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## EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT (O/DCI)

## Routing Slip

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		✓		
2	DDCI		✓		
3	DD/RM				
4	DD/NFA				
5	DD/CT				
6	DD/A				
7	DD/O				
8	DD/S&T				
9	GC				
10	LC	✓			
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/PA				
14	D/EEO				
15	D/Pers				
16	AO/DCI				
17	C/IPS				
18	CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM				
19	RELEASE IN FULL				
20					
21	1999				
22					
		SUSPENSE DATE: 11 April 79			

## Remarks:

10: Also prepare DCI response

*[Signature]* Executive Secretary

4/2/79  
Date

3637 (4-78)

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM  
RELEASE IN FULL

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OLC 79-1192/1

Executive Registry

79-818/1

APR 5 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Legislative Counsel

FROM : S. D. Breckinridge  
Principal Coordinator, HSCA

SUBJECT : HSCA Correspondence


CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM  
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1999

1. Subsequent to our meeting on 30 March 1979 at which we expressed reservations with a hypercritical quality being interjected into the HSCA report, G. Robert Blakey has written a letter signed by himself to the Director. Essentially, it criticized my performance, which is certainly not as he would have wished it, as well as attempting to defend certain aspects of the investigation.

2. The Blakey letter is something of a "breach of protocol". Correspondence from the Committee, particularly on matters such as this, should come over the signature of the Committee Chairman. My first reaction is that it should be returned to the Chairman, not Mr. Blakey, with the statement that if he wishes to discuss it, the Director, in my company, will be happy to meet with the Chairman and Mr. Blakey.

3. Lyle Miller's reaction is that he suggest to Blakey that the letter be withdrawn. The basis for doing so is an apparent misunderstanding on the part of Blakey that our written comments from the HSCA drafts are subject to FOIA proceedings. Our agreement with Blakey was that the Agency will retain no copies of the various draft reports or of our written comments. Most of this material has been retrieved by the OLC Registry, and the rest will be retrieved following such comment that we may make on the final HSCA report. The point is that these were, by agreement with the Committee, not to become records; specifically that they would be destroyed.

4. I think that Mr. Miller should be authorized to make his first representation to Blakey about withdrawing the letter because of the matter of the draft reports and comments on them. If that fails, I recommend that my first view be implemented by observing procedural formalities with correspondence between the Committee and the Agency, by returning the letter to the Director to Chairman Stokes.



*S. D. Breckinridge*  
S. D. Breckinridge

#8

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~~Internal Use Only~~

APPROVAL:

/s/ Frank C. Carlson

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

6 APR 1979

Date

Distribution:

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77-818

## Select Committee on Assassinations

U.S. House of Representatives

3369 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

March 30, 1979

Admiral Stansfield Turner  
Director of Central Intelligence  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Admiral Turner:

Since the work of the Select Committee has come to a conclusion, I feel free to write you this letter and share with you a matter that has been troubling me for some time.

It is a matter concerning the character of the relationship between the Committee and the Agency, really since last spring, but particularly in recent months. As you know, the Committee has been sharing with the Agency drafts of materials covering the staff's analysis of the Agency's performance. This was done for the dual purpose of meeting the Agency's security concern and to give the Agency an opportunity to comment upon the accuracy of the staff's analysis. The Committee has received, in turn, a series of letters commenting on those materials. The thought has been that your files and ours will contain our drafts and the Agency's comments. Only part of this material has found its way into the Committee's Report. What I am concerned about is the quality of the historical record that has now been created by the Agency's comments on our drafts.

I note initially that the Agency's letters have been variously classified and unclassified. Some of my staff sees a troubling pattern of classified explanatory comments dealing with the Agency and unclassified critical comments dealing with our staff. In this connection, I would ask that this letter be included in any material that is released at any time by the Agency that includes Agency comments on our staff. To this degree, this letter should not be considered part of the material covered by Chairman Stokes' letter to you of March 26, 1979 dealing with Freedom of Information suits. If the other material is to be released, this letter, too, should be released. If the other material is not released, this letter should not be released, but should remain part of the historical record.

EXECUTIVE REGISTRY

FILE # Spec. Int. #8

Admiral Stansfield Turner  
March 30, 1979  
Page 2

By way of example, let me discuss some of the concerns raised by those letters. It has been suggested that our staff did not review all of the files that the Committee requested from the Agency. Our records do not support this conclusion. I recognize, of course, that our review of the Agency's materials at the end may have been more cursory than might have been desirable. Nevertheless, I observe that everything was not made available to us, at least in the beginning, with the dispatch that it was at the end, particularly after our hearings had begun. Consequently, it was not always possible for us to review the documents during the course of the investigation itself, and in a number of cases, our need for them had in fact passed by the time they were finally made available to us.

In addition, it has been suggested that we did not always interview the relevant people. For example, it was suggested to me that we never talked with the head of a particular station that played a central role in one aspect of our investigation. As I indicated at the time, this is incorrect. That particular head of station was not only interviewed extensively at the Agency, he was also a guest at a dinner party to which I was invited in Georgetown at the home of one of your liaison people. We had, at that time, as I suppose it was intended, a full and frank conversation that was of particular assistance to me in developing our work plans. I am suggesting, in short, that your records of the relationship between our staff and the Agency are not only incomplete, but inaccurate.

But even if your records are correct, I fail to perceive the ultimate point of the observation. Is it suggested that had we reviewed more documents we might have found evidence of the Agency's complicity in the assassination, or some indication that additional material that should have been made available to the Warren Commission had not been so made available? If neither of these points are at issue, and I don't think either is, I take it the point is little more than a gratuitous bureaucratic criticism.

Questions have also repeatedly been raised about the objectivity, competence and maturity of our staff members who have come in contact with Agency personnel and prepared staff reports. The position consistently taken in these letters is that there is only one interpretation of the evidence - the Agency's - and that any contrary viewpoint is subjective and incompetent. Here it is relevant to comment that it was particularly unwise on your part to appoint last spring the

Admiral Stansfield Turner  
March 30, 1979  
Page 3

principal author of the 1967 IG report and the 1977 staff study as the key liaison person between the Committee and the Agency. His performance was, in fact, one aspect of our investigation; he should not have had a role to play in it. I reject out of hand, moreover, any suggestion that our people were biased or incompetent. I concede the question of relative maturity, but I would ask you who but those who are professionally a part of the intelligence community are mature in the sense of experienced in your special world? I also note that ad hominem arguments such as these ought to play no part in the relationship between the Congress and the Executive. You have not found an example where this Committee suggested that Agency employees were biased, incompetent, immature, or even lacking in integrity. In virtually all cases, the Committee has focused its attention on the institutional performance of the Agency and the quality of its leadership. Individuals have been left out of our focus.

I note this particularly in the context of more than one occasion where your people were vulnerable to possible exploitation of this character by the Committee. You are personally aware of one incident involving one of your security officers, a matter that goes not to bias, competence or maturity, but to integrity. I note, too, that other sensitive questions were handled with discretion and an effort was made not to embarrass or interfere with the professional careers of your people.

It is this last consideration, in the context of a public release of the kind of letters that have been written over the past month or so, that leads me to write this letter. If the record is to be polluted, as it has been, I would not want my silence to be construed as consent to the false and baseless charges raised in the letters sent to the Committee.

I have waited to the end of our relationship to draw this matter to your attention, for I thought that a response during its course could only result in the further deterioration of the working relationship between the Agency and the Committee. I draw it to your attention now only for the sake of the historical record and to suggest to you, personally, that you ought to see to it in the future that a relationship such as this does not again develop between a congressional committee and the Agency. If the Committee had not exercised utmost restraint, this matter could have resulted in a relationship that worked

Admiral Stansfield Turner  
March 30, 1979  
Page 4

to the substantial disadvantage of the Agency, the Congress, the truth-finding process, and the confidence that the American people must have in their governmental institutions - both the Central Intelligence Agency and the House of Representatives.

Sincerely,



G. Robert Blakey  
Chief Counsel and Director

GRB:dm

APR 2 5 32 PM '79

EB

OLC/79-1192/2  
4 April 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: 30 March 1979 Letter From HSCA Staff Director

1. The following brief comments are offered on subject letter:

a. G. Robert Blakey has apparently forgotten the agreement that the HSCA draft reports and our written comments on them are to be destroyed. They were not to constitute records and as a result are not subject to FOIA proceedings. This procedure was agreed and, given the involvement of a congressional committee, one would assume that the arrangements protecting the papers from FOIA proceedings are reinforced. This consideration does not apply, of course, to the information that went into those comments on the HSCA drafts; where relevant and appropriate it can still be used in any final comments that the Agency may wish to make on the report.

b. It is correct as shown on page 2 that I have understood that Shackley had not been interviewed. Such an interview was not arranged through our staff, as required, and when I last spoke with Shackley, he had not been approached by the Committee. However, I cited it when talking to Blakey as a "for instance" but not the ones that were truly relevant to the disagreement that we have on the central issue. In that case, knowledge concerning the so-called "AMLASH Operation," the Committee has been told that it has relied on testimony of the person not competent to speak on the operation while the two officers who still live who were aware of it at that time were not interviewed.

c. The question of their reading all of the records that were made available to them may be somewhat esoteric at this point. When I assumed my role as Agency coordinator for the HSCA investigation in the second half of May 1978 there was considerable tension between the Committee and the Agency on responses by the Agency to HSCA requests. While I was getting new priorities in operation, I did state to the Committee people that they had failed to read, at that point, about 50% of the material made available. I have continued to remind them about this when the question arose from time to time; they made good progress because the volume of unreviewed material dropped to 40%, to 30% and finally to about 20%, although the total volume of material made available increased. The only relevancy of that fact at this point has to do with gratuitous implications that the Agency may have withheld records that it knew it had; in response to that, we have stated to them that they were not in a position to make that statement until they have read everything that was made available to them. They only need remove the gratuitous insult to obviate my challenge to their right to make it.



d. I have challenged the staff. When I assumed my position in this matter, I learned that they had accused Agency employees of lying and of being incompetent. Some of the investigators were aggressively arrogant and offensive. At that time, I judged one of my two responsibilities; the first one being improving Agency responses to requests. The other was to change the style with which the investigators felt free to address the Agency; I could not do this without being blunt.

Agency personnel expressed considerable difficulty responding to questions by the investigators. When specific data on specific individuals was asked there was little difficulty in locating files but sweepingly general requests were useless as a basis for research. We were never entirely sure of whether they were unable to phrase better questions, or were trying to cast such a sweeping net that they could say they asked for everything, or whether they were trying to conceal their line of investigation by not revealing what it was. We like to think that they learned to ask better questions as a result of our persistence, but that they did it badly was a real part of some of the trouble that we had with the Committee.

Our impression has been that there is a hypercritical quality to some of the treatment in the report. In some instances it has been based on a highly selective and sometimes erroneous use of factual information. I believe that the Committee is entitled to make its criticisms and I also believe that the Agency is entitled to be critical of unbalanced criticism. There is a personal quality to our critique of some of the work by the Committee staff although we have generalized in commenting on the quality of the staff work. There is little question that some of the young investigators got on hobby-horses and developed a sense of personal compliment in some of the theories that they developed, however shakey the basis. Our communications with senior staff members as distinguished from the junior members who didn't communicate at all, was that we found ourselves on a one-way street that we traveled along without much dialogue. Quite frankly, I didn't think I got their attention, really, until I told Blakey last Friday that some of the more extreme sentiments in the report may provoke public criticism of the report. His letter follows that.

e. I think Blakey has a point as to whether I should have been assigned to this work. I was one of the two authors of the 1967 IG Report and I am responsible for much of the writing in the 1977 Task Force Report, all on the subject of assassinations. While the 1967 and 1977 studies were not part of the Warren Commission investigation, they were certainly on related subject matters. As a result of my experience I have some fairly firm views about what happened, and where we did well and where we did not; my views in the latter are largely incorporated in the 1977 study.

f. Blakey is correct to cite the embarrassing incident involving the officer assigned in the CIA work area in the HSCA offices. The Committee handled this with considerable compassion and discretion and expressions of appreciation have been made. The Committee also handled with considerable discretion the testimony by an Agency employee who had knowledge about the Martin Luther King assassination, a result of activities prior to his Agency employment. I wrote a personal note of appreciation to Blakey on this score. Finally, as recorded clearly in the testimony of the DDCI, their record on security has been outstanding; this has continued in the writing of the final report.

2. Blakey and I did not have the opportunity to establish relations under the most desirable conditions. The tensions in the investigation at the time I became involved directly led me to take certain positions that were unpalatable to Blakey. Were I in his position, I would resent some of it, but were I in his position I would have taken steps to control the course of it, which I think he failed to do.



S. D. Breckinridge  
Principal Coordinator, HSCA

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