

KX 88-7223 PAGE THREE CLEAR

TENNESSEE PRISON NUMBER 65907. CURRENTLY SERVING SENTENCES OF 63 TO 65 YEARS FOR FELONIOUS ASSAULT, GRAND LARCENY AND FIRST DEGREE MURDER.

EARL HILL. WHITE, MALE, DOB [REDACTED] ERWIN, TENNESSEE, SINGLE, 5'6", 135 POUNDS, BLACK HAIR, GREEN EYES, COMPLEXION MEDIUM, SCAR TOP RIGHT HAND. EDUCATION 8TH GRADE.

P11

DAVID LEE POWELL, NEGRO MALE, AGE 23, DOB [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] CLARKSVILLE, MISSISSIPPI, 6'1", 158 POUNDS, HAIR BLACK, EYES BROWN, TATTOO OF HEART WITH "CM" LEFT UPPER ARM.

P11

LARRY EDWARD HACKER, WHITE MALE, 32 YEARS OLD, 6'1", 170 POUNDS, ACNE SCARS ON FACE, TATTOOS OF SPIDER ON LEFT HAND AND "LARRY" ON RIGHT FOREARM. DOB [REDACTED], EYES GRAY, HAIR BROWN, RESIDENCE: HAMILTON, OHIO.

P11

DONALD RAY CAYLOR, WHITE MALE, 5'6", 130 POUNDS, BROWN HAIR, BROWN EYES, FAIR COMPLEXION, DOB [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] KNOXVILLE, TENNESSEE, TWO INCH SURGICAL SCAR ON

P11

KX 88-7223 PAGE FOUR CLEAR

LEFT FOREHEAD.

ARMED AND EXTREMELY DANGEROUS.

BT

K

NFI313 1631647 KNC546 1816

PP AFD

DE KX

P 121615Z JUN 77

FM KNOXVILLE (83-7223) (P)

TO DIRECTOR AND ALL CONTINENTAL SACS PRIORITY

BT

CLEAR

✓ JAMES EARL RAY, AKA - FUGITIVE, "TEN MOST WANTED FUGITIVE";

UFAC - ESCAPE; CONSPIRACY; OO: KNOXVILLE

PAUL VENNINGER, SECRET SERVICE, KNOXVILLE, ADVISED  
TODAY CHARLES GOODWIN, DUTY PRESS AIDE, WHITE HOUSE,  
WASHINGTON, D.C., ADVISED HE RECEIVED ANONYMOUS CALL  
WHICH STATED "JAMES EARL RAY CAN BE REACHED AT 574-7327  
RPT 574-7327".

ALL OFFICES, DETERMINE IF EXCHANGE 574 IS WITHIN  
YOUR DIVISION. IDENTIFY SUBSCRIBER AND IF RAY IS AT  
THAT LOCATION.

KNOXVILLE HAS DETERMINED THAT EXCHANGE 574 IS NOT  
A TENNESSEE EXCHANGE.

BT

44-268-208

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
JUN 1 1977	
FBI - NORFOLK	

*Armed* *RM*

*SP*

NF0331 163160209

K

NFI313 1631647 KX0546 1631616

PP AFD

DE KX

P 121615Z JUN 77

FM KNOXVILLE (88-7223) (P)

TO DIRECTOR AND ALL CONTINENTAL SACS PRIORITY

BT

CLEAR

JAMES EARL RAY, AKA - FUGITIVE, "TEN MOST WANTED FUGITIVE";

UFAC - ESCAPE; CONSPIRACY; OO: KNOXVILLE

PAUL NENNINGER, SECRET SERVICE, KNOXVILLE, ADVISED  
TODAY CHARLES GOODWIN, DUTY PRESS AIDE, WHITE HOUSE,  
WASHINGTON, D. C., ADVISED HE RECEIVED ANONYMOUS CALL  
WHICH STATED "JAMES EARL RAY CAN BE REACHED AT 574-7327  
RPT 574-7327".

ALL OFFICES, DETERMINE IF EXCHANGE 574 IS WITHIN  
YOUR DIVISION. IDENTIFY SUBSCRIBER AND IF RAY IS AT  
THAT LOCATION.

KNOXVILLE HAS DETERMINED THAT EXCHANGE 574 IS NOT  
A TENNESSEE EXCHANGE.

BT

44-268-208

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
JUN 1 1977	
FBI - NORFOLK	

*[Handwritten signature]*

WFI345 164231S KX0327 1642244

PP AFD

DE KK

P 132240Z JUN 77

FM KNOXVILLE (88-7223) (P)

TO DIRECTOR AND ALL SACS PRIORITY

BT

CLEAR

DONALD RAY CAYLOR; LARRY EDWARD HACKER; EARL HILL, JR.;

DAVID LEE POWELL; JAMES EARL RAY; DOUGLAS SMELTON - 88-5170

FUGITIVE; CONSPIRACY TO VIOLATE UFAC - ESCAPE. OO:  
KNOXVILLE.

TITLE CHANGED TO DELETE FUGITIVE FROM SUBJECTS  
CAYLOR, HILL AND RAY.

RE KNOXVILLE TELETYPE JUNE 12, 1977.

THE FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED  
JUNE 13, 1977. JAMES EARL RAY WAS APPREHENDED BY CORRECTION  
AUTHORITIES AT APPROXIMATELY 2:15 AM, JUNE 13, 1977, IN  
A MOUNTAINOUS AREA APPROXIMATELY ELEVEN MILES FROM BRUSHY

44-268-209

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
JUN 13 1977	
FBI - NORFOLK	

Arnold

1CC 88-5170

PAGE TWO KX 88-7223 CLEAR

MOUNTAIN STATE PRISON (MSMP).

INVESTIGATION BY BUREAU AGENTS AND ANDERSON COUNTY, TENNESSEE, DEPUTY SHERIFFS DETERMINED THAT INDIVIDUAL FITTING CAYLOR'S DESCRIPTION HAD POSSIBLY STOLEN A PICKUP TRUCK FROM A VILLAGE NEAR THE PRISON. A BROADCAST WAS PUT OUT ON THIS TRUCK AND IT WAS LATER WRECKED AT A ROADBLOCK NEAR OAK RIDGE, TENNESSEE, WITH THE DRIVER ESCAPING.

BUREAU AGENT TELEPHONICALLY CONTACTED OAK RIDGE, TENNESSEE, TO APPRISE THEM OF THE ABOVE INFORMATION, AND DONALD RAY CAYLOR WAS APPREHENDED BY OAK RIDGE, TENN., P.D. AS RESULT OF THIS INFORMATION.

PRISON AUTHORITIES STATE SUBJECT SHELTON ONLY REMAINING FUGITIVE IS IN A MOUNTAIN APPROXIMATELY TEN MILES FROM THE PRISON, AND THAT THEY ARE FEEDING THEIR DOGS AND HAVE THE MOUNTAIN SURROUNDED. PRISON AUTHORITIES STATE THEIR FORCES PLAN TO ATTEMPT TO APPREHEND SHELTON PM, JUNE 13, 1977.

SAC RELEASED ALL SPECIAL AGENTS ASSIGNED FROM OTHER DIVISIONS.

KNOXVILLE SPECIAL AGENTS DEPARTED PRISON PREMISES.

PAGE THREE KXBB-7223 CLEAR

DAILY TELETYPE SUMMARY BEING DISCONTINUED.

INVESTIGATION TO LOCATE SKELTON CONTINUING.

ARMED AND DANGEROUS.

BT

TRANSMIT VIA: Airtel

PRECEDENCE: \_\_\_\_\_

CLASSIFICATION: \_\_\_\_\_

DATE: 8/16/77

To: SAC, Albany

From: Director, FBI

INVESTIGATIVE PROGRAMS  
MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVES (MBO)  
FUGITIVE MATTERS

Reference Knoxville airtel, 7/25/77.

Enclosed herewith for each office is one copy of referenced communication which was submitted to the Bureau at its request. SAC, Knoxville's critique of the recent James Earl Ray manhunt hopefully will prove useful to all divisions in similiar operations. It should be noted that certain suggestions made of the Bureau are not being forwarded in this enclosure but are being considered separately.

Enclosure

2 - All other offices

(This line for LEFT MARGIN.)

(Do not type BEYOND THIS MARGIN.)

(Do not type below this line.)

44-268-210

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
AUG 17 1977	
FBI-NORFOLK	

FBI/DOJ



FBI

Date: 7/25/77

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_  
(Type in plaintext or code)Via A I R T E L A I R M A I L  
(Precedence)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI  
FROM: SAC, KNOXVILLE (67-16390)  
INVESTIGATIVE PROGRAMS  
MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVES (MBO)  
FUGITIVE MATTERS

Re Bureau airtel to Knoxville, 6/15/77.

The purpose of this critique is to acquaint FBI Headquarters and other divisions with the experience Knoxville has acquired in directing extensive terrain searches, highlighting both successful techniques and problems encountered, and to recommend courses of action that would hopefully prove useful to other field divisions.

There are four situations a field division can be faced with when conducting a terrain search. In order of increasing complexity, there are: 1) the FBI field office alone; 2) the FBI field office with Agent personnel from other divisions; 3) the FBI field office with local law enforcement agencies, both state and local; and 4) the FBI field office with SA personnel from other divisions and representatives of other Federal and local law enforcement agencies.

The recent JAMES EARL RAY special provided Knoxville with the opportunity of working with the most complex of the four basic situations, and we believe an analysis of the lessons learned from this experience should be of benefit to all field divisions. We hope that a review of the Knoxville Division's experience will assist other field divisions in developing a standard operating procedure (SOP) which can then be tailored to meet the needs of any situation faced by a particular division.

2 - Bureau  
1 - Knoxville

HCS/nls

(3)

Approved: \_\_\_\_\_ Sent \_\_\_\_\_ M Per \_\_\_\_\_  
Special Agent in Charge

KX 67-16390

When JAMES EARL RAY and five other co-escapees escaped from Brushy Mountain State Prison (BMSP), Petros, Tennessee, they precipitated what has been described as the most massive manhunt in the history of the State of Tennessee. This operation included FBI Agents from four field divisions, the Tennessee Highway Patrol, deputies from three counties, Tennessee prison guards, and numerous officers from local surrounding police departments.

Our experience in the JAMES EARL RAY manhunt caused us to identify six areas of particular concern that each field division should be aware of. These are: command and communications, organization and supply, liaison, and media. To a lesser, but no less important, extent, Knoxville Division has gained experience in the use of Bloodhounds and aircraft.

The remainder of this critique will discuss problems encountered and suggested solutions in each of these areas.

#### I. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS

I feel the most important facet of any fast-breaking, major situation is the ability of those in charge to receive up-to-date, reliable information and use it to formulate courses of action. Concurrent with this is the necessity to get instructions from the Special Agent in Charge to the Agents participating in the operation. From the outset in the JAMES EARL RAY operation, the Knoxville Division experienced difficulty in maintaining communications. The extremely mountainous terrain and physical location of only one repeater gave us partial communication on Channel 1 and 5 and no communication on Channel 4. The only factor that kept communication open was the presence of aircraft provided with Bureau radios. The personnel in the aircraft were able to relay messages between the command post (CP) and the various search teams.

Apart from the need for an effective, reliable radio system, other communications problems were identified. Immediately upon our arrival at BMSP, our radios

KX 67-16390

were set up in the prison communications room and operations center. Due to the size of this room the FBI CP had to be positioned in a different location. Other agencies participating in the search had their CP's at different locations, and it became immediately apparent that no real attempt had been made to coordinate the activities of all the police agencies into one unified effort. After the SAC took the initiative to seek out the leaders of the various agencies at the scene, the confusion and duplication of effort was somewhat reduced.

Although this case was complicated by political considerations, (i.e., the hostility of the Governor of the State of Tennessee toward the FBI) and resultant lack of cooperation on the part of prison leadership with the Knoxville Division, a valuable lesson was learned. In any situation involving representatives of numerous law enforcement agencies, a centralized CP should be set up and communications established with all agencies. This CP would serve as the briefing point for the SAC and the leaders of the various agencies and would also serve as the communications center.

Another command problem encountered by the Knoxville Division and unique only to smaller divisions is the small number of supervisory personnel available. During the initial night, the Special Agent in Charge, ASAC, and one of the two supervisors from the Knoxville Headquarters were on duty. This resulted in having only one supervisor replacement the following day and resulted in the SAC, ASAC, and supervisors having to work unduly long shifts. While this is creditable, it is not practical, as long hours worked in tense situations can lead to errors in judgment. We learned that although it is not possible to predict how long a situation such as this will continue, one important factor is to immediately set up a duty roster, and no matter how interesting the situation may be, either to supervisors or Agents, off-duty personnel must be required to adhere to the duty schedule so that they can be fresh in the event the operation continues for several days. A 12-hour shift system for non-supervisory Agent personnel was set up the first night for all Agent participants, and we

KX 67-16390

were able to make-do with a relatively smaller number of Agents for a longer period of time. An additional effect discovered was that the impact on morale was very positive, as Agents were more prone to undertake arduous and exacting tasks knowing that in 12 hours they would be relieved and able to get some sleep.

## II. ORGANIZATION AND SUPPLY

The need for adequate organization and equipment is magnified when conducting an operation at some distance from the Headquarters Office in sparsely populated areas. The Knoxville Division initially recognized that the manpower limitations of the Knoxville Office prevented us from conducting the search with only our assigned Agent complement, subsequently, 20 Agents were requested from other divisions. The first organizational requirement was to set up a duty roster, integrating Knoxville Agents who were familiar with the local area with Agent personnel from other field divisions. Since SWAT teams were furnished by the other divisions, one aspect of the organization was to maintain individual SWAT team integrity as much as possible. This enhanced our command and control structure, as the SWAT team concept provides a team leader who is readily integrated into a chain of command. We also found it desirable to maintain SWAT team integrity purely as a matter of morale, as each team possessed a certain esprit de corps. When it became necessary to break up a SWAT team, we did so on a rotation basis and allowed that team to function as a unit on their next scheduled shift.

Another concern is a problem insofar only as the result. Due to the caliber of the individual FBI Agent, practically any one Agent was capable of leading an operation such as this. This lead to certain problems, such as Agents assigned to somewhat less exciting tasks than others later yielding to the urge to go to the scene of the action. This problem can be overcome by training and through the use of more effective communications.

By using the shift concept in the operation, everyone was able to be briefed fully on the current situation. Each shift would receive a briefing from the CP and also

KX 67-16390

up-to-date information from the shift being relieved. In this manner we were able to capitalize immediately on problems confronting individual search teams and brief incoming personnel on changes in the situation.

Another problem which kept recurring was the tendency of Agents not assigned to the special to react to messages and CP communications that they monitored on their car radios. Again, this is not a negative problem, but rather a positive one, that required special handling to keep from dampening the enthusiasm of the individual Agent. The problem manifested itself, however, when the FBI CP had assigned tasks and believed that it knew where all Agent personnel were, only to be surprised to find out that Agents not even on duty were at certain locations. To preclude this, we learned that all Agents must be required to report to the field CP, rather than to the Headquarters Office, for instructions. Although there were supervisory personnel at the Knoxville Headquarters and reports were incoming from the CP, experience taught us that the SAC and the CP leader, at the scene of the operation, are more informed of minute-by-minute changes in the situation and can, therefore, more effectively assign duties and tasks. By having each Agent report to the CP, we were also able to be kept advised of all Agent participants in the operation.

During the JAMES EARL RAY operation, physical limitations forced us to use our CP as a staging and briefing area for the Agents going on shift duty. This is not a desirable situation, as it tends to create unnecessary confusion and also causes representatives of other law enforcement agencies to believe that the CP location is a "private" area for the FBI, and that they should not enter this area.

Logistics and supply are also a most important part of an operation involving large numbers of people over prolonged periods of time. The JAMES EARL RAY case did not cause any insurmountable logistical problems, as the BMSP furnished all items such as food, water, and other necessities. This may not often be the case, however, and each field office should be prepared to conduct independent operations.

KX 67-16390

Provisions should be made for such items as food, water, gasoline, special clothing to suit the terrain, and even such unlikely items as medical support. An example of the need for medical support was recently seen by this division when an Agent got Hypothermia during the WILLIAM BRADFORD BISHOP fugitive investigation, which took place in the Great Smoky Mountains National Park. Hypothermia is a reaction from exposure to extreme cold without adequate protection. The Knoxville Division has found that medical support is readily available from Civil Defense groups.

It is not practical to list individual items of supply that should be made available to assist the Agents in an operation such as this. Each field office would have to develop a list more suitable to its geographic location, i.e., desert, tundra, swamp, or mountains. This is not to minimize the importance of those items or the necessity of advanced preparation. It is one thing to be a little uncomfortable in a street surveillance or arrest situation because one forgot a raincoat or missed lunch, but it is quite another thing to be inadequately prepared when operating in hazardous terrain during extremes of weather. Improper clothing, equipment, fatigue, or hunger can result in serious injury.

Many items can be provided by each Agent and kept on hand in some type of emergency kit. However, some items are more suitable for purchase and stockpiling by the individual field division. Items in this category are an adequate supply of topographical maps, snake bite kits, canteens, emergency blankets, and emergency rations.

Another facet of the supply problem is that a system of rapid issue and accountability of office equipment must be devised. During any fast-moving situation, the question of who has a particular radio or weapon becomes greatly complicated when personnel from several different divisions are involved, and Agents are using the same equipment on different shifts. Our recommendation is to have each item of equipment marked with the initials of the particular division to which it belongs. These initials should be etched on all items of equipment and would greatly assist in the after operation cleanup of equipment.

KX 67-16390

Insofar as accountability for individual items, this office is studying the use of gummed labels and a "laundry ticket" type of arrangement to rapidly issue out and later establish accountability for each item of equipment. The "laundry ticket" would be some form of tag that would be attached to each serially numbered item of equipment and would have a detachable portion. This detachable portion would be similarly marked to the tag. It would then become an easy matter for the person issuing the equipment to place the initials of the individual receiving the item of equipment on the bottom detachable portion, and then at a later more convenient time, establish a list of which Agent received which item of equipment. (This is particularly important in an office where manpower is limited, and a man cannot be spared just to account for equipment.)

### III. LIAISON

Liaison is of such importance that it is given a separate section in this critique. Liaison can be divided into two segments, "Pre-operation" and "Operation." By pre-operation we mean that time before an operation is ever called for. During this phase, the field office should be establishing SOP's with every law enforcement agency within its division. We learned that some confusion arose during the initial phase of the RAY investigation, and much valuable time was lost in establishing liaison with prison guards, Tennessee Highway Patrol, and other agencies. Planning conferences are one logical step to preclude this from happening again.

Liaison during the operation phase would then be just a simple step of implementing pre-arranged SOP's. Operations liaison should include FBI representatives, with appropriate communication equipment, in the communication centers of each participating law enforcement agency. These Agents would be able to help the flow of command communications between the SAC and the appropriate responsible leader of the other agency. Additionally, liaison personnel from each agency would be designated for the FBI CP. This would result in having persons familiar with the local situation, as well as local personalities, available

KX 67-16390

to the SAC to assist him in his command and control responsibilities. The liaison persons would be getting the overall picture of developments in the operation and would be able to serve as "advocates" of particular plans, as they would more readily understand where their department or agency fit into the overall operational plan.

#### IV. MEDIA

Mass media response to major cases such as the escape of JAMES EARL RAY and six inmates from Brushy Mountain State Prison, Petros, Tennessee, on 6/10/77; as well as the MAROB, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve Center burglary; WILLIAM BRADFORD BISHOP fugitive matter; BILLY DEAN ANDERSON Top Ten Fugitive investigation; and the Kodak, Tennessee, BR- Murder case of 4/9/77, offered challenges to relatively smaller divisions such as Knoxville which may not concern a larger division where manpower may not be a critical factor. In this size office where at times manpower may be further depleted by in-service training, annual and sick leave, or Agents absent on specials in other divisions, every man available is needed on the scene of a fast-breaking investigation.

The presence of the SAC and the CP Coordinator on the scene directing the investigation is also imperative in these cases of major importance, thus normally leaving only remaining members of the supervisory staff and the media relations coordinator to cope with all Bureau communications and the flood of inquiries from local, national, and, on occasion, international media representatives.

The following represents observations of Knoxville Headquarters personnel which may be of benefit to other field offices which find themselves in a similar situation:

- 1) We have found it imperative to immediately contact clerical personnel to man the office switchboard on a 24-hour basis, if necessary. Incoming calls from media representatives can thus be directed to appropriate



KX 67-16390

telephones within the office or placed on "hold" until someone is available to speak with the caller. During many of the cases cited above, particularly the JAMES EARL RAY matter, Knoxville switchboard operators observed that media callers, both national and international, seemed understanding and relatively patient with delays in speaking with headquarters staff when the backlog of calls was explained by the switchboard operator.

2) In virtually all instances, prepared releases, either typed or handwritten, have been utilized to assure uniformity in the news release by headquarters personnel. In prolonged cases such as the Kodak BR - Murder; the MAROB, USMC Reserve Center burglary; as well as the RAY escape, releases were "updated" periodically. For example, during the RAY matter, six separate releases were prepared, thus providing up-to-date information relative to arrests of RAY and other escapees.

3) Due to the volume of media inquiries, no effort was made during some of the above named investigations to phone releases directly to local media which is a normal practice; however, local radio, television, and newspapers have made personal and telephonic inquiry and obtained available information at Knoxville Headquarters. Media representatives making the inquiries have indicated understanding that the volume of incoming inquiry by the media precludes individual calls to them or return calls when an "update" release is prepared.

4) In prolonged investigation such as the Kodak BR - Murder and the RAY case, the Knoxville Division has found that it is necessary to have media response personnel in headquarters around the clock; therefore, 12-hour shifts have been utilized.

5) In fast-moving investigations where fugitives are involved such as the RAY case, photographs made available by Knoxville to press and television are not delivered to them due to the scarcity of manpower. However, logical media are advised of the availability of photographs, and media representatives who desire the material have shown

KX 67-16390

resourcefulness in obtaining those available photographs from Knoxville Headquarters at all hours of the day.

6) Many telephonic inquiries received at Knoxville Headquarters during recent high publicity investigations (over 200 calls estimated during the RAY escape matter) have been noted to be calls from the media which has representation on the scene of the investigation, but who desire only to confirm some minor bit of copy received from their representative such as the spelling of a name, a time of occurrence of the crime involved, or a time of apprehension. That type inquiry has been handled from information available in releases and "updates" and is, therefore, not as time consuming as inquiries requesting all release material, as well as "updates."

7) The Knoxville Division has numerous rural publications printing on weekly or bi-weekly basis. On occasion of inquiry and request by that type of media, where deadlines may not be for several days, typed copies of releases and "updates" have been furnished to them by mail by Knoxville Headquarters.

8) Although tapes of releases being made on these cases are given both telephonically and personally upon appearance of the media at Knoxville Headquarters, all requests for question and answer-type tapes or interviews are referred by Knoxville Headquarters staff to the SAC located at the Command Post on the scene of the particular investigation in progress. No requests in these matters have been received at the Knoxville Headquarters Office for live television appearances; however, such requests would also be referred to the SAC, where the majority of television media are normally gathered.

#### V. BLOODHOUNDS

The use of Bloodhounds has proved to be of great assistance in the location of fugitives and other fleeing subjects. However, like any investigative aid, they have limitations as well as tremendous potential. We have found

KX 67-16390

that Bloodhounds, in conjunction with SWAT teams and aircraft, can keep a fugitive on the run in a contained area and prevent the fugitive from hiding or resting. So long as the searchers have the ability to be rotated to provide adequate rest time, they will eventually force the fugitive to become overly tired and more liable to capture.

One problem this division has encountered in the use of Bloodhounds was that Agents were unfamiliar with the limitations of their use. The scene of escape or last known location of a fugitive; for example, disturbed ground at an embankment which would indicate that a person had slid over this, must be kept as relatively untouched as possible to preserve the scene and enable the dog to track the fugitives, rather than being confused with conflicting scents.

Communications between the dog team and the Agents utilizing aircraft are a necessity. We learned that in dense terrain, it is sometimes difficult, if not impossible, for the air unit to locate the tracking unit. Although we have not tried the technique, we believe that an arrangement utilizing equipment similar to a globe tracking unit would be practical. The dog team could have the MCST beeper which would enable the aircraft unit to fix its position in dense underbrush.

The Knoxville Division has a Special Clerk who is a trained Bloodhound handler, and as a result, we are able to incorporate training in the use of Bloodhounds in our scheduled firearms sessions. It is suggested that those divisions that do not have such trained personnel should locate a trained handler and request that he conduct such training.

Bloodhounds are also effective for other uses, for example, during a recent bank robbery investigation a getaway car was located in an open field near a dense woods, and it was not known whether the subject went into the woods or back to the main road. The Bloodhounds were able to take the track of the subject back to the highway.

KX 67-16390

We were thus able to save valuable investigative time and manpower resources by not having to search the forest.

## VI. AIRCRAFT

Use of aircraft, both fixed wing and helicopter, adds a new dimension to our investigative techniques. Their use is extremely versatile and in manhunt situations such as the RAY case, their employment served three main purposes: containment, radio relay, observation and detection of subjects.

During the JAMES EARL RAY special, this division was able to keep an aircraft flying almost constantly. The Knoxville Division used a rented, private plane, manned by two Special Agent pilots, a UH1B helicopter provided by the Knoxville, Tennessee, Police Department, and an aircraft furnished by the Alexandria Division. Because of communication difficulties mentioned earlier, the aircraft were utilized, in addition to their search assignments, to relay radio messages between the command post and the various search teams.

Aircraft are advantageous for other reasons. Examples of this would be that the aircraft helps to locate and fix the position of ground tracking teams, and that interview of captured fugitives where aircraft have been utilized has shown the psychologically demoralizing effect of constantly hearing an aircraft in the air.

Considerations regarding the employment of aircraft should include plans to insure adequate pilots are available to rotate the crews of the aircraft, and that flight schedules are coordinated to insure that at least one aircraft is in the air at all times.

A thorough briefing on the situation for the aircraft crews is essential. The limits of the search area needed to be defined and suspect areas pin-pointed as well as logical avenues of escape. The location and direction of tracking dog teams in the last known direction of travel of the subjects needs to be known as the aircraft can work closely with the dog teams and search

KX 67-16390

parties by flying out in front of the dog teams to detect or contain the subject as well as closely work over areas subject is believed to be located.

In summary, a terrain search involving large amounts of personnel over long durations of time is a very complicated operation, requiring extensive prior planning and training. The Knoxville Division recommends the following courses of action, which are currently within the capability of each field division:

- 1) Develop standard operating procedures. Each field division can draw on its own resources of trained personnel, such as supervisory staff, SWAT team members, firearms Agents, pilots, and former military officers, to develop standard operating procedures and equipment lists to be used in the event of the necessity of sustained field operations. Concurrent with this planning, conferences can be arranged with logical law enforcement agencies to establish liaison and develop SOP's with these agencies.

- 2) Training. To further prepare itself for large scale future operations, each field office can incorporate into its firearms training program such things as the use of Bloodhounds and aircraft. Certain specialized training can be arranged within Federal or state park systems. The Knoxville Division has currently arranged for the Park Rangers at the Great Smoky Mountains National Park at Gatlinburg, Tennessee, to take Knoxville SWAT teams on a three-day exercise in the mountains. In addition to familiarizing Agents with the skills necessary to operate in hazardous terrain, we plan to refine our tracking and searching technique by incorporating Bloodhounds and aircraft into this exercise.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : SAC, NORFOLK (44-268)

FROM : ASAC PHILIP F. ENLOW

SUBJECT: MURKIN

DATE: 10/17/77

At 2:00 PM, today, Deputy Chief ERNEST TOWE, Norfolk PD, telephonically advised that MARTIN LUTHER KING, SR., would be arriving at the Norfolk Airport at 4:30 PM, 10/18/77. Rev. KING is to speak to a Chaplains Conference at Holiday Inn-Scope at 8:15 PM that evening. According to Chief TOWE, this is a closed conference.

Rev. KING is scheduled to depart Norfolk Airport Wednesday at 10:00 AM.

Deputy Chief TOWE advised that the Norfolk PD was providing a security detail.

✓ PFE:gfh  
(1)



5010-110

44-268-211


*Boyle* *SP*

SEARCHED.....	INDEXED.....
SERIALIZED.....	FILED.....
OCT 17 1977	
FBI-NORFOLK	

*Kerr*  
*Welke*

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan





2025 RELEASE UNDER E.O. 14176

SAC, MEMPHIS (44-1987)

6/3/68

SAC, NORFOLK (44-268)

MURKIN - COST DATA  
NORFOLK DIVISION  
(MAY, 1968)

(OO: MEMPHIS)

Re Memphis airtel to Albany, 4/19/68

The following is a breakdown of the Norfolk cost data for instant matter for <sup>(m)</sup>April, 1968:

- 1) Number of man hours spent on case:

	A. <u>Special Agents</u>	B. <u>Clerical Employees</u>
Regular	61	10
Overtime	<u>5</u>	—
Total	66	10

- 2) Total mileage traveled on case:

535

- 3) Unusual or out-of-ordinary costs:

None

- 4) Peak number of SA's working on case during month:

5 - on 5/29/68

2- Memphis  
1- Norfolk  
DGF:dmb  
(3)  
*dmb*

44-268-152  
Searched \_\_\_\_\_  
Serialized *MB*  
Indexed \_\_\_\_\_  
Filed *MB*



## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date 6/5/68

CLARENCE ELLIOTT FITCHETT was contacted at his residence and was advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the nature of the interview. He was advised of his rights by SA DAVID G. FLANDERS and he was furnished a copy of a warning and waiver form, which he read. FITCHETT advised that he had read and understood said form and that he was willing to answer questions, but that he preferred not to sign said form. He then furnished the following information:

He denied being JAMES EARL RAY.

He stated that he has lived at this residence at 2801 Somme Avenue, Norfolk, Va., for approximately two years. He advised he is the owner of a 1964 dark blue Oldsmobile, which bears 1968 Virginia license 32-823. The following descriptive information was obtained through observation and interview:

Name	CLARENCE ELLIOTT FITCHETT	
Sex	Male	
Race	White	PII
Date of birth		
Place of birth	Cape Charles, Virginia	
Height	5'7"	
Weight	180 pounds	
Hair	Brownish-grey	
Eyes	Bluish-grey	
Nose	Full-broad	
Scars	None	
Tattoos	None	
Marital status	Married to MARCELINE FITCHETT	
Children	Eleven (7 residing at home)	
Employment	Conrad Brothers Construction Company, 24th St., Norfolk, Va.	
Occupation	Carpenter	
Prior employment	Crest Construction Company, Norfolk, Va.	

On 5/27/68 at Norfolk, Virginia File # Norfolk 44-268-151

by SA DAVID G. FLANDERS /jvh Date dictated 5/28/68

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

NF 44-268

2

It was noted that FITCHETT had no cleft in his  
chin.

## DECODED COPY

PRIORITY: URGENT

DATE: 6/6/68

☒ Radio☐ Teletype

TO : ALL FIELD DIVISIONS

FROM: DIRECTOR

MURKIN.

FOR INFORMATION ALL OFFICES AND NOT TO BE DISCLOSED TO ANYONE OUTSIDE OF OFFICE IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THROUGH INVESTIGATION THAT SUBJECT JAMES EARL RAY RESIDED IN CANADA FROM APRIL 8, 1968 UNTIL MAY 6, 1968 UNDER NAMES PAUL BRIDGMAN AND RAMON GEORGE SNEYD. SUBJECT DEPARTED CANADA FOR LONDON, ENGLAND, ON MAY 6 LAST AS SNEYD AND IS BELIEVED USING CANADIAN PASSPORT IN THAT NAME. SUBJECT BELIEVED TO BE WEARING GLASSES.

IN VIEW OF ABOVE DEVELOPMENTS REVIEW OF DRIVER'S LICENSE BUREAU RECORDS AS REQUESTED IN BUREAU RADIOGRAM MAY 21 LAST MAY BE DISCONTINUED.

OFFICES COVERING POINTS OF ENTRANCE INTO U.S. SHOULD PLACE APPROPRIATE STOPS WITH BORDER AND CUSTOM AUTHORITIES UNDER NAME OF RAMON GEORGE SNEYD. NO INDICATION WHATSOEVER SHOULD BE GIVEN THAT THERE IS ANY CONNECTION BETWEEN SNEYD AND KING ASSASSINATION. YOU MAY ADVISE AUTHORITIES THAT INDIVIDUAL USING NAME SNEYD IS BEING SOUGHT BY FBI FOR

44-268-150

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
JUN 10 1968	
FBI - NORFOLK	

*Stops placed & removed as per p. 2*

*If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.*

## DECODED COPY

☐ Radio☐ Teletype

(PAGE TWO)

UNLAWFUL FLIGHT TO AVOID CONFINEMENT FOR CHARGE OF ROBBERY.

FOR INFORMATION OF BORDER OFFICES THERE IS ACTUAL PERSON  
RESIDING IN TORONTO, CANADA, WHO IS EMPLOYED BY TORONTO  
POLICE DEPARTMENT NAMED RAMON GEORGE SNEYD. THIS INDIVIDUAL'S  
NAME AND DATE OF BIRTH USED BY SUBJECT IN OBTAINING PASSPORT.  
THIS IS FOR YOUR INFORMATION IN EVENT BORDER STOPS DISCLOSE  
THAT INDIVIDUAL NAMED SNEYD IS ENTERING YOUR TERRITORY.  
COPIES MAILED WFO.

ARMED AND DANGEROUS.

6/7/68  
Stops placed w/ following:  
Billy Boren, INS, NF  
Warren White, US Customs NF  
James Myers, USCB, NF  
all checked records - negative re Sneyd.  
HGF

6/10/68  
above stops removed.  
HGF