

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

OLC 76-3094
27 October 1976



MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Relationships with House Select Committee
on Assassinations

1. This proposes a course of action to undertake with the Select Committee.

2. Discussion

a. In looking to the road ahead, which may well eventually prove bumpy for reasons beyond our control, it is absolutely imperative that we fortify ourselves with the Committee so that they have the most positive attitude towards our desire to be cooperative. The simplest way to do this is to put ourselves in their shoes, anticipating what we can do for them to ease their work.

b. Whatever merits there are to a passive course (waiting for specific requests), it is much less likely to create the positive attitude which can be of such significance in the long run.

c. Although we can't anticipate the Committee's complete line of inquiry, certain lines can be, and if we do, and facilitate their work as a result, we will have earned their respect and proved our willingness to cooperate. More importantly, we will have created a climate conducive to their objective viewing of problems which will eventually arise. Finally, and practically, any other approach will only feed their apprehension over our real willingness to cooperate.

3. Proposal

a. Inventory - Provide the Committee an inventory of the kinds of material we may have on hand and in which we may safely presume they have an interest, e.g., collections on John Kennedy and Martin Luther King, material made available to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the Warren Commission, the Rockefeller Commission, Agency responses to related Freedom of Information requests, and related IG and other conclusionary reports. (This inventory should be sized for them, how big, and recommendations

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on how to approach its review.)

b. Material - Offer the Committee copies of those collections which do not present a security problem.

c. Briefings - Offer introductory background briefings on lines of inquiry concerning (a) above, as well as other areas where it could be helpful to them and could also help to place events and developments in perspective, e.g., the general purpose of our past involvement with anti-Castro groups.

With the preceding in hand, with suggestions on the size of the job (e.g., the number of man-hours required to review the material and recommendations on how to get into it, etc.), and with the offer of introductory briefings on our collections and some of the central issues, we should be in the strongest possible position for exacting from the Committee the prerequisite quid pro quos on security and other matters in which we have strong equities.

4. The credibility of our effort depends upon assurance that those in the Agency working in this area have full access to all relevant information. We must not operate on less than a full and complete informational base. It is requested that the Working Group established under the chairmanship of Scott Breckinridge, Deputy Inspector General, seek to satisfy on an expeditious basis the requirement set forth in paragraph 3 above.


Lyle L. Miller
Deputy Legislative Counsel

Distribution:

- 1 - DCI
- 1 - DDCI
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- 1 - Scott Breckinridge
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OLC:LLM:ndl (27 October 1976)

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INSPECTOR GENERAL

IG 76-3249
11/2

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
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