

NW 185

DocId: 2500

Page 4

NW 88132

DocId:34671885 Page 5

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 6 -

Mr. Murphy wondered what specifically had caused the decision to be made to transfer from CIA to SAC the responsibility for reconnaissance of Cuba. Mr. Murphy thought that an understanding of the reasons for this shift of responsibility is important because the Board itself seemed to have been oblivious to developments which were of such a nature as to warrant the stepped-up coverage by SAC. Mr. Gray's comment on this was to the effect that he had noted an uncertainty in the past with regard to whether the problem of Cuba had been removed from the Board's area of responsibility. Mr. Gray recalled remarks by the Chairman at a Board meeting last summer indicating that the Cuba situation was being looked at elsewhere in Government. Therefore, Mr. Gray thought that if in fact the Board's responsibility extends to Cuba this should be made clear for the benefit of the Board. In Mr. Gray's opinion if the Board in fact had such a responsibility, then the Board should have been addressing itself to the implications of public statements such as those being made by Senator Keating and others, and particularly the statement by Senator Keating on October 10, 1962, that ballistic missile installations were being constructed in Cuba.

Acting Chairman Baker informed the Board that he had confirmed with the Chairman that the Chairman's remarks at the last summer's Board meeting were intended to convey that it was only in the NSC 5412/2 area that Cuba matters were being handled outside the purview of the Board.

Continuing, Mr. Gray said that it was a matter of personal regret to him that the public statements by Senators Keating, Humphry and others had not served to flag the situation.

Mr. Coyne said that following that line of reasoning he himself could be said to have been at fault. Mr. Coyne went on to point out in this connection that Senator Keating and others were speaking from the benefit of Executive Branch briefings which they had received, including General Carter's briefing of the Republican Policy Committee. In any case, the Senators had only information which was in the possession of the Executive Branch. Insofar as this information was based on foreign intelligence acquisitions, Mr. Coyne pointed out that all of the U.S. foreign intelligence agencies are under instruction and have an obligation to furnish the Board with all significant information derived from the foreign intelligence effort, and if such instructions and understandings were not in effect the Board would be in the position of having to dig out the intelligence information which the agencies are obligated to provide to the Board on a systematic basis. In the case of the developing Cuban situation, however, Mr. Coyne pointed out that a top level decision was made to give limited distribution of intelligence information on Cuba and the Board was excluded from those elements of the government which were designated to receive it.

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

Handle via BYEMAN

Handle Via TALENT-KEYHOLE Channels

Control System

~~TOP SECRET~~

NW 185

DocId: 2600

Page 5

NW 88192

DocId:34671885 Page 6

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 15 -

a periodic regional intelligence bulletin on Southeast Asia, and that consideration is being given to issuing similar regional intelligence bulletins for consumers in other areas. He described this particular recommendation as being a "good suggestion."

At this point Mr. Clifford, reverting to the discussion on the Hanson Baldwin matter, asked whether a separate investigative unit is being established as recommended by the Board, in lieu of the referral of leaks for investigation by the FBI. Mr. McCone responded that this matter is still under consideration; that in his own office he is prepared to set up such a unit; that he and the President feel this action must be taken; but that there is growing concern in some quarters that the creation of such a unit might ultimately lead to the establishment of some kind of internal Gestapo.

Mr. McCone next turned to the subject of Cuba. He said that in late July there was first witnessed an increased tempo of Soviet bloc shipments to Cuba, and by August the rate of shipments had more than doubled. On August 10, 1962 there was held a meeting of Principals (the President not participating) to discuss Cuban operations which had taken place during the preceding months of 1962. Up to that time there had been an exploratory intelligence effort primarily aimed at providing a basis for deciding what covert actions could be taken against the Castro regime. The results of this intelligence effort had been reflected in reports appearing in the Central Intelligence Bulletin and in items which were set forth in the Presidential Check List. At that time, Mr. McCone said, he analyzed the developments in Cuba as indicating (1) the establishment of a sophisticated SIGINT operation to be directed against our space activities at Camp Canaveral, (2) the establishment of a comprehensive air defense system, or (3) the introduction of a MRBM capability, or possibly all three. However, no one shared Mr. McCone's feeling that the Soviet activities in Cuba were directed toward the establishment of a ballistic missile capability. On the contrary, the Department of State and the Office of National Estimates within the CIA considered that such action by the Russians would be a departure from established Soviet policy.

Mr. McCone said that throughout August a careful watch was maintained with respect to developments in Cuba, and in late August the construction of SAM sites was detected. By August 23, when Mr. McCone left the country (on his honeymoon), there had been obtained photographic evidence of the construction of seven SAM sites together with evidence of extreme security measures being taken with respect to the unloading of ships at Cuban ports. These developments, Mr. McCone related, gave rise to considerable worry on his part,

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

~~TOP SECRET~~

Handle Via TALENT-KEYHOLE Channels

NW 1185

DocId:2500

Page 6

NW 88132

DocId:34671885 Page 7

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 16 -

and prior to his departure from the country, on August 23, he took the occasion on August 21, 22, and 23 to express his worry to the President and to the Secretary of Defense. Mr. McCone acknowledged that he had no positive evidence to support his concern, but he reasoned that the extensive air defense buildup which was underway in Cuba had as its immediate purpose the denial of the surveillance by the United States of the Soviet missile buildup in Cuba. The U-2 photography which was being obtained reflected that 26 SA-2 sites would be installed in Cuba. Mr. McCone observed that while the photography obtained at the time did not provide evidence of missile sites, a current review of that photography indicates the presence of tents and some construction equipment. Mr. McCone said that when he left the country on August 23, he instructed that a daily CIA bulletin be initiated at once with respect to Cuban developments, and he initiated issuance of this reporting after consultation with the USIB. When in September an incident was created by the U-2 which "wandered" over Soviet territory, and also when the U-2 was shot down over Communist China on September 9, these incidents caused Mr. McCone to be concerned. Nevertheless, overflights were ordered. It developed, however, that from September 17 to September 20, weather conditions would not permit the overflights of Cuba.

At about that time the Special NSC 5412/2 Group, as well as the CIA, became convinced that some risk was involved in the conduct of U-2 operations over Cuba. For that reason, Mr. McCone said, the flights which were scheduled were of a peripheral nature. Four flights were authorized and flown in late September and in early October, but because of their peripheral or semi-peripheral character they did not cover the western area of Cuba. Mr. McCone recalled that in early October there had been seen refugee reports concerning mysterious shipments being transported over Cuban roads, and there were other things of this nature reported by refugees.

As reflected in the SNIE dated September 19, 1962, Mr. McCone said that the USIB dismissed the possibility that MRBMs were being introduced into Cuba, and this view was based on the belief that such introduction would confront the USSR with so many difficulties that the action would not be undertaken. Mr. McCone said that he was in France when he received a summary of the SNIE, and he disagreed with its conclusions because he could not see why the Soviets were establishing such a comprehensive air defense system in Cuba unless this was being done to shield the island against U. S. surveillance and to protect the conduct of some clandestine operation.

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

Handle Via TALENT-KEYHOLE Channels

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

~~TOP SECRET~~

NW 185

DocId:2500

Page 7

NW 88132

DocId:34671885 Page 8

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 20 -

became greater. But even if this flight had been conducted, in Mr. McCone's opinion there would not at that time have been obtained information of a more convincing nature than was later obtained as a result of the October 14 mission. Mr. McCone said that on September 7 he made a recommendation that more frequent flights be conducted, and it continues to be Mr. McCone's view that there should have been more intense U-2 coverage during September.

Mr. Clifford asked why and from where was there concern over a possible U-2 incident involving Cuba. Mr. McCone said that this view was held within the NSC 5412 Group and in CIA as well. Mr. McCone said that he held a different view but he was away at the time. He cited as a current example of concern attaching to the possibility of U-2 incidents the fact that today the Special Group considered a U-2 flight over the China-India border, and great concern was expressed in the Group because the mission would have to include an overflight of Burma, and the prospect of the Burma overflight creating another U-2 incident was a matter of considerable sensitivity within the Group.

Mr. Clifford observed that while this concern might well be understandable in the case of Burma, he was nevertheless unable to understand why there should be a similar concern about reaction to a U-2 incident which might arise with respect to Cuba. Mr. McCone said that such concern with respect to Cuba does not exist today and, as a matter of fact, on that very day there were being conducted ten low-level and 3 U-2 missions against Cuba.

Mr. Clifford made the comment that he feared that the Board might possibly be subjected to criticism in the light of the fact that there was no photographic reconnaissance over Cuba between September 5 and October 14, despite the DCI's own suspicions and the content of refugee reports with respect to a Soviet missile buildup in Cuba.

Mr. Murphy inquired of Mr. McCone as to whether clandestine agents are being successfully operated in Cuba. Mr. McCone answered by saying that there have been three rather ineffective teams operating in Cuba with the principal objective of organizing dissidence against the Castro regime rather than obtaining intelligence. He said that there are approximately 40 third-country agents planted in various foreign embassies in Cuba, but we obtained no hard intelligence from them regarding the military buildup.

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

Handle Via TALENT-KEYHOLE Channels

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

~~TOP SECRET~~

could be reintroduced into Cuba as below-deck cargoes. Mr. Clifford thought that it would be a good idea to continue our surveillance in order to ascertain the destination of these ships and the disposition made of the missiles, and Mr. McCone said that we can probably track the ships into the Black Sea and the Baltic, but that we would not be able to cover the unloading and transshipment of missiles into Soviet ports.

Mr. Murphy wondered what had been the inspiration for the commitment not to invade Cuba. Mr. McCone supposed that this resulted from a Russian offer to do certain things in return for things which they asked for.

Mr. Clifford asked whether it is possible for the United States to develop intelligence sources in Cuba which would relieve our dependence upon photographic intelligence. Mr. McCone said that this is difficult to do primarily because Castro had instituted a police state in Cuba and, as an example of this, Mr. McCone cited the practice of the Castro regime in following a procedure whereby in effect the ration cards of the Cuban people serve as identification cards. Mr. McCone said that previously eight or nine teams of trained agents had been introduced into Cuba since April. Three of these teams remain in Cuba; the rest have been either killed or came back from their mission. Mr. McCone said that we have not been able to obtain much intelligence from these three teams because their principal activity has been to maintain their survival.

Mr. Clifford said that he found it hard to understand why the United States has not been able to develop intelligence sources within Cuba, a country situated only 90 miles away from the United States, and one with which we have enjoyed the friendliest relations for 60 years. Mr. McCone said that approximately 2000 Cubans are coming out of Cuba every week and at that rate practically all of the responsible Cubans have left the island. Mr. McCone said after the Bay of Pigs invasion an intelligence "paralysis" set in for a time. Then, in December 1961, the President and the Attorney General and Mr. McCone had discussions leading to the instigation of some operations in Cuba. Mr. McCone said that he was aghast to learn at that time there were no refugee interrogations being conducted, and so the interrogation center was established at Opalaka. He said that within CIA a 500-man task force was set up to work on the Cuba problem and disappointing results have been obtained. Mr. McCone said that

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

Handle Via TALENT-KEYHOLE Channels

Handle via DYEMAN
Control System

~~TOP SECRET~~

he is now concerned and he has had under review the question as to whether too much dependence is being placed on refugees as sources of information, and consideration is being given as to whether it may be necessary to send U. S. citizens into Cuba as intelligence agents. He said that we are not getting intelligence on Cuba through conventional means. Mr. Murphy observed that this is a salient point of interest to the Board. Mr. McCone repeated his concern which he had earlier expressed that even with the Soviet missiles removed, the Castro regime will continue to be a center of insurgency for Latin America, as indicated by the fact that during the recent days of the Cuban crisis orders were issued from within Cuba for the initiation of insurgency action in other Latin American countries.

At this point Mr. McCone's visit with the Board terminated and the Board recessed for lunch.

At 1:45 p.m., General Carroll, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, joined the Board meeting. General Carroll said that in an attempt to anticipate the specific matters in which the Board might be interested, he had prepared some materials regarding the Cuban situation over the period from last summer up to October 14 and thereafter. He said that the extreme pressures which had prevailed, and the requirement for daily presentations to top level officials concerning the progress of the Cuban situation, had made it impossible for him to complete a detailed survey up to this time, but that such a survey was in process within the DIA.

General Carroll began by describing briefly the role of the DIA's CIIC which was responsible for the coordination of intelligence regarding the Cuban situation. In July 1962, the CIIC reported on the increased Soviet shipping into Cuba. In August, reports were disseminated with regard to increasing introduction of Soviet materials. On September 8, the CIIC reported that the scope of the Soviet bloc assistance to Cuba suggested motives going beyond the lending of support and encouragement to the Castro regime. On August 15, in an effort to supply guidance and requirements for photographic reconnaissance, the DIA asked that the NPIC conduct a study and review of photographic intelligence which had previously been obtained with respect to three areas in Cuba. On August 17, photographic evidence indicated that SA-2 equipment was located in two of the three areas, although there was no evidence of deployment as yet. The next photographic mission flown on August 29 disclosed the presence of two SA-2 sites and the presence of a third site at Banes. Moreover, a study of the photographic evidence concerning the SA-2 sites,

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

Handle Via TALENT-KEYHOLE Channels

Handle via BYEMAN Control System

~~TOP SECRET~~