



**DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
2000 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20350-2000**

5720
Ser DNS-H
JL/26U106709
September 23, 2026

Sent via email to: john@greenewald.com

Mr. John Greenewald
27305 W. Live Oak Rd.
Suite #1203
Castaic, CA 91384

Dear Mr. Greenewald:

This is a response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request dated May 24, 2022. Your request was received on the same day and assigned tracking number DON-NAVY-2022-008648.

You requested: *"A copy of all emails, sent to and/or from and/or cc'd and/or bcc'd Scott Bray, Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence and Director, Naval Intelligence Activity at US Navy, which contain the following keywords/phrases: UNIDENTIFIED AERIAL PHENOMENA and/or UNIDENTIFIED AERIAL PHENOMENON and/or UAP and/or UAPTF and/or UFO and/or UNIDENTIFIED FLYING OBJECT and/or UNIDENTIFIED AERIAL THREAT and/or AATIP and/or ADVANCED AEROSPACE THREAT and/or AAWSAP."*

In order to locate potentially responsive records, this office contacted Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (DCNO) for Information Warfare (OPNAV N2N6) for Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force (UAPTF) to conduct a search for responsive files. OPNAV N2N6 conducted a search of their electronic files and advised this office that after the completion of the search, their office located 1,321 pages of responsive records.

Please be advised after the coordination and review of responsive documents, it was determined that 302 pages are exempt in their entirety from disclosure under FOIA 5 U.S.C. § 552 and the remaining 1,019 are exempt in part.

- 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b) (2): Information related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency.
- 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b) (3) 10 U.S.C. § 130(a): Information that is prohibited from disclosure by another federal law. Certain "technical data with military or space application in the possession of, or under the control of, the Department of Defense."

- 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b) (4): Trade secrets or commercial or financial information that is confidential or privileged.
- 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b) (6): Information that, if disclosed, would invade another individual's personal privacy.
- 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b) (5), the deliberative process privilege. This privilege has consistently been held to (1) encourage open, frank discussions on matters of policy between subordinates and superiors, (2) protect against premature disclosure of proposed policies before they are adopted, and (3) protect against public confusion that might result from disclosure of reasons and rationales that were not in fact ultimately the ground of the agency's action. If the redacted information were to be released, it would reveal agency's employees' internal predecisional deliberations about application of the FOIA exemptions and redactions in an active FOIA case that was not finalized at the time of the discussions. Because this was not a final action by the agency, and disclosure of such deliberations could have a chilling effect on the agency's ability to have open and frank discussions throughout these important decision-making processes. Therefore, the portions of the document are exempt from disclosure under FOIA exemption 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b) (5). The "foreseeable harm" standard was applied and it was determined that the release of these pre-decisional/draft materials could cause significant injury to the decision-making process, a chilling effect on discussion, hasty or uninformed decision-making, and public confusion.

Under 32 CFR §701.12(a), you have the right to an appeal. Appeals can be filed via email or through the U.S. mail. In both cases, send the appellate authority the following items:

1. An email/letter requesting an appeal with reasons why it should be granted.
2. A copy of your initial request.
3. A copy of this letter.

An appeal may be submitted through our online portal and must be received within 90 calendar days from the date of this letter. Use the public portal of Casepoint (the Department of the Navy's FOIA processing system). Go to <https://foiportal.casepointgov.com/dltnavy> for the Navy or <https://foiportal.casepointgov.com/usmc> for the Marine Corps. Click "Sign In / Sign Up" (in the top-right corner) and enter the information in the boxes that appear to create an account. Once that is done, you will be able to file an appeal for any request created through the Casepoint portal by clicking the Submit Appeal button next to the request you wish to appeal. To appeal a request that was not submitted through the Casepoint portal, create a Casepoint portal account, then use the Submit Request button on the Casepoint portal homepage to create a FOIA request. In the Request Description field for that FOIA request, indicate that this is an appeal and make reference to the tracking number you have received for the request you wish to appeal.

An appeal sent by email must be received within 90 calendar days from the date of this letter. In the subject line of the email, type "FOIA Appeal" and your case number DON-NAVY-2022-008648. Send the appeal to Navy-OJAG-C14-FOIA-PA-ADMINAPPEALS@us.navy.mil.

An appeal sent by mail must be postmarked within 90 calendar days from the date of this letter. Make sure to mark the envelope "FOIA Appeal". For issues related to the military, mail your appeal to The Judge Advocate General (Code 14). For all non-military related matters, mail your appeal to the Office of General Counsel (OGC). The appropriate addresses have been provided below.

The Judge Advocate General (Code 14)
1322 Patterson Avenue SE, Suite 3000
Washington Navy Yard, DC 20374-5066

General Counsel of the Navy
1000 Navy Pentagon, Room 5A532
Washington, DC 20350-1000

You have the right to seek dispute resolution services with this determination. You may contact the Navy FOIA Public Liaison Mr. Chris Julka via email Christopher.a.julka.civ@us.navy.mil or by phone (703) 697-0031. You may also contact the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) through their website ogis.archives.gov, via email ogis@nara.gov, or by phone (202) 741-5770.

We understand the importance of timely responses to FOIA requests and apologize for any inconvenience this delay may cause. Thank you, again, for your patience.

Please direct questions to the FOIA Service Center regarding the actions taken to process your request by phone (202) 685-0412 or via email don-foia-pa@us.navy.mil.

Sincerely,

Carl A. Laurie
for

R. STRONG
Director
NAVY FOIA/PA Program Office

This document is made available through the declassification efforts
and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of:

The Black Vault



The Black Vault is the largest online Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
document clearinghouse in the world. The research efforts here are
responsible for the declassification of hundreds of thousands of pages
released by the U.S. Government & Military.

Discover the Truth at: **<http://www.theblackvault.com>**

classified briefing on Unidentified Aerial Phenomenon to Reps. Reschenthaler (R-PA), Armstrong (R-ND), Garcia (R-CA), and Tiffany (R-WI). The brief was in response to a request from Rep. Reschenthaler's personal office.

- b. Classified Briefing to SSCI. On 23 September, N2N6T1 provided a classified update to SSCI PSMs. This brief was a periodic update.
- c. Six Committee Briefing. On 24 September, Navy representatives provided a classified update to SASC, HASC, SAC-D, HAC-D, SSCI and HPSCI SDs and PSMs.

Upcoming briefs:

- a. Classified Navy Intelligence Engineering Briefing. On 30 September, N2N6 representatives will present a classified briefing on the Navy Intelligence Engineering program to HPSCI PSMs. This brief is in preparation for FY21 IAA conferencing.

Also to note, I had the opportunity to participate in the restart of the biweekly IC Legislative Director's Review. Election Security remains the most central focus area for the Intelligence Committees.

Related to the FY21 NDAA, we have received indications the HASC will not accept any of the HPSCI NDAA amendments into the bill that goes forward (unless it goes to the House floor), furthering the strain between the two committees and confounding conference preparations. We will continue to examine the language of the drafts that proceed forward, as we cannot yet characterize any potential Navy intelligence impacts.

Please let me know if there are any questions, or if you prefer to receive this information in a different format.

V/r,

(b) (6)

[REDACTED]

From: Joyner, Sara A RDML USN OLA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

Sent: Friday, September 25, 2020 1:00 PM

To: Braithwaite, Kenneth J HON (USA) (b) (6)

Cc: Slavonic, Greg J HON USN UNSECNAV DC (USA) (b) (6); Geurts, James HON

[illegible]

DC (USA) (b) (6)

Subject: Navy and USMC Legislative Review for 19 - 25 September 2020

Mr. Secretary,

The Senate began debate for the FY21 CR. The vote on passage is expected to occur on Wednesday.

Expect informal conferencing to continue through October with PSMs and Staff Directors to tackle the majority of the differences in the NDAA. We expect the designation of formal conferees after the election.

OLA priorities:

- Set conditions for FY21 NDAA/Appropriations success

DC P&R call w/ HAC-D PSM re: USMC Force Design and USMC appeals (22Sep)

DC P&R classified USMC Force Design 2030 briefing to Rep. Steve Womack (R-AR; HAC-D) (22Sep)

DASN Env FRTC discussion with Sen. Cortez Masto (D-NV) staff (24Sep)

Classified DC CD&I Force Design Brief to Rep. Garamendi (D-CA), Rep. Norcross (D-NJ), and Rep. Hartzler (R-MO) (today)

- Synchronize DON messaging and priorities on the Hill

Joint Staff and NAVFAC Call with HASC PSMs re: Duqm, Oman Lease (21Sep)

VADM Hannink/MajGen Lecce meeting w/ Sen. Inhofe (R-OK) and Sen. Reed (D-RI) re: "Prosecutorial Authority" (22Sep)

Classified UAP TF Briefing to Reps. Reschenthaler (R-PA), Armstrong (R-ND), Garcia (R-CA), and Tiffany (R-WI) (22Sep)

Classified N2N6T1 Briefing with SSCI PSMs (23Sep)

Classified Six Committee Briefing to SASC, HASC, SAC-D, HAC-D, SSCI and HPSCI PSMs (24Sep)

NAVSEA Maintenance Discussion w/ Rep. Byrne (R-AL) (today)

Naval Reactors will host SASC Strategic Forces PSMs (today)

OASN EI&E and OPNAV N45 discuss sound monitoring at NASWI with Rep. Larsen and Rep. Kilmer (D-WA) staff (today)

VADM Wolfe (SSP) engagement w/ SASC Strategic Forces PSMs (today)

Your Future Engagements:

TBD Call w/ Sen. Cortez Masto (D-NV) re: Fallon

TBD Call w/ Rep. Suozzi (D-NY) re: Purple Heart Interim Letter

TBD SASC Readiness Subcommittee hearing on DON readiness (w/ CNO and CMC)

TBD Engagements w/ Rep. Lee (D-CA) and Rep. DeSaulnier (D-CA) re: Port Chicago

TBD Follow on engagement w/ Rep. Garamendi (D-CA)

TBD Follow on engagement w/ Rep. Waltz (R-FL)

Hill Engagements – Two Week Outlook:

28 Sep ADM Caldwell, VADM Galinis discussion with SASC PSMs re: Naval Engineering
28 Sep Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Plan (SIOP) Biannual Brief to SAC-D and HAC-D PSMs
29 Sep Amphibious Ship Discussion w/ MajGen King, Ms. Anderson & HASC PSMs
30 Sep PMA-265 (F/A-18) supply chain brief to National Security Advisor to Sen. Joni Ernst (R-IA)
30 Sep Classified Navy Intelligence Engineering Program Brief to HPSCI PSMs
30 Sep USNA Update to HAC-D
6 Oct Classified Brief to SASC/HASC PSMs on SM6 Impact of USA/USMC Interest
6 Oct TECOM and MCU call with Naval Education Caucus Staffers
7 Oct (T) USMC Autonomous Robotic Targets update. to Mr. Sam Fletcher (Shelby NSA)

Full report below.

Very Respectfully,

Clutch, Rob, (b) (6)

RDML Sara "Clutch" Joyner, USN

BGen Robert C. Fulford, USMC

(b) (6)

1. Executive Summary:

a. Senate and House Floor Action. The House passed and the Senate voted to take up a continuing resolution (CR) (HR 8337) to keep the government funded through 11 Dec -- details are below. The Senate also passed, by unanimous consent, a resolution (S Res 718) offered by Sen. Manchin (D-WV) reaffirming its "commitment to the orderly and peaceful transfer of power called for in the Constitution of the United States."

b. Significant Events This Week.

i. Appropriations. On 22 Sep, the House passed a Continuing Resolution (CR) by a 359-57 vote, funding government operations through 11 Dec. The bill includes an anomaly allowing DON to enter a contract for 2 COLUMBIA SSBNs using incremental funding, and allows up to \$1.62B for that purpose. It also extends a CARES Act authority to pay Federal Contractors if impacted by COVID operations. The House bill has support from Senate leadership, and is expected to be passed next week in time to avoid a government shutdown Wednesday night.

d. Significant Events Next Week.

i. Senate Floor Action. The Senate will consider the CR (HR 8337) -- the vote on passage is expected to occur on Wed, but could occur as early as Tue, depending on how much debate time is consumed. It is possible that the Senate will begin its election recess at close of business next week (a week earlier than scheduled), with the intent of calling Senators back as needed for votes on additional COVID relief legislation and/or a Supreme Court nomination.

ii. House Floor Action. The House is expected to consider another COVID relief bill. At close of

business next week, the House is scheduled to recess until after the Nov elections, although Members will be subject to call-back for votes on COVID legislation.

e. Upcoming Events.

i. Next Recesses. The election recess is currently scheduled for 5 Oct - 13 Nov in the House and 12 Oct - 6 Nov in the Senate. (As noted above, a Senate schedule change and House and Senate call-backs are possible.) Both chambers are scheduled to recess the week of Thanksgiving (23-27 Nov).

ii. Final Adjournment. The target dates for final adjournment of the 116th Congress are 10 Dec in the House and 18 Dec in the Senate. (The 117th Congress will officially begin on Sun, 3 Jan, but will likely convene on Mon, 4 Jan. The House and Senate will announce their 2021 schedules in the Nov/Dec timeframe.)

2. Upcoming Engagements/Committee Activities. A copy of the current engagement calendar is attached.

3. Committee Activities This Week: None.

4. Navy OLA Engagements This Week:

a. Joint Staff and NAVFAC Call with House Armed Services PSMs on Duqm, Oman Lease. On 21 September, staff from Joint Staff J5 Deputy Directorate for Middle East and NAVFAC Europe Africa Central presented HASC PSMs information regarding the planned Duqm, Oman lease action. PSMs did not concur with a sense of urgency on the leasing action. The following factors led the staffers to oppose the near-term lease initiation: lack of confirmed DoD end-state for Duqm; adequacy of Duqm commercial infrastructure for DoD's current requirements; lack of competitor plans to build out in Duqm in the near-term; magnitude of build-to-lease arrangement; and consequences of breaking the lease.

b. Classified UAP Briefing. On 22 September, the UAP TF (N2N6 representatives) presented a classified briefing on Unidentified Aerial Phenomenon to Reps. Reschenthaler (R-PA), Armstrong (R-ND), Garcia (R-CA), and Tiffany (R-WI). The brief was in response to a request from Rep. Reschenthaler's personal office.

c. RD&A and NAVFAC Small Business Payment Provision Phone Call with House Small Business Committee PSMs. On 23 September, NAVFAC representatives, Ms. Readal (Contracts Director) and Mr. Saunders (Counsel) and RD&A representatives Ms. Shaver (DASN P) and Mr. Frankfurt (Counsel) met with PSMs Ms. Irene Rivera and Ms. Vivian Ling from the House Small Business Committee to discuss a FY21 House passed NDAA provision requiring a 50% immediate payment, no discussion or negotiation permitted, to a small business presenting a request for an equitable adjustment. OSD representatives also participated in the call.

d. Classified Briefing to SSCI. On 23 September, N2N6T1 provided a classified update to SSCI PSMs. This brief was a periodic update.

e. Six Committee Briefing. On 24 September, Navy representatives provided a classified update to SASC, HASC, SAC-D, HAC-D, SSCI and HPSCI SDs and PSMs.

f. FRTC Update with Sen. Cortez-Masto (D-NV) staff and DASN Env. On 24 September, DASN Environment, Mr. Karnig Ohannessian, discussed the Fallon Range Training Complex-Modernization effort with staff from Sen. Cortez Masto's office. Navy requested the meeting to relay DOI's official position.

g. NAVSEA Introductory Meeting and Maintenance/Repair Discussion. On 25 September, VADM Galinis (NAVSEA) and RDML Ver Hage (CNRMC/SEA 21) conducted a Teams meeting with Rep. Byrne (R-AL) - at his request - to discuss the potential for drydocking and repair services of Navy vessels since Austal has acquired Alabama Shipyard.

h. NASWI Sound Monitoring Update to Rep. Larsen (D-WA) staff. On 25 September, staff from OASN EI&E and OPNAV N45 provided updates to Rep. Larsen and Rep. Kilmer's staff on the finalized locations for the sound level meters to begin the sound monitoring study at NASWI.

i. SSP and Naval Reactors In calls with SASC Strat Forces PSMs. On 25 September, Mr. Adam Trull (new Strat Forces Majority PSM) and Dr. Jon Epstein had lunch with VADM Wolfe at SSP and tour the model room at Naval Reactors, engaging with senior leaders at each command.

5. USMC Engagements This Week:

a. CODEL Moulton to The Basic School. On 22 Sep Rep. Moulton (D-MA) travelled to MCB Quantico to tour The Basic School among other facilities.

b. SJA Brief to SASC Chair and Ranking on SEC 540F JSS-PAS. On 22 Sep Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine Corps briefed Sen. Inhofe (R-OK) and Sen. Reed (D-RI) on the results of the Joint Service Subcommittee Prosecutorial Authority Study (JSS-PAS) required as part of Sec 540F FY20 NDAA.

c. Call with HAC-D PSM regarding Force Design and appeals. On 22 Sep DC P&R conducted a phone call with Ms. Brooke Boyer, HAC-D PSM on Force Design and appeals.

d. Classified Force Design brief to Rep. Womack (R-AR). On 22 Sep DC P&R provided a classified briefing on Force Design to Rep. Womack (R-AR).

e. Force Design discussion with Rep. Gallagher (R-WI). On 24 Sep BGen Fulford held an office call discussion on Force Design with Rep. Gallagher (R-WI).

f. Force Design discussion with Rep. Golden (D-ME). On 24 Sep BGen Fulford held an office call discussion on Force Design with Rep. Golden (D-ME).

g. AMCC Housing update to staff of Sen. Tillis (R-NC). On 24 Sep DC I&L provided an update on

AMCC Housing to staff members of Sen. Tillis (R-NC).

h. Office call with Rep. Bergman (R-MI). On 24 Sep BGen Fulford held an office call with Rep. Bergman (R-MI).

i. TS Force Design Brief to HASC Members. On 25 Sep DC CD&I conducted a classified briefing for members of the HASC Tactical Air and Land Forces subcommittee on Force Design.

6. FMBE Engagements This Week:

a. P&R Update to HAC-D. On 22 Sep, LtGen Jansen (DC P&R) had a Telecon with Ms. Brooke Barnard (HAC-D PSM) related to the USMC Force Design as well as background information on USMC FY21 programmatic appeals.

b. T-AO Cost Reduction Discussion with WA Delegation. On 22 Sep, Mr. Kosar (PMS 325) discussed T-AO program cost reduction efforts with Mr. Ryan Pettit (National Security Advisor to Sen. Murray (D-WA)).

c. Six Committee Briefing. On 24 September, Navy representatives provided a classified update to SASC, HASC, SAC-D, HAC-D, SSCI and HPSCI PSMs.

d. NASWI Sound Monitoring Update to Rep. Kilmer (D-WA) staff. On 25 September, staff from OASN EI&E and OPNAV N45 will provide updates to Rep. Kilmer (D-WA) and Rep. Larsen's (D-WA) staff on the finalized locations for the sound level meters to begin the sound monitoring study at NASWI.

7. Upcoming Navy OLA Engagements of Note:

a. Naval Engineering Discussion w/ADM Caldwell, VADM Galinis & SASC PSMs. On 28 Sep., ADM Caldwell, VADM Galinis, Mr. Jason Potter and Mr. Creighton Greene will conduct a phone call to discuss Naval Engineering best practices.

b. L-Class Ship Acquisition Discussion w/ MajGen King, Ms. Anderson, & HASC Seapower PSMs. On 29 Sep, MajGen King, Ms. Anderson and HASC Seapower PSMs will conduct a TEAMS call to discuss amphibious ship and connector requirements as it relates to SASC Sec 124 language (Wicker Ship Implementation Act).

c. F/A-18 Supply Chain discussion with PMA-265 and NSA from the office of Sen. Joni Ernst (R-IA). On 30 Sep, the program manager from PMA-265 will discuss topics covering the supply chain for the F/A-18 program with the National Security Advisor from the office of Sen. Joni Ernst (R-IA).

d. Classified Navy Intelligence Engineering Briefing. On 30 September, N2N6 representatives will present a classified briefing on the Navy Intelligence Engineering program to HPSCI PSMs. This brief is in preparation for FY21 IAA conferencing.

e. Classified Navy SM6 Inventory Impact based on Army/Marine Corps Demand. On 06 Oct, PEO IWS

with DASN SHIPS and OPNAV N96 support will brief HASC and SASC PSMs concerning the impact to the Navy SM6 inventory and industrial capacity based on Army and Marine Corps interest in SM6 procurement.

f. Congressional Military Family Caucus Summit. On 9 October, RADM Rock will participate in the virtual Congressional Military Family Caucus Summit to speak on EFMP partnerships alongside Mrs. Michelle Norman. SECDEF Esper is scheduled to be the keynote speaker.

g. SASC PSM Briefing to USNA Midshipmen. On 13 October, SASC PSMs Jason Potter and Creighton Greene will serve as guest speakers to discuss the legislative process and committee work to USNA midshipmen in the US Govt and Constitutional Affairs and Legislative Process courses.

h. ONR Railgun/Laser/AI update brief to Rep. Langevin (D-RI). On 14 October, RADM Selby will provide an update brief to Rep. Langevin on Railgun, Lasers, and AI.

8. Upcoming USMC Engagements of Note:

a. Call with Naval Education Caucus Staffers. On 6 Oct representatives from TECOM and MCU will conduct a phone call with staffers from the Naval Education Caucus.

b. CODEL Walker visit to MCAS Cherry Point. On 16 October Rep. Walker (R-NC) will lead a CODEL to MCAS Cherry Point.

c. CODEL Davis to Djibouti, and Afghanistan. TBD, Rep. Davis (D-CA) will lead a CODEL to Djibouti and Afghanistan to conduct oversight of the policy, strategy, and resource issues associated with Operation Resolute Support in Afghanistan and the Africa region.

9. Upcoming FMBE Engagements of Note:

a. Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth (NAS JRB-FW) Visit. On 28 Sep, Rep. Kay Granger (R-TX; HAC Ranking Member) will visit NAS JRB-FW (in district visit) to hear from base leadership and visit Texas Air National Guard equities (C130J).

b. Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Plan (SIOP) Biannual Brief. On 28 Sep, Mr. Burke (DASN Sustainment), Mr. Balocki (DASN I&F), Mr. Neff (N97B), and Mr. Lagana (PMS-555) will provide a biannual SIOP to Ms. Katy Hagan (SAC-D PSM), and Ms. Jennifer Chartrand (HAC-D PSM).

c. USNA Brief to HAC-D. On 30 Sep (T), VADM Buck (USNA) will brief Ms. Jennifer Chartrand and Ms. Ariana Sarar (HAC-D PSMs) on USNA operations.

d. Autonomous Robotic Targets update. On 7 Oct (T), 2MarDiv CG and Division Gunner will provide the operator's perspective of the training value of autonomous robotic targets to Mr. Sam Fletcher (Shelby NSA)

e. MARFORPAC Theater Posture Plan SVTC. On 12 Oct, representatives from MARFORPAC will

present a classified briefing on the Theater Posture Plan to Mr. Tim Nelson (Rep Case CoS)

From: [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#)
To: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: AFCEA INSA Intelligence and National Security Summit
Date: Monday, September 14, 2020 5:53:00 PM

Thanks, (b) (6). Just a process question for us here: in my old job, questions like this would have been sent to the NIM to make sure that we were preparing the boss with accurate, unclas material that supported our public affairs posture. Who provides the expertise for these questions to ensure that (b) (6) is well informed?

Thanks,
Scott

Scott W. Bray

Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence
Director, Naval Intelligence Activity

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, September 14, 2020 5:05 PM
To: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)
Subject: FW: AFCEA INSA Intelligence and National Security Summit
Importance: High

Boss – I punted this right back to (b) (6)... feel like he call pull this together based on previous speeches/comments he has put together.

Vr/ (b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, September 14, 2020 4:33 PM
To: (b) (6)
Cc: OPNAV N2N6I Front Office (b) (6)
Subject: FW: AFCEA INSA Intelligence and National Security Summit
Importance: High

(b) (6),

Here are the Tish Long Qs for Thursday's AFCEA-NSA Panel.

The ones specific to the DNI are highlighted.

Request a fairly quick turn on proposed responses so we can get him a look with time for follow-up if necessary.

Thanks,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, September 11, 2020 2:24 PM
To: Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO (USA) (b) (6); Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)
Cc: Aeschbach, Kelly A RADM USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6); Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6); OPNAV ALL N2N6 Front Office (b) (6); OPNAV N2N6I Front Office (b) (6)
Subject: AFCEA INSA Intelligence and National Security Summit
Importance: High

DCNO,

Next Thursday, you have the virtual AFCEA INSA Service Chiefs Panel for the subject conference from 1300-1400.

The initial invite is attached.

I have prepared some material for you to review, with the assistance of Scott Bray and his team, as in the designated attachment.

FYI.. former DDNI /
former NGA Director Tish Long is now moderating.

I just became aware that she had sent some questions for the panel out to all. She breaks down questions for panelists by name.

In the Tish Questions attachment, I've highlighted in yellow the ones directed at you.

Scott/Team,

My apologies for not having these sooner... I was not aware they had been sent.

Please look these questions over ASAP and send back proposed responses for VADM Trussler to study/use.

I will modify the prep document to include those Qs/As once I receive your talking points.

Thanks.

Sir,

This should get you started... we'll update once Scott and his team provide the request additional talking points.

Standing by for additional support as needed.

V/R,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

From: Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO (USA) (b) (6)
Sent: Saturday, August 8, 2020 1:03 PM
To: (b) (6); Bray, Scott W SES
OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
(b) (6) Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA
WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
Subject: RE: INSA Session

Some random brainstorming to be ready for:

- KIWC
- UAP
- Why a url
- Can/should I talk about HRE efforts led by (b) (6) team in cyber discussions
- I'll probably need a refresher of where the line is for classified on some adversary stuff

Vr, JT

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Thursday, August 6, 2020 12:53 PM
To: Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO (USA) (b) (6); Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV
N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA

WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

Subject: RE: INSA Session

Aye, Sir.

There will be a conference call scheduled within the next couple weeks (they are working to identify potential times) to discuss topics, etc.; hosted by Lt Gen Noonan, with participation by all the panelists. It would be good to have Scott on that call with you.

Typically, out of that we would then have specific areas to focus on, and would then farm out those topics/questions to the appropriate N2N6 Teams to provide answers for you to review in advance of the event.

It would indeed be good to go into that prep call with specific areas we'd like to highlight... so we (you) can drive some of the conversation in a preferred direction.

VADM Kohler participated in this event in 2018 (DDNI/Lynn Wright took last year's). Attached is the final version of the prep document we prepared that incorporated all inputs. The goal is to have a similar product to you to help you prepare.

FYI... this is typically a live event with open Q/A from media and other attendees... it will be interesting to see how this will work as a virtual event.

BT BT

Scott,

If you/your team have suggestions along those lines (topics/bullet points) that we want to suggest up front in the prep call, please send to me and I will compile for a pre-call read-ahead.

Standing by to discuss further/proceed as necessary.

V/R,

(b) (6)

From: Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO (USA) (b) (6)

Sent: Thursday, August 6, 2020 12:10 PM

To: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6 (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: INSA Session

(b) (6)/Scott, will need some thoughts from you on following panel. Vr, JT

Plenary 2: Service Intelligence Priorities

Thursday 1:00 p.m. - 2:00 p.m.

Presenters:

Panelist: LTG Scott Berrier, USA, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2

Panelist: VADM Jeffrey Trussler, USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information Warfare,
Director of Naval Intelligence

Moderator: LTG Robert Noonan, USA (Ret.), Chairman, AFCEA Intelligence Committee

Panelist: Lt Gen Mary O'Brien, USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance,
Reconnaissance and Cyber Effects Operations, Headquarters U.S. Air Force/A2

Description: This annual INSS panel is a thoughtful and wide-ranging guided conversation with the Service Intelligence Chiefs about their respective challenges and opportunities. Focus areas include: intelligence support to Service and Joint priorities; intelligence readiness trends; critical skill sets and talent development; desired outcomes for Space; and, private sector and IC partnerships.

From: [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#)
To: [Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#)
Subject: RE: Neill Tipton
Date: Wednesday, September 2, 2020 1:13:00 PM

I'll give you the history this afternoon....

Scott W. Bray

Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence

Director, Naval Intelligence Activity

(b) (6)

From: Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
Sent: Wednesday, September 2, 2020 6:51 AM
To: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)
Subject: RE: Neill Tipton

The UAP Task Force? I haven't been connecting Jenn with this...

From: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, September 01, 2020 9:40 PM
To: Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
Subject: FW: Neill Tipton

Scott W. Bray

Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence

Director, Naval Intelligence Activity

(b) (6)

From: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)
Date: Tuesday, Sep 01, 2020, 21:38
To: Obernier, Jennifer A SES USN UNSECNAV DC (USA) (b) (6)
Subject: RE: Neill Tipton

Thanks, Jen. I'm ready for it. Thanks for the heads up....

All the best,
Scott

Scott W. Bray

Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence
Director, Naval Intelligence Activity

(b) (6)

From: Obernier, Jennifer A SES USN UNSECNAV DC (USA) (b) (6)

Date: Tuesday, Sep 01, 2020, 20:17

To: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6 (b) (6)

Subject: Re: Neill Tipton

Hey Scott,

I popped in to see Neill today (I worked for him in my last job), gave him a heads up that we were setting up an EXCON for the Task Force and a seat had his name on it.

He mentioned you were coming by to chat with him next week; prepare to get an earful, lol.

Just wanted to keep the bubbles super level on this.

J

Jennifer Obernier, PhD
Acting Senior Director, Security & Intel
Office of Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy

(b) (6)

From: [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#)
To: (b) (6) [Stratton, John F \(Jay\) SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#)
Cc: (b) (6)
[OPNAV N2N6I Front Office](#)
Subject: RE: UAPTF Straight Talk TPs for DEPSECDEF - Making BIG News?
Date: Friday, August 21, 2020 12:54:00 PM

(b) (6)

Concur completely. Given that the Task Force was just officially assigned to us last week, I don't think it's appropriate for us to reach any conclusions at this point...

Concur with your recommendation below; let's stick to what we've said before.

Thanks,
Scott

Scott W. Bray
Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence
Director, Naval Intelligence Activity
(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, August 21, 2020 11:46 AM
To: Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6); Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
(b) (6) OPNAV N2N6I Front Office
(b) (6)
Subject: RE: UAPTF Straight Talk TPs for DEPSECDEF - Making BIG News?

Jay/Scott,

FYI... I just had the opportunity to mention this concept to DCNO.

(b) (5)

(b) (5)

(b) (5)

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, August 21, 2020 6:20 AM

To: Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6); Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6) Mckernan, Brennan P CIV USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6); OPNAV N2N6I Front Office (b) (6)
Subject: FW: UAPTF Straight Talk TPs for DEPSECDEF - Making BIG News?
Importance: High

Jay/Scott,

(b) (5)

He is pushing hard for it per the string below.

I've tried pushing back... staying with neutral language... both in email and in person with Sue.... But Cummings won't listen.

Unless you two push back... (b) (5)

Regards,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Thursday, August 20, 2020 2:51 PM
To: Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)
(b) (6); Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA)
(b) (6); Carranza, Guillermo R SES OSD OGC (USA)
(b) (6)
Subject: RE: UAPTF Straight Talk TPs for DEPSECDEF

Gentlemen,

I understand both positions. On the one hand, we've said many times previously that we aren't going to discuss details of the investigations. On the other hand, the news media is constantly linking the UAPTF to "investigating aliens" and it'd be good to tamp down on that. I had an otherwise serious major network reporter standing at my desk yesterday trying to get me to say more about the UAPTF (and to set up an interview) and constantly, repeatedly saying, 'but you guys are investigating aliens.' No matter how many times I corrected her to "unidentified" or to UAP, she used aliens.

This isn't going to be solved by us. And the DEPSECDEF specifically said he wanted the TPs "well coordinated." My recommendation to you is that you continue to run this up your chain of command:

Do we:

(b) (5)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Regards,

(b) (6)

From: Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)

(b) (6)

Sent: Thursday, August 20, 2020 1:29 PM

To: (b) (6) Stratton, John F

(Jay) SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA)

(b) (6)

; Carranza, Guillermo R SES OSD OGC (USA)

(b) (6)

Subject: RE: UAPTF Straight Talk TPs for DEPSECDEF

(b) (6), (b) (5)

[REDACTED]

Matthew C. Cummings, DISL

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Thursday, August 20, 2020 12:47 PM

To: Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA)

(b) (6)

; Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD
INTEL (USA)

(b) (6)

; Carranza, Guillermo R SES OSD OGC (USA)

(b) (6)

Subject: RE: UAPTF Straight Talk TPs for DEPSECDEF

ALL,

(b) (5)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(b) (5) [Redacted]
[Redacted]

- | [Redacted]
[Redacted]
- | [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
- | [Redacted]
[Redacted]
- | [Redacted]
- | [Redacted]

JAY... any additional thoughts?

(b) (6) [Redacted]

From: (b) (6) [Redacted]
Sent: Thursday, August 20, 2020 12:27 PM
To: (b) (6) [Redacted] Cummings,
Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA) (b) (6) [Redacted]; Carranza,
Guillermo R SES OSD OGC (USA) (b) (6) [Redacted]
Subject: FW: UAPTF Straight Talk TPs for DEPSECDEF
Importance: High

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY//PRE-DECISIONAL/EXEMPT FROM FOIA UNDER (b)(5)

(b) (6), (b) (5) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(b) (6), (b) (5)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

[Redacted]
[Redacted]

[Redacted]
[Redacted]

[Redacted]
[Redacted]

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Thursday, August 20, 2020 11:34 AM
To: (b) (6)
Subject: UAPTF Straight Talk TPs

(b) (6),

As discussed yesterday, DSD wants to develop talking points that clearly and simply lay out reinforcing points regarding the UAPTF. What do you think of the following? Once you think they are good; would appreciate you socializing with your folks to ensure we are solid. Also, if I'm missing anything, please let me know.

- (b) (5)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
- [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
- [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
- [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
- [Redacted]
[Redacted]

Thanks,
(b) (6)

[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(b) (6) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

From: [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#)
To: (b) (6); [Stratton, John F \(Jay\) SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#)
Cc: (b) (6)
[OPNAV N2N6I Front Office](#); (b) (6)
[Cummings, Matthew C \(Matt\) SES OSD OUSD INTEL \(USA\)](#); [Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#)
Subject: RE: UAPTF Query - Air Forces Monthly magazine - QUICK TURN NEEDED
Date: Tuesday, August 18, 2020 2:33:00 PM

By Monday, I think.....

Scott W. Bray
Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence
Director, Naval Intelligence Activity
(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, August 18, 2020 2:33 PM
To: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6); Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
(b) (6) OPNAV N2N6I Front Office (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA) (b) (6);
Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
Subject: RE: UAPTF Query - Air Forces Monthly magazine - QUICK TURN NEEDED

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY//PRE-DECISIONAL/EXEMPT FROM FOIA UNDER (b)(5)

Thanks, Scott.

Let's give ourselves time to work the explanation for that.... rather than rushing out a response for this particular query.

Any idea when SECNAV will officially task NIA?

Regards

(b) (6)

From: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)

Sent: Tuesday, August 18, 2020 2:28 PM

To: (b) (6) Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6) OPNAV N2N6I Front Office (b) (6)

Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA) (b) (6);
Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

Subject: RE: UAPTF Query - Air Forces Monthly magazine - QUICK TURN NEEDED

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY//PRE-DECISIONAL/EXEMPT FROM FOIA UNDER (b)(5)

(b) (6) —

(U//FOUO) I like all of your suggested responses. (b) (5)

All the best,
Scott

Scott W. Bray

Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence
Director, Naval Intelligence Activity

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Tuesday, August 18, 2020 1:38 PM

To: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6); Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6) OPNAV N2N6I Front Office (b) (6)

Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA) (b) (6);
Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

Subject: FW: UAPTF Query - Air Forces Monthly magazine - QUICK TURN NEEDED

Importance: High

Scott/Jay,

Need a quick look/input from you at this set please, so (b) (6) can provide prior to tomorrow's DoD regular news briefing.

(b) (6), (b) (5)

Thoughts?

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, August 18, 2020 1:11 PM
To: (b) (6) Cummings,
Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA) (b) (6)
Cc: Carranza, Guillermo R SES OSD OGC (USA) (b) (6)
Subject: UAPTF Query - Air Forces Monthly magazine
Importance: High

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY//PRE-DECISIONAL/EXEMPT FROM FOIA UNDER (b)(5)

(b) (6) Matt,
Please see my proposed responses/where I need inputs to below query, from (b) (6) with Air Forces Monthly magazine, part of Key Publishing, out of the UK. Pretty much pulled or extrapolated from the RTQ Q&As -- underlined phrases are changes/additions to the RTQ Q&As. Comments to you guys/requests for input are indicated by square brackets [] and astericks [*** ... ***].

Oh, I know he says his deadline is Aug. 24, but (b) (6) is briefing tomorrow afternoon, so I'd like to get this done before then.

Regards,

(b) (6)

To whom it may concern,

I am the Associate Editor for Air Forces Monthly magazine. I have some questions about the recent UAPTF announcement. My deadline is Aug. 24.

1. While Deputy Secretary of Defense David L. Norquist approved the establishment of the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force (UAPTF) when do you expect the UAPTF to start its first day of actual work?

(b) (5)

(b) (5)

(b) (5)

(b) (5)

From: [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#)
To: [Aeschbach, Kelly A RADM USN ONI WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#)
Subject: RE: CNN article
Date: Friday, August 14, 2020 4:12:00 PM

Thanks, Kelly....

Hope you have a great weekend,
Scott

Scott W. Bray

Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence
Director, Naval Intelligence Activity

(b) (6)

From: Aeschbach, Kelly A RADM USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, August 14, 2020 7:46 AM
To: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)
Subject: CNN article

https://www.cnn.com/2020/08/13/politics/pentagon-ufo-task-force/index.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+rss%2Fcnn_topstories+%28RSS%3A+CNN+-+Top+Stories%29&utm_content=FaceBook&fbclid=IwAR1qVNcaMzsfxJNrqaGZmtbXo-vb2kp0Pmss0RsK8w1lo7N33WB76jarZuE

Two defense officials have shared that we will be announcing the task force.

Kelly Aeschbach
Rear Admiral, United States Navy
Director, National Maritime Intelligence Integration Office
Commander, Office of Naval Intelligence

(b) (6)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

From: [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#)
To: (b) (6); [Stratton, John F \(Jay\) SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#); (b) (6)
Cc: [OPNAV ALL N2N6 Front Office](#); (b) (6); [Brown, Charles W RDML USN \(USA\)](#); (b) (6); [Aeschbach, Kelly A RADM USN ONI WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#); (b) (6); [Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#)
Subject: RE: HOT – DEPSECDEF Request for Press Release
Date: Wednesday, August 12, 2020 9:22:00 AM

Thanks, (b) (6). Appreciate your perspectives. My comments include RADM Aeschbach's concerns.

(U//FOUO) (b) (5)

[REDACTED]

(U//FOUO) (b) (5)

[REDACTED]

Thanks,
Scott

Scott W. Bray
Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence
Director, Naval Intelligence Activity
(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Wednesday, August 12, 2020 6:20 AM
To: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6); Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6); [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
Cc: OPNAV ALL N2N6 Front Office (b) (6); [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Brown, Charles W RDML USN (USA)
(b) (6); [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Aeschbach, Kelly A RADM USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA)
(b) (6); [REDACTED] Brown,
Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6); [REDACTED]

Subject: RE: HOT -- DEPSECDEF Request for Press Release

All,

(b) (6) and I have not seen RADM Aeschbach's edits... are they wrapped up in yours (attached), Scott?

FYI, Scott... By and large I have no issues with your edits... however some of the language you struck out has been included in previous responses to query...

- (b) (6), (b) (5)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

Keep in mind that the Q/As will not be shared... they are for (b) (6) (or the DoD Spokesperson if asked in a Press Brief) to use only in response to query.

As for whether to release or not... as I understand it, it was DEPSECDEF actual who directed the release.

(b) (6)

From: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6 (b) (6)

Sent: Tuesday, August 11, 2020 6:59 PM

To: Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)

(b) (6) Gradisher, Joseph F CIV USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)

(b) (6) Brown, Charles W RDML USN (USA) (b) (6)

Cc: OPNAV ALL N2N6 Front Office (b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6); Aeschbach, Kelly A RADM USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6) Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

Subject: RE: HOT -- DEPSECDEF Request for Press Release

(b) (6) —

(b) (5)

If we do proceed with a press release, I recommend the changes in the attached. Again, I can provide a rationale for the edits at the classified level.

All the best,
Scott

Scott W. Bray

Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence
Director, Naval Intelligence Activity

(b) (6)

From: Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)

Sent: Tuesday, August 11, 2020 6:41 PM

To: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6); Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I

(b) (6); Brown, Charles W RDML USN (USA) (b) (6)

Cc: OPNAV ALL N2N6 Front Office (b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6) Aeschbach, Kelly A RADM USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

Subject: RE: HOT -- DEPSECDEF Request for Press Release

I concur with RADM Aeschbach's recommendation, other than that it looks good to me. Standing by for any guidance from Mr. Bray.

V/r, Jay

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b) (6)

Date: Tuesday, Aug 11, 2020, 4:24 PM

To: (b) (6) Stratton, John F (Jay) SES
USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)
(b) (6), Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6) Brown,
Charles W RDML USN (USA) (b) (6)
Cc: OPNAV ALL N2N6 Front Office (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6), Aeschbach, Kelly A RADM USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: RE: HOT -- DEPSECDEF Request for Press Release

(b) (6) – Plan to discuss with Mr Bray this afternoon. Will provide feedback soonest.

Vr/ (b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, August 11, 2020 4:09 PM
To: Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)
(b) (6) Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV
N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6); Brown, Charles W RDML USN (USA)
(b) (6)
Cc: OPNAV ALL N2N6 Front Office (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6); Aeschbach, Kelly A RADM USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: FW: HOT -- DEPSECDEF Request for Press Release
Importance: High

All,

As mentioned, DepSecDef has directed DoD PA to issue a press release on the official standup of the UAP Task Force.

Attached is the draft release with related Q/As for our Navy chop.

The statement and answers use language previously agreed on and used.

All queries will continue to be directed to DoDPA.

Please let me know soonest if you have any issues and/or recommended changes.

I would anticipate release tomorrow (Wednesday).

Regards

(b) (6)

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b) (6)
Date: Tuesday, Aug 11, 2020, 3:23 PM
To: (b) (6) Cummings, Matthew C
(Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA) (b) (6), Carranza, Guillermo R SES OSD
OGC (USA) (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: HOT -- DEPSECDEF Request for Press Release

Gents,

DEPSECDEF has requested a press release on the establishment of the UAPTF. Please see attached. Top section is what would be released, bottom section is for the Q&As we're likely (!) to get once the press release goes out. If we want to keep the press release shorter, I'm fine with dropping the third paragraph from the release itself (I can incorporate into query responses as needed). Need Navy, OUSD(I&S) and OGC clearance; please run up your chains for appropriate level clearance. Once I have yours, then this will go to ATSD(PA) Hoffman for approval for release.

(b) (6), for your SA and Hill notification as appropriate. (b) (6), mainly for DIA SA also, as I've included likely question about AATIP & UAPTF in the Q&A.

Regards,

(b) (6)

From: [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#)
To: [Stratton, John F \(Jay\) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: [Non-DoD Source] Press Inquiry VICE
Date: Tuesday, June 23, 2020 7:33:00 PM

Ditto....

Scott W. Bray

Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence
Director, Naval Intelligence Activity

(b) (6)

From: Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

Sent: Tuesday, June 23, 2020 12:23 PM

To: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: FW: [Non-DoD Source] Press Inquiry VICE

Importance: High

Scott,

FYSA... This is the first time I have seen this language. I was aware that SASC was proposing language in the classified annex. This will undoubtedly guide conversation this afternoon.

V/r, Jay

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, June 23, 2020 12:05 PM
To: (b) (6) Stratton, John F (Jay) SES
USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: FW: [Non-DoD Source] Press Inquiry VICE

Importance: High

All,

(b) (6) (Vice) sent a query in asking for comment on the language in the INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2021 contained in the link he sent below.

The specific language is on pg 11/12:

Advanced Aerial Threats The Committee supports the efforts of the Unidentified Aerial Phenomenon Task Force at the Office of Naval Intelligence to standardize collection and reporting on unidentified aerial phenomenon, any links they have to adversarial foreign governments, and the threat they pose to U.S. military assets and installations. However, the Committee remains concerned that there is no unified, comprehensive process within the Federal Government for collecting and analyzing intelligence on unidentified aerial phenomena, despite the potential threat. The Committee understands that the relevant intelligence may be sensitive; nevertheless, the Committee finds that the information sharing and coordination across the Intelligence Community has been inconsistent, and this issue has lacked attention from senior leaders.

Therefore, the Committee directs the DNI, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the heads of such other agencies as the Director and Secretary jointly consider relevant, to submit a report within 180 days of the date of enactment of the Act, to the congressional intelligence and armed services committees on un-identified aerial phenomena (also known as “anomalous aerial vehicles”), including observed airborne objects that have not been identified.

The Committee further directs the report to include:

1. A detailed analysis of unidentified aerial phenomena data and intelligence reporting collected or held by the Office of Naval Intelligence, including data and intelligence reporting held by the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force;
2. A detailed analysis of unidentified phenomena data collected by:
 - a. geospatial intelligence;
 - b. signals intelligence;
 - c. human intelligence; and
 - d. measurement and signals intelligence;
3. A detailed analysis of data of the FBI, which was derived from investigations of intrusions of unidentified aerial phenomena data over restricted United States airspace;
4. A detailed description of an interagency process for ensuring timely data collection and centralized analysis of all un-identified aerial phenomena reporting for the Federal Government, regardless of which service or agency acquired the information;
5. Identification of an official accountable for the process described in paragraph 4;

6. Identification of potential aerospace or other threats posed by the unidentified aerial phenomena to national security, and an assessment of whether this unidentified aerial phenomena activity may be attributed to one or more foreign adversaries;
7. Identification of any incidents or patterns that indicate a potential adversary may have achieved breakthrough aero-space capabilities that could put United States strategic or conventional forces at risk; and
8. Recommendations regarding increased collection of data, enhanced research and development, and additional funding and other resources. The report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

His specific Qs:

1. Can you provide comments regarding the fact that ONI has a UAP task force?
2. Can you provide more details regarding how this task force operates?
3. I am generally looking for any public comment from the ONI regarding this bill.

UNODIR, My intent is to send (b) (6) your way, (b) (6) ... reminding him that all queries go to you.

(b) (5)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Previous statement on the TF:

Under the cognizance of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)), there is an interagency team charged with gathering data and conducting investigations into range incursions. As the preponderance of recent/reported sightings are from naval aviators, the Navy is leading much of the effort. All reports of range incursions are sent to this team for inclusion in the overall effort, thus maximizing the data available for analysis.

(b) (6), (b) (5)

[REDACTED]

Regards,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Tuesday, June 23, 2020 10:07 AM

To: (b) (6)

Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Press Inquiry VICE

Hi (b) (6),

I am covering the recent Senate Appro bill regarding an a UAP task force out of the ONI.

<https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CRPT-116srpt233/pdf/CRPT-116srpt233.pdf>

I provided the link above there for you.

Can you provide comments regarding the fact that ONI has a UAP task force? Can you provide more details regarding how this task force operates?

I am generally looking for any public comment from the ONI regarding this bill.

Thanks,

(b) (6)

From: [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#)
To: (b) (6) [Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#)
Cc: (b) (6) [OPNAV N2N6I Front Office; Stratton, John F \(Jay\) SES](#)
[USN ONI WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#); (b) (6)
Subject: RE: FOIA request - Office of Naval Intelligence -- (b) (6) (Scientific Coalition for UAP Studies)
Date: Thursday, April 30, 2020 7:02:40 AM

Thanks, (b) (6). Appreciate the heads up.

All the best,
Scott

Scott W. Bray
Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence
Director, Naval Intelligence Activity
(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Date: Thursday, Apr 30, 2020, 06:42
To: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6), Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
OPNAV N2N6I Front Office (b) (6), Stratton, John F (Jay) SES
USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: FOIA request - Office of Naval Intelligence -- (b) (6) (Scientific Coalition for UAP Studies)

Scott/Sandy,

FYI... ONI got the first FOIA related to the release of the 3 videos already (attached) yesterday (Wednesday).

I looped (b) (6) in late yesterday.

I am going to discuss with DOD PA later today.

I intend to mention to DCNO at stand-up this morning... but wanted to clue you in first.

We'll keep yo9u posted on how this shakes out.

Regards,

(b) (6)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Wednesday, April 29, 2020 4:00 PM
To: Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6);
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: FW: [Non-DoD Source] FOIA request (time-sensitive) - Office of Naval Intelligence -- (b) (6)
(Scientific Coalition for UAP Studies)

Jay (b) (6)

Thought you should see this FOIA to ONI...

This needs to be looked at to see how it intersects with the recently signed SCG.

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Wednesday, April 29, 2020 3:30 PM
To: (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: FW: [Non-DoD Source] FOIA request (time-sensitive) - Office of Naval Intelligence -- (b) (6)
(Scientific Coalition for UAP Studies)

(b) (6)

FYSA. Please see (b) (6) question.

V/r

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Wednesday, April 29, 2020 2:20 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: Fw: [Non-DoD Source] FOIA request (time-sensitive) - Office of Naval Intelligence -- (b) (6)
(Scientific Coalition for UAP Studies)

Hi (b) (6),

I hope all is well. I recently received a UAP FOIA request from (b) (6). As instructed, I am forwarding this request to you who will then forward to (b) (6). I do have a question, but I'll probably ask (b) (6) as well. Do we have a Template in place to forward to the requester as to what we are doing? I only ask because we are required to respond to a FOIA request within twenty working days. we do not have to deliver the records within 20-days but we have to provide some type of response (acknowledgment).

Thank you.

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Wednesday, April 29, 2020 1:28 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: [Non-DoD Source] FOIA request (time-sensitive) - Office of Naval Intelligence -- (b) (6)
(Scientific Coalition for UAP Studies)

To the FOIA Officer:

The attached PDF file contains a letter incorporating a time-sensitive FOIA request. The same PDF document holds documentation of my affiliation with the *Scientific Coalition for UAP Studies*, which has been recognized as a "noncommercial scientific institute" by various components of the Department of Defense.

Thank you for your kind attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

Subject: RE: Statement by the Department of Defense on the release of historical Navy videos - First story

All,

And the first story has hit the streets:

US Navy Officially Publishes Three UFO Videos

The three videos were originally released by former Blink-182 singer Tom DeLonge.

Vice Motherboard, 27 April 2020/10:17am ... by [Jason Koebler](#)

The U.S. Navy [has officially published](#) three UFO videos that were previously published by the [New York Times](#) and former Blink-182 singer Tom DeLonge's UFO research group, To the Stars Academy. Together, they are three of the most famous UFO videos of all time and have spurred a renaissance in UFOlogy.

The videos are called "FLIR.mp4," "GOFAST.wmv," and "GIMBAL.wmv." If you're even remotely interested in UFOs, you've probably seen them all many times; the three videos were obtained and published in 2017 and 2018 by To the Stars Academy. Two of the videos were also included in a *New York Times* article detailing the Pentagon's [Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program](#), which was run by a man named Luis Elizondo, who now works at DeLonge's To the Stars Academy. In the last few days, the Navy has officially published these videos on its Freedom of Information Act page.

The videos are tantalizing evidence that military airmen have seen UFOs, and that the Pentagon has researched what they are. Previous reporting from Motherboard has shown that an investigatory arm of the Air Force [has also studied the videos](#). Earlier this year, Motherboard also reported that the [U.S. Navy has a classified version of the FLIR video](#), which was shot in 2004 off the coast of California. People who witnessed the UFOs told [Popular Mechanics](#) that they have seen a higher definition version of the video.

While the official release of these videos doesn't actually give us any more information, it's still important, because for years the Pentagon has been changing its story about these videos. It is, at the very least, a step forward for transparency on UFOs.

https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/wxevmn/us-navy-officially-publishes-three-ufo-videos

Regards,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Monday, April 27, 2020 10:39 AM

To: Kohler, Matthew J VADM USN (USA) (b) (6); Miller, Christopher A SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6); Trussler, Jeffrey E RADM USN CNO (USA) (b) (6); Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6); Brown, Sandra SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6); Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6); Aeschbach, Kelly A RADM USN ONI
(b) (6); Brown, Charles W RDML USN (USA)
(b) (6); Dunn, Paula D RDML CHINFO, OI-00 (b) (6)

[illegible]

(b) (6)

Subject: Statement by the Department of Defense on the release of historical Navy videos

Importance: High

Admirals/Leaders/All,

DOD announcement on the release of the UAP videos has hit the street.

Text is below and posted on the DOD Website here:

<https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2165713/statement-by-the-department-of-defense-on-the-release-of-historical-navy-videos/>

The videos are posted on the NAVAIR FOIA site here: <https://www.navair.navy.mil/foia/documents>.

Any media queries to Navy on this will be forwarded to DOD PA without comment.

V/R,

(b) (6)

From: OSD Pentagon PA Mailbox Duty Officer Press Operations <osd.pa.dutyofficer@mail.mil>

Sent: Monday, April 27, 2020 9:40 AM

To: OSD Pentagon PA Mailbox Duty Officer Press Operations <osd.pa.dutyofficer@mail.mil>

Subject: Statement by the Department of Defense on the release of historical Navy videos

Media colleagues,

The below statement is attributable to (b) (6), Pentagon spokesperson.

The Department of Defense has authorized the release of three unclassified Navy videos, one taken in November 2004 and the other two in January 2015, which have been circulating in the public domain after unauthorized releases in 2007 and 2017. The U.S. Navy previously acknowledged that these videos circulating in the public domain were indeed Navy videos. After a thorough review, the department has determined that the authorized release of these unclassified videos does not reveal any sensitive capabilities or systems, and does not impinge on any subsequent investigations of

military air space incursions by unidentified aerial phenomena. DOD is releasing the videos in order to clear up any misconceptions by the public on whether or not the footage that has been circulating was real, or whether or not there is more to the videos. The aerial phenomena observed in the videos remain characterized as "unidentified." The released videos can be found at the Naval Air Systems Command FOIA Reading Room: <https://www.navair.navy.mil/foia/documents>.

Regards,
Duty Officer
Defense Public Affairs Operations

From: [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#)
To: [Tipton, Neill T SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC \(USA\)](#)
Subject: RE: UAP
Date: Saturday, March 7, 2020 9:07:28 AM

Neill-

Are you free sometime between 1500-1600?

All the best,
Scott

Scott W. Bray

Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence
Director, Naval Intelligence Activity

(b) (6)

From: Tipton, Neill T SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA) (b) (6)
Date: Friday, Mar 06, 2020, 5:51 PM
To: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)
Subject: UAP

Scott,

I've got a document I'd like to give you a copy of, relevant to our discussion the other day. Would rather do hardcopy - if you've got some time on Monday I'll do a drive-by and drop it off.

Thanks

Neill

Neill Tipton
Director of Defense Intelligence, Collection and Special Programs
OUSD(I&S)

(b) (6)

From: [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#)
To: (b) (6); [Aeschbach, Kelly A RADM USN ONI WASHINGTON DC \(USA\);](#)
(b) (6)
Cc: [Brown, Sandra SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC \(USA\);](#) [Richardson, Andrew G SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC \(USA\);](#) (b) (6); [Stratton, John F \(Jay\) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC \(USA\);](#) (b) (6)
Subject: RE: SSCI Brief from Jay Stratton
Date: Saturday, February 15, 2020 5:00:00 PM

Thanks, (b) (6). I'll reach out to Neill on Tuesday and make sure he and I are on the same page.

Thanks,
Scott

Scott W. Bray
Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence
Director, Naval Intelligence Activity
(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, February 14, 2020 4:57 PM
To: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6); Aeschbach, Kelly A RADM USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Cc: Brown, Sandra SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6); Richardson, Andrew G SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
(b) (6); Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: RE: SSCI Brief from Jay Stratton

Sir, Admiral, All,

I just learned from OUSD(I&S) they can support the SSCI Member brief on 25 Feb and they will have senior level representation at the table. Unknown who specifically it will be, but Mr. Tipton is the likely choice.

That being said, OUSD(I&S) and myself will communicate with the SSCI PSMs and more towards locking in this 25 Feb briefing.

V/r

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

From: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6 (b) (6)

Sent: Thursday, February 13, 2020 2:17 PM

To: Aeschbach, Kelly A RADM USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

(b) (6) (b) (6)

Cc: Brown, Sandra SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6); Richardson, Andrew G SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI

WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Subject: RE: SSCI Brief from Jay Stratton

Kelly / (b) (6) -

This all makes sense to me. I'm meeting with Jay on Tuesday as I prep for a different Hill engagement, so I'll be more up to speed then. I'll reach out to Neill Tipton and ensure that a) USD/I will be there with us and b) that they will be able to show that they're taking the leading role, as appropriate.

Just landed in Seattle. No risk of sunburn here....

Thanks,
Scott

—

Scott W. Bray
Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence
Director, Naval Intelligence Activity
(b) (6)

From: Aeschbach, Kelly A RADM USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

Date: Thursday, Feb 13, 2020, 09:41

To: (b) (6) Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV
N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)
Cc: Brown, Sandra SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6) Richardson, Andrew
G SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6), Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: RE: SSCI Brief from Jay Stratton

(b) (6),

Thanks. We'll work with Scott Bray and his team to shape the briefing/engagement accordingly. v/r,
Kelly

Kelly Aeschbach
Rear Admiral, United States Navy
Director, National Maritime Intelligence Integration Office
Commander, Office of Naval Intelligence

(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Thursday, February 13, 2020 12:37 PM
To: Aeschbach, Kelly A RADM USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6); Bray,
Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)
Cc: Brown, Sandra SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6); Richardson,
Andrew G SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6) Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI
WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: RE: SSCI Brief from Jay Stratton

Ma'am,

Admiral Kohler shares your concerns based upon his reaction to this morning's verbal report of this

Hill request.

Very Respectfully,

(b) (6)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

From: Aeschbach, Kelly A RADM USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
Sent: Thursday, February 13, 2020 7:47 AM
To: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)
Cc: Brown, Sandra SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6); Richardson, Andrew G SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]; Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA)
(b) (6)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Subject: FW: SSCI Brief from Jay Stratton

Scott,

I do not support Jay doing this engagement unless USD(I) attends. I request that you personally engage Neil Tipton to ensure that they attend. I think this is the right opportunity to discuss USD(I)'S role going forward; they promised to take a lead role in the meeting Lynn and I attended in Dec.

(b) (6) Chief, CI/CT for USD(I), was identified as the lead.

Jay can help present where we have come from but USD(I) needs to address the way forward. Lynn's intent in Dec was also to specifically address what we know. Jay is currently working on this paper. I recommend we shift the conversation from the history of the problem to what we are doing about it in support of USD(I) and what we think/have learned to date. Lynn and I were very clear with USD(I) that the CNO and VADM Kohler do want the Navy in the driver's seat on this issue. We need to start leveraging these engagements to shape the landscape differently.

Let me know how I can support. v/r, Kelly

Kelly Aeschbach

Rear Admiral, United States Navy
Director, National Maritime Intelligence Integration Office
Commander, Office of Naval Intelligence

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Wednesday, February 12, 2020 11:06 AM

To: Aeschbach, Kelly A RADM USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6);
Richardson, Andrew G SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6);
Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

Subject: FW: SSCI Brief from Jay Stratton

Admiral,

FYSA.

Vr/

(b) (6)

From: Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

Sent: Wednesday, February 12, 2020 10:47 AM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: RE: SSCI Brief from Jay Stratton

All,

I can support the 25th. We've got a great relationship with this committee and don't expect any issues. I'll provide them with a quick baseline of where we started, where we are at and where we are going. I'll also be prepared to address resourced if I'm asked.

V/r, Jay

Jay Stratton
Senior Analyst (DISL), General Military Intelligence
Nimitz Operational Intelligence Center
Office of Naval Intelligence

(b) (6) [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

From: (b) (6) [REDACTED]
Date: Wednesday, Feb 12, 2020, 7:25 AM
To: OPNAV ALL N2N6 Front Office (b) (6) [REDACTED], OPNAV N2N6I Front Office (b) (6) [REDACTED], Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
Cc: (b) (6) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
Subject: SSCI Brief from Jay Stratton

CAPT,

Good morning. The SSCI desires a briefing on 25 Feb from Jay Stratton. This will be the UAP brief for the SSCI Members that was previously scheduled but cancelled. Previously, OUSD(I&S) senior leadership would also attend along with (b) (6) [REDACTED].

Communication is ongoing between OUSD(I&S) and SSCI PSMs currently. They are pushing back on the 25 Feb date as that is in the middle of the budget roll out and hearings. TBD. Overall, we in OLA likely need to know if VADM Kohler or Mr. Bray desire to attend this session.

Cheers

(b) (6) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(b) (6) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Tuesday, December 15, 2020 9:17 AM

To: Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA)

(b) (6); Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I

(b) (6); Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)

(b) (6)

Subject: RE: Query

Good Morning,

I hope that everyone is having a good holiday in spite of the challenges that we face. I was following back up to request a copy of the DepSecDef memorandum establishing the UAP Taskforce.

v/r

(b) (6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)

(b) (6)

Sent: Thursday, October 1, 2020 5:54 PM

To: (b) (6)

(b) (6) Stratton, John F (Jay)

SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6); Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV

N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: RE: Query

(b) (6),

Happy to support. Navy generally briefs the program activities and status and I am happy to fill in any gaps from the OSD level. I'll defer to Navy to set up the best time with you.

Thanks!

Matt

Matthew C. Cummings, DISL

(b) (6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Thursday, October 1, 2020 5:34 PM

To: (b) (6)

Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6);
Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6);
Cc: Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)
(b) (6); (b) (6)

Subject: RE: Query

Thank you all for your assistance and I will stand by for more information.
I would also like to suggest that we combine the briefings from Navy and
OUSD(I&S) if possible.

v/r

(b) (6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Tuesday, September 29, 2020 12:13 PM

To: (b) (6) Stratton, John F
(Jay) SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6); Bray, Scott W SES
OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)

Cc: Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)

(b) (6)

Subject: RE: Query

(b) (6),

Jay Stratton (also in the 'to' line).. leads the UAP Task Force effort for
Navy... working directly for Scott Bray, our Deputy Director of Naval
Intelligence.

They will be in touch to discuss setting up a briefing for you and your
leadership.

Regards,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, September 29, 2020 12:03 PM
To: (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
(b) (6); Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL
(USA) (b) (6)
Subject: RE: Query

Hello, (b) (6),
(b) (6) should be able to coordinate with the appropriate Navy officials for you for a briefing, which would be classified. For OUSD(I&S), recommend you contact Mr. Matt Cummings, cc'd.

Regards,

(b) (6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, September 29, 2020 11:30 AM
To: (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: Query

Good Morning,

(FOUO) First as an introduction, I am (b) (6), Program Director for Intelligence within the Evaluations Component of the DoD Office of Inspector General. I am trying to obtain points of contact within the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (USD[I&S]) familiar with the submission in the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2020. Specifically, the Classified Annex to the Senate Armed Services Committee Report on S.1790, submission titled "Advanced Operational Capabilities Collection, Exploitation, and Research."

(FOUO) My leadership and I would like to obtain a briefing on the unexplained airborne activities and obtain an understand of the current efforts/programs in place and actions the Office of Naval Intelligence and OUSD(I&S) are taking to collect, exploit, and analyze the data on these phenomena. If this discussion needs to be taking to a higher system I am including my contact information below. I would appreciate any information you have.

v/r

(b) (6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Friday, September 25, 2020 3:56 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: RE: Query

(b) (6),

What is your question?

Regards,

(b) (6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Friday, September 25, 2020 3:50 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Subject: Query

(b) (6),

I am including the UAP team here to follow up on your query.

Thanks!

V/r,

(b) (6)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

From: [Aeschbach, Kelly A RADM USN ONI WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#)
Subject: FW: Article with Follow up query from (b) (6)
Date: Friday, December 4, 2020 12:17:34 PM

Scott,

Do you still want Jay included on these types of e-mails? v/r, Kelly

Kelly Aeschbach
Rear Admiral, United States Navy
Director, National Maritime Intelligence Integration Office
Commander, Office of Naval Intelligence

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Thursday, December 3, 2020 2:37 PM
To: (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6) Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN DCNO N2N6
(USA) (b) (6)
(b) (6) OPNAV ALL N2N6 Front Office
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: Article with Follow up query from (b) (6)

CHINFO Team, (b) (6)

The UAP article below (it was in my IW News Clips this morning... (b) (6) --- I've added you to the daily distro) mentions a still photo of a UAP supposedly taken by an F/A 18 pilot using his cellphone. See the portion highlighted.

That article has generated a follow-on query today from (b) (6) :

"I'm told there really is a cell phone picture taken by an F-18 pilot last year of a triangular shaped UFO. It's part of a classified briefing, but is the cell phone picture itself classified? If the Navy's policy is to release material that would have to be released in response to an FOIA request, can you release the photo? Or do I have to file an FOIA request? If so, who should it go to?

I told (b) (6) (by email) I was trying to contact my expert to get some details on that claim... and that I would get back to him.

No word yet.

CHINFO (b) (6),

Wanted to make sure you were aware in case (b) (6) contacted you.

Will keep you posted on what I learn.

Regards,

(b) (6)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

'Fast Movers' and Transmedium Vehicles – The Pentagon's Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force

The Debrief, 2 December 2020... by Tim McMillan

In an exclusive feature for The Debrief, U.S. military and intelligence officials, as well as Pentagon emails, offer an unprecedented glimpse behind the scenes of what's currently going on with The Pentagon's investigation into UFOs, or as they term them, "Unidentified Aerial Phenomena" (UAP).

For the last two years, the Department of Defense's newly revamped "Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force" (or UAPTf) has been busy briefing lawmakers, Intelligence Community stakeholders, and the highest levels of the U.S. military on encounters with what they say are mysterious airborne objects that defy conventional explanations.

Along with classified briefings, multiple senior U.S. officials with direct knowledge of the matter say two classified intelligence reports on UAP have been widely distributed to the U.S. Intelligence Community. Numerous sources from various government agencies told The Debrief that these reports include clear photographic evidence of UAP. The reports also explicitly state that the Task Force is considering the possibility that these unidentified objects could, as stated by one source from the U.S. Intelligence Community said, be operated by "intelligences of unknown origin."

Significantly, a retired U.S. Air Force brigadier general and head of RAND corporation's Space Enterprise Initiative has—for the first time—gone on record to discuss some of the most likely explanations for UAP. His responses were surprising.

Briefings At The Highest Levels

In June, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence's FY2021 Intelligence Authorization Act contained an intriguing section titled report on "Advanced Aerial Threats." In the inclusion, the committee gave an eye-opening official hint (in recent history) the government takes UFOs seriously by offering its support for the "efforts of the Unidentified Aerial Phenomenon Task Force at the Office of Naval Intelligence." The Intelligence Committee additionally requested an unclassified report detailing the analysis of "UAP" or "Anomalous Aerial Vehicles."

Though already acknowledged by the Intelligence Committee, in mid-August, the Pentagon formally acknowledged they had established a task force looking into UAP. In a press announcement, the Secretary of Defense's Office stated, "the UAPTF's mission will be to detect, analyze and catalog UAPs that could potentially pose a threat to U.S. national security." According to the release, authority for the Task Force was approved by the DoD's chief operating officer, Deputy Secretary of Defense David L. Norquist.

The summer news of the establishment of the UAPTF seemingly suggests—for the first time since the shuttering of Project Blue Book (the Air Force's official investigations into UFOs) in 1969—that the Pentagon is now taking the subject of UFOs seriously.

However, an internal email obtained by The Debrief shows that almost one year before the DoD's announcement, the highest levels of the U.S. military were already being briefed on UAP.

The email, obtained via Freedom of Information Act request, shows an October 16th, 2019 exchange between then Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Robert Burke, and current Vice Chief of Staff for the Air Force General Stephen "Steve" Wilson.

In the email, Adm. Burke tells Gen. Wilson, "Recommend you take the brief I just received from our Director of Naval Intelligence VADM Matt Kohler, on Unidentified Aerial Phenomena (UAP)." Adm. Burke concludes the email, "SECNAV [Secretary of the Navy] will get the same brief tomorrow at 1000."

The "SECNAV" referenced in Adm. Burke's email was then-Secretary of the Navy, Richard V. Spencer. A little over a month after this UAP briefing, Spencer was fired by then-Secretary of Defense Mark Esper over public disagreements stemming from a series of controversies involving the court-martial of Navy SEAL Eddie Gallagher.

Speaking on background, one U.S. Defense official lamented that a lack of continuity with DoD leadership might have hindered some of the UAPTF's work. Within the past 24 months, there have been four different Secretaries of the Navy and five additional Secretaries of Defense. Vice Admiral Matt Kohler, noted for having provided the briefings, retired after 36 years with the Navy in June of this year.

Reaching out to several active government officials and individuals who retain their government-issued security clearances, The Debrief learned that last fall was a busy time for the UAPTF. On October 21st, 2019, a briefing on

UAP was conducted at the Pentagon for several Senate Armed Services Committee staffers.

Attendees at the meeting told The Debrief that they were provided information on two previous DoD-backed UFO programs: The Advanced Aerial Weapons Systems Applications Program (AAWSAP) and the Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program (AATIP). They were also briefed on “highly sensitive categories of UFO investigations.” Only two days later on October 23rd, staffers with the Senate Select Intelligence Committee were provided the same information in a meeting on Capitol Hill.

A former private contractor for AAWSAP and AATIP, Dr. Hal Puthoff, confirmed for The Debrief he was one of a handful of persons who conducted the October briefings. “I have been invited to brief congressional staffers on the Senate Armed Services Committee on UAP matters in the last couple of years,” Puthoff said in an email, “and have done so on more than one occasion.” Dr. Puthoff described the staffers during these meetings as being “engaged,” and provided “positive responses, [and] more details always being requested.”

The Debrief reached out to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Office and DoD Executive Services Office and formally requested an interview with someone authorized to speak on the UAP briefings with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In an email, Senior Strategist and Pentagon spokesperson Susan Gough responded, “To maintain operations security, which includes not disseminating information publicly that may be useful to our adversaries, DOD does not discuss publicly the details of either the observations or the examination of reported incursions into our training ranges or designated airspace, including those incursions initially designated as UAP – and that includes not discussing the UAPTF publicly, also.”

Official public affairs channels indicate the Pentagon is not interested in sharing any more information on the UAP topic. However, several current and former officials with the DoD and individuals working for multiple U.S. intelligence agencies told The Debrief that there was much more going on behind closed doors.

UAP Intelligence Position Reports

Multiple sources confirmed for The Debrief that the UAPTF had issued two classified intelligence position reports, which one individual described as “shocking.” Details provided on these reports suggest both a greater degree of Pentagon involvement, and that the UAPTF’s hunt for unidentified objects isn’t confined only to aerial phenomena.

Two officials with the DoD and one from the U.S. Intelligence community were willing to provide details on the contents of the classified report. An additional three other U.S. Intelligence Officials and a federal law enforcement officer confirmed the report’s existence but were only willing to provide comments on their distribution. Given the report’s classification and their discussion of a “sensitive intelligence matter,” the officials we spoke with did so only under strict conditions of anonymity. While The Debrief has agreed not to provide information on sources, identities, and employers, though everyone we spoke with works within the U.S. Intelligence Community and under the authority of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence.

One of the intelligence reports, released in 2018, is said to have provided a general overview of the UAP topic and included details of previous military encounters. According to sources who had read it, the report also contained an unreleased photograph of an “aerial phenomena” categorized as “unidentified.”

The Debrief was told the accompanying photo was captured from within the cockpit of an F/A-18 fighter jet with a pilot’s personal cell phone. According to three U.S. officials who had seen it, the photo showed an unidentified silver

“cube-shaped” object. The report is said to have indicated the object was “hovering” or completely motionless when military pilots encountered it. All three officials agreed that based on the photo, the object appeared to be at an altitude of roughly 30,000 to 35,000 feet and approximately 1,000 feet from the fighter jet.

Defense and intelligence officials willing to discuss the report and those who only wished to confirm its dissemination all expressed shock that it had been so widely distributed amongst the Intelligence community.

“In decades with the [Intelligence Community] I’ve never seen anything like this,” said one intelligence official.

One defense official described the report’s distribution as having gone through “normal, non-public, information sharing channels.” Other officials who’d seen and read the report either declined to elaborate or indicated the report was distributed on various secure systems. One defense official indicated it was distributed on the DoD’s Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet). Two other intelligence officials said they received the information via “NSANet” (the NSA’s official intranet). An additional source said the report was distributed via the CIA’s Intelink system.

According to those willing to discuss the document, the report’s most disconcerting aspect was one of the potential explanations for what UAP could represent. Sources say a “list” of possible prosaic explanations for these mysterious airborne encounters was provided. However, the report expressly stated that the potential for UAP to be “alien” or “non-human” technology was of legitimate consideration.

All sources interviewed by The Debrief confirmed that the Task Force issued an updated second UAP position report later in the summer of this year. Like the first, officials say this recent intelligence report was very widely distributed and shared amongst the Intelligence Community.

“It went viral,” said one intelligence official who had read the report.

Overwhelmingly, everyone The Debrief spoke with said the most striking feature of the recently released UAPTF intelligence position report was the inclusion of new and “extremely clear” photograph of an unidentifiable triangular aircraft.

The photograph, which is said to have also been taken from inside the cockpit of a military fighter jet, depicted an apparent aerospace vehicle described as a large equilateral triangle with rounded or “blunted” edges and large, perfectly spherical white “lights” in each corner. Officials who had seen it said the image was captured in 2019 by an F/A-18 fighter pilot.

Two officials that received the report said the photo was taken after the triangular craft emerged from the ocean and began to ascend straight upwards at a 90-degree angle. It was indicated that this event occurred off the eastern coast of the United States. Several other sources confirmed the photo’s existence; however, they declined to provide any further specifics of the incident.

Regarding the overall theme of the recent report, officials who read it say the report primarily focused on “Unidentified Submersible Phenomena,” or unidentified “transmedium” vehicles capable of operating both under water and in the air.

The three officials we spoke with said the report suggested the UAP Task Force appears to be concerned that the objects being termed as UAP may be originating from within the world's oceans. Strange as this may sound, the idea of "USOs" or "unidentified submersible objects" is not something exclusive to the current UAPTF.

In various public appearances, astronomer and chief video/image analyst for the Mutual UFO Network (MUFON), Marc D'Antonio, has shared an unusual experience involving the detection of an underwater "Fast Mover," which occurred while he was sailing as a civilian aboard one of the U.S. Navy's prized attack submarines.

Last year, defense journalist Tyler Rogoway spoke with several veteran submariners to get their take on D'Antonio's account. While at least one person expressed skepticism about D'Antonio being granted a civilian ride-along, the Navy vets being interviewed almost unanimously acknowledged that unexplained, very high-speed sonar targets are indeed recorded by some of the most sophisticated listening equipment on the planet.

Agreeing only to speak on background, a senior member of the Intelligence Community whose responsibilities for decades involved underwater surveillance and reconnaissance programs told The Debrief there was validity to claims of extremely fast-moving underwater objects being detected by U.S. military systems.

"On occasion, there are detections made of non-cavitational, extremely fast-moving objects within the ocean." The intelligence official declined to elaborate further, citing the high-levels of security classification associated with underwater reconnaissance.

Officials who had read the reports say the UAPTF appears particularly interested in "transmedium vehicles." While this may seem unusual, many accounts exist—some going back centuries—in which people say they have observed unidentifiable craft operating in and out of the water.

The Debrief reached out to Steven Zaloga, co-author of the annual World Military Unmanned Aerial Systems Market Profile & Forecast and senior defense analyst for the Teal Group in Virginia, about the state of current or near-future development of "transmedium" vehicles or systems. Zaloga indicated he was unaware of any past or present technologies that are close to being capable of transitioning between air and submersible travel. "I have no idea what-so-ever on objects able to cross the air/water barrier," Zaloga said in an email.

What is The Pentagon Officially Saying ABOUT UAP?

Although The Debrief learned of the issuance and information reportedly detailed in the two UAPTF intelligence position reports, officials we spoke with declined to provide any specifics as to why the most recent report focused on waterborne associations with UAP.

One active defense official familiar with the current UAP investigations said the UAPTF has a wealth of photographic evidence, collected from military pilots' personal devices as well as sophisticated DoD surveillance and reconnaissance platforms. The source also told us some of the best evidence the UAPTF has acquired comes from measurement and signals intelligence (MASINT), rather than from videos or still images.

Although officials we spoke with didn't provide any specifics to this point, it is assumed that any Top-Secret or Sensitive Compartmentalized Information used to help form the UAPTF's current opinions would not have been included in the UAP position reports, based on their wide-spread distribution.

Before publication, The Debrief reached out to The Pentagon for comment on the information leaked from the UAPTF reports. Pentagon Spokesperson Susan Gough did not confirm or deny the existence of the UAP intelligence reports, and declined to make any comment on their contents. We followed up and requested the current media posture outlined by the official public affairs guide for UAP and dictated by Department of Defense policy (DoDI 5405.03). Ms. Gough referred back to her previous statement, indicating that the DoD does not discuss UAP publicly. As noted elsewhere, refusal by the Pentagon to discuss UAP is hardly anything new.

In 2017, then Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Dana White confirmed to Politico that the DoD had studied UFOs under the Advanced Aerial Threat Identification Program (AATIP). Additionally, White said the program had been run by the former Director of National Programs Special Management Staff for the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence, Luis Elizondo. However, in an effort to “correct the record,” in December 2019 the Pentagon issued a statement saying AATIP was not UAP related, and that Elizondo had “no responsibilities” in the program.

In May of this year, The Debrief informed The Pentagon Public Affairs Office that we had conducted a number of interviews with former senior Pentagon officials, a senior White House advisor and obtained documents, which all showed AATIP was involved in UAP investigations, and that indeed Luis Elizondo was the custodian of the AATIP portfolio. Additionally, information obtained showed elements of the Defense Intelligence Agency and National Reconnaissance Office had participated in AATIP.

Though this request was less than six months after The Pentagon’s “no responsibilities” statement, spokeswoman Gough replied, “Please keep in mind he [Elizondo] left DoD over three years ago, and there are personnel and privacy matters involved.”

Given the recent Presidential election results and impending transfer of executive power, The Debrief reached out to the transition team for President-Elect Joe Biden. While not explicitly discussing UAP, a transition team spokesperson said Biden intends to “Immediately return to daily press briefings at the White House, U.S. Department of State, and U.S. Department of Defense. Our foreign policy relies on the informed consent of the American people. That is not possible when our government refuses to communicate with the public.”

What Does It All Mean?

From closed-door meetings, to senior military leadership and the issuance of classified intelligence reports, all indications suggest the DoD is indeed taking the UAP issue seriously. However, what new information has come to light about the government’s UAP investigations provides us with few answers, and certainly raises a number of questions.

Classification has long surrounded the U.S. government’s most sophisticated airborne platforms. However, when it comes to underwater systems, the extremity of official secrecy falls into a class by itself. For instance, retired Navy Admiral Bobby Ray Inman acknowledged that he served as director for the National Underwater Reconnaissance Office (NURO) decades ago; yet despite this, to date the government denies that the NURO even exists.

Even if the Senate Select Intelligence Committee’s request for an unclassified UAP report ends up being enacted in the FY2021 Intelligence Act, as legislative experts have pointed out, the UAP report provision is not not binding law.

In essence, there's no guarantee the public will be provided any comprehensive information on UAP. Equally, while Congress is required to have access to classified information, only the executive branch has the authority to declassify national security information in order to make it public.

Should the DoD become more willing to discuss UAP publicly, there are plenty of indications that it might be a disappointment compared to many of the popular myths and narratives intertwined with the UFO subject over the last 70 years.

Every source The Debrief spoke with who had either seen the published position reports or were familiar with the activities of the UAPTF said that no concise estimate of the situation for UAP has been achieved. While they acknowledged that many hypotheses are being explored, the U.S. government presently lacks any definite explanation for UAP-related events.

Focusing on the DoD's statements that the mission of the UAPTF is to "detect, analyze and catalog UAPs that could potentially pose a threat to U.S. national security," The Debrief spoke with retired U.S. Air Force Brigadier General Bruce McClintock.

During his 30-year career with the Air Force, McClintock's assignments included White House Fellow to President George W. Bush, Executive Assistant to the Commander of NORAD, Executive Assistant to the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Special Assistant to the Commander of Air Force Space Command. Before retiring in 2017, Gen. McClintock amassed more than 3,000 flight hours on more than 35 aircraft, including the A-10, F-15B/D, F-16A/B/C/D, and the F-111. Presently, Gen. McClintock heads up the RAND corporation's Space Enterprise Initiative and serves as the focal point for all RAND space-related research for the U.S. government and U.S. allies.

McClintock was dismissive of the idea that U.S. military encounters with UAP could be related to any form of classified aerospace testing.

"It is unlikely that the U.S. government would intentionally conduct tests against its own unwitting military assets," he told The Debrief in an interview. "To do so would require a very high level of coordination and approval for the potential safety and operational security risks."

In separate interviews last year, aerospace engineer and Area-51 veteran T.D. Barnes and former CIA executive S. Eugene "Gene" Poteat both suggested radar detections by the Navy of extreme aerial maneuvers sounded suspiciously similar to a top-secret electronic warfare program they were involved with in the 1960s, codenamed PALLADIUM.

However, Poteat and Barnes acknowledged they had no explanation for any of the physical sightings by military aviators. Coinciding with Gen. McClintock's comments, both men said everyone involved in any classified assessments involving the use of classified aerospace platforms was made aware they were participating in a test. This even included times when the platforms were deemed "UFOs because they were so secret that they didn't exist."

McClintock, who also served as Senior Defense Attaché to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, seemed equally doubtful that UAP might represent the technology of a foreign adversary.

“It is not outside the realm of the plausible that an adversary would test the ability of the United States to detect some new capability, although it would be more likely they would only do this after testing the capability within or closer to their own territory before trying to penetrate U.S. airspace,” he stated.

Ultimately, after asking numerous current and former defense officials and subject matter experts, The Debrief has been unable to find anyone of authority—whether on, or off the record—willing to say the UAP encounters reported by military aviators are consistent with black budget testing, or “ferreting” of U.S. air defense by foreign governments. Equally, we have been unable to find anyone of credentialed background willing to say what, exactly, this means the source of these UAP could be.

Offering The Pentagon one final opportunity to discuss what we intended to report or comment on McClintock’s statement, The Debrief once more reached out to spokeswoman Susan Gough. Our offer went unanswered.

At least from an official position, the source behind unidentified aerial phenomena appears to remain a mystery.

[Article](#)

From: (b) (6)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6](#); [Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: FW: Article with Follow up query from (b) (6)
Date: Thursday, December 3, 2020 3:31:16 PM

Mr. Bray, Ms. Brown,

FYSA, you'll want to be aware of the below.

V/R,

(b) (6)

Very Respectfully,

(b) (6)

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From: (b) (6)
Sent: Thursday, December 3, 2020 3:03 PM
To: (b) (6)
Subject: FW: Article with Follow up query from (b) (6) (CBS)

FYI.

This issue continues to attract interest from (b) (6), who CHINFO takes very seriously.

No action required. Just for your SA. DDNI can be informed whenever this issue next comes up during end of day, passdown or prep.

V/r,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Thursday, December 3, 2020 2:37 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN DCNO N2N6

(USA) (b) (6)

Subject: Article with Follow up query from (b) (6)

CHINFO Team, (b) (6),

The UAP article below (it was in my IW News Clips this morning... (b) (6) --- I've added you to the daily distro) mentions a still photo of a UAP supposedly taken by an F/A 18 pilot using his cellphone. See the portion highlighted.

That article has generated a follow-on query today from David Martin of CBS:

"I'm told there really is a cell phone picture taken by an F-18 pilot last year of a triangular shaped UFO. It's part of a classified briefing, but is the cell phone picture itself classified? If the Navy's policy is to release material that would have to be released in response to an FOIA request, can you release the photo? Or do I have to file an FOIA request? If so, who should it go to?

I told David (by email) I was trying to contact my expert to get some details on that claim... and that I would get back to him.

No word yet.

CHINFO/ (b) (6),

Wanted to make sure you were aware in case David contacted you.

Will keep you posted on what I learn.

Regards,

(b) (6)

‘Fast Movers’ and Transmedium Vehicles – The Pentagon’s Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force

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Along with classified briefings, multiple senior U.S. officials with direct knowledge of the matter say two classified intelligence reports on UAP have been widely distributed to the U.S. Intelligence Community. Numerous sources from various government agencies told The Debrief that these reports include clear photographic evidence of UAP. The reports also explicitly state that the Task Force is considering the possibility that these unidentified objects could, as stated by one source from the U.S. Intelligence Community said, be operated by “intelligences of unknown origin.”

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Two officials that received the report said the photo was taken after the triangular craft emerged from the ocean and began to ascend straight upwards at a 90-degree angle. It was indicated that this event occurred off the eastern coast of the United States. Several other sources confirmed the photo’s existence; however, they declined to provide any further specifics of the incident.

Regarding the overall theme of the recent report, officials who read it say the report primarily focused on “Unidentified Submersible Phenomena,” or unidentified “transmedium” vehicles capable of operating both under water and in the air.

The three officials we spoke with said the report suggested the UAP Task Force appears to be concerned that the objects being termed as UAP may be originating from within the world’s oceans. Strange as this may sound, the idea of “USOs” or “unidentified submersible objects” is not something exclusive to the current UAPTF.

In various public appearances, astronomer and chief video/image analyst for the Mutual UFO Network (MUFON), Marc D’Antonio, has shared an unusual experience involving the detection of an underwater “Fast Mover,” which occurred while he was sailing as a civilian aboard one of the U.S. Navy’s prized attack submarines.

Last year, defense journalist Tyler Rogoway spoke with several veteran submariners to get their take on D’Antonio’s account. While at least one person expressed skepticism about D’Antonio being granted a civilian ride-along, the

Navy vets being interviewed almost unanimously acknowledged that unexplained, very high-speed sonar targets are indeed recorded by some of the most sophisticated listening equipment on the planet.

Agreeing only to speak on background, a senior member of the Intelligence Community whose responsibilities for decades involved underwater surveillance and reconnaissance programs told The Debrief there was validity to claims of extremely fast-moving underwater objects being detected by U.S. military systems.

“On occasion, there are detections made of non-cavitational, extremely fast-moving objects within the ocean.” The intelligence official declined to elaborate further, citing the high-levels of security classification associated with underwater reconnaissance.

Officials who had read the reports say the UAPTF appears particularly interested in “transmedium vehicles.” While this may seem unusual, many accounts exist—some going back centuries—in which people say they have observed unidentifiable craft operating in and out of the water.

The Debrief reached out to Steven Zaloga, co-author of the annual World Military Unmanned Aerial Systems Market Profile & Forecast and senior defense analyst for the Teal Group in Virginia, about the state of current or near-future development of “transmedium” vehicles or systems. Zaloga indicated he was unaware of any past or present technologies that are close to being capable of transitioning between air and submersible travel. “I have no idea what-so-ever on objects able to cross the air/water barrier,” Zaloga said in an email.

What is The Pentagon Officially Saying ABOUT UAP?

Although The Debrief learned of the issuance and information reportedly detailed in the two UAPTF intelligence position reports, officials we spoke with declined to provide any specifics as to why the most recent report focused on waterborne associations with UAP.

One active defense official familiar with the current UAP investigations said the UAPTF has a wealth of photographic evidence, collected from military pilots’ personal devices as well as sophisticated DoD surveillance and reconnaissance platforms. The source also told us some of the best evidence the UAPTF has acquired comes from measurement and signals intelligence (MASINT), rather than from videos or still images.

Although officials we spoke with didn’t provide any specifics to this point, it is assumed that any Top-Secret or Sensitive Compartmentalized Information used to help form the UAPTF’s current opinions would not have been included in the UAP position reports, based on their wide-spread distribution.

Before publication, The Debrief reached out to The Pentagon for comment on the information leaked from the UAPTF reports. Pentagon Spokesperson Susan Gough did not confirm or deny the existence of the UAP intelligence reports, and declined to make any comment on their contents. We followed up and requested the current media posture outlined by the official public affairs guide for UAP and dictated by Department of Defense policy (DoDI 5405.03). Ms. Gough referred back to her previous statement, indicating that the DoD does not discuss UAP publicly. As noted elsewhere, refusal by the Pentagon to discuss UAP is hardly anything new.

In 2017, then Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Dana White confirmed to Politico that the DoD had studied UFOs under the Advanced Aerial Threat Identification Program (AATIP). Additionally, White said the

program had been run by the former Director of National Programs Special Management Staff for the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence, Luis Elizondo. However, in an effort to “correct the record,” in December 2019 the Pentagon issued a statement saying AATIP was not UAP related, and that Elizondo had “no responsibilities” in the program.

In May of this year, The Debrief informed The Pentagon Public Affairs Office that we had conducted a number of interviews with former senior Pentagon officials, a senior White House advisor and obtained documents, which all showed AATIP was involved in UAP investigations, and that indeed Luis Elizondo was the custodian of the AATIP portfolio. Additionally, information obtained showed elements of the Defense Intelligence Agency and National Reconnaissance Office had participated in AATIP.

Though this request was less than six months after The Pentagon’s “no responsibilities” statement, spokeswoman Gough replied, “Please keep in mind he [Elizondo] left DoD over three years ago, and there are personnel and privacy matters involved.”

Given the recent Presidential election results and impending transfer of executive power, The Debrief reached out to the transition team for President-Elect Joe Biden. While not explicitly discussing UAP, a transition team spokesperson said Biden intends to “Immediately return to daily press briefings at the White House, U.S. Department of State, and U.S. Department of Defense. Our foreign policy relies on the informed consent of the American people. That is not possible when our government refuses to communicate with the public.”

What Does It All Mean?

From closed-door meetings, to senior military leadership and the issuance of classified intelligence reports, all indications suggest the DoD is indeed taking the UAP issue seriously. However, what new information has come to light about the government’s UAP investigations provides us with few answers, and certainly raises a number of questions.

Classification has long surrounded the U.S. government’s most sophisticated airborne platforms. However, when it comes to underwater systems, the extremity of official secrecy falls into a class by itself. For instance, retired Navy Admiral Bobby Ray Inman acknowledged that he served as director for the National Underwater Reconnaissance Office (NURO) decades ago; yet despite this, to date the government denies that the NURO even exists.

Even if the Senate Select Intelligence Committee’s request for an unclassified UAP report ends up being enacted in the FY2021 Intelligence Act, as legislative experts have pointed out, the UAP report provision is not not binding law. In essence, there’s no guarantee the public will be provided any comprehensive information on UAP. Equally, while Congress is required to have access to classified information, only the executive branch has the authority to declassify national security information in order to make it public.

Should the DoD become more willing to discuss UAP publicly, there are plenty of indications that it might be a disappointment compared to many of the popular myths and narratives intertwined with the UFO subject over the last 70 years.

Every source The Debrief spoke with who had either seen the published position reports or were familiar with the activities of the UAPTF said that no concise estimate of the situation for UAP has been achieved. While they

acknowledged that many hypotheses are being explored, the U.S. government presently lacks any definite explanation for UAP-related events.

Focusing on the DoD's statements that the mission of the UAPTF is to "detect, analyze and catalog UAPs that could potentially pose a threat to U.S. national security," The Debrief spoke with retired U.S. Air Force Brigadier General Bruce McClintock.

During his 30-year career with the Air Force, McClintock's assignments included White House Fellow to President George W. Bush, Executive Assistant to the Commander of NORAD, Executive Assistant to the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Special Assistant to the Commander of Air Force Space Command. Before retiring in 2017, Gen. McClintock amassed more than 3,000 flight hours on more than 35 aircraft, including the A-10, F-15B/D, F-16A/B/C/D, and the F-111. Presently, Gen. McClintock heads up the RAND corporation's Space Enterprise Initiative and serves as the focal point for all RAND space-related research for the U.S. government and U.S. allies.

McClintock was dismissive of the idea that U.S. military encounters with UAP could be related to any form of classified aerospace testing.

"It is unlikely that the U.S. government would intentionally conduct tests against its own unwitting military assets," he told The Debrief in an interview. "To do so would require a very high level of coordination and approval for the potential safety and operational security risks."

In separate interviews last year, aerospace engineer and Area-51 veteran T.D. Barnes and former CIA executive S. Eugene "Gene" Poteat both suggested radar detections by the Navy of extreme aerial maneuvers sounded suspiciously similar to a top-secret electronic warfare program they were involved with in the 1960s, codenamed PALLADIUM.

However, Poteat and Barnes acknowledged they had no explanation for any of the physical sightings by military aviators. Coinciding with Gen. McClintock's comments, both men said everyone involved in any classified assessments involving the use of classified aerospace platforms was made aware they were participating in a test. This even included times when the platforms were deemed "UFOs because they were so secret that they didn't exist."

McClintock, who also served as Senior Defense Attaché to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, seemed equally doubtful that UAP might represent the technology of a foreign adversary.

"It is not outside the realm of the plausible that an adversary would test the ability of the United States to detect some new capability, although it would be more likely they would only do this after testing the capability within or closer to their own territory before trying to penetrate U.S. airspace," he stated.

Ultimately, after asking numerous current and former defense officials and subject matter experts, The Debrief has been unable to find anyone of authority—whether on, or off the record—willing to say the UAP encounters reported by military aviators are consistent with black budget testing, or "ferreting" of U.S. air defense by foreign governments. Equally, we have been unable to find anyone of credentialed background willing to say what, exactly, this means the source of these UAP could be.

Offering The Pentagon one final opportunity to discuss what we intended to report or comment on McClintock's statement, The Debrief once more reached out to spokeswoman Susan Gough. Our offer went unanswered.

At least from an official position, the source behind unidentified aerial phenomena appears to remain a mystery.

[Article](#)

From: [Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO \(USA\)](#)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#)
Subject: synch
Date: Wednesday, December 2, 2020 1:13:17 PM

Scott, I am sitting in on both a J2 and a J6 VTC on separate terminals at the moment....effectively participating or absorbing neither!!

I need a quick chat today on UAP. I have a meeting with (b) (6) tomorrow and want to have org structure, other recent plans/efforts in my hip pocket. I don't intend to take or present anything but need to be ready to discuss enough level to calm them down.

Vr, JT

From: [Gradisher, Joseph F CIV USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#)
To: [Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO \(USA\)](#)
Cc: [OPNAV ALL N2N6 USERS](#)
Subject: CHINFO Talkers - Briefing Cards- IW related
Date: Tuesday, November 10, 2020 1:24:59 PM
Attachments: [Cybersecurity Awareness Month Briefing Card 24 September 2020.docx](#)
[UAP Briefing Card 24 July 2020.docx](#)
[UAP Briefing Card 27 Aug 2020.docx](#)
[CHINFO BRIEFING CARD 23DEC19 TikTok.docx](#)
[CHINFO BRIEFING CARD - Triton 9JAN20.docx](#)
[BRIEFING CARD 20200327 UAP.docx](#)
[CHINFO BRIEFING CARD AI June 2020.docx](#)
[CHINFO BRIef ing Card JADC2 20200605.docx](#)

Sir,

As requested...

I went through the CHINFO Talkers collections back to last December.

The 8 that are attached are the pulls that revolve around IW-related topics.

Standing by should you need anything else, Sir.

V/R,

(b) (6)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(b) (6), (b) (5)

(b) (6), (b) (5)

From: (b) (6)
To: (b) (6); Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I; Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: half a loaf is still only half.....
Date: Tuesday, October 20, 2020 2:22:48 PM

(b) (5)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, October 20, 2020 2:13 PM
To: (b) (6); Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6); Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: half a loaf is still only half.....

Geez. There are so many inaccuracies in that that you almost don't know where to start....and virtually nothing we could say would make any difference to someone like that.

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, October 20, 2020 1:55 PM
To: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6); Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: FW: half a loaf is still only half.....

All,
FYI...

ONI Public Affairs received the note below in their inbox overnight.
An interesting list of recipients (and the cc at the end).

Also interesting is the errors in content in the last few paragraphs...

For example, "Naval Intelligence and the Pentagon have teamed up with a civilian top-notch UFO evidence-gathering team called the **To The Stars Academy** in order to provide the public continuing solid information about UFOs."

No action required that I see!

Regards,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Monday, October 19, 2020 8:59 PM

To: (b) (6); ONI PAO; Kelly Aeschbach RADM, Comoni, Naval Intelligence

Cc: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Subject: [Non-DoD Source] half a loaf is still only half.....

(news item posted on the Internet by me)

On July 23, 2020 the New York Times published **the US Government's announcement; UFOs are real, that the Government has for years studied UFOs**, and has secretly worked on understanding how they fly. Further, the Government has created an *Unidentified Aerial Phenomenon [UFO] Task Force* (UAPTF), which is in charge of examining UFO evidence and all information about them.

Thus does the UFO Cover-Up end:' not with a bang but a whimper.'

This Pentagon Task Force is run by the Office of Naval Intelligence, which pledges that from now on UFO matters will be handled 'with transparency'.

[50%?]

The Commander of the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) is Admiral Kelly Aeschbach. She oversees the collecting and analyzing of UFO information and *objects* which ONI receives from all the intelligence branches of U.S. Armed Services and its Allies. Admiral Aeschbach is also Director of ONI's sister National Maritime Intelligence-Integration Office, which does the assembling and organizing of that UFO information.

- This Unidentified Aerial Phenomenon Task Force includes: retired Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, and such top scientists as Hal Puthoff, Ph.D., a contractor physicist specializing in antigravity, quantum physics, interstellar flight, and extraterrestrial intelligence, and Eric Davis, a Ph.D. engineer and consultant, who in March **briefed the Defense Department about "retrievals of off-world vehicles not made on this Earth."** [UFOs]

Thus, ONI has possession of some UFOs.

- *President Trump says he has been informed of "very interesting" things about the Roswell crash*, but has not decided about whether he will declassify that information for public knowledge.

Stay tuned. Now that the UFO Cover-Up is ended, we can expect a regular flow of news about exotic stuff overhead that 'didn't used to exist.'

Naval Intelligence and the Pentagon have teamed up with a civilian top-notch UFO evidence-gathering team called the **To The Stars Academy** in order to provide the public continuing solid information about UFOs.

But note, **Naval Intelligence has not [yet] said anything about the *people* [ETs] piloting those UFOs.**

Come on, COMONI Adm. Aeschbach, *the American public want to know!!*
And we **have the right** to know.

- Richard Boylan, Ph.D., Earth's Councillor

(b) (6)

cc: President Trump/the White House

From: (b) (6)
To: Okon, John A RDML USN COMNAVMETCOM SSC (USA); Creighton, Kathleen M RADM USN DCNO N2N6 (USA); Barron, Claude E SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA); BrverJovner, Susan RDML USN DCNO N2N6 (USA); Miller, Christopher A SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA); Flynn, William A SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA); Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA); Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I; Ekstrom, Christopher R SES USN DCNO N2N6 (US); Treat (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: VCNO - A communications strategy
Date: Thursday, October 15, 2020 7:27:53 AM

Ladies and Gentlemen,

To reinforce DCNO's comments at DIVDIRS this week regarding the Vice Chief's approach to his engagements with the staff, below was offered from the VCNO's personal staff to guide our preparations for briefing him.

I think our next VCNO event is the UAPTF update.

Very Respectfully,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

Subject: VCNO - A communications strategy

Team -

Would like to assist you and your principals in learning how best to work together with VCNO. Consider it lessons learned from watching him engage, and conversations with him on the same (he might have even had some input on this email!).

Fundamentally, he wants to maximize the value of leadership bandwidth spent on any specific discussion... doing so by clearly stepping through the following elements:

Clear Problem Statement: What exactly are we trying to solve?

Outcome/End State: Characterize current state... then characterize forecast/desired future state or endstate. Where are we trying to go?

Metrics: How will we measure our path/progress towards the proposed end state?

Decisions Required: How will today's discussion move us forward?

Key Assumptions: Where are we assuming? Why are we?

Key Uncertainties: Not everything is absolute... say so.

Key Barriers/Limitations: Where are these barriers... what are these barriers... can

SECNAV/CNO/VCNO help to remove them?

Courses of Action: Clear/Concise/Distinctive.

Confidence Factor: On a scale of 0 to 100, how confident is the briefer on the recommendations provided, leading to the outcomes specified.

Think of it as one's willingness to stake their professional reputation on this position or recommendation.

Be prepared to be evaluated over time on the accuracy of your confidence factors.

Not everything is a 100; and, the key assumptions, uncertainties, and barriers provide useful input into the confidence factors.

Other Important Elements

Action does not equal a Plan. Activity does not equal outcomes. Many briefs show action... but not actions in coherency reflecting a deliberate plan to achieve a specific outcome.

A Plan must be measurable. "Better" or "Enhanced" without metrics and objectives are not satisfying. Follow-on/follow-up dates matter. Demonstrate that you are driving the solution to the problem.

Information vs. Decision Briefs. He's not a big fan of information-only sessions... if we're sitting down, there should be a reason (problem statement) and desired outcome. These are up to you to define, unless we've called you in because we've given you the problem statement.

Iterative is Best. VCNO is a fan of iteratively attacking hard issues. Don't wait until the rock is fully polished to discuss these elements. Bring in 30%, 50%, or 75% thinking on such issues to brainstorm solution approaches and check for alignment.

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

Copy, these are exactly the behaviors in staffers I want to discourage (particularly those intel reserve officers that abuse their position – this is an example). Vr, JT

To: Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO (USA) (b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6) Creighton, Kathleen M RADM USN DCNO N2N6 (USA)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

Subject: RE: 9 OCT OLA UPDATE

Good morning Admiral,

I fielded the RFI from HASC PSM, (b) (6) regarding DWO. He requested a "DWO 101" product he could read through on his own. I explained to him that data is platform agnostic hence the N9I/N2N6 collaboration. He's asked for products like this in the past such as a command brief on Cryptologic Warfare Activity Sixty Five (CWA 65) over at Fort Meade. He knows a lot of commands have pre-existing command briefs so the DWO 101 product is under the belief that N9 has an existing brief they can modify. From what I gathered from our conversation, the RFI was more for professional development rather than anything related to legislative initiatives or concerns.

(b) (6) so it's not uncommon for him to call me and discuss IWO topics on a professional development level. He seems eager to digest any Navy IWC topics and genuinely excited to learn more about the Navy.

V/r

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

From: Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO (USA) (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, October 12, 2020 9:47 AM
To: (b) (6)
Cc: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6); Miller, Christopher A SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6); Aeschbach, Kelly A RADM USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6); Richardson, Andrew G SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
(b) (6)

(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

[illegible]

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

Thanks (b) (6)!

 $V_{r, JT}$

Sent: Friday, October 9, 2020 3:19 PM

Cc: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6); Miller, Christopher A SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6); Aeschbach, Kelly A RADM USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6); Richardson, Andrew G SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

; Rathbun, Jane O SES USN ASSTSECNAV RDA DC (USA)

(b) (6)

Creighton, Kathleen M RADM USN DCNO N2N6 (USA)

(b) (6)

Subject: FW: 9 OCT OLA UPDATE

Admiral,

Please see below for a highlight of N2N6 interests in this week's Legislative Review and additional ongoing efforts.

Overview:

- The Senate is postponing floor activities due to COVID concerns and is scheduled to resume the week of 19 Oct, focusing on the nomination of Judge Barrett to the Supreme Court.
- The House is in recess until 13 Nov, but is prepared to return for votes on additional COVID legislation.
- Of note, conferencing has begun for the FY21 Intelligence Authorization Act between HPSCI and SSCI. Informal conferencing continues for the FY21 NDAA, with formal conferees likely to be appointed post-election.

Upcoming briefs:

- Classified Navy Intelligence Engineering Briefing. On 28 October, N2N6 representatives will present a classified briefing on the Navy Intelligence Engineering program to HPSCI and HAC-D PSMs. This brief is in preparation for FY21 NDAA conferencing and was postponed from 30 September.

Other Ongoing Efforts:

- Assisting N3/N5 in viewing a copy of the HPSCI China Deep Dive Report, issued May 2020.
- Supporting CLA with preparations for Congressional input to UAPTF EXCOM. Prep brief to RADM Joyner scheduled for 14 Oct.
- Received follow up questions from SSCI PSM regarding FY21 NDAA draft language on

Commercial Bathymetric Data, in support of SSCI/HPSCI conferencing. (Note: A secure call was held in May 2020 between HPSCI PSMs and N2N6E on the topic.) Working with N2N6E on coordinated response.

- Received request from SSCI PSM for a classified brief on Navy CI and NCIS efforts, in support of a SSCI holistic counterintelligence review across the IC. Scheduling is in progress for the week of 19 Oct.
- Received request for a program update brief from SSCI PSM for the Navy Intelligence Engineering Program, in support of FY21 NDAA conferencing. Scheduling is in progress.
- Received an inquiry from HASC PSM regarding the Digital Warfare Office (DWO) and N9/N2N6 collaboration. A coordinated response is in progress.

V/r,

(b) (6)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

From: Joyner, Sara A RDML USN OLA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, October 9, 2020 12:46 PM
To: Gilday, Michael M ADM USN CNO (USA) (b) (6)
Cc: Lescher, William K ADM USN VCNO (USA) (b) (6); Davidson, Philip S ADM USN INDOPACOM J00 (USA) (b) (6); Grady, Christopher W ADM USN USFFC (USA) (b) (6); Aquilino, John C ADM USN COMPACFLT PEARL HI (USA) (b) (6); Caldwell, James F Jr ADM USN (US) (b) (6); Haeuptle, Andrew S SES USN DNS (USA) (b) (6); Nowell, John B Jr VADM USN (USA) (b) (6); Sawyer, Phillip G VADM USN (USA) (b) (6); Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO (USA) (b) (6); Crites, Randy B VADM USN DCNO N8 (USA) (b) (6); Malloy, James Joseph (Jim) VADM USN CENTCOM CCCG (USA) (b) (6); Williamson, Ricky Lee VADM USN DCNO N4 (USA) (b) (6); Wolfe, Johnny VADM (b) (6); Bynum, James S (Jay) RADM USN DCNO N7 (USA) (b) (6); Kilby, James W VADM USN CNO (USA) (b) (6); Mustin, John B VADM USN CNO (USA) (b) (6); Lindsey, Yancy B VADM USN CNIC WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6); Lewis, Andrew L VADM USN SECOND FLEET (USA) (b) (6); Caudle, Daryl L VADM USN COMSUBLANT (USA) (b) (6); Peters, G Dean VADM USN COMNAVAIRSYS COM PAX (USA) (b) (6); Miller, DeWolfe H VADM USN COMNAVAIRPAC SAN CA (USA) (b) (6); Galinis, William J VADM USN (USA) (b) (6); Whitesell, Kenneth R VADM USN COMNAVAIRPAC (USA) (b) (6); Conn, Scott D VADM USN (USA) (b) (6);

Fuller, Scott K RDML USN DCNO N9 (USA) (b) (6); Harris, Gregory N (Hyfi) RADM USN CNO (USA) (b) (6); Dunn, Paula D RDML CHINFO, OI-00 (b) (6); Houston, William Joseph RADM USN DCNO N9 (USA) (b) (6); Stamatopoulos, Peter G RADM USN COMNAVSUPSYSCOM PA (USA) (b) (6); Garvin, Peter A RADM USN NETC PENSACOLA FL (USA) (b) (6); Mewbourne, Dee L VADM USN TRANSCOM TCDC (USA) (b) (6); Meier, John F RADM USN COMNAVAIRLANT NOR VA (USA) (b) (6); Kern, Erin M SES USN DCNO N4 (US) (b) (6); (b) (6); Darnell, Donald P SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6); Swartz, Matthew H SES USN USFFC (USA) (b) (6); Lluy, Paul A SES USN DCNO N9 (USA) (b) (6); Schlise, Paul J RDML USN CNO (USA) (b) (6); Holsey, Alvin RADM USN COMNAVAIRPAC (USA) (b) (6); King, Tracy W MajGen USMC USN DCNO N9 (USA) (b) (6); Brophy, Richard T Jr RDML USN NAWDC (USA) (b) (6); Jablon, Jeffrey T RADM USN DCNO N1 (USA) (b) (6); (b) (6); (b) (6); (b) (6); (b) (6); Gumbleton, John E RDML USN ASSTSECNAV FMC DC (USA) (b) (6); Anderson, Thomas J RDML USN COMNAVSEASYSYSCOM DC (USA) (b) (6); Schafer, Todd L SES USN ASSTSECNAV EIE DC (USA) (b) (6); Miguez, Marc Jeffrey RDML USN JS J3 (USA) (b) (6); Greene, William C RDML USN USFFC (USA) (b) (6); Krikorian, Victoria SES USN CNO (USA) (b) (6); O'Connor, Cathal S RDML USN JS J5 (USA) (b) (6); (b) (6); (b) (6); (b) (6); (b) (6); Spedero, Paul C Jr RDML USN USFFC (USA) (b) (6); (b) (6); (b) (6); Westendorff, Robert D RDML USN CNATRA (USA) (b) (6); (b) (6); Korka, John W RADM USN NAVFAC WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6); LaTorre, Jennifer A SES USN COMNAVFACENGCOM DC (USA) (b) (6); Clark, Robert T RDML USN (USA) (b) (6); Lemmon, John S RDML USN NAVAIRWARCENACDIV MD (USA) (b) (6); (b) (6); (b) (6); (b) (6); Genoble, Brett J SES USN DCNO N1 (USA) (b) (6); (b) (6); (b) (6);

(b) (6)

[REDACTED]

; Vitale, Louise A SES USN OLA WASHINGTON DC (USA)

(b) (6)

[REDACTED]

; Selby, Lorin C RADM USN CNR ARLINGTON VA (USA)

(b) (6)

; Livingston, Mark A SES USN CNO (USA)

(b) (6)

[REDACTED]

; Crandall, Darse E RADM USN NAVY JAG WASH DC (US)

(b) (6)

[REDACTED]

Skillman, John Bradley

RADM USN DCNO N8 (USA) (b) (6)

[REDACTED]

(b) (6)

Williams,
Thomas R (Tom) RDML USN CNO (USA) (b) (6)

Subject: 9 OCT OLA UPDATE

CNO,

(Routine // FYSA)

FNFS rollout: On hold pending SECDEF and OMB review. Working closely with OSD LA and CHINFO. Will schedule joint calls with DSD as needed and follow-on briefs to the Hill once the report is released.

Pensacola Investigation: Working closely with CHINFO and NETC on Pensacola notifications TBD next week.

OLA priorities:

- Set conditions for FY21 NDAA/Appropriations success
- CLA call w/SASC SD (7Oct)

- Synchronize DON messaging and priorities on the Hill
- PMA-265 and Sen. Joni Ernst (R-IA) NSA discussion re: F/A-18 Supply Chain (5Oct)
PEO IWS, DASN Ships, and N96 brief to HASC/SASC PSMs re: SM6 Inventory (6Oct)
CMC call w/ Rep. Cunningham (D-SC) (6Oct)
N42 participation in Navy League Shipbuilding Caucus (6Oct)
PDASN RDA call w/Rep. Palazzo (R-MS) re: TAGS-67 Cost Escalation (8Oct)
Congressional Military Family Caucus Summit (today)
ASN RD&A Call to Rep. Gallagher (R-WI) re: FFG Constellation (today)

Your Future Engagements:

TBD Engagement with SDs
2 Dec SASC Readiness Subcommittee hearing on DON readiness (w/ SECNAV and CMC)

Senior Leader Future Engagements:

Oct Joint SN and DSD engagements re: FNFS rollout
TBD SN call w/ Sen. Cortez Masto (D-NV) re: Fallon
Nov SN follow on engagement w/ Rep. Garamendi (D-CA)
Nov SN follow on engagement w/ Rep. Waltz (R-FL)
Nov SN engagements w/ Rep. Lee (D-CA) and Rep. DeSaulnier (D-CA) re: Port Chicago

Hill Engagements – Two Week Outlook:

13 Oct SASC PSM Guest Lecture to USNA Midshipmen
13 Oct Rep. Calvert (R-CA) CODEL to BHR
14 Oct ONR Railgun/Laser/AI update brief to Rep. Langevin (D-RI)
15 Oct Naval University System Overview Briefing to Rep. Langevin (D-RI) and Rep. Panetta (D-CA) staffers
15 Oct DASN-S discussion with HASC-R PSMs re: Sustainment Systems Working Group (SSWG)
15 Oct DC I&L brief to Rep. Langevin (D-RI) re: USMC Force Design efforts
16 Oct Rep. Walker (R-NC) CODEL to MCAS Cherry Point
19 Oct DC I&L discussion with Rep. Garamendi (D-CA) re: Camp Lejeune facilities
20 Oct N96 quarterly portfolio update to SASC PSMs

Full report below.

Very Respectfully,
Clutch & (b) (6)

RDML Sara "Clutch" Joyner, USN

(b) (6)

1. Executive Summary:

a. Senate Floor Action. None. On 5 Oct, the Senate agreed to a unanimous consent request from Majority Leader McConnell (R-KY) to postpone Senate floor activity until 19 Oct due to COVID concerns. In the meantime, the Senate is holding twice-weekly pro forma sessions for procedural purposes.

b. House Floor Action. None. The House is in recess until 13 Nov, but is prepared to return for votes on additional COVID legislation. In the meantime, the House is holding twice-weekly pro forma sessions for procedural purposes.

c. Significant Events This Week.

i. Sen. Toomey (R-PA) Will Not Seek Reelection in 2022. On 5 Oct, Sen. Toomey of the Banking, Budget and Finance Committees announced that he will not seek reelection in 2022 and will retire from the Senate when his current term ends in Jan 2023. (He also announced that he will not be a candidate for governor in 2022.) Sen. Toomey is the second Senator to announce plans not to run in 2022; the other is SSCI Chairman Burr (R-NC).

ii. Rep. Womack (R-AR) Appointed Ranking Member of HAC-Financial Services. Rep. Womack has replaced former Rep. Graves (R-GA) as ranking member of the HAC Financial Services Subcommittee for the balance of this Congress (Jan 2021). Rep. Womack will continue to serve as the ranking member of the Budget Committee and as a member of HAC-D. Rep. Graves, who had originally planned to retire at the end of this Congress, resigned from the House on 4 Oct.

d. Significant Events Next Week.

i. Senate and House Floor Action. None. Both chambers will conduct brief pro forma sessions for procedural purposes only.

ii. Supreme Court Nomination Hearing. On 12-15 Oct, the Senate Judiciary Committee will hold a hearing on Judge Barrett's nomination to the Supreme Court. The committee vote is expected to occur on 22 Oct.

e. Upcoming Events.

i. Next Recesses. The House has recessed until 13 Nov, but is subject to call-back for votes on COVID legislation. The Senate is now scheduled to be in recess for the next two weeks, return the week of 19 Oct, and recess again until 6 Nov. Both chambers are scheduled to recess the week of Thanksgiving (23-27 Nov).

ii. Final Adjournment. The target dates for final adjournment of the 116th Congress are 10 Dec in the House and 18 Dec in the Senate. (The 117th Congress will officially begin on Sun, 3 Jan, but will likely convene on Mon, 4 Jan. The House and Senate will announce their 2021 schedules in the Nov/Dec timeframe.)

2. Upcoming Engagements/Committee Activities. A copy of the current engagement calendar is attached.

3. Committee Activities This Week: None.

4. Navy OLA Engagements This Week:

a. F/A-18 Supply Chain discussion with PMA-265 and NSA from the office of Sen. Joni Ernst (R-IA). On 05 Oct, the program manager from PMA-265 will discuss topics covering the supply chain for the F/A-18 program with the National Security Advisor from the office of Sen. Joni Ernst (R-IA).

b. Classified Navy SM6 Inventory Impact based on Army/Marine Corps Demand. On 06 Oct, PEO IWS with DASN SHIPS and OPNAV N96 support briefed HASC and SASC PSMs concerning the impact to the Navy SM6 inventory and industrial capacity based on Army and Marine Corps interest in SM6 procurement.

c. N42 Participation in Navy League Shipbuilding Caucus panel on "Sealift Requirements in Contested Environments." On 6 October, Ms. Erica Plath participated in an Navy League Shipbuilding Caucus panel on "Sealift Requirements in Contested Environments." Opening remarks were provided by Chairman Courtney who discussed the findings from the 2018 turbo activation exercise. He highlighted the need for industry and the Services to work together to achieve sealift readiness, acknowledging that it will take outside pressure to make it happen. The panel discussion focused on naval requirements that overlap with the commercial maritime industry: surge sealift, prepositioning, commercial product tankers, logistics in a contested environment, NGLS, and the

commercial mariner pool.

d. Congressional Military Family Caucus Summit. On 9 October, RADM Rock participated in the virtual Congressional Military Family Caucus Summit to speak on EFMP partnerships alongside Mrs. Michelle Norman. SECDEF Esper was the keynote speaker.

e. ASN RDA Call to Rep. Gallagher (R-WI) Concerning FFG Constellation Program. On 09 October, ASN RDA will conduct a call with Rep. Gallagher (R-WI) to provide an update on the Frigate program.

5. USMC Engagements This Week:

a. NSTR

6. FMBE Engagements This Week:

a. TAGS-67 Cost Escalation Phone Call. On 8 Oct, Rep. Palazzo (R-MS) had a call with Mr. Stefany (PDASN RDA) and PEO Ships reps to discuss concerns pertaining cost escalations with the TAGS-67 program.

7. Upcoming Navy OLA Engagements of Note:

a. SASC PSM Briefing to USNA Midshipmen. On 13 October, SASC PSMs Jason Potter and Creighton Greene will serve as guest speakers to discuss the legislative process and committee work to USNA midshipmen in the US Govt and Constitutional Affairs and Legislative Process courses.

b. Naval University System Overview Briefing. On 15 October, SMEs from the Chief Learning Office, Marine Corps University and N7 will participate in a briefing to select members of Rep. Langevin (D-RI) and Rep. Panetta's (D-CA) staff.

c. DASN-S SSWG Discussion with HASC-R PSMs. On 15 October, Mr. Sean Burke (DASN Sustainment) will discuss details about the Sustainment Systems Working Group (SSWG) with HASC Readiness PSMs, Melanie Harris and John Muller.

d. ONR Railgun/Laser/AI update brief to Rep. Langevin (D-RI). On 14 October, RADM Selby will provide an update brief to Rep. Langevin on Railgun, Lasers, and AI.

e. N96 Quarterly Portfolio Update to SASC PSMs. On 20 October, RDML Schlise will provide a routine portfolio update to SASC PSMs via TELCON.

f. STAFFDEL Bonicelli travel to Florida. On 24 October Dr. Paul Bonicelli of Sen. Scott (R-FL) is traveling to Florida for DOD and industry. Potential itinerary items include NSA Orlando, Naval Ordnance Test Unit (NOTU), Patrick AFB, MacDill AFB, Coast Guard Station Miami, and NAS Key West.

g. CODEL Lamborn (R-CO) travel to San Diego. On (T) 26 October, Rep. Lamborn (R-CO) will travel to

San Diego, CA to visit the BHR, LCS Training Facility, BAE and NASSCO shipyards, and FRW SW

h. Classified Navy Intelligence Engineering Briefing. On 28 October, N2N6 representatives will present a classified briefing on the Navy Intelligence Engineering program to HPSCI PSMs. This brief is in preparation for FY21 IAA conferencing and was postponed from 30 September.

i. DASN RDTE Intro Call with SASC ETC PSMs. On 29 October, Ms. Joan Johnson will conduct an introductory phone call with Dr. Arun Seraphin and Ms. Katie Sutton.

j. DASN RDTE Intro Call with HASC IETC PSMs. On 3 November, Ms. Joan Johnson will conduct an introductory phone call with Ms. Bess Dopkeen and Mr. Eric Snelgrove.

8. Upcoming USMC Engagements of Note:

a. Call with Naval Education Caucus Staffers. On 15 Oct representatives from TECOM and MCU will conduct a phone call with staffers from the Naval Education Caucus.

b. Force Design Brief to Rep. Langevin (D-RI). On 15 October DC CD&I will brief Rep. Langevin (D-RI) on USMC Force Design efforts.

c. CODEL Walker visit to MCAS Cherry Point. On 16 October Rep. Walker (R-NC) will lead a CODEL to MCAS Cherry Point.

d. Camp Lejeune discussion with Rep. Garamendi (D-CA). On 19 October DC I&L will hold a discussion with Rep. Garamendi (D-CA) regarding Camp Lejeune facilities.

e. AMCC Update to SASC Readiness PSMs. On 16 November DC I&L will brief SASC Readiness PSMs on AMCC issues.

f. Force Design briefing for HASC members. On 18 November DC CD&I will brief Rep. Moulton (D-MA) and Rep. Gallagher (R-WI) regarding Force Design.

g. CODEL Davis to Djibouti, and Afghanistan. TBD, Rep. Davis (D-CA) will lead a CODEL to Djibouti and Afghanistan to conduct oversight of the policy, strategy, and resource issues associated with Operation Resolute Support in Afghanistan and the Africa region.

h. CODEL Murphy visit to MCAS Cherry Point. TBD, Rep. Murphy (D-FL) will lead a CODEL to MCAS Cherry Point.

9. Upcoming FMBE Engagements of Note:

a. CODEL Calvert (R-CA) travel to San Diego. On 13 Oct, Rep. Calvert (R-CA; HAC-D RM) will travel to San Diego, CA to view damage on the BONHOMME RICHARD.

b. USMC Classified Pacific Posture Brief. On 12 Oct, representatives from MARFORPAC will brief Mr.

Tim Nelson (Rep. Case (D-HI) CoS) on the Theater Posture Plan.

c. Navy Surgeon General COVID update with SAC-D & HAC-D PSMs. On 16 Oct, RADM Gillingham (Surgeon General), will brief Ms. Ripke and Mr. Batmanglidj (HAC-D PSMs), and Ms. Littleton and Mr. Lucio (SAC-D PSMs), on Navy Medicine efforts regarding COVID-19.

From: (b) (6)
To: [Stratton, John F \(Jay\) SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#)
Cc: (b) (6); [Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#); [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#)
Subject: Re: Monthly cost for our reservist
Date: Wednesday, October 7, 2020 8:40:08 AM

Jay -- we have been allocated \$16K in first quarter ADT funding for the UAP requirement. The plan to move forward is to fund ADT orders and then, as additional funding becomes available, modify the orders to extend them.

I need the current AT/E-AT NROWS Requirement number and the proposed start date for the ADT.

r/

(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

From: Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA)
Sent: Monday, October 5, 2020 1:34 PM
To: (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6); Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA); Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I
Subject: RE: Monthly cost for our reservist

(b) (6),

As discussed last week, any help is appreciated. He's on regular AT now, submitting to increase that to E-AT but will need to get follow on orders going ASAP. Thanks!!!

V/r, Jay

From: Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA)
Sent: Thursday, October 1, 2020 9:16 AM
To: Sandra I SES OPNAV N2N6I Brown (b) (6)
Cc: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6); (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: Monthly cost for our reservist

Sandy,

The monthly cost is \$19,167. He's got annual tour orders until the 1 of Nov (paid for by USNR) so we'd need to pick up the cost starting at that point. I appreciate the help!!

V/r, Jay

From: (b) (6)
To: [Stratton, John F \(Jay\) SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#); [Cummings, Matthew C \(Matt\) SES OSD OUSD INTEL \(USA\)](#);
Cc: (b) (6); [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#)
Subject: RE: Query
Date: Friday, October 2, 2020 12:01:23 PM

Jay,

What is your availability for the following week (13 Oct-16)? Also, what is the classification level of the briefing? I want to make sure that we have the necessary caveats or access in order to receive the full picture during our briefing.

Tomica Scott

(b) (6)

From: Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, October 2, 2020 7:04 AM
To: Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)
(b) (6)
(b) (6) Bray, Scott W SES
OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: Query

(b) (6),

I'll be in the pentagon again next Friday, I could brief you anytime between 0700-1100. We'd need about an hour. If that doesn't work we could set up a Tandberg during the week.

V/r, Jay

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)
(b) (6)
Date: Thursday, Oct 01, 2020, 5:55 PM
To: (b) (6)

(b) (6) Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA)
(b) (6) , Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)

Subject: RE: Query

(b) (6)

Happy to support. Navy generally briefs the program activities and status and I am happy to fill in any gaps from the OSD level. I'll defer to Navy to set up the best time with you.

Thanks!

Matt

Matthew C. Cummings, DISL

(b) (6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Thursday, October 1, 2020 5:34 PM

To: (b) (6) Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN
DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6); Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)

Cc: Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA) (b) (6)

Subject: RE: Query

Thank you all for your assistance and I will stand by for more information.
I would also like to suggest that we combine the briefings from Navy and
OUSD(I&S) if possible.

v/r

(b) (6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Tuesday, September 29, 2020 12:13 PM

To: (b) (6) Stratton, John F
(Jay) SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6); Bray, Scott W SES
OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)

Cc: Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)

(b) (6)

Subject: RE: Query

(b) (6).

Jay Stratton (also in the 'to' line).. leads the UAP Task Force effort for
Navy... working directly for Scott Bray, our Deputy Director of Naval
Intelligence.

They will be in touch to discuss setting up a briefing for you and your
leadership.

Regards,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Tuesday, September 29, 2020 12:03 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL

(USA) (b) (6)

Subject: RE: Query

Hello, (b) (6),

(b) (6) should be able to coordinate with the appropriate Navy officials for you for a briefing, which would be classified. For OUSD(I&S), recommend you contact Mr. Matt Cummings, cc'd.

Regards,

(b) (6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Tuesday, September 29, 2020 11:30 AM

To: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: RE: Query

Good Morning,

(FOUO) First as an introduction, I am (b) (6), Program Director for Intelligence within the Evaluations Component of the DoD Office of Inspector General. I am trying to obtain points of contact within the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (USD[I&S]) familiar with the submission in the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2020. Specifically, the Classified Annex to the Senate Armed Services Committee Report on S.1790, submission titled "Advanced Operational Capabilities Collection, Exploitation, and Research."

(FOUO) My leadership and I would like to obtain a briefing on the unexplained airborne activities and obtain an understand of the current efforts/programs in place and actions the Office of Naval Intelligence and OUSD(I&S) are taking to collect, exploit, and analyze the data on these phenomena. If this discussion needs to be taking to a higher system I am including my contact information below. I would appreciate any information you have.

v/r

(b) (6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Friday, September 25, 2020 3:56 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: RE: Query

(b) (6)

What is your question?

Regards,

(b) (6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Friday, September 25, 2020 3:50 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: Query

(b) (6).

I am including the UAP team here to follow up on your query.

Thanks!

V/r,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

From: (b) (6)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N61](#); [Stratton, John F \(Jay\) SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: FW: Query
Date: Tuesday, September 29, 2020 11:45:34 AM

Scott/Jay,

Per the note below... the
Office of the Deputy Inspector General for Evaluations
DoD, Office of Inspector General

Wants to be brought up to speed on the UAPTF.

Over to you for response.

I will respond, cc you, indicating that I am putting him in touch with the
right people.

Regards,

(b) (6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, September 29, 2020 11:30 AM
To: (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: Query

Good Morning,

(FOUO) First as an introduction, I am (b) (6), Program Director for Intelligence within the Evaluations Component of the DoD Office of Inspector General. I am trying to obtain points of contact within the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (USD[I&S]) familiar with the submission in the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2020. Specifically, the Classified Annex to the Senate Armed Services Committee Report on S.1790, submission titled "Advanced Operational Capabilities Collection, Exploitation, and Research."

(FOUO) My leadership and I would like to obtain a briefing on the unexplained airborne activities and obtain an understand of the current efforts/programs in place and actions the Office of Naval Intelligence and

OUSD(I&S) are taking to collect, exploit, and analyze the data on these phenomena. If this discussion needs to be taking to a higher system I am including my contact information below. I would appreciate any information you have.

v/r

(b) (6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Friday, September 25, 2020 3:56 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: RE: Query

(b) (6)

What is your question?

Regards,

(b) (6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Friday, September 25, 2020 3:50 PM

To: (b) (6)

Subject: Query

(b) (6)

I am including the UAP team here to follow up on your query.

Thanks!

V/r,

(b) (6)


[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

From: (b) (6)
To: [Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO \(USA\)](#); [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#)
Cc: [Miller, Christopher A SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#); [Aeschbach, Kelly A RADM USN ONI WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#); [Richardson, Andrew G SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#); (b) (6)

Subject: FW: Navy and USMC Legislative Review for 19 - 25 September 2020
Date: Friday, September 25, 2020 1:50:15 PM
Attachments: [Hill Engagement Calendar Excerpt 25Sep20.docx](#)

Good afternoon Admiral/DDNI,

Here are brief N2N6 highlights from this week's Legislative Review:

- a. Classified UAP Briefing. On 22 September, the UAP TF (N2N6 representatives) presented a classified briefing on Unidentified Aerial Phenomenon to Reps. Reschenthaler (R-PA), Armstrong (R-ND), Garcia (R-CA), and Tiffany (R-WI). The brief was in response to a request from Rep. Reschenthaler's personal office.
- b. Classified Briefing to SSCI. On 23 September, N2N6T1 provided a classified update to SSCI PSMs. This brief was a periodic update.
- c. Six Committee Briefing. On 24 September, Navy representatives provided a classified update to SASC, HASC, SAC-D, HAC-D, SSCI and HPSCI SDs and PSMs.

Upcoming briefs:

- a. Classified Navy Intelligence Engineering Briefing. On 30 September, N2N6 representatives will present a classified briefing on the Navy Intelligence Engineering program to HPSCI PSMs. This brief is in preparation for FY21 IAA conferencing.

Also to note, I had the opportunity to participate in the restart of the biweekly IC Legislative Director's Review. Election Security remains the most central focus area for the Intelligence Committees.

Related to the FY21 NDAA, we have received indications the HASC will not accept any of the HPSCI NDAA amendments into the bill that goes forward (unless it goes to the House floor), furthering the strain between the two committees and confounding conference preparations. We will continue to examine the language of the drafts that proceed forward, as we cannot yet characterize any potential Navy intelligence impacts.

Please let me know if there are any questions, or if you prefer to receive this information in a different format.

(b) (6)

[REDACTED]

'Spangler, Caral E SES P&R, P&R'

(b) (6)

[REDACTED]

; Browne, Putnam H RADM USN DCNO N1 (USA)

(b) (6)

[REDACTED]

; Lopez, Omar R SES USN NAVCRIMINVSERV DC

(USA)

(b) (6)

Crandall, Darse E RADM USN NAVY JAG WASH DC (US)

(b) (6)

[REDACTED]

(b) (6)

Subject: Navy and USMC Legislative Review for 19 - 25 September 2020

Mr. Secretary,

The Senate began debate for the FY21 CR. The vote on passage is expected to occur on Wednesday.

Expect informal conferencing to continue through October with PSMs and Staff Directors to tackle the majority of the differences in the NDAA. We expect the designation of formal conferees after the election.

OLA priorities:

- Set conditions for FY21 NDAA/Appropriations success

DC P&R call w/ HAC-D PSM re: USMC Force Design and USMC appeals (22Sep)

DC P&R classified USMC Force Design 2030 briefing to Rep. Steve Womack (R-AR; HAC-D) (22Sep)

DASN Env FRTC discussion with Sen. Cortez Masto (D-NV) staff (24Sep)

Classified DC CD&I Force Design Brief to Rep. Garamendi (D-CA), Rep. Norcross (D-NJ), and Rep. Hartzler (R-MO) (today)

- Synchronize DON messaging and priorities on the Hill

Joint Staff and NAVFAC Call with HASC PSMs re: Duqm, Oman Lease (21Sep)

VADM Hannink/MajGen Lecce meeting w/ Sen. Inhofe (R-OK) and Sen. Reed (D-RI) re: "Prosecutorial Authority" (22Sep)

Classified UAP TF Briefing to Reps. Reschenthaler (R-PA), Armstrong (R-ND), Garcia (R-CA), and Tiffany (R-WI) (22Sep)

Classified N2N6T1 Briefing with SSCI PSMs (23Sep)

Classified Six Committee Briefing to SASC, HASC, SAC-D, HAC-D, SSCI and HPSCI PSMs (24Sep)
NAVSEA Maintenance Discussion w/ Rep. Byrne (R-AL) (today)
Naval Reactors will host SASC Strategic Forces PSMs (today)
OASN EI&E and OPNAV N45 discuss sound monitoring at NASWI with Rep. Larsen and Rep. Kilmer (D-WA) staff (today)
VADM Wolfe (SSP) engagement w/ SASC Strategic Forces PSMs (today)

Your Future Engagements:

TBD Call w/ Sen. Cortez Masto (D-NV) re: Fallon
TBD Call w/ Rep. Suozzi (D-NY) re: Purple Heart Interim Letter
TBD SASC Readiness Subcommittee hearing on DON readiness (w/ CNO and CMC)
TBD Engagements w/ Rep. Lee (D-CA) and Rep. DeSaulnier (D-CA) re: Port Chicago
TBD Follow on engagement w/ Rep. Garamendi (D-CA)
TBD Follow on engagement w/ Rep. Waltz (R-FL)

Hill Engagements – Two Week Outlook:

28 Sep ADM Caldwell, VADM Galinis discussion with SASC PSMs re: Naval Engineering
28 Sep Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Plan (SIOP) Biannual Brief to SAC-D and HAC-D PSMs
29 Sep Amphibious Ship Discussion w/ MajGen King, Ms. Anderson & HASC PSMs
30 Sep PMA-265 (F/A-18) supply chain brief to National Security Advisor to Sen. Joni Ernst (R-IA)
30 Sep Classified Navy Intelligence Engineering Program Brief to HPSCI PSMs
30 Sep USNA Update to HAC-D
6 Oct Classified Brief to SASC/HASC PSMs on SM6 Impact of USA/USMC Interest
6 Oct TECOM and MCU call with Naval Education Caucus Staffers
7 Oct (T) USMC Autonomous Robotic Targets update. to Mr. Sam Fletcher (Shelby NSA)

Full report below.

Very Respectfully,

Clutch, Rob, (b) (6)

RDML Sara "Clutch" Joyner, USN

BGen Robert C. Fulford, USMC

(b) (6)

1. Executive Summary:

a. Senate and House Floor Action. The House passed and the Senate voted to take up a continuing resolution (CR) (HR 8337) to keep the government funded through 11 Dec -- details are below. The Senate also passed, by unanimous consent, a resolution (S Res 718) offered by Sen. Manchin (D-WV) reaffirming its "commitment to the orderly and peaceful transfer of power called for in the Constitution of the United States."

b. Significant Events This Week.

i. Appropriations. On 22 Sep, the House passed a Continuing Resolution (CR) by a 359-57 vote, funding government operations through 11 Dec. The bill includes an anomaly allowing DON to enter a contract for 2 COLUMBIA SSBNs using incremental funding, and allows up to \$1.62B for that purpose. It also extends a CARES Act authority to pay Federal Contractors if impacted by COVID operations. The House bill has support from Senate leadership, and is expected to be passed next week in time to avoid a government shutdown Wednesday night.

d. Significant Events Next Week.

i. Senate Floor Action. The Senate will consider the CR (HR 8337) -- the vote on passage is expected to occur on Wed, but could occur as early as Tue, depending on how much debate time is consumed. It is possible that the Senate will begin its election recess at close of business next week (a week earlier than scheduled), with the intent of calling Senators back as needed for votes on additional COVID relief legislation and/or a Supreme Court nomination.

ii. House Floor Action. The House is expected to consider another COVID relief bill. At close of business next week, the House is scheduled to recess until after the Nov elections, although Members will be subject to call-back for votes on COVID legislation.

e. Upcoming Events.

i. Next Recesses. The election recess is currently scheduled for 5 Oct - 13 Nov in the House and 12 Oct - 6 Nov in the Senate. (As noted above, a Senate schedule change and House and Senate call-backs are possible.) Both chambers are scheduled to recess the week of Thanksgiving (23-27 Nov).

ii. Final Adjournment. The target dates for final adjournment of the 116th Congress are 10 Dec in the House and 18 Dec in the Senate. (The 117th Congress will officially begin on Sun, 3 Jan, but will likely convene on Mon, 4 Jan. The House and Senate will announce their 2021 schedules in the Nov/Dec timeframe.)

2. Upcoming Engagements/Committee Activities. A copy of the current engagement calendar is attached.

3. Committee Activities This Week: None.

4. Navy OLA Engagements This Week:

a. Joint Staff and NAVFAC Call with House Armed Services PSMs on Duqm, Oman Lease. On 21 September, staff from Joint Staff J5 Deputy Directorate for Middle East and NAVFAC Europe Africa Central presented HASC PSMs information regarding the planned Duqm, Oman lease action. PSMs did not concur with a sense of urgency on the leasing action. The following factors led the staffers to oppose the near-term lease initiation: lack of confirmed DoD end-state for Duqm; adequacy of Duqm commercial infrastructure for DoD's current requirements; lack of competitor plans to build out in Duqm in the near-term; magnitude of build-to-lease arrangement; and consequences of breaking the lease.

b. Classified UAP Briefing. On 22 September, the UAP TF (N2N6 representatives) presented a classified briefing on Unidentified Aerial Phenomenon to Reps. Reschenthaler (R-PA), Armstrong (R-ND), Garcia (R-CA), and Tiffany (R-WI). The brief was in response to a request from Rep. Reschenthaler's personal office.

c. RD&A and NAVFAC Small Business Payment Provision Phone Call with House Small Business Committee PSMs. On 23 September, NAVFAC representatives, Ms. Readal (Contracts Director) and Mr. Saunders (Counsel) and RD&A representatives Ms. Shaver (DASN P) and Mr. Frankfurt (Counsel) met with PSMs Ms. Irene Rivera and Ms. Vivian Ling from the House Small Business Committee to discuss a FY21 House passed NDAA provision requiring a 50% immediate payment, no discussion or negotiation permitted, to a small business presenting a request for an equitable adjustment. OSD representatives also participated in the call.

d. Classified Briefing to SSCI. On 23 September, N2N6T1 provided a classified update to SSCI PSMs. This brief was a periodic update.

e. Six Committee Briefing. On 24 September, Navy representatives provided a classified update to SASC, HASC, SAC-D, HAC-D, SSCI and HPSCI SDs and PSMs.

f. FRTC Update with Sen. Cortez-Masto (D-NV) staff and DASN Env. On 24 September, DASN Environment, Mr. Karnig Ohannessian, discussed the Fallon Range Training Complex-Modernization effort with staff from Sen. Cortez Masto's office. Navy requested the meeting to relay DOI's official position.

g. NAVSEA Introductory Meeting and Maintenance/Repair Discussion. On 25 September, VADM Galinis (NAVSEA) and RDML Ver Hage (CNRMC/SEA 21) conducted a Teams meeting with Rep. Byrne (R-AL) - at his request - to discuss the potential for drydocking and repair services of Navy vessels since Austal has acquired Alabama Shipyard.

h. NASWI Sound Monitoring Update to Rep. Larsen (D-WA) staff. On 25 September, staff from OASN EI&E and OPNAV N45 provided updates to Rep. Larsen and Rep. Kilmer's staff on the finalized locations for the sound level meters to begin the sound monitoring study at NASWI.

i. SSP and Naval Reactors In calls with SASC Strat Forces PSMs. On 25 September, Mr. Adam Trull (new Strat Forces Majority PSM) and Dr. Jon Epstein had lunch with VADM Wolfe at SSP and tour the model room at Naval Reactors, engaging with senior leaders at each command.

5. USMC Engagements This Week:

a. CODEL Moulton to The Basic School. On 22 Sep Rep. Moulton (D-MA) travelled to MCB Quantico to tour The Basic School among other facilities.

b. SJA Brief to SASC Chair and Ranking on SEC 540F JSS-PAS. On 22 Sep Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine Corps briefed Sen. Inhofe (R-OK) and Sen. Reed (D-RI) on the results of

the Joint Service Subcommittee Prosecutorial Authority Study (JSS-PAS) required as part of Sec 540F FY20 NDAA.

c. Call with HAC-D PSM regarding Force Design and appeals. On 22 Sep DC P&R conducted a phone call with Ms. Brooke Boyer, HAC-D PSM on Force Design and appeals.

d. Classified Force Design brief to Rep. Womack (R-AR). On 22 Sep DC P&R provided a classified briefing on Force Design to Rep. Womack (R-AR).

e. Force Design discussion with Rep. Gallagher (R-WI). On 24 Sep BGen Fulford held an office call discussion on Force Design with Rep. Gallagher (R-WI).

f. Force Design discussion with Rep. Golden (D-ME). On 24 Sep BGen Fulford held an office call discussion on Force Design with Rep. Golden (D-ME).

g. AMCC Housing update to staff of Sen. Tillis (R-NC). On 24 Sep DC I&L provided an update on AMCC Housing to staff members of Sen. Tillis (R-NC).

h. Office call with Rep. Bergman (R-MI). On 24 Sep BGen Fulford held an office call with Rep. Bergman (R-MI).

i. TS Force Design Brief to HASC Members. On 25 Sep DC CD&I conducted a classified briefing for members of the HASC Tactical Air and Land Forces subcommittee on Force Design.

6. FMBE Engagements This Week:

a. P&R Update to HAC-D. On 22 Sep, LtGen Jansen (DC P&R) had a Telecon with Ms. Brooke Barnard (HAC-D PSM) related to the USMC Force Design as well as background information on USMC FY21 programmatic appeals.

b. T-AO Cost Reduction Discussion with WA Delegation. On 22 Sep, Mr. Kosar (PMS 325) discussed T-AO program cost reduction efforts with Mr. Ryan Pettit (National Security Advisor to Sen. Murray (D-WA)).

c. Six Committee Briefing. On 24 September, Navy representatives provided a classified update to SASC, HASC, SAC-D, HAC-D, SSCI and HPSCI PSMs.

d. NASWI Sound Monitoring Update to Rep. Kilmer (D-WA) staff. On 25 September, staff from OASN EI&E and OPNAV N45 will provide updates to Rep. Kilmer (D-WA) and Rep. Larsen's (D-WA) staff on the finalized locations for the sound level meters to begin the sound monitoring study at NASWI.

7. Upcoming Navy OLA Engagements of Note:

a. Naval Engineering Discussion w/ADM Caldwell, VADM Galinis & SASC PSMs. On 28 Sep., ADM Caldwell, VADM Galinis, Mr. Jason Potter and Mr. Creighton Greene will conduct a phone call to

discuss Naval Engineering best practices.

b. L-Class Ship Acquisition Discussion w/ MajGen King, Ms. Anderson, & HASC Seapower PSMs. On 29 Sep, MajGen King, Ms. Anderson and HASC Seapower PSMs will conduct a TEAMS call to discuss amphibious ship and connector requirements as it relates to SASC Sec 124 language (Wicker Ship Implementation Act).

c. F/A-18 Supply Chain discussion with PMA-265 and NSA from the office of Sen. Joni Ernst (R-IA). On 30 Sep, the program manager from PMA-265 will discuss topics covering the supply chain for the F/A-18 program with the National Security Advisor from the office of Sen. Joni Ernst (R-IA).

d. Classified Navy Intelligence Engineering Briefing. On 30 September, N2N6 representatives will present a classified briefing on the Navy Intelligence Engineering program to HPSCI PSMs. This brief is in preparation for FY21 IAA conferencing.

e. Classified Navy SM6 Inventory Impact based on Army/Marine Corps Demand. On 06 Oct, PEO IWS with DASN SHIPS and OPNAV N96 support will brief HASC and SASC PSMs concerning the impact to the Navy SM6 inventory and industrial capacity based on Army and Marine Corps interest in SM6 procurement.

f. Congressional Military Family Caucus Summit. On 9 October, RADM Rock will participate in the virtual Congressional Military Family Caucus Summit to speak on EFMP partnerships alongside Mrs. Michelle Norman. SECDEF Esper is scheduled to be the keynote speaker.

g. SASC PSM Briefing to USNA Midshipmen. On 13 October, SASC PSMs Jason Potter and Creighton Greene will serve as guest speakers to discuss the legislative process and committee work to USNA midshipmen in the US Govt and Constitutional Affairs and Legislative Process courses.

h. ONR Railgun/Laser/AI update brief to Rep. Langevin (D-RI). On 14 October, RADM Selby will provide an update brief to Rep. Langevin on Railgun, Lasers, and AI.

8. Upcoming USMC Engagements of Note:

a. Call with Naval Education Caucus Staffers. On 6 Oct representatives from TECOM and MCU will conduct a phone call with staffers from the Naval Education Caucus.

b. CODEL Walker visit to MCAS Cherry Point. On 16 October Rep. Walker (R-NC) will lead a CODEL to MCAS Cherry Point.

c. CODEL Davis to Djibouti, and Afghanistan. TBD, Rep. Davis (D-CA) will lead a CODEL to Djibouti and Afghanistan to conduct oversight of the policy, strategy, and resource issues associated with Operation Resolute Support in Afghanistan and the Africa region.

9. Upcoming FMBE Engagements of Note:

a. Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth (NAS JRB-FW) Visit. On 28 Sep, Rep. Kay Granger (R-TX; HAC Ranking Member) will visit NAS JRB-FW (in district visit) to hear from base leadership and visit Texas Air National Guard equities (C130J).

b. Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Plan (SIOP) Biannual Brief. On 28 Sep, Mr. Burke (DASN Sustainment), Mr. Balocki (DASN I&F), Mr. Neff (N97B), and Mr. Lagana (PMS-555) will provide a biannual SIOP to Ms. Katy Hagan (SAC-D PSM), and Ms. Jennifer Chartrand (HAC-D PSM).

c. USNA Brief to HAC-D. On 30 Sep (T), VADM Buck (USNA) will brief Ms. Jennifer Chartrand and Ms. Ariana Sarar (HAC-D PSMs) on USNA operations.

d. Autonomous Robotic Targets update. On 7 Oct (T), 2MarDiv CG and Division Gunner will provide the operator's perspective of the training value of autonomous robotic targets to Mr. Sam Fletcher (Shelby NSA)

e. MARFORPAC Theater Posture Plan SVTC. On 12 Oct, representatives from MARFORPAC will present a classified briefing on the Theater Posture Plan to Mr. Tim Nelson (Rep Case CoS)

From: [Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO \(USA\)](#)
To: [OBRIEN, MARY F Lt Gen HAF HAF/DSI/HAF A2/6](#)
Cc: (b) (6); [Flynn, William A SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#); (b) (6); [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#)
Subject: RE: Contact info for ISR CIO
Date: Thursday, September 24, 2020 7:08:38 AM

Thanks Mary, Bill Flynn is cc'd here.

I am having my team get with you on setting up a short discussion on "unidentified aerial phenomenon (UAP)"that ought to tempt you!

Vr, JT

From: OBRIEN, MARY F Lt Gen HAF HAF/DSI/HAF A2/6 (b) (6)

Sent: Wednesday, September 23, 2020 11:13 AM

To: Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO (USA) (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: Contact info for ISR CIO

Jeff,

I'm following up on one more note I took when we met the other day. You asked for our ISR CIO POC, who is also engaged in ABMS, and wanted to connect him with Bill Flynn on your staff. I'm cc'ing (b) (6). If you put him in contact with (b) (6) can link him up with the right person/people.

Cheers,
Mary

MARY F. O'BRIEN, Lt Gen, USAF
Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
Surveillance, Reconnaissance
and Cyber Effects Operations
(b) (6)

(b) (6)

From: [Tipton, Neill T SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC \(USA\)](#)
To: [Scott Bray](#)
Cc: [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#)
Subject: RE: [Non-DoD Source] Fwd: UAP Brief
Date: Friday, September 18, 2020 3:15:16 PM

Scott, working options on day-to-day lead for us, but I am going to make a change. Will let you know by next week what that will look like.

Thanks

Neill

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Wednesday, September 16, 2020 3:54 PM
To: Tipton, Neill T SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA) (b) (6)
Cc: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Fwd: UAP Brief

All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.

Neill -

(b) (6), (b) (5)
[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Thanks,
Scott

Scott W. Bray

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Wednesday, September 16, 2020 15:29

To: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I; Scott Bray
Subject: FW: UAP Brief

Boss,

Please see below – Matt sent this to the wrong Scott Bray.

Thanks,

(b) (6)

From: Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)

(b) (6)

Sent: Wednesday, September 16, 2020 3:24 PM

To: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Tipton, Neill T SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA)

(b) (6)

Subject: Re: UAP Brief

(b) (6),

This may seem old fashioned to you, but I work for OSD not the US Navy. I have been given direction by my superior and can not change course until he orders me to do so.

While I appreciate that Scott will be the highest ranking official at the meeting, OSD was asked to ensure NSC was briefed and I will be the Senior Executive representing OSD at the meeting ensuring that occurs. Should Mr. Tipton want that changed, he will inform me. Until then, I will maintain contact with the NSC and manage the completion of this task.

Thanks,

Matt

From: (b) (6)

Date: Wednesday, September 16, 2020 at 3:15:24 PM

To: "Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)"

(b) (6)

"Stratton, John F (Jay) SES
USN DCNO N2N6 (USA)" (b) (6)

Cc: "Tipton, Neill T SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA)"

(b) (6)

"Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I" (b) (6)

Subject: RE: UAP Brief

Matt,

I just spoke with Mr. Bray and he affirmed his guidance to me that our office will handle the logistics and scheduling of this meeting. He also wants me to assure you that you will be present for the meeting.

If Mr. Tipton would like to speak with Mr. Bray please let me know.

Thanks,

(b) (6)

From: Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)

(b) (6)

Sent: Wednesday, September 16, 2020 2:42 PM

To: (b) (6)

Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)

Cc: Tipton, Neill T SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA) (b) (6); (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Subject: Re: UAP Brief

Sorry,

But I have direct guidance from Neill Tipton to maintain OSD management of the scheduling. I have cc'd Scott and Neill on this email. If Scott is unhappy with me managing this event, then he needs to have Mr. Tipton direct me to transfer.

Matt

From: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Date: Wednesday, September 16, 2020 at 2:35:51 PM

To: "Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)"

(b) (6)

(b) (6) "Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA)"

(b) (6)

Subject: RE: UAP Brief

Hi Matt,

Thanks for the below information.

During the discussion between Mr. Bray and Mr. Tipton on Monday afternoon, it was determined by both parties that all meeting logistics and associated details will be handled directly by this office (as Mr. Bray will be the senior DOD representative attending).

To that end, I have been directed by Mr. Bray to handle all future correspondence directly with the NSC in this matter.

Please feel free to reach out with any questions or concerns.

(b) (6)

[Redacted]

From: Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA) (b) (6)

Sent: Wednesday, September 16, 2020 1:18 PM

To: Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)

Subject: Fwd: UAP Brief

(b) (6),

NSC provided a new time/date. Please let me if Navy can support. As Amb. O'Brien is the limfac, we may have to adjust to NSC requirements.

Thanks!

Matt

From: (b) (6)

[Redacted]

Date: Wednesday, September 16, 2020 at 12:42:43 PM

To: "Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)" (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

[Redacted]

(b) (6) "Caine, J Daniel Maj Gen
USAF OSD OUSD A-S (USA)"

(b) (6)

Subject: RE: UAP Brief

Matt,

Good afternoon. Tentatively rescheduled for 24 Sep at 1600. Will
send updated WAVES link as the time nears.

Cheers,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

From: Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL
(USA) (b) (6)

Sent: Monday, September 14, 2020 3:53 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Caine, J Daniel Maj Gen USAF OSD OUSD A-S (USA)

(b) (6)

Subject: RE: UAP Brief

(b) (6)

Roger. We'll stand by to stand by.

Thanks!

Matt

Matthew C. Cummings, DISL

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Monday, September 14, 2020 3:28 PM

To: Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)

(b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Caine, J Daniel Maj Gen USAF OSD OUSD A-S (USA)

(b) (6)

Subject: RE: UAP Brief

Matt,

Just got word from APNSA's front office that Friday's Brief is canceled – I'll work with them to re-schedule and will circle back with you.

Cheers,

(b) (6)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

From: Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA) (b) (6)

[Redacted]

Sent: Monday, September 14, 2020 1:39 PM

To: (b) (6)

[Redacted]

Subject: RE: UAP Brief

Thanks.

Attendees will be me, Jay Stratton (Navy TF PM), and Scott Bray (Navy N2/N6)

We'll get everything in today and send the slides over shortly.

Matt

Matthew C. Cummings, DISL

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Sent: Monday, September 14, 2020 8:52 AM

To: Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)

(b) (6)

Subject: RE: UAP Brief

Matt,

Following up with you on this for Friday, 9/18. Reminder, the time has changed to **1230-1330**. As for WH complex access, please use the following link to submit your information and forward to the +3 you plan to bring along. Please ensure everyone enters their information accurately. Access locations attached.

Caution-[https://events.whitehouse.gov/AppointmentRsvpForm?](https://events.whitehouse.gov/AppointmentRsvpForm?rid=B8Y3YJW2YK)

rid=B8Y3YJW2YK < Caution-

[https://events.whitehouse.gov/AppointmentRsvpForm?](https://events.whitehouse.gov/AppointmentRsvpForm?rid=B8Y3YJW2YK)

rid=B8Y3YJW2YK >

Standing by on the high-side for the slides...

Cheers,

(b) (6)

From: Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA) (b) (6)

Sent: Tuesday, August 25, 2020 9:25 AM

To: (b) (6)

Subject: RE: UAP Brief

Super easy. Number of briefers is 1, me. I can send over slides on JWICS or bring hard copies, your choice. The brief lends itself to being shown on a large screen so I can point out some details in some

of the images, so that would be preferred, but I have done it several times with everyone having hard copies without a problem.

Whatever is easiest for you works for me.

Thanks!

Matt

Matthew C. Cummings, DISL

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Tuesday, August 25, 2020 9:17 AM

To: Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)

(b) (6)

Subject: UAP Brief

Good morning, Matt –

Still a ways out but figured I'd touch base with you IRT the UAP Brief to Ambassador O'Brien. I will send you WH Complex access instructions in a separate email but first, I'll need to know how many attendees you plan on bringing as well as their email addresses. Also, we'll need to coordinate Audio/Visual Requirements - will you bring hard copy slides or do you prefer to have them displayed? No rush on this.

Cheers,

(b) (6)

[Redacted signature block]

[Redacted signature block]

From: (b) (6)
To: (b) (6); Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA); (b) (6); Bray, Scott
W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I; (b) (6)
Subject: RE: UAP TF Briefing to House Representatives
Date: Thursday, September 17, 2020 4:36:14 PM

Thank you for sending, (b) (6),

I will have to send a request to ODNI for them to pass my clearances.

Can you please let me know where ODNI should send them? Is there a location/POC with a phone?
I'll have ODNI do this tomorrow morning, asap.

Thank you,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

-----Original Appointment-----

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Thursday, September 17, 2020 1:55 PM
To: Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA); (b) (6);
(b) (6); Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I;
(b) (6)
Subject: UAP TF Briefing to House Representatives
When: Tuesday, September 22, 2020 12:00 PM-1:00 PM (UTC-05:00) Eastern Time (US & Canada).
Where: HVC

*** Please see below for changes. ***

Purpose: Briefing to Reps. Reschenthaler (R-PA), Armstrong (R-ND), Johnson (R-SD), Garcia (R-CA), Tiffany (R-WI), Waltz (R-FL), Stauber (R-MN), Van Drew (D-NJ).

Classification: up to TS/SI

Attire: Business Attire

Audience:

- Rep Reschenthaler (R-PA)
- Rep. Armstrong (R-ND)

- Rep. Johnson (R-SD)
- Rep. Garcia (R-CA)
- Rep. Tiffany (R-WI)
- Rep. Waltz (R-FL)
- Rep. Stauber (R-MN)
- Rep. Van Drew (D-NJ)

- (b) (6)

- Others

Briefing Team:

Mr. Scott Bray

Mr. Jay Stratton

Others

OLA Escorts:

(b) (6)

Scheme of Maneuver:

1100 EMP pick up from ONI (Stratton). Pick up point will be in front of ONI, by flag poles.

1110 EMP pick up from Pentagon (Bray). Pick up will be from 5th Corridor.

1140 Arrive Capitol, rendezvous to transit to HVC SCIF

1200 Begin Discussion

1300 Conclude discussion

1310 Return to ONI (Stratton)

Return to Pentagon (Bray)

Notes:

- EMP reservation number: EMP-46440 (Stratton)

EMP-46485 (Bray)

- Navy OLA will request clearance delivery and confirm receipt.

Thank you,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
To: [Stratton, John F \(Jay\) SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#)
Cc: (b) (6); [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#); [Smyth, Miriam K CAPT USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#)
Subject: DepSecDef
Date: Friday, August 7, 2020 9:22:34 AM

Good Morning!

I see you, Scott, DCNO, and VCNO are on with DSD Monday afternoon.

I briefed DCNO this morning that DSD signed the UAPTF memo Tuesday (per (b) (6) emails late yesterday)... so that makes for good timing with your brief.

If you had not been planning this aspect... it might be good to have a copy of the SCG along... and make it a data point to mention that one is in place to protect the security and sanctity of the investigations....

Later,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6](#); [Stratton, John F \(Jav\) SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#); (b) (6)
Cc: [Brown, Charles W RDML USN \(USA\)](#)
Subject: DOD Press Release status
Date: Friday, August 14, 2020 6:31:23 AM
Attachments: [202008013 UAPTF Press Release and RTQ QAs OGC Navy.docx](#)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY//PRE-DECISIONAL/EXEMPT FROM FOIA UNDER (b)(5)//CONTAINS LEGAL COUNSEL-CLIENT PROTECTED INFO

All,

Current version attached.

OGC had extensive edits, many of which were either consistent with our edits or made our comments OBE.

They are still waiting for OUSD(I&S) chop.

The goal is to get it out today.

(b) (5)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(b) (6)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

From: (b) (6)
To: [Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO \(USA\); Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I; Stratton, John F \(Jay\) SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\); \(b\) \(6\)](#)
Cc: (b) (6); (b) (6); [Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\);](#)
Subject: FW: CNN - UAP Task Force
Date: Thursday, August 13, 2020 6:59:53 PM

Sir,

FYI.

No idea who spoke to them.

CNN went to press without waiting for what our DoD PA rep was preparing.

VR

(b) (6)

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

CNN reporting on UAP Task Force:

<https://www.cnn.com/2020/08/13/politics/pentagon-ufo-task-force/index.html>

From: (b) (6) on behalf of [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#)
Subject: FW: HOT -- DEPSECDEF Request for Press Release
Date: Tuesday, August 11, 2020 6:46:13 PM
Attachments: [202008010 UAPTF Press Release and RTQ Q&Asdocx.docx](#)
Importance: High

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, August 11, 2020 4:09 PM
To: Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)
(b) (6) Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6); Brown, Charles W RDML USN (USA)
(b) (6)
Cc: OPNAV ALL N2N6 Front Office (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6) Aeschbach, Kelly A RADM USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: FW: HOT -- DEPSECDEF Request for Press Release
Importance: High

All,

As mentioned, DepSecDef has directed DoD PA to issue a press release on the official standup of the UAP Task Force.

Attached is the draft release with related Q/As for our Navy chop.

The statement and answers use language previously agreed on and used.

All queries will continue to be directed to DoDPA.

Please let me know soonest if you have any issues and/or recommended changes.

I would anticipate release tomorrow (Wednesday).

Regards

(b) (6)

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b) (6)
Date: Tuesday, Aug 11, 2020, 3:23 PM
To: (b) (6) Cummings, Matthew C
(Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA) (b) (6), Carranza, Guillermo R SES OSD
OGC (USA) (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: HOT -- DEPSECDEF Request for Press Release

Gents,
DEPSECDEF has requested a press release on the establishment of the UAPTF. Please see attached. Top section is what would be released, bottom section is for the Q&As we're likely (!) to get once the press release goes out. If we want to keep the press release shorter, I'm fine with dropping the third paragraph from the release itself (I can incorporate into query responses as needed). Need Navy, OUSD(I&S) and OGC clearance; please run up your chains for appropriate level clearance. Once I have yours, then this will go to ATSD(PA) Hoffman for approval for release.

(b) (6), for your SA and Hill notification as appropriate. (b) (6), mainly for DIA SA also, as I've included likely question about AATIP & UAPTF in the Q&A.

Regards,
Sue

From: [Stratton, John F \(Jay\) SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#)
Cc: [Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#); (b) (6)
Subject: FW: SD Traveling press interested in UAPTF
Date: Thursday, August 20, 2020 10:54:49 AM
Importance: High

Scott,

FYSA

V/r, Jay

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Thursday, August 20, 2020 10:26 AM
To: (b) (6) Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6) Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA) (b) (6); Tipton, Neill T SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA) (b) (6) Carranza, Guillermo R SES OSD OGC (USA) (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: HOT: SD Traveling press interested in UAPTF
Importance: High

HOT! News media traveling with SECDEF today and tomorrow have indicated that they intend to ask him about the UAPTF during the trip. ATSD(PA) Hoffman is with the SECDEF, and we've provided (b) (6), who's the PA desk officer from my office on the trip, with our Q&As.

The two reporters mentioned below are from Military.com and Defense News, respectively.

Please let your Principals know, as you deem necessary.

Regards,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Thursday, August 20, 2020 7:12 AM
To: (b) (6)
Cc: Hoffman, Jonathan R SES OSD OSD (USA) (b) (6) OSD Pentagon PA List DPO CENTCOM (b) (6)
Subject: Traveling press topics of interest

(b) (6),

If provided an opportunity to speak with SD, (b) (6) are interested in talking to him about the UFO Task Force as well as healthcare updates. Would the team

please send me the latest briefing cards/hot topics/top line items on these.

I will keep you updated throughout the trip.

Thank you!

V/R

(b) (6)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

From: (b) (6)
To: [Stratton, John F \(Jay\) SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#); (b) (6) [Bray](#),
[Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: FW: UAPTF Press Release
Date: Tuesday, August 11, 2020 1:23:56 PM

FYI...

Regards,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, August 11, 2020 1:19 PM
To: Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA) (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: Re: UAPTF Press Release

Ok, I'll write it up a draft and send it around for clearance.

Sent from my iPhone

From: "Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)"
(b) (6)
Date: Tuesday, August 11, 2020 at 12:12:06 PM
To: (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: UAPTF Press Release

Sue,

Per the DepSecDef Front Office... the DSD wants a short press release on the formal establishment of the UAPTF. I would recommend something that uses most of what we gave Stars and Stripes. Please let me know how I can help.

Thanks,

Matt

MATTHEW C. CUMMINGS, DISL
Deputy Director, Technical Collection (C&SP/TC)
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
(b) (6)

(b) (6)



From: (b) (6)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#); [Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#); (b) (6)
Cc: [Stratton, John F \(Jay\) SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#); (b) (6); [OPNAV N2N6I Front Office](#)
Subject: In the News....
Date: Monday, September 14, 2020 1:58:30 PM

FYI...

Two new stories out on UAPs (below and in tomorrow's IW Clips).

One from Daily Mail (UK) and one from Fox News piggybacking on that one.

Also, Fox News in the Pentagon is trying to do a follow-up... and DoD is replying that we have no response.

Regards,

(b) (6)

Navy pilot who witnessed infamous declassified 'UFO' sighting said the Tic Tac-shaped phenomena committed an 'act of war' by jamming their radars when they tried to track it

Daily Mail (UK), 13 September 2020... by Marlene Lenthang

- **Former US Navy pilot Commander David Fravor** along with three others reported a potential UFO sighting off the coast of California **in 2004**
- They saw a **Tic Tac**-shaped object flying in the sky, hurtle down to hover over the Pacific ocean then zoom back into the sky
- He along with others were sent out to track the object, but when they neared it it accelerated and disappeared in 'less than a second'

- Fravor said the object committed an 'act of war' by jamming Navy radars when they tried to track the object

A former US Navy pilot is opening up about his infamous alleged UFO sighting off the coast of California in 2004.

Commander David Fravor said he witnessed a Tic Tac-shaped object in the sky in November 10, 2004 performing extraordinary aerial maneuvers that he said no modern human technology was capable of.

'This is not like we saw it and it was gone or I saw lights in the sky and it's gone – we watched this thing on a crystal clear day with four trained observers,' Fravor said in a sit-down interview with Russian-American YouTuber and MIT researcher Lex Fridman on September 8.

He said the phenomena committed an 'act of war' by jamming the military's radar when they tried to trace it.

Electronic jamming is a form of electronic warfare and is illegal in all 50 states. While it's not always considered an act of war, it is interpreted as hostile.

Video of what the Navy was able to trace of the object was leaked in 2017 and the case was declassified by the Pentagon earlier this year.

Fravor and others were conducting a routine training mission when the radio operator asked them to check out a mysterious aircraft they had been tracking for two weeks.

The operator said the object would suddenly appear at 80,000 feet, hurtle toward the sea, hover at about 20,000 feet, then shoot back up into the sky.

Fravor and Commander Jim Slight and two others were sent out in fighter jets to observe the shape.

'We see this little white Tic Tac because we're about 20 feet above it and its going north, south, north, south, and it's abrupt,' he said.

He explained that it didn't move like helicopters or other aircraft he was familiar with.

'By this time we're driving around and we're just watching this thing and I go, "hey I'm gonna check it out,"' Fravor recalled.

'It's aware of us and it goes bloop and start coming up, so it knows that we're there. This is like five minutes,' he added.

'I'm going to meet it and I'm probably a half mile away and it's coming across my nose ...and it just accelerates and disappears at about 12,000 feet in less than a half second and it's gone,' Fravor said.

'I remember telling the guy in my back sat, "Dude, I dunno about you but I'm pretty weirded out,"' he said in the interview.

Fravor said he and the other jets went down towards the water to see what the object was potentially hovering

around as they noticed white water when the object was over it, but it was 'clear blue' when they reached it.

After landing Fravor mentioned the UFO to colleague Chad Underwood who successfully located the unidentified object to get video on his radar. But when he attempted to trace the shape, the flying object jammed the radar.

'When he first sees [the object] he gets an energy lock on it. When he goes to lock it up, now he's putting a bunch of energy on it. He's telling the radar, "Stare down the line of sight, whatever is there I want you to grab it and build a trace file on it," which will tell you where it is, how fast it is and the direction that it's going,' Fravor said.

'The radar is smart enough that when the signal comes back if it's been messed with, it will tell you - it will give you indications that it's being jammed It's being jammed into about every mode you can see ... You can tell it's being jammed.

'When you actively jam another platform, yes it's technically an act of war,' he added.

When asked if he believes that Tic Tac shape could've been from another planet, Fravor said it could be possible.

'I don't like to get into little green men but I don't think we've developed it ... I think you can hide things for a while. This is a giant leap in technology,' he said.

[Article](#)

Fighter pilot says UFO he chased in 2004 committed 'act of war'

Commander David Fravor recalled the strange encounter off San Diego 16 years ago in a podcast

Fox News, 14 September 2020... by Robert Gearty

A former U.S. Navy fighter pilot spoke this month about what he says was an encounter with a "Tic Tac"-shaped UFO and believes the flying object committed an "act of war."

Retired Cmdr. David Fravor recalled the strange encounter off San Diego 16 years ago in a Sept. 8 podcast with MIT research scientist Lex Fridman.

Fravor says he was dispatched to investigate radar anomalies and later described what he saw as "like nothing I've ever seen" – a Tic Tac-shaped object able to turn on a dime and make itself invisible to radar, New Zealand's TV Channel 3 reported.

He was followed by other pilots who managed to catch it on video. Clips were leaked in 2017 by a UFO research group founded by punk singer Tom DeLonge of Blink 182, and formally declassified in 2020 by the Pentagon, according to the station.



"This is not like, 'we saw it and it was gone', or 'I saw lights in the sky and it's gone' – we watched this thing on a crystal clear day with four trained observers," Fravor said.

He said he tried to get close to it, but as he did so it accelerated so quickly, it was gone in half a second, according to Channel 3.

"I remember telling the guy in my back seat, 'Dude, I dunno about you but I'm pretty weirded out,'" Fravor said, according to the station,

Once he landed, Fravor mentioned the object to another pilot, Chad Underwood, the station reported.

Underwood found the UFO, aimed his radar at it – and got jammed.

"He's telling the radar, 'Stare down the line of sight, whatever is there I want you to grab it and build a trace file on it,' which will tell you where it is, how fast it is and the direction that it's going," Fravor told Fridman, according to the station.

"The radar is smart enough that when the signal comes back if it's been messed with, it will tell you – it will give you indications that it's being jammed... It's being jammed into about every mode you can see... You can tell it's being jammed," he said.

"When you actively jam another platform, that's technically an act of war," Fravor told Fridman.

Fridman called Fravor "one of the most credible witnesses" in the history of UFO research.

[Article](#)

From: (b) (6)
To: (b) (6) Stratton, John F (Jav) SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA)
Cc: Ray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6; (b) (6)
Subject: (b) (6) latest story
Date: Monday, August 24, 2020 11:38:19 AM

sigh

Regards,

(b) (6)

Evidence of U.S. Navy Involvement in UFO Program May Have Been Destroyed

The Black Vault, 24 August 2020... by

In April of 2020, the Department of Defense (DOD) shocked the world by releasing three videos they considered Unidentified Aerial Phenomena or UAPs. Although the three videos had already leaked and had been in the public domain for years, the official release of them represented a continued aura of transparency surrounding the UFO issue by the Navy, when all other military branches have been primarily silent on the issue. However, it appears that transparency may have morphed back into a shroud of secrecy. A string of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests filed by The Black Vault, one which recently went through the appeal process, may have completely crushed the hopes that the Navy would reveal startling new information about their connection to the Pentagon's UFO study known as AATIP. This two and a half year effort by The Black Vault may also foreshadow future secrecy which may surround the recently announced "UAP Task Force."

Navy and the AATIP

The Navy's involvement in the Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program, or AATIP, was first revealed in February of 2018. In an interview with Luis Elizondo, the man who says he ran the secret UFO study, he called out the Navy specifically as one of the sources for UFO case files that he utilized while working within the Pentagon.

"AATIP receives the cases from various different channels, so where our office sat at the top of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, we had multiple avenues of approach," Elizondo said in a recorded video to Open Minds TV. "So you had, in some cases, reporting would come up through Navy channels; in other cases it would come up through Air Force channels; in other cases it would come through the intelligence community; and as the focal point, if you will, for this capability, all roads I guess lead to Rome in this particular case. All roads led to our office regarding the phenomena."

Using this testimony, The Black Vault filed FOIA request DON-NAVY-2018-005476 on March 15, 2018, with the Navy. Within weeks, the request yielded a denial that any records existed pertaining to AATIP. The letter claimed that not a single photograph, video, report, letter, or memo existed within the Navy's possession, that was supplied to, sent to or received from, the AATIP program which operated within the Pentagon.

Although no appeal was filed by The Black Vault at the time, another shred of evidence presented itself in September of 2019, when Swedish researcher and journalist Roger Glassel received a statement from the Navy. "The AATIP program involved offices from across the Department of Defense, including Navy," spokesperson Joseph Gradisher told Glassel. "Details remain classified. For additional information, I would refer you to the Department of Defense."

This statement offered a second irrefutable piece of evidence, which came from the Navy itself, that the AATIP and the Navy worked hand in hand in some capacity while the program was running. So, within days of that statement being given to Glassel, The Black Vault refiled the request previously denied, in which the Navy spokesperson's statement was added as additional proof that records should exist. That request was identified as FOIA Case DON-NAVY-2019-011490.

Despite the new evidence, the second request yielded the same denial as the first.

The Appeal

It took much longer to deny on the second go-around, but this request was also given a "no records" determination by the Navy. However, this time, The Black Vault appealed the decision and filed appeal case NAVY-2020-003752.

Armed with Navy spokesperson Gradisher's statement, and with Elizondo's added testimony, it was felt that between the two, grounds for an appeal were met that a proper search was not done, and responsive records should exist.

The appeal was processed, and just like the requests which came before it, was denied. However, with a FOIA appeal, denials are not simply "no records" determinations. Rather, they offer much more detail, case law, and citations on why a case is denied. This additional legalese is due to the fact that the next step beyond an appeal, is litigation, so agencies, along with their lawyers, often try to dot their I's and cross their T's when it gets to this point.

Although many FOIA cases related to AATIP have come up empty, and many are still pending, this particular FOIA appeal denial represents the first seeking AATIP records that The Black Vault is aware of. With it, the Navy has likely set a legal precedent on how certain pieces of information are handled when submitted to the DOD within a FOIA request/case. And the precedent, does not offer a promising future for transparency and openness on the UAP issue.

"Your appeal is a request for a final agency determination under the FOIA. For the reasons set forth below, I must deny your appeal," E. J. Osterhues from the General Litigation Division of the Judge Advocate General's office said in the letter.

What followed were the brutally dry details on why this appeal was denied, and it is with those details that makes this all incredibly relevant for future research endeavors seeking information related to AATIP.

Breaking Down the Denial

When an appeal is filed, you outline why you feel the agency did not do their lawful duty of searching for records (there are other reasons to appeal, though not relevant here). In this particular case, this is called an appeal of the “adequacy of the search.” After The Black Vault outlined Elizondo’s testimony along with the Navy’s statement in the appeal itself, the Office of the Judge Advocate General then broke down each point and refuted it within their response.

First addressed, was the statement by the Navy spokesperson, which stated that the Navy had a role within the AATIP. Osterhues claimed that they could not verify the statement. “After receiving your appeal my office researched that quote and found no evidence Mr. Gradisher made that statement,” the letter outlined. “Even if he did, AATIP involvement by the Navy does not otherwise undermine a reasonable search, nor does it require the Navy to actually send records to the AATIP.”

The seemingly odd part of this, is that the Navy could not even confirm what the Navy had already said. To ensure no stance by the Navy or DOD had changed, since that has happened before, The Black Vault wrote the Pentagon to ensure the statement received by Glassel was not only genuine, but still represented the current stance of the department.

It took only hours for the Pentagon to respond. “While Joe Gradisher is away from the office, I can confirm that he did provide that A5 response to Roger Glassel in September 2019 and it is an accurate statement,” spokesperson Susan Gough said in a July 21, 2020, dated email.

It is unclear why the Navy could not do the same to verify the statement, but alas, even if they did verify it, they already dismissed the relevance of it.

Second, they addressed the testimony of Elizondo. Here, the Navy reiterated a much contested and very controversial aspect to this entire saga. The DOD denies Elizondo ever had assigned responsibilities on the program, and he did not serve as the director.

“You argue that Luis Elizondo, a supposed former director of AATIP, stated the organization received records from the various military services and therefore Navy records must exist,” the letter outlined. “However, the Department of Defense specifically has stated Mr. Elizondo never served as the Director of the AATIP and his statements are pure speculation that do not otherwise undermine the IDA search.”

Although this is not a new claim by the DOD, and Elizondo has addressed this prior, The Black Vault reached out to Elizondo for another response and reaction. His comments are published here, in full and unedited, to ensure his voice is heard on the matter:

“I’m greatly disappointed but not surprised. When the U.S. Government’s last resort is to refer to a single sourced opinion article, you know their position is getting desperate. This response is clearly a vindictive effort by some in the Pentagon to inflict retribution on myself and others for speaking the truth to the American people. It’s a failure for any real journalist to not recognize this is the eighth time the government has changed their position on this matter in the last three years; even contradicting their previous official statements. There are numerous senior former and current government officials who have stated for the record my role in AATIP to include the Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (the AATIP Program sponsor), Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Christopher Mellon, the Secretary of Defense’s own Press Secretary Dana White, numerous senior scientists, contract personnel, and even existing members of the Taskforce to name only a few. What is intriguing is that despite the overwhelming evidence and documentation that exists at both the classified and unclassified levels that the government continues to deny information that is easily verifiable. In essence, calling all of these individuals liars is not only despicable but duplicative and should cause one to wonder whether there is a real conspiracy to hide the truth to which we are privy. For those individuals who remain vindictive and untruthful, they will eventually be held accountable for their actions.”

To again ensure accuracy and verify that the Navy properly represented the current DOD stance, as rumors have circulated the DOD was possibly changing its position on Elizondo’s role on AATIP, The Black Vault reached out again to the Pentagon to clarify.

“Regarding Elizondo and the AATIP program, the department’s position has not changed. Elizondo had no assigned responsibilities for AATIP while he was in OUSD(I),” said Gough in another e-mail dated July 31, 2020.

The importance of dismissing the Navy’s own spokesperson, along with the testimony of Elizondo at the appeal level, is that it likely sets a future legal precedent on future FOIA cases, appeals and litigation (the next step in the FOIA process after an appeal), should the latter ever come to pass. To date, there has been no AATIP related FOIA litigation that is known.

The question then becomes if the Navy will not consider a statement from their current spokesperson or a former DOD employee who says he directed the program, who will be allowed to offer up testimony they would take?

Regardless of the answer to the above, there is one takeaway from the appeal letter that is easily missed. After the Navy dismisses their own spokesperson, along with the testimony of Elizondo, they say one thing that ultimately shuts down the entire effort to gain access to documents, photographs, videos, or whatever else the Navy supplied the AATIP.

“AATIP was disbanded in 2012 and therefore any records you seek, if they ever existed, may have been permanently transferred, destroyed, or otherwise no longer able to be located by the IDA [Initial Denial Authority].”

In other words, given the assumption records did exist based on the testimony outlined in the appeal – they are just gone. Whether the evidence has been shredded into millions of pieces of confetti or it

all has been moved to an undisclosed location that the Navy will not identify, they simply are not there in the eyes of the FOIA.

Elizondo re-affirmed this week to The Black Vault that the Navy did, in fact, supply AATIP information of some kind, but added, "I cannot comment nor elaborate on the nature and type of information provided to AATIP during my tenure."

Was the Evidence Transferred to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)?

If the records were transferred to an undisclosed location, rather than all copies being shredded beyond recognition, could the location be OSD at the Pentagon?

Despite the controversy behind Elizondo's position on the AATIP, one thing that has never been disputed is his employment at the DOD, specifically within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, or OUSDI, a component of OSD. The hierarchy and structure of OSD gets to be a bit overwhelming to fully understand, but it has been widely reported that AATIP, UFO research study or not, operated out of OSD/OUSDI where Elizondo worked.

Now, why could this all be a clue? Well, in May of 2019, just after documentation was leaked by KLAS-TV investigative journalist George Knapp that showed how the Pentagon videos were "released" to the public (later shown to likely be misreported), a request was filed by The Black Vault to the Navy for the three videos labeled as the FLIR1, Gimbal (identified on the form as "Gimble") and GoFast. This was FOIA case DON-NAVY-2019-006391.

The response from the Navy just two weeks later? The request needed to be filed to OSD to access the videos and obtain their release.

The request was immediately refiled to OSD under FOIA case 19-F-1231.

The response from OSD a month after that? The request was forwarded to the Navy for a response.

A phone call was made to the Pentagon to show the FOIA effort to get the FLIR1, Gimbal and GoFast videos was becoming a ping pong match, bouncing around back and forth between the two agencies. The answer that was given, was that the the Navy did not have the videos, and through the first FOIA case determined OSD did. The reason OSD bounced it back to the Navy, was that OSD could not determine if the videos could be released since they were not their own videos. Rather, OSD sent the videos it had in its possession to the Navy for the review. This is what is called the "Original Classifying Authority" or OCA. It is the OCA that needs to make the decision if a record can be released. Navy videos = Navy decision.

That therein lies the possible clue. The three videos released in April by the Navy, are Navy videos, hence why it was the Navy that released them through NAVAIR. However, what the original FOIA case DON-NAVY-2019-006391 proved, was that even though those videos were Navy records, the Navy did not have them in their possession. They were "permanently transferred" (reference the appeal letter language) to OSD, and there they sat until The Black Vault got the Pentagon to find

them, and forward them to the proper OCA for declassification. (It should be noted – The Black Vault received the final determination for this string of FOIA requests approximately one hour after NAVAIR released the videos on their website. The end result was a full grant of my FOIA request, and a link to the videos was provided in their letter. The Black Vault spent nearly a year working on these cases to secure the release of the three videos.)

To test the theory, The Black Vault reached out to Elizondo again regarding the FLIR1, Gimbal and GoFast videos, and asked about their use (if any) within the AATIP program.

“Yes they were part of Navy resource material, however the nature with which they were obtained I am unable to comment other than that were through official channels.”

Although Elizondo could not expand further, it may be safe to assume that those three Navy videos, which would likely have been originally obtained from the Navy, is a prime example of material that was sent to OSD/OUSDI — then no longer held within Navy archives. Once sent, the videos could have been destroyed at the Navy, but retained at OSD, therefore generating a “no records” determination by the Navy.

If the above is true — what other material may have suffered the same fate at the Navy, but is just waiting to be discovered at OSD?

The Black Vault has numerous open FOIA requests to OSD since 2017, including multiple FOIA appeal wins, that may play a role in future AATIP disclosures. This will be reported on when available.

More UAP Videos

A screen grab from the FLIR1 UAP video, which shows the unknown object as captured on camera by the Nimitz Carrier Strike Group in 2004, off the coast of San Diego.

Despite the alleged absence of material sent to AATIP by the Navy, The Black Vault also pursued the video designation of “Unidentified Aerial Phenomena” that was given to the FLIR1, Gimbal and GoFast videos, in a much more broader sense.

After the official release of the videos by the Navy in April of 2020, The Black Vault filed FOIA case DON-NAVY-2020-007226, which asked for other videos with the same “UAP” designation within the Navy’s holdings.

In the government record research realm, a general rule of thumb is if there is one (in this case, three), then there are more. Therefore, the intent was to discover additional videos, or lists of them, that revealed what else was there.

Their official response was a push back that represents one of the biggest conundrums in the FOIA process. In a letter dated July 15, 2020, the Navy shot the request down.

“We are unable to process your FOIA request. In accordance with 32 C.F.R. § 286.5(a), a requester is

required to reasonably describe the records sought and provide sufficient detail to enable personnel to locate those records with a reasonable amount of effort.”

Here is the conundrum. It is known that the designation “Unidentified Aerial Phenomena” exists. It was revealed by The Black Vault in September of 2019. Well before the Navy “officially released” the videos, they made comment on the leaked versions designating them “UAP.” However, the Navy said that on this request seeking other videos with the same designation, it did not reasonably describe the records sought. Apparently, a date, time, location, branch of the Navy, etc., are all required for the Navy to process this specific request seeking other UAP videos (an appeal is being pursued).

The conundrum is simply put like this: By law you have a “freedom of information” to know, yet, if you don’t know the exact details which would come from actually utilizing that freedom successfully without pushback, you ultimately lose that “freedom of information” because you, well, don’t have enough information required to access it.

This all may sound confusing, convoluted, and frustrating, and it is.

Though do not be too dismayed by what you just read. Despite the hardships and conundrums of the FOIA process, The Black Vault’s pursuit of the AATIP truth is far from over.

The Black Vault has been told UFO related documents were destroyed in the past, and although it took seventeen full years, The Black Vault finally found them through research, determination, and never saying “never.”

The AATIP truth will be sought after by the same means, no matter how long it may take.

[Article](#)

From: [Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#)
To: [Stratton, John F \(Jay\) SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#); [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: [EXTERNAL] Kirk McConnell, SASC PSM, mtg on Unidentified Aerial Phenomena, Wed, Aug 26, 3pm-4pm
Date: Tuesday, August 25, 2020 3:31:50 PM

Holy Toledo! I had no idea this organization existed.

Please please please do not let anyone agree to provide a lunch-time talk!

Sandy

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, August 17, 2020 3:48 PM
To: Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6); Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6); Gough, Susan L (Sue) CIV OSD PA (USA)
(b) (6)
Cc: Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: FW: [EXTERNAL] Kirk McConnell, SASC PSM, mtg on Unidentified Aerial Phenomena, Wed, Aug 26, 3pm-4pm

All,

"Help?!?" on the way?

Regards,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, August 17, 2020 12:59 PM
Subject: [EXTERNAL] Kirk McConnell, SASC PSM, mtg on Unidentified Aerial Phenomena, Wed, Aug 26, 3pm-4pm

Good afternoon Space friends,

A new group we're forming, Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Association, is hosting a virtual meeting with Kirk McConnell, PSM, Senate Armed Services Association, on Wednesday, August 26, 3pm-4pm.

As you may have heard, and summarized below, DEPSECDEF David Norquist released an announcement late Friday, August 14, stating the Pentagon is forming a Task Force on the topic, which was the impetus to form the group, since the topic is rather atypical

for Space Transportation Association and the National Security Space Division of Cyber, Space & Intelligence Association.

If you have an interest in hearing Kirk's view on the topic, please join us. On the other hand, if you have no interest on the topic, simply let us know and we'll remove you from the distro list on similar meetings.

To join the meeting, please use the MS Teams link below.

[Kirk McConnell, SASC PSM, mtg on Unidentified Aerial Phenomena](#)

Since this is likely to be a popular event, we will limit participation to 2-3 attendees per company, thanks for understanding.

An overview on UAPA may be found attached. We're also glad to announce the initial members of our Advisory Board, our good friends Ty McCoy, former Acting Secretary and Sr Assistant Secretary, USAF, National Security Advisor to Senator Jake Garn; Gary Sojka, The Potomac Advocates, former SSCI and SASC; and Gil Klinger, 31 years USG, DOD, CIA, ODNI, NRO and five years Defense industry, so welcome Ty, Gil and Gary!

We hope you find this of interest!

Rich and Ali

Richard Coleman

President

Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Association

(b) (6)

Event ID: 333

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Establishment of Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force

AUG. 14, 2020

On Aug. 4, 2020, Deputy Secretary of Defense David L. Norquist approved the establishment of an Unidentified Aerial Phenomena (UAP) Task Force (UAPTF). The Department of the Navy, under the cognizance of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, will lead the UAPTF.

The Department of Defense established the UAPTF to improve its understanding of, and gain insight into, the nature and origins of UAPs. The mission of the task force is to detect, analyze and catalog UAPs that could potentially pose a threat to U.S. national security.

As DOD has stated previously, the safety of our personnel and the security of our operations are of paramount concern. The Department of Defense and the military departments take any incursions by unauthorized aircraft into our training ranges or designated airspace very

seriously and examine each report. This includes examinations of incursions that are initially reported as UAP when the observer cannot immediately identify what he or she is observing.

From: (b) (6)
To: [Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN ONI USA](#); [Draz, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#)
Cc: [Aeschbach, Kelly A RADM USN ONI WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#); [Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#); (b) (6)
[OPNAV ALL N2N6 Front Office](#); [OPNAV N2N6I Front Office](#); (b) (6)
Subject: RE: AFCEA INSA Intelligence and National Security Summit
Date: Friday, September 11, 2020 5:47:27 PM

DCNO,

In addition to what I sent you earlier, here is a bit more information on the Summit itself:

Audience: "The virtual format will enable us to reach a larger audience than the 1,500 government, industry, academia, and media representatives who typically participate."

About the Intelligence and National Security Summit

Now in its seventh year, the Summit, powered by AFCEA International and the Intelligence and National Security Alliance (INSA), brings senior Intelligence Community leaders together to advance collaborative solutions to critical intelligence and national security challenges. This high caliber virtual program features five plenaries and five breakout sessions that will examine "ripped from the headlines" issues such as information warfare, U.S.-China relationship, use of AI, intelligence policy and workforce readiness.

Why Attend

The Summit is the premier forum for unclassified dialogue between U.S. Government intelligence agencies and their industry and academic partners. At this three day online program, senior leaders from across the IC will examine pressing national security challenges and opportunities, share insights and expertise, and advance practical and creative solutions.

Attending the Summit provides you with:

- Key insights from senior government leaders, technical experts, leading edge researchers, and people in the field working to overcome challenges with creative solutions
- Access to white papers, videos, and one-on-one online meetings with developers of the latest technological advancements in the intelligence community
- Opportunities to expand your professional network

What to Expect

- A robust virtual platform that is designed to encourage participant networking and engagement prior to and throughout the three day program
- Five **Plenary Sessions (Topics covered:** Strategic Challenges, Military Intelligence, Technology and National Security, and More!)
- Five **Breakout Sessions (Topics include:** Information Warfare, Cleared Workforce in a Post-COVID World, CIO Perspectives, U.S.- China Relations After the Pandemic, and Use of AI by U.S. and its Adversaries)
- Prior to the Summit, attendees and exhibitors will be able to message each other to request

virtual meetings

- Every participant will have their own virtual account that will assist with **planning and scheduling** which sessions to attend, which exhibitors kiosk to visit, and which participants to meet
- **Virtual Exhibit Hall** open all three days with options to interact

Hope this puts it all into better context for you.

I will have the answers to the proposed Qs to you early next week.

V/R,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, September 11, 2020 2:24 PM
To: Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO (USA) (b) (6); Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)
Cc: Aeschbach, Kelly A RADM USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6); Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6); OPNAV ALL N2N6 Front Office (b) (6); OPNAV N2N6I Front Office (b) (6)
Subject: AFCEA INSA Intelligence and National Security Summit
Importance: High

DCNO,

Next Thursday, you have the virtual AFCEA INSA Service Chiefs Panel for the subject conference from 1300-1400.

The initial invite is attached.

I have prepared some material for you to review, with the assistance of Scott Bray and his team, as in the designated attachment.

FYI.. former DDNI /
former NGA Director Tish Long is now moderating.

I just became aware that she had sent some questions for the panel out to all. She breaks down questions for panelists by name.

In the Tish Questions attachment, I've highlighted in yellow the ones directed at you.

Scott/Team,

My apologies for not having these sooner... I was not aware they had been sent.

Please look these questions over ASAP and send back proposed responses for VADM Trussler to study/use.

I will modify the prep document to include those Qs/As once I receive your talking points.

Thanks.

Sir,

This should get you started... we'll update once Scott and his team provide the request additional talking points.

Standing by for additional support as needed.

V/R,

(b) (6)

From: Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO (USA) (b) (6)

Sent: Saturday, August 8, 2020 1:03 PM

To: (b) (6) Bray, Scott W SES

OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

(b) (6) Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA

WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

Subject: RE: INSA Session

Some random brainstorming to be ready for:

- KIWC
- UAP
- Why a url
- Can/should I talk about HRE efforts led by Kathy's team in cyber discussions
- I'll probably need a refresher of where the line is for classified on some adversary stuff

Vr, JT

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Thursday, August 6, 2020 12:53 PM
To: Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO (USA) (b) (6); Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
(b) (6) Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA
WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
Subject: RE: INSA Session

Aye, Sir.

There will be a conference call scheduled within the next couple weeks (they are working to identify potential times) to discuss topics, etc.; hosted by Lt Gen Noonan, with participation by all the panelists. It would be good to have Scott on that call with you.

Typically, out of that we would then have specific areas to focus on, and would then farm out those topics/questions to the appropriate N2N6 Teams to provide answers for you to review in advance of the event.

It would indeed be good to go into that prep call with specific areas we'd like to highlight... so we (you) can drive some of the conversation in a preferred direction.

VADM Kohler participated in this event in 2018 (DDNI/Lynn Wright took last year's). Attached is the final version of the prep document we prepared that incorporated all inputs. The goal is to have a similar product to you to help you prepare.

FYI... this is typically a live event with open Q/A from media and other attendees... it will be interesting to see how this will work as a virtual event.

BT BT

Scott,

If you/your team have suggestions along those lines (topics/bullet points) that we want to suggest up front in the prep call, please send to me and I will compile for a pre-call read-ahead.

Standing by to discuss further/proceed as necessary.

V/R,

(b) (6)

From: Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO (USA) (b) (6)

Sent: Thursday, August 6, 2020 12:10 PM

To: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6 (b) (6); (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: INSA Session

(b) (6)/Scott, will need some thoughts from you on following panel. Vr, JT

Plenary 2: Service Intelligence Priorities

Thursday 1:00 p.m. - 2:00 p.m.

Presenters:

Panelist: LTG Scott Berrier, USA, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2

Panelist: VADM Jeffrey Trussler, USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information Warfare,
Director of Naval Intelligence

Moderator: LTG Robert Noonan, USA (Ret.), Chairman, AFCEA Intelligence Committee

Panelist: Lt Gen Mary O'Brien, USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance,
Reconnaissance and Cyber Effects Operations, Headquarters U.S. Air Force/A2

Description: This annual INSS panel is a thoughtful and wide-ranging guided conversation with the Service Intelligence Chiefs about their respective challenges and opportunities. Focus areas include: intelligence support to Service and Joint priorities; intelligence readiness trends; critical skill sets and talent development; desired outcomes for Space; and, private sector and IC partnerships.

From: [Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO \(USA\)](#)
To: (b) (6); [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I; Stratton, John F \(Jay\)](#)
[SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#); (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6); [Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#);
(b) (6)
Subject: RE: CNN - UAP Task Force
Date: Thursday, August 13, 2020 8:59:57 PM

Got it!

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b) (6)
Date: Thursday, Aug 13, 2020, 6:59 PM
To: Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO (USA); (b) (6); Bray, Scott W SES
OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I; (b) (6); Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA)
(b) (6)
<[il](#)>
Cc: (b) (6); Brown,
Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA); (b) (6)
Subject: FW: CNN - UAP Task Force

Sir,

FYI.

No idea who spoke to them.

CNN went to press without waiting for what our DoD PA rep was preparing.

VR

(b) (6)

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

CNN reporting on UAP Task Force:

<https://www.cnn.com/2020/08/13/politics/pentagon-ufo-task-force/index.html>

From: [Stratton, John F \(Jay\) SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#)
To: (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6); [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#); (b) (6)
Subject: RE: DepSecDef
Date: Friday, August 7, 2020 9:24:53 AM

Good idea (b) (6), thanks!

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b) (6)
Date: Friday, Aug 07, 2020, 9:22 AM
To: Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6); Bray, Scott W
SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)
Subject: DepSecDef

Good Morning!

I see you, Scott, DCNO, and VCNO are on with DSD Monday afternoon.

I briefed DCNO this morning that DSD signed the UAPTF memo Tuesday (per (b) (6) emails late yesterday)... so that makes for good timing with your brief.

If you had not been planning this aspect... it might be good to have a copy of the SCG along... and make it a data point to mention that one is in place to protect the security and sanctity of the investigations....

Later,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
To: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I; Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA); (b) (6)
Cc: OPNAV ALL N2N6 Front Office (b) (6); Brown, Charles W RDML USN (USA); (b) (6); Aeschbach, Kelly A RADM USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA); (b) (6); Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA)
Subject: RE: HOT -- DEPSECDEF Request for Press Release
Date: Wednesday, August 12, 2020 9:36:20 AM

Roger all... thanks for the further explanations, Scott!

Regards,

(b) (6)

From: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)
Sent: Wednesday, August 12, 2020 9:22 AM
To: (b) (6); Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)
Cc: OPNAV ALL N2N6 Front Office (b) (6); Brown, Charles W RDML USN (USA) (b) (6); Aeschbach, Kelly A RADM USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6); Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
Subject: RE: HOT -- DEPSECDEF Request for Press Release

Thanks, (b) (6). Appreciate your perspectives. My comments include RADM Aeschbach's concerns.

(U//FOUO) (b) (5)

(U//FOUO) (b) (5)

Thanks,
Scott

Scott W. Bray

Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence
Director, Naval Intelligence Activity

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Wednesday, August 12, 2020 6:20 AM

To: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6 (b) (6); Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN
DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)

Cc: OPNAV ALL N2N6 Front Office (b) (6)

(b) (6); Brown, Charles W RDML USN (USA)

(b) (6)

(b) (6) Aeschbach, Kelly A RADM USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA)

(b) (6)

(b) (6) Brown,
Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

Subject: RE: HOT -- DEPSECDEF Request for Press Release

All,

Susan and I have not seen RADM Aeschbach's edits... are they wrapped up in yours (attached),
Scott?

FYI, Scott... By and large I have no issues with your edits... however some of the language you struck
out has been included in previous responses to query...

- (b) (6), (b) (5)

|

|

|

|

Keep in mind that the Q/As will not be shared... they are for (b) (6) (or the DoD Spokesperson if asked in a Press Brief) to use only in response to query.

As for whether to release or not... as I understand it, it was DEPSECDEF actual who directed the release.

(b) (6)

From: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6 (b) (6)

Sent: Tuesday, August 11, 2020 6:59 PM

To: Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6); Brown, Charles W RDML USN (USA) (b) (6)

Cc: OPNAV ALL N2N6 Front Office (b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6); Aeschbach, Kelly A RADM USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6) Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA

WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

Subject: RE: HOT -- DEPSECDEF Request for Press Release

(b) (6) —

(b) (5)

(b) (5)

(b) (5)

(b) (5)

All the best,
Scott

Scott W. Bray

Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence

Director, Naval Intelligence Activity

(b) (6)

From: Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)

Sent: Tuesday, August 11, 2020 6:41 PM

To: (b) (6)

Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I

(b) (6); Brown, Charles W RDML USN (USA) (b) (6)

Cc: OPNAV ALL N2N6 Front Office (b) (6)

; Aeschbach, Kelly A RADM USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA)

Subject: RE: HOT -- DEPSECDEF Request for Press Release

I concur with RADM Aeschbach's recommendation, other than that it looks good to me. Standing by for any guidance from Mr. Bray.

V/r, (b) (6)

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b) (6)

Date: Tuesday, Aug 11, 2020, 4:24 PM

To: (b) (6) Stratton, John F (Jay) SES
USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)

Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6), Brown,
Charles W RDML USN (USA) (b) (6)

Cc: OPNAV ALL N2N6 Front Office (b) (6)

, Aeschbach, Kelly A RADM USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA)

(b) (6)

Subject: RE: HOT -- DEPSECDEF Request for Press Release

(b) (6) – Plan to discuss with Mr Bray this afternoon. Will provide feedback soonest.

Vr/ (b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Tuesday, August 11, 2020 4:09 PM

To: Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)

Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV

N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6); Brown, Charles W RDML USN (USA)

(b) (6)

Cc: OPNAV ALL N2N6 Front Office (b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6); Aeschbach, Kelly A RADM USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

Subject: FW: HOT -- DEPSECDEF Request for Press Release

Importance: High

All,

As mentioned, DepSecDef has directed DoD PA to issue a press release on the official standup of the UAP Task Force.

Attached is the draft release with related Q/As for our Navy chop.

The statement and answers use language previously agreed on and used.

All queries will continue to be directed to DoDPA.

Please let me know soonest if you have any issues and/or recommended changes.

I would anticipate release tomorrow (Wednesday).

Regards

(b) (6)

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b) (6)

Date: Tuesday, Aug 11, 2020, 3:23 PM

To: (b) (6) Cummings, Matthew C
(Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA) (b) (6), Carranza, Guillermo R SES OSD
OGC (USA) (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Subject: HOT -- DEPSECDEF Request for Press Release

Gents,

DEPSECDEF has requested a press release on the establishment of the UAPTF. Please see attached. Top section is what would be released, bottom section is for the Q&As we're likely (!) to get once the press release goes out. If we want to keep the press release shorter, I'm fine with dropping the third paragraph from the release itself (I can incorporate into query responses as needed). Need Navy, OUSD(I&S) and OGC clearance; please run up your chains for appropriate level clearance. Once I have yours, then this will go to ATSD(PA) Hoffman for approval for release.

(b) (6), for your SA and Hill notification as appropriate. (b) (6), mainly for DIA SA also, as I've included likely question about AATIP & UAPTF in the Q&A.

Regards,

(b) (6)

From: [Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#)
To: [Goldrich, Zev N SES USN \(USA\)](#); [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: INSA Session 17 Sep - VADM Trussler preps
Date: Wednesday, September 2, 2020 7:05:42 AM

Probably a good idea.

From: Goldrich, Zev N SES USN (USA) (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, September 01, 2020 4:21 PM
To: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6); Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: INSA Session 17 Sep - VADM Trussler preps

I can provide some overview civilian stats and some talking points/stats on diversity if helpful.

VR,

Zev

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, September 1, 2020 3:29 PM
To: Goldrich, Zev N SES USN (USA) (b) (6)
Subject: FW: INSA Session 17 Sep - VADM Trussler preps

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, September 1, 2020 3:24 PM
To: (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6) Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
(b) (6) Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I
(b) (6)
Subject: RE: INSA Session 17 Sep - VADM Trussler preps

Hi (b) (6),

We will get you a few adjusted topics by COB Thursday.

Thanks,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Tuesday, September 1, 2020 9:36 AM

To: (b) (6); Bray, Scott W SES

OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6) Brown,
Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

Subject: RE: INSA Session 17 Sep - VADM Trussler preps

(b) (6),

I think the "Why the URL" is why is the DNI a URL, not the IWC legislative proposal issue. We can get you latest Millington data of 1830 and IS Navy manning off the NPC website (authoritative source). V/R (b) (6)

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Tuesday, September 1, 2020 9:26 AM

To: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6) Brown,
Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

Subject: RE: INSA Session 17 Sep - VADM Trussler preps

Scott,

Just a reminder, we need some topics/bullet points from you/your team to prepare DCNO/DNI for the Service Intel Chiefs panel coming up on 17 September.

Also, if you can flesh out any of the areas VADM Trussler mentioned below, that would be most helpful.

(b) (6),

You'll note he mentioned the URL issue below... we'll need to make sure he has the standard reply you use.

Scott, (b) (6),

We should probably have available some info on Intel Community Manning/retention, etc, as well (both civ and mil).... Would appreciate input or POC info to get the latest.

THANKS!

(b) (6)

(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

From: Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO (USA) (b) (6)
Sent: Saturday, August 8, 2020 1:03 PM
To: (b) (6) Bray, Scott W SES
OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
(b) (6) Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA
WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
Subject: RE: INSA Session

Some random brainstorming to be ready for:

- KIWC
- UAP
- Why a url
- Can/should I talk about HRE efforts led by Kathy's team in cyber discussions
- I'll probably need a refresher of where the line is for classified on some adversary stuff

Vr, JT

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Thursday, August 6, 2020 12:53 PM
To: Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO (USA) (b) (6); Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV

N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA

WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

Subject: RE: INSA Session

Aye, Sir.

There will be a conference call scheduled within the next couple weeks (they are working to identify potential times) to discuss topics, etc.; hosted by Lt Gen Noonan, with participation by all the panelists. It would be good to have Scott on that call with you.

Typically, out of that we would then have specific areas to focus on, and would then farm out those topics/questions to the appropriate N2N6 Teams to provide answers for you to review in advance of the event.

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VADM Kohler participated in this event in 2018 (DDNI/Lynn Wright took last year's). Attached is the final version of the prep document we prepared that incorporated all inputs. The goal is to have a similar product to you to help you prepare.

FYI... this is typically a live event with open Q/A from media and other attendees... it will be interesting to see how this will work as a virtual event.

BT BT

Scott,

If you/your team have suggestions along those lines (topics/bullet points) that we want to suggest up front in the prep call, please send to me and I will compile for a pre-call read-ahead.

Standing by to discuss further/proceed as necessary.

V/R,

(b) (6)

From: Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO (USA) (b) (6)

Sent: Thursday, August 6, 2020 12:10 PM

To: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: INSA Session

(b) (6) /Scott, will need some thoughts from you on following panel. Vr, JT

Plenary 2: Service Intelligence Priorities
Thursday 1:00 p.m. - 2:00 p.m.

Presenters:

Panelist: LTG Scott Berrier, USA, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2

Panelist: VADM Jeffrey Trussler, USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information Warfare,
Director of Naval Intelligence

Moderator: LTG Robert Noonan, USA (Ret.), Chairman, AFCEA Intelligence Committee

Panelist: Lt Gen Mary O'Brien, USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance,
Reconnaissance and Cyber Effects Operations, Headquarters U.S. Air Force/A2

Description: This annual INSS panel is a thoughtful and wide-ranging guided conversation with the Service Intelligence Chiefs about their respective challenges and opportunities. Focus areas include: intelligence support to Service and Joint priorities; intelligence readiness trends; critical skill sets and talent development; desired outcomes for Space; and, private sector and IC partnerships.

From: [Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO \(USA\)](#)
To: (b) (6); [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I; Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\); Brown, Charles W RDML USN \(USA\); Stratton, John F \(Jay\) SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\); \(b\) \(6\) Aeschbach, Kelly A RADM USN ONI WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#)
Cc: [OPNAV ALL N2N6 Front Office; \(b\) \(6\)](#)
[Chinfo Duty Officer; \(b\) \(6\)](#)
Subject: RE: UAP Task Force DOD Press Release 14 August 2020
Date: Friday, August 14, 2020 6:57:59 PM

Got it, thanks (b) (6) !

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b) (6)
Date: Friday, Aug 14, 2020, 6:31 PM
To: Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO (USA); (b) (6); Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I; (b) (6); Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA); (b) (6); Brown, Charles W RDML USN (USA); (b) (6); Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA); (b) (6); Aeschbach, Kelly A RADM USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA); (b) (6)
Cc: OPNAV ALL N2N6 Front Office; (b) (6)

Subject: UAP Task Force DOD Press Release 14 August 2020

DCNO/All,

The DoD press release is on the street.

Link is below.


All queries will be handled by DoD PA.

V/R

(b) (6)

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

[Establishment of Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force](#)



**Establishment of Unidentified Aerial Phenomena
Task Force**

Deputy Defense Secretary David L. Norquist approved the
establishment of an Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task F...

From: [Stratton, John F \(Jay\) SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#)
To: (b) (6); [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#)
Cc: (b) (6); [OPNAV N2N6I Front Office; \(b\) \(6\)](#); [Cummings, Matthew C \(Matt\) SES OSD OUSD INTEL \(USA\); Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#)
Subject: RE: UAPTF Query - Air Forces Monthly magazine - QUICK TURN NEEDED
Date: Wednesday, August 19, 2020 9:02:45 AM

Concur as well...

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Wednesday, August 19, 2020 7:46 AM
To: (b) (6); [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#) (b) (6); [Stratton, John F \(Jay\) SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#)
(b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6); [OPNAV N2N6I Front Office](#) (b) (6); [Cummings, Matthew C \(Matt\) SES OSD OUSD INTEL \(USA\)](#)
(b) (6); [Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#)
(b) (6)
Subject: RE: UAPTF Query - Air Forces Monthly magazine - QUICK TURN NEEDED

I'm good with that....

The UAPTF, under the leadership of the Navy, is a coordinating body working across DoD to better understand these incursions into our training areas or designated airspace.

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, August 18, 2020 3:41 PM
To: (b) (6); [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#) (b) (6); [Stratton, John F \(Jay\) SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#)
(b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6); [OPNAV N2N6I Front Office](#) (b) (6); [Cummings, Matthew C \(Matt\) SES OSD OUSD INTEL \(USA\)](#)
(b) (6); [Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#)
(b) (6)
Subject: RE: UAPTF Query - Air Forces Monthly magazine - QUICK TURN NEEDED

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY//PRE-DECISIONAL/EXEMPT FROM FOIA UNDER (b) (5)

(b) (5)
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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]
[Redacted]

Regards,

(b) (6)
[Redacted]

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, August 18, 2020 2:55 PM
To: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6); Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
[Redacted] OPNAV N2N6I Front Office (b) (6)
[Redacted]
Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA) (b) (6);
Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
Subject: RE: UAPTF Query - Air Forces Monthly magazine - QUICK TURN NEEDED

All,

For your consideration on #6, here's a 3rd option that might work:

(b) (5)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

From: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, August 18, 2020 2:34 PM
To: (b) (6) Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
[Redacted] OPNAV N2N6I Front Office (b) (6)
[Redacted]
Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA) (b) (6);
Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
Subject: RE: UAPTF Query - Air Forces Monthly magazine - QUICK TURN NEEDED

By Monday, I think.....

Scott W. Bray

Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence

Director, Naval Intelligence Activity

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Tuesday, August 18, 2020 2:33 PM

To: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6); Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

(b) (6); OPNAV N2N6I Front Office (b) (6)

(b) (6); Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA) (b) (6);

Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

Subject: RE: UAPTF Query - Air Forces Monthly magazine - QUICK TURN NEEDED

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY//PRE-DECISIONAL/EXEMPT FROM FOIA UNDER (b)(5)

(b) (5)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

Regards

(b) (6)

From: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)

Sent: Tuesday, August 18, 2020 2:28 PM

To: (b) (6) Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

(b) (6) OPNAV N2N6I Front Office (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA) (b) (6)

Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

Subject: RE: UAPTF Query - Air Forces Monthly magazine - QUICK TURN NEEDED

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY//PRE-DECISIONAL/EXEMPT FROM FOIA UNDER (b)(5)

(b) (6) —

(U//FOUO) (b) (5)

All the best,
Scott

Scott W. Bray

Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence

Director, Naval Intelligence Activity

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Tuesday, August 18, 2020 1:38 PM

To: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6); Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

(b) (6) OPNAV N2N6I Front Office (b) (6)

Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA) (b) (6)

Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

Subject: FW: UAPTF Query - Air Forces Monthly magazine - QUICK TURN NEEDED

Importance: High

Scott/Jay,

(b) (6), (b) (5)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

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Thoughts?

(b) (6) [Redacted]

From: (b) (6) [Redacted]

Sent: Tuesday, August 18, 2020 1:11 PM

To: (b) (6) Cummings,

Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA) (b) (6)

Cc: Carranza, Guillermo R SES OSD OGC (USA) (b) (6)

Subject: UAPTF Query - Air Forces Monthly magazine

Importance: High

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY//PRE-DECISIONAL/EXEMPT FROM FOIA UNDER (b)(5)

(b) (6) & Matt,

(b) (6), (b) (5)

Regards,

(b) (6)

To whom it may concern,

I am the Associate Editor for Air Forces Monthly magazine. I have some questions about the recent UAPTF announcement. My deadline is Aug. 24.

(b) (5)

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(b) (5)

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

From: (b) (6)
To: (b) (6); Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I; Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA)
Cc: (b) (6) (USA); OPNAV N2N6I Front Office; Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA); Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA); (b) (6)
Subject: RE: UAPTF Query - Air Forces Monthly magazine - QUICK TURN NEEDED
Date: Wednesday, August 19, 2020 8:31:19 AM

Adding (b) (6) who has reported aboard as the N2N6 Deputy SJA.

Vr/TJW

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Wednesday, August 19, 2020 7:46 AM
To: (b) (6) Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6) Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA)
(b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
(b) (6) |>; OPNAV N2N6I Front Office (b) (6)
(b) (6); Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)
(b) (6); Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA)
(b) (6)
Subject: RE: UAPTF Query - Air Forces Monthly magazine - QUICK TURN NEEDED

I'm good with that....

The UAPTF, under the leadership of the Navy, is a coordinating body working across DoD to better understand these incursions into our training areas or designated airspace.

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: (b) (6)
To: (b) (6); Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6); Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) <john.f.stratton@navy.mil>
Cc: (b) (6)
(b) (6) OPNAV N2N6I Front Office (b) (6)
(b) (6) Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)
(b) (6)
(b) (6) >
Subject: RE: UAPTF Query - Air Forces Monthly magazine - QUICK TURN NEEDED

(b) (5)

Regards,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Tuesday, August 18, 2020 2:55 PM

To: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6) Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

(b) (6) OPNAV N2N6I Front Office (b) (6)

(b) (6)
Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA) (b) (6);
Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

Subject: RE: UAPTF Query - Air Forces Monthly magazine - QUICK TURN NEEDED

All,

For your consideration on #6, here's a 3rd option that might work:

(b) (5)

From: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)

Sent: Tuesday, August 18, 2020 2:34 PM

To: (b) (6) Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

(b) (6) OPNAV N2N6I Front Office (b) (6)

(b) (6)
Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA) (b) (6)

Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

Subject: RE: UAPTF Query - Air Forces Monthly magazine - QUICK TURN NEEDED

By Monday, I think.....

Scott W. Bray

Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence
Director, Naval Intelligence Activity

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Tuesday, August 18, 2020 2:33 PM

To: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6); Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

(b) (6); OPNAV N2N6I Front Office (b) (6)

Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA) (b) (6);

Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

Subject: RE: UAPTF Query - Air Forces Monthly magazine - QUICK TURN NEEDED

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY//PRE-DECISIONAL/EXEMPT FROM FOIA UNDER (b)(5)

Thanks, Scott.

(b) (5)

(b) (5)

Regards

Joe

From: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)

Sent: Tuesday, August 18, 2020 2:28 PM

To: (b) (6) Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6),

(b) (6) OPNAV N2N6I Front
Office (b) (6)

Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA) (b) (6)

Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

Subject: RE: UAPTF Query - Air Forces Monthly magazine - QUICK TURN NEEDED

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY//PRE-DECISIONAL/EXEMPT FROM FOIA UNDER (b)(5)

Joe –

(U//FOUO) (b) (5)

All the best,
Scott

Scott W. Bray

Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence

Director, Naval Intelligence Activity

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Tuesday, August 18, 2020 1:38 PM

To: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6); Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN
DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6) >

Cc: (b) (6)

(b) (6) OPNAV N2N6I Front
Office (b) (6)

Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA) (b) (6)

Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

Subject: FW: UAPTF Query - Air Forces Monthly magazine - QUICK TURN NEEDED

Importance: High

Scott/Jay,

Need a quick look/input from you at this set please, so Sue can provide prior to tomorrow's DoD
regular news briefing.

Beyond looking at the whole set, specifically, Sue needs our specific Navy take on these:

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

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[REDACTED]

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, August 18, 2020 1:11 PM
To: (b) (6) Cummings,
Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA) (b) (6)
Cc: Carranza, Guillermo R SES OSD OGC (USA) (b) (6)
Subject: UAPTF Query - Air Forces Monthly magazine
Importance: High

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY//PRE-DECISIONAL/EXEMPT FROM FOIA UNDER (b)(5)

(b) (6) & Matt,
(b) (6), (b) (5)
(b) (6)
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(b) (6)
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(b) (6)
(b) (6)

Regards,

(b) (6)

To whom it may concern,

(b) (6), (b) (5)
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June 12, 2020

Vice Admiral Jeffrey E. Trussler
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information Warfare (N2N6)
Director of Naval Intelligence
2000 Navy Pentagon
Washington, DC 20350-2000

Dear Admiral Trussler:

Adapting to public health considerations, AFCEA International and the Intelligence and National Security Alliance (INSA) will co-host the seventh Intelligence & National Security Summit **online** on September 16, 17, and 18, 2020. This annual unclassified conference in Washington, D.C., has become one of the leading public forums for the discussion of the Intelligence Community and its work. The virtual format will enable us to reach a larger audience than the 1,500 government, industry, academia, and media representatives who typically participate.

On behalf of AFCEA and INSA I would like to invite you to take part in the plenary session Service Intelligence Priorities which will take place on Thursday, September 17 from 1:00 pm – 2:00 pm.

In this unclassified discussion moderated by LTG Bob Noonan, USA (Ret), Chair of AFCEA's Intelligence Committee, we would look to you and other speakers to discuss Service intelligence challenges and opportunities. Focus areas include: intelligence support to Service and Joint priorities; intelligence readiness trends; critical skill sets and talent development; desired outcomes for Space; and, private sector and IC partnerships.

Other invited participants for this session are: LTG Scott Berrier, USA; BGen Melvin Carter, USMC; Lt Gen Mary O'Brien, USAF; and, RDML Andrew Sugimoto, USCG. In the weeks before the event, we will schedule a preparatory call to review the content of the discussion and to ensure you are comfortable using the online platform.

AFCEA and INSA are non-profit organizations with a focus on national security issues and a commitment to promoting public-private partnerships among the defense, intelligence and national security communities. The Summit's four plenary and five breakout sessions will address a variety of current and emerging policy- and technology-related issues, and a virtual exhibit hall will allow industry to highlight innovative products and technologies.

If you have any questions or follow-up, please contact AFCEA's Vice President for Intelligence, Ray Cross, at rcross@afcea.org, 703-631-6131, or, Gretchen Gunning, at ggunning@afcea.org, 703-631-6219.

Thank you for your consideration and for your continuing service to our nation.

Sincerely,



Robert M. Shea
LtGen, USMC (Ret)
President and CEO
AFCEA International

From: (b) (6)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N61](#); [Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#); (b) (6)
Cc: [Stratton, John F \(Jay\) SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#); (b) (6)
Subject: UAPTF NIA Role draft v1
Date: Wednesday, August 19, 2020 9:54:10 AM
Attachments: [UAPTF NIA Role draft v1.docx](#)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY//PRE-DECISIONAL/EXEMPT FROM FOIA UNDER (b)(5)

Scott/all,

(b) (6), (b) (5)
[Redacted]
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Standing by to discuss as necessary.

Regards,

(b) (6)
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(b) (6), (b) (5)

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(b) (6), (b) (5)

AFCEA INSA Intelligence & National Security Summit
(Virtual)

Service Intelligence Priorities Panel
Thursday, 17 September 2020
<https://intelsummit.org/>

EVENT DETAILS

Summit

AFCEA International and the Intelligence and National Security Alliance (INSA) present the annual Intelligence & National Security Summit, featuring leaders from both the public and private sectors in two full days of discussions, panels and keynotes about the needs of the U.S. Intelligence Community.

Service Intelligence Priorities Panel

When: Thursday, 17 September 2020, 1:00 p.m. - 2:00 p.m.

Description This annual INSS panel is a thoughtful and wide-ranging guided conversation with the Service Intelligence Chiefs about their respective challenges and opportunities.

Focus areas include Intelligence support to Service and Joint priorities; intelligence readiness trends; critical skill sets and talent development; desired outcomes for Space; and, private sector and IC partnerships.

Moderator Letitia A. Long, Chair, Intelligence and National Security Alliance

(note 1: Tish Long is a former Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence (DDNI))



Letitia A. Long Chair Intelligence and National Security Alliance

Letitia “Tish” Long became the fifth chairman of the INSA Board of Directors in January 2016. She served as director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) from October 2010 to October 2014, becoming the first woman to lead a major U.S. intelligence agency. Ms. Long is a proud alum of Virginia Tech, where she earned a Bachelor of Science in Electric Engineering. She also has a Master of Science in Mechanical Engineering from Catholic University of America. She currently sits on the boards of INSA member companies Raytheon Company and Noblis Inc., as well as Urthecast Corporation.

(note 2: this is a change in moderator from previous correspondence. Originally mentioned as moderator was LTG Bob Noonan, USA (Ret))

Panelists

- Brigadier General Melvin Carter, USMC, Director of Intelligence, Headquarters Marine Corps
- Brigadier General Leah Lauderback, USSF, Director of Intelligence, United States Space Force
- Major General Kate Leahy, USA, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, G2
- Lieutenant General Mary O'Brien, USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Cyber Effects Operations, Headquarters U.S. Air Force/A2
- RDML Andrew Sugimoto, USCG, Assistant Commandant for Intelligence (CG-2), U.S. Coast Guard
- Vice Admiral Jeffrey Trussler, USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information Warfare, Director of Naval Intelligence

DDNI/NIA Suggested Topics/Talking Points/Support Materials

Meeting multiple missions takes an Enterprise. Without everything behind it, our analysis is no better than pundits and think tanks.

- We deliver **unique secrets**
- We create **foundational** partnerships
- Our ability to protect our intelligence has national security implications
- A failure to communicate or collaborate is just as much a failure as bad analysis

Developing unique Naval Intelligence capabilities:

- Support undersea dominance (ACINT)
Central to warfare
- Civil Maritime
Policy impact of sanctions
- Special mission support
- JWICS modernization
Capability to deliver intelligence securely
Ensuring Navy JWICS is capable and resilient. We depend on it to do our job.
- GPC in maritime environment
The competition is playing out, not just in China or Russia, but in other places like Africa and Europe. It's important to understand the right context in which the competition is taking place.

Developing technologies that expand our capacities, especially AI/ML (Artificial Intelligence/Machine Learning). We need to learn better ways to use that technology and be cognizant of the fact that our adversaries are making great strides in these areas. We can't afford to let them gain the advantage.

Building a continuously well-trained, diverse workforce.

Civilian Diversity & Inclusion

- ~3000 civilian employees in the NAVINTEL workforce
- NAVINTEL has focused on increasing representation of females, minorities and individuals with disabilities through recruiting and engagement activities.
 - *Minority Representation*: From FY16-FY20, minority representation has increased 2%, to 29%. slightly above current IC levels.
 - *Female Representation*: From FY16-FY20, the percent of female employees remains unchanged, at 32%, slightly below current IC levels.
 - *Disability Representation*: From FY16-FY20, disability representation has increased 3%, to 11%, slightly above current IC levels.
- Moving forward, NAVINTEL will continue to focus on:
 - entry-level hiring (minorities represent 41% of entry-level employees; females represent 48% of entry level employees) through outreach to universities with diverse student populations, affinity and industry groups, etc.
 - inclusion activities, .e.g., increasing number and role employee resource groups focused on underrepresented communities (e.g., black/African America, women in STEM, etc.)
 - engaging with employees to increase application rates for training & development activities and senior level positions
 - launching a neurodiversity hiring initiative to attract & hire employees with autism to meet key mission critical roles (e.g., data scientist).
- ODNI IC-wide goal for diversity is annual 1% increase in recruitment rates for women & minorities.
- *Note: There is an federal interagency working group that is how the federal govt measures Sexual Orientation (SO) and Gender Identity (GI). (At current, all that we capture is Male/Female). Recommendations will be made to OMB and IC based following working group findings. Timing TBD...*

Civilian Hiring Timelines

- Historically averages ~220 days to hire new federal employees (security clearance process had accounted for ~65-70% of the process time; OPM has significantly reduced security clearance timelines with recent averages of ~3 months).
- NAVINTEL has reduced hiring timeline over the past 3 years through new hiring technologies and flexible hiring authorities.
 - *"Time to job offer"* for recent college graduates averages less than 30 days when utilizing technologies & flexibilities.

Ensuring security and counter-intelligence programs are in place. We need to protect our secrets.

(b) (6), (b) (5)

(b) (6), (b) (5)

(b) (6), (b) (5)

(b) (6), (b) (5)

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(b) (6), (b) (5)

(b) (6), (b) (5)

(b) (6), (b) (5)

(b) (6), (b) (5)

(b) (6), (b) (5)

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(b) (6), (b) (5)

(b) (6), (b) (5)

(b) (6), (b) (5)

(b) (6), (b) (5)

From: (b) (6)
To: [Brown, Charles W RDML USN \(USA\)](#)
Cc: [Dunn, Paula D RDML CHINFO, OI-00](#); (b) (6); [CHINFO NEWSDESK](#); (b) (6); [Chinfo Duty Officer](#); (b) (6)
[Brav, Scott W SES OPNAV N2A6, N2A6I](#); [Brown, Senora SES USN NIA](#)
[WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#); [OPNAV ALL N2N6 Front Office](#); [OPNAV N2N6I Front Office](#)
Subject: CNN News Story - Trump calls newly released UFO footage "a hell of a video"
Date: Thursday, April 30, 2020 11:19:38 AM

CI,

Apparently POTUS was asked about our 3 UAP videos....

Here is the story that CNN ran this morning on his response.

Other stories have also mentioned his comments.

This might be something that you/their PAOs need to let senior leadership know.... POTUS taking notice and commenting.

Regards,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

Trump calls newly released UFO footage 'a hell of a video'

CNN, 30 April 2020... by Devan Cole

President Donald Trump on Wednesday called footage from the Pentagon showing "unidentified aerial phenomena" a "hell of a video" and told Reuters he wonders "if it's real."

Earlier this week, the Pentagon officially released three videos that show what appear to be unidentified flying objects rapidly moving while recorded by infrared cameras. Two of the videos contain service members reacting in awe at how quickly the objects are moving. One voice speculates that it could be a drone.

"I just wonder if it's real," Trump said of the videos. "That's a hell of a video."

The Navy had acknowledged the veracity of the videos -- which had been previously released by a private company -- in September. They officially released them this week "in order to clear up any misconceptions by the public on whether or not the footage that has been circulating was real, or whether or not there is more to the videos," according to Pentagon spokesperson Sue Gough.

In 2017, one of the pilots who saw one of the unidentified objects in 2004 told CNN that it moved in ways he couldn't explain.

"As I got close to it ... it rapidly accelerated to the south, and disappeared in less than two seconds," said retired US Navy pilot David Fravor.

Trump, who has often spread conspiracy theories, is skeptical of UFOs. In an interview with ABC News last year, the President said he'd had a meeting on the subject, but that he's skeptical the fast-moving objects are anything extraterrestrial.

"I did have one very brief meeting on it," he said in the interview. "But people are saying they're seeing UFOs. Do I believe it? Not particularly."

The government has been quietly studying the possibility of UFOs for decades, with the Pentagon previously studying recordings of aerial encounters with unknown objects as part of a since-shuttered classified program that was launched at the behest of former Sen. Harry Reid of Nevada. The program was launched in 2007 and ended in 2012, according to the Pentagon, because they assessed that there were higher priorities that needed funding.

<https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/30/politics/donald-trump-ufo-videos-response/index.html>

(b) (5)

(b) (5)

(b) (5)

(b) (5)

(b) (5)

(b) (5)

DON-NAVY-2020-007226 request Details

Due Date: N/A Clock Days: 0 (Never Started)

Requester Information

Requester	(b) (6)	Tracking Number	DON-NAVY-2020-007226
Organization	(b) (6)	Submitted Date	04/28/2020
Requester Has Account		Received Date	04/28/2020
Email Address		Perfected Date	
Phone Number		Last Assigned Date	04/28/2020
Fax Number		Assigned To	Naval Air
Address			Systems
			Command -
			Head Quarters
City		Last Assigned By	(b) (6)
State/Province			(Chief of Naval
Zip Code/Postal Code			Operations)
		Request Track	Simple
		Fee Limit	\$25.00

Request Handling


Requester Info Available to the Public?	No	Request Type	FOIA
Request Track	Simple	Request Perfected	No
Fee Category	Media	Perfected Date	
Fee Waiver Requested	No	Acknowledgement Sent Date	04/28/2020
Fee Waiver Status		Unusual Circumstances	No
Expedited Processing Requested	No	Litigation	No
Expedited Processing Status		Court Docket Number	
		5 Day Notifications?	No

Description

Long Description



mail. Please contact me should this FOIA request should incur a charge. I respectfully request a copy of records, electronic or otherwise, of all videos with the designation of "unidentified aerial phenomena" or UAP, as archived by the U.S. Navy. The responsive records, would include those that were released officially on 4/28/20 via NAVAIR's FOIA reading room. I am seeking a copy of all other videos which would contact the same designation of UAP or "unidentified." I ask that, if available, a list of the videos be supplied as well. Thank you so much for your time, and I am very much looking forward to your response.



Has Description Been Modified? No
Description Available to the Public? No
Short Description UAP Records

Additional Information

Appellate Authority	OJAG14
Case #	N/A
Name of Local Command	N/A
Contract/Sol.#	N/A
Limit Request To Clearly Releasable Info	N/A

Attached Supporting Files

Attachments Available to the Public?
No

Attached File Name	Size (MB)	File Type
No supporting files have been uploaded.		

Appeals

Tracking Number	Appeal Date	Appellant	Phase	Notification
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No appeals have been created.

Consultations

Tracking Number	Consulted Agency	Created By	Consultation Date	Due Date	Phase
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No consultations have been created.

Correspondence to Requester

Subject	From	To	Date
FOIA Request DON-NAVY-2020-007226 Submitted	System	(b) (6)	04/28/2020

This message is to confirm your request submission to the FOIAonline application: [View Request](#). Request information is as follows:

- Tracking Number: DON-NAVY-2020-007226
- Requester Name: (b) (6)
- Date Submitted: 04/28/2020
- Request Status: Submitted
- Description: To whom it may concern,

(b) (6)

I respectfully request a copy of records, electronic or otherwise, of all videos with the designation of "unidentified aerial phenomena" or UAP, as archived by the U.S. Navy. The responsive records, would

include those that were released officially on 4/28/20 via NAVAIR's FOIA reading room. I am seeking a copy of all other videos which would contact the same designation of UAP or "unidentified."

I ask that, if available, a list of the videos be supplied as well.

Thank you so much for your time, and I am very much looking forward to your response.

Sincerely,

(b) (6)

Other Correspondence

Attached File	File Type	Size (MB)
No correspondence has been created.		

Fee Estimates

Current Estimate Total	\$0
Date Estimate Sent to Requester	N/A
Estimate Required for Payment	N/A

Invoices

Sent	Title	Invoice Date	Amount
No invoices have been created.			

Total Amount Billed Which Has Been Sent To Requester	\$0.00
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Payments

Date	Amount	Type	Total Amount Paid	\$0.00
			Total Amount Owed	\$0.00
No payments have been added.				

Case Responsive Records

Publish Options:

UU - Unredacted - Unreleaseable

RU - Redacted - Unreleasable

UR - Unredacted - Releaseable to the
General Public

RR - Redacted - Releaseable to the General
Public

REQ - Release to Requester Only

Release Type	Title	User	Date/Time	Exemptions	Release Date
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No records have been uploaded.

Restricted Materials

Attached File Name	Size (MB)	File Type	User	Actual Agency	Date/Time
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No restricted materials have been added.

Existing Admin Costs

Date	User Name	Charge Type	Hours/Quantity	Rate	Billable?	Total
No cost entries have been added.						

Fee Category: Media

Total: \$0.00

Invoice Amount: \$0.00

Assigned Tasks

Outcome	Task Type	Assigned To	Assigned By	Submitted Date	Due Date	Closed Date	Notification	Justification
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No tasks have been assigned.

Existing Comments (2)

Date Created	Last Edited On	User Name
04/28/2020 01:27 PM	04/28/2020 01:27 PM	Clifford Carter
Comment	- Admin Log-	
	4/28/2020 - Case In processed. Recommend re-assignment to NAVAIR.	
04/28/2020 10:51 AM	04/28/2020 10:51 AM	Clint Messner
Comment	Requester is seeking records pertaining to UAP records in NAVAIR Archives Reading Room Recommend re-assignment to NAVAIR for responsive records	
		

Assigned Reviewers

Review Order	Review Outcome	Assigned Reviewer	Review Date
No reviewers have been assigned.			

DON-NAVY-2020-007231 request Details

Due Date: N/A Clock Days: 0 (Never Started)

Requester Information

Requester	(b) (6)	Tracking Number	DON-NAVY-2020-007231
Organization	(b) (6)	Submitted Date	04/28/2020
Requester Has Account	(b) (6)	Received Date	04/28/2020
Email Address	(b) (6)	Perfected Date	
Phone Number	(b) (6)	Last Assigned Date	05/01/2020
Fax Number	(b) (6)	Assigned To	Naval Air Systems Command - Head Quarters
Address	(b) (6)	Last Assigned By	(b) (6) (Chief of Naval Operations)
City	(b) (6)	Request Track	Simple
State/Province	(b) (6)	Fee Limit	\$25.00
Zip Code/Postal Code	(b) (6)		

Request Handling

Requester Info Available to the Public?	No	Request Type	FOIA
Request Track	Simple	Request Perfected	No
Fee Category	Media	Perfected Date	
Fee Waiver Requested	No	Acknowledgement Sent Date	04/28/2020
Fee Waiver Status		Unusual Circumstances	No
Expedited Processing Requested	No	Litigation	No
Expedited Processing Status		Court Docket Number	
		5 Day Notifications?	No

Description

Long Description



mail. Please contact me should this FOIA request should incur a charge. I respectfully request a copy of records, electronic or otherwise, of all records pertaining to the addition of three Unidentified Aerial Phenomena / UAP videos titled FLIR1, Gimbal and GoFast posted on the NAVAIR FOIA website. I am seeking a copy of all records pertaining to the decision, and action, of adding these videos. This includes, but would not be limited to: 1) All letters/emails/memos etc. to/from all parties involved in the review of the videos. 2) All reports/investigative material involved in the review of the videos for potential public release. 3) All letters/emails/memos etc. pertaining to the videos being added to the NAVAIR website and the decision to do so (and why). Thank you so much for your time, and I am very much looking forward to your

(b) (6)

Has Description Been Modified?

No

Description Available to the Public?

No

Short Description

FLIR1, Gimbal and GoFast

Additional Information

Appellate Authority

N/A

Case #

N/A

Name of Local Command

N/A

Contract/Sol.#

N/A

Limit Request To Clearly Releasable Info

N/A

Attached Supporting Files

Attachments Available to the Public?

No

Attached File Name

Size (MB)

File Type

No supporting files have been uploaded.

Appeals

Tracking Number	Appeal Date	Appellant	Phase	Notification
-----------------	-------------	-----------	-------	--------------

No appeals have been created.

Consultations

Tracking Number	Consulted Agency	Created By	Consultation Date	Due Date	Phase
-----------------	------------------	------------	-------------------	----------	-------

No consultations have been created.

Correspondence to Requester

Subject	From	To	Date
FOIA Request DON-NAVY-2020-007231 Submitted	System	(b) (6)	04/28/2020

This message is to confirm your request submission to the FOIAonline application: [View Request](#). Request information is as follows:

- Tracking Number: DON-NAVY-2020-007231
- Requester Name: (b) (6)
- Date Submitted: 04/28/2020
- Request Status: Submitted
- Description: To whom it may concern,

(b) (6)

I respectfully request a copy of records, electronic or otherwise, of all records pertaining to the addition of three Unidentified Aerial Phenomena / UAP videos titled FLIR1, Gimbal and GoFast posted on the

NAVAIR FOIA website. I am seeking a copy of all records pertaining to the decision, and action, of adding these videos. This includes, but would not be limited to:

- 1) All letters/emails/memos etc. to/from all parties involved in the review of the videos.
- 2) All reports/investigative material involved in the review of the videos for potential public release.
- 3) All letters/emails/memos etc. pertaining to the videos being added to the NAVAIR website and the decision to do so (and why).

Thank you so much for your time, and I am very much looking forward to your response.

Sincerely,

(b) (6)

Other Correspondence

Attached File	File Type	Size (MB)
No correspondence has been created.		

Fee Estimates

Current Estimate Total	\$0
Date Estimate Sent to Requester	N/A
Estimate Required for Payment	N/A

Invoices

Sent	Title	Invoice Date	Amount
No invoices have been created.			

Total Amount Billed Which Has Been Sent To Requester	\$0.00
---	--------

Payments

Date	Amount	Type	Total Amount Paid	\$0.00
			Total Amount Owed	\$0.00
No payments have been added.				

Case Responsive Records

Publish Options:

UU - Unredacted - Unreleaseable

RU - Redacted - Unreleasable

UR - Unredacted - Releaseable to the
General Public

RR - Redacted - Releaseable to the General
Public

REQ - Release to Requester Only

Release Type	Title	User	Date/Time	Exemptions	Release Date
--------------	-------	------	-----------	------------	--------------

No records have been uploaded.

Restricted Materials

Attached File Name	Size (MB)	File Type	User	Actual Agency	Date/Time
--------------------	-----------	-----------	------	---------------	-----------

No restricted materials have been added.

Existing Admin Costs

Date	User Name	Charge Type	Hours/Quantity	Rate	Billable?	Total
No cost entries have been added.						

Fee Category: Media

Total: \$0.00

Invoice Amount: \$0.00

Assigned Tasks

Outcome	Task Type	Assigned To	Assigned By	Submitted Date	Due Date	Closed Date	Notification	Justification
---------	-----------	-------------	-------------	----------------	----------	-------------	--------------	---------------

No tasks have been assigned.

Existing Comments (2)

Date Created	Last Edited On	User Name
04/28/2020 02:00 PM	04/28/2020 02:00 PM	(b) (6)
Comment	Requester is seeking records pertaining to copies of FLIR1 images data from engagement between US Naval aircraft and UAP Recommend re-assignment to NAVAIR for responsive records (b) (6)	
04/30/2020 07:38 PM	04/30/2020 07:38 PM	(b) (6)
Comment	ADMIN LOG 4/30/20 - 10m - Case in processed via FOIA Online 4/30/20 - 10m - Recommend re-assigning to NAVAIR for processing.	

Assigned Reviewers

Review Order	Review Outcome	Assigned Reviewer	Review Date
No reviewers have been assigned.			

From: (b) (6)
To: [Koller, Matthew J VADM USN \(USA\)](#)
Cc: [Miller, Christopher A SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#); [OPNAV ALL N2N6 Front Office](#); [Brav, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#); [Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#); (b) (6)
[OPNAV N2N6I Front Office](#); [Stratton, John F \(Jay\) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#); (b) (6)
Subject: FOIA request - Office of Naval Intelligence -- (b) (6) (Scientific Coalition for UAP Studies)
Date: Thursday, April 30, 2020 8:04:09 AM
Attachments: [FOIA to ONI - Navy UFO videos - \(b\) \(6\) \(4-29-20\).pdf](#)

DCNO,

As mentioned, here (Attached) is the UAP FOIA request that ONI received yesterday.

The ONI team quickly sent it to the PAO (below), who passed it on to me.

I am meeting (in person) with DOD PA this afternoon to get their take.

V/R,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Wednesday, April 29, 2020 2:20 PM
To: (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: FW: [Non-DOD Source] FOIA request (time-sensitive) - Office of Naval Intelligence -- (b) (6) (Scientific Coalition for UAP Studies)

Hi (b) (6)

I hope all is well. I recently received a UAP FOIA request from (b) (6). As instructed, I am forwarding this request to you who will then forward to (b) (6). I do have a question, but I'll probably ask (b) (6) as well. Do we have a Template in place to forward to the requester as to what we are doing? I only ask because we are required to respond to a FOIA request within twenty working days. we do not have to deliver the records within 20-days but we have to provide some type of response (acknowledgment).

Thank you,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Wednesday, April 29, 2020 1:28 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: [Non-DoD Source] FOIA request (time-sensitive) - Office of Naval Intelligence -- (b) (6)
(Scientific Coalition for UAP Studies)

To the FOIA Officer:

The attached PDF file contains a letter incorporating a time-sensitive FOIA request. The same PDF document holds documentation of my affiliation with the *Scientific Coalition for UAP Studies*, which has been recognized as a "noncommercial scientific institute" by various components of the Department of Defense.

Thank you for your kind attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N61; Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#)
Cc: (b) (6); [OPNAV N2N61 Front Office; Stratton, John F \(Jay\) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC \(USA\); \(b\) \(6\)](#)
Subject: FOIA request - Office of Naval Intelligence - (b) (6) (Scientific Coalition for UAP Studies)
Date: Thursday, April 30, 2020 6:42:38 AM
Attachments: [FOIA to ONI - Navy UFO videos - \(b\) \(6\) \(4-29-20\).pdf](#)

Scott/Sandy,

FYI... ONI got the first FOIA related to the release of the 3 videos already (attached) yesterday (Wednesday).

I looped (b) (6) in late yesterday.

I am going to discuss with DOD PA later today.

I intend to mention to DCNO at stand-up this morning... but wanted to clue you in first.

We'll keep yo9u posted on how this shakes out.

Regards,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Wednesday, April 29, 2020 4:00 PM
To: Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA); (b) (6);
(b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: FW: [Non-DoD Source] FOIA request (time-sensitive) - Office of Naval Intelligence -- (b) (6) (Scientific Coalition for UAP Studies)

Jay (b) (6),

Thought you should see this FOIA to ONI...

This needs to be looked at to see how it intersects with the recently signed SCG.

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Wednesday, April 29, 2020 3:30 PM
To: (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: FW: [Non-DoD Source] FOIA request (time-sensitive) - Office of Naval Intelligence -- (b) (6)
(Scientific Coalition for UAP Studies)

(b) (6)

FYSA. Please see (b) (6) question.

V/r

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Wednesday, April 29, 2020 2:20 PM
To: (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: FW: [Non-DoD Source] FOIA request (time-sensitive) - Office of Naval Intelligence -- (b) (6)
(Scientific Coalition for UAP Studies)

Hi (b) (6),

I hope all is well. I recently received a UAP FOIA request from (b) (6). As instructed, I am forwarding this request to you who will then forward to (b) (6). I do have a question, but I'll probably ask (b) (6) as well. Do we have a Template in place to forward to the requester as to what we are doing? I only ask because we are required to respond to a FOIA request within twenty working days. we do not have to deliver the records within 20-days but we have to provide some type of response (acknowledgment).

Thank you,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Wednesday, April 29, 2020 1:28 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: Douglas Johnson

Subject: [Non-DoD Source] FOIA request (time-sensitive) - Office of Naval Intelligence -- (b) (6)
(Scientific Coalition for UAP Studies)

To the FOIA Officer:

The attached PDF file contains a letter incorporating a time-sensitive FOIA request. The same PDF document holds documentation of my affiliation with the *Scientific Coalition for UAP Studies*, which has been recognized as a "noncommercial scientific institute" by various components of the Department of Defense.

Thank you for your kind attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REQUEST

April 29, 2020

Office of Naval Intelligence
Staff Judge Advocate, Code: 00J
4251 Suitland Road, Room 4E128
Washington, DC 20395-5720

VIA E-MAIL TO: (b) (6)

To the FOIA Officer:

This letter is a request under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. § 552.

On April 27, 2020, the Department of Defense issued a press release (copy attached) under the headline, "Statement by Department of Defense on the Release of Historical Navy Videos." The press release said that the Department had "authorized the release of three unclassified Navy videos..." The press release further explained: "After a thorough review, the department has determined that the authorized release of these unclassified videos ... *does not impinge on any subsequent investigations of military air space incursions by unidentified aerial phenomena.*" [italics added for emphasis]

This FOIA request is for copies of any communications (including, but not limited to, emails sent or received, including cc'd or bcc'd emails) and any other records in any form, now held or retrievable by any component of the Office of Naval Intelligence, dealing with any aspect of the question of whether any or all of the three Navy videos could be released without negative effect on subsequent investigations of military air space incursions by unidentified aerial phenomena. This should be understood to include (but is not limited to) any communications or other records that contributed to or otherwise discussed the ultimate conclusion that was reached by the Department of Defense, i.e., that formal release of the three videos "does not impinge on any subsequent investigations of military air space incursions by unidentified aerial phenomena."

Please note that the records sought are only those as described that were created, shared, or received from **September 15, 2019, to the date on which the search required by this FOIA begins, inclusive.**

FOIA REQUEST, VIDEO RELEASE DECISION, (b) (6), 2

To further clarify: This FOIA request is NOT a request for records held not by ONI but solely by other components of the Department of Defense (or by agencies of the broader intelligence community) that may have participated in the discussions elsewhere that contributed to the Department of Defense's ultimate determination that formal release of the three videos "does not impinge on any subsequent investigations of military air space incursions by unidentified aerial phenomena." Rather, this FOIA request is directed only to communications or records pertaining to this matter that *originated with, were received by, or were shared with*, any component of Naval Intelligence.

I am submitting this request as part of research that I am conducting in association with the *Scientific Coalition for UAP Studies (SCU)*, which meets the definition of "noncommercial scientific institution" under OMB Fee Guidelines, 50 Fed. Reg. at 10,018. **I am attaching a letter from the SCU Board that explains the nature of this nonprofit organization and my status as a research affiliate.** Therefore, I request that for fee purposes, this request be classified as a "noncommercial scientific institution" request, covered by the fee provision found at 50 Fed. Reg. at 10,019, "Agencies shall provide documents to requesters in this category for the cost of reproduction alone, excluding charges for the first 100 pages." The status of SCU as a noncommercial scientific institution has been recognized by various divisions of the U.S. military, including the United States Air Force.

With respect to duplication fees in excess of the 100-page allowance, I am willing to pay up to \$250 in connection with this request; if your search reveals that the cost would be greater, please contact me in advance, preferably by phone (301-580-4927).

If any records responsive to my request originated with another agency, and require review or handling by that agency, I request that I be informed of the agency or agencies involved and their relationship(s) to the responsive records. I also ask that any and all such information be promptly forwarded to the appropriate agencies specified for review, and that I be informed of the actions of those agencies pertaining to those records.

If my request is denied in whole or in part, I ask that you explain each specific denial or redaction by reference to specific categories of exempt records, but (as required by law) release any segregable portions, after the exempted material has been redacted. If classified records are implicated by this FOIA request, please specify the level of classification and the Original Classification Authority in each instance, so that I may pursue Mandatory Declassification Review if appropriate.

FOIA REQUEST, VIDEO RELEASE DECISION, (b) (6), 3

I would prefer to receive the responsive documents electronically as PDF files emailed to (b) (6)

I look forward to receiving your initial response within the 20-working-day statutory deadline. Thank you for your kind attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

(b) (6)

Attached: letter on status as Research Affiliate, Scientific Coalition for UAP Studies

Release

IMMEDIATE RELEASE


Statement by the Department of Defense on the Release of Historical Navy Videos

APRIL 27, 2020



The Department of Defense has authorized the release of three unclassified Navy videos, one taken in November 2004 and the other two in January 2015, which have been circulating in the public domain after unauthorized releases in 2007 and 2017. The U.S. Navy previously acknowledged that these videos circulating in the public domain were indeed Navy videos. After a thorough review, the department has determined that the authorized release of these unclassified videos does not reveal any sensitive capabilities or systems, and does not impinge on any subsequent investigations of military air space incursions by unidentified aerial phenomena. DOD is releasing the videos in order to clear up any misconceptions by the public on whether or not the footage that has been circulating was real, or whether or not there is more to the videos. The aerial phenomena observed in the videos remain characterized as "unidentified." The released videos can be found at the Naval Air Systems Command FOIA Reading Room: <https://www.navair.navy.mil/foia/documents>.





October 9, 2019

To Whom It May Concern:

(b) (6) is a research Affiliate of the Scientific Coalition for UAP Studies. He is one of only 69 researchers internationally who have been granted this Affiliate status by the Board of Directors of our nonprofit research organization.

The Scientific Coalition for Unidentified Aerospace Phenomena (UAP) Studies (aka SCU) is a 501(c)(3) nonprofit research organization dedicated to the scientific study of UAP (commonly referred to as UFOs). The SCU is comprised largely of scientists, former military officers, law enforcement personnel, and investigative journalists with technical experience and backgrounds in investigation, and particular experience and expertise in various facets of the study of anomalous aerial phenomena.

The SCU operates as a cooperative among the founder board members, independent researcher affiliates, and affiliated or partnered organizations. The SCU functions as a hub for standardized research and investigation among peers in the respective disciplines into the subject of UAP. SCU board members and affiliated researchers have produced a number of technical papers on specific aspects and incidents of these types of phenomena, which are available on the organization's website at <https://www.explorescu.org/papers>.

In its mission and operations, SCU precisely matches the description of a "noncommercial scientific institution," as defined in OMB Fee Guidelines, 52 Fed. Reg. at 10,018, which describes a "noncommercial scientific institution" as one

that is “operated solely for the purpose of conducting scientific research the results of which are not intended to promote any particular product or industry.” SCU is a purely noncommercial enterprise -- indeed, our Board members and Affiliate researchers such as (b) (6) operate and collaborate as volunteers.

(b) (6) was granted Affiliate status by the SCU Board of Directors in May, 2019. Mr. Johnson has a degree and professional experience in journalism, and extensive professional experience in government relations work. In addition, he has engaged in UAP-related research since the 1970s, and his writings in that area have been published in various non-commercial publications and outlets. His current research is directly related to the mission of SCU, and is performed purely on a noncommercial basis, as a volunteer.

In view of the information set forth above, when (b) (6) submits requests under the Freedom of Information Act that touch on UAP-related incidents, policies, or subjects (whether termed “UFOs,” “anomalous aerial or aeronautical phenomena,” “unidentified aircraft,” or other overlapping terms), he should be deemed to fall within the “noncommercial scientific institution” category of requesters as described in OMB Fee Guidelines, 50 Fed. Reg. at 10,018. As stated there, at 10,019, “Agencies shall provide documents to requesters in this category for the cost of reproduction alone, excluding charges for the first 100 pages.”

Sincerely,

(b) (6)

From: [Stratton, John F \(Jay\) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: FW:
Date: Thursday, May 21, 2020 12:39:38 PM

Scott,

I hope you are feeling better!

FYSA... (b) (6) is standing by for a thumbs up or down on this so that he can share with OSD PA.

V/r, Jay

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Wednesday, May 20, 2020 11:22 AM
To: Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
Subject: RE:

I took the opportunity to show this to DCNO a few minutes ago when I was with him.

He had one recommended change, delete the highlighted phrase below:

(b) (5)

[Redacted content]

(b) (5)

From: Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

Sent: Wednesday, May 20, 2020 6:08 AM

To: (b) (6)

Subject: RE:

Copy... we will see what Scott says about the statement...

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Wednesday, May 20, 2020 6:07 AM

To: Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

Subject: RE:

Good Morning.

I'm in the office today.

(b) (6)

From: Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

Sent: Wednesday, May 20, 2020 6:03 AM

To: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: RE:

Scott,

Here's Glassel's article since its blocked on our NIPR.

The questions below are from (b) (6). We also had questions from (b) (6). We hope the statement I wrote will answer these but also be a standard response to questions on the "working group".

V/r, Jay

Here's (b) (6) questions:

I am writing an article based on your recent statements, and if possible, I'd love to ask some follow ups. I am hoping these are easy enough that maybe I can get some quick responses today? It is greatly appreciated.

1. You recently talked about a UAP Task Force. Can you break down what branches other than the Navy are working in it?
2. Is there a program name, project name, program element number, etc? that can be shared identifying it?
3. When did it start?
4. Are there any UNCLASS documents, guidelines, mission statements etc., that can be shared describing it?
5. You said the Navy is leading much of the effort. Is there a division of the Navy that is tasked with this? (NCIS? ONI? Etc.)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Tuesday, May 19, 2020 5:41 PM

To: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6 (b) (6)

Cc: Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6);

(b) (6)

Subject: FW:

Scott,

As discussed. I've also included the journalist's questions below as posed to (b) (6), OSD Public Affairs.

V/r,

(b) (6)

**

"Hi (b) (6),

I hope you had a good weekend. I recently read some responses you provided to (b) (6). I've linked below, but can you confirm that these are your statements?

<https://www.blueblurrylines.com/2020/05/pentagon-answers-on-navy-uap.html>

Furthermore, I have a few questions:

1) In your response to (b) (6), you stated;

"Under the cognizance of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)), there is an inter-agency team charged with gathering data and conducting investigations into range incursions. As the preponderance of recent/reported sightings are from naval aviators, the Navy is leading much of the effort. All reports of range incursions are sent to this team for

inclusion in the overall effort, thus maximizing the data available for analysis."

Was this "inter-agency team" operating prior to 2008/2009 and the beginning of AAWSAP/AATIP? If so, when did this team begin informal and/or formal operations?

2) Same quote as above. After AAWSAP/AATIP was shut down in 2011, was (b) (6) involved in this "inter-agency team?" He was a USD(I) staffer. He has also publicly stated that part of his portfolio of work did involve UAP. Was (b) (6) involved in this "inter-agency team" between the years of 2012 and 2017?

3) Same quote as above. Does this "inter-agency team" have an informal/formal name/title for the purpose of making a FOIA request?

4) Same quote as above. Does this "inter-agency team" have a yearly budget for the purpose of its investigations and work? If so, what is the amount of its budget both annually and overall?

5) Same quote as above. How many individuals make up this "inter-agency team?" Is this their full time job or is this a portfolio among their other work? In other words, I'm trying to gauge whether it is a part time and informal group of investigators, or is this a formal job?

Thank you,

(b) (6) "

From: Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

Sent: Tuesday, May 19, 2020 4:35 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: RE:

Love it, (b) (6) can you try a drive by with Scott? I would feel better if he reviews it.

V/r, Jay

Jay Stratton

Senior Analyst (DISL), General Military Intelligence

Nimitz Operational Intelligence Center

Office of Naval Intelligence

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Date: Tuesday, May 19, 2020, 4:08 PM
To: Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: RE:

That's good.

I made a couple little edits, in red below, for your consideration.

Should we run it by Scott Bray before sending on to (b) (6)?

(b) (6)

From: Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, May 19, 2020 3:53 PM
To: (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject:

(b) (6),

What do you think of this? I'm putting myself out there a bit but they've already figured out who I am, I'm not offering my name but the fact that a Navy senior has been directed to lead the effort.

We need to get off the dance floor with the term task force, the draft direction coming from USDI calls it a working group since task force has a specific meaning.

This language falls in line with what we determined is unclassified IAW the Security Classification Guide. I think it answers the questions received so far except for those dealing with (b) (6). In regards to (b) (6), (b) (6) and I in the past have pointed out that he was involved, especially in bridging us with colleagues across the DoD. There's plenty of paper trail to back that up. We recommend (b) (6) dust off the statement she was working. We are happy to help with that if she'd like.

Statement:

(b) (6)

From: [Brown, Sandra SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#); (b) (6)
Subject: FW: ACTION REQUIRED: N2N6 Legislative Priorities for FY21
Date: Friday, March 27, 2020 1:07:47 PM
Attachments: [DON Legislative Priorities March 12 2020.pdf](#)
[FY20 N2N6 Legislative Engagement Priorities.docx](#)

Does this impact us? I haven't seen this communication before.

Sandy

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, March 27, 2020 10:43 AM
To: NIA Seniors and Deputies (b) (6)
Cc: OPNAV N2N6I Front Office (b) (6)
Subject: FW: ACTION REQUIRED: N2N6 Legislative Priorities for FY21

Leaders:

DON FY21 Legislative Priorities are below. Please see the email from the front office below. More guidance to follow from N2N6SE Strategic Engagement. Thank you!

PROGRAMMATIC / RESOURCING ENGAGEMENT PRIORITIES:

- Priority 1: Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services (CANES).
- Priority 2: Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) Modernization.
- Priority 3: Digital Modular Radio (DMR)

POLICY ENGAGEMENT PRIORITIES:

- Priority 1: Raise stakeholder awareness of threats posed by economic statecraft
- Priority 2: Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Cybersecurity
- Priority 3: Formalize Naval Intelligence leadership across IC and DoD maritime intelligence initiatives

VR

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, March 27, 2020 10:22 AM
To: OPNAV N2N6E Front Office (b) (6); OPNAV N2N6G Front Office (b) (6); OPNAV N2N6F Front Office (b) (6); OPNAV N2N6I Front Office (b) (6)

(b) (6); OPNAV N2N6C Front Office
(b) (6); OPNAV N2N6F1 Front Office
(b) (6); OPNAV N2N6F2 Front Office
(b) (6); OPNAV N2N6F3 Front Office
(b) (6); OPNAV N2N6FX Front Office
(b) (6)
Cc: OPNAV N2N6SE Front Office (b) (6); OPNAV N2N6S Secretariat
(b) (6); OPNAV ALL N2N6 Front Office
(b) (6)
Subject: ACTION REQUIRED: N2N6 Legislative Priorities for FY21

Front Office Team,

With the recent release of the DON FY21 Legislative Priorities, we have an implied task to articulate N2N6's Legislative Priorities for FY21. N2N6 Strategic Engagements (SE) has been tasked to coordinate this action with your Division leads and provide a draft to the Front Office within the next four weeks. Expect to see an email from N2N6SE today .

To craft the best possible draft for A/DCNO review, I ask you to do the following:

1. Review the attached DON FY21 Legislative Priorities (1st attachment) and consider what your top priorities are, and where your priority programs align under SECNAV's construct.
2. Refer to the FY20 Legislative Engagement (2nd attachment) and determine whether you would recommend any repeats or revisions priority programs for FY21.
3. Provide a POC to work with N6SE to collect your inputs, coordinate our draft with OLA, and staff it to with the Front Office for N2N6 leader review.

I appreciate your help and leadership on this effort.

V/R, (b) (6)

(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
To: [NIA Seniors and Deputies](#)
Cc: [OPNAV N2N6I Front Office](#)
Subject: FW: ACTION: INPUT to N2N6 Legislative Priorities by 15 April
Date: Monday, April 6, 2020 2:36:30 PM
Attachments: [DON Legislative Priorities March 12 2020.pdf](#)
[TEMPLATE FY21 N2N6 Legislative Priorities.docx](#)
[FY20 N2N6 Legislative Engagement Priorities.docx](#)
[ACTION REQUIRED N2N6 Legislative Priorities for FY21 \(2.13 MB\).msg](#)

Good afternoon NIA Leaders:

A reminder that inputs for the N2N6 Legislative Priorities are due today. Please submit soonest.
Thank you!

VR

(b) (6)

[Redacted signature block]

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, March 27, 2020 11:12 AM
To: NIA Seniors and Deputies (b) (6)
Cc: OPNAV N2N6I Front Office (b) (6)
Subject: FW: ACTION: INPUT to N2N6 Legislative Priorities by 15 April

NIA Leaders:

ACTION REQUESTED: NIA leaders, submit to front office distro by COB 6 April, please. We will consolidate for DDNI review and submit one document for NIA.

1. Review the FY21 DON Legislative Priorities Letter signed by SECNAV (1st attachment)
2. Determine what your top 3-5 legislative priorities are and provide your input in the FY21 template (2nd attachment)
3. Refer to the FY20 letter from DCNO to SECNAV if you need background /history (3rd attachment). Yes, the format is different this year – different SECNAVs, different format.
4. Secure the approval of your senior Flag/SES and return your division's input to the N2N66 Strategic Engagements inbox (OPNAV N2N6SE Front Office). F, please submit one document for your entire division.

VR

(b) (6)

[Redacted signature block]

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Friday, March 27, 2020 10:57 AM

To: OPNAV N2N6C Front Office (b) (6); OPNAV
N2N6E Front Office (b) (6); OPNAV N2N6G Front Office

(b) (6); OPNAV N2N6I Front Office

(b) (6); OPNAV N2N6F Front Office

(b) (6); OPNAV N2N6F1 Front Office

(b) (6); OPNAV N2N6F2 Front Office

(b) (6); OPNAV N2N6F3 Front Office

(b) (6); OPNAV N2N6FX Front Office

(b) (6); OPNAV ALL N2N6FP Front Office

(b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6) OPNAV N2N6SE Front Office

(b) (6)

OPNAV N2N6S Secretariat (b) (6); OPNAV ALL N2N6 Front Office

(b) (6)

Subject: ACTION: INPUT to N2N6 Legislative Priorities by 15 April

N2N6 Divisions,

Referencing the DEA's email on the same subject, this is a request for each division to provide input to N2N6's legislative priorities for FY21.

ACTION REQUESTED: Divisions, by COB 15 April, please

1. Review the FY21 DON Legislative Priorities Letter signed by SECNAV (1st attachment)
2. Determine what your top 3-5 legislative priorities are and provide your input in the FY21 template (2nd attachment)
3. Refer to the FY20 letter from DCNO to SECNAV if you need background /history (3rd attachment). Yes, the format is different this year – different SECNAVs, different format.
4. Secure the approval of your senior Flag/SES and return your division's input to the N2N66 Strategic Engagements inbox (OPNAV N2N6SE Front Office). F, please submit one document

for your entire division.

COORDINATION TIMELINE: offered for your SA

27 March – 15 April: Division leaders provide input

16-17 April: N2N6SE compiles all input

20-21 April: N2N6SE finalizes cover letter language with N2N6FP and OLA and secures concurrence with same on draft

22-23 April: N2N6 sends draft out to divisions for all-chop

24 April: N2N6SE integrates edits from all-chop

27- 29 April: A/DCNO review and signature

If you've any questions, please email me offline and we'll set up a time to voice-con. Thank you and we look forward to working with you on this document.

Kind Regards,

(b) (6)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

From: (b) (6)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#); [Brown, Sandra SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#)
Cc: [OPNAV N2N6I Front Office](#)
Subject: FW: Another article (from Friday) from Vice
Date: Monday, March 16, 2020 10:57:30 AM

FYSA

Vr/CoS

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b) (6)
Date: Monday, Mar 16, 2020, 10:41 AM
To: (b) (6) Stratton, John F (Jay) SES
USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: Another article (from Friday) from Vice

FYI...

This one is about FOIA responses from the Army on their contract with TTSA.

(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

US Army Refuses to Release Records About Tom DeLonge's UFO Organization

The Army says details about its agreement with To the Stars Academy to research 'novel materials' are exempt from FOIA.

Vice, 13 March 2020... by MJ Banias

The U.S. Army refused to release any records about its deal with Tom DeLonge's UFO-hunting group To the Stars Academy (TTSA).

In October of 2019, the former Blink-182 frontman's UFO organization joined forces with the US Army's Combat Capabilities Development Command, a research and development body. According to the contract, the government is interested in studying some pretty exotic science such as active camouflage, inertial mass reduction, and quantum communication. In particular, the government is interested in the group's ADAM Project, which Doug Halleaux, a spokesperson for the U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command Ground Vehicle Systems Center described as "a global dragnet for the collection and evaluation of novel materials." In 2018, TTSA put out a call for individuals and organizations to submit materials from alleged exotic sources as part of the project.

John Greenewald of The Black Vault, a website dedicated to collecting declassified government documents, explained in a recent blog post that the research and reports related to the deal are exempt from Freedom of Information Act requests as per Army Regulation 70-57.

Knowing this, Greenewald instead filed a FOIA Request regarding a copy of all records and emails related to Dr. Joseph Cannon of U.S. Army Futures Command (who is working on the agreement) containing keywords such as "TTSA" and "To The Stars."

The Army got back to Greenewald telling him that 29 documents were found relating to his request, and each page was exempt from his request. The Army stated that it was not going to release any records. Motherboard reached out to Halleaux, the Army's CCDC spokesperson, who said that any documents related to DeLonge's organization would be classified as "trade secrets and commercial or financial information [that are] privileged or confidential."

In other words, the public can't know what the Army and TTSA is working on because of corporate and commercial secrets, namely intellectual property and finances. This includes related email communications. Halleaux told Motherboard that he personally had no idea what the Army and TTSA were up to, and if he did, he couldn't talk about it.

TTSA now has roughly four-and-a-half years left on its five-year contract with the Army to research and develop future military technology. Halleaux told Motherboard in 2019 that the government believes the "key technologies or capabilities that [the Army] is investigating with TTSA are certainly on the leading edge of the realm of the possible" and comes at a low cost for the government. Regardless, mounting a complex exploration of the various projects outlined in the CRADA such as "adaptive camouflage," "beamed energy propulsion," and "quantum communication" will definitely take some serious collaboration, laboratory set-up, equipment gathering, research and time. It is highly unlikely that any actual technology development has occurred in the last six months.

In a written statement to Motherboard, TTSA's Chief Operating Officer and former director of Advanced Systems Development at Lockheed Martin's Skunkworks, Steve Justice, stated,

"It is easy to assume that TTSA's government [agreement] automatically 'locks up' the results of research. However, it must be noted that the discussions with the government that led to the contract language were completed with the knowledge that one of TTSA's prime objectives is public transparency and commercial applications. Note the contract language that specifically identifies two-way sharing of information. The benefit of the [agreement] is to gain access to otherwise inaccessible government laboratories and technical expertise to expose all attributes of unusual materials and share the results. If unusual attributes are found, TTSA may use that information to create applications for public benefit. We cannot speak for any actions the Army might take after studying the results."

In a follow up request for comment concerning TTSA's claims concerning the collection of exotic otherworldly and UFO crash debris and materials, Chief Content Officer Kari DeLonge said that she could not comment on whether the company had their hands on truly alien materials, but added that, "we are steadfast and dedicated to responsible analysis and reporting without speculation."

While the whole weird relationship between UFOs and the Army's research and development arm has left many people scratching their heads, the real question is why would advanced space faring extraterrestrials keep crashing and leaving their scrap in the deserts of Nevada and New Mexico? Perhaps they are leaving humanity some technological breadcrumbs or they are just jerks dumping their garbage on our planet; whatever the case, the government isn't saying much.

[Article](#)

From: [Stratton, John F \(Jay\) SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#)
Subject: FW: CHINFO Talkers
Date: Wednesday, July 22, 2020 3:46:54 PM

Scott,

FYSA

V/r, Jay

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b) (6)
Date: Wednesday, Jul 22, 2020, 3:43 PM
To: (b) (6) Stratton, John F (Jay) SES
USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)
Subject: RE: CHINFO Talkers

Excellent!

Thanks!

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Wednesday, July 22, 2020 3:40 PM
To: (b) (6) Stratton, John F
(Jay) SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)
Subject: RE: CHINFO Talkers

Cool! One change. Please change/recommend changing this:

- (b) (5)

To this:

- (b) (5)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Wednesday, July 22, 2020 1:55 PM

To: Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)

Subject: CHINFO Talkers

Jay (b) (6),

Each month, RDML Brown (CHINFO) sends out a collection of "Monthly Talkers" to all of Navy's Team Public Affairs.

These talkers are simply briefing cards that PAOs, and/or their teams and leaders can refer to on any number of topics.

They intend to send the next batch out to the multitude next week.

With UAPs still in the news... and FOIA requests, media queries, still coming in... I see the sharing of a UAP Briefing Card with the worldwide PA Community a great/convenient way to get this important information out.

In particular... the idea that they should refer all queries to us without comment, that we should be coordinated with for any FOIA response, and that any info/imagery is classified (including SNOOPIE Team imagery)... is something that they should be aware of.

If you have no issues with this approach, and with all that in mind, please look at this updated Navy Briefing Card... and provide any recommended changes.

Standing by to discuss as necessary.

THANKS,

(b) (6)

[Redacted signature block]

From: (b) (6)
To: (b) (6) [Stratton, John](#)
F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA); (b) (6)
Cc: [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#); [Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#); [OPNAV ALL N2N6 Front Office](#); [OPNAV N2N6I Front Office](#); (b) (6)
Subject: FW: Follow-Up FOIA Requests Related to Video Release
Date: Friday, May 1, 2020 12:21:42 PM
Attachments: [DON-NAVY-2020-007231 Case File.pdf](#)
[DON-NAVY-2020-007226 Case File.pdf](#)

All,

FYI....

NAVAIR FOIA office has received two more FOIA requests related to the release of the 3 videos.

One, asks for all docs related to the decision to release. The other asks for other videos.

These are from (b) (6), who has filed numerous FOAI requests to us on the subject of UAPs.

Regards,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 12:00 PM
To: (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: Follow-Up FOIA Requests Related to Video Release

All,

Unsurprisingly, our office received additional FOIA requests (attached) related to the previous UAP video request. In short, DON-NAVY-2020-007226 is fishing for more UAP videos/documents; and DON-NAVY-2020-007231 is requesting all records related the decision to release the UAP videos.

(b) (5) [REDACTED], but I am unsure if NAVAIR is the appropriate office to handle DON-NAVY-2020-007231 since many offices throughout DoN and DoD will likely have records related to this request.

(b) (5) [REDACTED]

Best regards,

(b) (6) [REDACTED]

-
-
Confidentiality note: The information transmitted through this email communication is that of an attorney and is intended to be confidential and only for the use of the individual or entity addressed above. If the recipient is a client, this message may also be for the purpose of rendering legal advice and is thereby privileged. If you are not the intended recipient or an authorized representative of the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any review, dissemination or copying of this email and its attachments, if any, or the information contained herein is prohibited. If you have received this email in error, please immediately notify the sender by return email and delete this email from any computer.

From: (b) (6)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#)
Cc: [OPNAV N2N6I Front Office](#)
Subject: FW: Information Warfare News Clips 9 March 2020
Date: Monday, March 9, 2020 3:26:47 PM
Attachments: [Information Warfare News Clips 9 March 2020.docx](#)

Scott,

Here is today's copy of our Clips.

I've added you to the distro.

Regards,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, March 9, 2020 9:49 AM
To: (b) (6)
Subject: Information Warfare News Clips 9 March 2020

FYI... from various sources:

Judge says Amazon is 'likely to succeed' on key argument in Pentagon cloud lawsuit

Why A Federal Court Halted Work On The Pentagon's Enterprise Cloud

New court documents explain reasoning behind JEDI stop-work order

DOD's Cyber Strategy of Past Year Outlined Before Congress

Out at Sea, With No Way to Navigate: Admiral James Stavridis Talks Cybersecurity

'What's the next step?': US officials are rethinking how to dissuade cyberattacks

Building a resilient cyber future

The Pentagon's first class of cybersecurity auditors is almost here

Cyber Command was worried that WikiLeaks dump would burn Operation Aurora intel...

The intelligence community is developing its own AI ethics

Trump's intel power play spooks the spooks

Creating a Curious, Ethical, and Diverse AI Workforce

Public Opinion Is a Key to America's Global AI Leadership

DIB wants Pentagon to hire a 'digital people officer' for tech recruitment

Services grapple with 'any sensor, any shooter' network concept

Barred from Combat, These Women Rose to the Top of Military Intelligence

Q&A with Senior Women in Military Intelligence

US, UK Agree to 'Further' Restrict Huawei, Defense Secretary Says

Space Force's 2021 budget plan is heavy on satellites and launch

A Threat Unmet

This Is The Letter The Navy Sent A Congressman Who Was Demanding Answers About UFOs

10th Fleet Members Speak at West 2020

NOTE: Each edition of the Information Warfare News Clips is posted on milSuite (log in: <https://www.milsuite.mil/book/groups/navy-information-dominance-outreach/content?filterID=contentstatus%5Bpublished%5D~category%5Binformation-warfare-news-clips-formerly-information-dominance-news-clips%5D>)

(b) (6)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

And

(b) (6) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

From: [Brown, Sandra SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#)
Subject: FW: Information Warfare News Clips 21 January 2020
Date: Tuesday, January 21, 2020 9:52:35 AM
Attachments: [Information Warfare News Clips 21 January 2020.docx](#)

These are interesting but often too long to digest. (b) (6) is N2N6 Strategic Engagements.

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, January 21, 2020 9:01 AM
To: (b) (6)
Subject: Information Warfare News Clips 21 January 2020

FYI... from various sources:

A new GPS III satellite is online. What will it bring to the fleet?

The Navy Wants To Put Its Head In The Cloud

Top Secret documents show Cyber Command's growing pains in its mission against ISIS

What new documents reveal about Cyber Command's biggest operation

How a Military Cyber Operation to Disrupt Islamic State Spurred a Debate

Cyber Caucus Co-Chair Applauds NSA Disclosure of Microsoft Vulnerability

Top DHS cyber official discusses when Iran may retaliate in cyberspace

Estonia, US launch effort to ease sharing of cyberthreat intel

Worried about a cyberattack from Iran? Here's how feds prepare

Iran Conflict Could Shift To Cyberspace, Experts Warn

DOD CIO Is Prepping Guidance on Endpoint Management

Hyten Leading JROC Reform Process To Speed Decisions

JAIC Director: Future of Defense AI Relies on Global Collaboration

How Artificial Intelligence Will Make Decisions In Tomorrow's Wars

DIU seeks tech to support fast patching, inventory management

After canceling 2 contracts, DISA tells industry: 'We need you to deliver on contracts.'

DISA Defending, Improving DoD Network, Director Says

U.S. Space Command Has Passed First Combat Test, Officials Say

Space Force Offers First Peek at Camouflage Uniform

U.S. Space Force nameplates introduced for camouflage uniforms

Where the Space Force must go

Hyten: Stop 'studying the heck' out of space systems and get to work

USAF Navigational Warfare Laboratory to Study PNT Threats

Information Warfare: TikTok Already A Problem

FAA: Navy exercise near Florida to cause widespread GPS interference

Hollywood's UFO Stories Are Becoming Way More Realistic

NOTE: Each edition of the Information Warfare News Clips is posted on milSuite (log in: <https://www.milsuite.mil/book/groups/navy-information-dominance-outreach/content?filterID=contentstatus%5Bpublished%5D~category%5Binformation-warfare-news-clips-formerly-information-dominance-news-clips%5D>)

(b) (6)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

And

(b) (6)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

From: (b) (6)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#)
Subject: FW: Japanese Interest in UAP
Date: Wednesday, June 17, 2020 6:33:34 PM

From: Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
Sent: Wednesday, June 17, 2020 6:24 PM
To: (b) (6)
Subject: FW: Japanese Interest in UAP

Here's the email chain...

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b) (6)
Date: Tuesday, Jun 16, 2020, 9:11 AM
To: Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6), (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: Japanese Interest in UAP

Thanks Jay!!

(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

From: Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, June 15, 2020 3:18 PM
To: (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

(b) (6)

Subject: RE: Japanese Interest in UAP

(b) (6),

I agree and if DNI/DDNI concur I would be happy to meet with them.

V/r, Jay

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b) (6)

Date: Monday, Jun 15, 2020, 12:43 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Stratton, John F (Jay)

SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

Subject: RE: Japanese Interest in UAP

(b) (6),

I would think our safety of flight procedures for range foulers might be useful to them.

VR,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Monday, June 15, 2020 12:38 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA)

(b) (6)

Subject: RE: Japanese Interest in UAP

(b) (6),

I'm hoping you can point me in the right direction on how/if we can answer some questions from the Japanese regarding the Navy's approach to handling UAP sightings.

The Japanese Naval Attaché has been directed to solicit answers to a few questions related to our UAP process. Specifically, he is asking:

- The reason why the USN released this news.
- The reason why the USN released this news at the time it did.
- If the USN has procedures, or is developing procedures for dealing with UAP sightings.
- If the USN can share any procedures with the JMSDF.

I bet they have even more questions, and it looks like there may be an opportunity to provide answers later this week.

w/r,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Monday, June 15, 2020 9:38 AM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: RE: Japanese Interest in UAP

Thank you!!

Have we set anything up to talk to (b) (6) about UAPs? We have a great relationship with him and we should figure out the specific nature of their concerns and share anything we can.

VR,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Monday, June 15, 2020 8:37 AM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: FW: Japanese Interest in UAP

(b) (6)

Pushing this chain of an RFI from the Japanese on UAP only because of our VTC with them Wednesday morning. Let me know if you need me to work anything.

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Monday, June 15, 2020 7:39 AM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: RE: Japanese Interest in UAP

Thanks!

w/r,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Date: Friday, Jun 12, 2020, 5:50 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: RE: Japanese Interest in UAP

Jay Stratton has the lead (DISL at ONI Nimitz), but (b) (6) on our staff also has good background. Additionally, (b) (6) has all the PAO info on the topic.

Vr/ (b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, June 12, 2020 5:02 PM
To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: Japanese Interest in UAP

(b) (6) et al,

I'm looking for a PoC who can help me navigate an RFI from the Japanese regarding our UAP policies/procedure. Can you point me in the right direction?

w/r,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, June 12, 2020 9:35 AM
To: (b) (6)
Subject: FW: Office call request

(b) (6),

On the topic of UAPs...we got an RFI from Japanese, who seem interested in this topic. Our PAO recommended I reach out to N2/N6 to get the best answer. Would you happen to know anything about UAPs, or do you know a good POC on this topic?

Here's the question we're being asked: What are USN procedures for when/if Navy pilots observe UAPs?

It seems the Japanese keyed into this CNN Headline, "The Navy now has formal guidelines for how its pilots can report when they believe they have seen possible UFO's." They would like to know (1) do we really have procedures? And (2) if we have them, could we release all or part of the

guidelines to JSDF?

Thanks, and happy Friday!

V/r,

(b) (6)

[REDACTED]

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Friday, June 12, 2020 9:30 AM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: Krikorian, Victoria SES USN CNO (USA) (b) (6)

[REDACTED]

Subject: RE: Office call request

Hi (b) (6),

I'd recommend reaching out to N2/N6 on this. They were the ones really honcho-ing the UAP effort.

I just don't know and I'm very loathe to guess ;-)

V/r

(b) (6)

[REDACTED]

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Friday, June 12, 2020 8:56 AM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: Krikorian, Victoria SES USN CNO (USA) (b) (6)

[REDACTED]

Subject: RE: Office call request

(b) (6),

Thank you very much for passing this. With regard to potential questions about USN procedures for when/if Navy pilots observe UAPs, how would you recommend we respond?

It seems the Japanese keyed into this CNN Headline, "The Navy now has formal guidelines for how its pilots can report when they believe they have seen possible UFO's," and would like to know if we could release the guidelines to JSDF.

Again, many thanks!

V/r,

(b) (6)

[Redacted]

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, June 12, 2020 8:43 AM
To: (b) (6) Krikorian, Victoria SES USN
CNO (USA) (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: Office call request

HI All,

DOD announcement on the release of the UAP videos has hit the street 27 APR. Text is below and posted on the DOD Website here:

<https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2165713/statement-by-the-department-of-defense-on-the-release-of-historical-navy-videos/>

The videos are posted on the NAVAIR FOIA site here: <https://www.navair.navy.mil/foia/documents>. Any media queries to Navy on this will be forwarded to DOD PA without comment.

The below statement is attributable to (b) (6), Pentagon spokesperson.

The Department of Defense has authorized the release of three unclassified Navy videos, one taken in November 2004 and the other two in January 2015, which have been circulating in the public domain after unauthorized releases in 2007 and 2017. The U.S. Navy previously acknowledged that these videos circulating in the public domain were indeed Navy videos. After a thorough review, the department has determined that the authorized release of these unclassified videos does not reveal any sensitive capabilities or systems, and does not impinge on any subsequent investigations of military air space incursions by unidentified aerial phenomena. DOD is releasing the videos in order to clear up any misconceptions by the public on whether or not the footage that has been circulating was real, or whether or not there is more to the videos. The aerial phenomena observed in the videos remain characterized as "unidentified." The released videos can be found at the Naval Air Systems Command FOIA Reading Room: <https://www.navair.navy.mil/foia/documents>.

As for the TIMING why... It was due to the FOIA coming due / turning into a pumpkin. From the

RTQ:

Q1. Why are you releasing these now?

A1. The lengthy review process on whether these could be released publicly recently completed.

Q2. Why weren't these released earlier?

A2. The videos had not been cleared for general public release.

Hope that helps!

V/r

(b) (6)

[REDACTED]

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Thursday, June 11, 2020 9:41 PM

To: Krikorian, Victoria SES USN CNO (USA) (b) (6)

[REDACTED]

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: RE: Office call request

Thanks (b) (6).

One additional note for context – (b) (6) (USN LNO to JMSDF) passed this when I asked “Why now?”:

“Defense chief mentions need to prepare manual on how to deal with UFOs (29 Apr 20)

All national papers reported on press remarks made yesterday by Defense Minister Kono concerning the Pentagon’s release of videos showing several episodes of encounters between U.S. military aircraft and unidentified flying objects (UFOs). The minister said while SDF pilots have never encountered UFOs in the past, it is important to draw up operational procedures for handling such encounters should they occur. “

Japan MoD is drawing on such sentences as this from CNN: “The Navy now has formal guidelines for how its pilots can report when they believe they have seen possible UFO's.”

[28. Pentagon Officially Releases UFO Videos (CNN.COM 27 APR 20) ... Michael Conte]

V/r,

(b) (6)

From: Krikorian, Victoria SES USN CNO (USA) (b) (6)

Sent: Thursday, June 11, 2020 9:14 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: RE: Office call request

Than you, (b) (6). RTQs will be helpful. I actually want to know myself!

From: (b) (6)

Date: Thursday, Jun 11, 2020, 8:48 PM

To: Krikorian, Victoria SES USN CNO (USA) (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: RE: Office call request

Hi ma' am et al,

We can at least fill in the blanks w the OSD statement and RTQ... :-)

V/r

(b) (6)

From: Krikorian, Victoria SES USN CNO (USA) (b) (6)

Date: Thursday, Jun 11, 2020, 20:44

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: RE: Office call request

(b) (6),

All great questions, but I have no insights on this other than what I read in the paper. I'll dig in and then we can schedule a meeting.

VR,

Victoria

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Thursday, June 11, 2020 8:13 PM

To: Krikorian, Victoria SES USN CNO (USA) (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: FW: Office call request

Victoria,

FYSA (non-urgent).

Japanese are apparently concerned/interested in Navy sightings of “unexplained aerial phenomena” (UAPs – aka UFOs), and (b) (6) wanted to meet with you next Monday to discuss. I informed (b) (6) you were not available next Monday, but I would pass this info to you. (b) (6) also stated that since this request is coming from (b) (6) and not MSO, it indicates higher levels of GoJ are concerned about this issue. (b) (6) fielded similar questions ~1 month ago from Japanese Air Staff Office, and the attached email shows his responses.

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/27/pentagon-releases-three-ufo-videos-taken-by-us-navy-pilots> (article date: 27 April 2020)

(b) (6) planned to ask you the following questions:

- Why did USN release this news & at this time (late April)?
- Does USN have UFO procedures or developing UFO procedures?
- If UFO procedures exist, would they be releasable to share the JMSDF?

My follow-up question for (b) (6) would be – why are we just getting questions now when this was released almost a month and a half ago.

V/r,

(b) (6)

[Redacted signature block]

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Thursday, June 11, 2020 11:12 AM

To: (b) (6)

[Redacted email address]

Cc: (b) (6)

[Redacted email address]

Subject: Office call request

(b) (6),

(b) (6) would like to have an office call to Ms. Krikorian and (b) (6) on Monday.

He would like to know the background of the news about U.F.O.

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/27/pentagon-releases-three-ufo-videos-taken-by-us-navy-pilots>

Especially, he would like to ask

- The reason why the USN released this news.
- The reason why the USN released this news in this timing.
- If the USN has procedure about U.F.O or is currently making.
- If the USN has one, the releasability to share the JMSDF (Japan).

Since this question directly from (b) (6) not from the MSO, it should be higher level in GoJ interest.

I am not sure whether it is appropriate to ask this question to Ms. Krikorian and (b) (6), so if you think it is not, please let me know.

V/R

(b) (6)

[Redacted signature block]

[Redacted signature block]

prioritization with the overall DON prioritization.

Thank you.

Very Respectfully,

(b) (6)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

From: [Chamberlin, Thomas S SES USN ONI \(USA\)](#)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I; Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: FW: Per our Conversation -- RFI on UFO Story
Date: Thursday, July 30, 2020 8:30:48 AM

Scott, Sandy,

Long thread, but BLUF = pending requirement for UAP brief to DSD, VCJCS, and unspecified Navy senior(s) (N2N6 and you?) sometime next week. Trying to reach Jay to put him on stand-by and get hard copy of the brief to CNO for SA. (b) (6) will keep us apprised of dates/times when he gets them.
TC

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Thursday, July 30, 2020 7:27 AM
To: (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6); Chamberlin, Thomas S SES USN ONI (USA)
(b) (6)
Subject: RE: Per our Conversation -- RFI on UFO Story

(b) (6)

N2N6 is ready to go on short notice.

Very Respectfully,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Thursday, July 30, 2020 7:18 AM
To: (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: RE: Per our Conversation -- RFI on UFO Story

(b) (6) – Thanks!

Team –

Know that:
N2N6 has lead
VCNO has reviewed the brief and considers it ready for DSD

(b) (6) – Over to you if CNO has seen, or wants to see.

Suspect we'll need:
SME Briefer, N2N6, CNO or VCNO, and ???

(b) (6) – I can move things around to discuss at your convenience this morning.

VR/ (b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Thursday, July 30, 2020 7:10 AM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: RE: Per our Conversation -- RFI on UFO Story

Gentlemen,

I received e-mail from DSD regarding UAPs. Requesting a meeting between DSD, VCJCS, and Navy sometime next week. Please advise if we are able to coordinate and if I am communicating with the right personnel. Thank you

I was also given (b) (6) as a POC for clarity on the topic.

Email was received from:

(b) (6)

V/R

(b) (6)

(b) (6)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Wednesday, July 1, 2020 6:37 AM
To: (b) (6)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
Cc: (b) (6)
[Redacted]
Subject: RE: Per our Conversation -- RFI on UFO Story

Excellent! I was having dinner with (b) (6) last night... he says hi.

VR, (b) (6)

Sent from my handheld

From: (b) (6)
Date: Tuesday, Jun 30, 2020, 9:05 PM
To: (b) (6)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
Cc: (b) (6)
[Redacted]
Subject: RE: Per our Conversation -- RFI on UFO Story

Got it FORAC first thing tomorrow morning.

Took off early today to fold tinfoil hats.

VR,
(b) (6)

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b) (6)

Date: Tuesday, Jun 30, 2020, 4:37 PM

To: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Subject: RE: Per our Conversation -- RFI on UFO Story

(b) (6), Copy. Will coordinate with (b) (6). Thanks. Vr, (b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Tuesday, June 30, 2020 4:04 PM

To: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Subject: RE: Per our Conversation -- RFI on UFO Story

Team – N2N6-in-Black are our UAP heroes.

(b) (6) – Recommend turning this one over to (b) (6). Over to them regarding if a prebrief to CNO or VCNO is recommended first (i.e. are CNO/VCNO aware of the latest and Navy's conclusions)... or if they just provide a recap.

VR, (b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Tuesday, June 30, 2020 3:45 PM

To: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Subject: FW: Per our Conversation -- RFI on UFO Story

Gentlemen,

Good afternoon.

Back in Jan Navy provided the attached (and bullets below) in response to DepSECDEF on a RFI

about "UFO."

Today we were asked to provide follow-on information.

Can you work with (b) (6) to identify the requested details and work out a briefing?

Thank you

r/

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Tuesday, June 30, 2020 2:44 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: Lyons, David Brig Gen SD (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Subject: RE: Per our Conversation -- RFI on UFO Story

(b) (6),

On the subject below, I know I said I would get back to you if DSD wanted a more detailed brief on this...well, DSD would like a more detailed brief on this, to include a better understanding of the Navy's conclusions.

Can we make that happen?

I am also short – Thursday is my last day!

My replacement is (b) (6), cc'd above.

Thanks much!

V/R (b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, January 17, 2020 8:23 PM
To: (b) (6)
Cc: Lyons, David Brig Gen SD (b) (6)
Subject: RE: Per our Conversation -- RFI on UFO Story

(b) (6),

Thank you again for this info – very helpful to get the “Public Facing” part of this.

I do think DSD may want to better understand the Navy’s analysis on the UAPs, and perhaps watch some of the video.

We can touch base next week, but I wanted to give you a head’s up. If you have something already built, like a briefing or something, that may actually be enough.

More to follow!

Enjoy the long weekend.

V/R (b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, January 17, 2020 11:42 AM
To: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: Per our Conversation -- RFI on UFO Story

Ma’am,

Please see the below comments and the attached file pertaining to this article / topic.
Information provided via the office of the Director, Navy Staff (attachment developed by ONI).
Please let us know if you require any additional information.

r/

(b) (6)

-
- **What has the Navy said publicly about this incident (Nimitz 2004)?**
The Department of Defense, specifically the U.S. Navy, has the video referred to in the FOIA Request. As the Navy and my office have stated previously, the investigation of UAP sightings is ongoing, and we will not publicly discuss individual sighting reports/observations. However, I can tell you that the date of the 2004 USS Nimitz video is Nov. 14, 2004 and the

length of the video that's been circulating since 2017 is the same as the length of the source video. We do not expect to release this video."

- **Is there indeed classified footage as mentioned in the article?**

The video was initially classified SECRET by NAVAIR when provided to ONI for analysis, but has subsequently been reviewed and marked as unclassified. NAVAIR, via the FOIA review process, has determined that, while not classified, the video contains information that make it un-releasable to the media or general public.

- **What are 1-2 talking points DSD could use if asked about this? i.e. "yes, there is classified footage because..." "The Navy has said..."**

We will not publicly discuss individual sighting reports/observations.

Any incursion into our training ranges by any aircraft, identified or not identified, is problematic from both a safety and security concern.

There have been a number of reports of unauthorized and/or unidentified aircraft entering various military-controlled training ranges and designated air space in recent years. The U.S. Navy, the U.S. Air Force, and the Department of Defense (DoD) take these reports very seriously and investigate each and every report.

Safety of our aircrews is paramount. Unauthorized and unidentified aircraft pose a risk to flight safety. Additionally, it is vital we maintain security on our operations. Our aviators train as they fight. Any intrusions that may compromise the security of our operations, tactics, or procedures is of great concern.

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Thursday, January 16, 2020 11:52 AM

To: (b) (6)

Subject: RE: Per our Conversation -- RFI on UFO Story

Thanks!

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Thursday, January 16, 2020 11:43 AM

To: (b) (6)

Subject: RE: Per our Conversation -- RFI on UFO Story

Ma'am,

Received. Will look into and response soonest.

Vr/

(b) (6)

[Redacted]

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Thursday, January 16, 2020 11:40 AM

To: (b) (6)

Subject: Per our Conversation -- RFI on UFO Story

(b) (6),

Per our conversation... A reply back to me will work, if that is easiest.

Questions:

- What has the Navy said publicly about this incident?
- Is there indeed classified footage as mentioned in the article?
- What are 1-2 talking points DSD could use if asked about this? i.e. "yes, there is classified footage because..." "The Navy has said..."

Thank you!!

V/R (b) (6)

https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/wxe54z/the-navy-has-secret-classified-video-of-an-infamous-ufo-incident

From: (b) (6)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N61](#)
Cc: [Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\);](#) (b) (6)
Subject: FW: Per our Conversation -- RFI on UFO Story
Date: Wednesday, July 1, 2020 6:53:10 AM

Sir,

BLUF: DepSecDef wants the Navy to give him a brief on UAP.

I'll discuss with DCNO during our morning standup to learn his thoughts on how we proceed. While I think CNO (and to lesser degree VCNO) are up to speed, I have been watching the DepSecDef interest in ASW; In this instance there were pre-briefs to CNO, VCNO and SecNav. I also witnessed the Vice Chairman's staff requesting a prebrief on ASW before it went to DepSecDef.

Very Respectfully,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, June 30, 2020 4:04 PM
To: (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: RE: Per our Conversation -- RFI on UFO Story

Team – N2N6-in-Black are our UAP heroes.

(b) (6) – Recommend turning this one over to (b) (6). Over to them regarding if a prebrief to CNO or VCNO is recommended first (i.e. are CNO/VCNO aware of the latest and Navy's conclusions)... or if they just provide a recap.

VR, (b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, June 30, 2020 3:45 PM
To: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: FW: Per our Conversation -- RFI on UFO Story

Gentlemen,

Good afternoon.

Back in Jan Navy provided the attached (and bullets below) in response to DepSECDEF on a RFI about "UFO."

Today we were asked to provide follow-on information.

Can you work with (b) (6) to identify the requested details and work out a briefing?

Thank you

r/

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Tuesday, June 30, 2020 2:44 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: Lyons, David Brig Gen SD (b) (6)

Subject: RE: Per our Conversation -- RFI on UFO Story

(b) (6)

On the subject below, I know I said I would get back to you if DSD wanted a more detailed brief on this...well, DSD would like a more detailed brief on this, to include a better understanding of the

Navy's conclusions.

Can we make that happen?

I am also short – Thursday is my last day!

My replacement is (b) (6), cc'd above.

Thanks much!

V/R (b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, January 17, 2020 8:23 PM
To: (b) (6)
Cc: Lyons, David Brig Gen SD (b) (6)
Subject: RE: Per our Conversation -- RFI on UFO Story

(b) (6),

Thank you again for this info – very helpful to get the “Public Facing” part of this.

I do think DSD may want to better understand the Navy's analysis on the UAPs, and perhaps watch some of the video.

We can touch base next week, but I wanted to give you a head's up. If you have something already built, like a briefing or something, that may actually be enough.

More to follow!

Enjoy the long weekend.

V/R (b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, January 17, 2020 11:42 AM
To: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: Per our Conversation -- RFI on UFO Story

Ma'am,

Please see the below comments and the attached file pertaining to this article / topic.
Information provided via the office of the Director, Navy Staff (attachment developed by ONI).
Please let us know if you require any additional information.

r/

(b) (6)

-
- **What has the Navy said publicly about this incident (Nimitz 2004)?**
The Department of Defense, specifically the U.S. Navy, has the video referred to in the FOIA Request. As the Navy and my office have stated previously, the investigation of UAP sightings is ongoing, and we will not publicly discuss individual sighting reports/observations. However, I can tell you that the date of the 2004 USS Nimitz video is Nov. 14, 2004 and the length of the video that's been circulating since 2017 is the same as the length of the source video. We do not expect to release this video."

 - **Is there indeed classified footage as mentioned in the article?**
The video was initially classified SECRET by NAVAIR when provided to ONI for analysis, but has subsequently been reviewed and marked as unclassified. NAVAIR, via the FOIA review process, has determined that, while not classified, the video contains information that make it un-releasable to the media or general public.

 - **What are 1-2 talking points DSD could use if asked about this? i.e. "yes, there is classified footage because..." "The Navy has said..."**
*We will not publicly discuss individual sighting reports/observations.
Any incursion into our training ranges by any aircraft, identified or not identified, is problematic from both a safety and security concern.
There have been a number of reports of unauthorized and/or unidentified aircraft entering various military-controlled training ranges and designated air space in recent years. The U.S. Navy, the U.S. Air Force, and the Department of Defense (DoD) take these reports very seriously and investigate each and every report.
Safety of our aircrews is paramount. Unauthorized and unidentified aircraft pose a risk to flight safety. Additionally, it is vital we maintain security on our operations. Our aviators train as they fight. Any intrusions that may compromise the security of our operations, tactics, or procedures is of great concern.*

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Thursday, January 16, 2020 11:52 AM
To: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: Per our Conversation -- RFI on UFO Story

Thanks!

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Thursday, January 16, 2020 11:43 AM
To: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: Per our Conversation -- RFI on UFO Story

Ma'am,

Received. Will look into and response soonest.

Vr/

(b) (6)

[REDACTED]

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Thursday, January 16, 2020 11:40 AM

To: (b) (6)

Subject: Per our Conversation -- RFI on UFO Story

(b) (6),

Per our conversation... A reply back to me will work, if that is easiest.

Questions:

- What has the Navy said publicly about this incident?
- Is there indeed classified footage as mentioned in the article?
- What are 1-2 talking points DSD could use if asked about this? i.e. "yes, there is classified footage because..." "The Navy has said..."

Thank you!!

V/R (b) (6)

https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/wxe54z/the-navy-has-secret-classified-video-of-an-infamous-ufo-incident

From: [Brown, Sandra SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: FW: Proposed DoD Statement on Release of Navy Videos
Date: Monday, April 13, 2020 1:57:20 PM
Attachments: [PROPOSED Statement by the Department of Defense on the release of historical Navy videos.docx](#)

(b) (6),

I will let you reply to (b) (6). I agree with the statement and the questions and answers.
Sandy

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, April 13, 2020 12:46 PM
To: Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6); Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6); Brown, Sandra SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
Cc: OPNAV ALL N2N6 Front Office (b) (6); OPNAV N2N6I Front Office (b) (6); OPNAV N2N6SE Front Office (b) (6)
Subject: FW: Proposed DoD Statement on Release of Navy Videos

Jay/Scott/Sandy,

I worked the statement and Q/A set attached with (b) (6) over the last few weeks.

I am good with them.

Any concerns/edits on your part?

Regards,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

From: Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)
(b) (6)

Sent: Monday, April 13, 2020 12:35 PM

To: (b) (6)

(b) (6) Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI
WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6); Carranza, Guillermo R SES OSD OGC (USA)
(b) (6)

Subject: Re: Proposed DoD Statement on Release of Navy Videos

I have no issues with this.

Thanks,

Matt

From: (b) (6)

Date: Monday, April 13, 2020 at 12:29:04 PM

To: (b) (6)

(b) (6) "Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI
WASHINGTON DC (USA)" (b) (6), "Cummings, Matthew
C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)"
(b) (6), "Carranza, Guillermo R SES OSD OGC
(USA)" (b) (6)

Subject: Proposed DoD Statement on Release of Navy Videos

Folks,

Please see attached for review/comment/coordination chop. As many of you are aware, we will be releasing three historical Navy videos under FOIA, possibly as early as Thursday, depending on how long the FOIA DLI process takes.

The intent is to do a simultaneous release: as soon as the videos are up on the NAVAIR FOIA reading room, OSD will release the attached statement (without the Q&A; the Q&A is for PA use).

Regards,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
To: (b) (6); Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6i; (b) (6)
Cc: Brown, Sandra SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA); (b) (6)
Subject: Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA); (b) (6)
Date: FW: Release of Navy videos
Wednesday, March 25, 2020 7:52:35 AM

All,

Here is an exchange between the NAVAIR FOIA point person (Chris) and the DOD FOIA POC... (b) (6).

She seems inclined to see things our way in the need to keep these out of the release mode.

(b) (5)

Standing by to discuss...

Regards,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, March 24, 2020 8:27 PM
To: (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6); Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA); (b) (6); Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA) (b) (6); Julka, Christopher A CIV (USA) <christopher.a.julka.civ@mail.mil>; (b) (6)
Subject: RE: Release of Navy videos

(b) (6)

Thank you for the attachment and the note.

(b) (6), (b) (5)

(b) (6), (b) (5)

(b) (5)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Tuesday, March 24, 2020 9:46 AM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6) Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI
WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6); Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)
(b) (6); Julka, Christopher A CIV (USA) <christopher.a.julka.civ@mail.mil>

Subject: RE: Release of Navy videos

(b) (6),

(b) (5)

Best regards,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Monday, March 23, 2020 8:11 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

(b) (6) Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA)

(b) (6); Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)

(b) (6); Julka, Christopher A CIV (USA) <christopher.a.julka.civ@mail.mil>

Subject: RE: Release of Navy videos

You're welcome!

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Monday, March 23, 2020 8:07 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

(b) (6) Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA)

(b) (6); Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)

(b) (6); Julka, Christopher A CIV (USA) <christopher.a.julka.civ@mail.mil>

Subject: RE: Release of Navy videos

Thank you very much, (b) (6), we'll look into those.

Regards,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Monday, March 23, 2020 8:05 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

(b) (6) Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA)

(b) (6); Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)

(b) (6); Julka, Christopher A CIV (USA) <christopher.a.julka.civ@mail.mil>

Subject: RE: Release of Navy videos

(b) (6)

Sounds good, if there are investigatory aspects, then that opens up other exemptions. It's also possible that you might have an application of 10 USC 130(a).

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Monday, March 23, 2020 7:56 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

(b) (6) Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA)

(b) (6); Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)

(b) (6); Julka, Christopher A CIV (USA) <christopher.a.julka.civ@mail.mil>

Subject: RE: Release of Navy videos

(b) (6),

Thank you for your response. Your comment about DOPSR is correct. The Navy never cleared these for unrestricted release, and that is the issue – they still don't. (b) (5)

I'll circle back with Navy and OUSD(I); there may be other avenues under this or another statute that are appropriate.

Regards,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Monday, March 23, 2020 7:43 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

(b) (6) Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA)

(b) (6); Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)

(b) (6); Julka, Christopher A CIV (USA) <christopher.a.julka.civ@mail.mil>

Subject: RE: Release of Navy videos

(b) (6)

As I indicated to (b) (6), flight data is generally information transmitted from an aircraft about its path. Videos of Unidentified Aerial Phenomena or UAP, do not qualify. If 10 USC 130e was used previously for this information, it was in error. I think the information included in the public description of this use (available here: <https://open.defense.gov/Portals/23/Documents/FOIA/FOIA_Resources/DA%20Determination%20DoD%20Flights.pdf>) is clear.

(b) (5)

Please let me know if you have additional questions.

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Monday, March 23, 2020 1:33 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

(b) (6) Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA)

(b) (6); Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)

(b) (6) Julka,
Christopher A CIV (USA) <christopher.a.julka.civ@mail.mil>

Subject: RE: Release of Navy videos

Greetings again:

So, If Navy received a request for videos and was trying to protect them under 130E, it's not our office that would deny the protection under 130E. We are the OSD/JS FOIA Office, responsible for processing FOIA requests for the offices that fall under the OSD and the JS.

The DoD FOIA Policy Office, that falls under the OCMO, makes decisions on the use of 130E to protect records. I am cc'ing (b) (6), in that office. Also, I just spoke with (b) (6), who says that Chris Julka – in the Navy FOIA Policy Office coordinated the review with the DoD FOIA Policy Office. Between the two of them, someone should be able to get you answers on where we are with this issue. Without a case number I am unable to determine whether this was referred to us to coordinate with OUSD(I).

I hope this helps.

V/r,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Monday, March 23, 2020 1:16 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

(b) (6) Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA)

(b) (6); Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)

(b) (6)

Subject: Re: Release of Navy videos

(b) (6), do you have the number NAVAIR used when they submitted?

Sent from my iPhone

From: (b) (6)

Date: Monday, March 23, 2020 at 1:12:48 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

"Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA)"

(b) (6); "Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)"

(b) (6)

Subject: RE: Release of Navy videos

Hi there (b) (6):

Do you have a case number?

(b) (6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Monday, March 23, 2020 1:11 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

"Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA)"

(b) (6); Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)

(b) (6)

Subject: Release of Navy videos

(b) (6),

Recently the FOIA office received a request from NAVAIR regarding a request under FOIA for the release of three videos taken by Navy aviators. Previously, Navy had been able to deny release of these videos under 10 U.S.C. 130e., as containing flight data. However, someone in DoD told them it was denied this time.

We (I've cc'd the interested parties from Navy and OUSD(I)) would like to discuss the denial with you, as these videos are part of ongoing intelligence matters and investigations. I've been unable to determine the actual action officer in the OSD & JS FOIA office who worked this, so I'm reaching out to you. Who issued the denial? Was it coordinated with OUSD(I) first?

Regards,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
To: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6; Brown, Sandra SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA); (b) (6);
; Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA); (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: FW: Release of Navy videos
Date: Tuesday, March 24, 2020 9:53:40 AM
Attachments: [Video Example.jpg](#)

All,

This came in while I was typing the last note to you.

(b) (5)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Regards,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, March 24, 2020 9:46 AM
To: (b) (6)
[Redacted]
Cc: (b) (6) Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA); (b) (6); Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)
(b) (6); Julka, Christopher A CIV (USA) <christopher.a.julka.civ@mail.mil>
Subject: RE: Release of Navy videos

(b) (6)

(b) (5)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(b) (5)

Best regards,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Monday, March 23, 2020 8:11 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

(b) (6); Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA)

(b) (6); Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)

(b) (6); Julka, Christopher A CIV (USA) <christopher.a.julka.civ@mail.mil>

Subject: RE: Release of Navy videos

You're welcome!

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Monday, March 23, 2020 8:07 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

(b) (6); Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA)

(b) (6); Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)

(b) (6); Julka, Christopher A CIV (USA) <christopher.a.julka.civ@mail.mil>

Subject: RE: Release of Navy videos

Thank you very much, (b) (6) we'll look into those.

Regards,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Monday, March 23, 2020 8:05 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

(b) (6); Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA)

(b) (6); Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)

(b) (6); Julka, Christopher A CIV (USA) <christopher.a.julka.civ@mail.mil>

Subject: RE: Release of Navy videos

(b) (6)

(b) (5)

(a).

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Monday, March 23, 2020 7:56 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA)

(b) (6) Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)

(b) (6) Julka, Christopher A CIV (USA) <christopher.a.julka.civ@mail.mil>

Subject: RE: Release of Navy videos

(b) (6)

Thank you for your response. Your comment about DOPSR is correct. The Navy never cleared these for unrestricted release, and that is the issue – they still don't. (b) (5)

. I'll circle back with Navy and OUSD(I); there may be other avenues under this or another statute that are appropriate.

Regards,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Monday, March 23, 2020 7:43 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA)

(b) (6); Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)

(b) (6); Julka, Christopher A CIV (USA) <christopher.a.julka.civ@mail.mil>

Subject: RE: Release of Navy videos

Sue,

(b) (5), (b) (6)

(b) (5)

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Monday, March 23, 2020 1:33 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

(b) (6); Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA)

(b) (6) Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)

(b) (6) Julka,

Christopher A CIV (USA) <christopher.a.julka.civ@mail.mil>

Subject: RE: Release of Navy videos

Greetings again:

So, If Navy received a request for videos and was trying to protect them under 130E, it's not our office that would deny the protection under 130E. We are the OSD/JS FOIA Office, responsible for processing FOIA requests for the offices that fall under the OSD and the JS.

The DoD FOIA Policy Office, that falls under the OCMO, makes decisions on the use of 130E to protect records. I am cc'ing (b) (6), in that office. Also, I just spoke with (b) (6), who says that Chris Julka – in the Navy FOIA Policy Office coordinated the review with the DoD FOIA Policy Office. Between the two of them, someone should be able to get you answers on where we are with this issue. Without a case number I am unable to determine whether this was referred to us to coordinate with OUSD(I).

I hope this helps.

V/r,

(b) (6)

Comments: <https://ice.disa.mil/index.cfm?fa=card&sp=125562>

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Monday, March 23, 2020 1:16 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

(b) (6) Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA)

(b) (6); Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)

(b) (6)

Subject: Re: Release of Navy videos

(b) (6), do you have the number NAVAIR used when they submitted?

Sent from my iPhone

From: (b) (6)

Date: Monday, March 23, 2020 at 1:12:48 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

"Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA)"

(b) (6) "Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)"

(b) (6)

Subject: RE: Release of Navy videos

Hi there (b) (6):

Do you have a case number?

(b) (6)

Comments: <https://ice.disa.mil/index.cfm?fa=card&sp=125562>

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Monday, March 23, 2020 1:11 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA)

(b) (6) Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)

(b) (6)

Subject: Release of Navy videos

(b) (6),

Recently the FOIA office received a request from NAVAIR regarding a request under FOIA for the release of three videos taken by Navy aviators. Previously, Navy had been able to deny release of these videos under 10 U.S.C. 130e., as containing flight data. However, someone in DoD told them it was denied this time.

We (I've cc'd the interested parties from Navy and OUSD(I)) would like to discuss the denial with you, as these videos are part of ongoing intelligence matters and investigations. I've been unable to determine the actual action officer in the OSD & JS FOIA office who worked this, so I'm reaching out to you. Who issued the denial? Was it coordinated with OUSD(I) first?

Regards,

(b) (6)

A large black rectangular redaction box covers the majority of the page content, starting below the header and extending to the bottom of the page.

From: (b) (6)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N61](#)
Cc: [Brown, Sandra SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#); (b) (6) [Stratton, John F \(Jay\)](#)
[SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#); (b) (6)
Subject: FW: Release of Navy videos
Date: Tuesday, March 24, 2020 9:47:40 AM

Good Morning, Scott.

Wanted to bring you back into the conversations on the release of the 3 UAP videos via the FOIA process.

The conversations below are between (b) (6), our DOD Public Affairs lead, and the various Navy and DOD FOIA teams.

From my read, it looks like we need to identify (on SIPR?) the possible Intelligence-related objections to making these videos public.

As she stated below, (b) (6) is teleworking, but will be in on Thursday to check her SIPR account.

Also... VADM Kohler has expressed interest in sending a note to the 3 star at NAVAIR to get him into the loop, so he doesn't get surprised by all this dialogue, etc.

If you (or anyone else here) have anything you want me to add to that draft... please send.

And relatedly... VADM Kohler asked again this morning for me to check with the I Team on the materials reviewed for the television production and their return with the analysis results.

(b) (6), I told him we had exchanged notes yesterday on the subject.

If anyone has more to add to our conversation... please pipe in!

Standing by to assist.

(b) (6)

Regards,

(b) (6)

From: Carranza, Guillermo R SES OSD OGC (USA) (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, March 24, 2020 9:02 AM
To: Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA) (b) (6)
Cc: Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: RE: Release of Navy videos

Matt

Let me know what you need it terms of support. I've not see these requests.

r/ Bill

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, March 23, 2020 8:04 PM
To: (b) (6); Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)
(b) (6); Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA)
(b) (6); Carranza, Guillermo R SES OSD OGC (USA) (b) (6)
Subject: RE: Release of Navy videos

Adding Bill Carranza in for OUSD(I). (b) (6) taken off.

OK, gang, over to you. (b) (5)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Thursday is the only day that I will physically be in the office and can check SIPR.

Regards,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, March 23, 2020 7:56 PM
To: (b) (6)
[REDACTED]
Cc: (b) (6); Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA)
(b) (6); Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)
(b) (6); Julka, Christopher A CIV (USA) <christopher.a.julka.civ@mail.mil>
Subject: RE: Release of Navy videos

(b) (6).

Thank you for your response. Your comment about DOPSR is correct. The Navy never cleared these for unrestricted release, and that is the issue – they still don't. (b) (5)

[REDACTED] I'll
circle back with Navy and OUSD(I); there may be other avenues under this or another statute that are appropriate.

Regards,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, March 23, 2020 7:43 PM
To: (b) (6)
[REDACTED]
Cc: (b) (6); Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA)
(b) (6); Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)

(b) (6); Julka, Christopher A CIV (USA) <christopher.a.julka.civ@mail.mil>

Subject: RE: Release of Navy videos

(b) (6),

(b) (6), (b) (5)

(b) (6), (b) (5)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Monday, March 23, 2020 1:33 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

(b) (6) Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA)

(b) (6); Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)

(b) (6) Julka,
Christopher A CIV (USA) <christopher.a.julka.civ@mail.mil>

Subject: RE: Release of Navy videos

Greetings again:

So, If Navy received a request for videos and was trying to protect them under 130E, it's not our office that would deny the protection under 130E. We are the OSD/JS FOIA Office, responsible for processing FOIA requests for the offices that fall under the OSD and the JS.

The DoD FOIA Policy Office, that falls under the OCMO, makes decisions on the use of 130E to protect records. I am cc'ing (b) (6), in that office. Also, I just spoke with (b) (6), who says that Chris Julka – in the Navy FOIA Policy Office coordinated the review with the DoD FOIA Policy Office. Between the two of them, someone should be able to get you answers on where we are with this issue. Without a case number I am unable to determine whether this was referred to us to coordinate with OUSD(I).

I hope this helps.

V/r,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

Comments: <https://ice.disa.mil/index.cfm?fa=card&sp=125562>

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Monday, March 23, 2020 1:16 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

(b) (6) Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA)

(b) (6); Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)

(b) (6)

Subject: Re: Release of Navy videos

(b) (6), do you have the number NAVAIR used when they submitted?

Sent from my iPhone

From: (b) (6)

Date: Monday, March 23, 2020 at 1:12:48 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

(b) (6) "Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA)"

(b) (6) "Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)"

(b) (6)

Subject: RE: Release of Navy videos

Hi there (b) (6):

Do you have a case number?

Stephanie

(b) (6)

Comments: <https://ice.disa.mil/index.cfm?fa=card&sp=125562>

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Monday, March 23, 2020 1:11 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

(b) (6) Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA)

(b) (6) Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)

(b) (6)

Subject: Release of Navy videos

(b) (6),

Recently the FOIA office received a request from NAVAIR regarding a request under FOIA for the release of three videos taken by Navy aviators. Previously, Navy had been able to deny release of these videos under 10 U.S.C. 130e., as containing flight data. However, someone in DoD told them it was denied this time.

We (I've cc'd the interested parties from Navy and OUSD(I)) would like to discuss the denial with you, as these videos are part of ongoing intelligence matters and investigations. I've been unable to determine the actual action officer in the OSD & JS FOIA office who worked this, so I'm reaching out to you. Who issued the denial? Was it coordinated with OUSD(I) first?

Regards.

(b) (6)

From: Aeschbach, Kelly A RADM USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA)
To: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N61
Cc: Brown, Sandra SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA); Page, Christopher James (Chris) SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA); Richardson, Andrew G SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA); (b) (6)
Subject: FW: S2S: SLIDES FOR 31 Mar - 1 Apr EXCOMs
Date: Tuesday, March 31, 2020 4:56:43 PM
Attachments: S2S - CIO EXCOM - 31 Mar 2020 Rev D.pdf

Scott,

FYSA in case you were not in receipt. We are standing by to work with you and your team as required on a potential reclama. v/r, Kelly

From: Nashold, Elizabeth A (Liz) SES USN NAVIFOR SUFFOLK VA (USA)
Sent: Tuesday, March 31, 2020 4:08 PM
To: Aeschbach, Kelly A RADM USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA); Richardson, Andrew G SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA)
Subject: FW: S2S: SLIDES FOR 31 Mar - 1 Apr EXCOMs

RADM Aeschbach, Andrew,

Forwarding for your awareness...DCGS-N and SeaLink Advanced Analysis (S2A) are included in DON CIO's list. OPNAV N2/N6 is working through how to address.

Sincerely and V/r,
Liz

From: Miller, Christopher A SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, March 31, 2020 11:29 AM
To: Hermosilla, Manuel N SES USN FLTCYBER/COMTENTHFLT (USA) (b) (6); White, Timothy J VADM USN FLTCYBER/COMTENTHFLT (USA) (b) (6); Brown, Brian B VADM USN NAVIFOR SUFFOLK VA (USA) (b) (6); Nashold, Elizabeth A (Liz) SES USN NAVIFOR SUFFOLK VA (USA) (b) (6)
Cc: Parode, Steven L RADM USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6); Creighton, Kathleen M RADM USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)
Subject: FW: S2S: SLIDES FOR 31 Mar - 1 Apr EXCOMs

Leaders ,

Sharing for your awareness. We'll be working through with what to do with DoN CIO's recommendations on S2S. We'll keep everyone aware and engaged as necessary. We basically have two weeks to work through these and get them back in front of the EXCOMM for another look.

v/r

Chris

From: Hogg, Neil W SES USN CNO (USA) (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, March 30, 2020 4:26 PM
To: Luy, Paul A SES USN DCNO N9 (USA) (b) (6); Beyler, Juliet M SES USN DCNO N1 (USA) (b) (6); Miller, Christopher A SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)
Cc: Kohler, Matthew J VADM USN (USA) (b) (6); Kilby, James W VADM USN CNO (USA) (b) (6); Nowell, John B Jr VADM USN (USA) (b) (6); Leschier, William K VADM USN DCNO N8 (USA) (b) (6); Balisle, Jennifer J SES USN DCNO N4 (US) (b) (6); Williamson, Ricky Lee VADM USN DCNO N4 (USA) (b) (6); (b) (6)
Subject: FW: S2S: SLIDES FOR 31 Mar - 1 Apr EXCOMs

Paul, Juliet, and Chris,

The CIO brief to the S2S EXCOM is tomorrow at 07:00. In the attached slides 6-12 are the ones where CIO is mapping out Tier 1 and 2 Savings, what would be helpful is for you to chime in on if these efforts were already addressed in our WBR process.

Of note slides 14-22 show additional Top-Down Strategic Ideas that CIO is developing, it is not clear from the slides what (if any) coordination has gone on with the other OPT's and the Services.

The info for tomorrow AM is as follows -- Dial-in: 866-705-2880, P/C 8019185#

For the Wednesday S2S EXCOM, one of the attachments is included. The excursions addressed in here do not appear to be in coordination with the other OPT efforts.

V/R Neil

ADCNO, Integration of Capabilities and Resources (OPNAV N8B)

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, March 30, 2020 2:53 PM

Subject: S2S: SLIDES FOR 31 Mar - 1 Apr EXCOMs

Good afternoon,

Attached are:

--[if IsupportLists]-->1) <!--[endif]--> CIO slides for 31 Mar

--[if IsupportLists]-->2) <!--[endif]-->FM&C Navy Working Capital Fund (NWCF) slides for 1 April. NWCF will be briefed on 1 Apr after the AUDIT, IG, and NCIS topic, time permitting.

All slides and files can be found on SharePoint. ExCom slides located at:

<https://portal.secnav.navy.mil/cop/S2S/Shared%20Documents/Forms/AllItems.aspx?RootFolder=%2Fcop%2FS2S%2FShared%20Documents%2FExCom%20Briefs%20and%20Templates&FolderCTID=0x012000D902CFE71B24D04CB386B843C80324BF&view=%7B6EB12D8E%2DE1DB%2D4C12%2DA255%2D8AC08B323079%7D>

V/R

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
To: [Kohler, Matthew](#) [VAOP USN (USA)]
Cc: [Bray, Scott W](#) SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I; [Brown, Sandra](#) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA); [Stratton, John F](#) (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA); (b) (6)
Subject: FW: UAP Videos release this week - Way ahead and Assistance Requested
Date: Wednesday, April 22, 2020 9:16:44 AM
Attachments: [PROPOSED Statement by the Department of Defense on the release of historical Navy videos.docx](#)

DCNO,

FYI... CHINFO has outlined the below steps to ensure leadership awareness.

He will leverage the PAOs for (A)SN, CNO, VCNO, OLA, etc., and include it in his end of day report to leaders Thursday evening.

(b) (6) is standing by to assist with Hill notifications.

My next step is to share this with DOD PAO and the NAVAIR FOIA team to recommend we proceed with Friday release.

Standing by if you'd like to discuss further.

V/R,

(b) (6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Wednesday, April 22, 2020 8:52 AM
To: (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: FW: UAP Videos release this week - Way ahead and Assistance Requested

(b) (6)

Thank you for the info about DOD's upcoming (24APR) release of three previously classified Navy UAP videos, which have been circulating in the public domain.

Please fwd the finalized (vice proposed) OSD statement/RTQ to this group once you have it.

Tracking the fol timeline/actions for PA:

- PAO stakeholders (copied) inform their respective chain of command/leadership
- CI will tee up the UAP FOIA release/expected media reporting in his 23APR EOD email to senior leaders. Will also include DOD statement/RTQ as an attachment.
- Hill notification (if OLA hasn't already, they need to coord with OSD Leg Affairs since this is a DOD statement)
- NAVAIR releases videos to their FOIA reading room
- OSD PA publishes statement/release
- NAVAIR notifies people who requested videos (send link to reading room and link to DOD statement/release)
- Highlight UAP article in clips and/or Above the Fold

Thanks and V/r,

(b) (6)



From: (b) (6)

Sent: Monday, April 20, 2020 1:55 PM

To: Brown, Charles W RDML USN (USA) (b) (6)

Cc: Dunn, Paula D RDML CHINFO, OI-00 (b) (6) ; (b) (6)

CHINFONEWSDESK (b) (6)

Stratton, John F (Jay)

SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

OPNAV N2N6I Front Office

(b) (6)

; OPNAV ALL N2N6 Front Office

(b) (6)

; OPNAV N2N6SE Front Office

(b) (6)

Subject: UAP Videos release this week - Way ahead and Assistance Requested

CI,

We are now in the final stages of the process that will result in the 3 historic UAPs (Nimitz/2004, and 2 TR/2017) being released by NAVAIR via the FOIA process.

NAVAIR "owns" the source videos.

The steps will be:

1. We authorize release following Navy leader notification (DOD Leadership notification has been completed, per (b) (6)).
2. The release date is coordinated with DOD PA to ensure coordination with the DOD Briefing schedule.
3. On the day specified, NAVAIR posts to their site, test it out, and sends (b) (6) the URL(s)
4. (b) (6) will publish the DoD news release (see attached)
5. NAVAIR will notify all those who have requested the videos via the FOIA process.

As much as possible, the goal is to minimize the time between the posting and the publication of the DoD news release.

This week, OLA will also proceed with Hill notification of the intended release.

DOD PA (b) (6) remains as the central POC for all media queries, with my assistance as necessary for additional information from Navy.

Separately, but related, the Security Classification Guidance (SCG) for the current/ongoing UAP investigations was signed and is being distributed. In addition to the normal distribution channels, there will be a SIPR email sent this week with the SCG attached sent to those who will need to know of it most. That email list includes Naval Aviation Senior Leaders (VADM Miller/including (b) (6)), you and the Newsdesk team at CHINFO, OLA, and key DOD reps (including (b) (6)). This puts in place protections to preclude public release of any videos/reports/etc. for the current/ongoing/future investigations.

Here's where we need your help:

In conversations with VADM Kohler this morning, he sees this whole event this week as more of a PA issue vice a UAP current investigation-specific related issue... and asks for your help/suggestions in informing Navy leadership.

Might I suggest that you give a heads up to Leadership on the upcoming video release via either (or both) the CHINFO End of Day or Above the Fold emails?

Here is a proposed entry for you to consider, if you concur with that approach.

Historic UAP Videos Release:

(b) (5)



Does that approach work for you?

As always, standing by to discuss as necessary. I am teleworking today, but can come in to the building at any time as necessary to work with you/your team on this.

Regards,

(b) (6)

[REDACTED]

Memorandum for: SECNAV

Subject: N2N6 Legislative Engagement Priorities and Congressional Engagement Plan

I submit to you my FY20 legislative engagement priorities and congressional engagement plan to secure congressional advocacy for Information Warfare programs and policies.

PROGRAMMATIC / RESOURCING ENGAGEMENT PRIORITIES:

Priority 1: Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services (CANES).

Priority 2: Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) Modernization.

Priority 3: Digital Modular Radio (DMR)

POLICY ENGAGEMENT PRIORITIES:

Priority 1: Raise stakeholder awareness of threats posed by economic statecraft

Priority 2: Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Cybersecurity

Priority 3: Formalize Naval Intelligence leadership across IC and DoD maritime intelligence initiatives

More details on each priority and the corresponding congressional engagement plan are enclosed.

MATTHEW J. KOHLER

Enclosures:

1. N2N6 FY20 Programmatic/Resourcing Engagement Priorities
2. N2N6 FY20 Policy Engagement Priorities
3. N2N6 FY20 Congressional Engagement Plan

ENCLOSURE 1

N2N6 FY20 PROGRAMMATIC / RESOURCING ENGAGEMENT PRIORITIES

Priority 1: Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services (CANES). CANES is the Navy's Program of Record (POR) to replace and modernize existing afloat networks with the necessary hardware, software and service infrastructure to host and connect applications, systems, and services within the tactical domain.

SECNAV Bin Classification: Capabilities

Priority 2: Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS)

Modernization. Navy's extension of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise's JWICS Wide Area Network (WAN) provides the basis for Navy forces around the world to share time-sensitive, mission-critical Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) with each other and with their Intelligence Community (IC) partners. While JWICS has served the Navy abundantly well for nearly three decades, it must undergo consolidation and modernization in order to deliver the levels of robustness, resiliency, and combat readiness required by the Navy and its IC partners to fight and win in the era of Great Power Competition (GPC).

SECNAV Bin Classification: Capabilities

Priority 3: Digital Modular Radio (DMR). DMR provides Integrated Waveform (IW) and MUOS Wideband Code Division Multiple Access (WCDMA) capability, a significant enhancement over Navy's existing satellite communication radios. Accelerated fielding of DMR's enhanced capability is a high priority for both of Navy's Fleet Commanders, Pacific Fleet and U.S. Fleet Forces Command. DMR will enable simultaneous communications among a wider range of users, a major improvement and an imperative to overcome challenges with the existing aging satellite constellation.

SECNAV Bin Classification: Capabilities

ENCLOSURE 2

N2N6 FY20 POLICY ENGAGEMENT PRIORITIES

Priority 1: Raise stakeholder awareness of threats posed by economic statecraft. The global interconnectivity of commercial markets combined with the continuous expansion of technology has provided an avenue for foreign adversaries to exploit technical and human vulnerabilities through economic statecraft. While actions give the appearance of legitimate business practices, foreign adversaries conducting economic statecraft are decisively strategic with the intent of eroding, compromising and disrupting U.S. competitive advantage and warfighting superiority.

SECNAV Bin Classification: Capabilities

Priority 2: Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Cybersecurity. N2N6 will lead engagement with ASN (RDA), NCIS, FCC/10F and stakeholders to ensure Navy Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) held by defense contractors is sufficiently secured. While Navy proactively engaged on this topic ahead of the other services, this topic has transitioned to OSD playing the lead role in coordinating policy, action and response. Navy will coordinate with the OSD Protecting Critical Technologies Task Force (PCTTF) to represent Navy equities and ensure DOD-level policies are enacted and enforced.

SECNAV Bin Classification: Capabilities

Priority 3: Formalize Naval Intelligence leadership across IC and DoD maritime intelligence initiatives. Enables improved coordination, deconfliction, and resource optimization to resolve priority intelligence requirements.

SECNAV Bin Classification: People

ENCLOSURE 3

N2N6 CONGRESSIONAL ENGAGEMENT PLAN

N2N6 will secure congressional advocacy on Information Warfare priorities through proactive and thoughtful engagement with congressional members and staff at critical points throughout the fiscal year. N2N6 will also enhance trust and transparency with congressional members and staff through maintaining a posture of responsiveness and cooperation for congressional requests for hearings, briefings and information.

Specifically, N2N6 will conduct the following engagement and communication activities:

Proactive Engagement:

- Invite members and staff to briefings related to the status and progress of priority programs.
- Ensure members understand any challenges of execution and operational impacts of resourcing decisions in future fiscal years.

Responsive Engagement:

- Fully participate in committee hearings as invited with clear and cooperative testimony.
- Provide clear, transparent and comprehensive responses to congressional letters, questions for the record, and responses to query.
- Provide briefings requested by congressional members and staff in a timely manner.
- Provide congressionally mandated reports and other reporting mechanisms related to N2N6 programs within required timeframes.

Dialogue on Special Topics Where Navy Supports Broader DOD or USG Efforts

N2N6 will continue to provide members and staff requested updates on issues that are of interest to the media, high risk, or time-sensitive. While Navy recently proactively engaged on the below topics ahead of the other services, they have transitioned to OSD playing the lead role in coordinating policy, action and response.

- Unidentified Aerial Phenomena: N2N6 will continue to reshape inaccurate narratives and perceptions that might emerge on Unidentified Aerial Phenomena as it relates to Navy safety of flight and the Navy's alignment with higher DoD organizations.
- Cyber Security to the Defense Industrial Base: N2N6 will continue to respond to requests for updates relating to the Navy's role in supporting a DoD approach to defending the defense systems and infrastructure from cyber disruptions by external actors.

(b) (5)

Hill Engagement Calendar

October 2020						
MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY	SATURDAY	SUNDAY
			1 FY21 Begins	2 CMC Phone: SEN Graham	3	4
5 House & Senate Recess (Senate Schedule Change)	6 CMC Phone: REP Cunningham	7	8	9	10	11
12 Columbus Day House & Senate Recess SCOTUS nom hearing begins	13 Navy Birthday	14	15	16	17	18
19 House Recess Senate in Session (Senate Schedule Change)	20	21	22	23	24	25
26 House & Senate Recess	27 (T) SANTA BARBARA (LCS 32) Keel Laying at Austal	28	29	30	31 MARINETTE (LCS 25) Christening in Marinette	

Legend: Blue = SECNAV, Red = CNO, Orange = Under, Purple = VCNO, Green = FMBE, Brown = USMC

As of 3/13/2026, 11:46:35

Hill Engagement Calendar

November 2020

MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY	SATURDAY	SUNDAY
						1 Daylight Savings Time Ends
2 House & Senate Recess	3 General Elections and AZ & GA Senate Special Elections (McSally & Loeffler seats)	4	5	6	7	8
9 House Recess Senate in Session	10 USMC Birthday	11 Veterans Day	12	13	14	15 House New Member Orientation
16 House New Member Orientation	17 House New Member Orientation	18 House New Member Orientation	19 House New Member Orientation	20 House New Member Orientation	21 House New Member Orientation	22
23 House & Senate Recess	24	25	26 Thanksgiving	27	28	29 House New Member Orientation
30 No House Votes House New Member Orientation						

Legend: Blue = SECNAV, Red = CNO, Orange = Under, Purple = VCNO, Green = FMBE, Brown = USMC

As of 3/13/2026, 11:46:35

Hill Engagement Calendar

December 2020

MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY	SATURDAY	SUNDAY
	1 House New Member Orientation GA-5 Special Election Runoff (Lewis seat)	2 SASC-R DON readiness (SN, CNO, CMC) House New Member Orientation	3 House New Member Orientation	4 House New Member Orientation	5 House New Member Orientation	6
7	8	9	10 Hanukkah Begins (T) House Final Adjournment	11 CR Expires at Midnight	12 Army-Navy Game	13
14	15	16	17	18 Hanukkah Ends (T) Senate Final Adjournment	19	20
21	22	23	24	25 Christmas	26	27
28	29	30	31			

Legend: Blue = SECNAV, Red = CNO, Orange = Under, Purple = VCNO, Green = FMBE, Brown = USMC

As of 3/13/2026, 11:46:35

Hill Engagement Calendar

December 2020

MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY	SATURDAY	SUNDAY
	1 No House Votes GA-5 Special Election Runoff (Lewis seat) House New Member Orientation	2 SASC-R: DON readiness (SN, CNO, CMC) SEN Kelly Sworn-in to replace SEN McSally House New Member Orientation	3 House New Member Orientation	4 House New Member Orientation	5 House New Member Orientation	6
7	8 House Adopts NDAA Conf Report	9 House Passes 2nd CR	10 Hanukkah Begins CNO Video Conf: SASC & HASC Seapower PSMs	11 No House Votes Senate Clears NDAA Conf Report & 2nd CR 1st CR Expires at Midnight CNO Video Conf: HASC Readiness PSMs	12 Army-Navy Game	13
14 No House Votes	15 No House Votes	16	17	18 Hanukkah Ends 2nd CR Expires at Midnight	19	20
21 SN Phone: SENs Blumenthal, Murphy	22 SN Visit to Norfolk: REPs Luria, (T) Wittman CMC Podcast: REP Gallagher	23	24	25 Christmas	26	27
28	29	30	31			

Legend: Blue = SECNAV, Red = CNO, Orange = Under, Purple = VCNO, Green = FMBE, Brown = USMC

As of 3/13/2026, 11:47:32

Hill Engagement Calendar

January 2021

MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY	SATURDAY	SUNDAY
NOTE: This reflects the House 2021 floor schedule only. The Senate's schedule is TBD.				1 New Year's Day	2	3 Official Start of 117 th Congress (T) Swearing-in Day
4	5 GA Senate Runoff Elections (Perdue & Loeffler seats)	6 Joint Session to Count Electoral Votes	7	8	9	10
11 House Recess Senate TBD	12	13	14	15	16	17
18 MLK, Jr. Day	19 No House Votes	20 Inauguration Day (DC Area Holiday)	21	22	23	24
25	26	27	28	29 No House Votes	30	31

Hill Engagement Calendar

February 2021

MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY	SATURDAY	SUNDAY
1 House Committee Work Week Senate TBD PB22 Due to Congress	2	3	4	5	6	7
8	9	10	11	12 No House Votes	13	14
15 Presidents' Day House & (T) Senate Recess	16	17	18	19	20	21
22 No House Votes	23	24	25	26	27	28

Hill Engagement Calendar

September 2020

MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY	SATURDAY	SUNDAY
	1 House & Senate Recess	2	3	4 SN Phone: REP Amodei	5	6
7 Labor Day	8 House Committee Work Period (Schedule Change) Senate in Session	9 SN Phone: SEN Cotton SN Phone: SENs Rosen, Murkowski, Manchin; REP Bishop	10 CMC Phone: SEN Sullivan	11	12 MONTANA (SSN 794) Christening in Newport News	13
14	15	16	17	18 No House Votes Rosh Hashanah Begins	19	20 Rosh Hashanah Ends
21 No House Votes SN Phone: SEN Kaine	22 House Passes CR Lasting Through 11 Dec	23	24	25 No House Votes Justice Ginsburg Memorial Ceremony, Statuary Hall (CMC, VCNO)	26 DELBERT D. BLACK (DDG 119) Commissioning in Port Canaveral	27 Yom Kippur Begins
28 No House or Senate Votes Yom Kippur Ends	29 GA-5 Special Election (Lewis seat)	30				

Legend: Blue = SECNAV, Red = CNO, Orange = Under, Purple = VCNO, Green = FMBE, Brown = USMC

As of 3/13/2026, 11:45:29

Hill Engagement Calendar

October 2020						
MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY	SATURDAY	SUNDAY
			1 FY21 Begins	2	3	4
5 House Recess Senate in Session	6	7	8	9	10	11
12 Columbus Day House & Senate Recess	13 Navy Birthday	14	15	16	17	18
19 House & Senate Recess	20	21	22	23	24	25
26 House & Senate Recess	27	28	29	30	31 MARINETTE (LCS 25) Christening in Marinette	

Legend: Blue = SECNAV, Red = CNO, Orange = Under, Purple = VCNO, Green = FMBE, Brown = USMC

As of 3/13/2026, 11:45:29

Hill Engagement Calendar

November 2020						
MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY	SATURDAY	SUNDAY
						1 Daylight Savings Time Ends
2 House & Senate Recess	3 General Elections and AZ & GA Senate Special Elections (McSally & Loeffler seats)	4	5	6	7	8
9 House Recess Senate in Session	10 USMC Birthday	11 Veterans Day	12	13	14	15
16	17	18	19	20	21	22
23 House & Senate Recess	24	25	26 Thanksgiving	27	28	29
30 No House Votes						

Legend: Blue = SECNAV, Red = CNO, Orange = Under, Purple = VCNO, Green = FMBE, Brown = USMC

As of 3/13/2026, 11:45:29

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From: (b) (6)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N61](#); (b) (6)
Subject: Long Beach sighting story
Date: Tuesday, July 28, 2020 12:51:28 PM

Scott, (b) (6),

FYI... As mentioned at DIVDIRS.

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Possible UFO Sighting in Long Beach, Zooms By at Lightning Speed

TMZ.com, 26 July 2020

Take this with a big grain of salt, BUT ... we may have a legit UFO sighting on our hands here, people. Give it a gander and decide for yourself.

This footage was taken Sunday out in Long Beach, CA -- about 25 minutes south of central L.A. -- and it appears to show a UFO-like object in the air bolt across the sky at lightning-quick speed and disappear out of frame -- all while of-this-world fighter jets fly above.

The person who shot this insists it is not altered or edited at all -- if you buy that, then you gotta ask what the hell it is that zips across the camera's frame if only for a moment. Watch it as many times as you need to -- we even slowed it down/paused it for a close-up view.

If you look (and listen) carefully, you can see a black dot -- perhaps in a saucer shape, although it's hard to tell by how high it is -- flash across the screen and disappear.

At first glance, one could argue this looks like anything but a flying saucer -- could be a raisin, a fly or nothing at all. OR ... it could very well be aliens checking in on us (again?).

As for the jets you can hear in the background as well, we're told they were out there in LB flying around for no apparent reason for about 10 minutes or so. Unclear if their presence had anything to do with this alleged UFO sighting, but hey ... they could be related.

There's been other purported sightings in that area too of late -- about a couple weeks ago, someone posted another video of a strange object flying in the sky around sunset. They claim this was shot from about 2 miles away and at a height of 1,000 feet, more or less.

The YouTube user also says the thing disappeared on him when he stopped filming, but you don't see any of that on camera. Could just be a kite on a super long string -- or ... ALIENS!!

One last thing to consider ... the New York Times did a story this past week about Pentagon bigwigs working in their UFO Unit (yes, they have one of those). One of the subcontractors who used to work for the feds told the paper he recently briefed a Defense Dept. agency about "off-world vehicles not made on this earth" that they'd retrieved over the years.

The Pentagon also said they plan to make some of these findings public in the near future. So ... this might not be so far-fetched if Uncle Sam's ramping up to have a talk with us

[Article](#)



REMARKS AND QUESTIONS FOR SUMMIT PLENARY #2

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

OPENING REMARKS

- Thank you for that introduction, and welcome to the second day of the Intelligence and National Security Summit.
- I'm pleased to be here with leaders from **all six** Service intelligence staffs – including from the newest military Service, the United States Space Force.
- Your screen may look a little crowded with all seven of us, so let me take this opportunity to tell you who we will be hearing from today.
 - **Lieutenant General Mary O'Brien**, Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Cyber Effects Operations, Headquarters U.S. Air Force
 - **Vice Admiral Jeffrey Trussler**, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information Warfare and Director of Naval Intelligence, U.S. Navy
 - **Major General Kate Leahy**, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff/G2, U.S. Army
 - **Brigadier General Melvin Carter**, Director of Intelligence, Headquarters Marine Corps
 - **Brigadier General Leah Lauderback**, Director of Intelligence, U.S. Space Force
 - **Rear Admiral Andrew Sugimoto**, Assistant Commandant for Intelligence, U.S. Coast Guard
- With such a large panel and so many issues to discuss, I don't want to pose every question to all six of you. Instead, I will direct my questions to a couple of you and plan to move on to the next topic – but if anyone else wants to jump in, please feel free to do so.

QUESTIONS

Pandemic

- FOR ADMIRAL TRUSSLER (NAVY) AND ADMIRAL SUGIMOTO (COAST GUARD) -- It's hard to not begin by considering the current pandemic and its effect on intelligence operations.
 - What challenged you most during the pandemic and what investments are being made to be better positioned for the future?
 - Could the National Center for Medical Intelligence (NCMI), a DIA component focused principally on force protection, expand its mission to address medical threats to the United States as a whole without compromising its support to the armed forces?
- FOR GENERAL LEAHY (ARMY) AND GENERAL O'BRIEN (AIR FORCE) – The Army and the Air Force are piloting technologies that allow remote classified work. How will this affect the Service intelligence staffs – not just during the pandemic but long afterwards?

Space Force

- FOR GENERAL LAUDERBACK (SPACE FORCE): The Space Force is the newest of the armed services.
 - What are Space Force's intelligence requirements, and what capabilities does it need to develop organically that can't be met by existing military intelligence or IC capabilities?
 - What are some of the biggest challenges you've encountered in getting Space Force's intelligence office up and running?
 - How does the Space Force view space as a warfighting domain, and what has that meant for you as a force provider charged with training, equipping, and providing ready forces to combatant commanders?

Personnel and Diversity

- OPEN QUESTION – Developments throughout the country this Summer have led every organization – in government and out – to assess how well it promotes diversity, equity, and inclusion. Promoting diversity is a critically important topic for all of us, and one that INSA is working diligently to address, so on this issue I would like to get insights from all of you.
 - How are you creating diverse and inclusive teams that contribute a range of perspectives to your Service's intelligence capabilities? How are you ensuring that every team member is valued and has equal opportunities to succeed?
 - Admiral Trussler, as a member of the Cherokee Nation, you bring a valuable perspective to this issue, so let me start with you.
 - General O'Brien (USAF)?
 - General Leahy (Army)?
 - General Carter (USMC)?
 - General Lauderback (USSF)?
 - Admiral Sugimoto (USCG)?
- FOR GENERAL CARTER (MARINE CORPS) AND GENERAL LEAHY (ARMY) – Intelligence is very much a people discipline, with success heavily dependent upon the intellectual capabilities of a well-trained and ready force.
 - How are you doing with respect to recruiting people with the right aptitudes and skill sets – particularly linguists and cyber specialists – and retaining them in intelligence specialties?

Intelligence Support to Operations

- FOR GENERAL LEAHY (ARMY), GENERAL CARTER (MARINE CORPS), AND GENERAL O'BRIEN (AIR FORCE) -- The 2018 National Defense Strategy articulates our strategy to fight in an increasingly complex environment. The focus is threats from the 2 + 3 – China and Russia, plus North Korea, Iran, and violent extremism.
 - How is your Service adjusting military intelligence forces and capabilities in light of these complex threats? Do you see any major challenges for your Service beyond the 2 + 3 that could complicate force structure adjustments?
- FOR GENERAL LAUDERBACK (SPACE FORCE), GENERAL CARTER (MARINE CORPS), AND ADMIRAL TRUSSLER (NAVY) -- Late last year, Secretary Esper directed the creation of a new Joint Warfighting Concept for All-Domain Operations, the integration and exercise of command and control over all domains in a conflict – not just air, land, and sea, but also space, cyber, transportation, missile defense, and others. This concept requires near-instantaneous sharing of information among all forces in the fight.
 - How are your Services posturing intelligence capabilities to support All-Domain Operations? What changes have you made, and what changes do you foresee over the next 12-18 months? What does success look like?

Cyber

- FOR GENERAL O'BRIEN (AIR FORCE) AND GENERAL LEAHY (ARMY) – The heightened prospect for warfare in the cyber domain is one of the most significant national security developments of the last decade.
 - In providing intelligence support to military cyber operations, what challenges you most, and how can industry help?

Resources and Capabilities

- FOR ADMIRAL TRUSSLER (NAVY) AND GENERAL O'BRIEN (AIR FORCE) --
What shortfalls in your Service's intelligence capabilities most concern you, and what is being done to improve them?
 - If you had a marginal dollar to spend on your Service's intelligence capabilities, what would you spend it on?
 - Have you identified a capability gap for which there does not yet seem to be a viable technology solution? How can industry help?
- FOR GENERAL CARTER (MARINE CORPS) -- The Service Chiefs largely determine their MIP budgets, which shape the organization and equipping of MI battalions, reconnaissance squadrons, and maneuver unit intelligence staffs.
 - Could you speak to critical dependencies those units have on NIP-funded capabilities? Do you have any concerns that those NIP capabilities may become unavailable?

Overseas Threats

- Afghanistan / Iraq
 - FOR GENERAL LEAHY (ARMY) -- How will further proposed troop reductions in Afghanistan and Iraq affect our ability to understand the intelligence landscape?
 - Can we understand the human terrain with even fewer boots on the ground?
 - How can the United States ensure a continued intelligence presence to support both strategic interests and military objectives in these countries?
- Russia
 - FOR ADMIRAL TRUSSLER (NAVY) – Russia is deploying hypersonic weapons, which have the potential to significantly threaten U.S. ships at sea. How significant is this threat, and how could these weapons affect U.S. Navy operations in a conflict?

- China
 - FOR GENERAL O'BRIEN (AIR FORCE) -- The Chinese military is applying advanced technologies to enhance its military effectiveness. How is the PLA applying AI in ways that affect US forces? What Chinese military capabilities are of greatest concern?
- Arctic
 - FOR ADMIRAL SUGIMOTO (COAST GUARD) AND ADMIRAL TRUSSLER (NAVY) -- With global warming, navigation of the Arctic is going to be increasingly critical to both security and global trade. What are our adversaries' Arctic ambitions, and how well-positioned is the United States to counter them while advancing our own?
- Extremism
 - FOR GENERAL CARTER (MARINE CORPS) AND GENERAL LEAHY (ARMY) -- Several European countries have concluded that right-wing violent extremism now poses a greater threat than religiously-inspired terrorism.
 - How do your organizations see the recent – and future – evolution of terrorist threats?

From: (b) (6)
To: [Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CHC \(USA\)](#)
Cc: [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#); [Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#); (b) (6)
[OPNAV N2N6I Front Office](#); [Stratton, John F \(Jay\) SES USN DCNO](#)
[CHINFO USAF](#); (b) (6)
Subject: Monthly CHINFO Talkers - UAP addition
Date: Thursday, July 23, 2020 1:01:04 PM
Attachments: [CHINFO TALKERS 01JUN2020_FINAL.docx](#)
[20200724_UAP_Update_DRAFT v2 JFG.docx](#)

DCNO,

Each month, RDML Brown distributes a collection of CHINFO Talkers to the entire worldwide Navy Public Affairs Team designed to ensure consistency of messaging.

CHINFO Talkers are basically a collection of Briefing Cards on selected topics of great interest. Each one provides statements, themes, messages, Q/As, etc. that can be used in response to queries, to build speeches, keep leaders informed, etc.

The most recent collection (June) is attached. The next set will go out next week.

In coordination with DOD PA, Jay Stratton (who shared it with Scott Bray), and (b) (6), I've put together a Briefing Card on UAPs (also attached).

I want to share this with the Navy PA Community to make sure that all the PAOs out there (particularly those in operational billets) know the issues and what they should do if anyone in their commands observes a UAP or they should get a query.

This card includes specific information on classification guidance for any imagery that may be collected (including SNOOPIE Team imagery) that we want to share widely. We've been trying to figure out a mechanism to get that word out... and this is our best bet so far.

Unless you have any objections, Sir, I'll send this on to CHINFO for inclusion and release.

Standing by should you like to discuss or have any questions.

V/R,

(b) (6)

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From:

(b) (6)

To:

(b) (6)

Subject:

Naval Attache Newsletter

Date:

Friday, June 26, 2020 11:57:47 AM

Attachments:

[NAN 26 JUN 2020.pdf](#)

Dear esteemed colleagues of the Corps of Naval Attachés,

Please see the attached newsletter.

Have a safe and healthy weekend!

w/r,

(b) (6)

[Redacted signature block]

From: (b) (6)
To: [Stratton, John F \(Jay\) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC \(USA\);](#) (b) (6)
[Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I; Brown, Sandra SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC \(USA\); Aeschbach, Kelly A RADM USN ONI WASHINGTON DC \(USA\);](#) (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
(b) (6) [OPNAV ALL N2N6 Front Office; OPNAV N2N6I Front Office;](#)
Subject: Popular Mechanics Article
Date: Tuesday, February 18, 2020 9:22:29 AM

All,

Wanted to make sure you were aware/saw the lengthy Popular Mechanics article from over the weekend (attached below).

Navy/ONI mentioned a few times... but the focus of the story is DOD/DIA/AATIP.

DOD Spokesperson (b) (6) is the only official spokesperson quoted...

Regards,

(b) (6)

Inside the Pentagon's Secret UFO Program

Popular Mechanics, 14 February 2020... by Tim McMillan

The government can't keep its story straight about its involvement with UFO research. After a yearlong investigation, we bust open the files, break through the noise, and reveal the definitive, staggering truth.

As I sit in a small cafe in the shadow of the ancient Roman gates in Trier, Germany, talking to a person whose credibility seems beyond reproach, but who will only agree to talk to me if provide absolute assurances of anonymity, I can't help but feel like I'm trapped in a Dan Brown novel. The Da Vinci Code, however, never dealt with unidentified flying objects.

"Was it about UFOs? Of course," this person whispers with a grin of melodrama.

After almost a year of investigating the U.S. government's interest in UFOs, what they've just said should neither be shocking, nor revelatory. Unbeknownst to them, they've only further confirmed what over a dozen other people

with backgrounds inside the government and the now-defunct Bigelow Aerospace Advanced Space Studies (BAASS) have already admitted to me.

Just like the fictional Robert Langdon, the path to understanding these mysterious government programs has taken me through the catacombs of informal secret societies, whose surprising memberships include accomplished professionals from the military, aerospace, academic, medical, and intelligence communities.

Though diverse or abstinent in how they define exactly what it all means, each of these enigmatic characters shares one common belief: unidentified flying objects are neither myth nor figment of overactive imaginations. With absolute conviction, they've all told me that UFOs are real.

Now, after two years of scant details and a myriad of contradictory statements, *Popular Mechanics* is ripping open the U.S. government's massive UFO problem. What follows is a deep, unprecedented well of information that's only been known by a very small select group of insiders—until now.

Part I. The Disclosure

On December 16, 2017, the New York Times disclosed that the Pentagon had secretly funded research into UFOs through the Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program, or AATIP. As if the U.S. government quietly investigating UFOs wasn't enough, for the first time, the public also got a chance to see three videos captured by the U.S. Navy showing what has been claimed to be "Unidentified Aerial Phenomena," or UAP.

In an instant, UFOs were no longer relegated to society's nihilistically curious, and for the first time in decades, droves of the mainstream public suddenly found themselves peering skyward with wonder.

But almost as quickly as the excitement of mysterious black budget UFO programs crashed ashore, so, too, came vexing waves of criticism, confusion, and controversy.

From the onset, disarray and debate raged on whether the second "A" in AATIP officially stood for Aerospace or Aviation, with the former "Aerospace" eventually proving to be correct. Adding to the chaos, an entirely different program moniker emerged: the Advanced Aerospace Weapons Systems Applications Program, or AAWSAP. For over two years, no one has been able to adequately explain whether AAWSAP and AATIP were two separate programs, or the same intuitive under two separate names.

To muddle matters more, a revolving door of Pentagon spokespeople have successfully issued waves of contradictory statements about what the Department of Defense (DoD) did or didn't do when it came to studying UFOs.

Initially, the Pentagon said, AATIP had indeed investigated UFOs under the leadership of Luis Elizondo, a former senior member of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSDI). Eventually, in a complete reversal of official stances, the Pentagon's newly crowned UFO point person, Senior Strategic Planner and Spokesperson Susan Gough, recently told *The Black Vault*, "neither AAWSAP nor AATIP were UAP related," "Elizondo was not the director of AATIP," and he didn't have "assigned responsibilities" within the program.

In some consolation to the UFO faithful, the DoD has consistently been willing to say they consider the curious

objects shown in the 2017 videos to be unexplained UAP. What exactly that means, however, has been open for interpretation and debate.

After months of conducting interviews and uncovering previously undisclosed materials, Popular Mechanics is revealing here that the U.S. government does indeed have a definite interest in UFOs.

Provided, of course, that nobody says it out loud.

Part II. The Seeds

The path to truly understanding the Pentagon's current UFO problems doesn't begin in 2008 with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the AAWSAP, but rather, a decade earlier and some 2,000 miles from the nation's capital at the doorstep of a billionaire Nevada entrepreneur.

Robert T. Bigelow, the owner of Budget Suites of America and founder of the space technology company Bigelow Aerospace, has never shied away from amplifying his interest in UFOs. In a 2017 interview, Bigelow told CBS's 60 Minutes he was "absolutely convinced" aliens exist, before passionately declaring, "I don't give a damn!" when asked if it was risky to publicly say he believes in UFOs and aliens.

In 1995, four years before founding his aerospace startup, Bigelow established the National Institute for Discovery Sciences (NIDS). From the company's cached website, NIDS described itself as "a privately funded science institute engaged in research of aerial phenomena, animal mutilations, and other related anomalous phenomena."

The cached website of the now-defunct National Institute for Discovery Sciences.

Before ultimately disbanding in 2004, NIDS conducted research into a host of various paranormal topics, such as cryptid encounters, cattle mutilations, and especially UFOs. The group's most recognized research was the investigation of a purported paranormal Utah homestead owned by Bigelow called Skinwalker Ranch, which would later play a significant role in the DIA's UFO interest.

In a 2018 interview with New York magazine, former Nevada Senator Harry Reid told an interesting tale about a curious letter Bigelow received from a senior official from a federal national-security agency. "I'm interested in talking to you, Mr. Bigelow. I have an interest in what you've been working on. I want to go to your ranch in Utah," Reid recounted.

After vetting the letter's author, the individual Reid described as a "very low-key scientist" was granted a pass to visit Bigelow's ranch. In a lecture at "UFO MegaCon" in 2019, KLAS Las Vegas reporter George Knapp told the crowd these events occurred in 2007, and claims the person, described by Knapp as a "DIA scientist," had an "experience" while visiting the supposed paranormal site.

In an interview with researcher Joe Murgia, former AAWSAP contractor and astrophysicist Eric Davis shared what colleagues had told him of the DIA scientist's experience:

"In the living room of the former NIDS double wide observation trailer/staff quarters. A 3D object appeared in mid-air in front of him and changed shape like a changing topological figure. It went from pretzel-shaped to Möbius strip shaped. It was 3D and multi-colored. Then it disappeared."

According to Reid, whatever happened at Skinwalker was enough to convince the DIA to seriously investigate paranormal and UFO phenomena. ““Something should be done about this. Somebody should study it.’ I was convinced he was right,” Reid told New York.

In an interview with Popular Mechanics, Hal Puthoff, a former subcontractor for the AATIP, confirms the scientist’s visit, but was unsure how significant a role it played in the origins of AAWSAP.

“Reid is correct that early on there was a DIA scientist who expressed interest in hearing of the Skinwalker Ranch and did visit,” Puthoff says. “The degree to which this influenced initiation of the AAWSAP Program, however, or was just a side issue, I don’t know.”

While we don’t know how pivotal the Skinwalker visit was in the formation of the DIA’s UFO studies, we do know AAWSAP and AATIP were already taking shape almost a year before funding was established and the solicitation was issued.

Navy fighter pilot Cdr. David Fravor has arguably become the face of the famous UFO encounters by the Nimitz Strike Carrier Group, it was actually Marine Lt. Col. Douglas “Cheeks” Kurth who was first directed to investigate the strange airborne contacts that radar operators captured in November 2004.

On his LinkedIn profile, Kurth indicates he worked as a program manager for Bigelow Aerospace Advanced Space Studies, LLC (BAASS) until June 2013. Interestingly, Kurth began working for BAASS in December 2007—a month before Bigelow officially established his LLC in January 2008. That might be because Nevada state records show BAASS was technically a subsidiary of another business owned by Bigelow: International Space Hardware Services (ISHS). According to the Nevada Secretary of State’s Office, ISHS was incorporated on October 31, 2007.

Puthoff, who entered the BAASS fold in 2008, tells Popular Mechanics he was aware that Kurth was involved in the Nimitz events in 2004, but he didn’t believe BAASS specifically recruited Kurth because of it. “I think that it was just because of his experience he reached out to join [BAASS],” says Puthoff, who later founded and now runs the advanced concepts research institute Earthtech International.

Puthoff says he believes the DIA had expressed a need for what would become AAWSAP in 2007, but isn’t sure if the organization ever made a formal request. “I think that anything from 2007 was likely quite informal—discussions, letters, emails—but I’m not certain,” he says.

Regardless, roughly six months after BAASS opened up shop, with the support of late senators Ted Stevens and Daniel Inouye, Reid set up funding for AATIP and the AAWSAP contract in the Supplemental Appropriations Bill of July 2008. “It would be black money, we wouldn’t have a big debate on the Senate floor over it,” Reid told New York. “The purpose of it was to study aerial phenomena. The money was given, a directive was given to the Pentagon, to put this out to bid, which they did.”

On August 18, 2008, the contracting arm of the DIA issued a 32-page solicitation/contract/order for commercial items for the AAWSAP. When bidding closed three weeks later on September 5, as the sole bidder, BAASS was awarded \$10 million dollars for the guaranteed first year, of a five-year option, for the contract.

On September 13, 2008, Bigelow Aerospace began listing career opportunities with BAASS in 14 different disciplines related to aerospace and research sciences.

Absent from the AAWSAP solicitation is any language related to UFOs or UAP. Instead, as originally outlined in the July Supplemental Appropriations Bill, the “primary focus is on breakthrough technologies and applications that create discontinuities in currently evolving technology trends. The focus is not on extrapolations of current aerospace technology.”

In past interviews, Reid has indicated the interested parties at the DIA felt it prudent to avoid any language that might cause someone to realize the underlying focus of the AATIP program was UFOs. According to Reid, a representative with the DIA told him, “What I will do is prepare something for you that anyone can look at it that wants to, it’s strictly science.”

On multiple occasions over the past two years, both the government and former contractors have used the terms AATIP and AAWSAP almost interchangeably. This has caused significant confusion of whether AATIP and AAWSAP were two separate programs, or the same activity under differing names. In a recent statement, Pentagon spokesperson Susan Gough told longtime researcher John Greenewald, “[AATIP] was the name of the overall program. [AAWSAP] was the name of the contract that DIA awarded for the production of technical reports under AATIP.”

While all sources associated with the programs confirm Gough’s statement with Popular Mechanics—AAWSAP was the contract component of the broader umbrella program dubbed ATTIP—they dismiss the latter sentiment expressed by Gough that “neither AATIP nor AAWSAP were UAP related.”

The evidence collected here overwhelmingly suggests the government was indeed studying UFOs and not, as the Pentagon has said, “investigating foreign advanced aerospace weapons system applications with future technology projections over the next 40 years, and to create a center of expertise on advanced aerospace technologies.”

Part III. The Report

In July 2009, BAASS provided a comprehensive report to the DIA at the conclusion of the first-year option of the AAWSAP contract. The 494-page “Ten Month Report,” as it’s called, is chock full of strategic plans, project summaries, data tables, charts, descriptions of biological field effects, physical characteristics, methods of detection, theoretical capabilities, witness interviews, photographs, and case synopses—each one entirely, explicitly about unexplained aerial phenomena.

Throughout the report, “the sponsor” is mentioned, however, the DIA is never explicitly named.

The first pages list the names of every contractor working for BAASS with appropriate security clearances to have access to the program. Amongst dozens of credentialed names, some of those listed are very familiar to the UFO community, including Puthoff, Davis, Jacques Vallee, and Colm Kelleher. Regardless of one’s existing opinions of the UFO phenomena, the sheer volume of content in the BAASS Ten Month Report is astounding.

Some of the notable content of the 2009 BAASS Ten Month Report includes:

- Overview of the BAASS Physics Division's efforts to conduct research on advanced aerospace vehicles, including the development of standardization for measurement of physical effects and signatures associated with UAP.
- Overview of BAASS research for measuring and gleaning the effects on biological organisms from UAP.
- Mention of Skinwalker Ranch in Utah as a "possible laboratory for studying other intelligences and possible interdimensional phenomena."
- Strategic plans to organize a series of intellectual debate forums targeted to broad audiences pertaining to the "potential disclosure of an extraterrestrial presence."
- Plans to create a "medical physiological UAP effects program."
- Request for Project Blue Book files that have not been made public.
- Mention of BAASS program dubbed "Project Northern Tier," which involved securing documents related to instances where dozens of UFOs flew over restricted airspaces of facilities housing nuclear weapons.
- A possible UAP landing reported to BAASS by the Mutual UFO Network (MUFON) and its STAR Team (rapid response field investigators funded by BAASS in March 2009).
- Project databases of UAP-related materials compiled through various partnerships, and the intent to expand these databases by coordinating with foreign governments.
- Summaries of multiple UAP events both inside the U.S. and in foreign countries.
- Photographs of UAPs provided by various sources, including foreign governments.

From cover to cover, the BAASS report references the government's new buzzword for UFOs: UAP. However, nowhere could Popular Mechanics find a single reference to foreign (terrestrial) advanced aerospace weapon systems, or projected technological innovations based on current industry trends.

Sources tell Popular Mechanics the BAASS Ten Month report was only a sample of the materials the organization provided to the DIA. "Monthly reports were being sent to the Pentagon, in addition to annual program updates, that were all about UAP or anomalous phenomena," says one former BAASS contractor.

Chris Bartel, a security officer and investigator for BAASS (later Bigelow Aerospace) from 2010 to 2018, confirms the accounts of former BAASS and AATIP employees with Popular Mechanics. He says he indeed encountered some fairly dramatic paranormal events while working at the Skinwalker Ranch, and says he'd also heard mumblings of BAASS being interested in studying paranormal activity in hopes it could lead to technology research. However, Bartel says he didn't know anything about AAWSAP or AATIP until last fall. "I was a bit taken back, to say the least," he says.

Though unaware of any formal contract with the DIA, Bartel confirms that reports generated about paranormal events on the ranch were being faxed to both Bigelow and the Pentagon on a regular basis. ("I would hate to think

my experiences up there were somehow manipulated by outside man-made forces,” Bartel says. “I truly believe the ranch to be hallowed Native land.”)

Some have suggested the “paranormal” events associated with Skinwalker Ranch or AAWSAP could be associated with secret and highly advanced weapons testing. While Bartel says it’s possible weapons were being tested, nothing he observed was consistent with his experiences of top secret testing.

Puthoff also says he saw no evidence that BAASS was involved in weapons testing during his tenure with the organization—“a statement I’m certain Mr. Bigelow would support,” he says. (Bigelow could not be reached for comment.)

Part IV. The Secrets

The revelations in the BAASS report beg the question: Why is the government now insistent it never studied UFOs, and why aren’t these documents being discussed or made available through Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests?

Individuals who worked on the AATIP program say the current uncertainty and confusion was by design and involved a dizzying shell game that’s entirely consistent with how black budget intelligence programs are run. “What you’re dealing with is the very core of government secrecy and how things they absolutely don’t ever want to discuss are kept hidden away,” one former AATIP contractor tells Popular Mechanics.

Sources say the key to understanding current denials of UFO studies in AATIP comes from a phrase stamped on each page of the BAASS Ten Month Report obtained by Popular Mechanics:

“The information is proprietary and cannot be disseminated or used without prior written consent from the Operating Manager of BAASS.”

According to several former AATIP contractors, the “product” being produced for the DIA was technical reports on exotic and potential “game-changing” aerospace technologies, and the manner of determining what areas these radical airborne breakthroughs might emerge was through the research of UFOs.

In exchange, not only would the DIA get the agreed-upon technical reports, but it would also gain access to the extensive research BAASS was gathering on UFOs. While the DIA had access to the volumes of UFO data, the materials were actually commercial property of BAASS, as a subsidiary of Bigelow Aerospace.

The idea of using an aerospace research project as a cover for a secret UFO program may seem unscrupulous. “But this all rings very familiar,” Neil Gordon, an investigator with the Project on Government Oversight, tells Popular Mechanics.

Gordon, whose area of expertise is in federal contractor misconduct, contractor accountability, and government privatization, says running the “commercial in confidence” program through AATIP is consistent with how the DoD deals with programs it wants to keep secret. “Whether it’s right or not is another story,” Gordon says, “but everything sounds very common for how black budget programs run.”

The DIA may have had extensive access to the UFO materials, but because all of the data technically belonged to BAASS, under the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, disclosing or releasing proprietary materials provided to the government in confidence is a federal crime. Essentially, the DIA's UFO program was set up to circumvent FOIA requests and avoid having to discuss UFOs publicly.

Out of concern for providing Popular Mechanics access to the 2009 BAASS Ten Month Report, the person who made these materials available did so only under the guarantee of anonymity. It's worth noting this person is not a current government employee, nor were they involved with BAASS or the AAWSAP contract.

"Unfortunately, the government attempting to evade FOIA by contracting out its responsibilities is nothing new," Josh Budray, an attorney who specializes in FOIA and First Amendment cases, tells Popular Mechanics. "Both federal and state FOIA statutes strive to eliminate such obvious gamesmanship—avoiding transparency and disclosure obligations by contracting out functions—but whether they are successful in doing so is an entirely different story."

Davis, the astrophysicist and former AAWSAP contractor, says his work on the AATIP program was entirely consistent with all of the technological intelligence programs he'd previously worked on over the last 30-plus years. "Indeed, science is applied, but right now there's not enough data on UAP to make examining it a scientific endeavor. It's an intelligence issue, not a scientific endeavor," he says.

Puthoff, meanwhile, says BAASS produced "stacks of material to the ceiling," but because of the way things were done, he was surprised to hear any of it had become public. "To be honest, I didn't think this stuff would ever see the light of day," he says.

When reached for comment, Colm Kelleher, the former Deputy Director of BAASS, said, "I am unable to discuss this topic." Multiple other requests to Bigelow Aerospace for comment went unanswered.

The entire manner in which the DIA partnership allegedly operated raises an important question: Could the reason for the Pentagon's recent denials of AATIP or AAWSAP conducting UFO research be the result of the current DoD administration being naive to the program's underlying and commercially secret hidden purpose? It seems like a plausible theory ... if it wasn't for something else Popular Mechanics uncovered.

Part V. The Admission

Last year, Steven Aftergood of the Federation of American Scientists obtained via FOIA request and published a January 2018 letter that the DIA Congressional Relations Division sent to members of Congress. In the letter, the DIA provided "a list of all products produced under the AATIP contract for the DIA to publish." The referenced list includes 38 technical papers, called Defense Intelligence Reference Documents (DIRDs), which cover a range of advanced, exotic, and theoretical aerospace topics.

Given what's been said about the commercially confidential nature of AATIP, the phrase "for the DIA to publish" may be a critical play on words. Nevertheless, a source with access to the materials provided Popular Mechanics with a copy of a previously unreleased technical paper listed as one of AATIP's products.

While the DIA refers to the paper as "Field Effects on Biological Tissue," the original title for the submitted paper appears to actually have been "Clinical Medical Acute & Subacute Field Effects on Human Dermal & Neurological

Tissues.” According to the study’s introduction, the paper is an examination of “clinical medical signs and symptoms and biophysics of injury known and expected from near-field (mostly ultra-high), NIEMR Microwave, Thermal, from unintended exposure to anomalous systems.”

You can read the entire study below.

In light of the cumbersome clinical language, just a cursory scan reveals the entire focus was on examining injuries that may have occurred after contact with UFOs or UAP. In fact, the very term “UFO” appears 16 times in the report; the word “anomalous” is used 27 times (most often with the word “aircraft,” “aviation,” or “aerospace” immediately following); and the phrase “Advanced Aerospace Systems Applications Program” is mentioned in bold on four occasions.

Popular Mechanics spoke with the study’s author, Christopher “Kit” Green, a forensic clinician and neuroscientist. Green was surprised to learn his research paper had become publicly known, because he was under the impression it was never included in the distributed set, nor was it finally peer-reviewed.

Green confirms his paper wasn’t cited correctly in the letter to Congress, however, he says the 54-page document Popular Mechanics obtained appeared to be the same paper he was requested to provide as a product of AAWSAP.

“This focused on forensically assessing accounts of injuries that could have resulted from claimed encounters with UAP,” says Green. “I didn’t work for BAASS, other than as a contractor for my paper, and I wasn’t a part of AAWSAP. However, it is my understanding this program was a UFO study that outwardly was not supposed to look like it had anything to do with UFOs.”

Green cautions some past speculations about his paper were inaccurate, including the claims it was an effort to understand or reverse-engineer UAP technology. Green also stresses that while his work focused on encounters with unknown or unidentified aerial objects, all of the injuries he assessed could be accounted for by known terrestrial means, and did not provide any evidence for extraterrestrial or non-human technologies.

Could the 38 technical reports BAASS produced for AATIP represent what it determined accounted for UAP?

“Many of the topics could be called ‘dual-use’ given that, say, papers on advanced plasma propulsion and invisibility cloaking could apply to our own advanced aerospace development as well as possibly some UAPs,” says Puthoff. But his “spacetime metric engineering paper, the warp drive and wormhole papers, and specifically the Statistical Drake Equation paper are essentially applicable only to UAPs.”

Davis, who worked with Puthoff and authored four of the DIRDs, offers a particularly intriguing detail about the DIA’s 38 reference papers.

“This wasn’t focused on whether or not [UAP] are real. It’s already been well established that UAP are real by a preponderance of evidence. Some classified and some proprietary [that] I can’t talk about,” he says.

Instead of investigating if UAP are real, the 38 technical papers for the AAWSAP contract were also an intelligence assessment to measure just how far advanced UAP could be from current and projected scientific understandings.

“Me, Hal [Puthoff], and an aerospace executive who had access to materials worked on that assessment for the DIA,” Davis says.

Ultimately, aside from the wealth of BAASS proprietary evidence, Green's study alone—which the DIA told Congress was a product of AATIP that it would “be happy to provide upon direct request”—seems to completely dispute the Pentagon's recent claims that neither AATIP or AAWSAP were related to UFOs.

In an exchange of emails between Gough, the Pentagon spokesperson, and Swedish research Roger Glassal, which were provided and published by research analyst Keith Basterfield, Gough said AAWSAP commenced in the fiscal year (FY) 2008 with a designated \$10 million dollars of funding. Since the bid solicitation wasn't issued until August 2008, we now know that Gough was mistaken, and the program actually began in FY2009, which began October 1, 2008.

In the same email exchange, Gough indicated the first 26 technical reports were completed in late 2009 and an additional \$12 million dollars was designated in the FY2010 Defense Appropriations Act for 12 additional reports. (Editor's note: In the original email, Gough indicated “late 2008.” It's assumed this was also said in error since BAASS didn't receive the AAWSAP contract until September 2008 and Green's technical paper is dated May 2009.)

From Gough:

“After an OSD/DIA review in late 2009, it was determined the reports were of limited value to DIA and there was a recommendation that upon completion of the contract the project could be transited to an agency or component better suited to oversee it.

Funding for the program at the DIA ended in 2012 and DoD elected not to continue the program after the work contracted under the FY2010 NDAA was completed.”

Indeed, every source Popular Mechanics spoke to for this story agrees the partnership between BAASS and AAWSAP had concluded by 2012.

But here's where things get messy: Gough says when DIA funding dried up in 2012, the overarching AATIP program closed up shop as well. Every source we spoke to, however, says not only did AATIP not end in 2012, but the program is still ongoing to this day.

Core to the contention of whether or not the government maintained an interest after 2012 is the man the DoD says “had no responsibilities” with AAWSAP or AATIP: former senior Pentagon intelligence executive Luis Elizondo.

Who, exactly, is Elizondo? A patriotic whistleblower putting his reputation at stake for something he says the American public must know about? Or a huckster using his former position for his own benefit, as the Pentagon seemingly implies?

Part VI. The Leader

After serving a stint as a counterintelligence agent for the U.S. Army, in the late 1990s, Elizondo would be recruited into the ranks of the enigmatic U.S. intelligence community.

Elizondo's first stop as an intelligence operations specialist was running counterinsurgency and counternarcotics

operations in Latin America. “We dealt with a lot of stuff, like coup d’états, black market terrorism, violent drug cartels, all that kind of stuff,” Elizondo says.

Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, Elizondo was then redirected toward East Asia, where he served an advisor of a small intelligence unit assigned to support General James Mattis during his command of Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Task Force 58 (TF-58) in the War on Terrorism. In a case study published by the Naval War College in 2016, Lt. Col. Damian Spooner describes the analysis and products produced by intelligence sections under Gen. Mattis as being “indispensable” in driving TF-58 planning and operations.

Later, while continuing to support the U.S.-led war on terrorism, Elizondo, the son of a Cuban exile, found himself in Cuba dealing with some of the most dangerous terrorists in the world at Guantanamo Bay’s infamous “Camp Seven,” the prison constructed for the sole purpose of housing 14 “high-value detainees.”

In early 2008, James Clapper, then the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, asked Elizondo to come to the Pentagon to help coordinate information sharing and partnership engagement being run by the Secretary of Defense’s Office. Though the promise of cutting his daily commute in half was one of the biggest selling points, Elizondo’s decision to set up shop at the Pentagon would end up putting him directly in the path of recruitment for a special program the DIA had just started running: AAWSAP.

Though the BAASS Ten Month Report includes an abundance of UAP information, nothing within the text contains any data or information provided by the U.S. government. Conversely, there are a number of requests made by BAASS for access to specific UAP information being held within the DoD and other U.S. agencies. Sources say this is key to understanding how Elizondo entered the picture.

“If they [BAASS] wanted access to info that I’m not saying does exist, but it might have been highly classified, you need someone who had the tickets to make sure the contractors weren’t actually looking at Special Access Program (SAP) stuff thinking it was UFOs,” says an intelligence official who is not authorized to speak on the record.

“Plus,” the official tells Popular Mechanics, “I’m not saying it was, but they might have been looking into something that was of significant interest to foreign advisories and a high-value target for espionage. Bottom line, you needed a counterintel guy.”

Elizondo tells Popular Mechanics that he never wanted to be a part of AATIP. However, as a senior official at OUSDI with a background in counterintelligence, he found himself being recruited into the ongoing UFO effort.

“In 2008,” Elizondo says, “two guys came by my office and said, ‘Are you Lue Elizondo?’ The first thing I thought was, ‘Oh no, what did I do?’ They told me, ‘You came highly recommended as a former senior CI guy with some background in advanced avionics.’ Which is true—I worked some on the Open Skies Treaty. I worked with Raytheon, Boeing, and some other stuff. That was my portfolio.”

Elizondo was told AATIP needed a counterintelligence support and security guy for a very special program. Within a month, after a series of meetings, Elizondo finally met with the then-director of AATIP, who asked him what seemed like a strange question at the time:

“What do you think about UFOs?”

Elizondo was flummoxed. “I was like, ‘What the hell?’ I thought it was a test or something. So I told the truth: I don’t. I don’t think about UFOs. I don’t know if they’re real or not. I don’t think about them. I’m too busy trying to catch terrorists and bad guys.”

Elizondo’s ambivalence was evidently exactly what those running the program wanted to hear. Soon enough, Elizondo joined AATIP. “Seriously, for awhile, I still didn’t know if it was a test,” he says. “It wasn’t until I started examining the security posture of the portfolio that I suddenly realized these things are really unidentified.”

Not long after Elizondo was on board, in June 2009, Sen. Harry Reid submitted a letter to then-Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn III requesting AATIP be granted restricted SAP status. Though ultimately denied, had Reid’s request been granted, it would have further tightened security and secrecy around AATIP.

Last year, KLAS Las Vegas reporter George Knapp published Reid’s letter showing Elizondo’s name on the list of “preliminary government personnel” who would have had access to AATIP. In addition to Elizondo, Reid, and the late Senator Daniel Inouye, seven other names of government employees (which have not been released) would have had access to the proposed AATIP SAP. Notably, only three “contractor personnel” made the cut.

According to a source with knowledge of the letter, the three contractor personnel Reid wanted to grant preliminary access to were Bigelow, Kelleher, and Puthoff. Puthoff confirms with Popular Mechanics that he was one of the three approved contractors on the list. The Pentagon later confirmed the letter published by Knapp was authentic.

Sources say the limited number of contractors listed with access is yet another breadcrumb left on the trail of secrecy showing AATIP was indeed slightly different from the AAWSAP contract.

According to multiple sources, including individuals working within the Pentagon—and confirmed by Elizondo—in 2010, when the DIA cut off funding for AATIP’s contract, a DIA program manager asked Elizondo if he would keep the UFO project running. “I wasn’t a DIA employee,” Elizondo says, “so I’d have to run it wearing my OSD hat at the Pentagon. We all agreed this was the best thing to do, so that’s what we did.”

By all accounts, Elizondo was now “bootstrapping” AATIP from the OUSDI, meaning he added the program to the list of his existing intelligence portfolios.

Popular Mechanics has learned the post-BAASS era of AATIP was an even more closely guarded program and consistent with how highly classified intelligence projects are conducted.

“Ninety percent of people don’t understand how the general government runs, and even less understand the intelligence community,” a former senior Special Operations and Intelligence Officer tells Popular Mechanics. “Because this program would have now been out of the Front Office, your guy [Elizondo] would have had the ability to muster up people from various areas of the Intelligence Community. You would have wanted to include the least possible, but best people for the specific mission. You could have had people from the DIA, ONI [Office of Naval Intelligence], and OSI [Office of Special Investigations] all working separately, but together on the same mission.”

Elizondo says when he took over the AATIP, he ran it like a traditional government effort. “We greatly reduced the

number of contractors to just what we might have needed, but this was going to be government to government, looking on government systems at government data,” he says.

According to Elizondo, unlike most of the BAASS personnel, the post-2012 AATIP crew did have access to highly classified government information to adequately assess the situation. While the Pentagon denies that AATIP continued after 2012, Elizondo says the post-BAASS AATIP was not unsanctioned, and not just a group of government UFO enthusiasts. “Very, very few people in the building knew what we were doing, but the Front Office (Office of the Secretary of Defense) was in the loop,” he says.

Popular Mechanics has learned the ONI was one of the major backers that wanted to see AATIP continued, which sources say is why the Navy has been so willing to take the most public lead on the UAP issue today.

Elizondo’s critics have repeatedly asked an important question: If AATIP was such a secret program, why is Elizondo now talking about it publicly?

By denying AATIP SAP status back in 2009 and not ever officially blanketing it under a security classification, Popular Mechanics has learned that the government effectively allowed for the program itself to now be discussed.

“There’s a lot they can’t talk about, like sources, methods, etc., but the program itself is unclassified and fair game for public disclosure,” a source with knowledge of the program tells Popular Mechanics. Elizondo confirms this is correct. “I’ve never once violated, nor am I willing to violate my security oaths, so anything I’ve discussed is indeed unclassified,” he says.

In one of Elizondo’s employee performance evaluations, which Popular Mechanics obtained, it lists his primary “mission goals” as managing and administering information, access controls, and security of national-level SAPs for the Secretary of Defense. Elizondo confirms his position allowed him access to the most highly secretive and reclusive programs being run by the U.S. “The stuff we were seeing was truly unidentified. It wasn’t related to anything we were doing,” he says.

In October 2017, Elizondo resigned from the DoD to join former Blink-182 frontman Tom DeLonge’s UFO research group To the Stars Academy of Arts & Science, which would soon release the Navy’s “Flir1” video to the world and properly kick off a ufological renaissance. Elizondo now works as the company’s Director of Global Security and Special Programs.

Why did Elizondo leave his government job? Because he realized the Pentagon’s top brass would never treat UAP with the importance they deserved. A senior Pentagon official tells Popular Mechanics they were aware that Elizondo briefed a White House intelligence aide and two senior aides to Mattis, then the Secretary of Defense, in the spring of 2017.

The official, who is not authorized to speak on the record, says the White House aide was uncomfortable with the prospect of UFOs being real. To their knowledge, the White House aide did not pass the information along. The aides to Mattis, meanwhile, acknowledged UFOs were a real issue, but they were concerned with the political optics should it ever come out that the Secretary of Defense had been briefed about them. Elizondo confirms the accuracy of these accounts. “I resigned only after multiple attempts to brief the Secretary [of Defense] failed,” he previously told Popular Mechanics.

Finally, while the Pentagon has denied AATIP's existence after 2012 and that Elizondo was never involved in looking into UFOs, Popular Mechanics has obtained documentation that seems to unambiguously show AATIP was active after the closing of the BAASS AAWSAP contract, Elizondo was running this extension of AATIP, and the efforts to examine UFOs are still currently underway.

Though the documents were unclassified, they contained sensitive information, and the person sharing them did so only under the guarantee that Popular Mechanics would not make them publicly available. The person said they only were willing to share the materials to support Elizondo's claims, which they say have been unfairly challenged over the last two years. The individual, who is not a government employee, did approve the release of a small section from one of the documents showing the changing of responsibilities before Elizondo left the DoD.

Part VII. The Unknown

In June 2019, the Office of Sen. Mark Warner (D-Va.), vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee's office, confirmed that closed door meetings on UAP have occurred. More recently, last December, when asked by Conway Daily Sun reporter Daymond Steer about the Navy UAP encounters, recent presidential candidate and current member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Sen. Michael Bennet, was cautious in saying he wouldn't share anything he'd learned on the Intelligence Committee. However, Bennet said, "Our guys are seeing stuff that's unidentified. They don't know what it is, I don't know what it is ... We're trying to learn more about it. The Air Force is trying to learn more about it."

Popular Mechanics has since learned in October 2019, staffers with the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Armed Service Committee were briefed on current UAP issues. According to people with knowledge of these briefings, some former BAASS contractors and current AATIP leadership were in attendance.

Insiders also say this past year, during a closed-door meeting with the Senate Intelligence Committee, Brigadier General Richard Stapp, Director of the DoD Special Access Program Central Office, testified the mysterious objects being encountered by the military were not related to secret U.S. technology. The Pentagon did not respond to requests by Popular Mechanics to confirm Stapp's testimony before the Intelligence Committee.

In only the second time publicly discussing the event, Popular Mechanics spoke with the Navy fighter pilot who was Cdr. David Fravor's wingman during the now-famous 2004 Nimitz UFO encounter. Agreeing to talk only under the condition of anonymity, the fighter pilot confirmed they testified in front of congressional leadership about their encounter. "I've been requested repeatedly to go to the Pentagon and asked, 'Is this what you saw?'."

During a series of email exchanges, Popular Mechanics provided specific information to Gough, the Pentagon spokesperson, in an effort to see if this might influence the DoD's current position. Initially, Gough said she would examine the information and see if she could provide a statement in response. However, Gough has not responded to repeated follow-up requests from Popular Mechanics.

On its own, the evidence showing the Pentagon is interested in UFOs is unlikely to change the minds of many who are skeptical of the idea that mysterious, apparently intelligent, and possibly otherworldly objects might be buzzing around the skies above Earth.

“The whole contracting process for this program was irregular from start to finish,” Steven Aftergood, Director for the Federation of American Scientists Project on Government Secrecy, tells Popular Mechanics. “[The AAWSAP contract] sounds like it was a good deal for the contractor. But it would be hard to argue that either the military or the public got their money’s worth.”

Meanwhile, William Culbreth, an engineering professor at the University of Nevada Las Vegas who authored two of the 38 technical papers provided in the AAWSAP contract, offers a different opinion. He says he was unaware of the UFO background of AAWSAP, but very familiar with BAASS’s UFO interest.

“I had some graduate students who worked for BAASS during that time and I know Bigelow has an interest in the topic, but no one mentioned anything about UFOs when they asked me to write the papers,” Culbreth says.

Regardless of where the underlying motivation may have come from, Culbreth says his work on the two papers —“Detection and High Resolution Tracking of Vehicles at Hypersonic Velocities” and “Aneutronic Fusion Propulsion II”—led to his examination of new approaches to nuclear propulsion technology, which might not have been inspired otherwise.

“We’re looking into these propulsion technologies today, and this area alone led to several of my students pursuing PhDs who I don’t think otherwise would have,” Culbreth says.

With the wealth of data collected by BAASS, and almost assuredly more information being gathered by AATIP, it raises the question: **Is the UAP issue being closely guarded because we don’t believe it’s real, or because we’re afraid we can’t understand it?**

Mick West, the author of Escaping the Rabbit Hole: How to Debunk Conspiracy Theories Using Facts, Logic, and Respect, suggests the public availability and confirmation of rigorous empirical studies by AATIP could change the entire UFO dynamic. “It would be fantastic if there was some good evidence of something new to science. So far there isn’t,” he tells Popular Mechanics.

While he faces considerable angst for trying to debunk UFOs, West says he’d be as thrilled as anyone else if he was able to actually come across something that was truly unexplainable and unknown. “There’s no hard feelings,” he says. “I understand people are passionate—especially experiencers.”

So was this a matter of the government discovering something it didn’t understand, and therefore opting to avoid it altogether? Nick Cook, the former aviation editor of Jane’s Defense Weekly and author of The Grid, tells Popular Mechanics this idea reminds him of a conversation he had with Ben Rich, the former director of Lockheed Skunkworks and the “father of stealth.”

Cook says Rich told him when the ability for stealth aircraft was discovered, but not yet understood, there was considerable debate on what to do next. “Do you put a bunch of money into developing something and end up not being successful because you don’t understand it, or do you table the entire idea until you have more science, which runs the risk of someone else figuring it out first?”

With stealth technology, the U.S. military ultimately made the decision to move forward, which led to the development of the world’s first stealth aircraft, the F-117 Nighthawk. “I guess it would depend on how wide a

knowledge gap you thought there was and how high was the risk for success,” Cook says. “Could I see how something could come up, and the decision would be made to tuck something away like the final scene of Raiders of the Lost Ark? Yes, I could see how it could be possible.”

“Throughout history, many inventions have preceded an understanding of the science that makes them work,” Matthew Hersch, a history of science and technology professor at Harvard University, tells Popular Mechanics. “Engineers often ‘do science’ in the course of their work, just as scientists ‘invent.’ It’s inevitable that we as a species will continue inventing things without a real understanding of how they work, at least until our science catches up.”

Being unable to explain something with current science, Hersch says, is merely an invitation to do more science—not a rejection of the scientific worldview as a whole. “Suppressing good, non-fraudulent science because it challenges our beliefs is extremely dangerous,” he says. “Nobody has a right to do that, and it is contrary to the interests of humanity—that’s what science is for. Fortunately, there is no vast scientific conspiracy to suppress divergent ideas. More often, good science is suppressed by non-scientists for political reasons.”

Any discovery of extraterrestrial science or technology, then, is no reason to flush our political norms down the toilet, says Hersch.

“Human beings have believed in the existence of extraterrestrial life for millennia,” he says. “I suspect that any revelation that [UFOs] exist would be met with something close to a shrug.”

[Article](#)

(b) (5)

From: (b) (6)
To: (b) (6)
Cc: [OPNAV ALL N2N6 Front Office](#); [Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#); [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#)
Subject: RE: Division Directors Sync (DivDirs) Changes
Date: Wednesday, June 24, 2020 3:55:19 PM

Not sure who relayed that... but, not true. They maybe were thinking about the room size/social distanced capacity? We were at max capacity on Tuesday. The plan is to have folks up in VADM Trussler's office on JWICS VTC. And we could add a JWICS VTC in your area too?

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Wednesday, June 24, 2020 3:53 PM
To: (b) (6)
Cc: OPNAV ALL N2N6 Front Office (b) (6); Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6); Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)
Subject: RE: Division Directors Sync (DivDirs) Changes

Interesting... someone apparently relayed to Mr Bray's EA that it was principal's only on Tuesdays. Will plan to attend, and working dashboard input. Do want that for tomorrow?

Thanks!

Vr/ (b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Wednesday, June 24, 2020 3:50 PM
To: Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6); Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)
Cc: OPNAV ALL N2N6 Front Office (b) (6)
Subject: RE: Division Directors Sync (DivDirs) Changes

Haha. Double checked. You are both on both invites (Outlook on Tuesday, Teams on Thursday). See screen shots attached... Sorry if you thought you were eliminated. Not the case.

Look forward to your input! ☺

(b) (6)

From: Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
Sent: Wednesday, June 24, 2020 3:41 PM
To: (b) (6) Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)

Cc: OPNAV ALL N2N6 Front Office (b) (6)
Subject: RE: Division Directors Sync (DivDirs) Changes

(b) (6),
(b) (6) and I have been jettisoned from the DIVDIRs attendance. I will provide input to your dashboard if you can add us back to the meeting.
Thanks,
Sandy

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Wednesday, June 24, 2020 3:06 PM
To: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6 (b) (6); Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Cc: OPNAV ALL N2N6 Front Office (b) (6)
Subject: RE: Division Directors Sync (DivDirs) Changes

Hi Scott, Sandy and (b) (6),

Just a follow up on the weekly dashboard conversation. Not sure if you've had a chance to think through the top 5 items you'll report on each week per the email at the end of last week and the discussion at DIVDIRS yesterday, but wanted to provide some additional context for your consideration.

I have attached the draft template here. For each initiative, a green/yellow/red selection, a one sentence update, the next milestone, and the next milestone date will be required each Thursday COB for review at DIVDIRS the following Tuesday. The weekly will be built and distributed on SIPR.

ADCNO would like the initiatives to be linked to the IW Platform Execution Plan and has suggested the following for your consideration – but isn't wed to these:

I:
PED Study
UAM
UAP
MDA/S2A
One more here ☺

Let me know if you have any feedback for me. The first round of data is due next week, 2 JULY. I will also be on vacation next week. Happy to come up and talk through any of your feedback.

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, June 23, 2020 9:44 AM

To: Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO (USA) (b) (6); Miller, Christopher A SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6); Parode, Steven L RADM USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6); Creighton, Kathleen M RADM USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6); Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6); Okon, John A RDML USN COMNAVMETOCOM SSC (USA) (b) (6); (b) (6); St Pierre, Scott M SES USN COMNAVSEASYS COM DC (USA) (b) (6); Ekstrom, Christopher R SES USN DCNO N2N6 (US) (b) (6); (b) (6); (b) (6); (b) (6); (b) (6); Barron, Claude E SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6); Sadler, Stephen R SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6); Flynn, William A SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6); Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6);
Cc: OPNAV ALL N2N6 Front Office (b) (6); (b) (6);
Subject: RE: Division Directors Sync (DivDirs) Changes

Good morning all,

For those that will be virtual for DIVDIRS at 10am, please find attached framework for a weekly update, per the email below. Look forward to your feedback. I will have hard copies with me for those meeting on the 1st floor.

Thanks!

(b) (6)

From: Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO (USA) (b) (6)
Sent: Sunday, June 21, 2020 1:24 PM
To: (b) (6); Miller, Christopher A SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6); Parode, Steven L RADM USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6); Creighton, Kathleen M RADM USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6); Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6); Okon, John A RDML USN COMNAVMETOCOM SSC (USA) (b) (6); (b) (6); St Pierre, Scott M SES USN COMNAVSEASYS COM DC (USA) (b) (6); Brown, Brian B VADM USN NAVIFOR SUFFOLK VA (USA) (b) (6); (b) (6); Ekstrom, Christopher R SES USN DCNO N2N6 (US) (b) (6); (b) (6); (b) (6); (b) (6); Barron, Claude E SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6); Sadler, Stephen R SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6); Flynn, William A SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6);
Cc: OPNAV ALL N2N6 Front Office (b) (6); (b) (6);

(b) (6)

Subject: RE: Division Directors Sync (DivDirs) Changes

Team, this is also a good time after a little more than two weeks to get any questions out that you may have for me. Nothing's off the table, I like discussion more than transmission.

Vr, JT

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Thursday, June 18, 2020 11:56 AM

To: Miller, Christopher A SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6); Parode, Steven L RADM USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6); Creighton, Kathleen M RADM USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6); Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6); Okon, John A RDML USN COMNAVMETOCOM SSC (USA) (b) (6); St Pierre, Scott M SES USN COMNAVSEASYS COM DC (USA) (b) (6); Brown, Brian B VADM USN NAVFOR SUFFOLK VA (USA) (b) (6); Ekstrom, Christopher R SES USN DCNO N2N6 (US) (b) (6); Barron, Claude E SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6); Sadler, Stephen R SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6); Flynn, William A SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6); Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO (USA) (b) (6)

Subject: RE: Division Directors Sync (DivDirs) Changes

Hi everyone!

Per the email below, following up with you all on the product under development for the Tuesday version of DIVDIRS. I have worked the overall framework for the artifact which we will review at the meeting on Tuesday morning. It is a combination of the two points below – much like the monthly IWE Dashboard – front focused on program report outs, back on date-driven milestones and taskers. What I will need from each of you after our meeting on Tuesday is the top 3-5 initiatives in each of your directorates. These initiatives will be reported out each week and reviewed at the Tuesday DIVDIRS. The weekly report, due on Friday afternoon, will include a general red/yellow/green selection, a one sentence status update, and the title and date of the next milestone. This will be built and distributed on SIPR.

Please let me know if you have any questions. Look forward to your feedback on Tuesday morning and thereafter, and receiving your first update on 7/2.

(b) (6)

From: Miller, Christopher A SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)
Sent: Wednesday, June 17, 2020 5:47 PM
To: Parade, Steven L RADM USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6); Creighton, Kathleen M RADM USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6); Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6); Okon, John A RDML USN COMNAVMETOC SSC (USA) (b) (6); St Pierre, Scott M SES USN COMNAVSEASYS COM DC (USA) (b) (6); Brown, Brian B VADM USN NAVIFOR SUFFOLK VA (USA) (b) (6); Ekstrom, Christopher R SES USN DCNO N2N6 (US) (b) (6); Barron, Claude E SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6); Sadler, Stephen R SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6); Flynn, William A SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)
Cc: OPNAV ALL N2N6 Front Office (b) (6); Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO (USA) (b) (6)
Subject: Division Directors Sync (DivDirs) Changes

Leaders,

As I mentioned at yesterday's DivDirs meeting, we are shifting our Tuesday meeting to a classified session. (b) (6) is updating the meeting invitation to reflect this change which will include a JWICS bridge so that we can include folks from NSF Arlington and CNMOC. Please send your JWICS VTC Site Name and VTC POC to Wes. Folks are welcome to gather in 1E263 in addition. Since the discussion will be classified, there will NOT be an unclassified or TEAMS dial in. Please plan accordingly.

For the Tuesday session, we are also going to start reviewing a couple things:

- Upcoming schedule to include POM/PPBE, IWE engagements and other major events from our Executive Preparation Team (EPT). The goal is to have a single slide for all leaders to review and orient around.
- Status of major initiatives. Our goal is to QUICKLY review the top 3-5 initiatives for each division. The idea is have a single sentence on the status, state if it is on/off plan and highlight the next major milestone. This weekly one-pager will work in tandem with the monthly IWE dashboard. I've asked (b) (6) to reach out and pull this together with the Division Directors. It will be up to you to establish the list of top 3-5 initiatives and provide updates weekly. Our goal is to focus on the major areas like NTG, Office 365, PNT CTF, GEOINT PED, etc.

The two items above will frame our Tuesday discussion. Thursday's meeting will continue in the existing format and will allow for organic updates and conversation.

For this coming Tuesday, we also plan to walk through the Information Warfare In Great Power Competition Information Map that we've been building for upcoming senior engagements.

If you have any questions let us know.

v/r

Chris

From: [Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#)
To: (b) (6); [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#)
Cc: (b) (6); [OPNAV N2N6I Front Office; Stratton, John F \(Jay\) SES](#)
[USN ONI, WASHINGTON DC \(USA\); \(b\) \(6\)](#)
Subject: RE: FOIA request - Office of Naval Intelligence -- (b) (6) (Scientific Coalition for UAP Studies)
Date: Thursday, April 30, 2020 6:46:09 AM

Thanks (b) (6).

It's amazing the gov't gets any work done in between filling these types of requests.

Sandy

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Thursday, April 30, 2020 6:43 AM
To: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6); Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6) OPNAV N2N6I Front Office (b) (6); Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: FOIA request - Office of Naval Intelligence -- (b) (6) (Scientific Coalition for UAP Studies)

Scott/Sandy,

FYI... ONI got the first FOIA related to the release of the 3 videos already (attached) yesterday (Wednesday).

I looped (b) (6) in late yesterday.

I am going to discuss with DOD PA later today.

I intend to mention to DCNO at stand-up this morning... but wanted to clue you in first.

We'll keep yo9u posted on how this shakes out.

Regards,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Wednesday, April 29, 2020 4:00 PM

To: Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: FW: [Non-DoD Source] FOIA request (time-sensitive) - Office of Naval Intelligence -- (b) (6)
(Scientific Coalition for UAP Studies)

Jay (b) (6),

Thought you should see this FOIA to ONI...

This needs to be looked at to see how it intersects with the recently signed SCG.

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Wednesday, April 29, 2020 3:30 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: FW: [Non-DoD Source] FOIA request (time-sensitive) - Office of Naval Intelligence -- (b) (6)
(Scientific Coalition for UAP Studies)

(b) (6),

FYSA. Please see (b) (6) question.

V/r

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Wednesday, April 29, 2020 2:20 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: Fw: [Non-DoD Source] FOIA request (time-sensitive) - Office of Naval Intelligence -- (b) (6)
(Scientific Coalition for UAP Studies)

Hi (b) (6),

I hope all is well. I recently received a UAP FOIA request from (b) (6). As instructed, I am forwarding this request to you who will then forward to (b) (6). I do have a question, but I'll probably ask (b) (6) as well. Do we have a Template in place to forward to the requester as to what we are doing? I only ask because we are required to respond to a FOIA request within twenty working days. we do not have to deliver the records within 20-days but we have to provide some type of response (acknowledgment).

Thank you.

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Wednesday, April 29, 2020 1:28 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: [Non-DoD Source] FOIA request (time-sensitive) - Office of Naval Intelligence -- (b) (6)
(Scientific Coalition for UAP Studies)

To the FOIA Officer:

The attached PDF file contains a letter incorporating a time-sensitive FOIA request. The same PDF document holds documentation of my affiliation with the *Scientific Coalition for UAP Studies*, which has been recognized as a "noncommercial scientific institute" by various components of the Department of Defense.

Thank you for your kind attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
To: (b) (6)
Cc: Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA); (b) (6) [Bray, Scott W SES](#)
[OPNAV N2N6, N2N61](#)
Subject: RE: Per our Conversation -- RFI on UFO Story
Date: Wednesday, July 1, 2020 7:13:00 AM

(b) (6) – Roger all. We have a brief so stand ready to schedule/provide when directed.

Vr, (b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Wednesday, July 1, 2020 6:53 AM
To: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N61 (b) (6)
Cc: Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: FW: Per our Conversation -- RFI on UFO Story

Sir,

BLUF: DepSecDef wants the Navy to give him a brief on UAP.

I'll discuss with DCNO during our morning standup to learn his thoughts on how we proceed. While I think CNO (and to lesser degree VCNO) are up to speed, I have been watching the DepSecDef interest in ASW; In this instance there were pre-briefs to CNO, VCNO and SecNav. I also witnessed the Vice Chairman's staff requesting a prebrief on ASW before it went to DepSecDef.

Very Respectfully,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, June 30, 2020 4:04 PM
To: (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: RE: Per our Conversation -- RFI on UFO Story

Team – N2N6-in-Black are our UAP heroes.

(b) (6) – Recommend turning this one over to (b) (6). Over to them regarding if a prebrief to CNO or VCNO is recommended first (i.e. are CNO/VCNO aware of the latest and Navy's conclusions)... or if they just provide a recap.

VR/ (b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Tuesday, June 30, 2020 3:45 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: FW: Per our Conversation -- RFI on UFO Story

Gentlemen,

Good afternoon.

Back in Jan Navy provided the attached (and bullets below) in response to DepSECDEF on a RFI about "UFO."

Today we were asked to provide follow-on information.

Can you work with (b) (6) to identify the requested details and work out a briefing?

Thank you

 $r/$

(b) (6)

Administration	Percentage of respondents
Current administration	100%
Previous administration	0%

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Tuesday, June 30, 2020 2:44 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: Lyons, David Brig Gen SD (b) (6)

Subject: RE: Per our Conversation -- RFI on UFO Story

(b) (6),

On the subject below, I know I said I would get back to you if DSD wanted a more detailed brief on this...well, DSD would like a more detailed brief on this, to include a better understanding of the Navy's conclusions.

Can we make that happen?

I am also short – Thursday is my last day!

My replacement is (b) (6), cc'd above.

Thanks much!

V/R (b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Friday, January 17, 2020 8:23 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: Lyons, David Brig Gen SD (b) (6)

Subject: RE: Per our Conversation -- RFI on UFO Story

(b) (6),

Thank you again for this info – very helpful to get the “Public Facing” part of this.

I do think DSD may want to better understand the Navy's analysis on the UAPs, and perhaps watch some of the video.

We can touch base next week, but I wanted to give you a head's up. If you have something already built, like a briefing or something, that may actually be enough.

More to follow!

Enjoy the long weekend.

V/R (b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Friday, January 17, 2020 11:42 AM

To: (b) (6)

Subject: RE: Per our Conversation -- RFI on UFO Story

Ma'am,

Please see the below comments and the attached file pertaining to this article / topic.

Information provided via the office of the Director, Navy Staff (attachment developed by ONI).

Please let us know if you require any additional information.

r/

(b) (6)

- **What has the Navy said publicly about this incident (Nimitz 2004)?**

The Department of Defense, specifically the U.S. Navy, has the video referred to in the FOIA Request. As the Navy and my office have stated previously, the investigation of UAP sightings is ongoing, and we will not publicly discuss individual sighting reports/observations. However, I can tell you that the date of the 2004 USS Nimitz video is Nov. 14, 2004 and the length of the video that's been circulating since 2017 is the same as the length of the source video. We do not expect to release this video."

- **Is there indeed classified footage as mentioned in the article?**

The video was initially classified SECRET by NAVAIR when provided to ONI for analysis, but has subsequently been reviewed and marked as unclassified. NAVAIR, via the FOIA review process, has determined that, while not classified, the video contains information that make it un-releasable to the media or general public.

- **What are 1-2 talking points DSD could use if asked about this? i.e. "yes, there is classified footage because..." "The Navy has said..."**

We will not publicly discuss individual sighting reports/observations. Any incursion into our training ranges by any aircraft, identified or not identified, is problematic from both a safety and security concern. There have been a number of reports of unauthorized and/or unidentified aircraft entering various military-controlled training ranges and designated air space in recent years. The U.S. Navy, the U.S. Air Force, and the Department of Defense (DoD) take these reports very seriously and investigate each and every report. Safety of our aircrews is paramount. Unauthorized and unidentified aircraft pose a risk to flight safety. Additionally, it is vital we maintain security on our operations. Our aviators train as they fight. Any intrusions that may compromise the security of our operations, tactics, or procedures is of great concern.

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Thursday, January 16, 2020 11:52 AM
To: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: Per our Conversation -- RFI on UFO Story

Thanks!

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Thursday, January 16, 2020 11:43 AM
To: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: Per our Conversation -- RFI on UFO Story

Ma'am,
Received. Will look into and response soonest.

Vr/
(b) (6)

(b) (6)
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(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Thursday, January 16, 2020 11:40 AM
To: (b) (6)
Subject: Per our Conversation -- RFI on UFO Story

(b) (6),

Per our conversation... A reply back to me will work, if that is easiest.

Questions:

- What has the Navy said publicly about this incident?
- Is there indeed classified footage as mentioned in the article?
- What are 1-2 talking points DSD could use if asked about this? i.e. "yes, there is classified footage because..." "The Navy has said..."

Thank you!!

V/R (b) (6)

https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/wxe54z/the-navy-has-secret-classified-video-of-an-infamous-ufo-incident

From: (b) (6)
To: [Brown, Sandra SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#); (b) (6) [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6](#); (b) (6)
Cc: [Stratton, John F \(Jay\) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#); (b) (6)
Subject: RE: Release of Navy videos
Date: Wednesday, March 25, 2020 8:00:53 AM

Sorry...spell check or fat fingers must have jumped in... 3 videos, not venues.

From: Brown, Sandra SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
Sent: Wednesday, March 25, 2020 7:58 AM
To: (b) (6)
(b) (6); Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6 (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
Cc: Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: RE: Release of Navy videos

What are the 3 venues? Are these the actual videos?

Sandy

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Wednesday, March 25, 2020 7:52 AM
To: (b) (6) Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6 (b) (6) Brown, Sandra SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Cc: Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: FW: Release of Navy videos

All,

Here is an exchange between the NAVAIR FOIA point person (b) (6) and the DOD FOIA POC... (b) (6)

(b) (5)
(b) (5)
(b) (5)
(b) (5)
(b) (5)

Standing by to discuss...

Regards,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Tuesday, March 24, 2020 8:27 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6) Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI
WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6); Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)
(b) (6); Julka, Christopher A CIV (USA) <christopher.a.julka.civ@mail.mil>; (b) (6)

Subject: RE: Release of Navy videos

(b) (6)

Thank you for the attachment and the note.

(b) (5)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Tuesday, March 24, 2020 9:46 AM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6) Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI
WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6); Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)
(b) (6); Julka, Christopher A CIV (USA) <christopher.a.julka.civ@mail.mil>

Subject: RE: Release of Navy videos

(b) (6)

Thank you for your suggestions. (b) (5)

(b) (5)

[REDACTED]

Best regards,

(b) (6)

[REDACTED]

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Monday, March 23, 2020 8:11 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

(b) (6) Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA)

(b) (6); Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)

(b) (6); Julka, Christopher A CIV (USA) <christopher.a.julka.civ@mail.mil>

Subject: RE: Release of Navy videos

You're welcome!

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Monday, March 23, 2020 8:07 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

(b) (6) Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA)

(b) (6); Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)

(b) (6); Julka, Christopher A CIV (USA) <christopher.a.julka.civ@mail.mil>

Subject: RE: Release of Navy videos

Thank you very much, (b) (6), we'll look into those.

Regards,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Monday, March 23, 2020 8:05 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

(b) (6) Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA)

(b) (6); Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)

(b) (6); Julka, Christopher A CIV (USA) <christopher.a.julka.civ@mail.mil>

Subject: RE: Release of Navy videos

(b) (6),

Sounds good, if there are investigatory aspects, then that opens up other exemptions. It's also possible that you might have an application of 10 USC 130(a).

(b) (6)

(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Monday, March 23, 2020 7:56 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

(b) (6) Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA)

(b) (6); Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)

(b) (6); Julka, Christopher A CIV (USA) <christopher.a.julka.civ@mail.mil>

Subject: RE: Release of Navy videos

(b) (6),

Thank you for your response. Your comment about DOPSR is correct. The Navy never cleared these for unrestricted release, and that is the issue – they still don't. (b) (5)

(b) (6) I'll circle back with Navy and OUSD(I); there may be other avenues under this or another statute that are appropriate.

Regards,

(b) (6)

Defense Public Affairs Operations, OSD(PA)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Monday, March 23, 2020 7:43 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

(b) (6) Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA)

(b) (6); Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)

(b) (6); Julka, Christopher A CIV (USA) <christopher.a.julka.civ@mail.mil>

Subject: RE: Release of Navy videos

(b) (6)

(b) (6), (b) (5)

If the material is not this same case of UAP and the material does contain information related to intelligence, then it should be properly classified and withheld under (b)(1). Please let me know if you have additional questions.

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Monday, March 23, 2020 1:33 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

(b) (6); Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA)

(b) (6); Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)

(b) (6); Julka,

Christopher A CIV (USA) <christopher.a.julka.civ@mail.mil>

Subject: RE: Release of Navy videos

Greetings again:

So, If Navy received a request for videos and was trying to protect them under 130E, it's not our office that would deny the protection under 130E. We are the OSD/JS FOIA Office, responsible for processing FOIA requests for the offices that fall under the OSD and the JS.

The DoD FOIA Policy Office, that falls under the OCMO, makes decisions on the use of 130E to protect records. I am cc'ing (b) (6), in that office. Also, I just spoke with (b) (6), who says that Chris Julka – in the Navy FOIA Policy Office coordinated the review with the DoD FOIA Policy Office. Between the two of them, someone should be able to get you answers on where we are with this issue. Without a case number I am unable to determine whether this was referred to us to coordinate with OUSD(I).

I hope this helps.

V/r,

(b) (6)

Comments: <https://ice.disa.mil/index.cfm?fa=card&sp=125562>

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Monday, March 23, 2020 1:16 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

(b) (6); Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA)

(b) (6); Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)

(b) (6)

Subject: Re: Release of Navy videos

(b) (6), do you have the number NAVAIR used when they submitted?

Sent from my iPhone

From: (b) (6)

Date: Monday, March 23, 2020 at 1:12:48 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

(b) (6); "Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA)"

(b) (6); "Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)"

(b) (6)

Subject: RE: Release of Navy videos

Hi there (b) (6):

Do you have a case number?

(b) (6)

Comments: <https://ice.disa.mil/index.cfm?fa=card&sp=125562>

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, March 23, 2020 1:11 PM
To: (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)

(b) (6) Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA)
(b) (6) : Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)
(b) (6)
Subject: Release of Navy videos

(b) (6),

Recently the FOIA office received a request from NAVAIR regarding a request under FOIA for the release of three videos taken by Navy aviators. Previously, Navy had been able to deny release of these videos under 10 U.S.C. 130e., as containing flight data. However, someone in DoD told them it was denied this time.

We (I've cc'd the interested parties from Navy and OUSD(I)) would like to discuss the denial with you, as these videos are part of ongoing intelligence matters and investigations. I've been unable to determine the actual action officer in the OSD & JS FOIA office who worked this, so I'm reaching out to you. Who issued the denial? Was it coordinated with OUSD(I) first?

Regards,

(b) (6)

Defense Public Affairs Operations, OSD(PA)

From: [Aeschbach, Kelly A RADM USN ONI WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#)
To: (b) (6); [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#); (b) (6)
Cc: [Brown, Sandra SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#); [Richardson, Andrew G SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#); (b) (6); [Stratton, John F \(Jay\) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#); (b) (6)
Subject: RE: SSCI Brief from Jay Stratton
Date: Monday, February 17, 2020 10:10:27 AM

(b) (6)

Thanks.

(b) (6)

Scott,

I would like to strategize with you on who should attend these briefings. I want to get Jay and the Navy out of the driver's seat. I will look for a time this week around my travel. V/r, Kelly

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: Kasperski, Joseph M CDR USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)
Date: Monday, Feb 17, 2020, 09:34
To: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6); Aeschbach, Kelly A RADM USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
Cc: Brown, Sandra SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6); Richardson, Andrew G SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6); Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
Subject: RE: SSCI Brief from Jay Stratton

Sir, Admiral,

There are a few other Congressional engagements scheduled over the last few days besides the SSCI Member briefing. These were coordinated at the CoS and below level, but I want to ensure you are aware and not surprised.

25 Feb ONI and OUSD(I&S) will tentatively provide a UAP brief to SSCI Members.

25 Feb Rep Waltz (R-FL) PNT Threat and Program Brief from N2N6 and ONI (LA-52). Rep Waltz is a

HASC member. This brief will occur in the Pentagon and N2N6E and ONI will both support.

27 Feb Rep Timmons (R-SC) UAP brief from Navy and OUSD(I&S). Rep Timmons is not on the HASC, HPSCI or HAC-D, but is generally interested. He is a USAF reservist, F-16 pilot.

11 Mar ONI and OUSD(I&S) will provide a brief to the HASC Future Defense Task Force on the UAP topic. Rep. Moulton (D-MA) leads the Task Force, with Rep. Davis (D-CA), Rep. Houlahan (D-PA), Rep. Slotkin (D-MI), Rep. DesJarlais (R-TN), Rep. Mitchell (R-MI), and Rep. Waltz (R-FL). Rep Moulton previously received the brief late last year with HASC Seapower PSMs.

Of note, HAC-D Staffers are also interested in a UAP update, and we will likely schedule that for 27 Feb to minimize the trips to the Hill for Jay Stratton and the team.

Thanks for your time and standing by for any questions.

(b) (6)

[REDACTED]

From: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)

Sent: Saturday, February 15, 2020 5:00 PM

To: (b) (6) Aeschbach,
Kelly A RADM USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

Cc: Brown, Sandra SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6); Richardson,
Andrew G SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

[REDACTED]; Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN
ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

Subject: RE: SSCI Brief from Jay Stratton

Thanks, (b) (6). I'll reach out to Neill on Tuesday and make sure he and I are on the

same page.

Thanks,
Scott

Scott W. Bray
Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence
Director, Naval Intelligence Activity
(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, February 14, 2020 4:57 PM
To: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6); Aeschbach, Kelly A RADM USN
ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Cc: Brown, Sandra SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6); Richardson,
Andrew G SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6) Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN
ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: RE: SSCI Brief from Jay Stratton

Sir, Admiral, All,

I just learned from OUSD(I&S) they can support the SSCI Member brief on 25 Feb and they will have senior level representation at the table. Unknown who specifically it will be, but Mr. Tipton is the likely choice.

That being said, OUSD(I&S) and myself will communicate with the SSCI PSMs and more towards locking in this 25 Feb briefing.

V/r

(b) (6)

(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

From: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)

Sent: Thursday, February 13, 2020 2:17 PM

To: Aeschbach, Kelly A RADM USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6);
(b) (6)

Cc: Brown, Sandra SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6); Richardson,
Andrew G SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

(b) (6); Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI
WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

Subject: RE: SSCI Brief from Jay Stratton

Kelly / (b) (6) -

This all makes sense to me. I'm meeting with Jay on Tuesday as I prep for a different Hill engagement, so I'll be more up to speed then. I'll reach out to Neill Tipton and ensure that a) USD/I will be there with us and b) that they will be able to show that they're taking the leading role, as appropriate.

Just landed in Seattle. No risk of sunburn here....

Thanks,
Scott

—
Scott W. Bray
Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence
Director, Naval Intelligence Activity
(b) (6)

From: Aeschbach, Kelly A RADM USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

Date: Thursday, Feb 13, 2020, 09:41

To: (b) (6) Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV
N2N6, N2N6 (b) (6)

Cc: Brown, Sandra SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6), Richardson, Andrew
G SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

(b) (6), Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA)
(b) (6)

(b) (6)

Subject: RE: SSCI Brief from Jay Stratton

(b) (6),

Thanks. We'll work with Scott Bray and his team to shape the briefing/engagement accordingly. v/r,
Kelly

Kelly Aeschbach
Rear Admiral, United States Navy
Director, National Maritime Intelligence Integration Office
Commander, Office of Naval Intelligence

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Thursday, February 13, 2020 12:37 PM

To: Aeschbach, Kelly A RADM USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6); Bray,
Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6 (b) (6)

Cc: Brown, Sandra SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6); Richardson,
Andrew G SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

(b) (6); Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI
WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

Subject: RE: SSCI Brief from Jay Stratton

Ma'am,

Admiral Kohler shares your concerns based upon his reaction to this morning's verbal report of this
Hill request.

Very Respectfully,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

(b) (6)

From: Aeschbach, Kelly A RADM USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

Sent: Thursday, February 13, 2020 7:47 AM

To: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6 (b) (6)

Cc: Brown, Sandra SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6); Richardson, Andrew G SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

(b) (6); Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA)

(b) (6)

Subject: FW: SSCI Brief from Jay Stratton

Scott,

I do not support Jay doing this engagement unless USD(I) attends. I request that you personally engage Neil Tipton to ensure that they attend. I think this is the right opportunity to discuss USD(I)'S role going forward; they promised to take a lead role in the meeting (b) (6) and I attended in Dec. (b) (6) was identified as the lead.

Jay can help present where we have come from but USD(I) needs to address the way forward. (b) (6) intent in Dec was also to specifically address what we know. Jay is currently working on this paper. I recommend we shift the conversation from the history of the problem to what we are doing about it in support of USD(I) and what we think/have learned to date. (b) (6) and I were very clear with USD(I) that the CNO and VADM Kohler do want the Navy in the driver's seat on this issue. We need to start leveraging these engagements to shape the landscape differently.

Let me know how I can support. v/r, Kelly

Kelly Aeschbach
Rear Admiral, United States Navy
Director, National Maritime Intelligence Integration Office
Commander, Office of Naval Intelligence

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Wednesday, February 12, 2020 11:06 AM

To: Aeschbach, Kelly A RADM USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

Richardson, Andrew G SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6);

Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

Subject: FW: SSCI Brief from Jay Stratton

Admiral,

FYSA.

Vr/

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

From: Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

Sent: Wednesday, February 12, 2020 10:47 AM

To: (b) (6) OPNAV ALL
N2N6 Front Office (b) (6); OPNAV N2N6I Front Office

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

Subject: RE: SSCI Brief from Jay Stratton

All,

I can support the 25th. We've got a great relationship with this committee and don't expect any issues. I'll provide them with a quick baseline of where we started, where we are at and where we are going. I'll also be prepared to address resourced if I'm asked.

V/r, Jay

Jay Stratton

Senior Analyst (DISL), General Military Intelligence

Nimitz Operational Intelligence Center
Office of Naval Intelligence

(b) (6) [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

From: (b) (6) [REDACTED]
Date: Wednesday, Feb 12, 2020, 7:25 AM
To: OPNAV ALL N2N6 Front Office (b) (6) [REDACTED], OPNAV N2N6I Front Office (b) (6) [REDACTED], Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
Cc: (b) (6) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
Subject: SSCI Brief from Jay Stratton

CAPT,

Good morning. The SSCI desires a briefing on 25 Feb from Jay Stratton. This will be the UAP brief for the SSCI Members that was previously scheduled but cancelled. Previously, OUSD(I&S) senior leadership would also attend along with (b) (6) [REDACTED].

Communication is ongoing between OUSD(I&S) and SSCI PSMs currently. They are pushing back on the 25 Feb date as that is in the middle of the budget roll out and hearings. TBD. Overall, we in OLA likely need to know if VADM Kohler or Mr. Bray desire to attend this session.

Cheers

(b) (6) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

From: (b) (6)
To: (b) (6); Stratton, John F
(Jay) SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)
Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: Vice News Article of Interest - Sen Rubio Comments
Date: Tuesday, July 21, 2020 9:53:15 AM

(b) (6) at CHINFO

V/r,

(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, July 21, 2020 8:22 AM
To: (b) (6) Stratton, John F
(Jay) SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)
(b) (6) Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I
(b) (6) Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA)
(b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
(b) (6) OPNAV N2N6I Front Office
(b) (6); OPNAV ALL N2N6 Front Office
(b) (6)
Subject: RE: Vice News Article of Interest - Sen Rubio Comments

It's not required until the FY21 NDAA is passed and the committee report language is still there.

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, July 21, 2020 8:12 AM
To: (b) (6) Stratton, John F (Jay) SES
USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)
(b) (6) Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I
(b) (6); Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

(b) (6); OPNAV ALL N2N6 Front Office

(b) (6)

Subject: Vice News Article of Interest - Sen Rubio Comments

FYI... and the beat goes on....

(b) (6)

Marco Rubio Hopes UFOs Are Aliens, Not Chinese Planes

"Frankly, if it's something outside this planet that might actually be better than the fact that we've seen some sort of technological leap from the Chinese or Russians."

Vice, 20 July 2020... by Matthew Gault

Florida Senator Marco Rubio said he hopes that UFOs are extraterrestrials and not advanced Chinese aircraft.

In a July 16 interview with CBS reporter Jim DeFede about a range of topics, including the government's Covid-19 response and the possible existence of extraterrestrial life.

"We have things flying over our military bases and places where we're conducting military exercises and we don't know what it is and it isn't ours," Rubio said.

"Frankly, if it's something outside this planet that might actually be better than the fact that we've seen some sort of technological leap from the Chinese or Russians or some other adversary that allows them to conduct this sort of activity," Rubio said. "That to me is a national security risk and one we should be looking into."

DeFede and Rubio were talking about the U.S. Navy's declassification and release of three UFO videos in April. The videos show Navy pilots encountering strange objects in the sky. The Navy isn't saying the objects were extraterrestrial, but it's not discounting that fact either. At the time of the release, Former Nevada Sen. Harry Reid said the videos only scratched the surface of the Pentagon's UFO research.

The Senate Intelligence Committee, which Rubio currently chairs, recently required the military to produce a report about its UFO task force. That report will presumably be forthcoming.

This weekend, after the death of Civil Rights icon John Lewis, Rubio tweeted out his condolences alongside a picture of himself with Maryland Rep. Elijah Cummings. During his interview with DeFede, Rubio said he would be happy to

find out that aliens were visiting Earth, rather than be met with advanced technology from an American military rival.

A popular theory among extraterrestrial skeptics is that the Navy pilots encountered advanced aircraft from Russia or China, not an alien species. It's even possible, though Rubio discounted this in his interview, that the encounters are part of an American advanced weapons program.

[Article](#)

From: (b) (6)
To: (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6); [Stratton, John F \(Jay\) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#); (b) (6)
(b) (6); [Brown, Charles W RDML USN \(USA\)](#); [Dunn, Paula D RDML CHINFO, OI-00](#); (b) (6)
(b) (6); [OPNAV ALL N2N6 Front Office](#); (b) (6)
(b) (6); [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#); [Aeschbach, Kelly A RADM USN ONI WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#); [Brown, Sandra SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#)
Subject: RE: Videos ever released through FOIA?
Date: Monday, March 16, 2020 11:02:53 AM

TBD... DOD (b) (6)) and USDI need to be part of the discussions.

More to follow as people catch up to this latest...

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, March 16, 2020 11:00 AM
To: (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6); [Stratton, John F \(Jay\) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#); (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
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(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6); [Brown, Charles W RDML USN \(USA\)](#)
(b) (6); [Dunn, Paula D RDML CHINFO, OI-00](#); (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6); [OPNAV ALL N2N6 Front Office](#); (b) (6)
(b) (6)
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(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6); [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#); [Aeschbach, Kelly A RADM USN ONI WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#)
(b) (6); [Brown, Sandra SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#)
(b) (6)

Subject: RE: Videos ever released through FOIA?

Understood. What sort of time frame would you prefer?

Best regards,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Monday, March 16, 2020 10:54 AM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6) Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN
ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

(b) (6); Brown, Charles W RDML USN (USA)

(b) (6); Dunn, Paula D RDML USN (USA), OI-00 (b) (6)

(b) (6) OPNAV ALL N2N6

Front Office (b) (6); (b) (6)

(b) (6); Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV

N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6); Aeschbach, Kelly A RADM USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA)

(b) (6); Brown, Sandra SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA)

(b) (6)

Subject: RE: Videos ever released through FOIA?

PLEASE WAIT... can we get a communications plan in place, including a plan for Hill notification before doing anything????

This will be HUGE!

Dropping this out of the blue without prepping is just asking for more difficulties!!!

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, March 16, 2020 10:46 AM
To: (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: Videos ever released through FOIA?

(b) (6),

DoD denied our request to use 10 U.S.C. 130e ("flight data"). Therefore, after consulting with PMA-265, we decided that releasing the videos is the appropriate course of action. I apologize for the delay and change in course.

My intent is to post the videos in our FOIA reading room tomorrow (3/17), and then notify requestors shortly after.

Best regards,

(b) (6) [REDACTED]

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, December 10, 2019 2:48 PM
To: (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: RE: Videos ever released through FOIA?

(b) (6),

Appreciate the determination and the heads up, as well as all the deliberate thought process that went into the decision.

I would expect media reaction... but we (DoD with Navy assist) will respond accordingly!

Regards,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, December 10, 2019 2:22 PM
To: (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: RE: Videos ever released through FOIA?

All,

We will be withholding all three videos in their entirety under 10 U.S.C. 130e (DoD Critical Infrastructure Security Information). OSD categorically exempted "flight data," and all three videos being requested contain "flight data."

As I previously advised, withholding these videos that are already widely available to the public could result in a harmful perception that the Department of the Navy is trying to hide something. My intention with this email is to apprise the various public affairs offices of this issue before we officially deny multiple requests for these videos (many of which are from media).

Please let me know if you need any additional information. I will begin drafting the denial letters for IDA signature (cc'd: Tony Dowdle).

Best regards,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Tuesday, October 29, 2019 8:43 AM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: RE: Videos ever released through FOIA?

Thanks all. If there should ever be a decision to release them, in any form, please let (b) (6) and I know in advance, as that would generate significant media interest and change our official statements regarding those videos.

Regards,

(b) (6)

OSD(PA)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Tuesday, October 29, 2019 7:11 AM

To: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

Subject: RE: Videos ever released through FOIA?

Thanks for the answer and the quick response!

Regards,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Tuesday, October 29, 2019 7:06 AM

To: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

Subject: RE: Videos ever released through FOIA?

(b) (6)

The videos are still being discussed and have not been released.

Best regards,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Tuesday, October 29, 2019 6:52 AM

To: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

Subject: Videos ever released through FOIA?

Pax River Colleagues,

DOD Public Affairs (b) (6), cc'd) in order to respond to a media query, is double checking on whether or not the three UAP videos have ever been released through the FOIA process.

I believe, from our previous discussions, that they have not been. Is that correct?

Thank you!

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

From: [Stratton, John F \(Jay\) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: RE:
Date: Wednesday, May 20, 2020 6:02:50 AM
Attachments: [Story The Pentagon's Investigation of Navy UAP Reports \(26.8 KB\).msg](#)

Scott,

Here's (b) (6) article since its blocked on our NIPR.

The questions below are from (b) (6). We also had questions from (b) (6) who runs the Black Vault. We hope the statement I wrote will answer these but also be a standard response to questions on the "working group".

V/r, Jay

Here's (b) (6) questions:

I am writing an article based on your recent statements, and if possible, I'd love to ask some follow ups. I am hoping these are easy enough that maybe I can get some quick responses today? It is greatly appreciated.

1. You recently talked about a UAP Task Force. Can you break down what branches other than the Navy are working in it?
2. Is there a program name, project name, program element number, etc? that can be shared identifying it?
3. When did it start?
4. Are there any UNCLASS documents, guidelines, mission statements etc., that can be shared describing it?
5. You said the Navy is leading much of the effort. Is there a division of the Navy that is tasked with this? (NCIS? ONI? Etc.)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, May 19, 2020 5:41 PM
To: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)
Cc: Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6);
(b) (6)
Subject: FW:

Scott,

As discussed. I've also included the journalist's questions below as posed to (b) (6), OSD Public Affairs.

V/r,

(b) (6)

**

"Hi (b) (6),

I hope you had a good weekend. I recently read some responses you provided to (b) (6). I've linked below, but can you confirm that these are your statements?

<https://www.blueblurrylines.com/2020/05/pentagon-answers-on-navy-uap.html>

Furthermore, I have a few questions:

1) In your response to (b) (6), you stated;

"Under the cognizance of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)), there is an inter-agency team charged with gathering data and conducting investigations into range incursions. As the preponderance of recent/reported sightings are from naval aviators, the Navy is leading much of the effort. All reports of range incursions are sent to this team for inclusion in the overall effort, thus maximizing the data available for analysis."

Was this "inter-agency team" operating prior to 2008/2009 and the beginning of AAWSAP/AATIP? If so, when did this team begin informal and/or formal operations?

2) Same quote as above. After AAWSAP/AATIP was shut down in 2011, was Luis Elizondo involved in this "inter-agency team?" He was a USD(I) staffer. He has also publicly stated that part of his portfolio of work did involve UAP. Was Luis Elizondo involved in this "inter-agency team" between the years of 2012 and 2017?

3) Same quote as above. Does this "inter-agency team" have an informal/formal name/title for the purpose of making a FOIA request?

4) Same quote as above. Does this "inter-agency team" have a yearly budget for the purpose of its investigations and work? If so, what is the amount of its budget both annually and overall?

5) Same quote as above. How many individuals make up this "inter-agency team?" Is this their full time job or is this a portfolio among their other work? In other words, I'm trying to gauge whether it is a part time and informal group of investigators, or is this a formal job?

Thank you,

(b) (6)

From: Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

Sent: Tuesday, May 19, 2020 4:35 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: RE:

Love it, (b) (6) can you try a drive by with Scott? I would feel better if he reviews it.

V/r, Jay

Jay Stratton
Senior Analyst (DISL), General Military Intelligence
Nimitz Operational Intelligence Center
Office of Naval Intelligence

(b) (6) [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

From: (b) (6) [REDACTED]
Date: Tuesday, May 19, 2020, 4:08 PM
To: Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6) [REDACTED]
Cc: (b) (6) [REDACTED]
Subject: RE:

That's good.

I made a couple little edits, in red below, for your consideration.

Should we run it by Scott Bray before sending on to (b) (6)?

(b) (6) [REDACTED]

From: Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6) [REDACTED]
Sent: Tuesday, May 19, 2020 3:53 PM
To: (b) (6) [REDACTED]
Cc: (b) (6) [REDACTED]
Subject:

(b) (6) [REDACTED],

What do you think of this? I'm putting myself out there a bit but they've already figured out who I am, I'm not offering my name but the fact that a Navy senior has been directed to lead the effort.

We need to get off the dance floor with the term task force, the draft direction coming from USDI calls it a working group since task force has a specific meaning.

This language falls in line with what we determined is unclassified IAW the Security Classification Guide. I think it answers the questions received so far except for those dealing with Luis Elizondo. In regards to Lue, (b) (6) and I in the past have pointed out that he was involved, especially in bridging us with colleagues across the DoD. There's plenty of paper trail to back that up. We recommend (b) (6) dust off the statement she was working. We are happy to help with that if she'd like.

Statement:

(b) (5)

[Redacted text block containing approximately 18 lines of blacked-out content]

[Redacted text block containing 4 lines of blacked-out content]

V/r, Jay

Jay Stratton
Senior Analyst (DISL), General Military Intelligence
Nimitz Operational Intelligence Center
Office of Naval Intelligence

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From: (b) (6)
To: [Kohler, Matthew J VADM USN \(USA\)](#); [Brown, Charles W RDML USN \(USA\)](#); [Dunn, Paula D RDML CHINFO, OI-00](#); [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#); [Brown, Sandra SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#); [Stratton, John F \(Jav\) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#); (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
[OPNAV N2N6I](#)
[Front Office; OPNAV ALL N2N6 Front Office](#); (b) (6)
Subject: Release of the 3 Videos - Monday
Date: Friday, April 24, 2020 12:23:21 PM

Admirals/Leaders,

Per (b) (6), my UAP Counterpart at DOD PA: We are cleared to release on Monday morning. I would like to do this @0930 or 1000.

She is awaitng confirmation from NAVAIR FOIA Office to make sure they are ready to upload for that release time.

V/R,

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From: (b) (6)
To: [NIA Seniors and Deputies](#)
Cc: [OPNAV N2N6I Front Office](#)
Subject: SIPR TIPPER: Call for Inputs -- N2N6 Monthly Update (April 2020). SUSPENSE: COB 11 MAY (TUES)
Date: Friday, May 1, 2020 5:19:48 PM

Good afternoon NIA Leaders:

Inputs for CNO Monthly are due by noon on Thursday, 7 May to the NIA Front Office. We will take the majority of entries from the WAR inputs on NIPR. If you have inputs ready on SIPR, please send them to us there. Topics of interest are listed below. Thank you!

VR

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From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 4:03 PM
To: OPNAV N2N6F Front Office (b) (6); OPNAV N2N6F1 Front Office (b) (6); OPNAV N2N6F2 Front Office (b) (6); OPNAV N2N6I Front Office (b) (6); OPNAV N2N6F3 Front Office (b) (6); OPNAV N2N6FX Front Office (b) (6); OPNAV N2N6G Front Office (b) (6); OPNAV N2N6E Front Office (b) (6); OPNAV N2N6SE Front Office (b) (6); (b) (6)
Cc: OPNAV ALL N2N6 Front Office (b) (6); (b) (6)
Subject: Call for Inputs -- N2N6 Monthly Update (April 2020). SUSPENSE: COB 11 MAY (TUES)

Team,

BLUF: Call for inputs for N2N6 Monthly Update (Topics provided on SIPR. **SUSPENSE: COB 11 MAY (TUES).** Please DO NOT send inputs on NIPR.

TOPICS (not all-inclusive):

- COVID-19 Update
- HRE standdown update
- L16 CM
- C-C5IRST

- JTG/NTG/NICC
- GPNTS
- NC3
- UAP

Thank you in advance.

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From: (b) (6)
To: [Koller, Matthew J VADM USN \(USA\)](#)
Cc: [OPNAV ALL N2N6 Front Office](#); [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#); [Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA](#)
[WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#); (b) (5) [Stratton, John F \(Jay\) SES](#)
[USN ONI WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#); (b) (5) [OPNAV N2N6I Front](#)
[Office](#); (b) (5)
Subject: The Drive Story: Here Are The Detailed "UFO" Incident Reports From Navy Pilots Flying Off The East Coast
Date: Wednesday, May 13, 2020 8:15:48 AM
Attachments: [image001.jpg](#)
[image002.png](#)

DCNO,

As discussed, here is the link to the story released yesterday by The Drive/War Zone.


I added the full story below... but the online version is where you get a better feel for the content, with the actual Naval Safety Center documents included.

V/R,

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[Here Are The Detailed "UFO" Incident Reports From Navy Pilots Flying Off The East Coast](#)



Here Are The Detailed "UFO" Incident Reports From Navy Pilots Flying Off...

Tyler Rogoway and Joseph Trevithick

The reports are the first official documentation of various recent encounters with mysterious aircraft in restri...

Here Are The Navy Pilot Reports From Encounters With Mysterious Aircraft Off The East Coast

The Drive, 12 May 2020 ... by Tyler Rogoway & Joseph Trevithick

The reports are the first official documentation of various recent incidents with unidentified aircraft in restricted airspace along the east coast.

early one year ago, Navy fighter pilot testimony about a seemingly bizarre rash of encounters with unidentified craft flying in restricted airspace off the east coast hit the new cycle with a bang. In the months that have followed, limited additional details about those encounters have come to light. Meanwhile, The War Zone has been slowly assembling the building blocks of a case that may explain them. What we were still missing was any official Navy documentation that alludes to them. Now that has changed, and you may be surprised as to what these newly obtained documents actually say and when the incidents they described occurred—or didn't occur—for that matter.

The War Zone obtained the eight hazard reports, all of which are marked "Unclassified" and "For Official Use Only," via a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the Naval Safety Center. Seven of them involve F/A-18E/F Super Hornets and occurred at various times between 2013 and 2014 in a patch of airspace off the coast of Virginia and North Carolina known as the W-72 warning area. The eighth incidents took place in 2019 and involved an EA-18G Growler flying in a different portion of the Atlantic Ocean off the coast of Maryland called the W-386 warning area.

The FOIA officer handling our request said that these were the only eight reports in the Web-Enabled Safety System (WESS) Aviation Mishap and Hazard Reporting System (WAMHRS) to deal with naval aviation encounters with unidentified objects, balloons, and any other similar objects anywhere. WAMHRS is a centralized computer database that is supposed to contain all such hazard and flight incident reports that Navy aviation units file with the Naval Safety Center.

VFRMAP.COM

An airspace map of the mid-Atlantic coast of the United States showing the W-72 warning area, where the incidents in seven of the eight reports occurred. The last incident occurred in Warning Area W-386, which is also seen here.

#1, June 27, 2013: F/A-18F Super Hornet, Strike Fighter Squadron 11

On June 27, 2013, an F/A-18F Super Hornet from Strike Fighter Squadron 11 (VFA-11), flying out of Naval Air Station Oceana in Virginia had an encounter with an "aircraft [that] was white in color and approximately the size and shape of a drone or missile" in the W-72 warning area. The jet's crew "visually acquired" it as they saw it "pass down the right side of their aircraft with approximately 200 feet of lateral separation" while flying at an altitude of 17,000 feet. It was climbing and had a visible exhaust trail.

Neither the Super Hornet nor NAS Oceana recorded a radar track of the object. Commander, Strike Fighter Wing Atlantic, abbreviated in the report CSFWL, "contacted operating units but no one reported operations of this nature." Fleet Area Control and Surveillance Facility, Virginia Capes (FASCFAC VACAPES) "reviewed radar tapes and no aircraft was indentified [sic] or noted in the area."

The Navy did not issue any Notices to Airmen (NOTAM) or Temporary Flight Restrictions (TFR) based on this hazard report, but did issue internal notices to tactical aviation units, air traffic controllers, and unmanned aerial vehicle operators to be aware of the potential hazards posed by unauthorized or uncoordinated drone operations.

#2, Nov. 18, 2013: F/A-18E Super Hornet, Strike Fighter Squadron 143

An F/A-18E Super Hornet from Strike Fighter Squadron 143 (VFA-143), flying out of Naval Air Station Oceana in Virginia, spotted an object in the W-72 warning zone via radar off its nose at around 12,000 feet and a speed of approximately 0.1 Mach on Nov. 18, 2013. "The aircraft had an approximately 5-foot wingspan and was colored white with no other distinguishable features," according to the pilot who was able to visually acquire the object and tracked it for an hour.

This report says that the Navy concluded that this object was an unmanned aerial system (UAS), but that Commander, Strike Fighter Wing Atlantic and Fleet Area Control and Surveillance Facility, Virginia Capes (FASCFAC VACAPES), the latter of which is also identified here by its callsign Giant Killer, was not able to ascertain the operator. As was the case on June 27, the Navy issued a series of internal warnings, but there is no indication that it issued any Notices to Airmen (NOTAM) or Temporary Flight Restrictions (TFR).

Most curiously, this report notes that "surface traffic was light with only a single stationary commercial fishing trawler and a single unidentified US Naval vessel traveling south" during the incident, but that "the identity of the Naval vessel in the vicinity was undetermined." It's not at all clear how the Navy was able to determine that one of its ships was operating on the surface in the same general area, but not able to figure out which ship it was specifically.

At the end of the report, the concern regarding unknown aircraft operating in the warning areas is clearly growing more palpable.

#3, Nov. 18, 2013: F/A-18E Super Hornet, Strike Fighter Squadron 143

The report is effectively identical to the other one from Nov. 18, 2013, but is confirmation from the pilot of a second F/A-18E Super Hornet from Strike Fighter Squadron 143 (VFA-143) that they saw the same object at roughly the same position.

#4, Mar. 26, 2014: F/A-18E Super Hornet, Strike Fighter Squadron 106

On Mar. 26, 2014, an F/A-18E Super Hornet from Strike Fighter Squadron 106 (VFA-106), flying out of Naval Air Station Oceana, detected a possible radar track at around 19,000 feet and with a speed of 0.1 Mach in the W-72 warning area. The pilot's wingman did not have the object on radar and there was a debate about whether it might be a false track given high winds, gusting at over 100 knots at 18,000 feet.

"The unknown aircraft appeared to be small in size, approximately the size of a suitcase, and silver in color," according to the report. The pilot was only able to pass within 1,000 feet of it and could not identify it. After that pass, they lost sight of it and never regained visual contact.

This report notes that Fleet Area Control and Surveillance Facility, Virginia Capes (FASCFAC VACAPES) again did not spot this object on its radar screens. However, the commanding officer of VFA-106 also noted that FASCFAC VACAPES "cannot detect a target this size if it is not squawking IFF [Identification Friend or Foe] or communicating

via radio," which "presents a significant safety concern, given that this unknown aircraft was detected in an exclusive use area."

"I feel it may only be a matter of time before one of our F/A-18 aircraft has a mid-air collision with an unidentified UAS [unmanned aerial system]," the head of VFA-106 added in their comments. The report also says that "FACSFAC VACAPES has received multiple UAS sightings in the recent months," but does not say how many of those sightings resulted in sending in hazard reports. There's no indication that this particular report resulted in any Notices to Airmen (NOTAM) or Temporary Flight Restrictions (TFR), though it did spark additional internal Navy alerts.

#5, Apr. 23, 2014: F/A-18F Super Hornet, Strike Fighter Squadron 11

Another F/A-18F Super Hornet from Strike Fighter Squadron 11 (VFA-11) had an encounter with multiple "unidentified aerial devices" (UAD) on Apr. 23, 2014, while flying out of Naval Air Station Oceana and operating in the W-72 warning area. The crew initially detected two UADs on radar, one at 12,000 feet and another at 15,000 feet, both apparently stationary or near-stationary at 0.0 Mach. They then confirmed both of these objects using the jet's Advanced Targeting Forward Looking Infrared (ATFLIR) system.

While investigating the first pair of UADs, another two appeared to pass through the ATFLIR field of vision at high-speed. The two moving objects did not appear on the aircraft's radar.

The typical slew of internal warnings followed after the Navy determined it could not identify the objects or their operators. The commanding officer of VFA-11 notably included a note similar in tone to the one that the head of VFA-106 submitted along with the hazard report on Mar. 26, 2014. "Although this report is primarily submitted for tracking purposes, it is only a matter of time before this results in a midair [collision] in W-72," they said.

In addition, the VFA-11 commander noted that this was the second instance in 10 months that one of the aircraft's squadron had had such an encounter. This is a reference to the June 27, 2013 report and makes clear that this particular squadron had not run into any other unidentified object in between these two incidents.

#6, Apr. 24, 2014: Two F/A-18F Super Hornets, Strike Fighter Squadron 11

On Apr. 24, 2014, within a day of the F/A-18F Super Hornet from Strike Fighter Squadron 11 (VFA-11) having its encounter with four "unidentified aerial devices" (UAD), two more F/A-18Fs made radar contact with another UAD in the W-72 warning area while conducting Basic Fighter Maneuvering (BFM aka dogfighting) out of Naval Air Station Oceana. Both aircraft were able to maintain a radar track with the object, which was stationary or near-stationary at 0.0 Mach at 11,000 feet. The aircraft were also able to lock onto the object with their CATM-9Xs, a captive-carry training version of the AIM-9X Sidewinder missile. However, in this instance, neither one made visual contact.

The Navy issued more internal warnings and the commander of VFA-11 noted that this was the third such incident in 10 months for the squadron. That officer also noted that this encounter had occurred less than 24 hours after the one on Apr. 23.

#7, Apr. 27, 2014: F/A-18F Super Hornet, Strike Fighter Squadron 11

On Apr. 27, 2014, for the third time in five days, the crew of a F/A-18F from Strike Fighter Squadron 11 (VFA-11), flying out of NAS Ocean and operating in the W-72 warning area, reported encountering an unknown aerial device. This report is the most spartan in its details of the three, but describes a "near mid-air collision with balloon like object."

This is a notably more serious report than the other two from April 2014. It is also the first to give any kind of substantive description of the object, one that would match up with the two previous reports of stationary or near-stationary UADs at high-altitude in the W-72 warning area. Again, Navy officials sent out a host of internal warnings.

#8, Feb. 13, 2019: EA-18G Growler, Air Test and Evaluation Squadron 23

On Feb. 13, 2019, nearly five years after the last recorded encounter with an unidentified object in the Naval Safety Center's databases, the crew of an EA-18G Growler electronic warfare aircraft from Air Test and Evaluation Squadron 23 (VX-23), flying out Naval Air Station Patuxent River in Maryland and conducting activities in the W-386 warning area, visually spotted what they specifically described as "a red weather balloon" at 27,000 feet.

Neither Fleet Area Control and Surveillance Facility, Virginia Capes (FASCFAC VACAPES), again referred to by its callsign Giant Killer, nor the Echo Control team responsible for overseeing operations in the Atlantic Test Ranges off the coast, were aware of any scheduled balloon activity. The Federal Aviation Administration did not have any relevant notices to airmen (NOTAM), either. The report says that the Navy did not identify the individuals or organizations that might have released the balloon and issued various internal warnings in response to the incident.

More reports?

As noted, these are the only eight hazard or flight incident reports covering naval aviation encounters with unidentified objects, balloons, and any other similar objects anywhere that appear in the Web-Enabled Safety System (WESS) Aviation Mishap and Hazard Reporting System (WAMHRS), according to the Naval Safety Center. This is immediately curious given extensive previous reports, including from The War Zone, citing Navy pilots, on and off the record, who have said that these kinds of sightings over the Atlantic were occurring frequently between 2014 and 2015.

In addition, The War Zone obtained a copy of a report of another incident involving an F/A-18E Super Hornet from Strike Fighter Squadron 106 (VFA-106) that occurred on March 13, 2018. The pilot in this instance said they tracked four separate unknown objects on their radar in the W-122 warning area, which sits off the coast of North Carolina.

ANONYMOUS

The additional incident report that The War Zone received.

The objects were all flying at approximately 0.1 Mach at altitudes between 16,000 and 22,000 feet, according to the report. The pilot visually identified one at 20,000 feet that "appeared to be a quadcopter-type drone, 3-4 feet wide." They added that the objects did not appear to be doing anything in particular and were stationary or near-stationary. They were also spread out across an area approximately 40 to 50 miles wide, with the closest one being 15 miles away from the one boat that the pilot noted seeing down below.

An airspace map showing the W-122 warning area of the coast of North Carolina where the incident in the report The War Zone received reportedly occurred. W-72, where the bulk of the incidents in other reports we obtained took place, is visible to the north.

This specific description of something approximating a quadcopter is interesting, as is the fact that the report identifies the jet as one equipped with the AN/APG-79 active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar. The War Zone was first to explain how this new radar for the F/A-18E/F Super Hornets could allow them to more easily spot

objects with small radar cross-sections that would have gone unnoticed by previous mechanically scanned-array fire control radars.

The report lacks a serial number, raising questions about where it might have ended up being submitted in the end and what official action it might have prompted on the Navy's part. From our understanding, VFA-106 received this and other reports relating to encounters with unidentified objects and then passed them the chain of command to Commander, Strike Fighter Wing Atlantic. The assumption would have been that these would have then gone to the Naval Safety Center via WAMHRS, but, per our FOIA, this does not appear to have been the case. Given the general safety concerns that the commanding officers of the squadrons involved in many of the incidents clearly had, it seems odd that these reports would not have made it into that database.

There is the possibility that, for whatever reason, these reports subsequently began going through separate or even classified channels to commands other than the Naval Safety Center. However, again, given the broader flight safety concerns, one would imagine it would still have imperative to notify the entire service's aviation elements of the potential risks via an unclassified hazard report. The Apr. 27, 2014, report would seem to show that it is possible to prompt those kinds of alerts even with a report with very minimal specific details.

The apparent existence of hazard reports that did not actually make their way to the Naval Safety Center is reminiscent in some respects to the investigation into the so-called Tic Tac unidentified object that a pair of F/A-18F Super Hornets spotted flying near the Nimitz Carrier Strike Group in 2004. After that encounter, the Nimitz Carrier Strike Group's top intelligence officer sent a full report to the intelligence office within the U.S. Navy's 3rd Fleet, which is headquartered in San Diego, California, via secure Email. For reasons that remain unexplained, the senior intelligence officer there declined to send the report any further up the chain of command and deleted the Email.

What is also puzzlingly absent from this group of documents are any reports that occurred in the late-2014 to mid-2015 timeframe. A limited number of high profile aircrew witnesses have attested that this is when a rash of strange encounters happened, especially surrounding work-ups of the USS Theodore Roosevelt prior to deployment. Reporting surrounding these accounts have consistently made international news and are constantly touted as evidence that UFOs, at least in the traditional sense, exist. No safety reports about those encounters have been issued according to the people that are officially tasked with handling them.

In addition, it was claimed by one of the pilots that have discussed these events publically that safety reports surrounding the 2015 incidents led to the issuance of a Notice To Airman (NOTAM) warning of such risks out in the controlled airspace off Virginia's coastline, although we haven't been able to find proof that such a NOTAM actually existed.

GOOGLE EARTH

The sprawling ramp at the Navy's master fighter base on the East Coast, NAS Oceana.

It is also curious that nearly half of the incidents that were reported came from one squadron, VFA-11, with the rest being based on experiences by one squadron each. Considering that there are many squadrons based at NAS Oceana, and many more based at other bases nearby, this could point to a situation in which only certain units were officially reporting these encounters or that the criteria for doing so varied from one unit to the next.

For instance, maybe one squadron would write and elevate a safety report if something was spotted in a restricted

area, while another would only do so if a near-miss occurred. It also could be a function of the radar technology each unit possessed during the time period. As we discussed earlier, it is established that the Super Hornets that had the AN/APG-79 AESA radars could detect these small objects as opposed to Hornets and Super Hornets that had older AN/APG-73 mechanically scanned arrays.

This, combined with the possibility that some of these reports were funneled through some other channel, could explain why so few reports exist and none of them come from when these incidents were supposedly at their height in terms of frequency. Yet this would be puzzling as it would ignore the safety of aviators who rely on this information. It is notable that an encounter with one craft that the Navy has now officially released a video of was not in these reports, either.

On the other hand, maybe far fewer instances of this nature actually occurred than what we have been led to believe. It's also worth noting that according to the reports that we now have, it's clear that none of these objects possessed extreme performance as some have posited—quite the contrary actually. This also fits with what we have heard, both on and off the record, since these events were made public.

So no, as we expected, there isn't any proof here of extremely exotic flying craft or saucers with amazing kinematic performance. Assuming they do not belong to the U.S. government, the fact that they are being deployed in such sensitive airspace seemingly unimpeded is a far larger national security concern than it may seem at first glance. It is not the Navy's job to police America's airspace, it is the Air Force's. So far, the Department of Defense has been all but silent about the Air Force's involvement in these events. We have posed a number of specific questions about these facts to the Defense Department, but have gotten totally stonewalled in a remarkably rude manner.

You can learn more about this bizarre saga in this past piece of ours, but suffice it to say, that in our attempts at engagement with the DoD on the Air Force's involvement in all this, we did indirectly find out that according to Langley Air Force Base's 1st Fighter Wing, which is located very near NAS Oceana and their F-22 Raptors use the same general airspace as the Super Hornets to train in daily, their crews had had not experienced any similar phenomena, or at least were not willing to disclose that they had.

As to what the aircrews who did file the reports posted above actually saw and why those things were where they were, we believe there is an explanation, or at least explanations, of a very terrestrial nature. We have detailed some of this both directly and indirectly in the past, but suffice it to say, the electronic intelligence that an adversary could gather in the training ranges frequented by pretty much all of America's tactical fighter aircraft and other high-end sensor aircraft, as well as surface combatants, would be extremely valuable, especially considering they would be operating unimpeded, largely using their full sensor, electronic warfare, and communications suites. Doing so would also sow a level of confusion while presenting little risk, too. This sounds like a page ripped from an increasingly familiar playbook.

We will dive deeper into the possibilities surrounding these strange events off America's east coast in an upcoming piece, but for now, at least we have all the safety report documentation that the Naval Safety Center says it has on these bizarre events.

[Article](#)

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TASK FORCE REQUEST		
DON-NAVY #	NAME	REQUEST
DON-NAVY-2020-009560	(b) (6)	all documents related to the Office of Navy Intelligence (aka ONI) and the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena (UAP) Task Force and/or any document or correspondence related to UAP task force.
DON-NAVY-2021-002625		all report(s), document(s), media(s), or any other form of information on Advanced Aerial Threats and/or Unidentified Aerial Phenomenon Task Force and/or any other alias(es) in an unclassified manner.
DON-NAVY-2020-011402		requested all documents, reports, and research that has been provided to the newly formed "Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force" as well as any documents that have been created by this task force up to this point. This does include documents from any other preceding or parallel group studying "Unidentified Aerial Phenomena" (or UFOs, Foo Fighters, and other terms that may have been used to describe the same phenomenon) that are now in the purview of the "UAPTF". This request also includes all training materials provided to new members of the "Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force" in order to function in their assigned role that are directly related to understanding "Unidentified Aerial Phenomena.
DON-NAVY-2020-011303		requested all information, memorandum, video, reports, communications, analysis and catalogs relating to the cases, reports and sightings analyzed and those that are currently being analyzed by the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena (UAP) Task Force (UAPTF).
DON-NAVY-2020-009322		all records regarding the establishment of an entity that the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has referred to as the "Unidentified Aerial Phenomenon Task Force."
DON-NAVY-2020-009335		all releasable records produced by the Unidentified Aerial Phenomenon Task Force, including but not limited to briefings, presentation, case files, reports, memorandum, summaries, interviews.
DON-NAVY-2020-009556		Unidentified Aerial Phenomenon Task Force, copies of any annual histories prepared for the program for FY 14, FY 15, FY 16, FY 17, FY 18 and FY 19. Also, copies of any briefings prepared by members of the Task Force and lists of all reports or analysis done by the Task Force with the report name, date and classification of the report or similar.
DON-NAVY-2020-010777		all declassified information from the Unidentified Aerial Phenomenon Task Force regarding military or civilian encounters with so called "Unidentified Aerial Phenomenon" that had resulted in medical injury.
DON-NAVY-2020-010144		all files, reports, memos etc.. regarding the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force.
DON-NAVY-2020-010974		all documents relating to the creation of the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force (or UAP Task Force
DON-NAVY-2020-010698		reports and/or data produced by or for the Unidentified Aerial Phenomenon Task Force, formerly known either as the "Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program" or the "Advanced Aviation Threat Identification Program", pertaining to the retrievals of crashed A.A.V.s, or Advanced Aerospace Vehicles.
DON-NAVY-2020-009562		copies of documents concerning the Unidentified Aerial Phenomenon Task Force (briefing papers; reports generated by; emails mentioning the Task Force; between 1 July 2019 and 24 June 2020).
		Partial referral to NIA for UAPTF records only.
		Partial referral to NIA for UAPTF records only.
		Partial referral to NIA for UAPTF records only.
		Refer to NIA
		Refer to NIA
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		Partial referral to NIA for UAPTF records only.
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**Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force
Executive Committee (EXCOM)
Meeting Agenda
Pentagon N2N6Q Conference Room (5B253) with JWICS-VTC Outstations**

Wednesday, 24 February 2021

- 1500-1510 Opening comments
 UAPTF EXCOM Co-Chairs
- 1510-1530 UAPTF Update
 - Priority lines of effort
 - Current/projected staffing
 - Resourcing
 - Additional data challenges
 UAPTF Director
- 1530-1540 Update on relevant engagements/activities (Congress, public, other agencies, etc.)
 UAPTF Director and each attendee, as appropriate
- 1540-1550 Review draft EXCOM Charter
 All EXCOM members; led by Co-Chairs
- 1550-1600 Discussion
 All EXCOM members; led by Co-Chairs

UAP Report to Congress

Jan. 25, 2021

Executive Summary

Public and news media interest in unidentified aerial phenomena (UAPs) remains high. DoD formally established a UAP Task Force (UAPTF), per the FY19 NDAA, on Aug. 4, 2020. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) report attached to the FY21 Intelligence Authorization Act (signed into statute as part of the omnibus spending bill signed on Dec. 27, 2020) directed the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with SECDEF, to submit a report to Congress on UAPs within 180 days of enactment. The SSCI report specifically mentions the UAPTF.

Top Line Messages / Talking Points

- We are aware of the report requirement, and are working with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. I refer you to ODNI for anything else regarding the report.
- We take reports of incursions into our airspace – by any aircraft, identified or unidentified – very seriously, and investigate each one.
- Safety (of our personnel) and security (of our operations) are of paramount concern.
- DOD has established a UAP task force to gain knowledge and insight into the nature and origins of UAP incursions into our training ranges and designated airspace.
- The mission of the task force is to detect, analyze, and catalog UAPs that could potentially pose a threat to U.S national security.
- The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence & Security has oversight of the UAPTF.
- To maintain operations security and to avoid disclosing information that may be useful to potential adversaries, DOD does not discuss publicly the details of either the observations or the examination of reported incursions into our training ranges or designated airspace, including those incursions initially designated as UAP – that also includes any details of the UAPTF and its activities.

Additional Background Information (Not for Release)

Except for its existence, and the mission/purpose, virtually everything else about the UAPTF is classified, per the Security Classification Guide (SCG) on it.

Navy leads the UAPTF, with OUSD(I&S) oversight.

Statement by Pentagon Press Secretary John Kirby on Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Assessment

Today the Director of National Intelligence delivered to Congress a preliminary assessment on unidentified aerial phenomena (UAP) and the progress that the Intelligence Community and the Department of Defense UAP Task Force has made in understanding this threat.

Analyzing UAP is a collaborative effort involving many departments and agencies, and the Department thanks the Office of the Director of National Intelligence for leading a collaborative effort to produce this assessment, as well as the other contributing departments and agencies.

Incursions into our training ranges and designated airspace pose safety of flight and operations security concerns, and may pose national security challenges. DOD takes reports of incursions – by any aerial object, identified or unidentified – very seriously, and investigates each one.

The report submitted today highlights the challenges associated with assessing UAP occurring on or near DOD training ranges and installations. The report also identified the need to make improvements in processes, policies, technologies, and training to improve our ability to understand UAP.

To that end, Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks today directed the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security to develop a plan to formalize the mission currently performed by the UAPTF.

This plan will be developed in coordination with various DOD components, including the military departments and the combatant commands, and with ODNI and other interagency partners. The plan will establish procedures for synchronizing collection, reporting and analysis of UAP; provide recommendations for securing military test and training ranges; and identify requirements for the establishment and operation of a new follow-on DOD activity to lead the effort, including its alignment, resources, staffing, authorities, and a timeline for implementation.



Naval Intelligence Activity Annual Awards for FY2021



June 03, 2021

To recognize truly outstanding efforts from the Naval Intelligence Activity (NIA) workforce, Director Bray and Deputy Director Brown have established a Command-wide annual awards program. In September, NIA leadership will present three awards to recognize achievements from Fiscal Year 2021. This is the second year of these command-wide awards.

❖ **NIA Excellence Award**

- During the past 12 months, the NIA member/team demonstrated continued commitment to excellence by raising standards within their team or across the Naval Intelligence enterprise, enhancing the visibility and reputation of NIA, and demonstrating the desire for constant improvement.

❖ **NIA Collaboration Award**

- During the past 12 months, the NIA member/team demonstrated outstanding skill driving collaboration on a specific project. The collaboration must have resulted in measurable, successful outcomes or the resolution of significant challenges.

❖ **NIA Outstanding Enabler Award**

- During the past 12 months, the NIA member provided outstanding support to a team or project outside of their assigned mission area. Adopting a corporate mindset, he or she provided critical assistance to enable another teammate or department to achieve its goal without expectation of reward.

Eligibility. All civilian and military members of NIA – at any grade or rank – are eligible for these annual awards. Both individuals and small teams are eligible to be nominated. Team nominations may include government personnel (civilian or military) outside of NIA. Award recipients will receive a certificate of achievement signed by Director, NIA as well as a monetary award (for civilians) or special liberty (for military).

Nomination Process. All NIA supervisors are encouraged to nominate one individual or team for each of the three Command-wide awards described above. Supervisors will complete the Award Justification (Box 5) and endorse the nomination by signing in Box 6. NIA Heads of Department will review all nominations from their department prior to endorsing one nomination (individual or team) per award by digitally signing Box 7.

Nomination Deadline. COB Wednesday, June 30, 2021

Submission. NIA Heads of Department will send completed nomination forms to (b) (6) via NIPR e-mail.

Naval Intelligence Activity Annual Awards for FY2021

Selection Process. The NIA Annual Awards Board – consisting of the Director, Deputy Director, Chief of Staff, and Senior Enlisted Leader – will independently score/rate the nominees for each award category.

Members of the Awards Board will then meet to discuss the contributions of each nomination, with final selection made based on established criteria for each category and assessment of overall impact. Each nomination will be reviewed and scored against the standard criteria and selections will be made based on overall score. One individual or one team will be selected per category. There is no limit on the number of individuals who may be recognized as part of a team award.

Once selected, the NIA front office will complete the award certificates and will route to Director, NIA for signature. The front office team will also route the award requests to the NIA Comptroller for processing. NIA will keep records of annual nominations, scoring, and award recipients.

Recognition of outstanding contributions will be made in a timely manner on the basis of merit, without regard to age, sex, race, color, national origin, marital status, or physical or mental handicap.

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

**Naval Intelligence Activity
Annual Awards for FY2021**

**Award Nomination Rating Criteria
NIA Collaboration Award**

Name of candidate:

Reviewer:

Date Reviewed:

Rating Scale:

4 = Evidence of exceptional performance and quality are clearly indicated

3 = Evidence of strong performance and quality are clearly indicated

2 = Evidence of reasonable performance and quality are clearly indicated

1 = Evidence of minimal performance and quality are clearly indicated

0 = No evidence of performance and quality are clearly indicated

Rating	Criteria
	Demonstrated skill driving collaboration on a specific project
	Leveraged new or unusual partners across Navy, DoD, or IC to achieve results
	Fosters an engaging climate that spurs collaboration and enables substantive, respectful debate
	Collaboration resulted in measurable outcomes or the resolution of significant challenges

Impact of action on stated/desired objectives and goals of the organization:

	5 – High – Action had severe impact on achieving desired results or outcomes, critical to the success of the organization
	3 – Moderate – Action had moderate impact on achieving desired goals/objectives of the organization
	1 – Low – Action had no impact to organization or stated goals/objectives

Total Points:

Average Score:

ODNI TOPLINE MESSAGES:

- The DNI is releasing the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena (UAP) report on Friday and we wanted to give you a sense of what is coming and try to answer any questions you might have.
- The report and this issue more generally has received a great deal of media attention and is often laughed about but we want to make clear that we take this issue very seriously.
- The report reflects the work of the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force (UAPTF), which we have supported, using our office to coordinate across the intelligence community and provide analytic support.
- What the task force revealed is that we have quite a bit of work yet to do in order to truly assess the threat posed by UAP. We need to build an effective mechanism and invest additional resources in this work if we are to effectively address the challenge of identifying, analyzing, and responding to UAP – consequently this report simply represents an interim step.
- The report provides a preliminary overview for policymakers of the challenges associated with characterizing the safety of flight and national security issues associated with UAP, while also recommending that we standardize the reporting, consolidate and better integrate data regarding such UAP, invest in some additional collection opportunities, and on the basis of this stronger foundation, deepen our analysis.
- In particular, limited data and inconsistency in reporting were found to be key challenges to evaluating UAP. The report also recognizes that sociocultural stigmas create a challenge in getting more people to provide information.
- For this preliminary assessment, the review concentrated on 144 reports that occurred between 2004 and 2021.
- The UAP documented in this limited dataset demonstrate an array of aerial behaviors, reinforcing the possibility there are multiple types of UAP requiring different explanations.
- Our analysis supports an organizational frame for evaluating UAP that would have them fall into one of five explanatory categories: (1) airborne clutter; (2) natural atmospheric phenomena; (3) USG or industry developmental programs; (4) foreign adversary systems; and (5) a catchall “other” bin.
- With one exception, the report does not yet bin the different incidents identified into these categories, though it does describe some of the work done to begin to effectively characterize UAP and some of the patterns that have emerged, but we will need to improve our capacity to further analyze the remaining UAP, even as we accept that there will be limits to our capacity to characterize and understand UAP.

- In terms of next steps, the ODNI will work with DoD to develop an overarching UAP collection strategy and R&D technical roadmap intended to address the issues identified in the report – i.e., the need to standardize the reporting, consolidate and better integrate data regarding such UAP, invest in some additional collection opportunities, and deepen our analysis.
- We intend to update Congress on our process on these efforts in 90 days.

RESPONSES TO QUERY

Analysis/Content

Q1. What analytic measures and thresholds were applied to determine the final report's content? Did the scope of the report meet the Congressional intent?

A1. The report responded directly to each of the eight questions posed by Congress under the 2021 IAA.

Q2. Did the scope or type of information gathered for this report warrant a decision to initiate separate and additional analytic efforts?

A2. Yes, follow-on analytic efforts are planned.

Q3. Congress authorized ODNI to submit the report in unclassified form with allowance for a classified annex. Would you speak to the content ratio of information delivered to Congress?

A3. The unclassified report to Congress contains the key findings. The classified report includes some additional information that could not be declassified consistent with the protection of sources and methods.

Q4. What is the overall threat assessment of unidentified aerial phenomena in U.S. airspace to national security?

A4. UAP represent a threat to flight safety and, possibly, national security. The extent of the threat will come into sharper focus with additional collection and analysis.

Q5. Did the DNI attribute to one or more foreign adversaries the violation of U.S. airspace and a potential unidentified aerial phenomena threat to national security?

A5. We currently lack the data to indicate that UAP are the product of any foreign program.

Q6. Did the report's findings identify incidents or patterns that indicate a potential adversary may have achieved breakthrough aerospace capabilities that could put strategic or conventional forces at risk?

A6. In a limited number of incidents, UAP appeared to exhibit advanced propulsion characteristics. More collection and analysis is needed.

Q7. Are the classified and unclassified versions of the report substantively different?

A7. While some material was excised from the unclassified version of the report in order to protect sources and methods, the two versions are substantively consistent and the key conclusions are the same in both.

Q8. What happens to the data that did not make it into the report to Congress?

A8. In some cases, there are phenomena for which we do not have sufficient data. The UAPTF will continue to assess existing and new data as it attempts to characterize UAP.

Q9. What will be ODNI's next steps following the response to the CDA?

A9. ODNI will work with DOD to assist in the development of an overarching UAP collection strategy and R&D technical roadmap, and anticipates updating Congress on these efforts in 90 days.

Extraterrestrial and Adversary Concerns

Q1. Did the report address concerns about extraterrestrial technology?

A1. We refer you back to the specific language of the report. We currently lack sufficient information in our dataset to attribute incidents to specific explanations.

Q2. What are the national security and other implications if these incredible sightings are NOT extraterrestrial but are the product of Russian or Chinese scientists, the only two countries, other than the US, capable of producing products with capabilities even near to this level?

A2. UAP pose a threat to safety of flight, and some instances could pose a broader danger if conducted by a foreign actor. We currently lack the data to indicate that UAP are the product of any foreign program.

Q3. Are the incidents detailed during a recent 60 Minutes program among the 144 reports?

Q3. Yes, but as with all of the 144 reports (with the exception of one instance where the UAP was determined to be a deflating balloon), we do not have enough data to characterize those incidents.

Q4. You have characterized 1 report as a deflating balloon; what is happening with the other 143 reports?

Q4. The IC will standardize and consolidate data, deepen analysis, expand collection, and increase investments, and the UAPTF will continue to assess those reports and attempt to characterize them.

Q5. Why isn't the IC more concerned that Russia and China have deployed surveillance capabilities that we don't know about?

Q5. We take those counterintelligence risks very seriously, but we currently lack data to indicate any UAP are part of a foreign collection program or indicative of a major technology advancement by a potential adversary.

Contributors

Q1. What other agencies did the DNI and Secretary of Defense determine were relevant to the development of the report on unidentified aerial phenomena?

A1. The DNI and the Secretary of Defense sought input from across the IC, the armed services, and a number of other DoD and civilian agencies.

Q2. What/Which departments and agencies have capabilities and responsibilities that contribute to analysis of unidentified phenomena data collected by geospatial intelligence, signals intelligence, human intelligence, and measurement and signals intelligence?

A2. A number of agencies across the USG have capabilities and responsibilities that are germane to the topic of unidentified aerial phenomena.

Q3. Were any subject matter experts or foreign governments, such as the 5 Eyes consulted or briefed with the preparation and delivery of the CDA?

A3. A number of subject matter experts from across the community, including Five Eyes partners, were engaged in response to the preparation and delivery of this CDA.

Q4. If not, will our intelligence partners be briefed on this in the interest of identifying potential and similar foreign adversary-related threats, if any?

A4. We are willing to discuss the findings with partners.

Response and Delivery

Q1. To which committees was the report delivered?

A1. The report was delivered to the congressional intelligence and armed services committees.

Q. Was the report delivered to Congress on time?

A2. The report was delivered to Congress on time.

Q3. Will the report be released to the public?

A3. An unclassified report will be released to the public on DNI.gov.

ODNI Authorities and Oversight

Q1. What authorities did the ODNI employ to access and direct a unified, comprehensive process to collect and analyze intelligence on unidentified aerial phenomena?

A1. The ODNI conducted and oversaw this investigation consistent with its authorities as currently enumerated by law.

Q2. What ODNI component or element, if any, is responsible to ensure centralized collection and analysis of unidentified aerial phenomena?

A2. To date, the ODNI recognizes that in the language of the NDAA, the Department of the Navy has had responsibility for centralizing the collection and analysis of advanced aerial threats to military aviation, and has delegated responsibility for this mission to the Director, UAPTF.

This report was produced by ODNI in collaboration with the UAPTF. The report makes high-level recommendations for a unified interagency collection strategy and centralized analysis of UAP data.

Q3. Why was ODNI chosen to release this report, and not the Navy or DIA, as all of these findings are sourced by them?

A3. The Intelligence Authorization Act of 2021 requires that the DNI, in consultation with SECDEF, submit an intelligence assessment on this topic.



OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
FROM THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS

NEWS RELEASE

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
ODNI News Release No. 23-21
June 25, 2021

ODNI Releases Preliminary Assessment on Unidentified Aerial Phenomena

WASHINGTON, D.C. – Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines today submitted to Congress a preliminary intelligence assessment of the threat posed by Unidentified Aerial Phenomena and the progress the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force has made in understanding this threat. The release of this assessment is in response to a requirement in the Intelligence Authorization Act of 2021.

The unclassified version of the assessment will be posted on dni.gov later today.

###

- Later today the DNI will release the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena (UAP) report and we wanted to give you a sense of what is coming and try to answer any questions you might have.
- The report, and this issue more generally, has received a great deal of media attention with a broad range of reactions from the American public, but we want to make clear that we take this issue very seriously, and have structured our analysis, the report and our way ahead accordingly.
- This report reflects the work of the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force (UAPTF), which we have supported, using our office to coordinate across the intelligence community and provide analytic support.
- This release responds to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence report attached to the FY21 Intelligence Authorization Act, and the report provides policymakers a preliminary assessment of the work done to date--and the challenges associated with--characterizing the safety of flight associated with UAP and any related national security issues.
- What the task force and our analysis revealed is that we have quite a bit of work yet to do in order to truly assess and address the threat posed by UAP. While we are further ahead than we were just a few years ago, we need to build a comprehensive mechanism and potentially invest additional resources if we are to effectively address the challenge of identifying, analyzing, and responding to UAP – consequently this report represents an important but interim step.
- I would also highlight the report recognizes that historical sociocultural stigmas associated with UAPs create an additional challenge to timely and standardized reporting, and we applaud the UAP Task Force’s work in this area as a means toward improving our available datasets and understanding over time.
- For the report itself, in this preliminary assessment the review concentrated on 144 reports that occurred between 2004 and 2021. **Let me turn it over to Mr. Scott Bray to cover a few specifics that you will see in the report.**
- The UAP documented in this limited dataset demonstrate an array of aerial behaviors, reinforcing the possibility there are multiple types of UAP requiring different explanations.
- Our analysis supports an organizational frame for evaluating UAP that would have them fall into one of five explanatory categories: (1) airborne clutter; (2) natural atmospheric phenomena; (3) USG or industry developmental programs; (4) foreign adversary systems; and (5) a catchall “other” bin.

- With one exception, the report does not yet bin the different incidents identified into these categories, though it does describe some of the work done to begin to effectively characterize UAP and some of the patterns that have emerged, but we will need to improve our capacity to further analyze the remaining UAP, even as we accept that there will be limits to our capacity to characterize and understand UAP.
- Other Scott Bray points...
- **Pitch back from Scott Bray** One thing I'd like to add from an ODNI perspective is that both the classified and unclassified reports will state that we currently lack data to indicate any UAP are part of a foreign collection program or indicative of a major technology advancement by a potential adversary. We will continue to monitor for evidence of such programs due to the counterintelligence concern that would pose.
- That is a good segue to the way forward, so in terms of next steps, the ODNI will work with DoD to develop an overarching UAP collection strategy and R&D technical roadmap intended to address the issues identified in the report, particularly as the relate to expanding and standardizing reporting, consolidating and integrating UAP data, potentially investing in some additional collection opportunities, which together will enable us to deepen our analysis.
- We intend to update Congress on our process on these efforts in 90 days.
- I would highlight again, that at the DNI's direction we have and will continue to approach this work with seriousness and rigor. Our approach has been driven by science and data. And we have attempted to outline a standardized process moving forward that addresses this issue in a manner driven by science and information.
- Scott, is there anything else you'd like to add on the way ahead from DoD's perspective?
- **If needed** Let me turn it back over to (b) (6) so we can take a few of your questions.

COMPILATION | UAP REPORT

25-27 JUNE 2021

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PRINT/ONLINE

1. Closer encounters: How UFOs became a target for US intelligence again – 6/27

Agence France-Presse | Sebastian Seibt

A hotly anticipated US government report on unidentified aerial phenomena (UAP) was released on Friday. After decades of mysterious reported sightings, the Pentagon had too little data to accurately determine the nature of these flying objects. But the fact that the report even exists is a marvel in itself, dating back to events from 1947.

While Doctor Who, The X-Files and ET fuel our imaginations with the possibility of alien life on earth, they remain works of fiction. But the nine-page report on UFOs, released by the US Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Pentagon last Friday, is very much real.

The document discloses 144 observations of what the government calls “unidentified aerial phenomenon” (UAP) dating all the way back to 2004, most of which were reported by US Navy personnel. Mysterious flying objects, described in the report as a “potential threat” to US national security, were said to “probably lack a single explanation”.

Although the nature of these UFOs is still unknown, the document’s publication is a climactic moment in the decades spent analysing sightings. The US military has been tracking, deflecting and debunking observations of UFOs and “flying saucers” since the 1950s.

The truth is still out there

Bizarrely enough, efforts to disclose intelligence on UFOs wouldn’t have been possible without Donald Trump and the Covid-19 pandemic. In December 2020, just before leaving the White House, Trump signed a \$2.3 trillion (€1.9tn) coronavirus relief bill into law. The bill included a clause ordering the US Department of Defense to tell Congress everything they knew about UFOs. And they had six months to do so.

The news ignited excitement among alien enthusiasts, eagerly waiting for the report to be released. But to their dismay, there was little evidence to confirm or deny any intergalactic visitations. Possible explanations for UAP included birds, drones, atmospheric phenomena like ice crystals, innovative developments by US government entities and uncharted technologies by adversaries such as Russia or China. However, the report clearly stated a “lack [of] sufficient information” in its dataset “to attribute incidents to specific explanations”.

Only one of the reported sightings was fully accounted for. Classified as airborne clutter, it was identified “with high confidence” as a large, deflating balloon. “The others remain unexplained,” the report said.

There is still hope for enthusiasts, though. In the next three months, the Pentagon will develop a new strategy for collecting and tracking information on potential sightings.

“It is critical that the United States maintain operations security and safety at DoD ranges,” Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen Hicks wrote in a memo released on Friday. “To this end, it is equally critical that all US military aircrews or government personnel report whenever aircraft or other devices interfere with military training. This includes the observation and reporting of UAPs.”

UFOs: a bipartisan fascination

But a lack of conclusive evidence is precisely what could fuel more theories of otherworldly visitations, to which the US government is clearly not immune. The surprising decision to publish the report was described by the BBC as “a cultural shift that saw the US military and US political leadership go from extra-terrestrial-sceptic to ET-curious”.

In fact, UFOs have become a rare unifying topic across political lines. “After this last year, it’s kind of nice to see something that’s bipartisan,” Robert Powell, an executive board member of the Scientific Coalition for UAP Studies, told the Washington Post.

On the left, former presidential candidate Hillary Clinton, Bill Clinton’s chief of staff John Podesta and former Democratic Senate leader Harry M. Reid all expressed an interest in researching unidentified aerial phenomenon. Former President Barack Obama also chimed in, acknowledging in May 2021 that “there’s footage and records of objects in the skies that we don’t know exactly what they are”.

In the search for greater transparency, the top Republican on the Senate intelligence committee Marco Rubio said in May that despite the “stigma on Capitol Hill” resulting in “giggles” from his colleagues, the issue was worth investigating. He was joined by Fox news host Tucker Carlson, who referred to UFOs as a “very big issue”.

From the margins to the centre-stage

Often relegated to fringe, unscientific and even conspiratorial theories reserved for “ufologists”, it’s the first time since the 1950s that the topic has been taken seriously by the US government. After the pilot of a small plane reported seeing several “saucer-like” objects flying near Mount Rainier in Washington state in a 1947 newspaper headline, ordinary citizens followed suit. Sightings of “flying saucers” started exploding in numbers.

In the summer of that same year, theories circulated that an alien spacecraft had crashed near a military site in Roswell, New Mexico. US military officials visited the crash site and said they found remnants of a crashed weather balloon, but their findings weren’t enough to quell what had already become a national sensation.

Because of the Cold War, the US military wasn’t as worried about coming face to face with an alien as it was about discovering a Soviet machine more technically advanced than their own. So in 1953, a CIA advisory panel of experts was formed to officially investigate unidentified flying objects, saying they posed a potential threat to national security.

In a lengthy investigation on the relationship between UFOs and the Pentagon published by the New Yorker magazine in April 2021, journalist Gideon Lewis-Kraus wrote: “The Cold War made it crucial that the US government be perceived to have full control over its airspace.”

What ensued was a vast media campaign in the 1960s, orchestrated by the US government to try to dissuade the population from tracking down “flying saucers”. For a period of about 40 years, the US government was entirely silent on the issue. This never stopped ufologists from pilgrimaging across the “Extraterrestrial Highway” in the Nevada desert to Area 51, a US Air Force facility said to host an alien spacecraft that has become a popular tourist destination.

Later on in 2017, the New York Times published an article about the Pentagon’s mysterious UFO programme and the subject came back into the limelight. The article explained that sightings had frequently come from the US military itself, shattering the myth that the government considered civilian reports to be nonsense spewed by conspiracy theorists.

Since then, US media outlets have been able to access several videos and audio recordings of US Air Force pilots who have come face to face with unidentifiable objects flying at supersonic speeds, their movements hard to replicate.

Playing politics with Blink-182

Months before the report on UAP was ordered by Trump, the US Department of Defense formally released three Navy videos showing unidentified aerial phenomena blurrily moving against dark backdrops. Unintentionally stoking ufologists hopes that extra-terrestrial life exists, the Pentagon’s intention was to “clear up any misconceptions”.

The videos were first released between December 2017 and March 2018 by To The Stars Academy of Arts & Sciences, a private company co-founded by former Blink-182 member Tom DeLonge.

As to the question of why UFOs are coming back into the spotlight now, many speculate it could be tied to tense US-Russia relations. Just like in the beginning of the Cold War, the US once again feels its military and technological superiority is under threat.

David Clarke, an associate professor at Sheffield Hallam University in the UK, told the Washington Post: “My sort of view of this is UFOs are a product of the Cold War.” He said he found it “interesting that UFOs should once again come into public prominence” as they have today.

2. 8 takeaways from the government's big UFO report – 6/27

CNN | Chris Cillizza

On Friday evening the US intelligence community released something remarkable: An unclassified report to Congress of unidentified aerial phenomena (UAP) aka UFOs.

Which is a big deal! Especially when you consider that, for decades, the American government totally denied the existence of flying objects that they simply could not identify or, in some situations, explain.

The 9-page report isn't exactly an exhaustive study of UFOs, nor does it confirm or debunk the existence of alien life. And that it was released on a Friday night in the summer is also not an accident in terms of the government doing everything they can to bury the report.

Despite all of that, there were a number of interesting tidbits in the report. I pulled out some key quotes -- and added some context as well. That's below.

1. "Our analysis of the data supports the construct that if and when individual UAP incidents are resolved they will fall into one of five potential explanatory categories: airborne clutter, natural atmospheric phenomena, USG or U.S. industry developmental programs, foreign adversary systems, and a catchall 'other' bin."

OK, so there are five basic categories for UFOs according to the report: Random airborne, uh, stuff (like birds), weather phenomena, defense prototypes -- either from the US or "foreign adversary systems" and then the "other bin." And, yes, I (and the rest of the world) am most interested in the "other" bin.

2. "After carefully considering this information, the UAPTF focused on reports that involved UAP largely witnessed firsthand by military aviators and that were collected from systems we considered to be reliable."

The UAPTF is short for Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force, of course. (There's nothing that the government likes more than acronyms.) And, what this line says is that the task force decided to give precedence to UFO reports "witnessed firsthand by military aviators." Which is rightly read to mean that these reports are a) serious and b) credible.

3. "No standardized reporting mechanism existed until the Navy established one in March 2019. The Air Force subsequently adopted that mechanism in November 2020, but it remains limited to USG reporting."

Amazing! There was no formal way within the government to record UFO sightings until the Navy started one in 2019!!! And the Air Force didn't follow suit until, roughly, six months ago! Which reveals a) how resistant the government has been to acknowledging UFOs and b) how many sightings were almost certainly missed.

4. "[There were] 144 reports originated from USG sources. Of these, 80 reports involved observation with multiple sensors."

This line establishes the universe, ahem, that the task force examined. There were incidents between 2004 and 2021 -- and more than half were confirmed by "multiple sensors."

5. "Narratives from aviators in the operational community and analysts from the military and IC describe disparagement associated with observing UAP, reporting it, or attempting to discuss it with colleagues. Although the effects of these stigmas have lessened as senior members of the scientific, policy, military, and intelligence communities engage on the topic seriously in public, reputational risk may keep many observers silent, complicating scientific pursuit of the topic."

Important stuff here -- an acknowledgment that the number of reports of UFOs may have been kept artificially low because of the stigma long attached to reporting these sorts of things, particularly among the military and

intelligence community. That, according to the task force, has lessened somewhat as "senior members of the scientific, policy, military, and intelligence communities engage on the topic seriously in public."

6. "In 18 incidents, described in 21 reports, observers reported unusual UAP movement patterns or flight characteristics. Some UAP appeared to remain stationary in winds aloft, move against the wind, maneuver abruptly, or move at considerable speed, without discernable means of propulsion. In a small number of cases, military aircraft systems processed radio frequency (RF) energy associated with UAP sightings."

Eyes emoji!!!! Like, this seems like a big deal! A total of 18 incidents where UFOs "appeared to remain stationary in winds aloft, move against the wind, maneuver abruptly, or move at considerable speed, without discernable means of propulsion." In plain English, that means that military personnel spotted unidentified aerial phenomena that appeared to be unaffected by wind, move in ways that can't be explained and be propelled in ways that can't be explained. Which is very, very interesting.

7. "With the exception of the one instance where we determined with high confidence that the reported UAP was airborne clutter, specifically a deflating balloon, we currently lack sufficient information in our dataset to attribute incidents to specific explanations."

So, one time the thing that people thought was a UFO was a "deflating balloon." But, ALL the other times the military and intelligence community can't explain what the heck the UFO actually was. Which, again, BIG DEAL.

8. "Although most of the UAP described in our dataset probably remain unidentified due to limited data or challenges to collection processing or analysis, we may require additional scientific knowledge to successfully collect on, analyze and characterize some of them."

Most of these episodes remain mysterious, according to the report, because there simply isn't adequate information on hand to explain them. Then, however, there are some incidents that "may require additional scientific knowledge to successfully collect on, analyze and characterize some of them." Like, advanced science beyond our current capacity. Interesting!

3. New Pentagon report sheds little light on UFOs – 6/27

The Hill | Chris Impey

A large, deflating balloon. That's the only definitive interpretation of a UFO among 144 sightings in the recent Pentagon report to Congress. And it's the best analogy for my reaction to this much-anticipated assessment of unidentified aerial phenomena (UAP).

The report comes from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. It scrupulously avoids using the term UFO or the words "alien" or "extraterrestrial." It declines to draw any conclusions, saying that available data is "largely inconclusive" and noting it is limited and inconsistently reported. The military prefers the term UAP in part to avoid the stigma attached to UFOs. The report worries about increased air "clutter" and leaves open the possibility that some UAP sightings are the advanced technologies of foreign adversaries. It gives no oxygen to the "true believers" in UFOs as alien spacecraft and it fails to invite scientists to collaborate on explaining the most mysterious sightings.

It's a big anticlimax. How did we get here?

Ground zero for UFOs in the United States was Roswell, New Mexico in 1947. The fact the Roswell incident was explained as the crash of a military, high-altitude balloon did nothing to stem the tide of new sightings. Since then, nearly a hundred thousand UFO sightings have been reported, along with hundreds of claims of alien abduction. The U.S. military has been looking into UFOs since the Roswell incident. For much of that time, the investigations have been kept secret.

The first major academic survey of UFOs in 1968, the Condon Report, said that no scientific knowledge had been gained from 21 years of study of the phenomenon. However, a review led by Stanford professor Peter Sturrock in 1998 concluded that some sightings are accompanied by physical evidence that warrants investigation. Sturrock also surveyed professional astronomers and found that a majority of them thought that UFOs were worthy of scientific study.

Yet, mainstream scientists resist being drawn into the debate over UFOs. It's easy to see why. On the one hand, astronomers are confident that there is life beyond Earth. Dramatic progress in the search for exoplanets means there are about 300 million planets that could host biology in our galaxy, with billions of years for that life to evolve intelligence and technology. Aliens probably do exist and it's unlikely that we are the most advanced civilization. On the other hand, evidence that UFOs represent alien visits to the Earth is very weak. Most sightings can be attributed to weather balloons or astronomical phenomena such as meteors, fireballs and the planet Venus. There are many resources giving mundane explanations for UFO sightings.

The public has already decided. Nearly half of Americans think that UFOs represent aliens visiting the Earth. Government secrecy has contributed to conspiracy theories that swirl around UFOs. Even though UFO simply means "unidentified flying object," something with no obvious explanation, UFOs have taken deep root in some parts of the public consciousness. In fact, they have taken on the attributes of a new religion. Scientists who research UFOs risk being ostracized by their colleagues while being flamed by the "true believers," who might resent skepticism and evidence-based reasoning being applied to their subject.

Returning to the Pentagon report, it acknowledges that a majority of the reports can be traced to terrestrial causes: airborne debris like plastic bags, atmospheric phenomena like ice crystals and conventional aircraft from the U.S. or other countries. Others may be attributable to sensor anomalies. There's no sign in the report of a serious scientific analysis and no mention of the fact that the three Navy videos that caused a recent stir have conventional explanations.

The message to Congress: More data is needed, and we'll get back to you in 90 days. For the \$700 billion Pentagon, and the \$60 billion National Intelligence Program, this \$22 million report is a drop in the bucket. For that price, we might have expected something with more meat.

So, the slender nine-page report has landed with a faint thud on Congress's desk. Forgive the analogy, but the real sound was more like that of a large, deflating balloon.

- Chris Impey is a professor of astronomy at the University of Arizona. He is the author of hundreds of research papers on observational cosmology and education, and he has written popular books on black holes, the future of space travel, teaching cosmology to Buddhist monks, how the universe began, and how the universe will end. His massive open online courses have enrolled over 300,000 people.

4. 4 takeaways from the US intelligence community's UFO report – 6/26

CNN | Katie Bo Williams

Washington - The US intelligence community on Friday released a hotly anticipated report on what it knows about a series of mysterious sightings of unidentified flying objects by Navy pilots and others.

The report, which examined 144 reports of what the government terms "unexplained aerial phenomena" between 2004 and 2021, is among the first acknowledgments by the US government that it is looking into UFOs as a serious national security concern.

"UAP clearly pose a safety of flight issue and may pose a challenge to U.S. national security," the report states.

Here are the top four takeaways from the report:

No evidence of aliens — but what are they?

Investigators found no evidence that the sightings represented extraterrestrial life, a senior US official told reporters on Friday, although they didn't rule out the possibility.

"Of the 144 reports we are dealing with here, we have no clear indications that there is any non-terrestrial explanation for them — but we will go wherever the data takes us," the official said.

Even if they are not visiting life from another world, that doesn't mean investigators know what these strange sightings are. Of the 144 reports covered by the study, officials were able to explain only one of them. Investigators were convinced that the majority of the sightings were indeed "physical objects," the official told reporters on Friday.

"Most of the UAP reported probably do represent physical objects given that a majority of UAP were registered across multiple sensors, to include radar, infrared, electro-optical, weapon seekers, and visual observation," the report found. In 11 cases, pilots reported "near-miss" collisions with these strange objects.

No evidence of foreign government involvement, either.

For lawmakers, intelligence and military personnel working on the issue, the bigger and more likely concern was not that alien life is visiting Earth but rather that a foreign adversary like Russia or China might have developed some kind of next-generation technology that the United States doesn't know about.

At least for now, there's no evidence that the strange sightings are foreign surveillance or new technology, the report found.

Still, it's possible that some of the 143 unexplained cases might wind up being foreign technology. That's one of the reasons the report doesn't include more examples of sightings that haven't previously been made public.

"They're very sensitive to, if this is an adversary, you want to be really careful about saying, 'We know this and we don't know that,' " said Rep. Jim Himes, a Connecticut Democrat on the House Intelligence Committee who received a briefing on the matter from Navy and FBI officials last week.

"The report is going to be a little unsatisfying for that reason and that reason alone," he said.

Why don't they know more?

In short: bad data.

"The limited amount of high-quality reporting on unidentified aerial phenomena hampers our ability to draw firm conclusions about the nature or intent of UAP," the report found.

Officials don't believe any two of these 144 sightings are necessarily the same thing. For the report, investigators tried to sort the incidents into five categories: airborne clutter, like birds or weather balloons; natural atmospheric phenomena; US government or industry developmental programs; foreign adversary systems; and an alluring catchall -- "Other."

But in 143 cases, analysts simply lacked the technical information they needed to be able to come to firm conclusions. Some reports of sightings included no sensor data at all for engineers to examine but rather were solely verbal recollections by pilots.

Reporting was also hampered by the cultural "stigma" associated with UFOs, investigators found.

"Narratives from aviators in the operational community and analysts from the military and IC describe disparagement associated with observing UAP, reporting it, or attempting to discuss it with colleagues," the report said.

Part of what the Pentagon and the intelligence community intend to do next is develop a standardized reporting system for sightings.

They also plan to begin collecting data in places where pilots are not flying to see if there is a baseline level of activity that they can record. Right now, the senior US official said, there is a "reporting bias" in the database of sightings they have, because most of the reports they have are from Navy pilots.

UFO-ologists (and some lawmakers) disappointed

Some congressional sources who have seen the classified version of the report have already expressed disappointment there's not more of an explanation for the episodes, saying the report raises more questions than it answers.

Many lawmakers said the report signaled a need for further study on UFOs.

"This report is an important first step in cataloging these incidents, but it is just a first step," Sen. Marco Rubio of Florida, the top Republican on the Senate Intelligence Committee, said in a statement on Friday. "The Defense Department and Intelligence Community have a lot of work to do before we can actually understand whether these aerial threats present a serious national security concern."

The report is almost certain to disappoint UFO-ologists who had hoped it might offer definitive proof that the US government has made contact with extraterrestrial life -- what is known in those communities as "the Disclosure."

But the report does signal an extraordinary shift in attitudes within the national security community about what had long been considered a fringe issue, after years of Washington infighting.

Erasing the stigma surrounding a serious discussion of UFOs was also the goal for lawmakers in 2020 when they passed legislation requiring the Pentagon and intelligence community to produce this report.

That goal, at least, appears to be within sight, some lawmakers say.

"The stigma is gone," Rep. Mike Quigley, D-Ill., said last week following the House Intelligence Committee briefing.

"The fact that they are taking this sort of seriously for the first time I think is important," Quigley added.

5. Five things to know about the UFO report – 6/26

The Hill | Celine Castronuovo

The highly anticipated U.S. intelligence report on unidentified flying objects (UFOs) released Friday has bolstered calls for increased research into UFOs and possible signs of extraterrestrial life.

The report, released by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), said that the U.S. government has encountered 144 UFOs — or unidentified aerial phenomena (UAP), as the government refers to them — since 2004, with nearly all remaining a mystery.

The nine-page study was originally commissioned as part of a provision in the coronavirus relief package enacted by former President Trump last year following a push from lawmakers who cited interest in investigating a surge in UFO sightings by U.S. military aircraft.

While the report offers a glimpse into the ongoing studies into UFOs by a federal task force, the findings have prompted even more questions and speculation on potential explanations for the sightings.

Vast majority of UFO cases remain unexplained

The Office of Naval Intelligence's UFO task force said in the report that while it was able to identify one of the more than 140 objects with "high confidence," the vast majority of reported encounters remain riddled with mystery.

The task force said the one identified object was "a large, deflating balloon," but listed several possible explanations for the other objects, including airborne clutter like birds and "recreational unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV)," as well as natural atmospheric phenomena like ice crystals and "thermal fluctuations that may register on some infrared and radar systems."

The report also listed among possible explanations "developments and classified programs by U.S. entities," as well as possible technologies deployed by Russia, China or other countries.

Intelligence officials said that they grouped other UAP in a category labeled "other," to mark objects that require "additional scientific knowledge to successfully collect on, analyze and characterize some of them."

Stops short of ruling out extraterrestrial life

While the report offers a range of possible explanations for the sightings, it does not specifically mention or rule out the possibility for extraterrestrial life, a phenomenon that has long captured the public interest and has gained increased attention with more probes into UFO sightings.

The report noted that in a "limited number of incidents, UAP reportedly appeared to exhibit unusual flight characteristics," though it conceded that the "observations could be the result of sensor errors, spoofing, or observer misperception and require additional rigorous analysis."

The task force also identified some patterns in the UAP observations, including similarities in "shape, size, and, particularly, propulsion," as well as the fact that some UAP sightings "tended to cluster around U.S. training and testing grounds," which it noted "may result from a collection bias as a result of focused attention, greater numbers of latest-generation sensors operating in those areas, unit expectations, and guidance to report anomalies."

While the ODNI did not make any specific mention of the possibility of life beyond Earth, Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Mark Warner (D-Va.) said Friday that the report "marks the beginning of efforts to understand and illuminate what is causing these risks to aviation in many areas around the country and the world."

Raises specter of advanced-tech from China, Russia

One possible explanation mentioned in the report was that the unidentified objects could be advanced technologies developed by adversaries like China or Russia.

The theory has drawn increased attention recently as both China and Russia have invested substantially in hypersonic technology, suggesting that perhaps their military technology has evolved far beyond the capabilities of the U.S.

The Friday report noted that a handful of the reported UAP "demonstrate advanced technology," including appearing "to remain stationary in winds aloft, move against the wind, maneuver abruptly, or move at considerable speed, without discernable means of propulsion."

The report also said that the federal task force has some data that seemingly shows “UAP demonstrating acceleration or a degree of signature management,” with military aircraft systems processing radio frequency energy associated with UAP sightings in a small number of cases.

However, the ODNI noted that it lacks enough data “to indicate any UAP are part of a foreign collection program or indicative of a major technological advancement by a potential adversary.”

Objects could pose a threat to national security, pilot safety

The possibility of foreign adversaries being behind the UAP also brings with it potential national security threats, the ODNI noted in Friday’s report.

The document specifically noted the possibility of safety threats in airspace, with the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force reporting 11 “documented instances in which pilots reported near misses with a UAP.”

“Depending on the location, volume, and behavior of hazards during incursions on ranges, pilots may cease their tests and/or training and land their aircraft, which has a deterrent effect on reporting,” the office said in the report.

With limited data available on the specifics of the observed UAP, the ODNI said that it will continue to monitor “for evidence of such programs given the counter intelligence challenge they would pose, particularly as some UAP have been detected near military facilities or by aircraft carrying the USG’s most advanced sensor systems.”

Future sightings will rely on more data, resources

Intelligence officials said that the ability to detect and study future sightings will depend largely on the level of investment in continued research that would “allow for a more sophisticated analysis of UAP that is likely to deepen our understanding.”

The intelligence office said that the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force’s (UAPTF) long-term goal is “to widen the scope of its work to include additional UAP events documented by a broader swath of USG personnel and technical systems in its analysis.”

“As the dataset increases, the UAPTF’s ability to employ data analytics to detect trends will also improve,” the report said.

The UAP task force, which was formed last year, is expected to develop artificial intelligence and machine learning algorithms “to cluster and recognize similarities and patterns in features of the data points,” including if the UAP match characteristics of known aerial objects like “weather balloons, high-altitude or super-pressure balloons, and wildlife,” the report stated.

While the intelligence office noted that most of the current UFO data is from reporting by the U.S. Navy, the UAP task force is looking to “standardize incident reporting across U.S. military services and other government agencies to ensure all relevant data is captured with respect to particular incidents and any U.S. activities that might be relevant.”

6. Feds Release UFO Report; SETI Expert Says: “I Don’t Think We Are Going To Hit A Klingon Craft” – 6/26

KPIX 5 (CBS, San Francisco) | Juliette Goodrich

SAN FRANCISCO (CBS SF/CNN) — A special Pentagon task force has released its long awaited report on a series of mysterious sightings of unidentified flying objects by Navy pilots and others.

The report’s conclusion — well, it’s inconclusive. Of the 144 reports covered by the study, officials were able to explain only one of them.

"Of the 143 — What are they?" Dr. Seth Shostak, a senior astronomer from the San Francisco-based SETI Institute, told KPIX 5. "They don't know — it can be anything. They did not rule out anything in any category and that means they didn't rule out what they call atmospheric clutter. Things in our airspace. They didn't rule out Chinese or Russian vehicles. They didn't rule out alien vehicles."

Investigators looked into what the government terms "unexplained aerial phenomena" between 2004 and 2021.

The report is almost certain to disappoint UFO-ologists who had hoped it might offer definitive proof that the US government has made contact with extraterrestrial life — what is known in those communities as "the Disclosure."

But the report does signal an extraordinary shift in attitudes within the national security community about what had long been considered a fringe issue, after years of Washington infighting.

Erasing the stigma surrounding a serious discussion of UFOs was also the goal for lawmakers in 2020 when they passed legislation requiring the Pentagon and intelligence community to produce the report.

That goal, at least, appears to be within sight, some lawmakers say.

Shostak said the report should not make people over concerned.

"I don't see anything in this report that is going to discourage me from getting on a commercial airline this weekend and flying somewhere," he said. "I don't think we are going to hit a Klingon craft."

7. U.S. unable to explain more than 140 unidentified flying objects, but new report finds no evidence of alien life – 6/26

Washington Post | Shane Harris and Missy Ryan

The U.S. government was unable to determine whether more than 140 unidentified flying objects, many of them reported by Navy aviators, were atmospheric events playing tricks on sensors or crafts piloted by foreign adversaries, or whether the objects were extraterrestrial in origin, according to a long-anticipated report released Friday by the nation's top intelligence official.

The report finds no evidence that the objects, characterized as unidentified aerial phenomena, or UAPs, were the handiwork of alien beings. But in almost all of the 144 cases that a team of government experts examined, a lack of data stymied their efforts to say definitively what they were.

The largely inconclusive results of the report, which was required by Congress, are sure to fuel Americans' long-running interest in unexplained sightings, which have received unprecedented levels of attention in recent years from government officials and lawmakers.

The mere existence of the report is a remarkable acknowledgment that human beings have encountered objects that perform feats we cannot explain.

"Some UAP appeared to remain stationary in winds aloft, move against the wind, maneuver abruptly, or move at considerable speed, without discernible means of propulsion," the report found. "In a small number of cases, military aircraft systems processed radio frequency (RF) energy associated with UAP sightings."

Observers reported these unusual movements and "flight characteristics" in 18 separate incidents. The task force analyzing the UAP incidents will now focus additional analysis on that small number of cases, the report said.

At only nine pages in length, the unclassified report is also likely to prompt public speculation about what information the government chose not to reveal.

NASA Administrator Bill Nelson said he had seen the classified UAP report when he was serving in the Senate. "The hair stood up on the back of my neck," he said in an interview. He also spoke with some of the pilots involved in the incidents it documented. "They know they saw something," he said.

While NASA was not involved in writing the public report, Nelson, who spent six days orbiting the Earth during a space shuttle mission in the 1980s, said he had asked the agency's scientists to study the incidents that the report addressed and their potential explanations. NASA has a small office devoted to searching for extraterrestrial life.

Nelson said his personal view was that the vastness of the universe suggested there must be alien life. "If the universe is that big . . . is there likelihood of life? My answer is yes."

Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-Va.), the chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said in a statement that he was first briefed on UAPs nearly three years ago.

"Since then, the frequency of these incidents only appears to be increasing. The United States must be able to understand and mitigate threats to our pilots, whether they're from drones or weather balloons or adversary intelligence capabilities. Today's rather inconclusive report only marks the beginning of efforts to understand and illuminate what is causing these risks to aviation in many areas around the country and the world," Warner said.

The report does find that not all the UAPs behaved in the same way, which led the experts to offer different hypotheses about what they might be. The objects "very clearly demonstrate an array of aerial behaviors," said a senior U.S. government official who described the report's findings to a group of reporters on the condition of anonymity because the document had not yet been released.

"There is no one answer about what these UAP are," the official said.

The report offers five categories of potential explanations for the objects, which were observed between 2004 and this year. The first is, essentially, junk — man-made objects cluttering the air, such as balloons or even plastic bags, that are mistaken for craft. Only one of the 144 encounters was definitively characterized with "high confidence," and it fell into this category. "In that case, we identified the object as a large, deflating balloon," the report said. "The others remain unexplained."

Then there is the air itself. Ice crystals, moisture or heat fluctuations could register as a flying object to cameras and sensors on aircraft or aboard ships at sea. Navy aircraft and vessels have tracked and, in some cases, recorded encounters with UAPs that appear to zoom across a field of vision at unexpected speed, which had led some experts to question whether the supposed objects were actually just tricks of light or water.

The third possible explanation, according to the report, is that the objects are some kind of craft designed by the U.S. government or an American corporation. But that explanation seemed unlikely, according to officials who had earlier been briefed on the report and were confident that the UAPs are not American technology.

The report's authors noted, however, that they were "unable to confirm" that classified government programs account for any of the UAP cases they examined.

The objects could have been designed by a foreign adversary, the report found, offering a fourth explanation. China and Russia are making strides in hypersonic technology and directed energy, areas of increasing focus at the Pentagon.

But the task force said it lacked the data to indicate that the UAPs "are part of a foreign collection program or indicative of a major technological advancement by a potential adversary."

The fifth and final category is one sure to entice ufologists and amateur sleuths, as well as U.S. officials: "Other." The description is something of a catchall that could apply to encounters that were brief or generated too little data to advance a theory. Some of these encounters might be better defined with more information or through scientific advances to analyze the phenomena, the report finds.

The task force's work doesn't end with the release of the report. The Pentagon announced that it would develop a plan to formally carry on the mission, which will use artificial intelligence and machine learning, the report said, to recognize similarities and patterns in data from encounters.

There is now a formal process for Navy personnel to collect and report information about sightings, and efforts are underway to create a standard process across the military services and among government agencies, which should help generate more information for future study.

The report also found that the stigma around reporting encounters with UAPs, and facing ridicule for it, had hampered efforts to understand the phenomena.

Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.), the vice chairman of the intelligence committee, said, "For years, the men and women we trust to defend our country reported encounters with unidentified aircraft that had superior capabilities, and for years their concerns were often ignored and ridiculed. This report is an important first step in cataloguing these incidents, but it is just a first step. The Defense Department and Intelligence Community have a lot of work to do before we can actually understand whether these aerial threats present a serious national security concern."

8. Few answers in unclassified UFO report – 6/25

The report has no explanations for 143 aerial phenomena incidents

ABC News | Luis Martinez

A highly anticipated report on UFOs, prepared by the U.S. intelligence community and delivered to Congress on Friday, does not provide definitive explanations for 143 encounters the U.S. military reported with unidentified aerial phenomena, or UAPs.

An unclassified version of the report, released on the Office of the Director of National Intelligence website, does not contain the words "alien" or "extraterrestrial" and says further study or "pending scientific advances" may be needed to help explain what are known as unexplained aerial phenomena or UAP's that fall into a vague category the report lists as "other."

But a U.S. government official did not rule out the possibility that future data may lead to non-Earth-related technologies.

"Of the 144 reports we are dealing with here, we have no clear indications that there is any non-terrestrial explanation for them – but we will go wherever the data takes us," said a U.S. government official.

"We are open to other hypotheses that is meant to recognize that we have many things that we are currently unexplained," said the official. "We are open to the possibility that some things may be unexplainable with our current level of understanding."

The seven-page report presented to congressional committees on Friday met a requirement Congress put in place last year requesting that the U.S. intelligence community take six months to prepare an unclassified and classified report on what the U.S. government knew about UAP's.

"The UAP documented in this limited dataset demonstrate an array of aerial behaviors, reinforcing the possibility there are multiple types of UAP requiring different explanations," the report said.

The report reviewed 144 UAP incidents reported by U.S. military personnel in recent years. Only one could be explained and was attributed to a large deflating balloon.

The report detailed that there was not enough data gathered from the remaining 143 incidents to provide explanations as to what was described, but it lists five hypotheses that may possibly explain some of them in the future.

Those categories include "airborne clutter" -- a reference to birds, balloons, or drones in the atmosphere -- natural atmospheric phenomena like ice crystals that may be present on sensors, U.S. government or industry developmental programs, systems from a foreign adversary, and the catch-all category listed as "other."

"We are confident that that at least some portion of the dataset, represents physical objects, because they fell from multiple sensors..

But the report acknowledged that the UAP incidents describe what a U.S. government official described as "an array of aerial behaviors" that indicate that "that not all UAP are the same thing. There is a wide, wide range of phenomena that we observe."

"There is not one single explanation for UAP's, it's rather a series of things," said the official. "And our analytic approach to this is to create a framework in which we have considered five explanatory categories that we believe are plausible explanations for a UAP that we observe."

9. Evidence on UFOs 'largely inconclusive': US intelligence report – 6/25

Agence France-Presse | Not Attributed

A highly awaited US intelligence report on dozens of mysterious unidentified flying object sightings said most could not be explained, but did not rule out that some could be alien spacecraft.

The unclassified report said researchers could explain only one of 144 UFO sightings by US government personnel and sources between 2004 and 2021, sightings that often were made during military training activities.

Eighteen of those, some observed from multiple angles, appeared to display unusual movements or flight characteristics that surprised those who saw them, like holding stationary in high winds at high altitude, and moving with extreme speed with no discernable means of propulsion, the report said.

Some of the 144 might be explained by natural or human made objects like birds or drones cluttering a pilot's radar, or natural atmospheric phenomena, the report said.

Others could be secret US defense tests, or unknown advanced technologies created by Russia or China, it said.

Yet others appeared to require more advanced technologies to determine what they are, it said.

The sightings of what the report calls unidentified aerial phenomena (UAP) "probably lack a single explanation," said the report from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

"We currently lack sufficient information in our dataset to attribute incidents to specific explanations."

The report made no mention of the possibility of -- or rule out -- that some of the objects sighted could represent extra-terrestrial life.

The military and intelligence community have conducted research on them as a potential threat.

"UAP clearly pose a safety of flight issue and may pose a challenge to US national security," the report said.

Some could be US rivals' intelligence collection operations or represent other technology so advanced that the United States military has nothing similar.

The report was ordered after more UFO sightings by military pilots became public and pilot and radar videos leaked out showing flying objects behaving strangely with no explanation.

It stressed that pilots and their aircraft are ill-equipped to identify out-of-the-ordinary objects floating around the skies.

The only one of the 144 incidents in the years covered by the report that was explained turned out to be a large deflating balloon.

The nine-page report released Friday did not discuss any specific incidents.

It was the public version of a more detailed classified version being supplied to the armed services and intelligence committees of Congress.

Mark Warner, chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said the frequency of UFO reports "appears to be increasing" since 2018.

"Today's rather inconclusive report only marks the beginning of efforts to understand and illuminate what is causing these risks to aviation in many areas around the country and the world.," Warner said in a statement.

"The United States must be able to understand and mitigate threats to our pilots, whether they're from drones or weather balloons or adversary intelligence capabilities,"

10. No ET, no answers: Intel report is inconclusive about UFOs – 6/25

Associated Press | Nomaan Merchant

WASHINGTON -- A long-awaited U.S. government report on UFOs released Friday makes at least one thing clear: The truth is still out there.

Investigators did not find extraterrestrial links in reviewing 144 sightings of aircraft or other devices apparently flying at mysterious speeds or trajectories. But they drew few other conclusions and instead highlighted the need for better data collection about what's increasingly seen by Democrats and Republicans as a national security concern. In all but one of the sightings investigated, there was too little information for investigators to even broadly characterize the nature of the incident.

There were 18 cases in which witnesses saw "unusual" patterns of movement or flight characteristics, the report said, adding that more analysis was needed to determine if those sightings represented "breakthrough" technology.

Long the domain of science fiction and so-called ufologists, the subject of UFOs has in recent years drawn serious study from the Pentagon and intelligence agencies. The prospect of an adversary spying with unknown technology has alarmed lawmakers in both parties.

Congress last year required the creation of the report delivered Friday. While its lack of conclusions has already been made public, the report still represents a milestone in the study of the issue.

U.S. officials who briefed reporters on condition of anonymity said there were "no clear indications" that the sightings could be linked to alien life. There is also no definitive linkage of sightings to potentially unknown technology of an adversary like Russia or China.

"It's clear that we need to improve our capacity to further analyze remaining UAP observations, even as we accept that there are some limits to our capacity to characterize and understand some of the observations that we have," one official said.

The report was published online and delivered to the House and Senate intelligence committees with a classified annex. Lawmakers were given a briefing last week on the investigation. One person who attended the classified briefing and spoke on condition of anonymity said lawmakers were given little information beyond what's publicly available and that the only videos shown had already been made public.

The report lists five potential categories of what the government calls "unidentified aerial phenomena," including the possibility of foreign adversaries flying unknown technology to events occurring naturally in the atmosphere.

But only one was categorized as "airborne clutter" and believed to be a large, deflating balloon. The rest are uncategorized due to lack of information. That includes three instances of potential sightings captured on videos that were declassified and released in recent years.

The Department of Defense will over the next three months develop a new strategy for collecting and tracking information on potential sightings. Part of the data collection effort is destigmatizing UAPs and pushing pilots to report what they see, even when what they see is implausible.

"A big problem around UAPs has been the cultural stigma," said U.S. Rep. Andre Carson, an Indiana Democrat and member of the House intelligence committee, in an interview last week. "It has largely been relegated to science fiction."

U.S. Sen. Marco Rubio, who as the top Republican on the Senate Intelligence Committee has long pushed for more disclosure about UAPs, called the report "an important first step in cataloging these incidents, but it is just a first step."

"The Defense Department and Intelligence Community have a lot of work to do before we can actually understand whether these aerial threats present a serious national security concern," Rubio said in a statement.

11. UFO report: US 'has no explanation' for sightings – 6/25

BBC | Not Attributed

The US government has said it has no explanation for dozens of unidentified flying objects seen by military pilots.

A Pentagon report released on Friday says of 144 reports made about the phenomena since 2004, all but one remain unexplained.

It does not rule out the possibility that the objects are extraterrestrial.

Congress demanded the report after the US military reported numerous instance of objects seen moving erratically in the sky.

The interim report released on Friday said most of the 144 reported cases of the "unidentified aerial phenomena", referred to as UAP, came in the last two years, after the US Navy put in place a standardised reporting mechanism.

In 143 of the reported cases, they "lack sufficient information in our dataset to attribute incidents to specific explanations".

UAP "probably lack a single explanation", the report said. Some could be technologies from another nation like China or Russia, others could be natural atmospheric phenomena like ice crystal that could register on radar

systems, while the report also suggested some could be "attributable to developments and classified programs by US entities".

The one case they could identify "with high confidence" was identified as "a large, deflating balloon", the report said.

It added that the UAP pose "a clear safety of flight issue and may pose a challenge to US national security".

12. UFO Sightings' Stigma Is Gone as U.S. Urges Pilots to Speak Up – 6/25

Bloomberg | Billy House, Daniel Flatley and Tony Capaccio

The U.S. government wants to take reports of unidentified flying objects more seriously based on several unexplained sightings reported by military pilots over the years, though there's little evidence that Earth is being visited by aliens, according to a new intelligence report.

The Director of National Intelligence said in a report released Friday that pilots will be encouraged to report "unexplained aerial phenomena" -- the government's preferred term for UFO sightings -- in an effort to collect additional data. That's a change from the government's previous stance toward the phenomena, which often involved ignoring or downplaying reports.

The report calls for an effort to "standardize the reporting, consolidate the data and deepen the analysis" of UAP occurrences, saying reported events likely fall into a swath of categories. That includes airborne clutter, like birds and balloons, natural atmospheric phenomena and even "foreign adversary systems." A final "other" category would be a catch-all for unexplained events. The word "alien" doesn't appear in the document.

The DNI report follows the Pentagon's formal release earlier this year of videos -- long circulated in the public domain -- showing American military pilots tracking unidentified flying objects that rotated or quickly switched directions in mid-air.

Earthly speculation for the objects has ranged from technical glitches in military software to evidence of high-tech and secret Russian or Chinese weaponry -- or evidence that humans aren't alone in the universe. The nine-page release followed a closed-door briefing on its contents last week to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees by the FBI and Navy officials.

Lawmakers, including House Intelligence Committee Democrat Michael Quigley of Illinois, said the report is most notable for a shift in attitude by intelligence and military officials from decades of publicly dismissing reports of unidentified aerial phenomena spotted in the sky to seeking and uncovering more knowledge about them.

Representative Andre Carson, an Indiana Democrat who chairs a House subcommittee that considers unexplained aerial phenomena, says he intends to hold a public hearing on the topic at some point.

13. Pentagon task force's UFO report released – many cases remain unexplained – 6/25

CBS News | Nicole Sganga, David Martin, Olivia Gazis and Eleanor Watson

After decades of dismissing U.F.O. sightings popularized in American culture, a U.S. government task force assigned to investigate what it calls "unidentified aerial phenomena," or UAPs, has found no evidence that objects came from outer space or a foreign adversary.

However, while there's no evidence the objects are extraterrestrial, senior government officials said Friday that nearly all of the incidents investigated remain unexplained.

"Of the 144 reports that we are dealing with here, we have no clear indications that there's any non-terrestrial explanation for them," a senior government official said, nixing the possibility of exotic sightings. "But again, we will go wherever the data takes us on this."

U.S. government officials who briefed reporters on Friday said there is no doubt that identified UAPs were physical objects, tamping down speculation that sightings could be optical illusions caused by atmospheric conditions or sensor malfunctions.

"From a safety of flight issue, we absolutely do believe that what we are seeing are not simply sensor artifacts. These are things that physically exist," a senior government official said. "They are physical objects." But officials stressed that objects detailed in the 144 reports represent a "variety" of phenomena.

In 80 of the 144 investigated incidents, the task force detected objects using multiple sensors, leading officials to determine UAPs posed a hazard to flights. Over the years, the task force determined there have been 11 near misses.

Congress in December asked the Pentagon's Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force (UAPTF), along with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and other intelligence agencies, to submit a report on what is known about UAPs; relevant committees received a classified version of the report on Friday, before the unclassified version was publicly released. Read the report [here](#):

Officials pored over 144 incidents between 2004 and 2021, relying heavily on observations made by military aviators.

Without evidence that UAPs are operated by an adversary like China or Russia, government officials say there is no reason to believe that a foreign power has made a technological breakthrough in recent years.

"A small portion of the data set has propulsion we cannot explain," a senior government official said. "That doesn't necessarily mean that there is an adversary that is introducing a technological surprise here."

The report found that 18 objects investigated possess propulsion systems that cannot be explained, due in part to insufficient data and reporting.

- The report categorized the incidents into five explanatory categories:
- Airborne clutter, like birds, balloons and plastic bags
- Natural atmospheric phenomena, like ice crystal formations or thermal fluctuations
- Industry developmental programs
- Foreign adversary systems, including possible technologies deployed by Russia or China

"Other," which, the officials said, was a "catch-all" section where a lack of data or scientific knowledge meant the incident was uncategorizable.

Officials said they were limited in their analysis by the nature of the data underlying the incidents, which came chiefly in the form of verbal reports that were only occasionally supported by video or photographic evidence. The task force has since begun work on a new mechanism through which they hoped to standardize data collection on UAPs and apply scientific and engineering approaches to their explanation, they said.

"Ultimately, we have to increase the volume as well as the quality of the data we have," one official said.

The officials told reporters a "majority" of the information included in the classified report was presented in the unclassified version. They said neither agency would be releasing any supplementary evidence, including photos or video, of the phenomena the report had assessed.

Limited information about the UAPs has trickled out over the last few months. The Defense Department task force confirmed in April that the scope of its work includes objects described as a "sphere," "acorn," "pyramid" and "metallic blimp" by military personnel.

In May, CBS News' "60 Minutes" spoke with naval aviators David Fravor and Alex Dietrich, who had never before talked publicly about their encounter in Southern California in 2004 that was visible on their radar and on video when they were flying in the Nimitz carrier strike group. They observed an object that looked like a Tic Tac moving over whitewater in an otherwise calm blue sea.

The two said that they saw the object, about the size of their F/A-18F, but with no markings or wings and also without exhaust plumes, mimicking the movements of their own plane.

"Oh there's, there's definitely something that ... I don't know who's building it, who's got the technology, who's got the brains. But there's — there's something out there that was better than our airplane," Fravor told "60 Minutes" correspondent Bill Whitaker.

14. US intelligence community releases long-awaited UFO report – 6/25

CNN | Katie Bo Williams, Zachary Cohen and Jeremy Herb

The US intelligence community on Friday released its long-awaited report on what it knows about a series of mysterious flying objects that have been seen moving through restricted military airspace over the last several decades.

In short, the answer according to Friday's report is very little, but the fact that the intelligence community released the unclassified document marks one of the first times the US government has publicly acknowledged that these strange aerial sightings by Navy pilots and others are worthy of legitimate scrutiny.

The report examined 144 reports of what the government terms "unidentified aerial phenomenon" — only one of which investigators were able to explain by the end of the study. Investigators found no evidence that the sightings represented either extraterrestrial life or a major technological advancement by a foreign adversary like Russia or China.

"Of the 144 reports we are dealing with here, we have no clear indications that there is any non-terrestrial explanation for them — but we will go wherever the data takes us," a senior US official said.

But investigators were also convinced that the majority of the sightings were "physical objects," the official told reporters on Friday.

"We absolutely do believe what we're seeing are not simply sensor artifacts. These are things that physically exist," the official said, noting that 80 of the reported incidents included data from multiple sensors. In 11 cases, investigators believed that there was a "near-miss" collision with US personnel.

Report follows years of infighting

After years of Washington infighting, including bureaucratic battles within the Pentagon and pressure from certain members of Congress, the US government finally appears to be taking seriously what has for so long been considered a fringe issue.

For lawmakers and intelligence and military personnel working on unexplained aerial phenomena, the bigger concern with the episodes is not that alien life is visiting earth, but rather that a foreign adversary like Russia or China might be fielding some kind of next-generation technology in American airspace that the United States doesn't know about.

That is one of the reasons this unclassified report will likely disappoint UFO-ologists who had hoped it might offer definitive proof the US government has made contact with extraterrestrial life.

"For years, the men and women we trust to defend our country reported encounters with unidentified aircraft that had superior capabilities, and for years their concerns were often ignored and ridiculed," Republican Sen. Marco

Rubio of Florida, the Vice Chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said in a statement on Friday. "This report is an important first step in cataloging these incidents, but it is just a first step. The Defense Department and Intelligence Community have a lot of work to do before we can actually understand whether these aerial threats present a serious national security concern."

If the sightings were the result of Chinese or Russian technology -- either some kind of unknown aircraft or a technology system that can spoof US radar and other surveillance and reconnaissance systems -- the intelligence community would not want to reveal what it does and doesn't know.

"They're very sensitive to, if this is an adversary, you want to be really careful about saying, 'we know this and we don't know that,'" said Rep. Jim Himes, a Democrat on the House Intelligence Committee who received a briefing on the matter from Navy and FBI officials last week.

"The report is going to be a little unsatisfying for that reason and that reason alone," he said.

Still, the fact that the intelligence community is producing reports on what the Pentagon has labeled UAPs (Unidentified Aerial Phenomenon) is itself extraordinary, as CNN has previously reported.

Even as sightings of unexplainable objects rose into the hundreds, Pentagon officials wrestled with how much time and resources to devote to investigating them.

Most of the 144 sightings covered in the report were recorded by US Navy pilots, although there were some reports from other US government sources — a clear "reporting bias" in the data set investigators examined, the US official said.

Investigators tried to categorize the 144 sightings into five categories: airborne clutter, like birds or weather balloons, natural atmospheric phenomena, US government or industry developmental programs, foreign adversary systems, and an alluring catchall: "Other."

"There is a wide range of phenomena that we observed that we ultimately put into the UAP category," the official said. "There is not one single explanation of UAP."

But in the 143 unexplained cases investigators simply lacked the necessary data to categorize the sighting. Some reports included no technical data at all for engineers to examine, but rather were solely verbal recollections by pilots.

The report does not include any additional videos or UFO sightings.

Report raises more questions than answers

Congressional sources who have seen the classified version of the report have already expressed disappointment there's not more of an explanation to the episodes, saying that the report raises more questions than it answers.

Previous interviews with a half-dozen officials as well as documents reviewed by CNN depict a US military and intelligence community that's struggled over how to remove the issue from the realm of science fiction and consider its actual national security implications.

Even now, multiple sources told CNN, the government almost certainly wouldn't have moved to produce the report without public pressure from key lawmakers, as both Republicans and Democrats have taken an interest in the matter.

While former senior defense officials with knowledge of the most recent iteration of the department's investigations say the Pentagon took it seriously, some pilots and former officials tasked with investigating the matter say senior Pentagon leaders downplayed or ignored the threat.

Erasing the stigma surrounding a serious discussion of UFOs was also the goal for lawmakers in 2020 when they passed legislation requiring the Pentagon and intelligence community to provide more information about these UFO encounters, details that have, until recently, largely remained shrouded in secrecy.

Requiring production of the upcoming UFO report was also one way lawmakers have signaled that they intend to use their oversight authority to ensure coordination among the agencies involved, sources told CNN last month.

"One of the functions of a course like this is that it forces actual coordination within the agencies and makes clear that Congress is actually serious about its oversight function and that there's going to be increased scrutiny along the way," a congressional aide said at the time. "Some of it is a product of getting the agencies to take the issue more seriously and trying to help get rid of the stigma surrounding it."

15. UFO report reveals officials can't explain the mysterious sightings – 6/25

The report did not find any evidence to suggest the sightings were alien spacecraft but did not rule it out
Fox News | Thomas Barrabi

U.S. intelligence officials have no explanation for nearly all cases involving UFOs encountered by military pilots since 2004, according the findings of a highly anticipated report on the mysterious objects.

Of the 144 reported encounters with so-called unidentified aerial phenomena (UAPs) from 2004 to 2021, officials said they were able to identify just one with "high confidence," determining the object was a deflating balloon. The Pentagon task force said officials "currently lack sufficient information" to classify the other incidents with certainty.

Officials called on Congress to invest in standardized reporting and analysis of UAPs to aid efforts at reaching a conclusion on their origins. The report also found the objects could pose threats to flight safety and national security.

"UAP pose a hazard to safety of flight and could pose a broader danger if some instances represent sophisticated collection against U.S. military activities by a foreign government or demonstrate a breakthrough aerospace technology by a potential adversary," the report said.

Compiled by the office of the Director of National Intelligence, the report did not find any evidence to suggest the sightings were alien spacecraft or evidence of advanced technology possessed by a foreign power such as China or Russia. However, the report also did not rule out the possibility.

The report noted that observers saw "unusual UAP movement patterns or flight characteristics" in 18 of the incidents, including some cases where the objects moved "without discernible means of propulsion."

"For years, the men and women we trust to defend our country reported encounters with unidentified aircraft that had superior capabilities, and for years their concerns were often ignored and ridiculed," said Sen. Marco Rubio, R-Fla., vice chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee. "This report is an important first step in cataloging these incidents, but it is just a first step.

"The Defense Department and Intelligence Community have a lot of work to do before we can actually understand whether these aerial threats present a serious national security concern," he added.

Officials have identified five categories that are likely to explain the incidents once they are resolved: airborne clutter, natural atmospheric phenomena, classified U.S. technological development efforts, foreign adversary systems and a catch-all "other" category.

A portion of the report is expected to remain classified. Earlier this month, senior administration officials told the New York Times the classified material does not contain any information concluding the existence of alien spacecraft. They acknowledged that keeping part of the report hidden could prompt speculation otherwise.

Rep. Adam Schiff, D-Calif., chair of the House Intelligence Committee, said the report showed that encounters with UAPs are "not a rare occurrence."

"We should approach these questions without preconceptions to encourage a thorough, systematized analysis of the potential national security and flight safety risks posed by unidentified aerial phenomena, whether they are the result of a foreign adversary, atmospheric or other aerial phenomena, space debris, or something else entirely," Schiff said in a statement.

16. Why the Pentagon UFO report is deeply troubling for US security experts – 6/25

'If something's out there, let's seek it out, and it is probably a foreign power,' says chair of Senate foreign relations committee

The Guardian (UK) | Julian Borger

If the idea that we are being visited by aliens seems too much to contemplate, the thesis that the extraordinary-looking craft are the work of terrestrial adversaries seems only slightly less far-fetched – and at the same time, deeply troubling for US security experts.

In pressing for the Pentagon's UFO report to be published, congressional leaders briefed on the intelligence have pointed to the urgent security threat implied by the "unexplained aerial phenomena".

It came out of the sky: US releases highly anticipated UFO report

Read more

"If there are objects flying over military installations that could pose a security threat ... [it] needs to be declassified and revealed to American public," the Democratic chair of the Senate foreign relations committee, Mark Warner, told Fox 8 television. "If there's something out there, let's seek it out, and it is probably a foreign power."

The report, released Friday, found that while intelligence officials do not believe alien life is responsible for the dozens of reports of unidentified aerial phenomena (UAP), they cannot fully explain what is.

It said there was no evidence that the objects were linked to another country such as Russia or China – but it did not rule out the possibility.

Marik Von Rennenkampff, who served at the Pentagon and as an analyst in the state department's bureau of international security and nonproliferation, said that if a foreign power was behind the aircraft seen by US pilots and radar, they would have performed a breathtaking technological leap – and US intelligence would have had to have suffered an immense failure. He thought both were unlikely.

"China has well-documented issues with basic jet engines, they rely on espionage to develop their most advanced weapons systems. So, I struggle with China having developed this," Von Rennenkampff said. "Russia has a defense budget that is a fraction of the United States, and much of its military infrastructure is crumbling so I struggle with that too."

“So if it is China or Russia, then that’s extraordinary,” he added. “I don’t know how they did it, and it would be a monumental failure of intelligence collection on the part of the United States, orders of magnitude worse than 9/11.”

Jack Weinstein, an international security professor at Boston University and a former US air force lieutenant general, said: “If a foreign power had technology that could operate that fast, take turns that aerodynamically really shouldn’t be able to happen, that we would see that in operation during a conflict.”

“And if a foreign power was actually testing really high tech equipment, they would be testing high-tech equipment in a protected area of their country that the United States or other foreign powers couldn’t see,” Weinstein added. “If you get something that secret that can work that well, you’re not going to show it to anybody until you absolutely need it.”

Another option is that a foreign power had developed unmanned aircraft that could spoof US radar and instruments into seeing the incredible speeds and changes of direction that have been reported.

‘Something’s going on’: UFOs threaten national security, US politicians warn

[Read more](#)

Thomas Bania, professor of astronomy at Boston University, said: “Without the range, then one simply cannot tell speed, acceleration, etc. So the interpretation of speeds and turns (ie accelerations) that our US technology cannot match is just bogus. No need for invoking a foreign power with superior – much superior – technology.”

“Were it me running their electronic warfare show, I would build small drones and stuff them with electronics that would monitor and record everything our military radars would send at them,” Bania said. “Then I would get busy reverse engineering what our weaponry did. Then I would develop protocols to spoof radar locks back at us giving ranges that would imply these ridiculous motions.”

17. US Report Can't Explain UFOs, But Says They're Likely Real and Possibly a National Security Threat – 6/25

Military.com | Stephen Losey

Many unidentified flying objects observed by the military and other government sources since 2004 probably actually exist and may pose a threat to national security, according to an intelligence report released Friday.

Government sources originated 144 reports of unidentified aerial phenomena, or UAPs, the term the government now uses to describe objects popularly referred to as UFOs. Many incidents were witnessed firsthand by military aviators and observed by reliable sensor systems, the report adds.

UAPs largely remain a mystery. Aside from one that was identified as a large, deflating balloon, the government can't explain what they are.

The report gives no indication the UAPs' origins are extraterrestrial. But whatever they are and wherever they're from, the intelligence community says they exist -- and should be taken seriously.

"UAP clearly pose a safety of flight issue and may pose a challenge to U.S. national security," states the report from the Director of National Intelligence, or DNI, titled "Preliminary Assessment: Unidentified Aerial Phenomena." "Safety concerns primarily center on aviators contending with an increasingly cluttered air domain. UAP would also represent a national security challenge if they are foreign adversary collection platforms or provide evidence a potential adversary has developed either a breakthrough or disruptive technology."

The Pentagon announced Friday afternoon that Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks has ordered the military to draw up a plan to formalize the mission now performed by the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force.

Hicks said that military aircrews and other personnel need to speak up when they see UAPs.

"It is critical that the United States maintain operations security and safety at DoD ranges," she wrote in a memo released Friday by the Pentagon. "To this end, it is equally critical that all U.S. military aircrews or government personnel report whenever aircraft or other devices interfere with military training. This includes the observation and reporting of UAPs."

The DNI report states that 80 of the UFOs observed were tracked across multiple sensors, including radar, infrared, electro-optical sensors and weapon seekers, as well as visual observation. For that reason, the report concluded that most of the observed UFOs probably were actual physical objects.

In a few cases, the UAPs showed unusual flight characteristics, the report found, such as appearing to remain stationary in the air, moving against the wind, abruptly maneuvering, or traveling at considerable speed without any observable propulsion. The DNI said this could be the result of sensor errors, spoofing or observers misperceiving what was happening; it added that the issue needs further study.

In a handful of cases, military aircraft systems observed radio frequency energy alongside UAP sightings.

Reported UAP sightings tended to cluster around U.S. training and testing grounds, the report states, but that may be because there are more advanced sensors there and greater attention by personnel.

There is probably no single explanation for what UAPs are, the report concluded. They could be as mundane as airborne clutter such as birds, balloons and recreational drones, or airborne debris like plastic bags.

They could also be natural atmospheric phenomena such as ice crystals and moisture registering on some infrared and radar systems, the report states.

They also could be technology deployed by potential adversary nations such as China or Russia, or non-governmental entities.

The report acknowledges that some UAPs could be classified programs run by U.S. agencies, but said this could not be confirmed.

When it passed the fiscal 2021 Intelligence Authorization Act, Congress ordered the DNI and Pentagon to produce a report on the threat posed by UAPs and what progress the Defense Department's task force has made in understanding that threat.

18. Concerned over potential threats, DoD ramping up reporting efforts in wake of intel report on UFOs – 6/25

Military Times | Nomaan Merchant, The Associated Press and Howard Altman

WASHINGTON — In a memo to U.S. military leaders, Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen Hicks said a long-awaited U.S. government report released Friday highlights "the current challenges associated with assessing Unidentified Aerial Phenomena (UAP) occurring on or near DoD training ranges and installations.

"It is critical that the United States maintain operations security and safety at DoD ranges," Hicks wrote. "To this end, it is equally critical that all U.S. military aircrews or government personnel report whenever aircraft or other devices interfere with military training. This includes the observation and reporting of UAPs."

Investigators did not find extraterrestrial links in reviewing 144 sightings of aircraft or other devices apparently flying at mysterious speeds or trajectories. But they drew few other conclusions and instead highlighted the need for better data collection about what's increasingly seen by Democrats and Republicans as a national security

concern. In all but one of the sightings investigated, there was too little information for investigators to even broadly characterize the nature of the incident.

There were 18 cases in which witnesses saw “unusual” patterns of movement or flight characteristics, the report said, adding that more analysis was needed to determine if those sightings represented “breakthrough” technology.

The report, Hicks wrote, confirmed that the scope of UAP activity “expands significantly beyond the purview of the Secretary of the Navy, who heads the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force (UAPTF), and suggested process improvements to ensure timely collection of consistent data on UAP.”

She tasked the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security to develop a three-point plan to formalize the mission currently performed by the UAPTF. It will synchronize collection, reporting and analysis of UAP information and establish recommendations for securing military test and training ranges; increase staffing and authority to implement the plan and ensure that top military commanders and interagency partners receive reports of UAP observations within two weeks of an occurrence.

No longer just Sci-Fi

Long the domain of science fiction and so-called ufologists, the subject of UFOs has in recent years drawn serious study from the Pentagon and intelligence agencies. The prospect of an adversary spying with unknown technology has alarmed lawmakers in both parties.

Congress last year required the creation of the report delivered Friday. While its lack of conclusions has already been made public, the report still represents a milestone in the study of the issue.

U.S. officials who briefed reporters on condition of anonymity said there were “no clear indications” that the sightings could be linked to alien life. There is also no definitive linkage of sightings to potentially unknown technology of an adversary like Russia or China.

“It’s clear that we need to improve our capacity to further analyze remaining UAP observations, even as we accept that there are some limits to our capacity to characterize and understand some of the observations that we have,” one official said.

The report was published online and delivered to the House and Senate intelligence committees with a classified annex. Lawmakers were given a briefing last week on the investigation. One person who attended the classified briefing and spoke on condition of anonymity said lawmakers were given little information beyond what’s publicly available and that the only videos shown had already been made public.

The report lists five potential categories of what the government calls “unidentified aerial phenomena,” including the possibility of foreign adversaries flying unknown technology to events occurring naturally in the atmosphere.

But only one was categorized as “airborne clutter” and believed to be a large, deflating balloon. The rest are uncategorized due to lack of information. That includes three instances of potential sightings captured on videos that were declassified and released in recent years.

The Department of Defense will over the next three months develop a new strategy for collecting and tracking information on potential sightings. Part of the data collection effort is destigmatizing UAPs and pushing pilots to report what they see, even when what they see is implausible.

“A big problem around UAPs has been the cultural stigma,” said U.S. Rep. Andre Carson, an Indiana Democrat and member of the House intelligence committee, in an interview last week. “It has largely been relegated to science fiction.”

U.S. Sen. Marco Rubio, who as the top Republican on the Senate Intelligence Committee has long pushed for more disclosure about UAPs, called the report “an important first step in cataloging these incidents, but it is just a first step.”

“The Defense Department and Intelligence Community have a lot of work to do before we can actually understand whether these aerial threats present a serious national security concern,” Rubio said in a statement.

19. The new UFO report to Congress shows absolutely no evidence of aliens. Of course. – 6/25

The report didn’t state that the UFOs were not from outer space. But a failure to eliminate a hypothesis is not evidence for a hypothesis.

NBC News | Adam Larson

A lot has been made of an unusual provision in a pandemic relief bill passed last year that required government agencies to provide an analysis of “unidentified aerial phenomena,” or, in layman’s terms, UFOs. The ensuing report out Friday, however, rains on the parade of those who hoped the military would determine there was alien activity on Earth: It found no evidence that UFOs are alien in origin.

People who think we have footage of spaceships flown by little green men (or little gray men or, according to the “Men in Black” films, a pug) are unlikely to be swayed by this. True believers may in fact counter that the report couldn’t prove that UFOs aren’t from outer space, which is indeed correct: The report didn’t state that the UFOs were not from outer space (the report didn’t even mention the word “alien”). But a failure to eliminate a hypothesis is not evidence for a hypothesis.

Based on the information currently available to my remotely located editor, it’s not possible for her to eliminate the hypothesis that this article was actually typed by a hedgehog that got extremely lucky when walking on a keyboard. But that is not evidence that “Adam Larson” is just a pseudonym for an eccentric insectivore, nor does it make the belief that I am a hedgehog reasonable. (For the record, I am not a hedgehog.)

Likewise, while the intelligence report didn’t eliminate the hypothesis that UFOs are extraterrestrial in origin, it is also likely unable to eliminate the hypotheses that UFOs are dragons or flying pigs or the Norse god Odin riding Sleipnir, his magical eight-legged horse. Unidentified flying objects are just that: airborne objects that we can’t identify.

In fact, it would be odd if the report said the government could rule out an extraterrestrial origin of UFOs while still knowing next to nothing about what they are, just like it would be strange for a report on an unidentified serial killer to determine that the killer is not from Tulsa, Oklahoma, even though nothing else of their origins is known.

These sightings also lack any good supporting evidence to suggest they are life from other planets: UFOs were not observed entering our atmosphere from millions of miles away, leaving our atmosphere while en route to another planet or showing any sign of life, all things that would happen if UFOs really were extraterrestrials visiting us from Alpha Centauri.

Of course, those who believe “the truth is out there” might point to the fact that the government report exists at all. But government interest doesn’t inherently mean something is real. When national security is on the line, there’s little that government agencies (domestic and foreign) haven’t investigated. We’re familiar with the crazy ideas that were successful (try wrapping your head around how nuclear weapons work), but there are many other projects that proved to be boondoggles.

During World War II, a dentist proposed what he thought would be a revolutionary new weapon: bat bombs. The military could strap incendiary bombs to hundreds of bats, which would then be dropped over the Japanese countryside where they would roost in buildings that the bombs would set ablaze. Project X-Ray, as it was called, was canceled after researchers had spent \$2 million but only succeeded in destroying an Air Force hangar and a general’s car.

Around the same time the bat bomb project was canceled, the military was paying psychologist B.F. Skinner to create pigeon-guided missiles. The idea was that three pigeon pilots inside a missile would peck at the controls to steer the rocket; like the bat bombs, they never saw a battlefield.

The Japanese Empire, not to be outdone in the field of bizarre bombings, attached bombs to thousands of balloons and used easterly air streams to send them from Japan to the continental United States (and Alaska and Mexico and Hawaii and everywhere in between). Aiming a balloon at a target thousands of miles away works about as well as you'd expect, though they did manage to kill six American civilians in Oregon with one of the thousands of balloons released.

The Cold War saw research projects grounded more in cheesy pulp novels than reality. The CIA was so worried about the possibility that the Soviets had invented mind control techniques that they tried to develop their own. Collaborating with scientists from Imperial Japan and Nazi Germany, they gave unwitting volunteers LSD (a serious violation of research ethics). They failed to develop mind control, but they did introduce Ken Kesey (author of "One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest") and many other countercultural luminaries to dropping acid.

Later, a loosely organized group of military researchers, worried about the possibility the Soviets had recruited psychics (see a pattern here?), tried to recruit psychics of their own in an attempt to spy on enemy military bases, predict new types of enemy weapons and kill goats just by touching them. They supposedly killed at least one goat and definitively inspired a book with a movie adaptation that starred George Clooney: "The Men Who Stare at Goats."

This isn't to say that we shouldn't fund odd-sounding research (in fact, it's vital that we do) but merely to say that government funding does not by itself prove an idea is reasonable. (For a nonmilitary example, remember the bridge to nowhere?)

Ultimately, UFOs should be investigated not because we might need to call in Will Smith to fight aliens but because other, more plausible, explanations (like that UFOs are experimental technology from rivals overseas) are of national security importance.

Science relies on repeated observations to learn about the world, and right now, our observations of these unidentified aerial phenomena are limited. Part of science is admitting what we don't know today — but to keep watching closely so we might know tomorrow.

20. UFO report: Government can't explain 143 of 144 mysterious flying objects, blames limited data – 6/25

The Department of Defense established the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force in August to investigate mysterious flying objects

NBC News | Courtney Kube and Adam Edelman

The U.S. government can't explain 143 of the 144 cases of unidentified flying objects reported by military planes, according to a highly anticipated intelligence report released Friday.

That report, released by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, was meant to shed light on the mystery of those dozens of flying objects, spotted from 2004 to 2021, but instead said it didn't have adequate data to put all but one of them into a category.

That one UAP — shorthand for "unidentified aerial phenomena" — was a large, deflating balloon, the report said.

"The others remain unexplained," the report, which was required by Congress, added.

While the report explicitly stated that "unusual" activity had been reported on multiple occasions, it also did not rule out that those incidents were the result of errors or "spoofing."

"In a limited number of incidents, UAP reportedly appeared to exhibit unusual flight characteristics. These observations could be the result of sensor errors, spoofing, or observer misperception and require additional rigorous analysis," the report said.

The report does not mention aliens or even vaguely hint at an extraterrestrial explanation for the reported sightings, but makes clear that much of the phenomena may be beyond the existing means the government has to identify such objects.

A senior U.S. government official said ahead of the report's release Friday that, "We have no clear indications that there is any nonterrestrial explanation for them — but we will go wherever the data takes us."

The official added: "We do not have any data that indicates that any of these unidentified air phenomena are part of a foreign collection program nor do we have any data that is indicative of a major technological advancement by a potential adversary."

Last month, speaking about the upcoming report, officials told NBC News the government had not ruled out the possibility that the flying objects seen by U.S. military planes were highly advanced aircraft developed by other nations. These officials also said that the objects did not appear to be evidence of secret U.S. technology, but didn't definitively rule that out, either.

However, the report — the result of a provision in the \$2.3 trillion coronavirus relief and appropriations bill that former President Donald Trump signed last year — said these "unidentified aerial phenomena" represented safety of flight issues and potential operational security issues. Parts of the report remained classified.

"There is a wide, wide range of phenomena that we observe that are ultimately put into the UAP category. There is not one single explanation for UAP, it's rather a series of things," the senior U.S. official said Friday.

The Department of Defense established the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force in August to investigate and "gain insight" into the "nature and origins" of unidentified flying objects. Earlier that year, the Department of Defense declassified three videos taken by Navy pilots — one from 2004 and two from 2015 — that showed mysterious objects flying at high speeds across the sky.

"The aerial phenomena observed in the videos remain characterized as 'unidentified,'" Pentagon officials said in a statement at the time.

The three videos had leaked years earlier, but Pentagon officials said they declassified the footage to "clear up any misconceptions by the public on whether or not the footage that has been circulating was real, or whether or not there is more to the videos."

No additional incidents or videos were released Friday as part of the report.

According to the report, there were 18 incidents reported in which the UAPs that were seen featured some sort of "unusual movement patterns or flight characteristics" including propulsion or other technology that wasn't evident and that could be advanced. Eleven of the incidents reported were near misses with military planes, the report said.

"Some UAP appeared to remain stationary in winds aloft, move against the wind, maneuver abruptly, or move at considerable speed, without discernable means of propulsion," the report said, in describing those incidents. "In a small number of cases, military aircraft systems processed radio frequency (RF) energy associated with UAP sightings," the report added.

The report also said "there was some clustering of UAP observations regarding shape, size, and, particularly, propulsion" and that "UAP sightings also tended to cluster around U.S. training and testing grounds."

The report, however, concluded that "this may result from a collection bias as a result of focused attention, greater numbers of latest-generation sensors operating in those areas, unit expectations, and guidance to report anomalies."

All videos of the incidents that have so far been released remain unexplained, the report said.

The report noted that the limited amount of anecdotal data — as opposed to scientific data — and inconsistencies in reporting due to the lack of a standardized system make evaluating UFOs a challenge.

"The limited amount of high-quality reporting on unidentified aerial phenomena (UAP) hampers our ability to draw firm conclusions about the nature or intent of UAP. The Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force (UAPTF) considered a range of information on UAP described in U.S. military and IC (Intelligence Community) reporting, but because the reporting lacked sufficient specificity, ultimately recognized that a unique, tailored reporting process was required to provide sufficient data for analysis of UAP events," the report said.

"We quite frankly have a bit of work yet to do in order to truly assess and address the threat posed by UAP," the senior U.S. official said Friday. "Not all UAP are the same thing."

The Pentagon, the report said, would prefer to rely on a scientific and data-driven approach to collecting information on the UAP, instead of the anecdotal observations reported by military planes.

To that end, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Pentagon are making efforts to create a new collection strategy to standardize data reporting on UFOs, according to the report. The agencies said they will update Congress on their progress within the next 90 days, the report said.

In a statement after the report's release, Pentagon Press Secretary John Kirby said the intelligence office had been ordered to develop a plan to formalize that mission.

Lawmakers from both parties demanded the government do more to investigate.

"The United States must be able to understand and mitigate threats to our pilots, whether they're from drones or weather balloons or adversary intelligence capabilities," said Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Sen. Mark Warner, D-Va. "Today's rather inconclusive report only marks the beginning of efforts to understand and illuminate what is causing these risks to aviation in many areas around the country and the world."

Sen. Marco Rubio, the top Republican on that committee, added: "This report is an important first step in cataloging these incidents, but it is just a first step."

"The Defense Department and Intelligence Community have a lot of work to do before we can actually understand whether these aerial threats present a serious national security concern," added Rubio, who pushed the government to conduct the UFO report.

House Intelligence Committee Chairman Rep. Adam Schiff, D-Calif., said, "We should approach these questions without preconceptions to encourage a thorough, systematized analysis of the potential national security and flight safety risks posed by unidentified aerial phenomena, whether they are the result of a foreign adversary, atmospheric or other aerial phenomena, space debris, or something else entirely."

21. U.S. Has No Explanation for Unidentified Objects and Stops Short of Ruling Out Aliens – 6/25

A new government report is likely to fuel theories about unexplained aerial phenomena

New York Times | Julian E. Barnes

WASHINGTON — The government still has no explanation for nearly all of the scores of unidentified aerial phenomena reported over almost two decades and investigated by a Pentagon task force, according to a report released on Friday, a result that is likely to fuel theories of otherworldly visitations.

A total of 143 reports gathered since 2004 remain unexplained, the document released by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence said. Of those, 21 reports of unknown phenomena, involving 18 episodes, possibly demonstrate technological capabilities that are unknown to the United States: objects moving without observable propulsion or with rapid acceleration that is believed to be beyond the capabilities of Russia, China or other terrestrial nations.

There is no evidence that any of the episodes involve secret American weapons programs, unknown technology from Russia or China or extraterrestrial visitations. But the government report did not rule out those explanations.

Instead, government officials outlined a plan to develop a better program to observe and collect data on future unexplained phenomena.

The failure to reach a conclusion on the unexplained episodes raised questions about how seriously the government has taken them and whether it has assembled adequate scientific expertise to examine them.

Too little data exists to draw a conclusion about many of the episodes, officials said. But both scientific experts and enthusiastic amateurs have advanced explanations ranging from the mundane to the otherworldly and the report did little to substantiate or dismiss their theories.

Government officials on Friday were reluctant to acknowledge the potential that the phenomena could be extraterrestrial craft, a signal of how unlikely they view that explanation.

There was no affirmative evidence that the unexplained phenomena are alien spacecraft in the report. But because the government has offered no explanation for so many of the episodes, the new report is sure to fuel the enthusiasm of those who believe they could be.

Among the unexplained incidents are three high-profile videos of aerial phenomenon taken by the U.S. Navy and witnessed by pilots in recent years.

The report released on Friday is an interim report, which is how former officials involved in the Pentagon examination had predicted the government would initially handle the requirement by Congress to submit an unclassified report on what it knows about U.F.O.s.

The government intends to update Congress within 90 days on efforts to develop an improved collection strategy and what officials are calling a technical road map to develop technology to better observe the phenomena, senior government officials told reporters on Friday. Officials said they would provide lawmakers with periodical updates beyond that.

The Pentagon and intelligence agencies have eschewed the term U.F.O. and refer instead to U.A.P., or unidentified aerial phenomena. It has been a bit of rebranding, both to cut down on public enthusiasm and remove the stigma that U.F.O. can carry, in order to encourage pilots to report their observations and scientists to study them.

The new report laid out five categories of possible explanation for the phenomena: a secret technology developed by an adversarial power like Russia and China, classified cutting-edge American technology, a naturally occurring phenomenon, airborne clutter such as errant weather balloons and a catchall "other" category. That final group could include extraterrestrial technology.

Officials do not have any indications that the unexplained incidents show objects that are part of a foreign intelligence collection program or a major technological advancement by a potential adversary, a senior government official said. They are also unable to confirm that any of those incidents are part of a U.S. government or defense industry program, a senior official said.

Nevertheless, the report does not completely rule out a Russian or Chinese aircraft or an American classified program.

The report is being made public because of a provision inserted by Senator Marco Rubio of Florida, the top Republican on the Senate Intelligence Committee, into a huge spending bill passed by Congress.

“This report is an important first step in cataloging these incidents, but it is just a first step,” Mr. Rubio said in a statement. “The Defense Department and Intelligence Community have a lot of work to do before we can actually understand whether these aerial threats present a serious national security concern.”

Of the incidents examined by the task force, there are “no clear indications that there is any nonterrestrial explanation” for them, said a senior official, adding that the government would “go wherever the data takes us” as the inquiry continued.

The report avoids any real discussion of the possibility the unexplained phenomenon are extraterrestrial in nature. It was not the purpose of the government’s task force to search for extraterrestrial life, a responsibility that falls to NASA, said a senior governmental official.

Perhaps as a result, government officials said that going forward they would only focus on making observations of the phenomena and had no plans to try to communicate with the objects.

Government officials said that on further examination, the 21 reports that show unusual acceleration or movement could prove to have normal explanations. Government analysts have scrutinized the cameras and sensors that recorded the phenomena for potential flaws, a senior government official said.

There are plausible, but dry, explanations for each of the Navy recordings that are more likely than some sort of extraordinary technology, said Mick West, a science writer who focuses on debunking conspiracy theories.

In one video, a sharp movement of the object could be attributable to a shift in the camera’s movement. In another, an object that appears to be moving fast is shown to be actually moving much more slowly when a relevant trigonometric calculation is applied. An image of a rapidly spinning object skimming over the clouds is caused by infrared glare, Mr. West said.

“If you just say, ‘Oh, it’s aliens,’ that’s actually quite a simple explanation,” Mr. West said. “The actual explanation is kind of complicated, which is why a lot of people miss it. But yet the mundane explanations exist for all of these videos.”

The Pentagon and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence are considering research and development programs that could improve and standardize data collection, the officials said. With more data, better pattern analysis of the episodes could be done, said a senior government official.

The Pentagon is also hoping to look at historical data collected by radar to find other similar incidents, a senior government official said.

Officials said they looked at 144 unexplained incidents and were able to recategorize one as an example of airborne clutter. The failure to make headway on any of the others is a reflection of the lack of data but also a lack of scientific brainpower examining the problem.

Since the late 1960s, most scientists and scholars have steered away from U.F.O. studies. Their reluctance has hampered the government’s ability to put conspiracy theories about aliens to rest.

“Unfortunately, I don’t think that landscape is really going to change,” said Chris Impey, an astronomy professor at the University of Arizona. “It’s still an area where scientists mostly fear to tread.”

22. U.S. report on Pentagon-documented UFOs leaves sightings unexplained – 6/25

Reuters | Steve Gorman

A major U.S. government report on UFOs released on Friday said defense and intelligence analysts lack sufficient data to determine the nature of mysterious flying objects observed by military pilots including whether they are advanced earthly technologies, atmospheric or of an extraterrestrial nature.

The report, submitted to Congress and released to the public, encompasses 144 observations of what the government officially refers to as "unidentified aerial phenomenon," or UAP, dating back to 2004. It was issued by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence in conjunction with a U.S. Navy-led UAP task force.

"UAP clearly pose a safety of flight issue and may pose a challenge to U.S. national security," the report stated, adding that the phenomena "probably lack a single explanation."

"In a limited number of incidents, UAP reportedly appeared to exhibit unusual flight characteristics. These observations could be the result of sensor errors, spoofing, or observer misperception and require additional rigorous analysis," it added.

The report includes some UAP cases that previously came to light in the Pentagon's release of video from U.S. naval aviators showing enigmatic aircraft off the U.S. East and West Coasts exhibiting speed and maneuverability exceeding known aviation technologies and lacking any visible means of propulsion or flight-control surfaces.

A senior U.S. official, asked about the possibility of extraterrestrial explanations for the observations, said: "That's not the purpose of the task force, to evaluate any sort of search for extraterrestrial life. ... That's not what we were charged with doing."

"Of the 144 reports we are dealing with here, we have no clear indications that there is any non-terrestrial explanation for them – but we will go wherever the data takes us," the official added.

The report established five potential explanatory categories: airborne clutter, natural atmospheric phenomena, U.S. government or American industry developmental programs, foreign adversary systems and a catch-all "other" category.

All but one of the incidents, an instance attributed to "airborne clutter," remain unexplained, subject to further analysis, U.S. officials, speaking on condition of anonymity, told reporters during a briefing describing the report's findings.

For the remaining 143 cases, the government has yet to rule in or out whether the sightings might be of extraterrestrial origin, the officials said.

"Of data we have, we don't have any clear indications that any of these unidentified aerial phenomena are part of a foreign (intelligence) collection program, and we don't have any clear data that is indicative of a major technological advancement by a potential adversary," the senior official said.

The government in recent years has adopted UAP as its preferred term for what are otherwise known as "unidentified flying objects," or UFOs, long associated with the notion of alien spacecraft.

A second senior official said that 21 of the reports show UAPs "that appear to have some sort of advanced propulsion or advanced technology," and appear to lack any means of propulsion or acceleration and exhibit speeds beyond what the United States believes foreign adversaries possess.

ORDERED BY CONGRESS

The report was ordered by Congress as part of broader intelligence legislation signed by former President Donald Trump in December. Senator Marco Rubio was instrumental in commissioning it.

"For years, the men and women we trust to defend our country reported encounters with unidentified aircraft that had superior capabilities, and for years their concerns were often ignored and ridiculed," Rubio said. "This report is an important first step in cataloging these incidents, but it is just a first step."

The report marks a turning point for the U.S. government after the military spent decades deflecting, debunking and discrediting observations of unidentified flying objects and "flying saucers" backing back to the 1940s.

"Anytime there is a safety-of-flight or counterintelligence concern we take those things very seriously and we will continue to take those things seriously," the first senior official said.

U.S. Representative Adam Schiff, chairman of the House of Representatives Intelligence Committee, urged a systematic analysis of the potential national security and flight safety risks posed by UAP "without preconceptions" to determine whether they are the result of a foreign adversary, atmospheric or other aerial phenomena, space debris "or something else entirely."

It is not the first official U.S. government report on the subject. For example, the U.S. Air Force carried out a previous UFO investigation called Project Blue Book <https://www.archives.gov/research/military/air-force/ufos#geninfo>, ended in 1969, that compiled a list of 12,618 sightings, 701 of which involved objects that officially remained "unidentified."

In 1994, the Air Force announced that it had completed a study to locate records relating to the 1947 "Roswell incident" in New Mexico. It said materials recovered near Roswell were consistent with a crashed balloon, the military's long-standing explanation, and that no records indicated that there had been the recovery of alien bodies or extraterrestrial materials.

-- Additional reporting by Pavithra George in Washington

23. Intelligence agencies: UFOs are real but origins a mystery – 6/25

Explanations include potential 'foreign adversary systems,' don't rule out aliens

Roll Call | Gopal Ratnam

A U.S. intelligence assessment released to Congress on Friday confirmed that military pilots over the years had observed, and in some cases recorded, more than 100 instances of high-speed craft whose origin could not be traced or identified.

The nine-page report, titled a preliminary assessment, is the first official U.S. government recognition of the sightings of unidentified flying objects after decades of speculation and fascination among believers of UFOs and ridicule by others who dismissed the notion of alien spacecraft visiting Earth.

The highly anticipated report said its findings were drawn from 144 reports stemming from multiple U.S. government sources.

Of those, 80 observations were drawn using multiple sensors, the report said. The assessment could neither explain the origins of the flying objects nor eliminate the possibility that the craft were of alien origin.

While multiple explanations were possible, including airborne clutter and atmospheric phenomena, the report said it was unable to assess whether the sightings stemmed from experiments by secret U.S. programs.

"The limited amount of high-quality reporting on unidentified aerial phenomena (UAP) hampers our ability to draw firm conclusions about the nature or intent of UAP," the report said.

The report was mandated by the fiscal 2021 intelligence authorization law that required the director of national intelligence to prepare the report in coordination with defense and other agency officials.

Congress asked U.S. intelligence agencies to assess, among other issues, whether the objects constituted threats from foreign adversaries. The New York Times, citing unnamed U.S. officials, reported earlier this month that some of the unidentified phenomena could be tests of experimental technologies developed by Russia or China, both of which are pursuing hypersonic missiles.

Sen. Marco Rubio, R-Fla., who was acting chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee when it asked for the report, recently told CBS' "60 Minutes" that any object in the U.S. "airspace that's not supposed to be there is a threat."

"There's a stigma on Capitol Hill," Rubio told CBS about acknowledging the likelihood of UFOs. "Some of my colleagues are very interested in this topic and some kind of giggle when you bring it up."

But, Rubio said, "I don't think we can allow the stigma to keep us from having an answer to very a fundamental question." He called for a "process to analyze the data every time it comes in" on sightings of such objects.

Jimmy Carter's encounter

Sightings of UFOs aren't restricted to cranks and those on the fringes.

Former President Jimmy Carter reported seeing an alien spacecraft in 1969, two years before he became the governor of Georgia.

Carter, a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy who went on to work on nuclear submarines, filed a report with the International UFO Bureau in October 1969 that he had seen an unidentified object after dark in Leary, Ga.

For more than a decade, the Pentagon has been collecting information from Navy pilots and others who reported most of the 120 sightings of such objects, including radar and video recordings of some of them.

The office called the Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program began in 2007 after then-Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid ensured funding and insisted that the Pentagon begin assessing reports.

The office suspended operations in 2012 when it ran out of money. But Luis Elizondo, who ran the program, revealed some of the findings and records to the Times in 2017, forcing the Pentagon to restart the program, renaming it Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force.

Among the sightings and reports the Pentagon office examined were numerous reports by Navy pilots who reported seeing Tic Tac-shaped objects or those resembling a spinning top flying at speeds far exceeding any human-made aircraft and missiles. The pilots said they saw such objects in the sky routinely during training missions over both the Pacific and Atlantic oceans.

Navy Lt. Ryan Graves, who flew F/A-18 Super Hornets for 10 years, told The New York Times that he had seen such objects "out there all day," appearing almost every day for about a year in 2014 and 2015, flying at hypersonic speeds but without any visible engine or exhaust plumes.

Commercial pilots, as far back as 1948, have reported encountering unidentified objects that flew at impossible speeds or disc-shaped objects around airports, according to a recent story in The New Yorker.

24. UFOs 'may be threat to national security' & it was mistake when 'overt hostility' was ruled out in 1969, expert says – 6/25

The Sun | Chris Bradford

UFOs may be a threat to national security and the US made a "grave" mistake when "overt hostility" was ruled out in 1969 as part of Project Blue Book, an expert has warned.

The Pentagon's report into unidentified aerial phenomena has been published today and reveals what the US government knows about decades of sightings.

The US Air Force's investigation, Project Blue Book, revealed that no UFO was a threat to national security, but the debate has reopened after the Pentagon last year released a series of videos showing alleged US Navy encounters with unidentified objects.

Skeptics within the UFO community think Russian or Chinese agents may be flying drones or hypersonic missiles close to navy jets while "believers" think extra-terrestrial activity exists further afield.

Nick Pope, a former Ministry of Defence official who investigated UFOs for the British Government, said unidentified aerial phenomena is both a national security and defense issue.

He told The Sun: "Whether it's Russia sending drones dangerously close to aircraft carriers or whether it really is something from further away, it is a defense and national security issue and you can't just dismiss it."

In a warning to officials producing the report, he added: "You can't say it's unidentified. You have to do better than that. We've had those decades of denial and debunking."

He warned that president Biden will have to address the public on the issue as he has the "final responsibility" to safeguard the country.

Pope criticized US officials after they appeared to conclude UFOs were not a threat to national security in 1969 as part of Project Blue Book.

The investigation also revealed that there was no evidence suggesting "uncategorized" sightings were extraterrestrial vehicles.

He said: "I think it was a huge mistake. I think they fell into a trap of saying because there has been no overt hostility we can extract ourselves from this issue."

Pope said US officials should have concluded that there had been a number of unexplained sightings, including ones from their own military pilots, and they will continue investigating.

Pentagon officials last year took the unprecedented step to release a trio of remarkable videos which showed "encounters" with UFOs.

Lt. Commander Alex Dietrich was training with a strike group approximately 100 miles southwest of San Diego when she and another pilot spotted the mysterious object.

And, Navy Lieutenant Ryan Graves said that he recalled seeing unexplained flying objects flying in restricted airspace on a daily basis.

The former MOD official said anecdotes reveal the "impressive" capability of UAPs but said there is a complete unknown regarding their intent.

He said: "We don't even know what these things are. Let alone what they're doing."

Pope said making an assessment about UAP is much more "difficult" and "nebulous" as there are many unknowns.

The former MOD official hopes Washington would try to take time to investigate comprehensively rather than rush and meet an “artificial” deadline.

The US intelligence community is expected to report back to Senators by June 25 after they were mandated to research into unidentified aerial phenomena.

But, it's feared that the report could be underwhelming despite its global interest.

The former civil servant thinks the public will be "disappointed" as they will not get to see "much of anything".

The report will be unclassified but will contain a classified annex that the public will not be able to view.

Pope said: “I think it's going to be the classified annex where the interesting material is going to be put.”

He joked that Americans' only hope is for an “indiscreet” Senator to potentially leak its conclusions.

The ex-civil servant said the conclusions could be "history-making" particularly if intelligence agencies do not rule out the extraterrestrial hypothesis.

He said: “I think it would change everything. Who we are? What our place is in the cosmos, where do we come from, what's our meaning of life?

“We'd have to rethink an awful lot of things and realize that there might be more there than we had thought.”

Pope said he hopes there was life out there in the universe and he'd like to think that humans are being visited as the idea of aliens is "more interesting and fun".

He said: "Martians would be more interesting than Russians.”

25. UFO Report Cites 'Unidentified Aerial Phenomena' That Defy Worldly Explanation, U.S. Official Says – 6/25

Propulsion, technology in some cases exceed present-day scientific knowledge, U.S. officials say
Wall Street Journal | Brett Forrest

WASHINGTON—U.S. intelligence officials have examined more than a dozen sightings of unexplained aerial objects that displayed no visible propulsion or that used technology beyond the known capabilities of the U.S. or its adversaries, according to a senior U.S. official describing a new report.

The instances were among 144 studied by intelligence officials for the long-awaited report, but weren't offered as evidence of possible alien activity—though that prospect wasn't definitively ruled out. Instead, officials said greater technological understanding may be required to determine what was behind many of the unexplained cases.

"Some of those could require some scientific advances on our part to allow us to better understand what it is that we're observing," said one of the officials. "It's clear that we need to improve our capacity to further analyze remaining observations."

Eighteen of the cases involved objects that displayed patterns of flight not well explained by current knowledge of propulsion and technology, the officials said.

The intelligence report, prepared by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, didn't resolve the issue of possible alien flight in U.S. airspace, but steered the debate over what the Pentagon calls unidentified aerial phenomena, or UAP, out of the fringes of conspiracy theory and into official discourse.

The unexplained sightings have been occurring for nearly two decades. Some video footage of pilots' encounters with the unknown aircraft, as well as the pilots' reactions, has leaked into the public domain.

The Pentagon last summer revived a small, secretive unit called the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force to study the encounters.

U.S. military pilots have observed objects moving at hypersonic velocity, more than five times the speed of sound, and conducting maneuvers impossible using publicly known technology, stoking fears of industrial leaps made by adversarial nations.

Both China and Russia are believed to have experimented with hypersonic technology, but Friday's report doesn't support a conclusion that those countries were involved in the unexplained flights.

"There's no evidence that foreign government systems account for any of the events described," one of the officials said.

The report also provides no confirmation of otherworldly aircraft and technologies, settling discussion of unidentified aerial phenomena in the gray area where theories thrive.

"We have no clear indications that there is any non-terrestrial explanation," one of the officials said.

Friday's report encompasses 144 reports of UAP activity from 2004 until this year and offers almost no conclusive interpretation for the sightings.

"They very clearly demonstrate an array of aerial behaviors, which makes it very clear to us that there are multiple types of unidentified aerial phenomena that require different explanations," one of the officials said.

In the report, ODNI establishes five categories for UAP sightings: airborne clutter such as birds and balloons; natural atmospheric phenomenon like thermal fluctuations; governmental or industrial developmental programs; foreign-adversary systems; and brief encounters for which there is too little information for more exact categorization.

Of the 144 UAP sighting reports, ODNI placed only one of the cases into any of categories—saying it resulted from airborne clutter—with the remainder lacking sufficient data for any classification, including as either foreign government or U.S. technology.

"The potential of this report was actually significant," said Seth Shostak, a senior astronomer at the SETI Institute in Mountain View, Calif. "It could have come up with something that was incontrovertible evidence for extraterrestrial flight. That was the implicit promise here. But in the end, it didn't go any farther than reports made in the 1950s. We can explain some of these things, but we can't explain them all."

The report was spurred in part by the public release of three Navy videos showing the flight of UAP aircraft. One of the officials said that the government has studied these videos and the readings given by U.S. onboard sensors, but that the government has settled on no explanation for the phenomenon observed in the clips.

"We don't have any clear indications that any of these unidentified aerial phenomena are part of a foreign collection program," one of the officials said. "And we don't have any clear data that is indicative of a major technological advancement by a potential adversary."

26. 'Important first step': Highly anticipated UFO report released with no firm conclusions – 6/25
USA Today | Jeanine Santucci

WASHINGTON — The office of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence on Friday made public a highly anticipated report examining "unidentified aerial phenomena," telling Congress that it could not draw "firm conclusions" on more than 140 instances.

"In a limited number of incidents, UAP reportedly appeared to exhibit unusual flight characteristics. These observations could be the result of sensor errors, spoofing, or observer misperception and require additional rigorous analysis," the report reads.

The report concluded that a "unique, tailored reporting process" should be implemented to better be able to assess unidentified aerial phenomena, but found no evidence of extraterrestrial life.

Defense, Intelligence communities have more work to do

"This report is an important first step in cataloging these incidents, but it is just a first step. The Defense Department and Intelligence Community have a lot of work to do before we can actually understand whether these aerial threats present a serious national security concern," said Sen. Marco Rubio, R-Fla., the ranking member and former chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, in a statement.

"We should approach these questions without preconceptions to encourage a thorough, systematized analysis of the potential national security and flight safety risks posed by unidentified aerial phenomena, whether they are the result of a foreign adversary, atmospheric or other aerial phenomena, space debris, or something else entirely," said Rep. Adam Schiff, D-Calif., chairman of the House Intelligence Committee.

Sightings of objects in American skies with no explanation have been the subject of public fascination for some time, and the report was expected to add more details to reported incidents and sightings. Video declassified by the Pentagon years ago showed high-speed objects with no clear propulsion outpacing Navy pilots' jets. Since 2007, the Pentagon has been tracking UFOs.

"Is it some sort of new type of cruise missile technology that China has developed? Is it some sort of high-altitude balloon that's conducting reconnaissance? Ultimately when you have exhausted all those what-ifs and you're still left with the fact that this is in our airspace and it's real, that's when it becomes compelling, and that's when it becomes problematic," Luis Elizondo, former director of the defense department's Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program, told "60 Minutes" earlier this year about unidentified flying objects.

Explanations of sightings of aerial phenomena most often include potential weather incidents, routine natural events or otherwise identifiable cases, like weather balloons or misfires in sensor systems and cameras.

Five categories, but few conclusions

The ODNI report concluded that the phenomena could most likely be resolved in one of five categories: airborne clutter, natural atmospheric phenomena, USG or U.S. industry developmental programs, foreign adversary systems, and a catchall "other" bin.

The assessment was only able to confidently identify one of the 144 reported cases as a large, deflating balloon.

In 18 incidents, observers described "unusual UAP movement patterns or flight characteristics," which could be indicative of advanced technology, and further analysis is being conducted.

The report comes after lawmakers included an order for it in the December omnibus spending and coronavirus relief package. Lawmakers hope the report will expand on UFO sightings not explained by these cases.

Officials have said they do not believe unidentified flying objects are a sign of alien life; rather, they are more concerned about foreign technology that could pose a national security threat.

"Today's rather inconclusive report only marks the beginning of efforts to understand and illuminate what is causing these risks to aviation in many areas around the country and the world," said Sen. Mark Warner, D-Va., chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

27. U.S. Releases UFO Report, Congress Criticizes 'Inconclusive' Findings – 6/25

A hotly anticipated report that delved into sightings of UFOs, or 'unidentified aerial phenomena' as the military calls them, appears to have yielded more questions than answers

U.S. News & World Report | Paul D. Shinkman

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence confirmed late Friday it had submitted to Congress a report of its government-wide investigation on UFO sightings and released publicly a nine-page unclassified version of it.

The submission barely met the deadline set by Sen. Marco Rubio of Florida, who, as the top Republican on the Senate Intelligence Committee, last December called for the report within six months to investigate any known causes behind confirmed sightings of what the military and spy agencies call unidentified aerial phenomena or UAP.

The unclassified version of the report offered few details that hadn't previously been leaked, and it aligned with widespread speculation that its findings would not confirm the existence of extraterrestrials. Rather, it identifies the potential national security implications of Earth-bound threats such as previously unidentified technology – perhaps Russian or Chinese experimental projects.

"The limited amount of high-quality reporting on unidentified aerial phenomena (UAP) hampers our ability to draw firm conclusions about the nature or intent of UAP," the report states in its findings. "In a limited number of incidents, UAP reportedly appeared to exhibit unusual flight characteristics. These observations could be the result of sensor errors, spoofing, or observer misperception and require additional rigorous analysis."

Each case likely requires separate explanation, the report stated, adding that some incidents clearly represent "a safety of flight issue" and may pose "a challenge to U.S. national security."

Sen. Mark Warner of Virginia, the committee's top Democrat, criticized the report's findings as "inconclusive," stressing the need to understand more about a problem that appears to be worsening.

"I was first briefed on these unidentified aerial phenomena nearly three years ago. Since then, the frequency of these incidents only appears to be increasing," he said in a statement. "The United States must be able to understand and mitigate threats to our pilots, whether they're from drones or weather balloons or adversary intelligence capabilities."

Rubio touted the important precedent set by the report, one shared by so-called "ufologists" worldwide.

"For years, the men and women we trust to defend our country reported encounters with unidentified aircraft that had superior capabilities, and for years their concerns were often ignored and ridiculed," Rubio said. "This report is an important first step in cataloging these incidents, but it is just a first step. The Defense Department and Intelligence Community have a lot of work to do before we can actually understand whether these aerial threats present a serious national security concern."

Pentagon spokesman John Kirby in a statement thanked the DNI office for leading the investigation that produced the report, and announced the Defense Department will continue the work of a task force created to support the investigation.

"Incursions into our training ranges and designated airspace pose safety of flight and operations security concerns, and may pose national security challenges. DOD takes reports of incursions – by any aerial object, identified or unidentified – very seriously, and investigates each one," Kirby said. "The report submitted today highlights the challenges associated with assessing UAP occurring on or near DOD training ranges and

installations. The report also identified the need to make improvements in processes, policies, technologies, and training to improve our ability to understand UAP."

Friday's report centered on 144 government sightings that took place between 2004 and 2021, 80 of which registered on multiple government sensors, including radar, infrared technology and visual observation, among others. The majority are from Navy personnel.

"Our analysis of the data supports the construct that if and when individual UAP incidents are resolved they will fall into one of five potential explanatory categories: airborne clutter, natural atmospheric phenomena, [U.S. government] or U.S. industry developmental programs, foreign adversary systems, and a catchall 'other' bin," the report states. The "other bin" includes sightings for objects that appear to defy physics and known technologies, requiring "additional analysis on the small number of cases where a UAP appeared to display unusual flight characteristics or signature management."

One of the sightings was identified as a large, deflating balloon. The remainder are unexplained, the report states.

The report in part faults the military services, specifically the Navy and Air Force, for not developing a standardized way for pilots and other eyewitnesses to report UAPs until recent years. It also cites a cultural stigma that may prevent professionals from admitting they witnessed an aerial phenomenon they can't explain.

"Although the effects of these stigmas have lessened as senior members of the scientific, policy, military, and intelligence communities engage on the topic seriously in public, reputational risk may keep many observers silent, complicating scientific pursuit of the topic," it notes.

Many of the reported sightings originate from areas near known military and government aerial testing facilities, which the report says may indicate the UAP was, in fact, a government program or simply that observers are more inclined to look for unexplained aircraft nearby.

28. Decoding the government's UFO report – 6/25

Washington Examiner | Tom Rogan

"There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy."

Hamlet's open-mindedness offers utility as a guide to addressing the UFO subject. But Hamlet's tragic fate offers a guide not to jump off the deep end.

This bears note in light of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence's provision to Congress and the public on Friday of a report on unidentified flying objects — UFOs. Or what the government refers to as "unidentified aerial phenomena" — UAPs. The report was requested in 2020 by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, under then-Chairman Sen. Marco Rubio, a Florida Republican.

Here are my main takeaways from the public, unclassified version. It's appropriately serious and sober but has one striking and inexcusable absence.

First, the report notes that some UAPs are likely to be "physical objects" due to the range of sensors by which they have been recorded. This has been established behind closed doors, but government affirmation of that analysis lends credibility to further scientific study of the topic.

Second, the report adds that further analysis will likely put these UAPs into one of "five potential explanatory categories: airborne clutter, natural atmospheric phenomena, U.S. government or U.S. industry developmental programs, foreign adversary systems, and a catchall 'other' bin."

The report considers 140 U.S. government-sourced UAP incidents between 2004 and 2021, 18 of which involved observers reporting "unusual UAP movement patterns or flight characteristics."

These include the observation that "some UAP appeared to remain stationary in winds aloft, move against the wind, maneuver abruptly, or move at considerable speed, without discernible means of propulsion. In a small number of cases, military aircraft systems processed radio frequency (RF) energy associated with UAP sightings. ... We are conducting further analysis to determine if breakthrough technologies were demonstrated."

This is the area that encompasses what I refer to as the most extraordinary of UAPs, or the report's "other" bin. Those that numerous sensors and trained military observers have identified as most likely being intelligently controlled vehicles of unconventional technical capability, not known to be in the possession or development of any national government or corporation. It is this UAP category that also involves the most stigma. As the report observes, "Narratives from aviators in the operational community and analysts from the military and Intelligence Community describe disparagement associated with observing UAP, reporting it, or attempting to discuss it with colleagues."

Yet, while the report calls for more organization and funding in the research of UFOs, it does offer some notable absences. For whatever reason, the CIA was not a party to the report. Also glaring is the report's finding that "UAP sightings also tended to cluster around U.S. [military/government] training and testing grounds, but we assess that this may result from a collection bias as a result of focused attention, greater numbers of latest-generation sensors operating in those areas, unit expectations, and guidance to report anomalies."

One word is missing here. Nuclear. Its absence in the context of that training area quote undermines the government's assertion that this report provides a public accounting of what it knows about UFOs.

As I've previously reported, it is a commonly understood assessment by those at ODNI and the Office of Naval Intelligence that the saturation of credible sightings of the most extraordinary UAPs by the U.S. Navy bears a direct connection to the nuclear reactors that power U.S. aircraft carriers and submarines. Beyond the concentration of activity at these sites, I understand that this connection has been forensically tested, and validated, by the government. On Friday, the Debrief's Tim McMillan reported on part of this effort. There is a particular concern on the part of the Pentagon that were China and Russia able to replicate these nuclear detection technologies, whatever they may entail, they would be able to permanently hold at risk U.S. nuclear deterrence forces. In essence, denying those forces their deterrent quality.

On that point alone, we can observe that this report does not evince the totality of the U.S. government's information on unidentified aerial phenomena. Certain information will have been withheld from the public report under the excuse of protecting intelligence sources and methods. Noteworthy here is the apparent absence of undersea sonar and acoustic data, of which there is a significant quantity and quality related to this subject. Also absent is reference to metallurgy analysis of exotic materials that has been conducted, two exceptional sources tell me, under U.S. government supervision. This is not to say that the government remains engaged in a vast, coordinated cover-up. No reliable source has told me that they have seen evidence suggesting the U.S. government retains intact UFOs. That is not to say that no such evidence exists, just that the subject deserves prudent investigation.

Again, this is not to say that all UAPs are truly extraordinary. As first suggested by the Drive, Russia has likely used its submarine force and civilian aircraft and vessels to conduct signal and electronic intelligence operations against U.S. military exercises. Balloon-based devices would offer the most realistic deliverable capability here, offering intelligence collection in a semipersistent and less-detectable state. China may have conducted similar activities, though its submarine force would struggle to avoid U.S. sensor nets. Again, however, this does not explain the most extraordinary "other" UFOs that have been recorded by the U.S. military.

The need for more questions should not dilute the import of absent answers. The most capable intelligence apparatus of the most powerful nation on Earth says that some UFOs are likely to be truly unexplained vehicles.

Hence why certain former U.S. government officials are saying that open-minded questions must be part of the solution in considering this topic. The report rightly indicates a need for further investigation.

29. U.S. unable to explain more than 140 unidentified flying objects, but new report finds no evidence of alien life – 6/25

Washington Post | Shane Harris

The U.S. government was unable to determine whether more than 140 unidentified flying objects, many of them reported by Navy aviators, were atmospheric events playing tricks on sensors or crafts piloted by foreign adversaries, or whether the objects were extraterrestrial in origin, according to a long-anticipated report released Friday by the nation's top intelligence official.

The report finds no evidence that the objects, characterized as unidentified aerial phenomena, or UAPs, were the handiwork of alien beings. But in almost all of the 144 cases that a team of government experts examined, a lack of data stymied their efforts to say definitively what they were.

The largely inconclusive results of the report, which was required by Congress, are sure to fuel Americans' long-running interest in unexplained sightings, which have received unprecedented levels of attention in recent years from government officials and lawmakers.

The mere existence of the report was a remarkable acknowledgment that human beings have encountered objects that perform feats we cannot explain — accelerating to great speeds with no obvious signs of propulsion, for example, or inexplicably holding still in midair.

The report does find that not all the UAPs behaved in the same way, which led the experts to offer different hypotheses about what they might be. The objects "very clearly demonstrate an array of aerial behaviors," said a senior U.S. government official who described the report's findings to a group of reporters on the condition of anonymity because the document had not yet been released.

"There is no one answer about what these UAP are," the official said.

The report offers five categories of potential explanations for the objects, which were observed between 2004 and this year. The first is, essentially, junk — man-made objects cluttering the air, such as balloons or even plastic bags, that are mistaken for craft.

Then there is the air itself. Ice crystals, moisture or heat fluctuations could register as a flying object to cameras and sensors on aircraft or aboard ships at sea. Navy aircraft and vessels have tracked and in some cases recorded encounters with UAPs that appear to zoom across a field of vision at unexpected speed, which had led some experts to question whether the supposed objects were actually just tricks of light or water.

The third possible explanation, according to the report, is that the objects are some kind of craft designed by the U.S. government or an American corporation. But that explanation seemed unlikely, according to officials who had earlier been briefed on the report and were confident that the UAPs are not American technology.

The objects could have been designed by a foreign adversary, the report found, offering a fourth explanation. China and Russia are making strides in hypersonic technology and directed energy, areas of increasing focus at the Pentagon.

The fifth and final category is one sure to entice ufologists and amateur sleuths, as well as U.S. officials: "Other." The description is something of a catchall that could apply to encounters that were brief or generated too little data to advance a theory. Some of these encounters might be better defined with more information or through scientific advances to analyze the phenomena, the report finds.

"I was first briefed on these unidentified aerial phenomena nearly three years ago," said Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-Va.), the chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee. "Since then, the frequency of these incidents only appears to be increasing. The United States must be able to understand and mitigate threats to our pilots, whether they're from drones or weather balloons or adversary intelligence capabilities. Today's rather inconclusive report only marks the beginning of efforts to understand and illuminate what is causing these risks to aviation in many areas around the country and the world."

Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.), the ranking member of the intelligence committee, said, "For years, the men and women we trust to defend our country reported encounters with unidentified aircraft that had superior capabilities, and for years their concerns were often ignored and ridiculed. This report is an important first step in cataloging these incidents, but it is just a first step. The Defense Department and Intelligence Community have a lot of work to do before we can actually understand whether these aerial threats present a serious national security concern."

30. The truth is out there: Govt. releases UFO report; unexplained phenomena could pose security threat – 6/25

Washington Times | Ben Wolfgang

A string of UFO sightings by military personnel remain largely unexplained but may pose a serious threat to U.S. national security, and much more data must be collected before any firm conclusions can be reached, the federal government said in a highly anticipated report released Friday.

The study by the Pentagon and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) is the most comprehensive government looks at UFOs — referred to in the report as "unidentified aerial phenomena," or UAP — in decades, though it hardly offers the concrete answers that many lawmakers, scientific researchers and paranormal enthusiasts had hoped for. The report also reportedly contains a classified portion that was delivered to Congress Friday afternoon.

In the unclassified materials posted online by the ODNI, the government says that the dozens of UFO reports that were examined may have a host of explanations.

The study does not offer a firm conclusion on whether the unidentified craft could be of extraterrestrial origin. It also seemingly leaves open the possibility they could be high-tech weapons or aircraft from another country.

"The limited amount of high-quality reporting on unidentified aerial phenomena hampers our ability to draw firm conclusions about the nature or intent of UAP," the study reads.

"UAP clearly pose a safety of flight issue and may pose a challenge to U.S. national security," it continues. "Safety concerns primarily center on aviators contending with an increasingly cluttered air domain. UAP would also represent a national security challenge if they are foreign adversary collection platforms or provide evidence a potential adversary has developed either a breakthrough or disruptive technology."

The release of the study follows public pressure by Congress and by a host of outside organizations that urged the most secretive arms of the federal government — most notably, the Defense Department and intelligence agencies — to reveal what they know about UFOs and the potential national security threats they might pose.

Last year, the Pentagon announced the formation of its Unidentified Aerial Phenomena [UAP] Task Force, designed to "detect, analyze and catalog UAPs that could potentially pose a threat to U.S. national security." The public disclosure of that task force came on the heels of several leaked Navy videos showing military personnel encounters with unidentified craft.

The most recent footage, captured in 2019 by the USS Omaha, seems to show an unidentified object disappearing into the waters off the coast of California. A host of alleged UFO encounters are detailed in the study, though many remain unexplained.

Key lawmakers said the study is a “first step” but by no means by the end of the story.

“For years, the men and women we trust to defend our country reported encounters with unidentified aircraft that had superior capabilities, and for years their concerns were often ignored and ridiculed,” said Sen. Marco Rubio, a Florida Republican who has been outspoken in pushing the government to release more information on UFOs.

“This report is an important first step in cataloging these incidents, but it is just a first step,” he said in a statement Friday. “The Defense Department and intelligence community have a lot of work to do before we can actually understand whether these aerial threats present a serious national security concern.”

SELECT TWITTER COVERAGE

Paul Handley, Agence France-Presse (@PaulHandley2)

- "Other": "if & when individual UAP incidents are resolved they will fall into 1 of 5 potential explanatory categories: airborne clutter, natural atmospheric phenomena, USG or US industry developmental programs, foreign adversary systems, and a catchall “other” bin."

Lee Hudson, Aviation Week (@LeeHudson_)

- What we've all been waiting for, the UAP report is out! The investigation did not find evidence that the sightings by Navy pilot were other worldly.

Katie Bo Williams, CNN (@KatieBoWill)

- ODNI publishes its report on UAPs, aka UFOs. As expected, investigators did not find any evidence these sightings by Navy pilots were extraterrestrial. But they also weren't able to determine much else, either. In 143 out of 144 cases, they have no idea.
- Investigators didn't *rule out* an extraterrestrial explanation. But they're not leaning into it either. Maybe more importantly for natsec wonks, they also found no evidence these incidents were the work of some kind of next-gen technology or surveillance by a foreign adversary.
- But they do believe the majority of sightings were real objects, per a senior US official. “We absolutely believe what we’re seeing are not simply sensor artifacts. These are things that physically exist.” Why? 80 of the reported incidents include data from multiple sensors.
- Will tweet a few key lines from the report: "Most of the UAP reported probably do represent physical objects given that a majority of UAP were registered across multiple sensors, to include radar, infrared, electro-optical, weapon seekers, and visual observation."
- "In a limited number of incidents, UAP appeared to exhibit unusual flight characteristics," report finds. Could be "sensor errors, spoofing, or misperception." Investigators were stymied by UAP that held steady in midair despite wind currents & had no visible propulsion system.
- "There are probably multiple types of UAP requiring different explanations based on the range of appearances and behaviors described in the available reporting," the report finds. In other words, not all UAP are the same.
- But the report finds that "UAP clearly pose a safety of flight issue and may pose a challenge to U.S. national security." In other words, this isn't just a fringe issue anymore—this is being treated as a serious airspace security issue.
- Important: Objects are "clustered" around US training and testing grounds. BUT: "We assess this may result from a collection bias as a result of focused attention, greater numbers of latest-gen sensors operating in those areas, unit expectations & guidance to report anomalies."
- To this point: The UAP task force at the Pentagon "has 11 reports of documented instances in which pilots reported near misses with a UAP," according to the report.

- This is interesting. Investigators lacked needed data to make definitive conclusions about what these objects are. So they're planning to up collection efforts:
- "Of the 144 reports we are dealing with here, we have no clear indications that there is any non-terrestrial explanation for them — but we will go wherever the data takes us," a senior US official said.

Andrew Clevenger, CQ Roll Call (@andclev)

- "There are probably multiple types of UAP requiring different explanations based on the range of appearances and behaviors described in the available reporting." The unidentified aerial phenomena report is out from the ODNI:

Kevin Baron, Defense One (@DefenseBaron)

- How come nobody ever sees unidentified *driving* objects? Or unidentified *boating* objects? You think aliens traveled light years to get here, but didn't bring a car? Golf cart? Scooter? A raft? It's 75% water here. We went to the moon and brought a friggin dune buggy.
- Meanwhile, you all made ODNI look into it and, drumroll.... "These observations could be the result of sensor errors, spoofing, or observer misperception and require additional rigorous analysis."
- "...of five potential explanatory categories: airborne clutter, natural atmospheric phenomena, USG or U.S. industry developmental programs, foreign adversary systems, and a catchall "other" bin."
- Word search of this ODNI super duper unclassified UFO report you dolts were all waiting for: "UFO" = 0 "Alien" = 0 "Space" = 0 "Outer Space" = 0 "Mars" = 0 "Space Mountain" = 0 "Planet Claire" = 0
- LOL, the government's big UFO report concludes: We Need More Money.
- Wow. Sad and frustrating to see this from a fellow newsroom. No, the government did NOT say that UFOs are real. I don't understand why respected newsrooms and journalists are playing this game, fomenting conspiracy nuts and mining for cheap clicks. Having a bit of fun? It matters
- DOD's @PentagonPresSec echoes DNI's only national security concern about ALLEGED un-ID'ed things in the sky, which is: "Incursions into our training ranges and designated airspace pose safety of flight and operations security concerns, and may pose national security challenges."
- Confirmed: UFOs (don't exist but the war in Afghanistan still does)
-

Tara Copp, Defense One (@TaraCopp)

- I think the Pentagon just created an #XFiles office

Lucas Tomlinson, Fox News (@LucasFoxNews)

- Rubio on UFO report: "This report is an important first step in cataloging these incidents, but it is just a first step. The [DoD] and [IC] have a lot of work to do before we can actually understand whether these aerial threats present a serious national security concern."
- ODNI: "The limited amount of high-quality reporting on unidentified aerial phenomena (UAP) hampers our ability to draw firm conclusions about the nature or intent of UAP."
- UFO report says they "clearly pose a safety of flight issue and may pose a challenge to U.S. national security."
- UFO report says the 143 "observations could be the result of sensor errors, spoofing, or observer misperception and require additional rigorous analysis."

Howard Altman, Military Times (@haltman)

- Space aliens? Chinese? Russians? The origin of unidentified objects apparently flying at mysterious speeds or trajectories seen by military pilots and others remains up in the air, according to a report released today by ODNI.
- Update: Deputy SECDEF, citing concern over potential threats to US training ranges and installations, orders increased reporting and assessments of Unidentified Aerial Phenomena.

Idrees Ali, Reuters (@idreesali114)

- No matter what story reporters are publishing today, the UFO report story is going to be more widely read (even though it doesn't say much new definitively).

Paul Szoldra, Task & Purpose (@PaulSzoldra)

- The @ODNIgov report on flying little green men (ok ok 'unidentified aerial phenomena') is out

Paul D. Shinkman, U.S. News and World Report (@PDShinkman)

- NEW: @PentagonPresSec announces the Defense Department will continue the work of a UFO task force set up to contribute to the @ODNIgov's government-wide investigation. 1/
- "Incursions into our training ranges and designated airspace pose safety of flight and operations security concerns, and may pose national security challenges," Kirby says. The report submitted today highlights the challenges associated with assessing UAP." 2/
- "The report also identified the need to make improvements in processes, policies, technologies, and training to improve our ability to understand UAP." 3/
- BREAKING: @ODNIgov confirms it has submitted to Congress its report on UFOs/UAPs "that relays the progress the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force has made in understanding UAP." Unclassified version will be posted on its website later today.
- @marcorubio, who ordered the report as top Republican on the Senate Intel Cmte., calls it "an important first step in cataloging these incidents, but it is just a first step."
- "For years, the men and women we trust to defend our country reported encounters with unidentified aircraft that had superior capabilities, and for years their concerns were often ignored and ridiculed," @marcorubio says.
- "The Defense Department and Intelligence Community have a lot of work to do before we can actually understand whether these aerial threats present a serious national security concern," @marcorubio says.

Jeff Seldin, Voice of America (@jseldin)

- Just in: Statement from Senate Intel Committee Vice Chair @marcorubio on release of @DeptofDefense @ODNIgov report on #UFOs #UAPs "This report is an important first step in cataloging these incidents, but it is just a first step..."
- NEW: US @DeptofDefense @ODNIgov report on #UFOs #UAPs (Unidentified Aerial Phenomena) only "able to identify one reported UAP with high confidence" out of 144 sightings. "The others remain unexplained"
- The 1 identified #UFO #UAP was "a large, deflating balloon" per @ODNIgov. "Limited Data Leaves Most UAP Unexplained..." per the report, which says it focused on "largely witnessed firsthand by military aviators and that were collected from systems we considered to be reliable"
- Of the 144 reports of #UFOs #UAPs, 80 involved observation w/multiple sensors, per @ODNIgov. The report looked at incidents from 2004-2021 "w/the majority coming in the last 2 years as the new reporting mechanism became better known to the military aviation community"
- US report on #UFO conclude they are real things: "Most of the #UAP reported probably do represent physical objects given that a majority of UAP were registered across multiple sensors, to include radar, infrared, electro-optical, weapon seekers & visual observation" per report
- "Unusual flight characteristics" only witnessed in "a limited number of incidents" per @ODNIgov report on #UFO #UAP. "These observations could be the result of sensor errors, spoofing, or observer misperception & require additional rigorous analysis"
- NEW: US #UAP Task Force concludes there are likely 5 types of #UFO: - airborne clutter - natural atmospheric phenomena - US gvt or US industry developmental programs - foreign adversary systems - "other"

- #UFO threat assessment: "#UAP clearly pose a safety of flight issue and may pose a challenge to US national security" per @ODNIgov report "Safety concerns primarily center on aviators contending with an increasingly cluttered air domain"
- #UFO threat assessment: "#UAP would also represent a national security challenge if they are foreign adversary collection platforms or provide evidence a potential adversary has developed either a breakthrough or disruptive technology" per @ODNIgov report
- "Consolidation of reports from across the federal gvt, standardized reporting, increased collection & analysis, & a streamlined process for screening all such reports...will allow for a more sophisticated analysis of UAP that is likely to deepen our understanding" per @ODNIgov
- #UFO #UAP patterns: "There was some clustering of UAP observations regarding shape, size, &, particularly, propulsion" per @ODNIgov "UAP sightings also tended to cluster around US training & testing grounds"
- But sightings near US training/testing grounds "may result from a collection bias as a result of focused attention, greater numbers of latest-generation sensors operating in those areas, unit expectations, & guidance to report anomalies" per @ODNIgov
- #UFO #UAP technology: "Some UAP appeared to remain stationary in winds aloft, move against the wind, maneuver abruptly, or move at considerable speed, without discernable means of propulsion..." per @ODNIgov report
- "...In a small number of cases, military aircraft systems processed radio frequency (RF) energy associated with #UAP sightings" per @ODNIgov
- #UFO #UAP technology: "The UAPTF holds a small amount of data that appear to show UAP demonstrating acceleration or a degree of signature management...We are conducting further analysis to determine if breakthrough technologies were demonstrated"
- Reaction from @DeptofDefense on #UFO #UAP - @DepSecDef Kathleen Hicks says in memo it's "critical that all US military aircrews or gvt personnel report whenever aircraft or other devices interfere w/ military training" "This includes the observation & reporting of UAPs"
- NEW: @DepSecDef makes the hunt for #UFOs permanent mission - directs "the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security to develop a plan to formalize the mission currently performed by the UAPTF [Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force]"
- More @DeptofDefense on plan to improve identification of #UFO #UAP "The plan will establish procedures for synchronizing collection, reporting and analysis of UAP..." per @PentagonPresSec
- Senate Intelligence Committee Chair @MarkWarner says US "must be able to understand & mitigate threats to our pilots" "Today's rather inconclusive report only marks the beginning of efforts to understand..."
- New #UFO #UAP report "just the 1st step" per Senate Intelligence Committee Vice Chair @marcorubio "The Defense Department & Intelligence Community have a lot of work to do before we can actually understand whether these aerial threats present a serious nat'l security concern"
- #UFO #UAP report reax from House Intel Committee Chair @RepAdamSchiff: "increasingly clear that unidentified aerial phenomena are not a rare occurrence & our government needs a unified way to gather, analyze, & contextualize these reports..."

From: (b) (6)
To: [Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO \(USA\)](#); (b) (6) [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6](#); (b) (6)
Cc: [Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#); [Chamberlin, Thomas S SES USN ONI \(USA\)](#); [Stratton, John F \(Jay\) SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#); (b) (6) [OPNAV ALL N2N6 Front Office](#); [Aeschbach, Kelly A RADM USN ONI WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#); (b) (6) (b) (6)
Subject: Re: News Article: The Pentagon Has 6 Months To Disclose What It Knows About UFOs
Date: Tuesday, January 5, 2021 8:33:37 AM

VADM Trussler,

So you're aware, ODNI has the lead on this, as the language of the SSCI committee report directs DNI to prepare the report, in consultation with SECDEF. I'm in contact with the ODNI PA shop, and we're not saying anything other acknowledging that we're aware of the requirement, and referring anything else to ODNI.

Regards,

(b) (6)

OSD(PA)

Sent from my iPhone

From: "Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO (USA)"
(b) (6)
Date: Tuesday, January 5, 2021 at 7:01:31 AM
To: (b) (6) "Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA)"
(b) (6)
Cc: "Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA)"
(b) (6), "Chamberlin, Thomas S SES USN ONI (USA)"
(b) (6), "Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA)" (b) (6)
(b) (6) "OPNAV ALL N2N6 Front Office" (b) (6)
(b) (6) "Aeschbach, Kelly A RADM USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA)"
(b) (6)
Subject: RE: News Article: The Pentagon Has 6 Months To Disclose What It Knows About UFOs

Copy (b) (6), thanks! Vr, JT

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Tuesday, January 5, 2021 6:32 AM

To: Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO (USA) (b) (6);

Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)

Cc: Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA)

(b) (6)

; Chamberlin, Thomas S SES USN ONI (USA)

(b) (6)

; Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN DCNO N2N6

(USA) (b) (6)

OPNAV ALL N2N6

Front Office (b) (6);

Aeschbach, Kelly A RADM USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA)

(b) (6)

Subject: News Article: The Pentagon Has 6 Months To Disclose What It Knows About UFOs

Good Morning DCNO, All.

Subject news article is provided below for your information.

Media interest will remain high on this issue... and will increase as we get closer to that 6 month mark.

Additionally, per OLA, there is continued interest in the UAPTF.

V/R,

(b) (6)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The Pentagon Has 6 Months To Disclose What It Knows About UFOs

Military.com, 4 January 2021... by Oriana Pawlyk

As part of the newly passed COVID-19 relief legislation, lawmakers are demanding answers from U.S. intelligence agencies and the Defense Department on the potential existence of UFOs and other unidentified aerial phenomena.

The \$2.3 trillion omnibus appropriations legislation passed last month includes the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 2021, which provides more resources toward investigation gathering and "strengthening open source intelligence" collection among the agencies, according to a release from Florida Republican Sen. Marco Rubio, who introduced the bill in June. The Senate passed the legislation in July.

Some of that information includes what the Pentagon, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and its counterparts know about unidentified aerial phenomena -- also known as "anomalous aerial vehicles." Lawmakers expect to see a report on the collected UFO data 180 days from the bill's passage, according to the legislation.

News website Complex was first to report the details. The report will be unclassified, but will include a classified supplement.

Lawmakers are concerned that there is "no unified, comprehensive process within the federal government for collecting and analyzing intelligence on unidentified aerial phenomena, despite the potential threat," which is why a sweeping report on all relevant information regarding UAPs is essential, according to the bill's text.

Lawmakers want information on any UAPs that were found using geospatial intelligence, signals intelligence, human intelligence, or measurement and signature intelligence, regardless of which agency or service collected the data, the bill states.

The UFOs don't have to be out of this world, either. The legislation requires information on any technologies China, Russia, Iran, North Korea or others may possess in this field, including "aerospace or other threats posed by the unidentified aerial phenomena to national security, and an assessment of whether this unidentified aerial phenomena activity may be attributed to one or more foreign adversaries," it adds.

In April, the Pentagon officially acknowledged three incidents reported by Navy F/A-18 Hornet fighter pilots after years of speculation that pilots were encountering alien spacecraft during training missions.

The Defense Department that month published videos of the incidents -- one taken in November 2004 and the other two in January 2015 -- "which have been circulating in the public domain after unauthorized releases in 2007 and 2017," officials said in a statement.

"After a thorough review, the department has determined that the authorized release of these unclassified videos does not reveal any sensitive capabilities or systems, and does not impinge on any subsequent investigations of military airspace incursions by unidentified aerial phenomena," Pentagon spokeswoman Sue Gough said at the time.

The video confirmation came a few months after Navy pilots got the word out there had been an increase of UFO sightings in recent years. As a result, the service issued new guidelines on how best to document sightings or encounters, according to a 2019 report from Politico.

The New York Times reported that pilots had sightings -- and, in one instance, a near collision -- while flying training missions off the East Coast between 2014 and 2015.

Then last August, Deputy Defense Secretary David Norquist officially created the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force, a Navy-led unit, to hunt down any pertinent encounters service members may have had with aerial objects that pose a threat to national security.

The U.S. government has looked into UFOs for years, most notably between 2007 and 2012 when the Pentagon began its Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program, an effort championed by then-Sen. Harry Reid, a Democrat from Nevada and the Senate majority leader at the time.

The program was meant to "pursue research and investigation into unidentified aerial phenomena," the Defense Department said, motivated by events such as the 2004 "Tic Tac" incident, which was documented in one of the Navy's released videos.

In that incident, F/A-18 pilots from the aircraft carrier Nimitz, operating off the San Diego coast, reported spotting a large, Tic Tac-shaped object that appeared to be floating without the assistance of an engine or exhaust plume.

[Article](#)

From: [Chamberlin, Thomas S SES USN ONI \(USA\)](#)
To: [Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#); [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#)
Subject: RE: News Article: The Pentagon Has 6 Months To Disclose What It Knows About UFOs
Date: Tuesday, January 5, 2021 9:34:15 AM

Indeed. If we don't qualify for combat pay, can we apply for annoyance pay?

From: Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, January 5, 2021 6:59 AM
To: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6); Chamberlin, Thomas S SES USN ONI (USA) (b) (6)
Subject: FW: News Article: The Pentagon Has 6 Months To Disclose What It Knows About UFOs

2021 may be as annoying as 2020.

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, January 05, 2021 6:32 AM
To: Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO (USA) (b) (6); Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Cc: Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6); Chamberlin, Thomas S SES USN ONI (USA) (b) (6); Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)
(b) (6); OPNAV ALL N2N6 Front Office
(b) (6); Aeschbach, Kelly A RADM USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: News Article: The Pentagon Has 6 Months To Disclose What It Knows About UFOs

Good Morning DCNO, All.

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Additionally, per OLA, there is continued interest in the UAPTF.

V/R,

(b) (6)

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Military.com, 4 January 2021... by Oriana Pawlyk

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Some of that information includes what the Pentagon, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and its counterparts know about unidentified aerial phenomena -- also known as "anomalous aerial vehicles." Lawmakers expect to see a report on the collected UFO data 180 days from the bill's passage, according to the legislation.

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Lawmakers are concerned that there is "no unified, comprehensive process within the federal government for collecting and analyzing intelligence on unidentified aerial phenomena, despite the potential threat," which is why a sweeping report on all relevant information regarding UAPs is essential, according to the bill's text.

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The UFOs don't have to be out of this world, either. The legislation requires information on any technologies China, Russia, Iran, North Korea or others may possess in this field, including "aerospace or other threats posed by the unidentified aerial phenomena to national security, and an assessment of whether this unidentified aerial phenomena activity may be attributed to one or more foreign adversaries," it adds.

In April, the Pentagon officially acknowledged three incidents reported by Navy F/A-18 Hornet fighter pilots after years of speculation that pilots were encountering alien spacecraft during training missions.

The Defense Department that month published videos of the incidents -- one taken in November 2004 and the

other two in January 2015 -- "which have been circulating in the public domain after unauthorized releases in 2007 and 2017," officials said in a statement.

"After a thorough review, the department has determined that the authorized release of these unclassified videos does not reveal any sensitive capabilities or systems, and does not impinge on any subsequent investigations of military airspace incursions by unidentified aerial phenomena," Pentagon spokeswoman Sue Gough said at the time.

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Then last August, Deputy Defense Secretary David Norquist officially created the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force, a Navy-led unit, to hunt down any pertinent encounters service members may have had with aerial objects that pose a threat to national security.

The U.S. government has looked into UFOs for years, most notably between 2007 and 2012 when the Pentagon began its Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program, an effort championed by then-Sen. Harry Reid, a Democrat from Nevada and the Senate majority leader at the time.

The program was meant to "pursue research and investigation into unidentified aerial phenomena," the Defense Department said, motivated by events such as the 2004 "Tic Tac" incident, which was documented in one of the Navy's released videos.

In that incident, F/A-18 pilots from the aircraft carrier Nimitz, operating off the San Diego coast, reported spotting a large, Tic Tac-shaped object that appeared to be floating without the assistance of an engine or exhaust plume.

[Article](#)

From: (b) (6)
To: (b) (6) [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#)
Cc: [Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#); [Chamberlin, Thomas S SES USN ONI \(USA\)](#); [Stratton, John F \(Jay\) SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#); (b) (6)
(b) (6); [Chinfo Duty Officer](#); (b) (6)
Subject: RE: News Article: Are UFOs a threat to national security? We may find out in 6 months
Date: Wednesday, January 6, 2021 11:21:26 AM

Thanks for keeping on top of all the press attention, (b) (6). I'd like to meet with you sometime over the next week to discuss a strategy for handling anticipated press attention going forward and in advance of the requirements delineated in the congressional language. In addition to DOD and ODNI public affairs folks, FBI has also reached out with a desire for coordination on a strategy.

V/r,

(b) (6)

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From: (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, January 5, 2021 1:47 PM
To: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Cc: Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6); Chamberlin, Thomas S SES USN ONI (USA) (b) (6); Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6); Chinfo Duty Officer (b) (6)
(b) (6) OPNAV ALL N2N6 Front Office
(b) (6)
Subject: News Article: Are UFOs a threat to national security? We may find out in 6 months

Scott, (b) (6),

Another article out today (see below).

I will add to the IW Clips Wednesday.

This one is interesting as it points to China and Russia as a more likely source for range incursions.

You'll note that the ODNI PAO is quoted... DOD PA ((b) (6)) referred the reporter there because of the NDAA language.

FYI... I join a weekly IC Community Communicators each Thursday that ((b) (6)) (ODNI PAO) hosts... I have kept her up to speed on UAP queries/issues through this channel since we started all this.

Regards,

((b) (6))

((b) (6))
((b) (6))
((b) (6))
((b) (6))
((b) (6))

Are UFOs a threat to national security? We may find out in 6 months

Are the Russians and Chinese ahead of the US?

Task & Purpose, 5 January 2021... by Jeff Schogol

Now the director of national intelligence and defense secretary have six months to provide lawmakers with an unclassified report about whether these aircraft indicate that foreign adversaries have made breakthroughs in aerospace technology that could endanger U.S. forces.

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence, which is in charge of preparing the report to Congress, is aware of the requirement to do so and will respond accordingly, said ODNI spokeswoman Susan Meisner.

The report, which may include a classified annex, is mandated by the Fiscal 2021 Intelligence Authorization Act, which was included in other legislation that was passed in December.

"Recent events make it all too clear that our nation continues to face ever-expanding threats from hostile foreign actors, including China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea," Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.), acting chair of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, said in a Dec. 21 news release.

Nothing in the legislation or Rubio's press release indicates that lawmakers are concerned that the unidentified aircraft in question could be extraterrestrial in origin. The lingering question is whether Russia or China has

surpassed the U.S. military in terms of hypersonic technology.

For the past several years, the Pentagon has been ramping up efforts to develop hypersonic technology. President Donald Trump has boasted that the Defense Department is working to develop a missile that can fly at 17 times faster than the speed of sound.

Defense officials have openly lamented that Russia and China are working on developing their own hypersonic weapons. Former Acting Navy Secretary Thomas Modly was fired in April after berating the crew of the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt, during which he warned sailors that they would be “pretty f—ing scared” if hypersonic missiles were fired at the ship.

Right now, it is unclear whether the Russians and Chinese are ahead of the U.S. military in efforts to field hypersonic weapons, said retired Air Force Lt. Gen. David Deptula, dean of The Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies. While the United States made significant advances in hypersonic technology in the 1960s, funding for those efforts was canceled following the end of the Cold War, Deptula said.

“This is one thing that the Russians and the Chinese aren’t encumbered with: and that is political limitations. If in fact they have a scientific or technological goal that they want to accomplish, they’ll proceed with it,” said Deptula, though he cautioned that “it might break them in terms of what happened to the Soviet Union when it came to spending on defense.”

The Defense Department, which referred questions on the report to ODNI, has shown a growing interest in reported sightings of aircraft that appear not to spew any visible engine exhaust – and which can also loiter for up to 12 hours.

In April, the Pentagon officially released videos of three close encounters with “unidentified aerial phenomena” — the military’s term for UFOs — taken by Navy pilots. Then in August, the Pentagon established a task force “to detect, analyze and catalog UAPs that could potentially pose a threat to U.S. national security.”

In response to a question from Task & Purpose, the commander of U.S. Pacific Air Forces told reporters in September that none of his personnel had reported seeing unidentified aircraft since the Pentagon task force had been stood up.

Air Force Gen. Kenneth Wilsbach also said that he has seen strange things during his decades of flying experience, but he was unsure if extraterrestrial life has visited Earth. “I don’t know,” Wilsbach said while shaking his head. “I don’t know.”

[Article](#)

From: (b) (6)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N61](#)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: CNA contact (from VCNO Briefing)
Date: Monday, January 11, 2021 8:18:20 PM

How about...

=====

(b) (6),
(b) (5) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Kind regards,
Scott

Scott W. Bray
Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence
Director, Naval Intelligence Activity
(b) (6)

(<https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2314065/establishment-of-unidentified-aerial-phenomena-task-force/>)

=====

From: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)

Sent: Friday, January 8, 2021 6:16 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: FW: CNA contact (from VCNO Briefing)

(b) (6) –

Would you ghost an email for me to send to (b) (6)? I know what I want to say, but you're familiar with what we do/don't say at this classification level....

Many thanks,
Scott

Scott W. Bray

Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence

Director, Naval Intelligence Activity

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Friday, December 18, 2020 2:06 PM

To: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Subject: CNA contact (from VCNO Briefing)

Hi Boss and (b) (6) –

Below is the CNA representative the VCNO referenced in your briefing on Thursday.

Thanks,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N61](#)
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] RE: VCNO Recommended I Reach Out – Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force
Date: Wednesday, January 13, 2021 11:28:34 AM

Good morning Mr. Bay,

Following up! Please let me know when you are ready to start coordinating meeting dates. I look forward to hearing from you soon. Have a great day and Stay Safe!

Thank you,

(b) (6)



From: (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, January 12, 2021 2:20 PM
To: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N61 (b) (6)
Cc: Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: RE: VCNO Recommended I Reach Out – Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force

Mr. Bray,

Thanks for reaching out. My team and I would definitely welcome a conversation with you and Task Force members on how we might be able to contribute to or help accelerate your efforts. Is there someone on your staff my EA can work with to set up the meeting?

Best,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

From: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)

Sent: Tuesday, January 12, 2021 7:27 AM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

Subject: [External]VCNO Recommended I Reach Out -- Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force

(b) (6) -

In a recent meeting, VCNO suggested your talents and skill-sets may be a part of the solution to a challenging problem.

In one of the more unique tasks handled by my organization, Navy has the lead for the recently announced Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force (UAPTF). The Deputy Secretary of Defense announced the formation of the Task Force in August 2020. More may found in the August 2020 press statement ([link](#)), but the release clearly states the Task Force's objective:

“The Department of Defense established the UAPTF to improve its understanding of, and gain insight into, the nature and origins of UAPs. The mission of the task force is to detect, analyze and catalog UAPs that could potentially pose a threat to U.S. national security.”

ADM Lescher recommended that we reach out to you for your perspective and experience in handling complex data sets and unique analytic approaches to gain insights and understanding of high-order problems. In fact, the VCNO offered that he would like to participate in discussions with you and the Task Force following initial introductions.

If you are available over the coming month, I would like to introduce you to some members of the Task Force and explore cooperative approaches to the collection and analysis of relevant data.

Kind regards,
Scott Bray

Scott W. Bray

Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence
Director, Naval Intelligence Activity

(b) (6)

From: [Richardson, Andrew G SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#)
To: (b) (6)
Cc: [Aeschbach, Kelly A RADM USN ONI WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#); [Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#); [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#); (b) (6)
Subject: RE: Proposed Congressional Engagements
Date: Tuesday, January 26, 2021 4:01:12 PM

Thanks (b) (6)!

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, January 26, 2021 2:58 PM
To: Richardson, Andrew G SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
Cc: Aeschbach, Kelly A RADM USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6);
Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6); Bray, Scott W SES
OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: RE: Proposed Congressional Engagements

Mr. Richardson,

I understand and will start working the details with your team. Undoubtedly those engagements will be an excellent foundation prior to budget roll out.

I will reach out to (b) (6), FMB, to examine feasibility and interest for appropriator participation.

V/r,
(b) (6)

(b) (6)

From: Richardson, Andrew G SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA)
(b) (6)
Sent: Monday, January 25, 2021 3:20 PM
To: (b) (6)
Cc: Aeschbach, Kelly A RADM USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6); Bray, Scott W SES
OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Subject: Proposed Congressional Engagements

Hi (b) (6),

To start off the new year, COMONI would like to invite staff members from our main oversight committees (HPSCI, SSCI, HAC-D, SAC-D) to the NMIC for an annual briefing/overview. (HPSCI and SSCI staff have already expressed interest, but the appropriators usually don't make it over.)

Second, we would like to engage ASAP (in writing) with these committees about the funding we were given for the garage – which is now OBE – given that the Navy provided funds late last FY to demolish and pave over the current structure. COMONI would like to formally ask the committees what else we could use it for. For example, could we instead use that funding to make other infrastructure improvements at the NMIC?

Finally, we would like to invite the local Member of Congress, Rep. Anthony Brown, to the NMIC. He has visited before and we think it makes sense to keep the NMIC on his radar. Also, we could invite him to speak to the workforce about diversity and opportunity issues as part of our ongoing outreach in this area.

Please let me know if you have any questions.

Thanks,
Andrew

Andrew G. Richardson
Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service
Deputy Commander
Office of Naval Intelligence

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Friday, January 22, 2021 5:37 PM

To: Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO (USA) (b) (6)

Cc: Aeschbach, Kelly A RADM USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6);
(b) (6); Barron,
Claude E SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)

(b) (6); Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I

(b) (6); Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA)

(b) (6); BryerJoyner, Susan RDML USN DCNO N2N6 (USA)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6); Correll, Richard A RADM USN DCNO N2N6 (USA)
(b) (6); Creighton, Kathleen M RADM USN DCNO N2N6 (USA)
(b) (6)
(b) (6); Ekstrom, Christopher R SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA)
(b) (6); Emery, Gregory K RDML USN DCNO N2N6 (USA)
(b) (6); Flynn, William A SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
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(b) (6)
(b) (6)
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(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6); Miller, Christopher A SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6); Okon, John A RDML USN COMNAVMETOC COM SSC (USA)
(b) (6); Page, Christopher James (Chris) SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA)
(b) (6); Reiter, Joshua (Josh) SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA)
(b) (6); Richardson, Andrew G SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA)
(b) (6)
(b) (6); Sadler, Stephen R SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

Subject: FW: 22 Jan OLA Update

Admiral,

Please see below for a highlight of N2N6 equities in last week's Legislative Review and additional ongoing efforts.

Overview:

- Next week the Senate is in session and the House will be in committee work.
- New appointees to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and Senate Select

Committee on Intelligence have not yet been announced. According to media and staffer speculation, the composition of the committee member leadership is not expected to change significantly. The committee assignment process is ongoing in the House and pending in the Senate.

- Senate confirmed Ms. Avril Haines to be the Director of National Intelligence on 20 Jan in a 84-10 vote.

Upcoming briefs:

- **Sen. Rounds (R-SD) Introductory Call with DoN Principal Cyber Advisor (PCA).** On 26 Jan, Mr. Chris Cleary will participate in an introductory phone call with Sen. Rounds (Chairman Cybersecurity Subcommittee) along with PCAs from OSD, Army, and Air Force. (POC: (b) (6))
- **N97 Classified UUV Brief to SSCI PSMs (Part II).** On 28 Jan, RDML Houston, N97, will provide a classified brief to SSCI PSMs, (b) (6), on large and extra large Unmanned Undersea Vehicles. The brief was requested by SSCI PSMs in order to better understand UUV requirements, acquisition, and utilization of lessons learned on other unmanned platforms. (POC: (b) (6))
- **Operation Cattle Drive Brief (removal of obsolete IT equipment) to HASC PSMs.** On 05 Feb, (b) (6) will deliver a joint brief to HASC PSMs, (b) (6). HASC PSMs requested the briefing after reading a press release on the DON CIO website. (POC: (b) (6))

Other Ongoing Efforts:

- SASC PSM, (b) (6), requested an updated UAP Task Force brief to the SASC and SSCI, in accordance with the Senate's language in the NDAA annex and IAA. Mr. Bray, DDNI, and (b) (6), UAPTF Lead, plan to support the briefing when it is scheduled in early February. SASC and SSCI PSMs have requested a call with DDNI prior, which is scheduled for 26 Jan. (POC: (b) (6))
- The personal staffs for Senator Cornyn (R-TX) and Senator Fischer (R-NE) have requested an informational briefing from the UAP Task Force, in order to better support their members. Scheduling is in progress. (POC: (b) (6))
- SSCI PSM, (b) (6), has requested information from ONI on the following topics: RFN submarine deployments, activity in the Red Sea and Eastern Mediterranean, adversary UUVs, and ONI website upgrades. Additionally, SSCI PSMs would like to schedule a site visit to ONI (Suitland and Annapolis). Coordination is in progress. (POC: (b) (6))
- (b) (6), MLA for Rep. Gaetz, (R-FL) requested an introductory call with the

Commanding Officer of CIWT Pensacola, (b) (6), to gain familiarization with Navy equities in his district. Rep. Gaetz represents FL-01 which covers NAS Pensacola and IWTC Corry Station. Coordination is in progress. (POC: (b) (6))

- (b) (6) has replaced (b) (6) as the HASC Minority PSM for the cyber portfolio. (b) (6) has requested a series of "101" briefings with OSD and the military services in February. Coordination is in progress with C10F and DON CIO to deliver a joint brief. (POC: (b) (6))
- (b) (6), HASC PSM has requested a phone call with representatives from NCWDG, N2N6, and C10F to discuss FY21 NDAA legislation impacting NCWDG. Coordination is in progress. (POC: (b) (6))

Upcoming travel:

- SSCI PSMs, (b) (6), have requested travel support to Fort Bragg and Virginia Beach, for a predominantly SOCOM agenda. Navy equities are included in the program, with a prospective visit to USFF/2nd Fleet/Atlantic Fleet. The trip has been tentatively scheduled for mid-March. (POC: (b) (6))

V/r,

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(b) (6)

From: Joyner, Sara A RDML USN OLA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, January 22, 2021 5:33 PM
To: Gilday, Michael M ADM USN CNO (USA) (b) (6)
Cc: Lescher, William K ADM USN VCNO (USA) (b) (6); Davidson, Philip S ADM USN INDOPACOM J00 (USA) (b) (6); Grady, Christopher W ADM USN USFFC (USA) (b) (6); Aquilino, John C ADM USN COMPACFLT PEARL HI (USA) (b) (6); Caldwell, James F Jr ADM USN (USA) (b) (6); (b) (6); Haeuptle, Andrew S SES USN DNS (USA) (b) (6); Nowell, John B Jr VADM USN DCNO N1 (USA) (b) (6); Sawyer, Phillip G VADM USN (USA) (b) (6); Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO (USA) (b) (6); Crites, Randy B VADM USN DCNO N8 (USA) (b) (6); Malloy, James Joseph (Jim) VADM USN CENTCOM CCCG (USA) (b) (6); Williamson, Ricky Lee VADM USN

DCNO N4 (USA) (b) (6); Wolfe, Johnny VADM (b) (6);
Bynum, James S (Jay) RADM USN DCNO N7 (USA) (b) (6); Kilby, James W VADM
USN CNO (USA) (b) (6); Mustin, John B VADM USN CNO (USA)
(b) (6); Lindsey, Yancy B VADM USN CNIC WASHINGTON DC (USA)
(b) (6); Lewis, Andrew L VADM USN SECOND FLEET (USA)
(b) (6) Caudle, Daryl L VADM USN
COMSUBLANT (USA) (b) (6); Peters, G Dean VADM USN COMNAVAIRSYSCOM PAX
(USA) (b) (6); Galinis, William J VADM USN (USA) (b) (6);
Whitesell, Kenneth R VADM USN COMNAVAIRPAC (USA) (b) (6); Conn, Scott
D VADM USN (USA) (b) (6); Fuller, Scott K RDML USN DCNO N9 (USA)
(b) (6); Harris, Gregory N (Hyfi) RADM USN CNO (USA)
(b) (6); Dunn, Paula D RDML CHINFO, OI-00 (b) (6);
Houston, William Joseph RADM USN DCNO N9 (USA) (b) (6);
Stamatopoulos, Peter G RADM USN COMNAVSUPSYSCOM PA (USA)
(b) (6); Garvin, Peter A RADM USN NETC PENSACOLA FL (USA)
(b) (6); Mewbourne, Dee L VADM USN TRANSCOM TCDC (USA)
(b) (6)
Meier, John F RADM USN COMNAVAIRLANT NOR VA (USA) (b) (6); Kern, Erin M
SES USN DCNO N4 (USA) (b) (6); (b) (6)
(b) (6) Darnell,
Donald P SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6); Swartz, Matthew H SES
USN USFFC (USA) (b) (6); Luy, Paul A SES USN DCNO N9 (USA)
(b) (6); Schlise, Paul J RDML USN CNO (USA) (b) (6); Holsey, Alvin
RADM USN COMNAVPERSCOM MIL TN (USA) (b) (6); King, Tracy W MajGen
USMC USN DCNO N9 (USA) (b) (6); Brophy, Richard T Jr RDML USN NAWDC
(USA) (b) (6); Jablon, Jeffrey T RADM USN DCNO N1 (USA)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6); Gumbleton, John E RDML USN
ASSTSECNAV FMC DC (USA) (b) (6); Anderson, Thomas J RDML USN
COMNAVSEASYSYSCOM DC (USA) (b) (6)
(b) (6); Schafer, Todd L SES USN ASSTSECNAV EIE DC (USA)
(b) (6); Miguez, Marc Jeffrey RDML USN JS J3 (USA) (b) (6)
(b) (6) Greene, William C RDML USN USFFC (USA)
(b) (6)
(b) (6) Krikorian, Victoria SES USN CNO (USA) (b) (6);
O'Connor, Cathal S RDML USN JS J5 (USA) (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6); Spedero, Paul C Jr RDML USN USFFC (USA) (b) (6);
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6); Westendorff, Robert D RDML USN CNATRA (USA)

(b) (6)
; Korka, John W RADM USN NAVFAC WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6); LaTorre,
Jennifer A SES USN COMNAVFACENGCOM DC (USA) (b) (6); Clark, Robert T
RDML USN (USA) (b) (6); Lemmon, John S RDML USN NAVAIRWARCENACDIV MD
(USA) (b) (6)
; Genoble, Brett J SES USN DCNO
N1 (USA) (b) (6)
; Vitale, Louise A SES USN OLA WASHINGTON DC (USA)
(b) (6)
; Selby, Lorin C RADM USN CNR ARLINGTON VA (USA)
(b) (6); Livingston, Mark A SES USN CNO (USA) (b) (6)
; Crandall, Darse E RADM USN NAVY JAG WASH DC (USA)
(b) (6)

(b) (6) Skillman, John Bradley

RADM USN DCNO N8 (USA) (b) (6)

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(b) (6)

(b) (6) Williams,

Thomas R (Tom) RDML USN CNO (USA) (b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6) VerHage, Eric Holt RDML USN

(USA) (b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6) ; Chatfield, Shoshana S., RADM, NAVWARCOL

(b) (6) ; Scott, Lance G RDML USN COMPATRECONGRU (USA)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6) Skillman, John Bradley RADM USN DCNO N8 (USA)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

Subject: 22 Jan OLA Update

CNO,

(Routine // FYSA)

Majority control shifted to the Democrats on Wed 20 Jan with the swearing in of three new Senators and the inauguration of VPOTUS. On Thu 21 Jan, both chambers passed legislation (HR 335) granting the necessary waiver for Mr. Austin to serve as SECDEF, and the Senate voted to confirm him today.

The committee assignment process is ongoing in the House and pending in the Senate (due to the 50/50 split and pending adoption of an organizing resolution). We are working with DASN SHIPs to sked FFG reprogramming brief and LCS Combing Gear brief to HASC and SASC Seapower PSMs. Both are of high interest to the Congressional committees.

OLA priorities:

- Set conditions for NDAA/Appropriations success

DASN Env FRTC-Modernization discussion with Rep. Gallego (D-AZ) MLA (19 Jan)

PEO USC and DASN Ships FFG Update to HAC-D and SAC-D PSMs (21 Jan)

- Synchronize DON messaging and priorities on the Hill

NAVSAFECEN 101 Brief to Ms. Rachel Bombach (MLA to Sen. Feinstein (D-CA)) (19 Jan)

PEO USC and DASN Ships LCS Combining Gear Brief to HAC-D and SAC-D PSMs (21 Jan)

NAVFAC HI Red Hill Env Brief to HASC PSMs (21 Jan)

CMC phone call with Rep. Speier (D-CA) (today)

DON Senior Leader Engagements:

26 Jan CMC phone call with Rep. Rogers (R-AL)

3 Feb CMC phone call with Sen. Duckworth (D-IL)

9 Feb CMC participation in House Congressional Marine Caucus Breakfast

Hill Engagements – Two Week Outlook:

25 Jan CNAFR brief on VFA-204 to Louisiana Staff delegation

25 Jan F-35 JPO Q2 update to SASC PSMs

25 Jan CNSF discussion with HASC SPF PSMs

26 Jan F-35 JPO Q2 update to HASC PSMs

26 Jan DON Principal Cyber Advisor Introduction w/Sen. Rounds (R-SD)

26 Jan F-35 PEO Q2 Quarterly Update to SAC-D PSMs

26 Jan NAVSEA SIOP Brief to Rep. Case (D-HI)

27 Jan TECOM discussion w/ Rep. Moulton (D-MA) re: Force Design impacts on training and education

27 Jan FMB-1 Quarterly Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Brief to HAC-D and SAC-D PSMs

28 Jan MQ-25 Brief to HASC and SASC PSMs by N9 and PMD RDA

28 Jan N9SP meeting with SASC SPF PSMs

28 Jan Unmanned War Room visit by HASC and SASC SPF PSMs

28 Jan N9 Unmanned Campaign Plan and War Room discussion with HASC and SASC PSMs

29 Jan CNSF discussion with SASC Seapower PSMs

29 Jan FRTC disc with Sen. Rosen (D-NV) staff and DASN Environment

2 Feb VADM Buck call with Rep. Ruppertsberger (D-MD), Chair of USNA BoV

3 Feb CMC phone call with Sen. Duckworth (D-IL)

5 Feb CNGS MIDPAC 101 brief to Mr. Tim Nelson (Rep. Case CoS)

5 Feb DON CIO/FM&C Op. Cattle Drive IT Infrastructure Brief to HASC PSMs

Full report below.

Very Respectfully,

Clutch & (b) (6)

RDML Sara "Clutch" Joyner, USN

(b) (6)

1. Executive Summary:

a. Senate and House Floor Action. Majority control shifted to the Democrats on Wed, 20 Jan with the swearing in of three new Senators (details below) and the inauguration of VPOTUS. On Thu, 21 Jan, both chambers passed legislation (HR 335) granting the necessary waiver for Gen. Austin to serve as SECDEF, and the Senate voted today, 22 Jan, to confirm him. The votes were 326-78 in the House and 69-27 in the Senate for the waiver bill and 93-2 in the Senate for confirmation.

b. Significant Events This Week.

i. Swearing In of New Senators. On 20 Jan, Sen. Ossoff (D-GA), Warnock (D-GA) and Padilla (D-CA) were sworn in to replace Sens. Perdue (R-GA), Loeffler (R-GA) and Harris (D-CA), respectively. Sens. Warnock and Padilla are filling the balance of unexpired terms and will be up for reelection in 2022.

ii. Committee Membership Assignments. The committee assignment process is ongoing in the House and pending in the Senate. (Committee ratios in both chambers are still TBD.) Highlights of House committee assignments announced to date (all previously reported):

- HASC:

- o Newly assigned: Reps. Morelle (D-NY), Kahele (D-HI) and Jacobs (D-CA). (Reps. Kahele and Jacobs are freshmen.)

- o Returning after one Congress absence: Reps. Murphy (D-FL), Panetta (D-CA), and Veasey (D-TX).

- HAC: Newly assigned: Reps. Espaillat (D-NY), Harder (D-CA), Lee (D-NV), Trone (D-MD), Underwood (D-IL), Wexton (D-VA), Valadao (R-CA), Reschenthaler (R-PA), Garcia (R-CA), Cline (R-VA), T. Gonzales (R-TX), and Hinson (R-IA). (Reps. T. Gonzales and Hinson are freshmen.)

iii. House Schedule Change. The House has changed its schedule for the next two weeks. Next week (25-29 Jan), the House will be in a committee work period vice in session. The following week (1-5 Feb), the House will be in session vice in a committee work period.

c. Significant Events Next Week.

i. Senate Floor Action. The Senate is expected to consider additional Cabinet nominations. The way ahead on the impeachment trial is still TBD. (The House is expected to transmit the articles of impeachment to the Senate next week.)

ii. House Floor Action. None. The House will be in a committee work period.

d. Upcoming Events.

i. Next Recess. Both chambers will be in recess the week of 15-19 Feb, which includes the Presidents' Day holiday.

2. Upcoming Engagements/Committee Activities. A copy of the current engagement calendar is attached.

3. Committee Activities This Week:

a. SASC Hearing on SECDEF Nom. On 19 January, the Senate Armed Services Committee held a hearing to receive confirmation testimony from Mr. Lloyd J. Austin III to be Secretary of Defense. A well-attended hearing, 14 members appeared in person while the rest participated remotely. Overall, testimony was well received by members. AAR sent SEPCOR.

b. HASC Roundtable in Lieu of Hearing on SECDEF Waiver. On 21 Jan, HASC held a closed roundtable with (P) SECDEF regarding civilian control of the military. The roundtable was in lieu of a planned hearing. The change was due to delays in the House committee assignment process, which has prevented HASC from conducting its organizational meeting as required before the committee can conduct formal business. (HASC was also unable to consider the SECDEF waiver bill (HR 335), which instead went directly to the House floor without intervening committee action.)

4. Navy OLA Engagements This Week:

a. FRTC-Modernization discussion with Rep. Gallego (D-AZ) MLA. On 19 January, DASN Environment, Mr. Karnig Ohannessian, discussed FRTC Modernization with Rep. Gallego (D-AZ) MLA, Robert Ikoku. The briefing was at the request of the Navy to update him on the DON's continued advocacy in the 117th Congress.

b. Red Hill Environmental Impact Brief to HASC PSMs. On 21 January, NAVFAC HI CO, CAPT Meyer, briefed HASC PSMs per FY21 NDAA requirement on the geological and hydrological mechanisms that impact how a release of fuel from the Red Hill facility would impact the drinking water supply. Staff from Navy Region Hawaii, OASN EI&E and OPNAV N45 will also join the MS Teams call.

5. USMC Engagements This Week:

a. TECOM engaged Rep. Cole's (R-OK) staff on Cold Weather training at Mountain Warfare Training Center (MWTC) on 19 January.

b. JAD engaged Rep. Connolly's (D-VA) staff on 21 January regarding the death of a constituent in March from COVID-19.

c. CMC phone call with Rep. Speier (D-CA) on 22 January.

6. FMBE Engagements This Week:

a. NAVSAFECEN 101 Brief to Ms. Rachel Bombach. On 19 Jan, Mr. Tarsa (NAVSAFECEN ED) provided a "101" brief to Ms. Rachel Bombach (MLA to Sen. Feinstein (D-CA)).

b. PEO USC FFG Update for SAC-D. On 21 Jan, RDML Moton (PEO USC) and Ms. Anderson (DASN

Ships) provided an FFG Update to Ms. Kate Käufer (SAC-D PSM) and Ms. Brooke Barnard (HAC-D PSM) on the FFG-62 program since contract award.

c. PEO USC LCS Combining Gear Brief for SAC-D. On 21 Jan, RDML Moton (PEO USC) and Ms. Anderson (DASN Ships) provided an LCS Combining Gear Brief to Ms. Kate Käufer (SAC-D PSM) and Ms. Brooke Barnard (HAC-D PSM) on the recent LCS Combining Gear casualties, limitations being implemented and the ongoing root cause analysis.

7. Upcoming Navy OLA Engagements of Note:

a. CNAFR brief to staff members from Louisiana delegation on status of VFA-204. On 25 January, CNAFR leadership will provide an update brief on the transition of VFA-204 aircraft to perform adversary training. There is significant interest from Rep. Scalise (R-LA) given that VFA-204 is located in New Orleans.

b. CNSF meeting with HASC SPF PSMs. On 25 Jan, VADM Kitchener will discuss vision, priorities, opportunities and challenges with HASC SPF PSMs.

c. F-35 JPO Q2 update to SASC PSMs. On 25 January, the F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO) will deliver their Q2 update to SASC Air Land PSMs Mr. Creighton Greene and Robert Winkler.

d. F-35 JPO Q2 update Part 1 to HASC PSMs. On 26 January, the F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO) will deliver their Q2 update Part 1 to HASC TALF and Readiness PSMs Heath Bope, Jesse Tolleson, Brian Garrett, Jay Vallario, and Melanie Harris.

e. Sen. Rounds (R-SD) Introductory Call with DoN Principal Cyber Advisor (PCA). On 26 Jan, Mr. Chris Cleary will participate in an introductory phone call with Sen. Rounds (Chairman Cybersecurity Subcommittee) along with PCAs from OSD, Army, and Air Force.

f. N9SP Meeting with SASC SPF PSMs. On 28 Jan, Mr. Brain Howes (N9SP) will meet with SASC SPF PSMs Mr. Creighton Greene and Mr. Jason Potter to discuss classified programs.

g. ASN RDA (PMD) and N9 MQ-25 Control Station Brief to HASC and SASC PSMs. On 28 Jan, VADM Moran (ASN RDA PMD) and VADM Kilby (N9) will provide a classified update to HASC and SASC Seapower PSMs Mr. Creighton Greene, Mr. Jason Potter, Mr. Phil MacNaughton, and Mr. Dave Sienicki. The brief was requested by the Navy to highlight upcoming programmatic changes.

h. N9 Unmanned Campaign Plan and War Room discussion with HASC and SASC PSMs. On 28 Jan, VADM Kilby (N9) will lead a discussion of the Navy's ongoing effort to develop a holistic approach to fielding unmanned systems in the future. The brief will include a visit of the Unmanned War Room.

i. N97 Classified UUV Brief to SSCI PSMs (Part II). On 28 January, RDML Houston, N97, will provide a classified brief to SSCI PSMs, Mr. James Sauls, Mr. Jacob Barton and Mr. Arjun Ravindra, on large and extra-large Unmanned Undersea Vehicles. The brief was requested by SSCI PSMs in order to better understand UUV requirements, acquisition, and utilization of lessons learned on other unmanned

platforms.

j. CNSF meeting with SASC Seapower PSMs. On 29 Jan, VADM Kitchener will discuss vision, priorities, opportunities and challenges with SASC Seapower PSMs.

k. FRTC discussion with Sen. Rosen (D-NV) staff. On 29 Jan, staff from Sen. Rosen's office will discuss the Fallon Range Training Complex modernization efforts with DASN Environment, Mr. Karnig Ohannessian. The call was at the request of the Navy to provide status updates and discuss DON's continued advocacy in the 117th Congress.

l. F-35 JPO Q2 update Part 2 to HASC PSMs. On 2 February, the F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO) will deliver their Q2 update Part 2 to HASC TALF and Readiness PSMs Heath Bope, Jesse Tolleson, Brian Garrett, Jay Vallario, and Melanie Harris.

m. Operation Cattle Drive Brief (removal of obsolete IT equipment) to HASC PSMs. On 05 Feb, Mr. Galbraith from DON CIO and Ms. Tompa from FM&C will deliver a joint brief to HASC PSMs, Mr. Josh Stiefel and Ms. Sarah Moxley. HASC PSMs requested the briefing after reading a press release on the DON CIO website.

n. Rep. Luria (D-VA) Visit to NAVSEA War Room. On 23 Feb, Rep. Luria will visit NAVSEA for a War Room tour.

o. SASC Parade of Captains with N1. On 5 March, VADM Nowell will virtually host SASC Personnel PSMs for the annual Parade of Captains briefings on N1 legislative priorities and challenges.

8. Upcoming USMC Engagements of Note:

a. Force Design Impacts on Training and Education. On 26 January, TECOM representatives will hold a discussion with Rep. Moulton (D-MA) on the impacts of Force Design on training and education in the Marine Corps.

b. Force Design Elements within FY21 Approps Bill. On 26 January, DC P&R will hold a teleconference with the HAC-D/SAC-D PSMs.

c. MARFORPAC will host Mr. Tim Nelson, Rep. Case's MLA, 4 February. This visit is to discuss future installation support required for the next Congressional cycle.

d. Marine Barracks Washington / CMC Home Tour. On 5 February several HASC PSMs will be given a tour of CMC Home and Marine Barracks.

9. Upcoming FMBE Engagements of Note:

a. F-35 Q2 Quarterly Update to SAC-D. On 26 Jan, Gen Fick (F35 PEO), will provide the required Q2 quarterly brief to SAC-D PSMs, Ms. Kate Kaufer, Mr. Todd Phillips, Mr. Mike Clementi, Ms. Rosie Heiss, and Mr. Andy Vanlandingham (SAC-D PSMs) on the status of the F-35 program.

b. NAVSEA SIOP Brief to Rep. Case (D-HI). On 26 Jan, On 26 Jan, VADM Galinis (NAVSEA) will brief Rep. Case to provide updates to the SIOP Program.

c. Quarterly Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Brief. On 27 Jan, CAPT Reynolds (FMB-1) will provide the Quarterly O&M Execution Brief to Ms. Katy Hagan (SAC-D PSM) and Ms. Jennifer Chartrand (HAC-D PSM).

d. Submarine Maintenance Update. On 1 Feb, RDML Anderson (Commander, Undersea Warfare), will provide an update to the maintenance efforts of USS Boise and USS Hartford to Ms. Jennifer Chartrand (HAC-D PSM).

e. VADM Buck call with Rep Ruppertsberger (D-MD). On 2 Feb, VADM Buck (USNA), will have a telcon with Rep. Ruppertsberger (D-MD), Chairman of USNA Board of Visitors, to discuss USNA BOV operations and planning.

f. CNGS MIDPAC 101 brief to Mr. Tim Nelson (Rep. Case CoS). On 5 Feb, CAPT Joe Ring (CNSG MIDPAC CoS) will provide an introductory brief to Mr. Tim Nelson (Rep. Case CoS) for an in district visit. LT Matt Bernard (Rep. Case Legislative Fellow) will be traveling with Mr. Nelson as an escort.

g. SIOP Brief to Rep. Kilmer Staff. On 19 Feb, Mr. Lagan (PMS-555 Program Manager) will provide a SIOP 101 brief to Mr. Ben Donovan (MLA to Rep. Kilmer (D-WA)).

From: (b) (6)
To: [Brown, Charles W RDML USN \(USA\)](#); [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6J](#); (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: TF Talking Points
Date: Tuesday, February 2, 2021 11:35:14 AM
Attachments: [20210125 BC UAP Report to Congress.docx](#)
[UAP Briefing Card 27 Aug 2020.docx](#)

CI/Scott, (b) (6),

Just heard from DOD PA that re: "UAP Talking Points... Just received word DSD tasked Navy PA via VCNO to come up with something."

Any additional guidance?

FYI... here is DOD's latest Briefing Card on the Report to Congress... and the comprehensive Navy Card I put together in August...

There have been lots of queries on the report (generally punted to ODNI PA) ... and requests for detailed info on the UAPTF.

Is the intent to actually provide some details?

Standing by, as always, to work.

Regards,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)
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(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
To: (b) (6); [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6J](#); (b) (6)
Cc: [OPNAV ALL N2N6 Front Office](#); (b) (6)
(b) (6)
[Brown, Sandra](#)
[SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#); (b) (6)
Subject: RE: VCNO TF meeting today
Date: Tuesday, February 2, 2021 1:01:48 PM

Point of clarification (for everyone other than Joe): my card not intended to be ALL talking points/responses to queries on UAPs/UAPTF. Rather, it is focused on the current "hot topic," which is the SSCI report attached to the Intel Auth. Act, directing DNI, in consultation with SECDEF, to submit a report on UAPs. Since the SSCI mentioned the UAPTF, it also includes our top lines on the UAPTF.

Regards,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, February 2, 2021 12:45 PM
To: Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA); (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Cc: OPNAV ALL N2N6 Front Office; (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
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(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6); Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: VCNO TF meeting today

Scott, (b) (6),

FYI... VCNO's PAO just got me added to the 1600 meeting this afternoon (in-person in 4D645), given all the churn on the PA Perspective.

I will bring multiple copies of the 2 briefing cards (attached again) that have been used to respond to queries.

See you there.

Regards,

(b) (6)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

From: (b) (6)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6](#); [Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#); [Stratton, John F \(Jay\) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#); (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6); [Miller, Christopher A SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#); (b) (6)
Subject: TASK FORCE FOIA RECORDS
Date: Wednesday, February 3, 2021 11:30:38 AM
Attachments: [UAPTF FOIAs.xlsx](#)

Mr. Bray, Mr. Brown, Jay, (b) (6) :

Thanks to (b) (6) and Jay for providing responsive records regarding the FOIA request for those pertaining to the change in leadership. I have what I need to staff that request. However, as indicated in my prior e-mails on this matter, the avalanche of requests are inbound. I am using this as an opportunity to (1) request recipients to review their e-mail accounts (NIPR, SIPR, and JWICS) for records pertaining to the TF and forward same to me and (b) (6) as soon as possible so that we can begin reviewing them.

I recognize that many of these records will either be classified and thus withheld under Exemption 1 and/or will contain pre-decisional/deliberative information that will be withheld under Exemption 5. Additionally, information that would cause an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy (names and contact information) will also be withheld. We have an obligation under the law to identify the records and then explain why records or portion of records were withheld. They have the right to administratively appeal to OJAG Code 14 with the option to file suit in Federal District Court if they believe the DON did not apply the FOIA correctly. In short, we need responsive records in order to do our due diligence.

Attached is the spreadsheet listing the inbound FOIA requests. At this point, I simply recommend forwarding anything that the UAP has produced or created, as well as all e-mails so that we have them. We will circle back with stakeholders with proposed releases and redactions before allowing them to be released.

Thanks.

Vr/JAG

(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
To: (b) (6) [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: DEPSECDEF UAPTF Tasker
Date: Thursday, February 4, 2021 7:46:22 PM

(b) (6),

Sorry for the delay in getting back with you. My edits are coming SEPCOR.

V/r,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Thursday, February 4, 2021 6:15 AM
To: (b) (6) Bray, Scott W
SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: DEPSECDEF UAPTF Tasker

Thanks, (b) (6).

We do still owe them a response for DEPSECDEF coming out of that VCNO meeting... even as we hope he will not have a chance to use it.

I sent you a separate note with the beginning of a response to get us going.

It has to go through both OSD PA and ODNI PA before getting to DSD staff.

Regards,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Wednesday, February 3, 2021 8:23 PM
To: (b) (6) Bray, Scott W SES
OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)
Subject: RE: DEPSECDEF UAPTF Tasker

I think Matt's propose language is about right. Harkens back to the "doing the right thing, as normal" that we are maintaining in the RTQs.

Are they still looking for us to draft something new?

V/r,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Wednesday, February 3, 2021 5:57 PM
To: (b) (6) Bray, Scott W
SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)
Subject: FW: DEPSECDEF UAPTF Tasker

Gentlemen,

Please see the DOD PA proposed way ahead to provide a little clarity on the TF budget Q we keep getting.

Also note the USDI perspective.

Comments? Thoughts?

(b) (6)

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b) (6)
Date: Wednesday, Feb 03, 2021, 5:03 PM
To: Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA) (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: DEPSECDEF UAPTF Tasker

Thanks, Matt. (b) (6), comments?

From: Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)
(b) (6)
Sent: Wednesday, February 3, 2021 4:54 PM
To: (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: DEPSECDEF UAPTF Tasker

(b) (6),

I would limit any comment on the budget, but if we say anything, I would say something like...

(b) (5)

Matt

Matthew C. Cummings, DISL

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Wednesday, February 3, 2021 4:08 PM

To: Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)

(b) (6)

Subject: FW: DEPSECDEF UAPTF Tasker

FYSA, see below. Also, DEPSECDEF PAO provided the following in response to my note below:

(b) (5)

Regards,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Tuesday, February 2, 2021 6:06 PM

To: Kirby, John F SES (USA) (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: DEPSECDEF UAPTF Tasker

BLUF: After noticing a COB item on the UAPTF, DEPSECDEF tasked VCNO with developing something that he/DoD can say publicly about the UAPTF efforts.

- VCNO, DDNI, N2N6 and the UAPTF director met late this afternoon to discuss.
- Navy will send a proposed statement to us, probably tomorrow sometime.
- Whatever Navy sends us has to be coordinated with OUSD(I&S), as they have oversight of the UAPTF, and ODNI, as ODNI has the lead on the UAP report to Congress.
- We have to be careful not to get ahead of the congressional report. All that ODNI is saying when asked anything about the required report is: "We are aware of the requirement and will respond accordingly."
- Anything new that we put out is likely to generate a LOT of press interest.

Background note for John Kirby:

Around mid-Summer 2019, Rear Adm. Brown approached Mr. Hoffman, saying that he thought the UAP issue was not solely a Navy issue, and that OSD(PA) should be the ones answering UAP queries rather than Navy. Mr. Hoffman agreed, and ever since then OSD(PA) has been the single point of contact on UAP-related queries – even Service-specific ones.

I'll keep you updated as this develops.

Regards,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
To: (b) (6) [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: A little more context... shell for DepSecDef task
Date: Thursday, February 4, 2021 7:49:36 PM
Attachments: [DepSecDef RTQ v1 bpm.docx](#)

(b) (6),

Please find some suggested changes in the attached. Probably still needs quite a bit of work to meet the request.

V/r,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Wednesday, February 3, 2021 1:17 PM
To: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: A little more context... shell for DepSecDef task

Gentlemen,

I am going into a media training sessions for RDML BryerJoyner from 1330-1500, so if you send something and get no acknowledgement... that is the reason.

FYI... I started to put together a shell that we can use as a starting point... using your inputs to replace and/or add to what is already here.

Thought this might help.

Regards,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Wednesday, February 3, 2021 8:28 AM
To: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: A little more context...

Scott, (b) (6),

This paragraph is from the DOD Press Desk officer who has been talking about the DSD request:

(b) (5)

[Redacted text block]

That could give a better approach to what we say...

Regards,

(b) (6)

[Redacted signature block]

From: (b) (6)
To: (b) (6) [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: DepSecDef task - DRAFT V2 for review
Date: Friday, February 5, 2021 1:26:57 PM
Attachments: [DepSecDef RTO v2 bpm edits.docx](#)

(b) (6)

I like your changes. I had one comment in the attached about who is on the hook for the CDA, and who is doing the work. Not sure if we wanted to get into those weeds, but it may take the burden off ODNI a bit to provide a little clarity on this point.

V/r,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, February 5, 2021 11:27 AM
To: (b) (6) Bray, Scott W
SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: RE: DepSecDef task - DRAFT V2 for review

FYI... just got pinged by (b) (6) ... who is getting pinged by DepSecDef's PAO...

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, February 5, 2021 10:07 AM
To: (b) (6) Bray, Scott W
SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: DepSecDef task - DRAFT V2 for review
Importance: High

Thanks for the input, (b) (6).

Taking what you've provided... I've fleshed it out a little as in v2 attached.

Over to you and Scott for a sanity check.

Once we get this to our liking... I'll forward to (b) (6) for her look... she will also coordinate the

proposed response with our ODNI PA contact, (b) (6).

In this draft, I did add that the UAPTF is working with ODNI on the drafting of the report to Congress.

I did try to keep it in the spirit of that additional guidance para... he wants to be able to say more than, "that's classified," to explain its practical application

Standing by to revise as necessary.

Regards,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Thursday, February 4, 2021 7:50 PM
To: (b) (6); Bray, Scott W SES
OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: A little more context... shell for DepSecDef task

(b) (6),

Please find some suggested changes in the attached. Probably still needs quite a bit of work to meet the request.

V/r,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Wednesday, February 3, 2021 1:17 PM
To: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: A little more context... shell for DepSecDef task

Gentlemen,

I am going into a media training sessions for RDML BryerJoyner from 1330-1500, so if you send something and get no acknowledgement... that is the reason.

FYI... I started to put together a shell that we can use as a starting point... using your inputs to replace and/or add to what is already here.

Thought this might help.

Regards,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Wednesday, February 3, 2021 8:28 AM

To: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: A little more context...

Scott, (b) (6),

This paragraph is from the DOD Press Desk officer who has been talking about the DSD request:

(b) (5)

”

That could give a better approach to what we say...

Regards,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
To: (b) (6)
Cc: [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#); (b) (6)
Subject: RE: Consolidated Version - DSD Q-A
Date: Friday, February 5, 2021 3:15:15 PM
Attachments: [DepSecDef RTQ 5 Feb edits.docx](#)

(b) (6),

Looks good to me. One minor point about word choice (objects vs. aircraft), but I'm open to your expert guidance on that in the attached.

V/r,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, February 5, 2021 2:14 PM
To: (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Cc: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: Consolidated Version - DSD Q-A
Importance: High

(b) (6),

This version incorporates the last minor changes you each suggested.

(b) (6), If you are okay with this... or have further issues... let us know soonest.... So (b) (6) can take it from her end.

Regards,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
To: (b) (6) [Brav. Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: FW: DEPSECDEF UAPTF Tasker _DSD Followup Questions...
Date: Monday, February 8, 2021 12:39:09 PM
Attachments: [\[Untitled\].pdf](#)
Importance: High

(b) (6) /Scott,

Your input needed to respond to the specific Qs below from SD (via his PAO and his notes on the attachment)...

I suspect they want a quick turn on responses....

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, February 8, 2021 12:24 PM
To: (b) (6) Cummings,
Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA) (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: FW: DEPSECDEF UAPTF Tasker
Importance: High

Guys,

See below for the questions that Mr. Norquist is asking. In talking with (b) (6), DEPSECDEF's PAO, one his main concerns is that when he leaves office, he is likely to be asked to speak/do interviews, and since it's known that the UAPTF was established under his watch as the DEPSECDEF, he'll likely get questions about it. So he wants to know what he can/can't say. I would recommend that Navy & OUSD(I&S) try to set up a quick conference call, or get on his calendar today, to discuss.

Regards,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, February 8, 2021 12:07 PM
To: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: DEPSECDEF UAPTF Tasker

Thanks!

I scanned DSD's comments from the latest briefing card so you can see what I was referencing during our call. His bottom line questions follow. Also, I sent the update we discussed to the DSD FO.

1. Why can't we definitively say – no alien tech (maybe not those words, but that sentiment to better frame the TF's intent)

2. Has the TF explained anything we previously categorized as unidentified?
3. Why is non-disclosure of information necessary for security and safety?

V/r,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Monday, February 8, 2021 11:13 AM

To: (b) (6)

Subject: FW: DEPSECDEF UAPTF Tasker

Here you go

UAP Report to Congress

Jan. 25, 2021

Executive Summary

Public and news media interest in unidentified aerial phenomena (UAPs) remains high. DoD formally established a UAP Task Force (UAPTF), per the FY19 NDAA, on Aug. 4, 2020. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) report attached to the FY21 Intelligence Authorization Act (signed into statute as part of the omnibus spending bill signed on Dec. 27, 2020) directed the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with SECDEF, to submit a report to Congress on UAPs within 180 days of enactment. The SSCI report specifically mentions the UAPTF.

Top Line Messages / Talking Points

- We are aware of the report requirement, and are working with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. I refer you to ODNI for anything else regarding the report.
- We take reports of incursions into our airspace – by any aircraft, identified or unidentified – very seriously, and investigate each one.
- Safety (of our personnel) and security (of our operations) are of paramount concern. — ?
- DOD has established a UAP task force to gain knowledge and insight into the nature and origins of UAP incursions into our training ranges and designated airspace.
- The mission of the task force is to detect, analyze, and catalog UAPs that could potentially pose a threat to U.S national security.
- The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence & Security has oversight of the UAPTF. (Navy leads the UAPTF)
- To maintain operations security and to avoid disclosing information that may be useful to potential adversaries, DOD does not discuss publicly the details of either the observations or the examination of reported incursions into our training ranges or designated airspace, including those incursions initially designated as UAP – that also includes any details of the UAPTF and its activities. Why?

- 1) Affirmatively say - we have no alien technology
- 2) Do have things we can't yet explain - that is why we set up UAP
- 3)

(b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: RE: DEPSECDEF UAPTF Tasker

Suggested answers

(b) (6)

As far as what the DSD can say in retirement... I would stick to what is on the OSD(PA) sheet.

Thoughts?

Matt

Matthew C. Cummings, DISL

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Monday, February 8, 2021 12:24 PM

To: (b) (6); Cummings,
Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA) (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: FW: DEPSECDEF UAPTF Tasker

Importance: High

Guys,

See below for the questions that Mr. Norquist is asking. In talking with (b) (6), DEPSECDEF's PAO, one his main concerns is that when he leaves office, he is likely to be asked to speak/do interviews, and since it's known that the UAPTF was established under his watch as the DEPSECDEF, he'll likely get questions about it. So he wants to know what he can/can't say. I would recommend that Navy & OUSD(I&S) try to set up a quick conference call, or get on his calendar today, to discuss.

Regards,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Monday, February 8, 2021 12:07 PM

To: (b) (6)

Subject: RE: DEPSECDEF UAPTF Tasker

Thanks!

I scanned DSD's comments from the latest briefing card so you can see what I was referencing during our call. His bottom line questions follow. Also, I sent the update we discussed to the DSD FO.

1. Why can't we definitively say – no alien tech (maybe not those words, but that sentiment to better frame the TF's intent)
2. Has the TF explained anything we previously categorized as unidentified?
3. Why is non-disclosure of information necessary for security and safety?

V/r,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Monday, February 8, 2021 11:13 AM

To: (b) (6)

Subject: FW: DEPSECDEF UAPTF Tasker

Here you go

From: [Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO \(USA\)](#)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#)
Cc: [Miller, Christopher A SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#); (b) (6)
Subject: RE: UAP briefs to Hill
Date: Monday, February 8, 2021 7:19:42 PM

“thumbs up emoji” since I don’t know how to make one on the computer!

From: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, February 8, 2021 6:14 PM
To: Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO (USA) (b) (6)
Cc: Miller, Christopher A SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: RE: UAP briefs to Hill

Thanks, Boss. Welcome (b) (6) participation with the SASC PSMs – so we’ll have me, (b) (6), SecNav CoS, and Obernier at the meeting – as well as perhaps an SES from USD/I&S. The three PSMs certainly can’t feel undervalued! I’ll let the Pentagon team know that if the staffers want to yell at me about the change in leadership of the Task Force, let ‘em yell. My message is that we should be judged by our performance, so let’s discuss what we’re doing....

VR,
Scott

Scott W. Bray
Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence
Director, Naval Intelligence Activity
(b) (6)

From: Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO (USA) (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, February 8, 2021 3:57 PM
To: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)
Cc: Miller, Christopher A SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: FW: UAP briefs to Hill

Scott,

See below exchange with Jodi.

Had a really good discussion with her this morning about following:

- CI instruction and how we got where we were. She was basically cut out of the final weeks discussion before change out. Implied she was told “didn’t get it done so now we’ll handle

it" from the COS.

- Discussed extremist activity and how InT/UAM might play in that. Overall good discussion about questions CNO has been asking and discussions I have had with Omar, IG, etc.
- Sec Harker wants her to reinvigorate the SRB. Some more on that next time we chat.

Overall very positive discussion! Vr, JT

From: Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO (USA)

Sent: Monday, February 8, 2021 3:46 PM

To: Greene, Jodi J SES USN (USA) (b) (6)

Cc: Moran, Michael T VADM USN ASSTSECNAV RDA DC (USA) (b) (6); Joyner, Sara A RDML USN OLA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

Subject: RE: UAP briefs to Hill

Copy Ma'am, lots of interest. Scott and (b) (6) briefed Fleet staffs the other day with VCNO.

Big concern is that we have put (b) (6) in charge of the TF now instead of Jay Stratton and folks on the Hill are implying "...he was fired because he tells the TRUTH..." or something....accusing us of low balling. We didn't fire him, we just put someone in place to manage the effort and team, not an analyst that likes to brief. We now have someone that is managing a team and not inciting people with unusual statements...we are in a much better place!

Look forward to next discussion. Vr, JT

From: Greene, Jodi J SES USN (USA) (b) (6)

Sent: Monday, February 8, 2021 3:04 PM

To: Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO (USA) (b) (6)

Cc: Moran, Michael T VADM USN ASSTSECNAV RDA DC (USA) (b) (6); Joyner, Sara A RDML USN OLA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

Subject: UAP briefs to Hill

VADM Trussler –

One issue that came across my desk today post our 0830 discussion was the UAP Task Force and the upcoming briefings on the Hill. Apparently there have been questions from some staffers on overall process and DON leadership in the matter. Hence, I have asked Dr. Jen Obernier and her team to work with Scott Bray and his team to ensure there is a ExComm touchpoint built into the briefing deck and that she join for the next briefing to SASC PSMs on Thursday. I am free to discuss further should you have any questions, but I think this should be an easy add. Meanwhile, we have been trying to work between VADM Moran's and my schedule to set up the next DON sync on the subject in the next couple weeks.

Best, Jodi

(b) (6) /Scott,

From below: A stunning admission by the US government that it possesses UFO debris was recently made in response to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request filed over three years ago by this author. In a reply letter, the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) has ended decades of speculation by verifying that UFO material has indeed been recovered. Now officially referred to as UAP (Unidentified Aerial Phenomena) rather than UFOs, some this material was placed with a defense contractor for analysis and storage in "specialized facilities." Incredibly, part of the information released discusses material with shape recovery properties, much like the "memory metal" debris found fallen at the Roswell UFO crash in 1947.

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

DIA release by FOIA is included as pdf. There's a story, link below. Found on Reddit at /r/ufo. a fairly good forum. There's quite a lot in there, from metallic glass, memory metal, and metamaterials.

Caution-https://www.ufoexplorations.com/?fbclid=IwAR2l_lHxJ_47YLhzuc3leCeEpLUNcSJTL49AkEr93I4IO8CXprXFKrmwJQE < Caution-
https://www.ufoexplorations.com/?fbclid=IwAR2l_lHxJ_47YLhzuc3leCeEpLUNcSJTL49AkEr93I4IO8CXprXFKrmwJQE >

QUOTE

A stunning admission by the US government that it possesses UFO debris was recently made in response to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request filed over three years ago by this author. In a reply letter, the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) has ended decades of speculation by verifying that UFO material has indeed been recovered. Now officially referred to as UAP (Unidentified Aerial Phenomena) rather than UFOs, some this material was placed with a defense contractor for analysis and storage in "specialized facilities." Incredibly, part of the information released discusses material with shape recovery properties, much like the "memory metal" debris found fallen at the Roswell UFO crash in 1947.



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-5100



FAC-2C

January 08, 2021

(b) (6)

This responds to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, dated December 27, 2017 that you submitted to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) for information concerning Requesting all information on test results from the UAP material from Bigelow Aerospace. I apologize for the delay in responding to your request. DIA continues its efforts to eliminate the large backlog of pending FOIA requests. In order to properly respond, it was necessary to consult with another office within the agency.

A search of DIA's systems of records located five documents (154 pages) responsive to your request.

Upon review, I have determined that some portions of five documents (154 pages) must be withheld in part from disclosure pursuant to the FOIA. The withheld portions are exempt from release pursuant to Exemptions 3 and 6 of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(3) and (b)(6). Exemption 3 applies to information specifically exempted by a statute establishing particular criteria for withholding. The applicable statute is 10 U.S.C. § 424. Statute 10 U.S.C. § 424 protects the identity of DIA employees, the organizational structure of the agency, and any function of DIA. Exemption 6 applies to information which if released would constitute an unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of other individuals. DIA has not withheld any reasonably segregable non-exempt portions of the records.

If you are not satisfied with my response to your request, you may contact the DIA FOIA Requester Service Center, as well as our FOIA Public Liaison at 301-394-6253.


Additionally, you may contact the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) at the National Archives and Records Administration to inquire about the FOIA mediation services they offer. You may contact OGIS by email at ogis@nara.gov; telephone at 202-741-5770, toll free at 1-877-684-6448 or facsimile at 202-741-5769; or you may mail them at the following address:

Office of Government Information Services
National Archives and Records Administration
8601 Adelphi Road-OGIS
College Park, MD 20740-6001

You may also exercise your right to file an administrative appeal by writing to the address below and referring to case number FOIA-00089-2018. Your appeal must be postmarked no later than 90 days after the date of this letter.

Defense Intelligence Agency
7400 Pentagon
ATTN: FAC-2C (FOIA)
Washington, D.C. 20301-7400

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Steve Tumiski for".

Steven W. Tumiski
Chief, Records Management and Information Services

5 Enclosures

1. Metallic Glasses - Status and Prospects for Aerospace Applications (30 pgs)
2. Biomaterials (32 pgs)
3. Materials for Advanced Aerospace Platforms (27 pgs)
4. Metallic Spintronics (27 pgs)
5. Metamaterials for Aerospace Applications (38 pgs)

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Defense Intelligence Reference Document

Acquisition Threat Support

14 December 2009

ICOD: 1 December 2009

DIA-08-0911-012

Metallic Glasses: Status and Prospects for Aerospace Applications

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Metallic Glasses: Status and Prospects for Aerospace Applications

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Metallic Glasses: Status and Prospects for Aerospace Applications

Summary

Metallic glasses combine some of the advantageous mechanical properties of metals—strength, stiffness, and in some cases toughness—with the processing flexibility usually associated with thermoplastic polymers. The absence of crystalline defects allows metallic glasses to be much stronger than conventional alloys but also means they have near-zero tensile ductility and poor fatigue resistance. In structural applications, therefore, metallic glasses are most likely to be useful in the form of composites consisting of ductile crystalline dendrites in a metallic glass matrix. These dendritic composites sacrifice some strength but can have exceptionally high fracture toughness, as well as good fatigue resistance, and could replace high-strength steels in certain load-limited structural components in aerospace vehicles where space is limited.

Because they are true glasses, thermoplastic forming near the glass transition temperature affords metallic glasses tremendous flexibility in processing. For instance, metallic glass components can be formed in a single step (for example, by injection molding) in complex geometries that would be difficult or impossible to produce with conventional alloys. In addition, metallic glass foams can be made with relative ease, raising the possibility of making structural foams with high strength and stiffness. Finally, because they lack a crystalline grain structure, metallic glasses can be used to form nanoscale features with high fidelity. This may make metallic glasses useful in a variety of micro-electromechanical systems (MEMS) applications.

Metallic glasses also have significant limitations for aerospace applications, however. Foremost among these is a lack of good glass-forming alloys; in particular, there are no good aluminum-rich glass-forming alloys, the known titanium-based alloys are either relatively dense (owing to high concentrations of alloying elements) or contain beryllium, and the known magnesium- and iron-based alloys are all quite brittle, with low fracture toughness. Although metallic glass matrix composites can have outstanding properties (particularly strength and fracture toughness), the number of good composite systems known at present is also quite limited.

Therefore, in order for metallic glasses (and their composites) to be of broad utility in aerospace structural applications, progress in the following areas is required:

- Development of new lightweight alloys and composite systems, preferably by computational and/or combinatorial approaches rather than by trial and error.**
- Understanding of mechanical behavior, especially:**

- The effect of alloy composition and structure on plastic deformation.
- Microstructural design of composites for optimal toughness.
- Development of processing techniques, including thermophysical processing of complex and/or nanoscale features as well as production of metallic glass foams.

It is highly likely that continued work over the next 20-50 years will result in significant advances in all these areas, and that metallic glasses and metallic glass matrix composites will see increasing acceptance as structural materials. Whether or not they achieve widespread use in aerospace applications, however, depends critically on the development of new, lightweight alloys.

Metallic Glasses

STRUCTURE

The atomic-scale structure of most metals and alloys is crystalline; that is, the atoms are arranged in a highly ordered manner on a lattice that is periodic in three dimensions, as depicted in Figure 1(a). In contrast to this crystalline structure, metallic glasses lack the long-range order of a lattice and are therefore said to be amorphous, as depicted in Figure 1(b). Although the word "amorphous" implies a complete lack of structural order, in fact the atomic structure of metallic glasses is not truly random. Constraints on atomic packing provide strong short-range order; for instance, on average the atoms have a particular number of nearest atomic neighbors at a well-defined distance. But this short-range order persists only over distances of a few atoms; there is no long-range order as there is in a crystalline alloy. In many ways, the atomic-scale structure of metallic glasses more closely resembles the highly disordered structure of a liquid than the structure of a crystalline alloy.




Figure 1. Amorphous Versus Crystalline Structure. Schematic atomic-scale structure of crystalline (a) and amorphous (b) metals. In a crystalline structure, order persists over long distances (many atomic dimensions). In a glass, there is short range order but no long-range order.

A corollary of this difference in structure is that the nature of structural defects is quite different between crystalline and amorphous alloys. Crystalline alloys, for example, have extended linear defects in the crystal structure, called dislocations, that are (in large part) responsible for determining mechanical behavior. The lack of crystalline order precludes the existence of dislocations in metallic glasses, but other sorts of defects can be present and may influence properties and behavior.

From an applications point of view, the amorphous structure of metallic glasses has two principal implications. First, the mechanical properties of amorphous alloys are significantly different from those of their crystalline counterparts; some of these differences are advantageous, but others are not. Second, because metallic glasses are

glasses in the true sense of the word, rather than melting abruptly (as crystalline metals do), they soften and flow over a range of temperatures in a manner akin to common (oxide) glasses. This creates opportunities for tremendous flexibility in the processing of metallic glasses.

PROCESSING

Glass-Forming Alloys

The key to making a metallic glass is to retain the disordered, liquid-like atomic scale structure during cooling from the melt. All materials have a tendency to crystallize upon cooling because the crystalline state is the most stable structure at any temperature below the melting point. But crystallization takes time, so if the cooling is fast enough, it is possible to bypass crystallization and form an amorphous structure at the glass transition temperature (Figure 2(a)). Glass formation and crystallization are therefore competitive processes; which one will occur depends on the material and the processing conditions.




Figure 2. Critical Cooling Rate. (a) Effect of the cooling rate on glass formation – If the cooling rate is slow (path 1), then the melt crystallizes before going through the glass transition. If the cooling rate is fast enough (path 2), then the melt can form a glass. The critical cooling rate (path 3) is the slowest rate at which the melt can be cooled and still form a glass. (b) Critical cooling rates for various metallic alloys – The horizontal axis is the glass transition temperature normalized to the melting (liquidus) temperature.¹

For some materials, such as silica (silicon dioxide) and most thermoplastic polymers, the crystallization process is slow because the crystal structures are complex and the basic structural units (for example, segments of polymer chains) are slow to rearrange into a crystalline form. These materials can therefore be produced in glassy form even at very low cooling rates; in fact, it can be difficult to crystallize them at all. Metals and alloys are another matter because the crystal structures are relatively simple and the basic structural units are individual atoms, which are highly mobile. Metallic crystals nucleate and grow quickly, making production of a metallic glass more challenging.

One way to quantify the ability of a metallic alloy to be produced in glassy form is through the critical cooling rate—the slowest rate at which a metallic liquid may be cooled and still produce a fully amorphous structure, as shown in Figure 2(a). The critical cooling rate for a variety of metallic glass-forming alloys is shown in Figure 2(b). Early metallic glasses (discovered in the 1960s and 1970s) were binary alloys with critical cooling rates typically on the order of 10^4 to 10^7 K/s. Achieving such high cooling rates requires specialized techniques (such as melt spinning) and limits the maximum thickness of the metallic glass to < 100 μm because of the need to rapidly extract heat from the melt. As a result, these early metallic glasses could be produced in only a limited range of forms, including ribbons, foils, wires, and powders.

Extensive research efforts in alloy design over the past two decades have resulted in the development of multi-component alloys with much lower critical cooling rates (0.1 K/s or even lower). This has enabled the production of metallic glass specimens in larger sizes—in some cases exceeding 1-cm section thickness. Common practice in the field is to refer to any alloy capable of being cast into a section at least 1-mm thick as a “bulk” metallic glass. These alloys may be cast or molded into forms suitable for structural applications.

At present, it is not possible to predict a priori the glass-forming ability of an alloy of arbitrary composition. A variety of empirical rules for selecting alloying elements and compositions have been proposed, and techniques have been demonstrated for efficient searching of composition space. But identification of alloys with good glass-forming ability is still mostly a matter of trial and error. As a result, the number of truly outstanding glass-forming alloys (loosely defined as being able to be cast as a glass to a thickness of at least 1 cm) is quite limited (see Table 1).

Table 1. Selected Bulk Glass-Forming Alloys. Selected alloys reported to have excellent glass forming ability, quantified here as the maximum thickness of a fully amorphous casting.^{2 3 4 5 6 7 8}

Composition	Maximum Thickness (mm)	Reference
Mg ₆₅ Cu ₁₅ Ag ₅ Pd ₅ Gd ₁₀	10	2
Zr _{41.2} Ti _{13.8} Cu _{12.5} Ni ₁₀ Be _{22.5}	50	3
Pd ₄₀ Cu ₃₀ Ni ₁₀ P ₂₀	72	4
Cu ₄₇ Zr ₄₅ Ag ₄ Al ₄	10	5
Pt _{57.5} Cu _{14.7} Ni _{5.3} P _{22.5}	16	6
Ti ₄₀ Zr ₂₅ Ni ₃ Cu ₁₂ Be ₂₀	14	7
Fe ₄₈ Cr ₁₅ Mo ₁₄ Er ₂ C ₁₅ B ₆	12	8

Moving from the laboratory to industrial practice, it is important to note that factors besides alloy composition can affect glass-forming ability. In particular, some alloys are sensitive to the presence of impurities; for example, the glass-forming ability of some zirconium-containing alloys is dramatically reduced by the presence of oxygen. Processing conditions also influence the ability to make a glass; these may include the material and surface finish of the mold and the temperature of the liquid prior to casting. Finally, glass-forming ability can be quite sensitive to small variations in composition, which may be difficult to control in industrial practice.

Casting and Molding

Like other alloys, metallic glasses can be cast into net-shape or near-net-shape geometries. Die casting into a permanent (metal) mold—because it provides the rapid heat transfer needed to meet the requirement for relatively rapid cooling—is the most common casting technique. In most cases, casting is done in either a vacuum or an inert atmosphere to prevent formation of oxide particles that promote crystallization.

Conventional casting, however, does not take advantage of the flexibility afforded by the glassy nature of these alloys. If a metallic glass is heated to a temperature above its glass transition temperature, it becomes a supercooled liquid. In this state, the viscosity drops with increasing temperature over a wide range, making it possible to control the viscosity by controlling the temperature.¹ This ability to control the viscosity enables many of the processing techniques commonly used in molding thermoplastic polymers to be applied to metallic glasses (Figure 3).




Figure 3. Examples of Processing of Metallic Glasses. (a) Microspring produced by lithography and (b) thin-walled bottle produced by blow molding. Images are courtesy of Professor Jan Schroers (Yale University).

There are two important limitations on processing of metallic glasses in the supercooled liquid region. First, supercooled liquids are metastable and have a tendency to crystallize, so there is a limited window of time (typically on the order of minutes) in which the processing must be completed if the glassy structure is to be maintained. Second, the viscosity of many glass-forming alloys near the glass transition temperature is too high for convenient processing. The viscosity can be reduced by increasing the processing temperature, but higher temperatures promote crystallization

¹ A crystalline metal, in contrast, melts abruptly, going from a rigid solid to a low-viscosity fluid very quickly.

and thus reduce the window of time available for molding. In practice, therefore, successful molding requires careful control of the processing conditions.

Joining

Structural applications inevitably require joining of components, for instance by mechanical fasteners or adhesives or by welding, soldering, or brazing. The use of fasteners and adhesives is much the same for metallic glasses as for any other metal. Techniques such as welding, soldering, and brazing are potentially problematic because they involve heating the glassy alloy, running the risk of crystallization (which could make the joint more brittle). In welding, for instance, the metal to be joined is actually melted and then resolidifies upon cooling. In the case of a metallic glass, care must be taken to ensure the cooling rate is fast enough to avoid crystallization. There is also a risk that the glassy material in the heat-affected zone (near to but not in the molten region) might crystallize. Laboratory tests of a variety of welding techniques have been performed on several glass-forming alloys with mixed results, and it is clear that much remains to be done in this area.

Foams

One particularly promising recent development is the ability to produce metallic glass foams. Here, the relatively high viscosity of glass-forming alloys is an advantage in producing a stable foam structure that can be solidified, leaving a high-porosity foam with metallic glass ligaments.⁹ These foams have high specific strength (that is, strength normalized to density) and specific stiffness and could have excellent damage tolerance, although this has not been demonstrated.

Thin Films and Coatings

The discussion above focuses on the processing of free-standing metallic glasses, with an emphasis on structural applications. However, it is also possible to produce amorphous alloys as thin films or coatings using techniques such as physical vapor deposition or electrodeposition. Although the thicknesses of material that can be produced in this way are limited, they are useful for making amorphous alloy coatings (for wear and corrosion resistance) or for thin films for magnetic or micro-electromechanical system (MEMS) applications. A distinct advantage of the thin film techniques is that because the effective cooling rates during vapor deposition are extremely high, a much wider range of alloys can be produced in amorphous form than is possible with casting. This allows the alloy composition to be tailored for optimization of functional properties, with less concern about glass-forming ability.

Mechanical Behavior Near Room Temperature

When a material is subjected to a stress, it can experience both elastic and plastic deformations. Elastic deformation occurs at lower stresses and is recoverable when the applied stress is removed. The limit of elastic deformation is defined by the yield stress—the point at which plastic (nonrecoverable) deformation begins. Much of the current interest in metallic glasses arises because their yield stresses (that is, their strengths) can be much higher than those of crystalline alloys of similar composition; this difference is a direct result of the novel atomic-scale structure of metallic glasses. The fracture and fatigue characteristics of metallic glasses are also different from those

of conventional alloys. In this section, we review the mechanical behavior of metallic glasses, with particular attention to properties of interest for aerospace applications. We consider actual properties in detail in the section below on applications, where we compare the properties of metallic glasses with those of other advanced structural materials.

Stiffness: Elastic Deformation

Stiffness is the resistance of a material to elastic deformation and is quantified by either the elastic modulus (for tensile or compressive loads) or the shear modulus (for shear loading). Metallic glasses tend to be somewhat (20-30 percent) less stiff than crystalline alloys of similar composition. The lower modulus is a consequence of the amorphous structure, in which atoms are (on average) slightly farther apart than in a crystalline alloy, enabling certain atomic relaxations that are not possible in a crystal. The lower modulus of amorphous alloys is clearly a concern in applications where stiffness is a primary criterion, but it does present some advantages. For instance, some applications (springs, for example) require the ability to store elastic strain energy (resilience), and here metallic glasses do quite well. Resilience is also a key figure of merit for snap-fit assembly of materials without fasteners. Overall, however, for structural applications, the low stiffness of metallic glasses is a disadvantage.

Strength and Ductility: Plastic Deformation

The theoretical strength of perfect, defect-free crystalline metals is several orders of magnitude larger than strengths measured in typical laboratory experiments. The difference exists because metallic crystals inevitably have crystalline defects (dislocations) that are able to move at relatively low stresses and cause plastic (nonrecoverable) deformation. Because dislocations cannot exist in an amorphous structure, in principle the strength of amorphous alloys should approach theoretical limits based on the inherent strength of the atomic bonds. As shown in Table 2, the strength of aluminum-based metallic glasses can be two or three times greater than those of conventional (crystalline) high-strength aluminum alloys. Similarly high strengths are seen for other amorphous alloys; for instance, the best iron-based alloys have a strength of approximately 4 GPa—again, two or three times greater than those of conventional high-strength steels.¹⁰ Such high strengths create great interest in potential structural applications of metallic glasses.

Table 2. Comparison of Strengths of Amorphous and Crystalline Aluminum Alloys. Compared with the theoretical maximum strength (taken to be $\mu/30$, where μ is the shear modulus of pure aluminum).

	Yield Stress (MPa)	% of Theoretical Strength
Theoretical Strength (Defect-Free Crystal)	1,600	-
Typical High-Strength Aluminum Alloy (7xxx Series) ¹¹	400–500	25–31%
Best Crystalline Aluminum Alloy ¹²	770	48%
Aluminum-Based Metallic Glass ¹³	1,280	80%

Unfortunately, the lack of dislocations in amorphous alloys is also their Achilles' heel. In crystalline alloys, dislocations move and multiply in response to applied stresses, resulting in dislocation tangles that increase the resistance to further dislocation motion. This process, called strain hardening, is of crucial importance because it makes plastic deformation stable. If one region of a crystalline material yields and begins to plastically deform, the deforming region strain hardens, and so another region will deform instead. The result is that the plastic deformation is not concentrated but rather spreads through a large volume of material. Metallic glasses, lacking dislocations, do not strain harden and in fact strain soften in response to plastic deformation. This means that as soon as any one region yields, any further deformation will occur in the same region. This process, known as shear localization, leads to the formation of shear bands (Figure 4). In any loading geometry where the metallic glass experiences significant tensile loading, fracture occurs on a single dominant shear band with essentially zero tensile ductility.² Metallic glasses therefore fracture in an abrupt, apparently brittle manner on the macroscopic scale (even though there can be significant plasticity on a microscopic scale). This lack of ductility is of obvious concern to designers interested in structural applications. Furthermore, it limits the ability to fabricate metallic glasses into different shapes by deformation processing (by rolling or forging, for instance) after casting.

² This assumes there is no geometrical constraint preventing fracture. Some geometries (such as simple bending) can involve tensile loading, but there can still be significant plastic deformation because the geometrical constraints inhibit propagating of shear bands across the specimen.




Figure 4. Shear Bands. Produced by bending of a zirconium-based metallic glass.¹⁴

Fracture Toughness

Fracture toughness is a measure of a material's resistance to growth of cracks, a critical property for structural materials subjected to tensile loading. In very tough metals, the toughness usually results from plastic deformation that occurs near the tip of the advancing crack; plastic deformation requires energy, and the need to provide this energy translates into resistance to crack growth.³ Despite their lack of tensile ductility, at least some metallic glasses are not brittle in the same sense that ceramics are, for example, because they can experience significant plastic deformation around the crack tip during fracture. For instance, the fracture toughness (K_{Ic}) of zirconium-based metallic glasses is about $20 \text{ MPa}\cdot\text{m}^{1/2}$ ¹⁵—somewhat lower than the $\sim 55 \text{ MPa}\cdot\text{m}^{1/2}$ typical of crystalline zirconium alloys¹⁶ but much greater than the fracture toughness of ceramics (typically $1\text{--}5 \text{ MPa}\cdot\text{m}^{1/2}$). The fact that metallic glasses are reasonably tough despite their lack of tensile ductility suggests structural applications are not out of the question.

However, some metallic glasses appear to be intrinsically brittle in that they fracture with only limited plastic deformation near the crack top and thus have very low values of fracture toughness. For this reason, some alloys that would otherwise be highly desirable, such as iron-based metallic glasses (for their high strength and low cost) and magnesium-based glasses (for their low density), fall into this category. The physical origins of the difference between intrinsically brittle metallic glasses and those capable of limited plastic deformation (and thus some toughness) are not well understood.

³ In other materials, notably polymer-matrix composites, other mechanisms of toughening can be more important.

Even some metallic glasses with reasonable toughness may be embrittled by exposure to elevated temperatures. This may occur in the heat-affected zone during welding (as discussed above), or it may be a by-product of processing in the supercooled liquid region (as in injection molding, for instance). The causes of embrittlement are also not well understood, and there is no known way to reverse embrittlement once it occurs.

Fatigue

Fatigue is a process by which materials can experience incremental crack growth owing to cyclic loading, even at stresses well below the yield stress. If unabated, fatigue cracks can grow to a critical length at which abrupt catastrophic fracture occurs. Up to 90 percent of failures of structural components in service are estimated to be caused by fatigue, making fatigue resistance of obvious importance to designers.

The fatigue resistance of metallic glasses is not very good. A common measure of fatigue resistance is the fatigue limit—the stress amplitude (range) below which no fatigue failure will occur, regardless of the number of loading cycles the material experiences. The fatigue limit for high-strength crystalline alloys is typically about 40 percent of the tensile strength, but for metallic glasses, it is only about 5 percent of the tensile strength (Figure 5). The reason for this difference has to do with the structure of the material. In a crystalline alloy, there are microstructural features (such as grain boundaries and precipitate particles) that can inhibit the growth of fatigue cracks. In metallic glasses, the microstructure is completely featureless, and there is nothing to prevent fatigue cracks from growing once they have been initiated.

The poor fatigue resistance of metallic glasses is a critical limitation for structural applications in aerospace because it implies a need to overdesign components to keep the stresses far below the yield stress. Thus, much of the advantage of having a high-strength material in the first place is lost. The desire to improve metallic glasses' fatigue performance has led to the development of metallic-glass-matrix composites with outstanding properties, as discussed below.




Figure 5. Fatigue Limit of Metallic Glasses and Metallic-Glass-Matrix Composites. Fatigue life data for single-phase zirconium-based metallic glass (red) and a dendritic metallic glass matrix composite (blue). Representative data for steel (300-M) of similar tensile strength are shown for comparison.^{17 18 19}

Wear Resistance

Because of their high yield strength, metallic glasses also have very high hardness. This, in turn, implies they might have good tribological behavior, which would be of particular interest when combined with the good corrosion resistance of some alloys (see below), opening up potential applications such as coatings on dry bearings for space applications.²⁰ However, the tendency of metallic glasses to form shear bands and (in some cases) partially crystallize owing to deformation means their wear resistance is perhaps not as good as their high hardness would suggest. Nevertheless, the wear resistance of metallic glasses can still be quite good, and in fact one of the principal current markets for amorphous alloys is as wear- and corrosion-resistant coatings for tools such as drill bits.

Corrosion and Stress-Corrosion Cracking

It is frequently stated that metallic glasses have excellent corrosion resistance, but this is not always true. The lack of grain boundaries and second-phase particles makes some metallic glasses extremely resistant to corrosion, but this is not true of all alloys (some of which oxidize rapidly in air). Broadly speaking, the corrosion resistance of nickel- and iron-based metallic glasses is better than that of alloys based on zirconium, titanium, and copper (particularly in environments containing chloride ions).²¹ Some alloys are susceptible to localized pitting corrosion, probably facilitated by the presence of crystalline inclusions.

The subject of stress-corrosion cracking of metallic glasses, despite its obvious importance for structural applications, has received scant attention in the literature. What little work that has been done has focused on zirconium-based glasses, with the observation that these alloys are very susceptible to stress-corrosion cracking in aqueous environments containing chloride ions, likely owing to the fact that they do not form protective oxide surface layers.²²

Mechanical Behavior at Elevated Temperature

The discussion above relates to mechanical behavior at temperatures well below the glass transition temperature. At elevated temperatures, the strength drops and plastic deformation transitions to a homogeneous mode, occurring throughout the specimen instead of being localized into shear bands (Figure 6). Above the glass transition temperature, the alloy becomes a fluid, with a viscosity that drops exponentially with increasing temperature. Because the strength of the material is low, temperatures either above or below the glass transition may be useful for processing, as discussed above. However, the decrease in strength and the tendency for crystallization at elevated temperatures preclude use of metallic glasses from structural applications at temperatures approaching the glass transition temperature.




Figure 6. Deformation Map for Metallic Glasses. As a function of temperature (normalized to the glass transition temperature) and applied shear stress τ (normalized to the shear modulus, μ). At high stresses, plastic deformation occurs inhomogeneously, being localized into shear bands. At high temperatures, plastic deformation becomes homogeneous. The dashed lines represent different strain rates. The absolute stresses given are representative of the well-studied bulk metallic glass $\text{Zr}_{41.2}\text{Ti}_{13.8}\text{Cu}_{12.5}\text{Ni}_{10}\text{Be}_{22.5}$, but the general features of the map are expected to apply to all metallic glasses.²³

Other Properties: Magnetic, Electrical, Optical, Thermal, and Acoustic

Although most of the current interest in metallic glasses centers on their mechanical properties, it is appropriate to consider other properties of potential utility. Of these, the magnetic properties of ferromagnetic metallic glasses stand out.²⁴ A variety of ferromagnetic glass-forming alloys exist, mostly based on transition metals (iron, nickel, and cobalt). The presence of alloying elements (necessary to make the material glass-forming) means the saturation magnetization of metallic glasses is not as large as that of the pure elements. However, some amorphous alloys have very low coercivity (a measure of how strong a magnetic field must be to change the direction of magnetization of the material) owing to the lack of crystalline defects (such as grain boundaries) and magnetocrystalline anisotropy. In addition, the relatively high electrical resistivity of amorphous alloys (see below) minimizes eddy current losses caused by high-frequency magnetization/demagnetization. Some amorphous alloys also have strong magnetoelastic effects (coupling between magnetic properties such as susceptibility or magnetization and elastic strain). Current and potential future applications of these magnetic properties are discussed below.

Like crystalline alloys, metallic glasses have conduction electrons that make them both electrically and thermally conductive,²⁵ although their structural disorder and high alloy content make them poor conductors. In addition, in a behavior that is useful in some applications, the conductivity of metallic glasses is not very sensitive to temperature; an exception is near absolute zero, where some amorphous alloys become superconducting.

Another consequence of the amorphous structure of metallic glasses is that they tend to have very low acoustic damping. This may be useful in applications such as vibrating-structure gyroscopes for vehicle orientation.²⁶

A common misperception among those hearing about metallic glasses for the first time is to think they are transparent. This is not the case; amorphous alloys are highly reflective, with a shiny luster similar to that of other metals (Figure 7). This is a result of the presence of the conduction electrons, which scatter and absorb incident light.




Figure 7. Cast Metallic Glass Wedge. Wedge of a zirconium-based bulk metallic glass produced by casting. Note the shiny metallic luster, typical of metallic glasses.²⁷

Metallic Glass Matrix Composites

As discussed above, the lack of crystalline defects gives metallic glasses high strength but compromises their ductility and fracture toughness. In particular, the tendency for plastic deformation to localize into shear bands prevents the material from deforming in a "graceful" manner. So it should not be surprising that there have been many attempts to control shear band initiation and propagation by making composite materials consisting of particles or fibers of some other material (most commonly a ductile crystalline metal) in a metallic glass matrix. The idea is to produce a material with improved ductility, fracture toughness, and fatigue properties while (hopefully) not sacrificing the qualities—especially strength and processing flexibility—that make metallic glasses interesting in the first place.

PROCESSING AND STRUCTURE OF COMPOSITES

Broadly speaking, there are two kinds of metallic glass matrix composites: ex situ and in situ. In ex situ composites, the metallic glass and the crystalline phase (be it in the form of particles or fibers) are physically combined, for instance by adding particles to the melt before casting. In situ composites are different in that the crystalline phase is produced directly from the melt (by precipitation) during processing. This fundamental difference in processing leads to significant differences in structure and therefore in properties.

EX SITU COMPOSITES

There are two basic ways of making ex situ composites, in which the metallic glass matrix and the crystalline phase are combined physically, without a chemical reaction:

- Add crystalline particles to a melt of a glass-forming alloy and then cast under conditions that allow the matrix to form a metallic glass.
- Make a preform of a crystalline phase (by packing fibers into a mold, for instance) and then cast the glass-forming alloy around the preform.

Both approaches have limitations. In the first, the addition of particles to the melt increases the viscosity (which is already quite high relative to non-glass-forming alloys) considerably, ultimately to a point where casting becomes impossible. This limits the volume fraction of particles that can be added, which in turn limits the control one has over the microstructure and, in particular, the spacing of the particles. With a preform, the volume fraction of the crystalline phase can be much higher (up to about 80 percent by volume), but the problem then is how to infiltrate the high-viscosity melt into the preform without leaving voids and while still ensuring sufficiently rapid cooling to form a glassy matrix. With both approaches, interfacial reactions between the crystalline phase and the melt can cause partial or complete crystallization of the matrix, degrading the mechanical properties.

IN SITU COMPOSITES

The difficulty of making satisfactory ex situ composites has led to the development of a new approach in which the crystalline phase is precipitated directly from the melt, either during casting²⁸ or in a separate step prior to casting.^{29 30} Precipitation during casting, although easier, is problematic from a practical standpoint because variations in the cooling rate (from the surface to the center of a casting, for instance) lead to significant variations in structure and, hence, in properties.

One of the most promising recent advances in the metallic glass field is the development of in situ composites in which the crystalline phase is precipitated as dendrites, either during casting (Figure 8) or by holding the alloy at an elevated temperature prior to casting.³¹ By suitably choosing alloy composition, holding time, and temperature, the volume fraction, size, and spacing of the dendritic phase can be controlled. This control provides great flexibility in determining the mechanical properties of the resulting material. Because the crystalline phase is produced prior to casting, variation in the cooling rate across the casting is much less important, though the cooling rate must still be sufficiently high to ensure the matrix forms a glass during cooling. Once the glassy matrix is formed, the composite can be reheated above the glass transition temperature, allowing for thermoplastic forming in a manner similar to single-phase metallic glasses (as described above). Finally, the presence of the dendritic second phase allows for deformation processes (for example, by cold rolling or forging), similar to crystalline alloys.³²




Figure 8. Microstructure of In Situ Metallic Glass Matrix Composite. With ductile crystalline dendrites.
 (a) Scanning electron micrograph showing the dendrites (light gray) in the glassy matrix (dark gray).
 (b) Composite after plastic deformation; note the multiplicity of slip steps, indicating extensive interaction of shear bands with the dendrites.³³

The key limitation of these in situ composites is that not every alloy system is capable of forming them. While any alloy will form crystalline phases at elevated temperatures, usually the crystalline phases that form are brittle intermetallics that degrade rather than enhance the mechanical properties. To be effective in controlling shear bands, the precipitated phase needs to be ductile, have a shear modulus lower than that of the glassy matrix, and (preferably) form as dendrites. To date, the only published reports of systems that satisfy these criteria concern alloys based on early transition metals, notably zirconium and titanium. Whether in situ composites can be developed in other alloy systems remains to be seen.

MECHANICAL PROPERTIES OF COMPOSITES

The ability to produce mixed amorphous-crystalline microstructure provides the ability to control the formation and propagation of shear bands. The resulting materials can have good fracture and fatigue resistance while retaining the high strength and processing flexibility associated with metallic glasses.

The origin of these effects is related to the development of a region of plastic deformation at the tip of an advancing crack. For a crack opening under tensile loading, the size of the plastic region is approximately given by:

$$R_p \approx \frac{1}{2\pi} \left(\frac{K_{Ic}}{\sigma_y} \right)^2, \quad (\text{Equation 1})$$

where K_{Ic} is the plane-strain fracture toughness (mentioned above) and σ_y is the yield strength. The size of the plastic zone varies from $\sim 1 \mu\text{m}$ for "intrinsically brittle" metallic glasses to $\sim 1 \text{ mm}$ for glasses capable of some plastic deformation.³⁴ If the material has structure on this length scale (or if the sample itself is of this size), then

deformation can proceed in a stable manner by generation and subsequent arrest of shear bands. The key to composite design is to produce a microstructure with the correct length scale to prevent propagating shear bands from becoming catastrophic cracks. This turns out to be relatively difficult with ex situ composites, for reasons of processing described above. As a result, the recently developed dendritic in situ composites have the most promising properties, and we focus the remainder of our discussion on them.

STRENGTH AND DUCTILITY: PLASTIC DEFORMATION

As with other composite materials, the yield strength of metallic glass matrix composites can be approximated as a simple rule of mixtures based on the volume fraction of the two phases. Because the ductile crystalline phases useful for limiting shear band propagation are weaker than the amorphous matrix, in producing a composite, some sacrifice in strength is inevitable. However, the gains in tensile ductility can be significant. For instance, monolithic titanium-based metallic glasses (like all metallic glasses) have essentially zero tensile ductility, but in situ composites based on titanium have been reported with tensile elongation as large as 12 percent.³⁵ This is comparable to the ductility of Ti-6Al-4V (the most common conventional titanium alloy), but in a material with about 30 percent greater strength. The properties of metallic glass matrix composites and more conventional materials are further compared below.

FRACTURE AND FATIGUE

The development of a stable plastic zone means additional energy is required for crack propagation, making in situ composites much more resistant to fracture and fatigue than are single-phase glasses. For instance, the plane-strain fracture toughness of some zirconium-based in situ composites can exceed $170 \text{ MPa m}^{1/2}$ —7 times greater than that of single-phase glasses and greater than that of virtually any other metallic alloy.³⁶ This resistance to crack propagation is also manifested as improved fatigue performance. The fatigue strength of the zirconium-based in situ composites is 20-30 percent of the tensile strength; in comparison, monolithic metallic glasses have a fatigue strength of only ~ 5 percent of the tensile strength.³⁷ The fatigue strength of the in situ composites is thus comparable to that of conventional structural alloys.

Aerospace Applications of Metallic Glasses

STRUCTURAL APPLICATIONS

The key properties of materials for structural applications in aerospace are:

- Strength.
- Stiffness (Young's modulus).
- Density (weight).
- Fracture toughness (damage tolerance).

- Fatigue resistance (including resistance to both fatigue crack initiation and fatigue crack growth).
- Corrosion resistance (including stress-corrosion cracking).
- Cost (including raw materials, shaping, and assembly).

Figure 9 illustrates the mechanical properties of metallic glasses and metallic glass matrix composites compared with other structural materials. Since weight is a particular concern in aerospace applications, in Figure 9(a) we normalize both yield strength (σ_y) and stiffness (E) to density (ρ); two materials with the same specific strength (σ_y/ρ) or specific stiffness (E/ρ) could be used to produce a component with the same overall strength or stiffness, respectively, at the same weight. Materials in the upper-right corner of the plot have the best combination of strength and stiffness for a given weight. Notice that the metallic glasses (and dendritic composites) can be stronger than virtually all crystalline metals, although the stiffness of metallic glasses tends to be somewhat smaller than that of crystalline alloys of similar composition.

Figure 9(b) illustrates the damage tolerance of metallic glasses compared with other materials. By plotting the fracture toughness (K_{Ic}) against modulus (E), we can also compare the fracture energy ($G_{Ic} \approx (K_{Ic})^2/E$) of the materials; the dashed diagonal lines are lines of constant fracture energy. Figure 9(b) reveals several interesting aspects of the damage tolerance of metallic glasses. First, although the fracture toughness of some metallic glasses is comparable to that of crystalline metals, some metallic glasses—most notably those based on iron (Fe) and magnesium (Mg)—are as brittle as any ceramic. Second, both the fracture toughness and the fracture energy of the dendritic metallic glass matrix composites can be superior to those of all but the most fracture-resistant metals.

These considerations suggest the dendritic metallic glass matrix composites might indeed find applications as structural materials in aircraft and/or spacecraft. The most obvious applications would be to replace steel in certain components where strength is critical but space is limited. These might include pylon structures and landing gear,³⁸ although it has yet to be demonstrated that the composites can be fabricated in the sizes necessary. Furthermore, the corrosion and stress-corrosion cracking resistance of these materials has not been fully evaluated.




Figure 9. Materials Property Charts. (a) Strength and stiffness (both normalized to density) of metallic glasses (yellow) and dendritic metallic glass matrix composites (red) compared with other materials. (b) Damage tolerance. On this plot, the dashed lines represent contours of equal fracture energy. In both plots, polymer composites (CFRP and GFRP) are represented by isotropic averages; continuous fiber composites can have greater strength and stiffness in a direction parallel to the fibers.³⁹

Metallic glass foams (see above) also provide intriguing possibilities for structural applications. It has recently been shown that metallic glass foams with outstanding strength can be formed by controlling the size of the ligaments between pores.⁴⁰ This is a new development, and these foams have not been fully characterized, but it seems likely that optimized foams will have a specific stiffness (E/ρ) superior to that of polymer foams, along with high strength and acoustic damping. Such structural foams could be useful in applications requiring strength and stiffness under compressive loads, such as structural panels for extraterrestrial buildings. Conceivably, such structural foams might even be produced on site (from raw feedstock), reducing the volume of material that needs to be launched.

A final possibility is that metallic glasses might be combined with polymer composites into metal-fiber laminate materials. Similar laminates (with crystalline aluminum alloys) are being employed in large quantities on the new Airbus 380 and are likely to find increased application in the future.⁴¹ The use of metallic glasses in these laminates is appealing because of their high specific strength (although the specific stiffness is lower than that of aluminum). Furthermore, the individual layers in the laminate are sufficiently thin that a wide range of glass-forming alloys might be considered (in contrast to thicker structural sections, which will be limited by the glass-forming ability of the alloy).

OTHER APPLICATIONS

Monolithic metallic glasses are unique among metallic materials in having no microstructure at length scales of more than a few atomic spacings. In principle then, metallic glasses should be capable of replicating features down to this scale. This possibility is facilitated by the ability of metallic glasses to be formed in the supercooled liquid temperature range with controllable viscosity. Indeed, superplastic forming of metallic glass surfaces with features as small as 13 nanometers has been demonstrated.⁴² This ability could be exploited for direct embossing of nanostructures in polymers or other materials. Structures on this length scale are also potentially useful as diffraction gratings for ultraviolet and soft x-ray radiation.

In a related area, metallic glasses have a variety of useful properties for application in micro-electromechanical system (MEMS) actuators, including large elastic strains and high resilience (elastic strain energy storage), good corrosion and wear resistance, and an excellent surface finish.⁴³ The scale of these devices is smaller than the plastic zone size (Equation 1 above), making brittle fracture unlikely. Furthermore, a much wider variety of amorphous alloys can be made in thin film form (by vapor deposition) than is possible by casting.

Finally, the magnetic properties of certain amorphous alloys have long been exploited. For instance, their low coercivity and high electrical resistivity make ferromagnetic amorphous alloys attractive as high-efficiency electrical transformers, particularly at high frequencies. Such applications are likely to continue well into the future.

Current Challenges and Prospects for the Future

ALLOY DESIGN

A critical limitation of existing metallic glass technology (and related composites) is the relative dearth of alloys with good glass-forming ability. The best glass-forming alloys are either based on expensive elements (for example, palladium) or contain toxic elements (for example, beryllium in the best zirconium- and titanium-based alloys). For aerospace applications, the most glaring lack is that, despite significant alloy design efforts in the United States (through the DARPA Structural Amorphous Metals program), Japan, China, and elsewhere, there are no good glass-forming alloys based on aluminum. Attempts to make aluminum-based metallic glass components by consolidating amorphous powders have met with limited success. Similarly, all of the good iron-based metallic glasses contain considerable amounts of nonmetallic elements (notably carbon, boron, silicon, and/or phosphorus), which are thought to contribute to the very low fracture toughness of these alloys (Figure 9(b)).

However, there is reason to expect that further progress is possible. Recent experimental results have shown that some of the empirical "rules" of glass-forming ability⁴⁴ are actually quite flexible, and that glass-forming ability is much more sensitive to composition than had been previously appreciated.⁴⁵ So it is highly probable that some excellent glass-forming alloys compositions remain to be discovered, possibly including some low-density glasses based on aluminum.

Identifying these good glass-forming alloys will be a challenge. Most alloy development to date has been done with a brute-force approach, but combinatorial techniques⁴⁶ are likely to enable much more rapid screening. One issue is identification of suitable metrics for glass-forming ability, since the combinatorial approaches use vapor-deposited thin films, and it is not clear what characteristics of such a film correlate with glass-forming ability in the bulk. Similarly, continued development of ab initio molecular dynamics techniques should enable identification of candidate alloys from computer simulations, particularly as computers continue to increase in power.

One area that has received insufficient attention is the influence of processing conditions on glass-forming ability. For instance, application of electromagnetic vibrations during cooling reportedly significantly enhances the glass-forming ability of magnesium-based metallic glasses.⁴⁷ This approach could, in principle, be applied to other alloys, possibly greatly extending the range of alloys and compositions that can be produced as bulk metallic glasses.

THERMOPHYSICAL PROPERTIES AND THERMOPLASTIC PROCESSING

Most of the practical interest in single-phase (monolithic) metallic glasses centers on the potential for thermoplastic processing near to or above the glass transition temperature. However, the thermophysical properties and behavior of metallic glasses are not well understood. For instance, the viscosity of the metallic glass melt (or supercooled liquid) is of critical importance, but we do not know how and why alloy composition influences viscosity. From an engineering point of view, the practical aspects of molding of metallic glasses are just beginning to be explored. Certainly many

parallels can be drawn with thermoplastic forming of polymers, but there are certain to be many differences as well.

Continued developments in this area are highly likely to result in the ability to produce complex net-shape parts in a single processing step. This ease of processing could offset the higher raw materials costs for metallic glasses, making them competitive in a much wider range of applications. Furthermore, as noted above, the ability to replicate extremely small features (< 20 nanometers) in metallic glasses is likely to be exploited in the manufacture of nanostructured devices.^{48 49}

Finally, development of metallic glass foams will continue and will be aided by improved understanding of thermophysical properties. It is highly likely that foams will be produced in a wide range of glass-forming alloys, and that techniques will be developed for precise control of the porosity, pore size, ligament size, and connectivity. This will allow the properties of these foams to be tailored to particular applications.

COMPOSITES AND THE QUEST FOR DUCTILITY

From the point of view of structural applications, localization of plastic deformation into shear bands is the single biggest challenge because this tendency limits the tensile ductility, fracture toughness, and fatigue crack resistance of metallic glasses. There may well be no solution to this problem for monolithic metallic glasses, for the simple reason that they lack any microstructure to interact with shear bands.

Progress is likely to occur on two fronts. First, it is now well established that some alloys are inherently brittle, in the sense that they experience very little plastic deformation around a crack tip, while other alloys show extensive plastic deformation (albeit localized into shear bands). The precise reason for this difference is not understood at present, but it seems likely that it will be resolved with continued work on fundamental aspects of plastic deformation and fracture. This is likely to lead to development of new alloys with reasonable fracture toughness, although not to tensile ductility. However, even this will be an important step if such alloys can be used as matrices for composites.

Second, in order to achieve tensile ductility, it appears to be necessary to have some microstructural features to interact with shear bands. Furthermore, the length scale of the microstructure is clearly a critical parameter in arresting shear band propagation. Again, the precise reasons for this are not known, but continued research quite likely will lead to an improved understanding of the interactions between second-phase particles and shear bands.

At present, the most promising approach to producing composite materials with the proper microstructural length scale is the formation of dendritic composites, as discussed above. A critical limitation is that this process has been demonstrated in only two, closely related alloys and does not appear to be a general phenomenon.

Unfortunately, our understanding of thermodynamics and phase formation in complex multicomponent alloys is not such that we can predict a priori which alloys are capable of producing ductile dendrites in a glass-forming matrix. Until that understanding is developed, discovery of new dendritic composite materials will remain a matter of trial

and error. The potential benefits are significant, however, because there exists the possibility of making materials with exceptionally high strength, fracture toughness, and fatigue resistance.

Summary and Recommendations

Metallic glasses combine some of the advantageous mechanical properties of metals—strength, stiffness, and in some cases toughness—with the processing flexibility usually associated with thermoplastic polymers. The absence of crystalline defects allows metallic glasses to be much stronger than conventional alloys but also means they have near-zero tensile ductility and poor fatigue resistance. In structural applications, therefore, metallic glasses are most likely to be useful in the form of composites consisting of ductile crystalline dendrites in a metallic glass matrix. These dendritic composites sacrifice some strength but can have exceptionally high fracture toughness, as well as good fatigue resistance, and could replace high-strength steels in certain load-limited structural components in aerospace vehicles where space is limited.

Because they are true glasses, thermoplastic forming near the glass transition temperature affords metallic glasses tremendous flexibility in processing. For instance, metallic glass components can be formed in a single step (for example, by injection molding) in complex geometries that would be difficult or impossible to produce with conventional alloys. In addition, metallic glass foams can be made with relative ease, raising the possibility of making structural foams with high strength and stiffness. Finally, because they lack a crystalline grain structure, metallic glasses can be used to form nanoscale features with high fidelity. This may make metallic glasses useful in a variety of micro-electromechanical systems (MEMS) applications.

Metallic glasses also have significant limitations for aerospace applications, however. Foremost among these is a lack of good glass-forming alloys; in particular, there are no good aluminum-rich glass-forming alloys, the known titanium-based alloys are either relatively dense (owing to high concentrations of alloying elements) or contain beryllium, and the known magnesium- and iron-based alloys are all quite brittle, with low fracture toughness. Although metallic glass matrix composites can have outstanding properties (particularly strength and fracture toughness), the number of good composite systems known at present is also quite limited.

For metallic glasses (and their composites) to be of broad utility in aerospace structural applications, progress in the following areas is required:

- Development of new lightweight alloys and composite systems, preferably by computational and/or combinatorial approaches rather than by trial and error.
- Understanding of mechanical behavior, especially:
 - The effect of alloy composition and structure on plastic deformation.
 - Microstructural design of composites for optimal toughness.
- Development of processing techniques, including thermophysical processing of complex and/or nanoscale features as well as production of metallic glass foams.

It is highly likely that continued work over the next 20-50 years will result in significant advances in all these areas, and that metallic glasses and metallic glass matrix composites will see increasing acceptance as structural materials. Whether or not they achieve widespread use in aerospace applications, however, depends critically on the development of new, lightweight alloys.

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Prepared by:

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Biomaterials

Introduction

Biomaterials are metals, ceramics, polymers, glasses, carbons, and composite materials intended to interface with biological systems. They are often used to treat, augment, or replace bodily tissues, organs, or functions. Such materials are used in various forms, including molded or machined parts, coatings, fibers, films, foams, and fabrics. Biomaterials are usually nonliving, but recent definitions also include living skin and tissues produced in culture.

A biocompatible material is different from a biological material produced by a biological system, such as bone. Artificial hips, vascular stents, artificial pacemakers, and catheters are all made of biocompatible materials that typically have a synthetic origin. An extraordinarily wide range of medical devices are made from biomaterials. Figure 1 shows some representative examples of medical devices that use biomaterials.




Figure 1. Biomaterial Applications in Medical Devices

Encompassing elements of medicine, biology, chemistry, and materials science, biomaterials science has experienced steady and strong growth over its approximately half-century history.

Although biomaterials are used primarily for medical applications, they are also used to grow cells in culture, to assay for blood proteins in the clinical

laboratory, in processing biomolecules in biotechnology, for fertility regulation implants in cattle, in diagnostic gene arrays, in the aquaculture of oysters, and for investigational cell-silicon "biochips." The common thread in these applications is the interaction between biological systems and synthetic or modified natural materials.

Biomimetic materials, in contrast, are not made by living organisms but have compositions and properties similar to materials made by living organisms. For example, the calcium hydroxyapatite coating found on many artificial hips—used as metal-bone interface cement to make it easier to attach implants to bone—is similar to the coating found in mollusk shells.

IMPORTANCE OF BIOCOMPATIBILITY

Biocompatibility is an important issue in biomedical implants and sensors. A material-tissue interaction that results from implanting a foreign object in the body is a major obstacle to developing stable and long-term implantable devices and sensors.

The processes that occur when sensors are placed in the complex living environment of the human body are sometimes known as biofouling. In biofouling, the physical or chemically sensitive portion of the sensor interface becomes coated with proteins, blood-formed elements, adherent immunological cells, and sometimes forms of scar tissue that tend to isolate the sensor from the rest of the body environment. This response of tissue is a foreign body reaction to any object introduced in tissue that does not express surface characteristics that identify it as part of the host tissues.

Experiences of many investigators (more than 600 reported studies since 1996) with the biocompatibility of biomaterials related to the function of implanted biosensors have been poor such that many companies have abandoned implantable sensor devices altogether. Rather, the recent trend in medical biosensors is toward placing them outside the body. Newer sensors are often based on optical principles in an effort to obviate the biocompatibility and biomaterial issues of placing sensors inside the human body.

SCIENCE OF BIOMATERIALS

The study and use of biomaterials bring together researchers from diverse academic backgrounds who must communicate clearly. Professions that intersect in the development, study, and application of biomaterials include bioengineer, chemist, chemical engineer, electrical engineer, mechanical engineer, materials scientist, biologist, microbiologist, physician, veterinarian, ethicist, nurse, lawyer, regulatory specialist, and venture capitalist.

The number of medical devices used each year in humans is very large. Figure 2 estimates usage for common devices, all of which employ biomaterials.




Figure 2. Common Medical Devices That Use Biomaterials

The development of biomaterials is the junction of materials science and chemistry. Medical devices may be composed of a single biomaterial or a combination of several materials. A heart valve might be fabricated from polymers, metals, and carbons. A hip joint might be fabricated from metals and polymers (and sometimes ceramics) and will be interfaced to the body through a polymeric bone cement.

Biomaterials by themselves do not make a useful clinical therapy but rather have to be fabricated into devices. This is typically an engineer's role, but the engineer might work closely with synthetic chemists to optimize material properties and with physicians to ensure the device is useful in clinical applications.

Biomaterials must be compatible with the body, and there are often issues that must be resolved before a product can be placed on the market and used in a clinical setting. Because of this, biomaterials are usually subjected to the same very stringent safety requirements as those of new drug therapies.

Biomaterials for Biosensors

Implantable biosensors for the human body place some of the greatest functional demands on biomaterials. Biosensors monitor the physiologic state of tissues for medical therapeutics or for assessing human performance. Sensors for glucose, oxygen, blood pH, adrenal hormones, nervous activity, heart performance, and blood pressure monitors are all of interest.

Blood biochemistry sensors are the most difficult sensors to keep functioning over time primarily because the sensor interface materials provoke low-level foreign-body reactions in tissues. These types of responses are not specifically important to implantable devices that have structural rather than sensing functions, such as heart valves, but they can completely render a biosensor for blood glucose, for example, useless after a few days.

Chemically sensitive biosensor interfaces to tissue and body environments employ membranes in an effort to protect the biosensor active-sensing surface from possible body reactions. The membrane allows small molecules of interest to pass through its pores while excluding larger proteins, blood-formed elements, and cells like macrophages that would engulf the sensor.

The membrane's biomaterial composition, pore size, and long-term physical integrity are critical components in the functioning of the sensor. If the biomaterial chosen retards the adhesion of proteins and does not provoke a biological response, then this improves sensor longevity. Figure 3 shows some representative biomembranes.

No one biomaterial is best for all sensor applications, primarily because different biomaterials behave differently relative to the substance being sensed. Membranes that pass glucose, for example, may not pass oxygen that is needed for a sensor to function. Membrane biofouling starts immediately upon contact of the sensor with the body cells. Proteins and other biological components adhere to the sensor surface, and in some cases, impregnate the pores of the material. This process retards diffusion of the molecules of interest to the sensor surface and either slows the sensor's response to changes in concentration or reduces the overall response to the point where the sensor falls out of calibration.



Figure 3. Biomaterials Such as Polycarbonates, Cellulose, and Silicones Used in Membranes for Sensors, Dialyzers, and Oxygenators

The design of sensor membrane materials has been found to be critically dependent on subtle features of the membrane's chemistry, material thickness, and porosity, as well as, more generally, where in the human body the sensor is located. The blood stream is

the most hostile location both for sensor performance and in terms of the potential for danger to the patient through the provocation of blood clotting.

The most successful biomembrane materials have been porous forms of Teflon, polyurethanes, and cellulose-based materials such as cellulose acetate. As important as the material composition is for sensors, so are aspects of a membrane's structure and mechanical properties, such as its ability resist abrasion and adhere to sensor surfaces.

Biomaterials for Biomedicine

In this review, we look at representative biomaterials as well as representative applications. These biomaterials are among the most popular of those used in medicine today, and the applications in some cases represent multibillion-dollar-a-year markets.

Some of the best known of the biomaterials are:

- Silicone
- Teflon
- Biodegradable polymers
- Hydrogels
- Titanium alloys
- Ceramics
- Tissue constructs

Some of the largest applications are:

- Cardiovascular – stents, synthetic blood vessels, heart valves
- Hip and knee joints
- Contact lenses
- Drug delivery devices
- Kidney dialysis

BIOMEDICAL SILICONES- POLYDIMETHYLSILOXANES

Perhaps the most well known of all biomaterials are the silicones—soft, pliable, and semitransparent materials that are used in many different applications in modern society, ranging from water sealants to fibrous insulations.

Silicone is often mistakenly called "silicon." Although silicones contain silicon atoms, they are an organic material of greater complexity and are not made up exclusively of silicon. Silicone is used in an exceptionally large number of biomedical applications. It is blood compatible, sterilizable, rugged, and strong but flexible. Its mechanical properties

can be tailored to varying degrees of hardness and strength for stiffness in catheter applications.

Biomedical silicones attracted notoriety in 1995 when a class-action lawsuit against Dow Corning, Inc., brought a huge settlement resulting from the supposed dangers of silicone breast implants.

After reviewing years of evidence and research concerning silicone gel-filled breast implants, the national Institute of Medicine found that "evidence suggests diseases or conditions such as connective tissue diseases, cancer, neurological diseases or other systemic complaints or conditions are no more common in women with breast implants than in women without implants." Dow moved out of the medical silicone business and has since been replaced by an array of smaller companies offering specialized silicone products.

Figure 4 shows the present form of silicone used for reconstructive surgery following a mastectomy, particularly after breast cancer in women.




Figure 4. Photograph of Silicone (polydimethylsiloxane) Biomedical Implants Used in Breast Reconstructive Surgery

SILICONE CHEMISTRY

Silicone is actually a common name for the chemical compound polydimethylsiloxane (PDMS), a class of synthetic polymers with repeating units of silicon and oxygen. Figure 5 shows the polymeric repeating structure of medical silicones. Various functional groups—often methyl—can be attached to that backbone to change the material properties. Silicone polymers can easily be transformed into linear or cross-linking materials without using any toxic plasticizers. The resulting materials are elastic at body temperature.




Figure 5. Silicone Chemical Groups

The simultaneous presence of different groups attached to the silicon-oxygen backbone gives silicones a range of viscous and mechanical properties that allow their use as fluids, emulsions, compounds, resins, and elastomers in numerous applications. Thus, silicone is a versatile polymer, although its use is often limited by its relatively poor mechanical strength. However, this limitation can be overcome by reinforcing silicone with a silica filler or by chemically modifying the backbone.

The stability, lack of toxicity, and excellent biocompatibility of PDMS make these materials well suited for use in personal care, pharmaceutical, and medical device applications. Silicone is easily molded and cast using room temperature curing (known as RTV) or through the use of an organic catalyst.

SILICONE IN BIOMEDICAL PRODUCTS

Silicone membranes are made by casting the silicone liquid precursor into thin sheets. Such membranes are often used in oxygen and carbon dioxide blood biosensors because membranes made of this material are highly transmissive to these gases while they block most other chemical substances present in the blood stream. In addition, silicone's resistance to protein adhesion and its excellent overall biocompatibility make it one of the most commonly used materials for encapsulating biosensors for tissue or blood contact.

Recent formulations of silicone can be patterned with ultraviolet light and, thus, lend themselves to manufacture with biosensors made by photolithography.




Figure 6. Silicone Tracheostomy Tube

Figure 6 is a representative example of silicone-based medical products involving tubes or catheters. A tracheostomy tube, or "trach tube," is a 2- to 3-inch-long curved metal or plastic tube placed in a surgically created opening (tracheostomy) in the windpipe to keep it open. Versions of these products are used in cases where patients have difficulty breathing on their own, such as in a spinal cord injury.

A product known as Mepiform™ is an example of silicone use in a sheet form for the management of scars, particularly keloid scars. Figure 7 shows this product.



Figure 7. Silicone Sheets Used Under the Skin as a Physical Supporting Layer for Repair of Scar Tissue

TEFLON

Biomedical materials must be inert to the complex chemistry of biological fluids so they neither suffer nor instigate change in tissue. Teflon™ admirably fulfills these requirements. Teflon is a trade name for polytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE), a fluorocarbon-based polymer. It is made by free radical polymerization of tetrafluoroethylene and has a carbon backbone chain in which each carbon has two fluorine atoms attached to it.

This polymer is hydrophobic (water hating), biologically inert, and nonbiodegradable and also has low friction characteristics and excellent "slipperiness." The chemical inertness (stability) of PTFE is related to the strength of the fluorine-carbon bond that makes it resistant to adhesion. Figure 8 shows the structure of this material. It is a long chain of repeating chemical units, as shown in the right of the figure.




Figure 8. Teflon Structure

Goretex® is a medical form of Teflon (PTFE) that, when stretched and extruded, entraps air cells in its microstructure much like foam does and, thus, is relatively soft and repellant to most liquids. This material is known as e-PTFE (expanded PTFE).

PTFE can be fabricated in many forms, including pastes, tubes, strands, and sheets, while ePTFE can be woven into a porous, fabric-like mesh. When implanted in the body, this strong mesh allows tissue to grow into its pores, making it ideal for medical devices such as vascular grafts.

Preformed ePTFE subcutaneous implant materials have been used to improve facial reconstruction and cosmetic surgery outcomes. Figure 9 is a manufacturer's product information showing the utility of using ePTFE in cosmetic surgery.

PTFE has relatively low wear resistance, but under compression or in situations where rubbing or abrasion can occur, it can produce wear particles. These can result in a chronic inflammatory reaction, an undesirable outcome. For a given application, the biomaterials engineer must consider many aspects of the physical and biological properties of the materials. Thus, although PTFE is highly inert in the body, applying it in the wrong circumstances (for example, to a device that is under compression or exposed to wear) may lead to a reaction that no longer qualifies as "biocompatible."




Figure 9. Expanded PTFE (Gore-Tex or ePTFE) Used in Lip Implants. This is a synthetic implant that has been used in the face and body for many years. The main advantage is that it is not absorbed over time and the results are permanent.

BIODEGRADABLE POLYMERS

Biodegradable polymers are an important and relatively large category of biomaterials that are used extensively in the medical and food industries. In the latter, they are used as food wrappings and other packaging derived from natural food substances that slowly degrade—by evaporation into water vapor and carbon dioxide—when exposed to the sun and outdoor environments, thus minimizing waste disposal. Figure 10 shows a complex shape made from polylactide (PLA), a biodegradable polymer.

Biodegradable polymers can be either natural or synthetic. In general, synthetic polymers offer greater advantages than do natural materials in that they can be tailored to give a wider range of properties and more predictable lot-to-lot uniformity than can materials from natural sources. Synthetic polymers also represent a more reliable source of raw materials—




Figure 10. Biodegradable Polymers. Polymers such as PLA are much like conventional plastics and, as such, have qualities of clarity, flexibility, and strength.

one free from concerns of immunogenicity. These polymers can be optically clear, exhibit good flexibility, and have strength comparable to that of many plastics.

BIODEGRADATION ADVANTAGES

In the human body, biodegradable polymers have good compatibility but also decompose to harmless materials and over time dissolve altogether. Biodegradable polymers undergo a chemical hydrolysis in the salty and wet environment of tissues by way of a labile chemical backbone of the polymer. The degradation starts immediately upon water exposure and occurs in two steps.

In the first step, the material thoroughly hydrates, and the water attacks the polymer chains, converting long chains into shorter, water-soluble fragments. The desirable aspect of this process is a reduction in molecular weight without a loss in physical properties, since the device matrix is still held together, even with the shorter chains.

In the second step, the shorter polymer chains are attacked by enzymes that are naturally present in tissues. Basically, a metabolization of the fragments by the body tissues results in a rapid loss of polymer mass, what is referred to as bulk erosion. All the commercially available synthetic devices and sutures degrade by bulk erosion.

DEGRADABLE BIOMATERIALS

Different biodegradable polymers have different lifetimes in tissues, ranging from a few days to years. Combining two different biopolymers—for example, short-lived (days) PLA (polylactide) and longer lived (months) PGA (polyglycolide)—reveals that polymers can be produced with intermediate decomposition times. Thus, their decay times can be custom determined through their formulation.

Biodegradable polymers fulfill a physician's desire to have an implanted device that will not require a second surgical intervention for removal, which is desirable in many applications. In orthopedic applications, for example, a fractured bone that has been fixated with a rigid, nonbiodegradable stainless implant has a tendency for refracture upon removal of the implant, making removal undesirable. This refracturing results from the offloading of the stress on the bone by the stainless steel support because the bone has not carried a sufficient load during the healing process. However, a fixation system prepared from a biodegradable polymer can be engineered to degrade at a rate that will slowly transfer the load to the healing bone, thereby avoiding the risk of refracture and eliminating the need to remove the implant.

POLYLACTIC ACID AND POLYGLYCOLIC ACID

Polylactic acid (PLA), polyglycolic acid (PGA), and their copolymers are the most widely used of the biodegradable polymers. These materials, when exposed to the sun and weather, will degrade into water and carbon dioxide and essentially vanish, given sufficient time.

In the human body, combinations of PLA and PGA are used to control the longevity of a material by controlling its degradation rate when exposed to tissues. The degradation products in the human body are also water and carbon dioxide.

PLA, or polylactide, is a thermoplastic, long-chained organic material derived from renewable resources, such as corn starch (in the United States) or sugarcane (in the rest of the world). PLA has been recognized for more than a century and is of commercial interest primarily because of its biomedical applications. Figure 11 shows the chemical structure of PLA.




Figure 11. Structure of Polylactic Acid (a Biodegradable Polymer)

These materials are popular because they have already been used in many approved medical implant devices and have been shown to be safe, nontoxic, and biocompatible. They have been used in the development of several commercially available medical products, including sutures, tissue screws and tacks, guided tissue-regeneration membranes for dentistry, internal bone-fixation devices, microspheres for implantable drug delivery systems, and meniscus and cartilage repair systems.

These polymers can potentially be used in the design of vascular and urological stents and skin substitutes. This is possible through the manipulation of the polymer characteristics of these materials, such as their three-dimensional architecture, their mechanical and structural integrity, and their biodegradability. The materials can also be used as scaffolds for tissue engineering and for tissue reconstruction.

A medical application of these materials in thin-sheet form is their placement as a thin barrier layer that prevents entry of debris into wounds and as an underlayer to the skin and body tissue. Figure 12 is an artist's conception of a layer of PLA polymer being placed over the heart after open-heart surgery.

The Clear Choice



Protection in case there is a re-operation...

Figure 12. Biodegradable PLA as an Antiadhesion Barrier after Open-Heart Surgery

The PLA sheet acts as a barrier and spacer to prevent the healing heart wall from growing an attachment to the chest wall and from forming adhesions onto the overlying

tissues. The barrier remains in place only for a week or so during the healing process before biodegrading so no foreign body is left inside of the body.

POLYETHYLENE GLYCOL OR POLYETHYLENE OXIDE

Polyethylene glycol (PEG) is a widely used material in biomedicine, pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, and agriculture. Its chemical compatibility, water solubility, nontoxicity, biocompatibility, and multiple physical states allow it be used as coatings and in solid form to create surfaces that are very acceptable to biology. Figure 13 shows the marketing of PEG to broad markets that include biodegradable polymers.

One of PEG's major applications is in the creation of "nonfouling" surfaces when exposed to blood or biological environments. The nonfouling, or cell- and protein-resistant, properties of surfaces containing PEG are due to the material's highly hydrated state.

PEG is used in drug delivery systems to improve the solubility of drugs and to help stabilize immunogenic or unstable protein drugs. This can enhance the circulation times and stabilities of drugs in the body.

HYDROGELS

Hydrogels are liquid or semisolid materials that have a strong affinity for water. Poly(hydroxyethyl methacrylic) acid, or poly(HEMA), is one of the most important hydrogels in the biomaterials world because it has many advantages over other hydrogels. These include a water content similar to living tissue, inertness to biological processes, resistance to degradation, permeability to metabolites, and resistance to absorption by the body.

Poly(HEMA) can easily be manufactured into many shapes and forms and be easily sterilized. This is due to its structure, which is



Figure 13. Biodegradable Polymers Based on Copolymers of Polylactic Acid and Polyethylene Glycol



Figure 14. Dots of Hydrogel

composed of long-chain molecules crosslinked to one another to create many small empty spaces that can absorb water or other liquids like a sponge. Hydrogels can be extruded into nearly any shape. Figure 14 shows them as small dots.

If the spaces are filled with a drug, the hydrogel can dispense the drug gradually as the structure biodegrades. Hydrogels are also used for tissue engineering and tissue repair, where the spaces in the gel might be filled with stem cells, tissue-growth factors, or a combination of the two.

Hydrogels are cross-linked polymer networks that are insoluble in body fluids but are able to swell and often have a water content of up to 90 percent. These can be formed by crosslinking one or several types of monomer units into a network, forming a homopolymer, copolymer, or multipolymer. With the incorporation of different monomers, gels with wide-ranging chemical and physical properties can be formed. The gels can be neutral or charged, soft or stiff, strong or brittle. Hydrogels are routinely used for biomedical and pharmaceutical applications such as drug release, artificial tendons, wound-healing bioadhesives, artificial kidney membranes, artificial skin, and contact lenses.

TITANIUM – HIP AND KNEE JOINTS

Titanium-based hip and knee implants are quite successful and are among the most common orthopedic procedures. When a hip replacement is performed, the arthritic, damaged hip joint is removed. The ball-and-socket hip joint is then replaced with an artificial implant.

Hip implants often show no visible sign of their existence in either walking gait or functionality. In adults, they can last a lifetime. Knee implants are also known to be successful. Figure 15 shows an assortment of titanium hip joint assemblies. The long shaft part of the device fills a drilled hole in the long bone of the femur.




Figure 15. Various Titanium Components Used in Hip Joint Replacement

BIOCERAMICS

Ceramic materials are sometimes used directly or modified for use in applications in the human body and, so, become known as bioceramics.

The most common applications are in bone repair, dentistry, and the use of ceramics in hip and knee joint replacements, where their exceptional hardness can be put to advantage in wear joints.

Bioceramics range in biocompatibility from the ceramic oxides, which are inert in the body, to the other extreme of resorbable materials, which are eventually replaced by the materials they were used to repair.

Two common ceramics used in dentistry and hip prostheses are alumina and hydroxyapatite (HA). HA is a major component of the inorganic compartment of bone. Commercially prepared HA is processed using a technique of phosphoric acid and hydrothermal exchange that produces a porous, "bone-like" morphology in the resulting structure. Figure 16 shows this result. When implanted into bone defects, HA supports bone growth through the pores and, thus, becomes an intermediate scaffold, as well as an eventual support matrix.

Hydroxyapatite composites have been successfully used to repair, reconstruct, and replace diseased or damaged body parts, especially bone. They have been used in vertebral prostheses, intervertebral spacers, bone grafting, middle-ear bone replacements, and jawbone repair.



Figure 16. Hydroxyapatite Porous Bone-Like Structure After Commercial Processing

Aluminum oxide, or alumina (Al_2O_3), has been used in orthopedic surgery for more than 20 years as the joint surface in total hip prostheses because of its exceptionally low coefficient of friction and minimal wear rates. Alumina has excellent corrosion resistance, good biocompatibility, high strength, and high wear resistance, making it ideal for orthopedic applications.

Other bioceramics include coral skeletons, which can be transformed into hydroxyapatite by high temperatures. Their porous structure allows relatively rapid ingrowth of living cells at the expense of initial mechanical strength. The high temperature also burns away any organic molecules, such as proteins, preventing graft-versus-host disease and rejection.

Bioceramics made from a calcium phosphate material containing tiny pores have been used to coat metal joint implants or as unloaded space fillers for bone ingrowth. Tissue ingrowth into the pores occurs, with



Figure 17. Bioceramic Used in Artificial Hip Replacement Component

an increase in the interfacial area between the implant and the tissues. This tissue ingrowth results in an increased resistance to device movement within the tissue. As in natural bone, proteins adsorb to the calcium phosphate surface to provide the critical intervening layer through which the bone cells interact with the implanted biomaterial. Figure 17 shows an example of this.

DENTAL CERAMICS

Dental ceramics are a major subclass of biomaterials. Porcelains are hard ceramic materials that are based on a glass of silica and alumina, with fluxes used to lower their fusion temperature. Dental porcelains can have a hardness that exceeds that of the enamel of natural teeth, but they are often more brittle and more likely to fracture. They also do not have the same optical properties, thermal conductivity, or natural fluorescence as biological materials.

Full-porcelain (ceramic) dental materials include porcelain, ceramic, or glasslike fillings and crowns (a metal-free option known as a jacket crown). They are used as inlays, onlays, crowns, and aesthetic veneers. A veneer is a very thin shell of porcelain that can replace or partially cover tooth enamel. Full-porcelain (ceramic) restorations are particularly desirable because their color and translucency mimic natural tooth enamel.

Zirconium oxide is a very strong and refractory material that has recently appeared as a dental material. With a three-point bending strength exceeding 900 megapascals, zirconium oxide is expected to be applicable to many new applications in dentistry, including bridges, implant suprastructures, and root dowel pins.

Casting the shape of a broken tooth into a natural shape or one that resembles the fragment of the broken tooth is greatly facilitated by the use of computerized CAD/CAM technologies. These technologies are used to make molds for the casting of dental ceramics. Figure 18 illustrates natural-looking teeth made from dental porcelains defined by a computer-generated mold.

TISSUE CONSTRUCTS AS BIOMATERIALS

Figure 18. Computer-Based Sculpted Ceramic Teeth

Living tissues are sometimes considered biomaterials if they have been cultured prior to application to the human body or utilized much the same way as a synthetic material would be utilized. The formation of living tissues into constructs is sometimes called tissue engineering. This is a bit of a misnomer in that it is an advanced form of cell culture and cellular biology and has little in common with engineering in the classical sense of application of mathematics and physics to problems.

Rather, tissue engineering is the application of biological and cell culturing techniques to encourage the growth of tissues in certain ways and in the development of viable substitutes that restore and maintain the function of human tissues. This is a form of

medical therapeutics and differs from standard drug therapy or permanent implants in that the culture becomes integrated within the patient, affording a potentially permanent and specific cure of the disease state.

There are many approaches to tissue engineering, but all involve one or more of the following key ingredients: harvested cells, introduction of specialized signaling molecules, and three-dimensional matrices.

The approach involves seeding highly porous biodegradable matrices (or scaffolds) in the shape of the desired bone or tissue, with cells and signaling molecules (for example, protein growth factors), then culturing and implanting the scaffolds into the defect to induce and direct the growth of new bone or tissue. The goal is for the cells to attach to the scaffold, multiply, differentiate (that is, transform from a nonspecific or primitive state into cells exhibiting the specific functions), and organize into normal, healthy tissue as the scaffold degrades. The signaling molecules can be adhered to the scaffold or incorporated directly into the scaffold material. Figure 19 illustrates the sequence of steps in this process.




Figure 19. Scaffold-Guided Tissue Regeneration

Perhaps the biggest challenge for tissue engineering is how to ensure angiogenesis in a timely fashion within the scaffold construct; without a blood supply, cells will die, and mass infection will occur.

In biology, "autologous" refers to cells, tissues, or even proteins that are reimplanted into the same individual they were taken from. Bone marrow, skin biopsy, cartilage, and bone can be used as autografts. In contrast, cells or tissues transplanted from a different individual are referred to as allogeneic, homologous, or an allograft.

TISSUE SCAFFOLD BIOMATERIALS

An intriguing idea in tissue engineering is the use of biodegradable polymers as a scaffold for growing tissues of a certain defined shape—for example, the cartilage of an ear pinna lost in an accident.

Biodegradable polymers have been used with computer-based rapid prototyping machines to form porous shapes where tissue cells can ingrow. The result after many weeks of submersion in tissue culture is that the polymer slowly degrades, leaving the cultured tissue in the shape of the predefined scaffold. Although this approach cannot grow complex organs, like a heart or kidney, that have many different tissues, it can be used to create simple structures of cell products—for example, of cartilage excreted by fibroblast cells. These structures do not create their own networks of blood vessels, a problem whose solution lies in the future.

Figure 20 shows CSLA (Crosslinkable Star Lactide-co-Glycolide), a biodegradable polymer deposited into a honeycomb structure by a process not unlike ink-jet printing. The ink-jet pen is supplied with a hot liquid form of the CSLA polymer, which then hardens when it cools and is exposed to the air. Using a computer to rewrite successive layers on top of one another, a three-dimensional structure is built.




Figure 20. Biodegradable Material CSLG Deposited in a Honeycomb Structure to Allow Infiltration by Living Cells While in a Submerged Cell Culture

CARDIOVASCULAR BIOMATERIALS

Biomaterials are often made into medical devices rather than being sold in raw form. Among the largest and most demanding of all biomaterial applications are devices that come into direct contact with blood. In general, various derivatives of Teflon and silicone are the most widely used for blood contact, while metals and ceramics are more often used in tissues.

Cardiovascular (heart and blood vessel) applications are one of the most important categories of implant biomaterials. Biomaterials for cardiovascular applications are usually prepared using polymers, because polymers are available in a wide variety of compositions with adequate physical and mechanical properties and can easily be manufactured into products with the desired shape. In addition, some metals and ceramics are used in the blood stream. Figure 21 lists some of the common cardiovascular devices and how long they are in contact with blood.

Medical Devices Used in the Bloodstream

	<u>Blood contact time</u>
Catheters	Min-days
Guidewires	Min-hrs
Sensors	Min-months
Pacemaker	10 yrs
Vascular Graft	lifetime
Heart Valve	lifetime
Stent	lifetime
Extracorporeal Oxygenation	hrs
Artificial Kidney (hemodialyzer)	hrs
Total Artificial Heart	10 yrs
Left Ventricular Assist Device (LVAD)	Days-yrs

Figure 21. Some of the More Popular Biomedical Devices and Duration of Their Blood Contact

Biomaterials are used as vascular grafts for artery replacements in which they are connected (grafted) onto natural blood vessels at both ends. When arteries, particularly the coronary arteries and the vessels of the lower limbs, become blocked by fatty deposits (atherosclerosis), segments in some cases can be replaced with grafts. Figure 22 shows commercial vascular grafts made by Gore Medical (Flagstaff, Arizona, USA).




Figure 22. Gore Medical Teflon Foam Used in Vascular Grafts. These are artificial blood vessels used to replace blood vessels in the human body damaged by accident, atherosclerosis, or diabetic vascular disease.

A problem most materials cause when in blood contact is that they trigger the rapid formation of thrombus (an aggregation of blood cells). The formation of a thrombus is dangerous, as the thrombus could either adhere to the surface of the biomaterial or be detached. If a thrombus is detached, it can travel in the blood stream and occlude smaller vessels in the brain (called a stroke) or lungs (called an embolism). Some small-diameter vascular grafts (< 5-millimeter internal diameter) and prostheses for reconstruction of diseased veins are "safe" only when anticoagulant drugs are used.

In addition to thrombus formation, biomaterials can become colonized with infection-causing bacteria. Some microorganisms found in hospitals are extremely resistant to antibiotic therapy, and infections cannot be fully resolved until the biomaterial is removed. This is particularly a problem with hip and knee implants, where there is poor blood flow near the joint and the body's immune system has limited access. Methicillin-resistant staphylococcus aureus infections are dangerous in these situations.

The high tolerance of the body for woven and formed Teflon allows it to be used as a flexible patch material for other blood-contacting surfaces, in addition to blood vessels. For example, Gore, Inc., makes a Teflon-based material that is used to patch holes in the heart of infants born with atrial septal defects. Figure 23 is an artist's conception of how the patch is inserted into the hole in the atrial wall using a catheter.



Figure 23. Illustration of Treatment of an Atrial Septal Defect Using a Teflon-Based Product Manufactured by Gore, Inc.

Heart valves are another application of biomaterials in which the materials are in direct contact with blood. They are typically constructed using a form of stainless steel and woven Teflon (or Dacron) as a suture ring to anchor the device. Figure 24 shows one of these devices.

STENT BIOMATERIALS

A stent is a metal mesh tube that looks something like a Chinese finger puzzle and is used to prop open a clogged artery. These are delivered to the heart in a catheter on the end of a wire usually inserted into an artery in the groin.

The stent is collapsed to a small diameter and placed over a balloon catheter. It is then surgically moved into the area of the blockage. When the balloon is inflated, the stent expands, locks into place, and forms a scaffold that holds the artery open. Figure 25 shows an artist's conception of this process.

The stent stays in the artery permanently, holds it open, improves blood flow to the heart muscle, and relieves symptoms (usually chest pain). Within a few weeks after the stent was placed, the inside lining of the artery (the endothelium) grows over the metal surface of the stent.

Stents are often made from a form of stainless steel that is ductile enough to be expanded by a balloon and then resist closure forces of the vessel wall after the balloon is removed.

The insertion and use of the balloon to expand the stent involves some hazards that can be overcome if the stent is made from a self-expanding metal called Nitinol™. With a nitinol stent, the stent is placed into the body collapsed while it is held cold by a flow of refrigerated saline through the catheter. When allowed to heat up to body temperature by shutting off the cold water to the catheter, the stent expands and more reproducibly applies a calibrated amount of pressure to the blood vessel walls.




Figure 24. Stainless Steel and Teflon Bjork Shiley Heart Valve




Figure 25. Illustration of Stent Placement. The stent is used to expand the luminal opening of a clogged blood vessel.

NITINOL AS A BIOMATERIAL

The use of nitinol metal in stents is a clever application of the properties of a class of materials called shape memory alloys (SMAs). SMAs are mixtures of metals that, after being stress treated, can be deformed significantly but then triggered to return to their original shape.

SMAs have a rather remarkable property: they remember their shape. This "smart" property is the result of the substance's ability to undergo a phase change. This occurs at the atomic level, where atoms in the solid subtly shift their positions in response to a stimulus, such as a change in temperature or the application of mechanical stress.

Once the metal is formed at a high temperature it remembers this shape. Subsequent distortions of the material when it is cold remain locked in place while the material remains at a low temperature. However, warming the material to a specific temperature that is relatively closer to its formation temperature will trigger a return to its original formed shape.

In stents, the web is collapsed while it is cold for easy insertion into a blood vessel and held cold by a flow of cold saline out of the catheter. When the stent warms up as the catheter is removed, it expands itself and the surrounding blood vessel. Figure 26 shows a Nitinol stent.




Figure 26. Nitinol Stent. Nitinol is an alloy of titanium. It is biocompatible and also a shape memory material.

CONTACT LENSES

Contact lenses are used to correct vision in the same way as worn glasses but are lightweight and virtually invisible. Their practicality and popularity ultimately depend on the biomaterials of which they are made.

Modern soft contact lenses were invented by Czech chemist Otto Wichterle and his assistant, Drahoslav Lím who also invented the first gel used for their production. However, it was not until the employment of poly-methyl-methacrylate, known as PMMA (a cousin of acrylic plastics, such as Plexiglas™), that they began to enjoy mass appeal. Figure 27 shows a gas-permeable contact lens.

PMMA, however, is not an ideal contact lens material since no oxygen is transmitted through the lens to the conjunctiva and cornea. This can cause a number of adverse clinical effects. To solve this problem, a range of oxygen-permeable but rigid materials were developed. These materials, referred to as "rigid gas-permeable" or "RGP" materials or lenses, were made by synthetically adding dimethylsiloxane (a form of silicone) to acrylate plastics. Silicones have a very high level of oxygen transport, and amalgamating them with plastics adds this quality, while the acrylics provide strength and hardness. The easy diffusion of oxygen across silicones is thought to be a result of an intermediate solubility of oxygen in the gas phase with the gel phase of silicone.




Figure 25. Contact Lens. Modern contact lenses are made of a mixture of acrylics and silicones that readily pass oxygen to the cornea.

Occasionally, the term "gas permeable" is used to describe RGP lenses, but this is potentially misleading, as soft lenses are also gas permeable in that they allow oxygen to move through the lens to the ocular surface.

In 1999, first silicone hydrogels were launched on the contact lens market. These new materials had the advantage of high oxygen permeability, with the comfort and clinical performance of the conventional hydrogels that had been used for the previous 30 years. These lenses were initially advocated primarily for extended (overnight) wear, although more recently, daily (no overnight) wear silicone hydrogel contact lenses have been launched.

DRUG DELIVERY POLYMERS

One area of biomaterials research is the use of biodegradable materials in the design of systems for controlled drug delivery. Much of this work is driven by the need for the slow release of insulin for the control of brittle diabetes. Mechanical insulin delivery pumps are moderately successful but usually are worn on the outside of the body and are cumbersome.

The ability to introduce insulin and other drugs in a controlled-release manner using biopolymers has clear advantages in terms of user convenience. Similarly, the slow release of other drugs, such as chemotherapeutic agents, is necessary to maintain the drug in the desired therapeutic range with just a single dose.

The basic strategy with some of these systems is to encapsulate drugs in membranes, capsules, microcapsules, liposomes, and hollow fibers. Another approach is to disperse

the active agent in a biodegradable polymer, as shown in Figure 28. The polymer host to the drug dissolves, releasing the drug in a controlled manner over time.




Figure 26. Schematic Representation of Biodegradable (Bioerodible) Drug Delivery Device

The use of biodegradable materials allows the drug to be introduced without much concern for the build-up of the polymer carrier. The carrier is eventually absorbed by the body and, thus, need not be removed surgically.

Drug diffusion through the polymer matrix can also determine the drug dosage rate without actual loss of the polymer. This rate is determined by the choice of polymer, the size of its pores, and the rate at which the drug diffuses from the pores.

The three key advantages polymeric drug delivery products can offer are:

- **Localized Delivery of Drugs:** The polymer-drug combination can be implanted directly at the site where drug action is needed and, hence, whole-body exposure of the drug can be reduced. This becomes especially important for toxic drugs, such as the chemotherapeutic drugs.
- **Sustained Delivery of Drugs:** Once injected, the encapsulated drug is released over extended periods, thereby eliminating the need for multiple injections. This feature can improve patient compliance, especially with drugs for chronic indications that require frequent injections (such as for deficiency of certain proteins).
- **Stabilization of the Drug:** The polymer can protect the drug from the physiological environment and hence improve its stability in vivo. This particular feature makes this technology attractive for the delivery of labile drugs, such as proteins.

An appropriate selection of the polymer matrix is necessary in order to develop a successful drug delivery system. The most commonly used polymers for this application, polylactide (PLA) and poly(lactide-co-glycolide) (PLGA), have been used in biomedical applications for more than 20 years and are known to be biodegradable, biocompatible, and nontoxic. A vast amount of literature is available on the characterization of these polymers and their biodegradation and drug-release properties.

MEDICAL TITANIUM AS A BIOMATERIAL

Titanium metal has qualities of strength, inertness, and a biological compatibility that make it desirable as a biomaterial. Essentially all pacemakers, neurostimulators, and various other implanted medical devices use titanium as a packaging case material.

Titanium metal exposed briefly to the atmosphere oxidizes to form a microscopically thin layer of titania (titanium oxide). Titania is a hard, adherent, and inert ceramic-like compound and is thought to be largely responsible for titanium's acceptability in biomedical applications where metal corrosion in warm, salty body fluids ordinarily would be a problem.

Titanium is used for its high strength in replacement hip and knee joints. In these cases, it is important how the metal integrates with living tissue and bone because load must be transferred from the metal to the bone. Titanium generally does exceedingly well and is used as the metal of choice in nearly all biomedical applications where high strength and impact resistance is important.

Titanium has a particular ability among the various metals that might otherwise be chosen in that it can integrate itself well with living bone. The recognition of this dates back to 1952, when Swedish Professor Per-Ingvar Brånemark conducted an experiment in which he studied blood flow in living rabbit bone. The bone was fixed in a roughly machined titanium holder. At the conclusion of the experiment, after many days, he found that the bone had integrated so completely with the titanium that removing it was impossible. He called this osseointegration and saw the possibilities for human use.

Figure 29 shows a photomicrograph of a titanium-bone interface. The close approximation of the titanium (black) to the tissue is an indicator of a close-metal-tissue integration. Osseointegration was first implemented in dentistry to fixate teeth. It is now also used for head and jaw reconstruction.




Figure 27. Photomicrograph of Titanium Metal (Appears Black in This Photo) in an Intimate Integration With Living Bone. The intersection of the two materials shows a thin barrier layer and then healthy tissue very close to the metal. It does not show inflammation or scar tissue formation.

Optimization of the bone integration with titanium has been much studied over the years. It has been found that if single cells can nestle into pores on the metal surface and then can reach out and attach to their neighbors, this forms a particularly good adhesive interface. This observation has led to new types of surface treatments for titanium to improve its ability to attach to bone. The need for a particular porosity size scale for optimal bone integration has only recently been recognized.

Sand blasting of the titanium surface has long been done, but, recently, plasma etching and pitting with the use of acids have been found effective. Some of the more recent (2008) innovations have been the use of lasers to create a surface modification by melting pits.

Another good approach is to coat metal implants with bioactive materials, such as hydroxyapatite (HA). HA has excellent biocompatibility, bioactivity, and bone-binding properties. It forms a bond with titania thin films on the surface of titanium implants and so prepares the surface for adhesion. Researchers recently determined that making this layer thick (about 1 micron) encourages cell proliferation and bonding.

Recent improvements in HA have included manufacturing it in the form of a spherical nanopowder that is more acceptable to tissues than are spicule forms of its natural occurrence. Using HA in the form of a nanopowder stimulates bone formation leading to a natural, as well as chemical, adhesion, much like glue.

Another recent discovery is that treating the titanium surface with a silane compound will create a surface chemistry that attracts certain biomaterials known as proteoglycans. From this point, it is possible to lay down layers of collagen on the surface from which connective tissues will form.

Titanium metal used for implants is usually a biomedical alloy, Ti-6Al-4V, since biomedical alloys provide good corrosion resistance and reasonable fatigue life and are much stiffer than cortical bone. The Ti-6Al-4V alloy is more suitable than is the Co-Cr alloy for coating with HA because it has less potential proximal stress shielding and bone resorption.

BIOMATERIALS IN DIALYSIS

Medical therapeutic dialysis, often called hemodialysis, is a method of removing uric acid and other waste products from blood, a necessity when the kidneys fail. It is also useful in removing exogenous poisons like ethanol, aspirin, barbiturates, and boric acid from the blood in cases of poisoning.

Hemodialysis accesses the blood stream through the use of two large needles—one in an artery and one in a vein—in order to flow a patient's blood through a series of hair-thin, hollow-membrane, tube-like fibers.

A dialyzer is composed of thousands of tube-like hollow fiber strands encased in a clear plastic cylinder several inches in diameter. Blood flows on the inside of the membrane fiber, and a dialysate (extraction stream) flows across the outside. Low-molecular-weight waste products pass out through the membrane, while blood cells and other large molecules in the blood are retained. Figure 30 shows an illustration (left) and photograph (right) of dialyzers used to treat kidney failure.




Figure 28. Illustration (Left) and Photograph (Right) of a Blood Dialyzer as Used in Medicine

Dialysis works on the principles of natural diffusion of metabolic waste products in the blood across a semipermeable membrane. Waste products in high concentration in the blood will diffuse across the membrane. The membrane allows the passage of certain-sized molecules across it but prevents the passage of other, larger molecules of the blood, thus helping to get rid of waste products. Figure 31 illustrates this idea. The blood cells are kept on the outside of the membrane (orange) while waste product solutes (violet and yellow dots) pass through.



Figure 29. Cuprophane Membrane Passes Blood Waste Products (Violet and Orange Dots) Through Pores and Blocks Passage of Red Blood Cells

Advances in bioengineering and in the technical aspects of dialysis machines have made hemodialysis a safe and effective procedure.

The design of dialyzers is primarily an exercise in biomaterial selection. Biomembrane materials play the critical role in cleansing the blood, but they must not damage the blood or provoke thrombus. The most common biomaterial used in dialyzers is a semipermeable membrane made of cellulose acetate trade-named Cuprophane™.

Dialyzer membranes come with different pore sizes. Nanotechnology is being used in some of the most recent high-flux membranes to create a uniform pore size. The goal of high-flux membranes is to pass relatively large molecules, such as beta-2-microglobulin (MW 11,600 daltons), but not albumin (MW ~ 66,400 daltons). Dialysis membrane materials are crucial to the practical performance of medical hemodialysis systems. These systems/materials support the survival of millions of people in kidney failure that undergo routine dialysis, usually for several hours during the day and three to four times a week.

Summary and Recommendations

The performance of biomaterials underlies the success of many medical devices that must be acceptable to body tissues. These materials often serve critical—perhaps life-and-death—functions and, so, require large amounts of money and time to rigorously test. This appears to be the reason the biomedical industry is slow to produce and accept new materials.

Existing materials for implants are generally based on materials that have been available for more than 20 years. Biodegradable materials, particularly the polylactide and glycolide, have a long history of safe and effective use. Building on this solid foundation, most of the innovation is occurring in devising new ways to embody the materials and apply them to new applications. Thus, the markets are expanding for biomaterials, and physicians can look forward to new products that will help speed patient recovery.

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Materials for Advanced Aerospace Platforms

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Materials for Advanced Aerospace Platforms

Introduction

"Advanced aerospace platforms" is a broad topic that can be divided into several narrower subtopics to enable a more concise discussion of materials advances, challenges, and opportunities. Consequently, this document discusses the areas of launch vehicles, space vehicles, and space propulsion systems separately because their key requirements are often application specific, which affects materials selection decisions. In addition, single-use and reusable boosters have different durability requirements that directly impinge on design and materials selection. Furthermore, current engineering practice has evolved to the point that design synthesis must integrate the structure and construction materials to achieve optimum product performance. For example, the space shuttle was designed to meet customer-imposed mission requirements (range, payload, empty weight, landing capability, and so forth) without significant real-time consideration of materials capability. This approach led to significant compromises at later stages in the shuttle's development and maturation. (Arguably, the shuttle could be designed as a more efficient vehicle today.) In the extreme, a spectacular engineering failure was the National Aerospace Plane (also dubbed the Orient Express), which was launched as a military project and was intended to be a mach 12 reusable strike vehicle. This project rapidly became materials limited and was canceled in 1993, after about \$750 million in federal R&D expenditures and a substantial private sector investment. The point is that any "clean sheet of paper design" must start with an assessment of the requirements for construction materials and be accompanied by a realistic assessment of the capability of currently available materials to meet these needs. If these two assessments indicate a gap between requirements and existing materials capability, a risk assessment and a risk-mitigation plan must be developed before expending engineering hours and funds.

Since the inception of manned space flight, the approach to design has changed to include the concept of damage tolerance. This shift in design philosophy was prompted by the (eventual) recognition that complex structures cannot be designed and produced with zero defects. With the maturation of fracture mechanics and means of reducing these concepts to practice, the transition from zero defects to defect tolerance became the norm. This new approach in turn led to recognition that high-performance materials required not only high specific strength and stiffness but pacing increases in strength with simultaneous improvements in fracture toughness and fatigue crack growth resistance. The introduction of damage tolerance was accompanied by a renewed emphasis on nondestructive inspection capabilities. This latter thrust was driven by the need to demonstrate the capability to reproducibly locate small flaws that could become failure initiation sites, either because of static or because of cyclic loading conditions. In the case of atmospheric flight, the U.S. Air Force has introduced standards for airframes (the Aircraft Structural Integrity Program) and propulsion systems (the Engine Structural Integrity Program) that tie structural life and reliability to

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this demonstrated inspections capability. Implementation of these standards, starting with the B-1 bomber and the F-100 and F-110 engines, has dramatically reduced (but not eliminated) the incidence of catastrophic failures of critical components that endanger crews, vehicles, or both.

Taking these changes into account, this document outlines the current situation regarding the design and production of high-performance structures for aerospace platforms, including launch vehicles, space vehicles, and propulsion systems for transporting space vehicles (and payloads) into orbit.

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Materials for Advanced Aerospace Platforms

LAUNCH VEHICLES

For the purposes of this document, launch vehicles are defined as the structure that supports and/or encloses the propulsion system, the fuel supply, and the crew or payload module. Launch vehicles today are either single use or multiple use after recovery and extensive refurbishment. This approach adds considerably to the cost of transporting a pound of payload into earth orbit, regardless of whether an unmanned satellite or a manned orbiting crew module that must withstand the temperatures and loads associated with safe reentry to earth. Furthermore, the larger the payloads are, the greater are the reaction forces the launch vehicle must withstand during launch. With the total weight of the payload, the empty weight of the launch vehicle, and fuel all needing to be lifted initially, fuel-efficient propulsion and lightweight launch vehicles are essential to maximizing the payload. Except in the area around the propulsion system exhaust, the temperatures experienced by launch vehicles during launch are not demanding. Therefore, advanced, high-strength aluminum (Al) alloys and polymer matrix carbon fiber composites (PMCs) are prime candidates for the parts of the structure that experience aerodynamic loads and where aerodynamic heating does not exceed about 125 °Celsius. One class of advanced Al alloys is the lithium (Li)-bearing alloys, such as Al alloy 2090. This alloy contains enough Li to reduce its density by 8 percent while increasing the elastic modulus (E) by 10 percent. Other, newer advanced Al alloys, such as 7050 and 2050, have been developed to have improved damage tolerance. These alloys have excellent specific strength at or near room temperature and experience no major loss of ductility at cryogenic temperatures. The newer variants of the 2000 and 7000 Al alloys also have substantially improved resistance to most types of corrosion, including exfoliation and stress corrosion cracking. This can be important in a reusable vehicle.

Perhaps the most important aspect of the improved Al alloys is their higher fracture toughness, accomplished through a combination of alloy composition control and improved processing. In alloy composition control, the concentrations of the residual elements iron (Fe), chromium (Cr), manganese (Mn), and silicon (Si) are reduced at the ingot stage. These elements combine with Al to form hard, brittle intermetallic compounds known as constituent phases. The advanced alloys contain fewer, smaller constituent phases, leading to improved fracture resistance and higher fracture toughness values. In applications such as body skins for commercial aircraft, this improved toughness has enabled an increase in the spacing of the circumferential fuselage frames, or "hat sections," that serve both as stiffeners and as crack stoppers to prevent a catastrophic failure during pressurization. For any given operating stress—in this case the pressurization stress—the spacing of the frames is directly related to the critical crack size of the body skin. Higher toughness alloys have larger critical crack sizes, and the frames can be spaced further apart without increasing the risk of catastrophic failure. The increased spacing ultimately allows a fuselage design that requires fewer frames. Consequently, the airplane benefits from a commensurate reduction both in weight and in manufacturing cost. Similar possibilities exist for the design of a fail-safe launch vehicle that has a lower empty weight. Clearly, the advanced Al alloys offer intrinsic improvements over the alloys used in the Saturn launch vehicle and introduce the prospect of new, more efficient launch vehicle designs.

The newer Al alloys also can be specially processed to render them superplastically formable. This capability opens a realm of possibilities to replace structures that, in the absence of this capability, are machined from thick plate. Very large structures are produced in sections that must be joined. Conventional fusion welding techniques do not work for high-strength Al alloys such as 7075, 7050, 2024, or 2050 because either the welds lead to cracks or the welds made under conditions that avoid cracking have greatly reduced tensile properties. Because these alloys are not amenable to welding, heavier, fatigue-prone mechanically fastened joints must be used. Recently, scientists developed a joining process that permits joining of Al alloys such as 7050. This process, called friction stir welding (FSW), allows joint designs in a variety of configurations that were not considered possible when fusion welding was the only alternative.

In FSW, a rotating steel tool is inserted into the seam between the two Al alloy pieces to be joined. As the rotating tool is driven forward, the friction between the tool and the work piece generates enough heat to soften the Al alloy without melting it. A schematic of this process is shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Schematic Diagram of Friction Stir Welding

The combined action of the rotation and the traversing of the tool essentially kneads the two pieces together, leaving a mechanically sound joint. Although the weld properties may be somewhat inferior to those of the base metal, they are good enough that a relatively small increase in thickness at the joint position can compensate. Although substantial development of the FSW process is ongoing, FSW already has been put into practice. For example, the current external propellant tank on the space shuttle is made from an Al-Li alloy fabricated through FSW. The weight advantage of using welded as opposed to bolted joints in a large structure such as a launch vehicle is considerable. With earlier high-strength alloys such as 7075, concerns about fracture toughness in conjunction with monolithic structures would have caused a welded

construction to be considered too risky. Today, the combination of higher toughness alloys and FSW opens up the possibility of greater design flexibility resulting in lighter large structures with equal or greater reliability than earlier ones.

In sum, metallic, nonreusable (at least nominally so) launch vehicles made from advanced Al alloys and fabricated through FSW constitute an incremental but significant improvement over earlier versions.

In recent years, PMCs have matured significantly. For many components that are not exposed to elevated temperatures, PMCs provide a degree of design flexibility not readily available in metals. Consequently, PMC materials have begun to supplant Al alloys in the construction of commercial subsonic aircraft. The use of PMCs in the empennage of the Boeing 777 was one of the first examples of Al alloys being displaced. Subsequently, the new Boeing 787 has more structure made from composites than from metallic materials. Once PMCs are introduced into a structure in significant quantities, a constraint related to galvanic incompatibility between the PMC structure and any adjoining Al alloys also is introduced. When a PMC structure is in direct contact with an Al alloy structure, catastrophic corrosion of the Al alloy components can occur. In the Boeing 787, the remedy for this concern is the use of titanium (Ti) alloys in areas where there is direct contact between the metallic and the PMC structures. This is directly analogous to the plastic bushing a plumber puts in the joint between copper and iron piping. Notwithstanding this constraint, the specific strength and stiffness of PMC structures make a compelling argument for their application in high-performance structures, such as launch vehicles.

Composite structures can be manufactured using one of three methods: hand layup of pre-preg, automated tow placement, and resin transfer molding.

- The most rudimentary of these, but also the most flexible, is hand layup of pre-preg. This method uses sheets of material that contain both the fiber and the polymeric matrix (called pre-preg). The polymeric matrix can be either a thermoset (for example, epoxy) or a thermoplastic. Individual plies are cut from the pre-preg typically using a numerically controlled laser or mechanical cutting device and are laid up to form the desired shape. Areas that have heavier loads contain more plies locally, and the plies are cut in an orientation with respect to the fiber direction in the pre-preg to achieve the desired strength relative to the principal load path. These plies are carefully placed according to a drawing (blueprint), making hand layup a labor-intensive process and, therefore, making parts made using this method expensive. During ply placement, it is critical that no ply wrinkles are introduced, as these create severe reductions in the local load-bearing capability of the final component. Once all the plies are in their proper places, the article is placed in a vacuum-tight bag that is evacuated and placed in an autoclave for curing of the epoxy matrix or fusing of the thermoplastic. A disadvantage of a pre-preg whose matrix is a thermoset is limited shelf life. In practice, this is managed to a degree by storing the pre-preg in a freezer to slow the rate of chemical reaction that sets the epoxy. However, this does not completely halt the reaction, causing these materials to have a shelf life beyond which they are not easily manipulated during layup and do not develop full strength after curing in the autoclave. An additional issue is out time—the time the pre-preg can be out of the freezer during layup before the reaction proceeds at an accelerated rate and reaches a point at which the

material is not suitable for the reasons stated earlier. Clearly, the time required for layup places practical limitations on component size.

- In automated tow placement, thin ribbons of a pre-preg are fed off a drum or rolled into a computer numerically controlled machine that places them in the desired position. In principle, this process trades recurring labor cost for up-front capital investment (the tow placement machine) and programming time. If the anticipated volume of identical parts is high enough to amortize the capital investment and, particularly, the programming cost, this can be an attractive means of reducing manufacturing costs. For axisymmetric shapes, such as cylinders, this essentially becomes a winding process and is quite efficient. An example of a finished composite fuselage barrel section for the Boeing 787 is shown in Figure 2. For more irregular three-dimensional shapes, such as a spar or a strut, placing the tows becomes much more difficult and presents a fundamental limitation. Consequently, PMC structures with complex shapes are still for the most part made using the hand layup process. A variant of automated tow placement is compression, whereby a preform, made by automated tow placement, is forced by a press into a preshaped die. This process allows fabrication of more complex shapes, but the rigidity of the fiber and the extreme anisotropy of the tows can lead to wrinkles, which are not acceptable because of the reductions in properties these cause.




Figure 2. Specially Modified 747 Transporter Unloading a Boeing 787 Composite Fuselage Barrel Section

- The third main composite fabrication method, resin transfer molding (RTM), begins with a woven fiber mat or preform. The polymeric matrix is injected into this mat to create a fully dense composite. The major benefit of RTM is that it permits use of a three-dimensional weave that minimizes the risk of delamination between plies. Note that, with the other two methods, the material is reinforced in only two dimensions (the plane of the pre-preg or tows). RTM's limitations include the viscosity of the resins used. If the resin is too viscous, injecting it will either distort the fiber architecture of the woven preform or not fully penetrate the preform,

leaving voids. This limitation makes it difficult to use many thermoplastic resins that are otherwise attractive because they are recyclable and have much longer shelf lives than thermosets (epoxies). Another, more obvious limitation of RTM is component size. This is in part because weaving of very large fiber preforms is challenging and requires a very large weaving machine. It also requires a large injection machine capable of multiple injection sites to ensure the complete infiltration necessary to avoid formation of voids.

In practice, there are several significant challenges associated with manufacturing large PMC structures today. Among these, perhaps the most significant are manufacturing cost and the difficulty associated with making large, nonaxisymmetric components. Large axisymmetric components that can be produced by winding tows of pre-preg are clearly possible today, as demonstrated by the Boeing 787 fuselage whose section is shown in Figure 2. For other shapes, because the load-bearing capability of PMCs depends on the transfer of externally imposed loads to the strong, stiff fibers, joints that intersect the principal load path become problematic. This is because the fibers and, as a direct consequence, the load path are discontinuous, requiring local section size adjustments to offset this local structural inefficiency. Thus, achieving the most structurally efficient use of PMCs requires monolithic structures with continuous fibers. In large structures, this is at best a challenge. Even in the Boeing 787's PMC fuselage, mechanically fastened joints are used to connect adjacent barrel sections. In the fuselage, as in any cylindrical pressure vessel, the principal stresses are hoop stresses stemming from pressurization during flight. However, the compromise in structural efficiency is minimized by the circumferential orientation of the joints. Although these bolted joints add weight, the overall structural efficiency of the PMC structure is still better, albeit considerably more expensive, than a longitudinally and circumferentially stiffened Al structure. The circumferential joints also create discontinuous longitudinal crack paths that improve the structure's damage tolerance. Some of the added expense of the PMC fuselage stems from the use of Ti alloy fasteners because of the galvanic coupling issues that would accompany Al or steel fasteners.

For other applications, which are limited by different material properties, the PMC system can be tailored to optimize structural performance. This is possible because both the matrix and the fiber can be independently selected. Moreover, the fiber "architecture" (fiber orientation, weave geometry, and fiber volume fraction) can be varied spatially to optimize load-bearing capability under complex stress states. For example, again drawing on recent applications in commercial aircraft, the fan blades of the large, high-bypass-ratio turbofan engine (GE90) produced by General Electric for the Boeing 777 are made from PMCs. The limiting design consideration for these fan blades is resistance to bird strikes. To optimize the PMCs' impact resistance, a medium-modulus, high-tensile-strength carbon fiber was selected in combination with a thermoplastic toughened epoxy matrix. Furthermore, the fiber architecture was set to optimize the bending strength under the impact of a bird. The GE90 fan blades are produced by hand layup and are quite costly to produce. In the 10-plus years that these fan blades have been in service, not a single unscheduled engine removal related to the PMC fan blades has occurred. The competitive fan blade technology for B-777-class engines is hollow Ti, which is used by both Pratt & Whitney and Rolls Royce. By all informal accounts, these blades are cost intensive. This example supports the unwritten rule that the pathways leading to high-performance, high-value structures typically are

not technology dependent but are cost intensive, no matter what technology is employed to meet the requirements.

An additional characteristic of PMC structures—one related to the laminated construction of components made by hand layup or automated tow placement methods—is their susceptibility to formation of delaminations when impacted perpendicular to the plane of the plies. This is due to the mismatch in bending stiffness between adjacent plies that have different unidirectional fiber orientations. This mismatch causes shear stresses to develop that can exceed the shear strength of the interlaminar bonds, causing small, embedded cracks to form. Under subsequent inplane compression loading, the laminates bow because of the Poisson stresses and separate because of the lack of an interlaminar bond to hold them together. In significant compression loads, the laminates buckle, and this leads to structural failure. This phenomenon, called compression after impact, is an insidious failure mode because the delaminations are not externally detectable unless ultrasonic inspection methods are used. Sources of such an impact include dropped tools, foreign objects (for example, meteorites), and, perhaps most commonly, hail storms. Ultrasonic inspection, if required, is expensive and time consuming. The latter concern in turn affects vehicle availability and turnaround time. PMC parts made using RTM typically have reinforcing fibers in the through-thickness direction, so concerns about compression after impact are minimal.

The maximum temperature at which PMCs can be used is limited by PMCs' susceptibility to oxygen degradation of the polymeric matrix. The maximum-use temperature for prolonged exposure is determined by the thermal oxidative stability (TOS) of a particular resin. The TOS, like any chemical reaction, is determined by both time and temperature. The glass transition temperature (T_g) of the polymeric matrix also imposes strength and dimensional stability limitations independent of the TOS limits. This is particularly true for thermoplastics. However, the TOS limits usually impose lower temperature limits than T_g if prolonged thermal exposure is contemplated. Three distinct classes or groups of resins exist, each with a successively higher temperature capability. These are conventional epoxies and most thermal plastics, bismaleimides (BMIs), and linear polyimides. The first class is limited by TOS to about 125° Celsius. BMIs can be used to about 175° Celsius. Linear polyimides, such as the in situ polymerization of monomer reactants (PMR) group of thermosetting formulations, can be used to about 300° Celsius. Many of the PMR resins contain the hazardous compound *methylenedianiline*, which requires special care during use, including protective clothing to limit personnel exposure (for example, during ply cutting and hand layup). This requirement reduces productivity, adds cost, and creates a degree of liability concern for the manufacturer of the PMC components. For RTM, the BMIs and PMR resins typically have higher viscosity and require commensurately higher injection temperatures to reduce the viscosity to manageable levels for reasons discussed earlier. New resins are constantly being developed, including some with attractive properties. However, many of the sources of these resins are startup companies that exist on R&D funding, often in the form of U.S. government SBIR (Small Business Innovative Research) projects. Such companies are good at innovation but often have limited experience transitioning new products from the laboratory to large-scale production. Furthermore, in the current economic climate, access to sufficient capital to set up production-scale capacity can be a formidable problem for a small company. Larger companies (for example, BASF, DuPont, GE Plastics) typically are not interested

in materials with small annual sales volume, so even licensing the new material to one of these companies may not be commercially feasible.

This foregoing discussion highlights a commonly encountered inconsistency between technical innovation and commercial progress. Until a production-scale source exists, pricing of new materials is at best highly uncertain and potentially unstable over time. This is in part due to the uncertainty surrounding demand and the associated volume of material that will be required. Taken together, these factors act as a clear deterrent to the adoption of new materials of literally all classes (polymers, metals, and ceramics).

For heavily loaded structures or structures that will experience temperatures higher than about 200 °Celsius, Ti alloys are the preferred material class. Ti alloys are about half as dense as steel or Ni-base alloys and possess a density-corrected strength and stiffness competitive with that of other metallic materials. Numerous grades of Ti alloys are in use today, and a strong domestic industrial base of suppliers exists for nearly all these grades. Ti alloys for structural applications can be divided into three groups based on their metallurgy: near α alloys, $\alpha+\beta$ alloys, and metastable β alloys (commonly called β alloys for short). Both the aircraft and propulsion original equipment manufacturers and several private engineering firms have extensive design experience with Ti alloys. Although most of this experience is with Ti-6Al-4V (Ti-6-4), other alloys also are widely used, particularly in jet engines and liquid-fueled rocket engines. The alloy most likely to be used in a launch vehicle, Ti-6-4, has been available and in use for more than 40 years but is still highly competitive with newer grades in large part because of its versatility. Potential applications of other alloys that have particularly attractive characteristics, such as a higher temperature capability, are discussed in the Reusable Reentry Vehicle and Propulsion Systems sections of this document.

The most commonly used structural grade of Ti alloy today, Ti-6-4, can be readily fusion welded, formed both by forging and as a sheet product, and conventionally machined, although each of these operations requires special precautions. In addition, the feasibility of friction stir welding has been demonstrated. Ti-6-4 also can be superplastically formed and diffusion bonded, enabling synthesis of innovatively shaped components. For launch vehicles, the most likely application for Ti alloys is in the structure that carries the reactions from the propulsion system to the vehicle itself. These applications typically involve heavy sections to accommodate the large loads, and the main property requirements are high strength, fatigue resistance, and fracture toughness. Ti alloys have been used in both military and commercial aircraft. Heavily loaded components in service today include the wing box of the B-1B bomber (Ti-6-4), the landing gear beam in the B-747 (Ti-6-4), and the landing gear truck beam in the B-777 (higher strength Ti-10V-2Fe-3Al [Ti-10-2-3]). The choice of Ti-10-2-3 for the landing gear truck beam reflects the time-based maturation of the newer β -Ti alloys, such as Ti-10-2-3. These alloys have the advantage of being "deep hardenable"—compared with Ti-6-4, they can develop full strength in thicker sections during heat treatment. For example, that the B-777's truck beam is up to 6 inches thick in some locations factored significantly in the choice of Ti-10-2-3. Because Ti alloys are about half as dense as steel, they are very competitive on a density-corrected basis. However, mass is not the only driver for some applications; the volume of a component also must be compatible with the space available for it. This factor also is a consideration in the choice of Ti-10-2-3 for the B-777 truck beam. And it also applies to an application such as landing gear, because it is retracted into the fuselage for aerodynamic reasons.

β -Ti alloys would be an attractive option for a launch vehicle with a very heavy payload. These alloys can be processed and heat-treated to ultimate tensile strengths greater than 1,300 mega-Pascals (MPa), making them very efficient structural alloys. However, at these strength levels, the fracture toughness is decreased to about 40 MPa-m^{0.5}, making damage tolerance marginal. For example, using a design stress that is two-thirds that of ultimate tensile strength, the critical crack size for an alloy with these properties is about 4 millimeters. Such a small critical crack size poses a challenge to any required field inspections associated with reusability requirements. β -Ti alloys' stiffness also is as much as 10 percent lower than that of α + β alloys. Ten percent lower stiffness generally is not an issue in a tension-loaded structure, but it can be an issue for a compression-loaded structure because of the potential for buckling. Designs with a higher section modulus can eliminate this concern, but the additional shape complexity will almost certainly add cost. In extreme circumstances, Ti alloys can be reinforced with ceramic fibers (typically silicon carbide) to increase their intrinsic stiffness, as will be discussed later.

Ti alloys are reactive when exposed to air at temperatures of 550 °Celsius or above. Consequently, any manufacturing operations that exceed this temperature limit must be performed in a protective atmosphere of argon (Ar) or helium (He) gas. An exception occurs during forging if enough excess material is left on the raw forging to contain the oxygen-contaminated layer so it can be machined away during the final machining of the finished component. How to deal with this reactivity issue is well understood, and it poses no concern other than the additional costs associated with the excess material and additional machining. In other operations, such as welding, use of specially designed fixtures incorporating inert shielding gas also effectively eliminates concerns about oxygen contamination. In hot-forming applications, the as-formed part is typically chemically milled to remove the oxygen-rich surface layer because this layer typically has lower ductility and can cause fatigue cracking in service. The practice of eliminating all oxygen-contaminated material has served the aerospace industry well over the years but is quite conservative and restrictive. This matter is discussed in greater detail in the Reusable Reentry Vehicle section of this document.

In summary, although the choices of materials for launch vehicles are in principle numerous, in practice these choices are reduced by a variety of application-specific considerations that include manufacturing capability for large components and manufacturing cost. The foregoing discussion has attempted to examine the prospects for advanced Al alloys, PMCs, and Ti alloys in light of these perceived practical constraints. On a case-by-case basis, a variety of requirements are imposed by design constraints, which some materials meet more readily than others. In all cases, discussion of available material options was constrained by the assumption that the maximum service temperatures would be relatively low. Consequently, the material classes discussed here are all intended for relatively low-temperature use. The separate case of a reusable single-stage-to-orbit vehicle, where operating temperature requirements are considerably higher, is discussed in a later section of this document. Ultimately, materials are selected to optimize structural performance, and a coordinated approach of materials selection and geometric design is essential to this. Going forward, a design using a synthesis process that treats form, fit, function, and materials capability as equal constraints is needed to achieve true optimum structural efficiency.

REUSABLE CREW MODULES

The concept of manned orbital crew modules has evolved from the Mercury capsules to the Gemini and Apollo programs to the space shuttle, the first fully reusable crew module. The shuttle also has a combined payload bay used for transporting satellites into orbit and hardware for developing the International Space Station and for repairing and refurbishing the Hubble telescope, among other uses. The reusable nature of the shuttle crew module introduced a number of design and materials selection challenges. Perhaps foremost among these is the requirement for a thermal protection system (TPS) that would protect the crew during reentry and also minimize the intermission refurbishment requirements of the spacecraft itself. During the early days of the shuttle development program, there was much initial interest in a metallic TPS because it appeared to better meet the program's needs. Ultimately, however, ceramic tiles were used on the underbody and carbon-carbon composites (C-CCs) were used on the leading edges of the wings. The shuttle design itself can therefore be characterized as a "cold structure" with an insulating TPS. For example, much of the shuttle load-bearing structure is made of the Al alloy 2219, in part because it is fusion weldable and in part because it retains its strength at moderately elevated temperatures better than other high-strength Al alloys can. The refurbishment needs of the ceramic shuttle tiles after each flight reputedly are considerable and increase with vehicle age. The C-CC wing leading edges are basically not repairable but require scrutiny. Hindsight shows that C-CCs "age" and lose much of their fracture toughness during repeated thermal exposure. (This loss of toughness was a prime factor in the Columbia disaster. Had a metallic heat shield that included the wing leading edges been used, this disaster arguably could have been avoided.) If the discussion of a metallic TPS were held today, the outcome might not be much different. Certainly any serious consideration of a reusable single-stage-to-orbit vehicle today would need to reopen the discussion of a metallic TPS. The challenges and opportunities associated with a metallic TPS are discussed later.

The design efficiency of an integrated TPS and load-bearing structure is extremely attractive. Such a design requires availability of high-temperature alloys that also have good strength at the moderate temperatures to withstand the aerodynamic and vibrational loads encountered during launch and orbital insertion. Any attractive alloy also must have reasonable intrinsic resistance to oxidation at the reentry temperatures and should be capable of being fabricated into sheet gauges at reasonable cost. Meeting these various requirements in combination becomes quite daunting. Earlier programs such as the DynaSoar reusable reentry glider devoted considerable time and resources to examining the use of refractory alloys such as Mo-0.5%Ti (Moly half Ti) and several Columbia-based alloys for the TPS and some hot structure. All the refractory metal alloys are solid solution strengthened and, consequently, have relatively low ambient temperature strengths. They also are quite dense, making the density-corrected strength even less attractive. Refractory metals and their alloys react extensively when exposed to air at elevated temperatures. Therefore, even if the mechanical property limitations could be overcome, any hot structure would require an oxidation-resistant protective coating. In the case of the DynaSoar program, scientists extensively investigated a surface conversion coating of MoSi₂ formed by reacting the Moly half-Ti alloy with Si powder in a high-temperature fluidized bed. With the benefit of hindsight, it is now unclear how a large structure could have been successfully coated in this manner. This is particularly true when the brittle nature of MoSi₂ is

considered in light of the thermal stresses that were certain to develop in a large structure placed in the fluidized bed.

Reusable Single-Stage-to-Orbit Vehicles

A reusable single-stage-to-orbit (SSO) vehicle will require metallic materials for the TPS and for much of the other hot structure. This will be challenging from the standpoint of an empty vehicle weight. With the exception of military applications, which are outside the scope of this document, empty vehicle weight is a critical metric because every additional pound of empty weight reduces the payload by the same amount (assuming a fixed propulsion capability). As mentioned earlier, the key to a lightweight vehicle is the use of design methods that integrate the TPS and the load-bearing structure to minimize structural redundancy and single-function structure (for example, a TPS that is not load bearing). Achieving this goal will require new design paradigms that incorporate true synthesis of new structural concepts. In reality, such designs can be completed only if they are based on a detailed set of mission requirements, including the number of missions and expectations for turnaround time between missions. Furthermore, operational parameters such as the value of inserting a pound of payload into orbit are needed to bound the cost of the initial vehicle and the maintenance cost per mission (translated into cost per pound of payload). Absent such specific data, the following discusses possibilities for materials systems that can enable a reusable SSO vehicle. It is perhaps more efficient to discuss these materials according to their principal capability and the anticipated temperature regime in which they can be used most productively. This categorization method is illustrated in Table 1.

Table 1. Potential Materials by Use Temperature Regime and Property

Temperature Regime	Specific Strength	Specific Stiffness	Fatigue Resistance	Fracture Toughness	Creep Resistance
Ambient up to 250 °C	PMCs; Advanced Al alloys; AMCs*; Ti alloys; TMCs*	PMCs; AMCs; TMCs	PMCs; AMCs; Ti Alloys; TMCs	PMCs; Ti alloys	Ti alloys; TMCs
250 °C up to 550 °C	Ti alloys; TMCs	TMCs	Ti alloys; TMCs	Ti alloys	Ti alloys; TMCs
Above 550 °C	Ni-base alloys; Ti aluminides; Refractory metal alloys; CMCs*; C-C Cs*	Ti aluminides; CMCs; C-CCs	Ni-base alloys; Refractory metal alloys	Ni-base alloys; CMCs; Refractory metal alloys	Ni-base alloys; Ti aluminides; CMCs; Refractory metal alloys; C-C Cs

AMCs = Al matrix composites; TMCs = titanium matrix composites; CMCs = ceramic matrix composites; C-CCs = carbon-carbon composites

Table 1 shows there are essentially 10 distinct classes of candidate materials for use in a reusable SSO vehicle. Their usefulness for specific applications and components depends on the operating temperature regime and the design-limiting material property. Some background and characteristics of each of these materials are described in this section. Applications of some of these materials have already been addressed, so the discussion here is limited to applications for a reusable SSO vehicle.

Advanced Al Alloys

This class of materials is limited by its temperature capability because, even if used in an embedded structure, the thermal soakback from the hot external structure can lead to softening in real time or overaging during extended exposure (that is, after several missions). Scientists have worked to develop high-temperature powder-metallurgy Al alloys, mainly alloys containing Fe, cobalt (Co) and cesium (Ce) or Mn and Si. These alloys are not routinely produced today owing to a lack of demand stemming in part from their cost and their relative lack of maturity as judged by the high variability in mechanical properties between lots of material. Consequently, the main application for Al alloys is in the crew compartment itself, where temperatures must be maintained at levels that are tolerable for the human occupants. Al alloys have marginal stiffness, even on a density-corrected basis. However, using fabricated panels with Al face sheets and a lightweight core can minimize this limitation. Such panels have a high section modulus, which increases the structural stiffness without adding much weight. Earlier uses of phenolic honeycomb cores experienced only limited success because of the tendency of the core to absorb water from the environment if a breach of the face sheet or the face sheet core bond occurred. Today, Al phenolic honeycomb sandwich construction is unpopular among aircraft and spacecraft designers because of this earlier, unfavorable experience. However, a new possibility for lightweight stiff structures—Al face sheets with a foamed Al alloy core—is worthy of consideration. Considerable progress in making uniform-density Al and other metallic foams has been realized in the past 10 years. This new class of sandwich materials is sufficiently different from the earlier versions to merit a careful evaluation.

Polymer Matrix Composites

As described in the Launch Vehicle section, polymer matrix composites have excellent strength, stiffness, fatigue resistance, and fracture toughness. All polymeric materials are to some degree susceptible to degradation when exposed to ultraviolet (UV) radiation. For an orbiting vehicle, a major limitation is the effects of UV radiation on the polymer matrix. Given their limited time at altitude, this vulnerability is not an issue for launch vehicles; however, it is a concern for structures that remain in orbit for an extended time at altitudes where the UV intensity is much greater. Although there are coatings that protect substrates (PMCs in this case) from UV radiation, the risk of these coatings being breached and the uncertainty about their effectiveness in orbit make UV exposure an ongoing concern. Any consideration of using PMCs for exterior applications would need to include an evaluation of their effectiveness. As discussed for Al alloys, PMCs also could be considered for interior applications where temperatures are within the material capabilities. As discussed earlier, some polyimide resins are usable up to about 300 °Celsius; therefore, the low density and excellent specific stiffness of PMCs make them viable candidates for some components. As also discussed, some polyimides, such as PMR-15, contain *methylenedianiline*, and care must be taken to

ensure that any outgassing that occurs in space would not liberate any of this toxic material—at least not where it could be ingested by the crew.

Al Matrix Composites

Al matrix composites (AMCs) are typically made by mixing short fibers or even particulate silicon carbide (SiC) with Al alloy powder and hot-pressing or mechanically consolidating the mixture by extrusion or forging. AMCs have higher modulus and strength but suffer ductility losses owing to the hard, nondeforming SiC second phase. They also are much better in fatigue because the SiC particles or short fibers mitigate the effects of planar slip in precipitation-hardening alloy matrices. Machining, fusion-welding, or cold-forming AMCs is difficult. Mechanical fastening is possible, but drilling fastener holes is difficult and expensive because the wear caused by the hard, reinforcing phases shortens tool life.

Most of the AMCs produced to date have used relatively simple Al matrix alloys such as 6061 and 5083. This presumably is because of the conventional wisdom that AMCs are not heat treatable and the perception that no benefit is gained by using more complex alloy matrices. This is probably the case for a conventional solution treat-and-age approach. Consequently, there has been little effort to optimize AMC systems. For the right application where AMCs could provide a significant benefit, this could present an opportunity. For example, using the high-temperature Al-Fe-Co-Ce alloy powder as the matrix could prove interesting and might permit use of AMCs at up to 200 °Celsius—a temperature at which Ti alloys do not provide any significant advantage, but one that is too high for conventional Al alloys to be suitable.

In sum, while AMCs are not really a commercial materials system today, sufficient research has been performed to establish proof of concept. If an adequate market for AMCs were to emerge, the time and cost to make them commercially available could prove acceptable.

Ti Alloys

Ti alloys also have been discussed earlier, but mainly in the context of heavy-section, large-load-bearing applications for launch vehicles. Here, the potential of Ti alloys for lighter gauge applications in the warm structure and the TPS is considered. Table 1 shows that at intermediate temperatures, Ti alloys are attractive in all aspects except for specific stiffness. What this table does not capture is Ti alloys' propensity to react with oxygen in the air to form an oxygen-stabilized α phase layer on the surface known as α case. An example of α case is shown in Figure 3.




Figure 3. Micrograph Showing α Phase Formation at the Surface of a Ti Alloy That has Been Exposed to Air at Elevated Temperature

The α case is harder than the matrix because oxygen is a potent α -phase solid-solution strengthener. As with almost all other strengthening reactions, the increased strength is accompanied by reduced ductility. Again, drawing on conventional wisdom, the presence of α case in sheet structures has been forbidden by specification, design practice, or whatever means a company uses to manage its hardware. Less clear is how truly detrimental α case is to properties. Essentially no effort has been made to determine whether it can be tolerated if the affected hardware is allowed to operate at a modestly reduced stress. The industry standard for α case has essentially been one of zero tolerance. Given the significant potential weight advantage associated with use of Ti alloys in portions of the TPS and warm structure, this conservative approach needs to be revisited. Several key questions related to this are:

- Is α case truly detrimental to the load-bearing capability of Ti alloy sheet structures?
- If so, is there a limiting amount that can be tolerated without significantly degrading the structural capability?
- Which properties are the most severely degraded?
- Are α case formation and property degradation alloy dependent?
- If so, which alloys are the most tolerant of α case formation?

- Once α case is present, can the structure be repaired (for example, by fusion or friction stir welding)?

The Air Force Materials and Manufacturing Directorate is starting a new project intended to address these questions. The motivation for this program is hypersonic flight vehicles. The results from this U.S. Air Force program should prove highly useful to the design of future reusable SSO vehicles.

Earlier uses of Ti alloys at high temperatures included the skin and much of the load-bearing structure of the SR-71 Blackbird. This airplane flew successfully at peak speeds in excess of mach 3.2 for 34 years (1964-1998). While the maximum skin temperatures are not readily available, they were in excess of 300 °Celsius. There were no known issues involving α case during the SR-71's service. Notably, the primary alloy used for the SR-71 was one of the original β -Ti alloys, B-120 VCA, the composition of which is Ti-13V-11Cr-3Al. The primary reason for choosing this alloy was that it is much easier than any of the $\alpha+\beta$ Ti alloys are to roll into sheet gauges. Today there are newer β -Ti sheet alloys featuring a better balance of properties that could be used in the same way as B-120 VCA. The most common of these is Ti-15V-3Cr-3Sn-3Al. However, the successful use of B-120 VCA raises the question of whether β -Ti alloys are more resistant than $\alpha+\beta$ alloys such as Ti-6-4 are to α case formation.

The attraction to using Ti alloys, in addition to their structural efficiency, is the extensive industrial base for making the material in a variety of product forms and the extensive knowledge base resulting from the many successful applications of Ti alloys in high-performance products. For example, the ability to superplastically form Ti alloys such as Ti-6-4 creates the opportunity for design of a structure that functions both as load bearing and as thermal protection.

Ti Matrix Composites

As Table 1 showed, Ti alloys are not especially attractive for their specific stiffness. One way to overcome this limitation is to reinforce a Ti alloy matrix with SiC fibers. In this case, the fibers are "long" fibers—they have sufficient length for the matrix to transfer the maximum possible fraction of the external load to the fiber. The fibers are essentially monofilaments and must be carefully placed so adjacent fibers do not touch one another. Areas of contact between fibers essentially are incipient cracks that degrade the mechanical strength. As Table 2 shows, TMCs have excellent properties.

Table 2. Example of Properties of Ti Matrix Composites

Property	Property Value (English / Metric Units)
Ultimate tensile strength	276 ksi / 1902 MPa
Young's modulus	32.8 msi / 226 GPa
Strain to fracture	0.95%
Density	0.16 lb/in ³ / 4.43 g/cm ³
Fiber Volume fraction	0.39

Figure 4 shows an example of a TI matrix composite (TMC) cross section.




Figure 4. Cross-Section Micrograph of a TI Matrix Composite. Small, dark centers of fibers are C monofilament substrates for deposition of SiC (light micrograph). Material system: Matrix alloy - Ti-6242; Fiber - SiC about 5.6-mil-diameter SCS-6

Table 2 shows that the strength and stiffness properties of TMCs can exceed those of the Ti matrix (or other $\alpha+\beta$ Ti alloys) by more than a factor of two with no increase in density. So why are TMCs not in widespread use? The foremost reason is cost. Another reason is the availability of SiC fiber for TMCs.

- During the 1990s, when the U.S. government (mainly DoD) was interested in and provided development money for TMC R&D, the most attractive reinforcing fiber was SCS-6™, which was produced exclusively by Textron Specialty Materials (TSM) in Lowell, MA.

- Unfortunately (at least in hindsight), TSM made a business decision not to sell fiber and to instead forward-integrate and sell TMC components or finished TMC mill products. This decision stemmed in part from TSM's negative business experience with development of B-based fiber (Boro-SiC™) for first-generation TMCs.

- Prior to making this business decision, TSM did not develop sufficient TMC-manufacturing expertise to properly position itself as a producer of TMC products with consistent properties.

- A couple of costly and highly visible TMC component test failures using TSM materials called into question the viability of TMCs. In truth, the real issue was one of quality and not the fundamental viability of the TMC material concept.
- These failures led to extreme caution by the government, which promptly imposed stringent quality requirements on TSM. Consequently, TSM became a serious bottleneck for availability of TMCs with acceptable quality. As a result, numerous large, government-funded R&D programs fell behind schedule to the point that some were canceled and others were abandoned.
- Other, less attractive SiC fibers were being developed during this period, including Nicalon in Japan and Sigma in the United Kingdom. Because SiC fiber and TMCs were deemed strategic materials and neither of these alternate fibers was produced in the United States, there was reluctance to experiment with them, and the U.S. government occasionally prohibited their use in federally funded R&D programs.
- The issue of fiber availability became a major distraction from the real business at hand—that is, improving the consistency and reducing the cost of the TMC product.
- In the end, TSM partially relented, but by then such limited interest in TMCs existed that the original opportunity was lost. Furthermore, there still was no concrete evidence that TMCs could be produced with sufficiently consistent properties that they could be considered an engineering material (at any cost).
- In the mid-1990s, a cost study that assumed fiber availability showed that TMCs that meet specification properties could be manufactured for about \$500/lb (in 1995 \$) if the use volume was about 10,000 lb/year. Finding enough low-risk, high-value applications to consume this quantity of TMCs was not deemed possible.
- Consequently, work on TMCs halted after an investment of about \$500 million of U.S. government funds and a (presumably) comparable, but less well known private sector (mostly independent R&D \$) investment.
- One lesson from this is that a credible market and cost study should be undertaken before embarking on a major R&D program to develop revolutionary materials such as TMCs.

The foregoing discussion exemplifies the challenges associated with developing and commercializing a revolutionary new materials system. New material concepts originating from nonproduction sources such as national laboratories or research universities should be approached with caution and never be put on the critical path of product design. Even if a new material is vetted through an established production source, the timing of full commercialization should be carefully examined.

Ni-base Alloys

Ni-base alloys have been considered real engineering materials for at least 40 years. Because of their relatively low rate of strength loss with increasing temperature, Ni-base alloys are also called "superalloys." They are commonly used at temperatures well in excess of half of their melting point (T_m), which is the accepted useful limit for most structural metallic materials. There is no other class of structural alloys for which this is true. Ni-base alloys have been used in turbine engines of all types almost since their

inception. In fact, Ni-base alloys are a prime enabler of the modern gas turbine engine. As a result, this class of materials has a well-established industrial base for the production of literally all product forms. There is a second class of Ni-base alloys that has excellent resistance to attack in aggressive environments, such as those encountered in petroleum recovery, but these alloys are not of interest for high-temperature applications. To avoid any confusion, the term Ni-base alloys is used in this document to mean *high-temperature* Ni-base alloys.

Ni-base alloys have a high elevated temperature strength because they typically contain Al and Ti, which enable them to be precipitation strengthened. The alloys with the highest temperature capability are strengthened by precipitates of Ni₃Al (called γ'), which have a positive temperature coefficient of strength up to about 1,000 °Celsius. This unusual characteristic accounts for Ni-base alloys' elevated temperature capability. In combination with the ordinary temperature dependence of the matrix strength, the overall temperature dependence is quite low compared with that of any other class of structural alloys. Ni-base alloys also contain alloying additions of refractory elements such as tungsten (W), tantalum (Ta), and niobium (Nb). These additions also improve the elevated temperature strength because they diffuse slowly and strengthen the matrix. Because Ni-base alloys are used at elevated temperatures, they contain Cr additions in significant concentrations to improve their oxidation resistance. The tailoring of the properties of Ni-base alloys has been studied extensively and is quite well understood empirically, albeit less so in a fundamental sense. Current-generation Ni-base alloys contain as many as 10 alloying additions, and interelement interactions make gaining a fundamental understanding of alloying effects a major challenge.

Production of Ni-base alloys has evolved over several decades. Both ingot metallurgy and powder metallurgy methods are used to produce a full range of mill products. New alloys have periodically been introduced in response to specialized needs. Sometimes these alloy development efforts have been so focused on the "specialized need" that retention of other generally accepted Ni-base alloy properties has been overlooked. An example of this is the development of early "low coefficient of thermal expansion" (α) alloys (the so-called low- α alloys). An example of an application for which low- α alloys are attractive is structures in which there are two or more concentric rings connected by radial struts. In the presence of a radial temperature gradient, these alloys tend to crack during thermal cycling situations owing to "thermal fatigue." In principle, the availability of an "Invar type" alloy with structural characteristics reduces the thermal strains and improves the thermal fatigue life. Invar is so named because it uses the magnetic characteristics of Ni to offset normal thermal expansion, resulting in much lower α values. It was recognized that this concept could also be adapted to Ni-base structural alloys. The first-generation low- α alloy, Inco 903, had about half the coefficient of thermal expansion compared with ordinary Ni-base alloys up to the Curie temperature. This remarkable alteration of a physical property was achieved by removing the Cr from the alloy to intensify the magnetic effects of magnetostriction. An unfortunate, unintended consequence of this composition alteration was that the oxidation resistance was seriously degraded. In particular, Inco 903 had a propensity for intergranular cracking in air under stress, rendering it of limited utility as a structural alloy. In fact, the cracking was so severe it was given a name: stress-assisted grain boundary oxidation (SAGBO). A second-generation low- α alloy, Inco 909, contained Si to help improve the oxidation resistance, but this alloy has not gained widespread acceptance, possibly because Inco 903 problems were so severe. Low- α

alloys' superior thermal fatigue resistance gives them great potential for use in TPS; thus, it would be appropriate to revisit this class of alloy after addressing its past problems.

Many of the Ni-base alloys are fusion weldable, but the higher strength grades are prone to cracking without special precautions such as preheating the work piece. Most alloys capable of being processed into sheet also can be processed to create a fine-grained structure. The fine-grained material can be superplastically formed, which is potentially of very important benefit to making light-gauge, load-bearing structures and TPS components. Finally, although almost all Ni-base alloys contain Cr and Al, both of which improve oxidation resistance by forming a stable, protective scale, this scale begins to lose its effectiveness above about 1,000 °Celsius. A number of effective environmental coatings have been developed by the gas turbine industry for Ni-base alloys. The only concern or unknown for application in a reusable SSO vehicle is the durability of these coatings under very high mass flow conditions, such as during reentry.

Refractory Metal Alloys

Refractory metal alloys were discussed briefly earlier in connection with the DynaSoar project. Subsequent to this, there has been limited systematic interest in designing aerospace structures that incorporate refractory metal alloys. There has been interest in using these alloys for high-temperature gas-cooled nuclear reactors, where the operating environment is benign and well controlled, but this has limited relevance to the current discussion of space vehicles required to withstand reentry into the earth's atmosphere. The attraction of refractory metals as a class is the high melting temperature of Mo, Nb, and Ta. Although alloys of these metallic elements exhibit "normal" temperature dependence of mechanical strength, $0.5T_m$ of Nb or Mo is still a higher temperature than Ni-base alloys can withstand. Of the three metals, Nb is by far the most attractive because of its lower density, lower elastic modulus, and better (but not good) oxidation resistance. The clear barrier to use of Nb alloys is their reactivity in air at high temperatures. There are coatings for these alloys, but at 1,250 °Celsius, a breach in the coating will cause immediate, catastrophic failure.

A reasonable design practice for critical structure, such as the TPS, is to disallow use of any coated material if the material fails catastrophically when the coating is breached. If this practice were the norm, then refractory metal alloys would not be usable in the TPS or other critical hot structure in a reusable SSO vehicle.

Ceramic Matrix Composites

Ceramic matrix composites (CMCs) are attractive because they are much tougher than, but retain the high-temperature capability of, monolithic ceramics. CMCs' toughness is derived from the fibers used to reinforce the ceramic matrix. When a CMC is loaded in tension and the stress in the ceramic matrix reaches a critical value, microcracks develop. This stress level is known as the matrix microcrack stress. In a monolithic ceramic such as silicon carbide (SiC) or silicon nitride (Si₃N₄), microcracks would propagate rapidly, causing immediate failure. For this reason, monolithic ceramics are not suitable for tension-loaded applications. This characteristic is mitigated in CMCs by reinforcing the ceramic matrix with high-strength ceramic fibers, typically Al₂O₃ or SiC, whose role is to bridge and arrest the cracks. Under continued loading, the fibers also

will eventually fracture at their weakest points, which, statistically, is often somewhere in the matrix rather than at the mouth of the crack. These fractured fibers then must be pulled out of the matrix during crack extension under continued loading, an action that dissipates additional energy. Therefore, the total energy expended during fracture of a CMC is much greater than it would be in the case of a monolithic specimen of the ceramic matrix. The crack bridging and pullout mechanisms of toughening, with the attendant increase in energy dissipation during fracture, are the conceptual foundation for CMCs. In SiC fiber-reinforced SiC matrix (called SiC-SiC) CMCs, the toughness can be as high as 10 times that of the unreinforced matrix. Clearly, the nature of the fiber-matrix interface determines the resistance to fiber pullout after fracture and controls the toughness. In high-temperature CMCs, the fibers are coated to achieve an intermediate fiber-matrix interfacial bond strength that optimizes pullout toughening. If the interface is too weak, the fibers pull out too easily. If it is too strong, the fibers break without any pullout. Neither of these situations maximizes the toughness. Therefore, the challenge in creating a tough CMC is not only creating this interface but also finding a coating that will remain stable over time during exposure to elevated temperatures. As service temperature increases, this latter requirement becomes more challenging. For extended service, SiC-SiC CMCs currently are limited to about 1,400 °Celsius, but this is higher than the capability of metallic materials.

The matrix microcrack stress is also significant because once the matrix develops microcracks, it allows the environment to gain access to the fiber-matrix interfaces. The role of environment can be to alter the nature of the interface and reduce the extent of pullout toughening. The obvious difficulty with this is that the properties are better initially than after a period of exposure in service. This leads to a nonconservative design that is dangerous. Absent an arbitrary knockdown, there currently exists no means of estimating the reduced toughness as a function of service life.

Nevertheless, CMCs are the material class that holds the greatest promise of defeating the temperature limits of current metals. An important issue at present is the limited industrial base for producing CMCs and the even more restrictive range of suitable ceramic fibers available for use as the reinforcement in CMCs. The cost of CMCs is currently very high but should come down with increased demand, as happened with TMCs. Even so, CMCs will always be expensive, making development of efficient designs that make optimal use of this class of material important.

Carbon-Carbon Composites

Carbon-carbon composites (C-CCs) consist of carbon fibers in a typically amorphous carbon matrix. In principle, this class of materials is very attractive because it has very low density and high strength at elevated temperatures. C-CCs also have good oxidation resistance at very high temperatures (1,200 °Celsius) because they use an Si-rich coating that forms a stable, protective SiO₂ film on the surface. This coating system is "self healing" if breached because, among other things, it is glassy (viscous) and reforms over cracks. The principal vulnerability occurs at intermediate temperatures where the viscosity of the glass is high enough that it may not flow rapidly enough to heal a breach, exposing the reactive C substrate to the damaging oxidizing environment. As with CMCs, there also are some questions concerning long-term changes in the fiber-matrix interfaces that are at least partially responsible for the loss of impact toughness over time, as experienced in the Columbia accident.

Therefore, instabilities that cause time-dependent reductions in toughness must be understood before these materials can be considered candidates for future TPS applications.

Titanium Aluminides

Titanium aluminides are intermetallic compounds that form between Ti and Al. There are three such compounds— Ti_3Al , TiAl and Al_3Ti —but the one of principal interest is TiAl , often referred to as gamma titanium aluminide or $\gamma\text{-TiAl}$. This compound contains about 35 weight % Al, but ternary and quaternary alloys based on TiAl typically contain somewhat less than this amount. $\gamma\text{-TiAl}$ is interesting for intermediate-temperature applications for several reasons. These include a lower density, at least a 125 °Celsius higher temperature capability, and better surface stability (oxidation resistance) compared with conventional Ti alloys. The surface scale that forms during oxidation of $\gamma\text{-TiAl}$ is Al rich and is more protective than the TiO_2 scale that forms on conventional Ti alloys. Like most other intermetallic compounds, $\gamma\text{-TiAl}$ has very limited ductility at temperatures up to about 600 °Celsius but is not brittle in the classical sense; that is, it has the capability to deform plastically before fracturing. The ductility increases as temperatures increase and is quite good at normal service temperatures.

$\gamma\text{-TiAl}$ alloys' limited ductility poses manufacturing problems for any wrought products. These issues are manageable but reduce product yields, which in turn impacts cost. Recent work in Austria has demonstrated that some $\gamma\text{-TiAl}$ alloys can be made into sheet. This is particularly relevant to applications such as metallic TPS. Other work has demonstrated that some $\gamma\text{-TiAl}$ alloys can be conventionally forged, albeit with care. Should one or more of the efforts currently under way to produce low-cost, prealloyed Ti powder prove successful, the availability of affordable $\gamma\text{-TiAl}$ alloy powder could be a major cost breakthrough.

The development and maturation of $\gamma\text{-TiAl}$ alloys has taken more than 30 years. This is in part due to the lack of actual production applications because of designer's concerns regarding the limited low-temperature ductility of all the $\gamma\text{-TiAl}$ alloys. Today, finally, there are several applications of alloys based on $\gamma\text{-TiAl}$, the most significant of which are two stages of low-pressure turbine blades in the engine General Electric is providing for the Boeing 787 and the growth 747 (called the 747-8). These blades are cast to near net shape and will operate at temperatures up to about 750 °Celsius. Another application is a cast $\gamma\text{-TiAl}$ turbocharger rotor Mitsubishi uses in a production auto because it has half the mass of an equivalent Ni-base alloy component.

A potentially ideal, high-volume application of $\gamma\text{-TiAl}$ alloys is exhaust valves for autos. If the low-cost powder mentioned earlier becomes a reality, this factor, coupled with the current pressure to improve fuel consumption in American cars, could make this prospect a reality. The point of this short discussion of non-space-related applications of $\gamma\text{-TiAl}$ alloys is that realization of any or all of these applications will create a stronger production base for this class of alloy, which in turn will make their introduction into future space platforms easier and more cost effective.

PROPULSION SYSTEMS

Among propulsion systems, only reusable rocket engines are considered here because they hold potential for significant progress that could reduce the cost of placing payloads into orbit.

The basic concept of the space shuttle main engine is still viable, but the durability of the materials used to make the hardware has been a major expense and source of concern for NASA. Much of the concern is related to the effects of hydrogen on the Ni-base alloys used in the turbo pumps. The turbo pumps are the heart of a liquid-fueled hydrogen-oxygen rocket engine because they deliver the fuel and oxidizer to the thrust chamber. The turbo pumps rotate at a very high speed—up to 35,000 rpm. Such speeds create enormous centrifugal stresses in the rotating components, particularly the disks that hold the air foils used to extract work from the hot gas stream. One side of the turbo pump rotor operates in the hot gas stream created by the combustion of the oxygen-hydrogen mixture; the other end is a cryopump that operates at cryogenic temperatures, either in liquid oxygen (90 K) or in liquid hydrogen (20 K). The hot side, a turbine, resembles the turbine rotor in a gas turbine engine and is made of many of the same Ni-base alloys. The cryopump is made of Ti alloys.

The turbine essentially operates in a hydrogen-rich supercritical steam environment at a maximum temperature of about 1,050 °Celsius. The turbine disk is a forged Ni-base alloy, and the air foils are single-crystal investment castings. Neither material is well suited to operate in a hydrogen-rich environment; however, no other material class can withstand the operating temperatures and has better hydrogen tolerance—a situation that still prevails today. The mechanism of hydrogen-induced cracking is much better understood today as the result of extensive research over the past 25 years. Therefore, it would be very useful to use this improved understanding to design a Ni-base alloy that has improved hydrogen tolerance. If successful, a turbine that has improved resistance to hydrogen cracking would greatly reduce the intermission refurbishment time and cost.

Traditionally, the cryopump rotating parts have been made from forgings of the near- α -phase Ti alloy Ti-5Al-2.5Sn (Ti-5-2.5). This alloy has been chosen for its superior notched tensile strength compared with Ti-6-4 when tested at cryogenic temperatures. Hindsight suggests it is unclear that notched tensile strength is the best criterion for selecting a cryogenic rotor material. The use of notched tensile strength originated with steels. Here, the hydrostatic stress state at the notch root could trigger the onset of brittle fracture of the type seen in smooth tensile tests below the ductile brittle transition temperature (DBTT). Ti alloys do not exhibit a DBTT; therefore, true fracture toughness measured at the relevant temperature is a more accurate indication of the fracture resistance of the rotor. An examination of the limited available fracture toughness data for the two alloys shows no clear advantage in using Ti-5-2.5. Because Ti-5-2.5 is more difficult to produce than Ti-6-4, using Ti-5-2.5 adds cost to the cryopump. Other, newer, higher strength Ti alloys—for example, several of the newer β -Ti alloys—may be even better suited than Ti-6-4 is for this application. The critical question of how much toughness is really required cannot be answered at present because the notched tensile ratio has been the deciding criterion. Therefore, a new

design of a cryopump potentially can benefit from these new materials and from abandoning the use of notched strength as a design paradigm.

The combustion chamber of a rocket engine is made from a copper alloy and is cooled by passing liquid hydrogen through channels in the outer wall. The space shuttle main engine combustion chamber is made of NARloy-Z, a Cu-3%Ag-0.5%Zr alloy that has excellent thermal conductivity and better strength than the commercially available Cu-0.15%Zr alloy known as AMZIRC. While a lighter combustion chamber would be welcome, developing hydrogen-resistant turbine materials would be a much better use of available rocket engine alloy development resources.

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This document has attempted to review a range of materials that may have promise for all aspects of aerospace platforms. Because of the breadth of this topic, discussion has focused on opportunities and associated risks, but with little technical detail. Practical issues such as manufacturing capabilities and costs and the availability of materials also have been addressed where appropriate. Another recurring issue is the ability to achieve better design efficiency through a design synthesis process that concurrently treats form, fit and function, manufacturing capability, and materials capability as equally important design constraints. Although this approach has yet to be successfully used for a major high-performance structure project, engineering is nearing a state of development where it may now be feasible.

If the space shuttle is used as a benchmark, it is clear that numerous opportunities will exist to improve structural efficiency. This possibility reflects the progress made since the shuttle and its engine were designed. Improved durability and reduced operating cost also are possible. The issue of long lead time holding back these improved design methods is most often one of timely availability of new, attractive materials that are mature enough to be used in a system without increasing the risk of failure. The materials community is actively developing and using computational models and simulation methods to address this concern. Despite some progress, further advances are required to bring computational materials engineering to the desired level of maturity.

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Metallic Spintronics

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Metallic Spintronics

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Administrative Note

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Metallic Spintronics

1. Introduction

The rapid pace of progress in the computer industry over the past 40 years has been based on the miniaturization of chips and other computer components. Further miniaturization, however, faces serious challenges—for example, increasingly high power dissipation. To continue on pace, the industry must go beyond incremental improvements and embrace radically new technologies. A promising nanoscale technology known as spintronics (a neologism for “spin-based electronics”) has emerged. Spintronics refers to the role an electron spin plays in solid-state physics. Spintronics researchers aim to develop a revolutionary new class of electronic devices based on the spin of electrons in addition to the charge. In spintronic devices, information is carried not by the electron's charge, as in conventional microchips, but by the electron's intrinsic spin. Changing the spin of an electron is faster and requires less power than moving it. Therefore, if a reliable way could be found to control and manipulate spins, spintronic devices could offer higher data processing speeds, lower electricity consumption, and many other advantages over conventional chips, perhaps including the ability to carry out radically new quantum computations.

Spintronics in ferromagnetic systems is built on a complementary set of phenomena in which the magnetic configuration of the system influences its transport properties and vice versa. Giant magnetoresistance (GMR) (Reference 1, 2) and spin-transfer-torque (STT) (Reference 3-5) phenomena exemplify such interconnections in multilayers composed of ferromagnetic (F) and nonmagnetic (N) layers. The physics and applications of metallic spintronics are discussed in this report from the perspective of these two phenomena. GMR, research on which was awarded the Nobel Prize in Physics in 2007, refers to a large change in resistance of magnetic multilayers when the relative orientation of magnetic moments in their constituent ferromagnetic layers is altered by an applied magnetic field. The inverse effect, STT, in which a large electrical current density j can perturb the magnetic state of a multilayer, has also been predicted (Reference 3, 4) and observed in experiments on current-induced reversal and precession of magnetization (Reference 5-9) and magnetic domain wall motion (Reference 10, 11).

Spintronics is a broad research field with (currently) three major subfields: (1) materials research that is attempting to create new materials that are both magnetic and semiconductors, (2) research on novel magnetotransport effects in ferromagnetic metals, and (3) research on techniques that can be used to manipulate individual electron spins. The first subfield is targeting magnetic semiconductors because devices based on such materials would be the easiest to integrate with the present semiconductor device technology and processing capabilities. However, despite extensive research, most semiconductor spintronic devices are still theoretical concepts awaiting experimental demonstrations. This report focuses on spintronics research in metallic systems within the scope of the second and third subfields. The second subfield has experienced an unprecedented period of new discovery over the past 20 years, including the discovery of GMR, and has already spawned major technological change in the information storage industry with the use of GMR sensors and read heads. The third subfield is vital for spintronic devices, as virtually any processing of information in such devices is associated with transport and manipulation of spins.

New and efficient methods for manipulating spins that stimulate active research programs in spintronics at a large number of academic institutions and a half-dozen industrial research labs around the world are highly desirable. The prize to be gained is active control and manipulation of spin distributions (magnetic moments) for new and improved functionality in electronic/spintronic devices. The confluence of intense basic science and industry interest in ferromagnetic metal spintronics has not occurred on this scale in physics in a long time.

The report is arranged as follows: Section 2 is dedicated to magnetotransport effects in magnetic systems where magnetic configuration can influence the system's transport properties. It discusses GMR in magnetic multilayers and related phenomena, highlights basic physical principles responsible for GMR, and describes technological applications of the effect. Section 3 focuses on the reverse connection between the system's magnetic configuration and its transport properties—the so-called STT effect. The physical origin and potential applications are discussed. Section 4 discusses other new directions in metallic spintronics, with a particular focus on spintronics with antiferromagnetic materials. Section 5 summarizes, with an eye to the future, the development of spintronic technologies and their aerospace applications.

2. Giant Magnetoresistance

2.1 GMR BASICS

This section discusses the phenomenon of giant magnetoresistance (GMR). Excellent reviews of GMR are available elsewhere (Reference 12-22). The focus on physical concepts important for the sections to follow are discussed.

GMR in magnetic multilayers refers to a dramatic reduction in the resistance of the multilayers when subjected to an external magnetic field. GMR's size is usually defined as the resistance change in magnetic field relative to its peak value. The effect can be distinguished from the ordinary magnetoresistance (MR) coming from the direct action of the magnetic field on the electron trajectories via the Lorentz force (Reference 23), and from the anisotropic MR, which comes from dependence of the resistivity on the relative orientation of magnetic moment to the current (Reference 24).

To prepare the magnetic multilayers, where several atomic layers of one (ferromagnetic) material alternate by layers of another (nonmagnetic) material (see Figure 1), a wide variety of deposition methods have been used, such as electrochemical deposition techniques (Reference 25, 26) and various vacuum deposition techniques (Reference 27, 28). The latter shares mainly between two methods using either sputter deposition or molecular beam epitaxy (MBE) systems. Sputter deposition involves knocking off the atoms of the material of interest from a target by particle bombardment, followed by the deposition of high-energetic atoms ($\sim 2\text{-}30$ electronvolts [eV]) onto the substrate. A principal advantage of sputter deposition is the ease with which many different materials can be deposited at relatively high deposition rates. In contrast, deposition rates in MBE systems are usually much lower than for sputtering systems, but much lower energies (~ 0.1 eV) of the evaporated material make this technique favorable for growth of highly oriented single-crystalline films.




Figure 1. In a Magnetic Multilayer, Several Atomic Layers of Magnetic Material (shown in grey) Alternate With Layers of Nonmagnetic Material (shown in white). GMR occurs in one of two different geometries: (1) when the current flows in the plane (CIP geometry) of the layers or (2) when the current flows perpendicular (CPP geometry) to the layers.

The original observation of GMR (Reference 1) was made on MBE grown iron-chromium (Fe/Cr) multilayers with nearly perfect crystallinity. Subsequently, by using sputtered samples that are grown much more rapidly than MBE samples, it was possible not only to reproduce these results but also to observe oscillations in the magnetoresistance as the thickness of the nonmagnetic spacer layers was varied (Reference 29). Subsequent

studies (Reference 30) on sputtered cobalt-copper (Co/Cu) multilayers revealed magnetoresistances at room temperatures 3 to 4 times larger than those for iron-chromium and 13 times greater than those for the permalloy films that were used as magnetoresistive sensors in magnetic reading heads at that time. The much higher numbers observed in magnetic multilayers predetermined the fate of GMR in magnetic recording technology.

The current understanding is that GMR observed in magnetic multilayers arises from the dependence of the resistivity on their internal magnetic configuration and the role of the external magnetic field to change this configuration. Figure 2b illustrates GMR in the simple limit where the electron mean-free-path is much longer than the layer thicknesses. The electrical transport properties of the system are described in terms of the so-called two-current model (Reference 31), based on the suggestion by Mott (Reference 32) that, at temperatures lower than the Curie temperature, the spin-up and spin-down electrons will be almost independent and carry current in parallel. Electrons are much more strongly scattered by a magnetic layer if they and the local magnetization spin in opposite rather than the same direction ($R > r$). For simplicity, the figure is drawn with scattering only at interfaces; however, there is also scattering within the layers. At zero magnetic field, where the magnetizations of adjacent magnetic layers are aligned antiparallel—for example, because of exchange coupling between the layers (Reference 29)—the spin-down electrons are weakly scattered in layer F1 but strongly scattered in F2. In contrast, the spin-up electrons are weakly scattered in layer F2 but strongly scattered in F1. As a result, two channels are equivalent, leading to a total resistance in this “antiferromagnetic” configuration $R_{AF} = (R+r)/2$ (see the corresponding resistance circuit in Figure 2c).




Figure 2. (a) Resistance of a magnetic multilayer R versus magnetic field. (b) Origin of GMR in terms of spin-dependent electron scattering: F1 and F2 are ferromagnetic layers with a nonmagnetic layer in between. At zero magnetic field, the magnetizations in F1 and F2 are aligned antiparallel (center panel) and can be switched to parallel orientation by an applied field. (c) The equivalent resistance circuits corresponding to the three magnetic configurations shown in (b). See text for details.

When the magnetizations of the two F layers are set into parallel configuration by an applied magnetic field, the spin-up electrons are weakly scattered in both layers and form a low-resistivity channel, whereas the spin-down electrons are strongly scattered in all the layers and form a high-resistivity channel. The reversal of magnetic field just interchanges the roles of spin-up and spin-down channels. The current's shunting by the low-resistivity channel produces a low total resistance $R_F = 2Rr/(R+r)$ in this “ferromagnetic” configuration. The size of the GMR is defined as $(R_{AF}-R_F)/R_{AF} = (R-$

$r^2/(R+r)^2 \leq 1$. The other definition $\Delta R/R = (R_{AF}-R_F)/R_F = (R-r)^2/4Rr$ (unbounded from above) is also in use. Figure 2a shows a magnetoresistance curve typical for magnetic multilayers. The resistance is constant at a minimum value R_F above a saturation field B_s (parallel F_s) and rises to a maximum value R_{AF} as the applied magnetic field B approaches zero (antiparallel F_s).

GMR occurs in two different geometries (see Figure 1): namely when the current flows in the plane of the layers, or CIP geometry, or when current flows perpendicular to the layers, or CPP geometry. Most of experiments on GMR are carried out in the CIP geometry because measuring the fairly large resistance of a thin film is quite easy (film length is typically orders of magnitude larger than its thickness). Experiments in the CPP geometry are more difficult (Reference 33) and require special techniques for precision measurements of very small resistances $\sim 10^{-7}$ - $10^{-8} \Omega$ resulting from the "short and wide" geometry of a 1-mm² "wide" and 1- μ m "long" sample. In order to increase the resistances to easily observable values, microfabrication techniques can be used to reduce the sample's cross-sectional area (Reference 34-36). Finally, a simple and inexpensive point-contact technique (Reference 37) may also be suitable for this purpose. The samples with a reduced cross-sectional area will be of interest for spin-transfer-torque experiments presented in Section 3.

2.2 GMR APPLICATIONS

GMR is currently used in magnetic field sensors, including those in read heads for computer hard drives, in galvanic isolators, and in nonvolatile random access memory devices. Reading information stored on magnetic hard disk drives in computers was the first large-scale commercial application of GMR. The information is stored by magnetizing small regions (magnetic domains) of a magnetic recording disk in different directions. The stray magnetic fields from these domains are detected by a GMR sensing element called spin valve. The simplest type of spin valve consists of two ferromagnetic layers separated by a thin, nonmagnetic spacer. The spin-valve resistance is smallest when the magnetizations of the two ferromagnetic layers are parallel and largest when the magnetizations are antiparallel. The antiparallel alignment is achieved by making the two layers respond differently to an external magnetic field; an antiferromagnet in contact with one of the layers is used to effectively "pin" the magnetization in this layer through an effect called "exchange bias." The exceptional responsiveness of spin valves to magnetic fields has enabled very high areal packing densities in hard drives.

Other sensor applications using GMR elements include monitoring of a ferrous gear rotation in machinery operation (Reference 38) via detection of a changing magnetic flux when a gear tooth passes near the sensor, monitoring of electrical current via detection of the current-induced Oersted magnetic field, and transferring high-frequency signals between isolated circuits (Reference 39) via magnetic fields generated by a high-frequency inductor in one circuit and replicated in another circuit by a GMR sensor.

3. Spin-Transfer-Torque

This section focuses on the spin-transfer-torque (STT) phenomenon, which refers to a novel method to control and manipulate magnetic moments in nanostructures by spin currents—one of the forefront and most exciting areas in magnetism research today.

3.1 STT BASICS

The previous section showed that the magnetic state of a ferromagnet can affect its electrical transport properties; for instance, the relative orientation of the magnetic moments in magnetic multilayers underlies the phenomenon of GMR (Reference 1, 2). The inverse effect, in which a large electrical current density can perturb the magnetic state of a multilayer, has also been predicted (Reference 3, 4). Here the current transfers vector spin between the magnetic layers and induces precession and/or reversal of the layer magnetizations. Altering the magnetic state with spin currents is based on quantum mechanical exchange interaction and represents a novel method of magnetization control on the nanometer length scale and the picosecond time scale.

The first observation of such a spin-transfer phenomenon in magnetic multilayers was recorded by Tsoi et al. (Reference 5) (see Figure 3). In this experiment, the spin-transfer-induced excitations were produced by injecting high-density electrical currents into a Co/Cu magnetic multilayer through a mechanical point contact. Point contacts smaller than 10 nanometers (nm) are formed when a sharpened Cu metal wire (tip) is carefully brought into contact with the multilayer. The extremely small cross-sectional area of such a contact makes it possible to achieve current densities in excess of 10^{12} A/m². Because of its extremely small size (<10 nm), point contact is a very efficient probe of electrical transport properties in extremely small sample volumes inaccessible with other techniques (for example, electron-beam-lithography patterning). The latter qualifies point contact as the smallest probe of STT today.




Figure 3. Differential Resistance dV/dI of a Mechanical Point Contact as a Function of Current for a Series of Magnetic Fields. The peak in dV/dI indicates the onset of SST excitations. The inset shows that the threshold current at the peak in dV/dI increases linearly with the applied field. (Reference 5)

The STT phenomenon currently attracts considerable attention because it combines poorly understood fundamental science questions with the promise of applications in a broad range of technologies. In high-speed, high-density magnetic recording technology, for instance, SST could replace the Oersted field currently used for writing magnetic bits in storage media (for example, in magnetic random access memory [MRAM]). This may lead to a smaller and faster magnetic memory. Another possible application is based on the spin-transfer-induced precession of magnetization, which

converts a direct current (dc) voltage input into an alternating current (ac) voltage output. The frequency of such a precession can be tuned from a few gigahertz (GHz) to > 100 GHz by changing the applied magnetic field and/or dc current, effectively resulting in a current-controlled oscillator for use in practical microwave circuits.

Since its prediction in 1996, the STT effect has been observed in a number of experiments, including those with mechanical (Reference 5, 9, 40) and lithographic point contacts (Reference 6, 41), manganite junctions (Reference 7), electrochemically grown nanowires (Reference 8), lithographically defined nanopillars (Reference 42, 43), tunnel junctions (Reference 44), and semiconductor structures (Reference 45). These different methods all share one characteristic feature: they make it possible to attain extremely high current densities ($> 10^{12}$ A/m² for metallic structures) needed to produce sufficiently large spin-transfer torques (Reference 3, 4). This is achieved by forcing the electrical current to flow through a very small constriction. The latter can be a mechanical point contact, a lithographically defined point contact or nanopillar, or a nanowire, as illustrated in Figure 4. In all cases, the maximum current density $j_{\max} = I/A$ is defined by the current I flowing through the device and the minimum cross-sectional area A of the current path. For typical mechanical point contacts, $I \sim 1$ mA and $A \sim 100$ nm² gives $j_{\max} \sim 10^{13}$ A/m². In lithographically defined structures, both I and A are typically larger, $I \sim 10$ mA and $A \sim 10000$ nm², that gives $j_{\max} \sim 10^{12}$ A/m².




Figure 4. Device Schematics for STT Experiments. All experiments share one common feature: a small constriction for electrical current—that is, point contact, junction, nanowire, or nanopillar. Black (grey) indicates insulator; dark blue indicates magnetic material.

The basic physical mechanism underlying STT relies on conservation of angular momentum. Consider a pedagogically simple case where a conduction electron crosses an interface between a nonmagnetic metal (N) and a ferromagnet (F). We assume the initial state of the electron's spin S in N is noncollinear to the F's magnetization M . Once into F, S is subject to an exchange torque caused by M that tends to reorient S . Therewith, according to Newton's Third Law, there should also exist a reaction torque that acts on M – STT torque. Deep into F, S is aligned with M , and the change in angular momentum that occurs from its reorientation has been transferred to M . Hence the phenomenon's name: spin-transfer torque. Of course, the torque applied to M by a single-spin S is negligibly small owing to S being negligibly small compared with M . For high current density crossing the N/F interface, however, the number of such spins can be very large and the resulting effective S might become comparable to M . This highlights the need for high current densities to observe the STT phenomenon.

A typical experiment on current-driven excitation of a ferromagnet usually involves two single-domain thin-film magnets separated by a nonmagnetic spacer. Here one magnet

(F_a) is "hard" and used to polarize the current, while the spacer (N) is thin enough for the polarized current to get through and excite the second "free" magnet (F_b). This $F_a/N/F_b$ trilayer structure is similar to a GMR spin valve. The GMR effect can thus be used to monitor the orientation of F_b relative to F_a – GMR varies linearly with $\cos\theta$, where θ is angle between magnetic moments of F_a and F_b , and a phenomenological description (Reference 46) gives the trilayer resistance $R(\theta) = R_F + (R_{AF} - R_F) (1 - \cos\theta)/2$. When current flows across $F_a/N/F_b$, the current-induced torques act on both F_a and F_b layers (Reference 3, 47). This is schematically illustrated in Figure 5. This qualitative picture of STT assumes both F_a and F_b layers are perfect spin filters, so that electron spins aligned with the magnetic moment of, for example, F_a layer are completely transmitted through the layer, while spins aligned antiparallel to the layer moment are completely reflected. When electron current crosses the $F_b/N/F_a$ trilayer from right to left (Figure 5a), electrons transmitted through F_a will be polarized along F_a . If spin-diffusion length in N is long enough, this spin-polarized current will reach F_b and exert a torque on F_b in a direction so as to align F_b with F_a . Repeating the argument for F_b , we find that electrons reflected from F_b will be polarized antiparallel to F_b and, hence, in turn exert a torque on F_a trying to align F_a antiparallel with F_b . The net result is a pinwheel-type motion with both F_a and F_b rotating in the same direction (clockwise in Figure 5a), as described previously by Slonczewski (Reference 3). When the current crosses the trilayer from left to right, the directions of the torques are reversed (Figure 5b)—the torque on F_a is trying to align F_a parallel with F_b , while the torque on F_b is trying to align F_b antiparallel with F_a .




Figure 5. Qualitative Picture of STT. (a) For left-going electrons magnetic moments (thin arrows) of both F_a and F_b are rotated clockwise. (b) For right-going electrons the directions of the torques (thick arrows) on F_a and F_b are reversed. (Reference 47)

The above discussion implies the asymmetry of STT with respect to current direction as follows. Let's fix the orientation of the polarizer F_a ; in experiments this is usually accomplished by making F_a very thick (compared with F_b) or by pinning its orientation with an adjacent antiferromagnetic layer via the phenomenon of exchange bias. If initially F_b is almost parallel with F_a , the left-going electrons will stabilize this parallel alignment, and no STT excitation is present. When current bias is reversed, the torque on F_b will try to rotate F_b away from F_a and will result in STT excitation of the system. This asymmetry with respect to current polarity is one of the main features of STT in experiments; see, for instance, Figure 5, where STT excitations are present only at negative bias.

3.2 STT EXPERIMENTS

Section 3.1 introduced the physics of STT in magnetic nanosystems. We have seen that a high-density electrical current can result in torques on magnetic elements of the system. These torques may be used to control and manipulate the system's magnetic state. However, the resulting behavior of the system can differ significantly from case to case, depending on particular conditions of observation. For instance, in modest external magnetic fields, magnetization of a small element can be repeatedly reversed between two stable configurations, while at higher fields, where the reversal is energetically unfavorable, the moment can be set into precession at a very high frequency. To understand details of what happens with a magnetic moment $\vec{S}$ in a particular situation, one can use Newton's Second Law.

For $\vec{S}$ this would be the Landau-Lifshitz-Gilbert equation, where the rate of change of $\vec{S}$ is set equal to the net torque acting on $\vec{S}$:

Equation 1:
$$\frac{d\vec{S}}{dt} = \gamma \vec{S} \times \vec{B}_{eff} - \frac{\alpha}{|\vec{S}|} \vec{S} \times \frac{d\vec{S}}{dt} + \eta I \frac{\mu_B}{e} \vec{s} \times (\vec{s}^* \times \vec{S})$$

Here the first term on the right is the torque on a magnetic moment $\vec{S}$ in an effective magnetic field $\vec{B}_{eff}$, (including applied, demagnetizing, anisotropy, and other fields), with γ the gyromagnetic ratio; the second term is a phenomenological damping term introduced by Gilbert, with α the Gilbert damping parameter; the third term is the SST where small $\vec{s}$ and $\vec{s}^*$ are unit vectors along $\vec{S}$ and the polarizer $\vec{S}^*$, I is the current, μ_B is the Bohr magneton, e is the electron charge, and η is the spin-polarization factor.

The diagram in Figure 6 shows the directions of the three torques from Equation 1. Note that, depending on the polarity of applied current, the STT torque can be either in the same or opposite direction as the damping torque. In the former case, STT will effectively result in an increased damping for any magnitude of the applied current and suppress any possible excitations of $\vec{S}$ from its equilibrium state along $\vec{B}_{eff}$. If, however, the STT torque is opposite to the damping, we can distinguish two situations. For currents below a critical current, where STT is small compared with damping, $\vec{S}$ spirals toward $\vec{B}_{eff}$ (red trajectory in Figure 6). For




Figure 6. Torques on a Magnetic Moment in a Magnetic Field and Subject to an Electrical Current

currents larger than the critical current, STT exceeds the damping torque and causes $\vec{S}$ to spiral away from $\vec{B}_{\text{eff}}$, with a steadily increasing precession angle. The ultimate result can be either stable steady-state precession of $\vec{S}$ around $\vec{B}_{\text{eff}}$ (black trajectory in Figure 6) or magnetic reversal of $\vec{S}$ into a state antiparallel to $\vec{B}_{\text{eff}}$, depending on the angular dependence of STT and damping torques.

Almost all experimental observations of STT rely on the GMR phenomenon to detect the current-induced reorientation of magnetic moments in nanodevices. Typical measurements include (1) measuring static device resistance $R=V/I$ as a function of applied dc bias current I in an applied magnetic field $\vec{B}$ and (2) measuring R versus $\vec{B}$ at a constant I . Figure 3 shows how the differential resistance dV/dI of a Cu point contact to Co/Cu magnetic multilayer varies with the bias voltage V (equivalent to I) applied across the contact. Here the multilayer magnetic moments are saturated out of the plane of the layers by a sufficiently large external magnetic field ($B \geq 2T$). The onset of STT-driven magnetic precession is revealed by a peak in differential resistance of the contact. The peak in dV/dI indicates the transition into precession is a reversible process, and in a small range of currents, one can continuously increase or decrease the angle of precession. However, other scenarios are also possible—for example, fast transitions between static and steady-state precession states with current-dependent dwell time.

If the applied magnetic field is small, the magnetic system can have more than one low-energy state. In the simple case of a magnetic element with uniaxial anisotropy, STT can trigger a transition between two static states that are energetically favorable. An example of such behavior is shown in Figure 7. Here the current is driven across a trilayer Py20nm/Cu12nm/Py4.5nm spin-valve structure patterned by electron beam lithography into a nanopillar with a $40 \times 120 \text{ nm}^2$ cross-sectional area (Reference 48). The differential resistance of the nanopillar exhibits a hysteresis as a function of an applied bias current as the magnetization of the thin (free) permalloy (Py) layer is aligned parallel and antiparallel to the thick (hard) Py layer by the current.




Figure 7. Spin-torque-driven magnetic switching for a Py20nm/Cu12nm/Py4.5nm spin valve with a $40 \times 120\text{-nm}^2$ cross-sectional area, as the magnetization of the thin (free) magnetic layer is aligned parallel and antiparallel to the thicker magnetic layer by an applied current. (Reference 48)

The two examples presented above (Figures 3 and 7) demonstrate how simple dc resistance measurements can be used for STT observation. Here the measured resistance of a device provides indirect information about the relative orientation of magnetic elements in the device. However, measured critical currents highlighted by sharp variations in the resistance remain the only experimental information that can be used to quantitatively compare theory and experiment. Moreover, the dc measurements in Figure 3 provide no information about fast evolution of magnetization in the device

associated with high-frequency precession of magnetic moments. High-frequency techniques must be employed to provide such capabilities, as discussed next.

The first experiment providing unequivocal evidence that a dc electrical current can result in high-frequency (tens of GHz) precession of magnetic moments was reported by Tsoi et al. in (Reference 9). Here an STT device—point contact—was placed in a microwave cavity of a high-frequency, high-field electron spin resonance (ESR) spectrometer. This arrangement allowed performing dc transport experiments, such as those described above, while the contact was irradiated with high-frequency microwaves. When the frequency of external microwaves matched the precession frequency excited by the dc current, an additional (rectified) voltage was detected across the contact. By detecting this voltage while varying the external frequency, field, and applied current, Tsoi et al. (Reference 9) were able to map the frequency excited by dc current as a function of applied field and current. In a more recent experiment, Rippard et al. (Reference 49) fed microwaves to a point contact via electrical leads and reported observation of a similar dc response.

Finally, the high-frequency dynamics of the free-layer magnetization can be measured directly by detecting high-frequency oscillations in voltage across a spin valve under dc current. Here the hard magnetic layer is fixed, while the free layer exhibits a high-frequency precession relative to the hard layer. GMR results in a high-frequency modulation of the spin-valve resistance, which in turn leads to a high-frequency component of the voltage across the spin valve traversed by a dc current. This voltage can be directly probed with a high-frequency spectrum analyzer, as was recently done by Kiselev et al. (Reference 50) and by Rippard et al. (Reference 41). Moreover the voltage oscillations owing to spin-torque-driven magnetic precession can be directly measured in time domain using a sampling oscilloscope (Reference 51), as illustrated in Figure 8.




Figure 8. Oscillatory Voltage Generated by Precessional Motion of the Free Magnet in IrMn8nm/NiFe4nm/Cu8nm/NiFe4nm Nanopillar, in Response to a 335-mV dc Voltage Step Applied to the Device at $B = 630$ Oersteds (Reference 51)

The above examples illustrate how broadband instrumentation for measuring voltage in GMR devices may provide important and often unique information about high-frequency magnetic dynamics driven by spin-transfer torques. However, the detailed understanding of STT is still the subject of debate and requires new experimental techniques capable of probing magnetization dynamics on nanometer length scales and sub-nanosecond time scales. In principle, this can be accomplished by the use of synchrotron x-rays that were recently shown (Reference 52) to probe interfacial phenomena and directly image the time-resolved response of magnetic nanostructures to sub-nanosecond magnetic field pulses (Oersted switching) and spin-polarized current

pulses (STT switching). Figure 9 shows scanning transmission x-ray microscopy (Reference 53) images of in-plane components of magnetization M – M_x in panel (a) and M_y in panel (b)—in the free CoFe layer (indicated by blue ellipse) of a 100x150-nm² magnetic nanopillar. The images were obtained by scanning a focused (diameter ~ 30 nm) circularly polarized x-ray beam across the CoFe layer, with the photon energy tuned to the characteristic Co L3 resonance to provide magnetic contrast through the x-ray magnetic circular dichroism effect (Reference 54), and by monitoring transmission of the x-rays as a function of the position x, y with a fast avalanche detector. The M -vector field of the free layer can be reconstructed from the measured M_x and M_y components as illustrated in Figure 9c, and the ultrafast x-ray microscopy technique provided a means to monitor this field as a function of time with ~100-picosond resolution. The spatial resolution of the technique is set by the spot size of the x-ray beam (~30 nm) and currently limits its application to spintronic devices >100 nm in size (Reference 52). Potentially, however, technical development of the ultrafast x-ray microscopy may lead to an ultimate technique for STT studies that can probe the M -vector field on the nanometer length scale with picosecond time resolution.




Figure 9. Scanning transmission x-ray microscopy images of M_x (a) and M_y (b) components of magnetization M combine into the vector field (c), which represents the direction of M in the plane of the CoFe free layer. (Reference 52)

3.3 STT APPLICATIONS

The STT method to manipulate magnetic moments by an electrical current offers unprecedented spatial and temporal control of spin distributions and attracts considerable attention because of its potential application in a broad range of technologies. The perspective of STT for GHz communication applications and in magnetic recording technology is discussed.

The STT application in high-frequency technologies is based on the spin-transfer-induced precession of spins. The previous section discussed how precession of magnetization in GMR devices can convert a dc current input into an ac voltage output. The frequency of this output can be tuned from a few GHz to > 100 GHz by changing the applied magnetic field and/or the dc current, effectively resulting in a current-controlled oscillator for use in practical microwave circuits. Hence, the STT effect in

GMR structures provides a means to engineer a nanoscale high-frequency oscillator powered and tuned by dc current. Such an oscillator could have frequency characteristics spanning more than 100 GHz and perhaps into terahertz range. Linewidths as narrow as 2 megahertz were demonstrated (Reference 55), leading to quality factors over 18,000. Potential applications for such high-frequency sources include integrated transceivers for wireless and wired applications, as well as wireless and wired chip-to-chip and on-chip communications. For the latter, logic circuits with a spin wave bus were proposed (Reference 56, 57) as an interface between electronic circuits and integrated spintronics circuits. Here spin waves are used for information transmission and processing, and the STT effect can provide a means for efficient spin-wave generation on the nanoscale.

In high-speed, high-density magnetic recording technology, STT could replace the Oersted field currently used for writing magnetic bits in storage media (for example, magnetic random access memory [MRAM]), thus leading to smaller and faster magnetic memory. Figure 10a schematically shows a bit cell of a conventional MRAM. The bit state is programmed to a "1" or "0" by switching between the parallel and antiparallel states of a GMR-like storage element. The first-generation MRAM utilizes magnetic tunnel junctions (MTJ) as storage elements because of their higher magnetoresistance ratios and impedance-matching constraints. However in scaling MRAM to small dimensions, the same constraints are expected to drive a transition from MTJs to fully metallic spin-valve storage elements. The switching between "1" and "0" states (writing) relies on magnetic reversal of the MTJ's free layer, achieved by passing electrical currents down the "bit" and "write" lines, that generates a sufficiently strong magnetic field at their intersection (that is, for a given MTJ). However, as the spatial decay of this Oersted field is rather slow ($\sim 1/r^2$), it may affect neighboring cells. This makes scaling of MRAM to small dimensions questionable.




Figure 10. Conventional MRAM Cell (a) Versus STT MRAM Cell (b) (Reference 58)

STT MRAM (see Figure 10b) removes the constraints on scalability. Here the switching of the free layer magnetic moment is achieved by STT switching when a high-density electrical current is driven directly through the storage element (MTJ or spin valve). This writing is thus performed at high current levels, while the reading (measuring the resistance of the element) is done at low currents. Since STT MRAM eliminates the need for "write" and "bypass" lines, a more compact memory can be realized.

3.4 STT-DRIVEN MOTION OF MAGNETIC DOMAIN WALLS

Yet another manifestation of STT in metallic ferromagnets is a motion of magnetic domain walls traversed by an electrical current. The original prediction of the effect dates back to 1978, when Luc Berger predicted that a spin-polarized current should apply a torque to a magnetic domain wall (Reference 59). In a series of remarkable but only recently appreciated works, Berger set the theoretical (Reference 59-62) and experimental (Reference 63-65) groundwork for current-induced domain wall motion (CIDWM), which is now documented in materials ranging from magnetic semiconductors (Reference 66) to perpendicular-anisotropy superlattices (Reference 67). But the most widely studied materials by far have been metallic ferromagnets (Reference 10, 11, 68-82), including Py ($\text{Ni}_{81}\text{Fe}_{19}$), CoFe, and Co, because of their decades-long ubiquity in magnetic storage technology.

The CIDWM effect can be qualitatively understood on the basis of the following arguments. Consider an electrical current flowing between two magnetic domains (A and B) with opposite magnetizations and, thus, traversing a 180-degree magnetic domain wall. The situation is similar to that of a single N/F interface discussed in Section 3.1. While in domain A, spins of conduction electrons are preferentially aligned with the magnetic moment of A. Once into domain B, the spins reverse to align with the moment of B. In reversing the electron spins, magnetic moments in the domain wall experience a torque associated with the change in angular momentum that occurs from the rotation of electrons spins. This spin-transfer torque can move the domain wall in the direction of the electron flow.

Moving magnetic domain walls with current was proposed as the basis for a new type of magnetic memory called "racetrack" (Reference 83). In contrast to today's hard disk drives (HDD), which rely on spinning motion of a disk to move their magnetic regions where the data is stored past a read head, the racetrack memory exploits the idea of moving magnetically stored data electronically. Figure 11 illustrates the concept of the racetrack. The racetrack is a ferromagnetic nanowire, with data encoded as a pattern of magnetic domains along the wire. Current pulses can move the entire pattern along the wire. The two cartoons of Figure 11a




Figure 11. Racetrack Memory Concept. (Reference 83)

show the domain wall patterns in the racetrack before and after they have moved past read and write elements. Reading is achieved by measuring the resistance of a tunnel junction element connected to the racetrack (Figure 11b); writing (Figure 11c), by applying local magnetic fields—for example, the fringing fields of a domain wall moved in another nanowire. If U-shaped nanowires are placed normal to the plane of a chip and arranged into high-density arrays of racetracks (Figure 11d), the resulting storage density can be higher than that in solid-state memory devices like flash RAM and

similar to conventional HDDs; but the racetrack memory would have much higher read/write performance than HDD.

4. Antiferromagnetic Metal Spintronics

Recently, MacDonald and coworkers (Reference 84) predicted that effects similar to GMR and STT observed with ferromagnets ought to occur in multilayer systems where the ferromagnetic (F) components are replaced by antiferromagnets (AFM). First, they predicted that the resistance of an AFM spin valve—where two AFM layers are separated by an N spacer—could depend on the relative orientations of the magnetic moments in the two AFM layers (antiferromagnetic GMR = AGMR). Second, they predicted that injecting a sufficiently strong current density into an AFM should affect its magnetic state via current-induced spin torque. These new AFM effects could lead to new all-AFM spintronics where AFMs are used in place of Fs.

Replacing F metals with AFM metals in a spintronic device has several advantages. While AGMR of an AFM spin valve was predicted (Reference 84) to be similar in magnitude to GMR in standard F spin valves, the critical current needed to alter the magnetic order in AFMs can be smaller than for Fs, partly because spin torques can act through the entire AFM volume. The estimate of the necessary current density $j \sim 10^9$ A/m² (Reference 84) was less than the typical $j \sim 10^{11}$ A/m² needed to reverse the magnetic order in F/N/F multilayers (Reference 5-9, 40-43, 48-51). Finally, using AFM metals in spintronic devices in place of F metals would eliminate unwanted effects of shape anisotropy on the magnetic stability of small elements, thus potentially offering better control of the magnetic state in nanoscale systems and easing fabrication requirements.

Following the original predictions of MacDonald and coworkers (Reference 84), Xu et al. (Reference 85) calculated the AGMR for a simple AFM/N/AFM/N = FeMn/Cu/FeMn/Cu multilayer, and Gomonay and Loktev (Reference 86) provided additional theoretical evidence that polarized current can destabilize the equilibrium state of an AFM. Note, however, that all calculations to date are for perfect samples and depend on quantum coherence. It is known that disorder can reduce the predicted effects. Experiments are thus crucial to see if any such effects are visible in real samples.

4.1 ANTIFERROMAGNETIC GMR

To the author's knowledge, the only experimental study searching for AGMR was performed by Wei et al. (Reference 87). They have measured current-in-plane (CIP) and current-perpendicular-to-plane (CPP) magnetoresistances (MR) of magnetic multilayers containing two antiferromagnetic layers separated by a nonmagnetic layer. Such an antiferromagnetic spin valve, AFM/N/AFM, was predicted (Reference 84) to exhibit AGMR similar to GMR seen in ferromagnetic spin valves, F/N/F, containing two ferromagnetic layers separated by a nonmagnetic layer. Note, however, that calculations (Reference 84) assumed ballistic transport in samples with perfect layers and interfaces where AGMR is a consequence of quantum interference effects. Thus, any disorder that produces diffusive scattering and weakens quantum interference will weaken any such AGMR.

In F/N/F trilayers, the relative orientation of the magnetizations of the two Fs is controlled by an externally applied magnetic field B. To achieve well-defined antiparallel and parallel states of the two F layers, the moment of one F is often "pinned," via exchange coupling (exchange bias) to an adjacent AFM layer (Reference 88, 89), leaving the moment of the other free to reverse in much smaller B. In a simple AFM/N/AFM sample, just applying a field B is not expected to be efficient because of the weak effect of external fields on magnetic moments in AFMs. To achieve better control of the AFMs, AFM/N/AFM spin valves can be sandwiched between two F layers to give F/AFM/N/AFM/F, with the two AFM layers differently exchange-coupled to their respective F neighbors. Applying a magnetic field to change the magnetic order of the F layers should then also affect the order of the AFM layers. In addition to AFM/N/AFM and F/AFM/N/AFM/F multilayers, Wei et al. (Reference 87) have studied a variety of structures—F/AFM/N/AFM, AFM/F/N/AFM, F/AFM, and single F and AFM layers—to isolate the MR observations of interest from potential spurious effects.

For small applied currents, neither standard current-in-plane (CIP) MR measurements on extended multilayer films nor CPP MR measurements with point contacts showed any MRs for samples of all types. For larger applied currents, small positive CPP MRs (resistance is highest at saturation) were sometimes observed in samples with at least one F layer, while no MR was seen in samples with no Fs. These observations suggest sputtered AFM/N/AFM multilayers do not show AGMR, possibly owing to mostly diffusive transport in such imperfect films. Small MRs observed at higher currents in films with F layers may be associated with the suppression at high currents of spin accumulation induced within and around Fs (Reference 90). Further studies on high-quality films are still needed to verify any possible existence of AGMR in such structures.

4.2 ANTIFERROMAGNETIC STT

Stimulated by the theoretical studies in (Reference 84-86), four experimental searches for effects of STT on AFMs have been published so far (Reference 91-94), all working with exchange-biased spin-valves (EBSVs) of the form AFM/F1/N/F2. Here the AFM lies outside the "active" GMR region of the two F layers and serves mainly to "pin" the magnetization of the adjacent F2 layer to a higher reversing (switching) field than that of the "free" F1 layer, leaving the F1 layer free to rotate at a lower field. The pinning is produced either by heating the sample to above the blocking temperature of the AFM, applying a magnetic field, and then cooling to room temperature with the field on or by applying a magnetic field during sample growth. Wei et al. (Reference 91) used a point contact to inject a high dc current density $j \sim 10^{12}$ A/m² approximately CPP into an EBSV film. Urazhdin and Anthony (Reference 92) sent a dc CPP current density $j \sim 5 \times 10^{11}$ A/m² into electron-beam-lithography-fabricated nanopillar EBSVs. Tang et al. (Reference 93) sent a dc current-in-plane (CIP) current density $\sim 10^{10}$ A/m² into an EBSV film with a metallic AFM. Dai et al. (Reference 94) sent an ac CIP current density $j \sim 10^9$ A/m² into an EBSV film with an insulating AFM. In all of the studies (Reference 91-94), it was found that a sufficiently high bias current can influence the magnetic reversal of the "pinned" F1 layer. As the pinning (exchange bias) is known to be associated with interfacial AFM moments (Reference 88, 89), this observation can be taken as evidence of effects of the current on the AFM predicted in (Reference 84-86), given that other spurious effects (for example, Joule heating) can be ruled out.

The original observation of the effect was reported by Wei et al. (Reference 91), who measured magnetoresistance of a point contact to EBSV film at room temperature ($\sim 295\text{K}$) with negative current flowing from the contact tip into the film. The sample geometry is shown in Figure 12a. A point contact is used to inject a dc current into a sputtered $\text{N/F1/N/F2/AFM/N} = \text{Cu}(50 \text{ or } 100\text{nm})/\text{CoFe}(3 \text{ or } 10\text{nm})/\text{Cu}(10\text{nm})/\text{CoFe}(3 \text{ or } 10\text{nm})/\text{FeMn}(3 \text{ or } 8\text{nm})/\text{Au}(5\text{nm})$ multilayer (or inverted versions thereof—that is, $\text{Cu/FeMn/CoFe/Cu/CoFe/Au}$). The sample is heated to $\sim 450\text{K}$ (above the blocking temperature of FeMn) and then cooled in a magnetic field of 180 Oersteds to exchange-bias the "pinned" layer F2 to a higher magnetic field than needed to reverse the "free" layer F2. The top layer is covered by a 5-nm-thick layer of Au to protect it from atmospheric contamination. The magnetic field H is applied in the plane of the layers and along the direction of exchange bias. Magnetic coupling between the two F layers should be negligible, because the N layer is thick enough (10 nm) to eliminate exchange coupling, and the two F layers are wide enough ($\sim \text{mm}$) to minimize dipolar coupling. The bottom N layer is Cu, made thick enough (50 or 100 nm) to approximate an equipotential, thereby generating an approximately CPP current flow through the F1/N/F2/AFM EBSV.




Figure 12. (a) Schematic of point contact to sample geometry. Omitted is a 5-nm-thick protective Au capping layer between the point contact and the multilayer. The bottom N layer is also much thicker than shown to help produce a nearly CPP current. (b) R (vertical scale) versus applied magnetic field B for a series of currents I . The solid black curves are hysteresis curves starting from large positive B and finishing at large negative B . The grey curves start at large negative B and finish at positive B . In the dark curves, the "free" layer, F1, switches at ~ -5 mT and the pinned layer, F2, switches at fields ranging from below -40 mT (large positive I) to about -60 mT (large negative I). (c-e) Grey-scale plots of R versus B for different values of I . White is maximum R (antiparallel state) and black is minimum R (parallel state). Lines are linear fits to the data at 30 percent (dashed white), 50 percent (solid white) and 70 percent (dashed black) of maximum R . Sample (c) is the sample of (b), with the AFM layer on the bottom (furthest from the point contact). Sample (d) is similar to (c), except inverted, so that the AFM layer is on top (closest to the point contact). Sample (e) differs from (b) only in that it has two equally thick (8-nm) F layers. (Reference 91)

Figure 12b shows magnetoresistance curves for a series of currents I applied to a point contact with resistance $R = 0.92 \Omega$. The dark curves show sweeps from positive to negative field, and the lighter curves show sweeps back down from negative to positive field. For this contact, $I = 30$ mA corresponds to $j \sim 2 \times 10^8 \text{ A/cm}^2$. For dark curves, a large positive field $+B$ along the pinning direction causes the moments of both the "free" and "pinned" F layers to point along $+B$, producing the minimum resistance R_P in this parallel orientation of the two Fs. Reducing the magnitude of B , the "free" F2 layer reverses at a small-magnitude negative B , giving the maximum resistance R_{AP} in antiparallel configuration. Finally, a larger magnitude negative B breaks the exchange-bias pinning of the "pinned" F1 layer, and its moment rotates to along $-B$, returning the

sample to R_p . For lighter curves of back-sweeps (Figure 12b), the measured resistance follows these changes in reverse order.

Focusing on the dark curves, we see that the switching field of the free layer F1 is essentially independent of the magnitude of I and shows little broadening. In contrast, the switching field of the pinned layer F2 broadens significantly as the magnitude of I increases, and the midpoint of the switching also shifts with I , increasing for $-I$ and decreasing for $+I$. Similar behaviors are seen also in the lighter curves. Opposite shifts for $+I$ and $-I$ indicate these shifts cannot be due to Joule heating, which should cause shifts in the same direction for both directions of I . But Joule heating might contribute to the broadening of the switching transitions. The shifts of the dark curves are specified more clearly in Figure 12c, which shows grey-scale plots of the heights of the curves in Figure 12b, with white representing the antiparallel state of maximum resistance, and black the parallel state of minimum resistance. Data for three representative contacts (out of 29) on three different samples show that the behavior of interest is not limited to a single sample or contact, and that similar results are generally obtained for straight line fits to 30 percent (white dashed lines), 50 percent (solid white lines), and 70 percent (solid black lines) of the maximum change in R . The sample in Figure 12d is a contact with $R = 1.6 \Omega$ to an inverted version of the sample in Figures 12b and c, so that the "directions" of currents are reversed. The sample in Figure 12e has equal thickness $F1 = F2 = 3\text{-nm}$ layers. All three samples show the same features—that is, electrons passing through F2 into the AFM layer enhance pinning, and electrons passing through the AFM layer into F2 reduce it. Similar to the case of AFM=CoFe, a negative current density $\sim 10^{12} \text{ A/m}^2$ injected through the F=CoFe into an AFM=IrMn/CoFe interface (Reference 95, 96) was found to increase the exchange bias, while a positive current decreased it.

Wei et al. (Reference 91) proposed the following qualitative explanation for these asymmetric changes in switching (exchange bias) field with current. Near the switching field, the metastability of F2's opposite to field orientation is due almost entirely to exchange interactions with uncompensated moments in the surface layer of the antiferromagnet. Some of these spins are pinned, thereby inducing an energy barrier for ferromagnetic layer spin reversal (Reference 88, 89). Electrons flowing from F2 into AFM induce torques on moments in the AFM matrix, altering its magnetic configuration (Reference 84). These STT torques tend to favor parallel alignment of moments at the F2/AFM interface and will therefore tend to increase the exchange bias field. Electrons flowing in the opposite direction will tend to have the opposite effect. The observed variations in exchange bias mediated by an electrical current thus can be taken as good evidence of the STT effect in AFM. However, such transport measurements do not distinguish between effects of the current on the bulk AFM and those on interfacial AFM moments, and more elaborate techniques are needed to obtain a detailed understanding of the phenomenon.

5. Summary and Conclusions

The semiconductor industry has distinguished itself by a long-term trend known as Moore's law (Reference 97) that foresees an exponential increase in transistor density on a chip, doubling approximately every 2 years. Continuing at this pace, the transistor density will reach $\sim 10^{13} \text{ cm}^{-2}$ by 2035, which at clock speeds of $\sim 10 \text{ GHz}$ would result in $\sim 40 \text{ MW/cm}^2$ of power dissipated on a chip. Unless the energy dissipation from

transistor switching can be reduced dramatically, the thermal load associated with 40 MW/cm² will exceed that in a rocket nozzle. The failure of thermal management on a chip might end the continued progress of the semiconductor industry well before 2035. The International Technology Roadmap for Semiconductors (<http://www.itrs.net>) has termed this imminent collapse the "Red Brick Wall," where "Red" indicates no "known manufacturable solutions" (of reasonable confidence) exist for continued scaling in some aspect of the semiconductor technology.

The scenario above motivates the search for signal-processing devices that dissipate very little energy when they switch. The emerging spintronic technology might offer such devices where information is carried by spin—in contrast to CMOS transistors, where it is carried by charge—since spin has an inherent advantage over charge when it comes to energy dissipation. Therefore, if a reliable way can be found to control and manipulate spins, spintronic devices could offer higher data processing speeds, lower electricity consumption, and many other advantages over conventional chips, perhaps including the ability to carry out radically new quantum computations.

A spintronic device calls for efficient methods to generate, conduct, process, and detect spin-encoded signals. We have reviewed the physics and emerging applications of two principal spintronic phenomena—giant magnetoresistance and spin-transfer-torque—that provide means to detect (GMR) and manipulate (STT) the spin signals. GMR has already spawned major technological change in the information storage industry with the usage of GMR sensors and read heads and, along with tunneling magnetoresistance (TMR), is expected to continue to dominate the detection of spin-encoded signals. STT is a more recent development in spintronics that provides an efficient means of controlling and manipulating spin distributions on the nanometer length scale and the picosecond-time scale, thus positioning STT as the method of choice for fast processing of spin signals in nanodevices.

What is the future of spintronic applications? A number of new spintronic devices based on GMR and STT have been proposed. These include high-frequency (GHz) oscillators, sources, and detectors, as well as magnetic field sensors—for example, in nonvolatile memories such as racetrack and STT magnetic random access memory (STT-MRAM). However, much fundamental work remains to be done before we see commercial applications of these devices. For the memory industry, development of these spintronic applications may lead to a universal memory that would combine cost benefits of DRAM, speed of SRAM, and nonvolatility of flash RAM. Potentially all logic operations on a chip could be carried out by manipulating spins in metallic systems instead of manipulating charges in semiconductor transistors, as in conventional microchips. Moreover, such operations could be combined on a chip with a universal memory. This would result in a new scalable and radiation-resistant electronics, computers, and so forth. The radiation resistance would be of particular interest for aerospace applications because the radiation in space is known to severely damage conventional electronics by building up a destructive charge in transistors. Long space trips that would expose onboard electronics to years of radiation would benefit from the radiation resistance and reduced power consumption (for example, like a nonvolatile memory that can retain the stored information even when not powered) of metallic spintronic devices. More generally, the impact of reduced power consumption in electronic devices is hard to overestimate, as we rely on such devices in almost every aspect of our everyday lives.

Finally, metallic spintronics and its applications discussed in this report are all based on already well-established physical phenomena such as GMR and STT. As the spintronics field is still in a relative state of infancy, new and more exciting phenomena are likely to be uncovered in the future.

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
Definition of Metamaterials

A metamaterial is defined as an artificial medium whose properties (mechanical, optical, magnetic, or other) cannot be found in naturally-occurring materials. The emphasis of this study will be on electromagnetic and optical metamaterials. Such metamaterials can exhibit rather extreme properties, such as negative refractive index, which implies that both electric permittivity and magnetic permeability must be negative ($\epsilon < 0$, $\mu < 0$) (Reference 1). Such metamaterials used to be called "left-handed" because of the unusual phase relationship between the electric and magnetic fields. Specifically, in most (positive index, including vacuum) media one uses the right-hand rule to define the relationship between electric field ($\vec{E}$), magnetic field ($\vec{H}$), and the propagation wavenumber ($\vec{k}$). The physical basis of the right-hand rule is that the direction of energy propagation defined by the Poynting vector $\vec{S} = c\vec{E} \times \vec{H}/4\pi$ and the direction of the phase velocity (defined by the wavenumber $\vec{k}$) must coincide. That does not hold true for negative index metamaterials where the two directions are opposite, therefore, the left-handed relationship must hold for the three vectors. Nevertheless, the "left-handed" designation did not withstand the test of time because it was causing confusion and creating irrelevant allusions to helical (a.k.a. chiral) structures. Although chiral structures can indeed exhibit negative index behavior (Reference 2), chirality is not necessary.

A typical metamaterial consists of resonant elements such as Split Ring Resonators (SRR). An example of an SRR is shown in Figure 1. The main function of the SRR is to enable strong magnetic response of the structure. A simple empirical formula exists for the magnetic permeability of a metamaterial comprised of the SRRs:

$$\mu = 1 - \frac{F\omega_M^2}{\omega^2 - \omega_M^2} < 0, \quad (1)$$

where ω_M is the resonant frequency of the SRR, and F is proportional to the volume filling factor of SRRs. It is noteworthy that SRRs are designed in such a way that it has a large capacitance. As the result, the resonant frequency of an SRR is small, (that is, the SRR-containing cell is very sub-wavelength). In the example shown in Figure 1 (taken from Reference 6), the unit cell operated at $\omega/2\pi = 10$ GHz is $\lambda/10$. In fact, the sub-wavelength size of the metamaterial is what distinguishes them from their close cousins: photonic crystals. By properly designing magnetic SRRs, it is possible to achieve any value of μ for any given frequency. Special challenges exist for optical structures, though, as will be explained below.



cyl.	r	s	μ_r
1	0.260	1.654	0.003
2	0.254	1.677	0.023
3	0.245	1.718	0.052
4	0.230	1.771	0.085
5	0.208	1.825	0.120
6	0.190	1.886	0.154
7	0.173	1.951	0.188
8	0.148	2.027	0.220
9	0.129	2.110	0.250
10	0.116	2.199	0.279

Figure 1. Example of a Metamaterial Component: The Magnetic Split Ring Resonator (MSRR). The in-plane lattice parameters are $a_y = a_z = 10/3$ mm. The ring is square, with edge length $l = 3$ mm and tracewidth $w = 0.2$ mm. The substrate is 381 μm -thick Duroid 5870 ($\epsilon = 2.33$, $t_d = 0.0012$ at 10 GHz, where t_d is the loss tangent). The Cu film, from which the SRRs are patterned, is 17 μm thick. The parameters r and s are given in the table together with the associated value of μ_r . (Reference 6)

Electric properties of metamaterials can be similarly controlled. An example of a planar electrically-active metamaterial is shown in Figure 2.




Figure 2. Example of Another Metamaterial Component: Electric Ring Resonator (ERR). This component provides tunable resonant electric response to the incident electromagnetic field, and can be utilized for engineering the frequency-dependent dielectric permittivity $\epsilon(\omega)$. Possible application: THz and microwave absorbers. (Reference 7)

The electric response of such (or similar) metamaterial is given by

$$\varepsilon(\omega) = 1 - \frac{\omega_p^2}{\omega^2 - \omega_R^2 + i\omega\gamma} \quad (2)$$

where ω_R is the resonant frequency and γ is the loss coefficient.

Negative index metamaterials are by no means the only potentially useful metamedia. Several new concepts such as Indefinite Permittivity Metamaterials (IPM) (References 3, 4) and Epsilon-Near-Zero (ENZ) metamaterials (Reference 5) have recently emerged and found some exciting applications that will be reviewed below. IPMs can be used as ultra-compact spatial filters (both high-pass and low-pass) whereas ENR metamaterials can be used for making sub-wavelength waveguides capable of coupling close to 100 percent of the incident radiation (Reference 8), as well as directing it around tight bends with negligible bending losses. Yet another class of planar metamaterials, complementary metamaterials (CMMs), has recently emerged (Reference 7). Instead of using metallic structures deposited on a substrate (left panel of Figure 3), CMMs consist of slits in the continuous metal screen (right panel of Figure 3). The shape of the slits coincides with that of the materials themselves. Such complementary metamaterials have been recently used for making epsilon-near zero waveguides (Reference 8).




Figure 3. Geometry of Original Planar Metamaterial Unit Cells (OE1-OE6) and Their Complements (CE1-CE6). The polarization of normally incident electromagnetic radiation is configured as shown in OE1 and CE1 for the original and complementary metamaterials, respectively. (Reference 9)

In general, metamaterials offer a new way of designing electromagnetic structures with arbitrary values of permittivity/permeability tensors, as well as other parameters (such as bi-anisotropy coefficient). In many instances, metamaterials enable us to considerably minimize sizes of resonators, transmission lines, and so forth. Such miniaturization is possible due to the resonant nature of the individual unit cells. Specifically, the structures shown in Figure 3 have high capacitance; therefore, their individual sizes are very sub-wavelength. That enables arrangement within sub-wavelength units that can be densely packed and result in strongly miniaturized components. It is this miniaturization that makes metamaterials interesting for aerospace application where small weight and size are essential.

While the most spectacular progress in the field of electromagnetic metamaterials has so far occurred in the microwave range, it is the optical (visible, infrared, mid-infrared) spectral regions that hold most promise for revolutionary applications. Electromagnetic metamaterials have a tremendous potential for revolutionizing propagation, storage, and conversion of electromagnetic waves across the entire Electromagnetic Spectrum. In our opinion, the most exciting applications that are relevant for aerospace applications include energy harvesting, developing novel optical devices with unusual yet practically important capabilities (for example, non-reciprocal devices), enhancing the efficiency of nonlinear optical devices, developing novel imaging modalities capable of breaking the diffraction limit (for example, super-lenses, hyper-lenses, far field super-lenses), and developing novel lithographic techniques.

Optical metamaterials are still a very new area. Just a handful of experimental demonstrations of multi-layer (truly bulk) optical metamaterials exist at the moment. Among the most recent ones are (a) demonstration of the negative index optical metamaterial at the telecommunications wavelength (Reference 10) that used the so-called fishnet structure shaped as a prism for demonstrating Snell's Law, and (b) demonstration of the Indefinite Permittivity Material (IPM) and *negative refraction* (which, in the context of anisotropic metamaterials, is not the same as *negative refractive index*) in the mid-infrared part of the spectrum (Reference 11). These structures have the distinction of being multi-layer (or bulk). Most previous examples of optical metamaterials have dealt with single or double-layer substances which cannot be, strictly speaking, characterized as metamaterials. The difficulty in obtaining strong magnetic activity in optical metamaterials has been explained in several recent reviews (References 12, 13). In a nutshell, the issue is that the magnetic moment of most structures (including atomic systems) is very small, much smaller than the electric moment. Therefore, it is difficult to observe any optical effects that can be clearly assigned to magnetic activity. This is especially true for the structures that are much smaller than one wavelength. Exceptions, such as artificially constructed split rings, are possible. However, such structures cannot be operated at very high frequency because of the excitation of electrostatic resonances (Reference 12). In other words, when the resonant frequency is too high (or the dielectric permittivity of a metal is not sufficiently large), electrostatic resonances disrupt magnetic activity. More specifically, the energy inside and in the vicinity of a metamaterial element (for example, Split Ring Resonator) becomes predominantly electrostatic, (that is, in the form of the kinetic energy of oscillating electrons). The recently described multi-layer fishnet (Reference 10) is not an exception: its unit cell (that is, the lateral period) is only one-half of the operating wavelength.




Figure 4. Recent Optical Metamaterials for Telecommunication Wavelength $\lambda = 1.5 \mu\text{m}$ (Left and Middle) and Mid-Infrared IPM. The multi-layer fishnet is made of silver films separated by a dielectric spacer. A focused ion beam was used to produce the prism-shaped fishnet. The IPM was obtained by depositing interleaved 80 nm layers of $\text{In}_{0.53}\text{Ga}_{0.47}\text{As}$ and $\text{Al}_{0.48}\text{In}_{0.52}\text{As}$. The layers, approximately 8.1 μm thick, grown by molecular beam epitaxy on lattice-matched InP substrates. The InGaAs layers were uniformly doped to create different values of permittivity in alternating layers. (Reference 10 and 11)

That is not to say that there is not ongoing theoretical and experimental work on designing optical metamaterials for practical applications. The author's research group at UT- Austin, has designed the first Plasmonic Negative Index Metamaterials (P-NIM) super-lens (Reference 14), developed novel techniques for analyzing optical properties of plasmonic nanostructures, (including band-structure calculations of periodic nanostructures) (Reference 15) and quasi-static calculations of plasmonic resonances (Reference 16). The UT-Austin group has also designed a number of unique sub-wavelength P-NIMs in the optical part of the spectrum (References 14, 17, 18), and has recently published a review of optical P-NIMs (Reference 12). The group has also contributed to developing and experimentally implementing the concept of the "perfect lens" (Reference 19) based on plasmonic/polaritonic materials. A perfect lens enables imaging of sub-wavelength objects in the infrared part of the spectrum, including objects buried under the surface. Also developed is a Wide-Angle "Perfect" Absorber of Mid-Infrared Radiation (WAPAMIR) (Reference 20) based on the negative index metamaterial whose impedance is perfectly matched to vacuum.

Below is a concise summary of various topics/applications that are especially suitable for the aerospace industry. This study concentrates on the facility of metamaterials to miniaturize various optical and microwave components. Metamaterials can also be used for imaging very small (sub-wavelength) objects without resorting to costly and space-consuming near-field scanning optical microscopy. Also described are the ongoing efforts in the field to make extremely compact metamaterials-based lasers. Smaller lasers mean smaller weight and more room for other diagnostic devices and useful payload within the confines of a space vehicle. Applications of metamaterials to photon harvesting is especially fitting for advanced aerospace platforms because of the necessity to collect electromagnetic energy for battery recharging, diagnostic spectroscopy, and other vital functions of a space vehicle.

- **Complementary Metamaterials for Energy Harvesting.** Development of ultra-thin photovoltaic and thermo-photovoltaic cells is hampered by weak photon absorption in semiconductors. Metamaterials can modify absorption making it wavelength-selective (tunable), highly efficient, and, if desired, wide-angle. Recently a way has been found for creating quarter-wavelength resonators backed by leaky mirrors made out of CMMs.

- **Far Field Super-Lens Based on the Interferometry of Sub-Diffraction Waves.** Sub-diffraction imaging has long been considered to be possible only using near-field microscopes. Those are fairly complex, slow-scanning, and large devices that are not appropriate for advanced aerospace platforms. Metamaterials enable new imaging modalities: super-lenses, hyper-lenses, and far-field super-lenses. In addition to a survey of the existing scientific literature, novel ideas on developing a new interferometric Far-field Super-Lens (FSL) based on the multi-beam multi-detector technique utilizing materials with Indefinite Permittivity Tensor are presented. Fabrication of such Indefinite Permittivity Materials (IPMs) for the mid-infrared part of the spectrum is achieved and demonstrates the capabilities of transmitting electromagnetic waves with the spatial period much smaller than the vacuum wavelength of light. Interference between sub-diffraction waves enables disentangling multiple diffractive orders and extracting their amplitudes.
- **Nonlinear Non-Reciprocal Chiral Metamaterials: Developing Novel Optical Isolators and "One-Way" Microwave Mirrors.** These developments are motivated by the need to construct one-way "light diodes" for compact optical isolators. Presently there are two approaches to optical isolation: the most common using magnetic fields, and the less developed based on using nonlinearities. A different approach relies on the phenomenon of adiabatic mode conversion in nonlinear chiral metamaterials. Preliminary theoretical results for a simple chiral fiber with a variable twist period (pitch) that enables full transmission of a tightly confined core mode in the forward direction and full mode-conversion of the core mode into a cladding mode for the backwards propagation is obtained.
- **Slowing Down Light and Miniaturizing Optical Components Using the Phenomenon of Electromagnetically Induced Transparency in Metamaterials.** The speed of light places a natural limit on the size of optical/microwave components. Metamaterials offer an exciting opportunity to slow down light. This has two major implications: (a) light can be stored/manipulated in smaller volumes, and (b) nonlinear effects are strongly enhanced by the resulting energy compression.

Applications to Sub-Diffraction Imaging: Super-Lens and Hyper-Lens

The super-lens is one of the earliest applications of metamaterials (Reference 21), and its principle is shown in Figure 5. Without the super-lens, all information about sub-diffraction (or sub-wavelengths, which is equivalent) features of the periodic object would have been lost. The reason for the information loss is evanescent decay of the large spatial wavenumbers. The only method of accessing/measuring these features would be to scan the object using a near field scanning optical microscope. By inserting a super-lens between the object and the imaging plane, evanescent waves may be amplified and the image transferred forward. Unfortunately, this approach by itself does not remove the need for a near-field scanning device; the image that is recreated in the imaging plane is still sub-wavelength, and needs to be read out.




Figure 5. Schematic of the Super-Lens with $n=-1$ Refractive Index Corresponding to $(\epsilon = -1, \mu = -1)$ Surrounded By Vacuum. Super-lens' presence enables imaging sub-diffraction objects such as the periodic grating shown here.

There are, however, interesting circumstances when it is very important to transport the image towards the scanning device. One such special circumstance is spatially-resolved spectroscopy of small (for example, cellular) structures. One can envision space expeditions to other planets that could, potentially, result in finding some evidence of primitive cellular-level life. It would then be highly desirable to examine the structure of the living cell in its natural environment. In all likelihood, that environment would be liquid. Therefore, it would be very desirable to examine the cell without actually touching it with a tip of a near-field optical microscope. Thus, the sub-surface imaging of a small object which is buried underneath a liquid layer would be necessary. No such experiments have so far been conducted. However, several years ago there was an experiment demonstrating imaging of sub-diffraction objects buried under the layer of silicon dioxide.

The schematic and experimental results from the experiment (Reference 19) are shown in Figure 6. In this experiment the sub-wavelength objects were simple holes that were milled in the metal using an FIB. They were buried underneath the super-lens consisting of SiC (negative epsilon material for mid-infrared frequencies) and silicon dioxide (positive epsilon material). Note that this configuration (materials with $\epsilon_1 > 0$ and $\epsilon_2 \approx -\epsilon_1 < 0$ joined together: sandwiched or positioned next to each other) is typical for a near-field super-lens. The difference between the near-field super-lens shown in Figure 6 and the "ideal" super-lens shown in Figure 5 is that the ideal also requires a material with a negative value of magnetic permeability.




Figure 6. Schematic of the SiC-Based Super-Lens Which is Imaging Sub-Wavelength Holes Buried Under the SiO₂ Layer. The imaged objects are $\lambda/20$ holes milled in gold using FIB. The scattered signal is picked up by the tip of an NSOM and directed towards the IR detector. Depending on the imaging wavelength, either amplitude (e) or the phase (f,g) of the signal are prominent.

As the laser beam scatters off the sub-wavelength holes, its electric field is picked up by the tip of a Near-Field Scattering Optical Microscope (NSOM) and re-scattered into the far-field. There it is interfered with the reference pulse and picked up by an infrared detector. Note that this interferometric technique enables one to extract both the phase and amplitude of the field, as shown in Figure 6. This significantly broadens the spectral range over which the super-lens yields meaningful information. For example, the amplitude contrast is highest at $\lambda = 10.85 \mu\text{m}$ shown in panel (e) while the phase contrasts are the highest at $\lambda = 11.03 \mu\text{m}$ and $\lambda = 10.65 \mu\text{m}$.

Despite the convenience of the near-field super-lens, (that is, its ability to transport the image) it still requires an NSOM to read out the image. Within the confines of an advanced aerospace platform such device (with its necessary auxiliaries) may not fit. Therefore, one has to consider alternative metamaterials-based ideas for sub-diffraction imaging. One such idea, the hyper-lens, has been proposed recently by two groups (References 22-24), and already experimentally tested by another group (Reference 25). The principle of the hyper-lens is very simple: to use an indefinite permittivity medium (sometimes referred to as the hyperbolic medium because the relationship between the propagation wavenumbers and the frequency, also known as the constant frequency contour, has a hyperbolic nature) in a tapered format. Several conceptual implementations such as the spoke-like structure and the cylindrical multi-layer structure (see Figure 7, left panel) have been suggested. The hyper-lens works on two principles: (a) indefinite permittivity materials (of which the super-lens is one example) are capable of propagating sub-diffraction waves, and (b) the expanding nature of the hyper-lens can magnify images to the $\lambda/2$ size, at which point they become observable in a conventional microscope. One recent experimental implementation of the hyper-lens in UV is shown in the right panel of Figure 7. The hyper-lens is made of 16 layers of Ag/Al₂O₃. This specific hyper-lens was used for imaging a line pair object with line width of 35 nm and spacing of 150 nm and was operated at $\lambda = 400$ nm. The magnified image (350 nm spacing) can be clearly resolved with an optical microscope [numerical aperture (NA) = 1.4], thus demonstrating magnification and projection of a sub-diffraction-limited image into the far field.




Figure 7. Theoretical Concepts (left panel) and Experimental Implementation (right panel) of an Optical Hyper-lens Capable of Magnifying Sub-Diffraction Objects to Observable (larger than $\lambda/2$) Size

Note that the hyper-lens concept does not require employing a bulky near-field scanning optical microscope. However, the practical implementation of the hyper-lens is by no means simple. The original implementation required depositing the sample on the curved surface of the hyper-lens. A more practical implementation of the super-lens has been theoretically proposed by another group (Reference 26). The concept is shown in Figure 8. The hyper-lens involves an array of thin metallic wires converging towards the tip. As is demonstrated, a dense array of metal wires separated by much less than the wavelength constitutes a metamaterial with the indefinite permittivity tensor. Specifically, the tensor component along the wires is given by:

$$\epsilon_{zz} = 1 - \omega_p^2 / (\omega^2 - k_z^2 c^2) \text{ and } \epsilon_{xx} = \epsilon_{yy} = 1, \quad (3)$$

where the z component is along the wires and perpendicular direction is normal to the wires. Because the only propagating waves are the TEM waves satisfying the $\omega^2 = k_z^2 c^2$ dispersion relation, this meta-medium is strongly anisotropic and supports sub-wavelength waves which perform imaging. The spatial resolution is given by the spacing between wires. Figure 8 (right panel) shows the magnified image of a small ($\lambda/25$) object placed at the tip of the hyper-lens. The magnification factor is 5x.




Figure 8. Hyper-Lens Based on a Converging Array of Metal Wires. A small object can be placed at the tip, illuminated from the top, and magnified by the expanding array of wires. Left panel: schematic. Right panel: $\lambda/25$ object magnified by a factor 5x by the expanding hyper-lens. This hyper-lens can operate at mid-IR frequencies. (Reference 26)

Another concept for sub-wavelength imaging employing metamaterials is the so-called Far-Field Super-Lens (FSL). The concept is pioneered in Reference 27. The idea is

described in Figure 9. A sub-wavelength object (for example, two slits) is located at the bottom of a multi-layer super-lens. Another sub-wavelength grating is deposited on top of the super-lens. Because the super-lens (and for that matter, any indefinite permittivity material) is capable of propagating sub-diffraction waves, the electromagnetic perturbations created by the object are propagated through the super-lens upwards, until they encounter the sub-wavelength grating. At that point these sub-wavelength perturbations are diffracted on the image-releasing grating and converted into the far-field electromagnetic waves. Those far-field waves are collected by the objective of a microscope and observed through the eyepiece. The schematic is shown in Figure 9(a). Note that, again, there is no need for NSOM. The actual implementation of the FSL used the following object: a nanowire pair with 50 nm wide slit and 70 nm gap inscribed by focused ion beam on a 40 nm thick Cr film on the quartz substrate. Diffraction-limited image from a conventional optical microscope cannot resolve the two nanowires ($NA = 1.4$, $\lambda_0 = 377$ nm) as can be seen in Figure 9(c), but the FSL-equipped microscope can as shown in Figure 9(d).

Despite the success of this demonstration, there are serious issues involved in imaging sub-wavelength objects. Specifically it is pointed out in Reference 27 that multiple diffractive orders can become entangled, (that is, launched in the same direction into the far field). Disentangling these diffraction orders is very important. The payoff would be imaging of fully 2-D (flat) objects with a resolution smaller than the period of the image-releasing grating. More precisely, this ambiguity is illustrated by the right panel in Figure 10. If the sub-wavelength object is represented by the continuous spectrum (blue line), then the spectrum can be sampled within the discrete set of "zones" which are defined by the diffractive orders of the image-releasing grating. The width of each zone is $2\omega/c$, and they are labeled as 1st order, 2nd order, and so forth. Wave numbers belonging to the different zones can be diffracted onto the same far-field detector as explained in Figure 10. In order to disentangle the 1st and the 2nd zones, a single detector cannot provide sufficient information. It turns out that using two detectors (A and B) and two laser beams (Beam A and Beam B) provides additional information that is sufficient to disentangle the two zones. This additional information is obtained by comparing the intensity on the two detectors A and B. Another advantage of this imaging technique is that it is interferometric in nature. Therefore, even if the contribution of some of these spectral zones' orders is very weak, it can still be detected because of the high sensitivity of the interferometric techniques. What makes this interference special is that it involves sub-diffractive waves propagating through the indefinite permittivity metamaterial. Below some of the experiments conducted in the laboratory that demonstrate such interference are discussed.




Figure 9. FSL Based on an Indefinite Permittivity Metamaterial Placed Between the Object and the Image-Releasing Grating. The grating releases into the far field sub-diffraction waves produced by light scattering off the object. The role of the metamaterial is to propagate sub-diffraction waves from object to grating. (Reference 27)

Ever since Merlin's invention (Reference 28) of the sub-diffraction near-field plate, it has become clear that the interference between sub-diffraction electromagnetic fields can result in the formation of a deeply sub-wavelength image. The near-field plate, however, is not an imaging device; its purpose is to create a well-defined image using an elaborate pre-fabricated sub-wavelength structure on the plate's surface. The goal for this study is to observe an a priori unknown sub-wavelength image using a near-field structure. In the past, successes (Reference 19) in retrieving images of sub-wavelength objects (such as $\lambda/20$ holes) using an NSOM for radiation detection are achieved. An NSOM is a near-field instrument, therefore, a much more desirable detection method would involve far-field detection. To advance this goal, and to develop a tool sometimes referred to as the FSL, we've initiated research on multi-beam multi-detector sub-wavelength holography illustrated in Figure 10.




Figure 10. Tomographic Multi-Beam Multi-Detector Holography of Sub-Wavelength Objects Using Indefinite Permittivity Medium (IPM). Incident beam(s) scatter off the sub- λ object, propagate through the IPM, and then get re-scattered into the far field by the grating with the period D . The purpose of the multi-detector arrangement is to disentangle the k_x and k_y spatial wave numbers in the object's spectrum (shown in the left panel). Beams A and B are phase-shifted with respect to each other.

Our implementation of the FSL utilizes an IPM whose dielectric permittivity tensor is anisotropic and contains positive and negative components: $\varepsilon_{\perp} > 0, \varepsilon_{\parallel} < 0$, where parallel refers to the IPM/object interface. We have already fabricated such IPMs using SiO₂-SiC-SiO₂ multi-layer, and are investigating other approaches involving selectively-doped semiconductor multi-layers similar to the ones used by Gmachl's group at Princeton. SiO₂-SiC-SiO₂ multi-layers are produced in-house (with SiC films shipped by Professor Ferro from University of Lyons, France). The main function of the IPM is to propagate sub-diffraction waves ($k_{\parallel} > \omega/c$) with as little decay as possible. That happens because these sub-diffraction waves are no longer evanescent: $k_{\perp}^2 \approx -k_{\parallel}^2 \varepsilon_{\parallel} / \varepsilon_{\perp} > 0$. It is demonstrated experimentally that there exists a frequency range for which sub-diffraction waves propagate through the IPM with less attenuation than the radiation-zone waves ($k_{\parallel} < \omega/c$), see Figure 11.




Figure 11. First Experimental Demonstration of Propagating Sub-Diffraction Waves in the IPM. (Left): Experimental setup demonstrating how sub-diffraction waves are launched into the IPM using FIB-fabricated sub-wavelength grating. Because the periods of the bottom ("launching") and top ("transforming") gratings are different, far-field observation of different harmonics of the bottom grating is enabled. (Right): Experimental results: the first sub-diffraction harmonic of the grating (green line) becomes stronger than the zeroth radiation-zone harmonic of the grating (blue line) in the region where $\varepsilon_{\perp} > 0, \varepsilon_{\parallel} < 0$.

Once sub-diffraction waves propagate through the IPM, they can diffract on the image-releasing grating (see Figure 10) and be radiated out into the far field. A detector array can be used to collect the signal and reconstruct the image. Unfortunately, different wave numbers $k_{\parallel}$ of the object are directed into the same detector and produce an ambiguity in extracting their respective amplitudes $A(k_{\parallel})$. This ambiguity is illustrated by Figure 10: wave numbers $k_1 = \Delta k + 2\pi/D$ and $k_2 = \Delta k + 4\pi/D$ are directed to the same far-field detector. Simply put, a single number (intensity of light with the wave number $\Delta k < \omega/c$ incident on the detector) is insufficient for determining two scattering

amplitudes ($A(k_1)$ and $A(k_2)$). Therefore, a new concept has to be developed, and the multi-detector technique is such a concept.

The concept requires two detectors and two coherent laser beams. The two beams are formed using a beam-splitter and a variable delay line imparting a phase shift to the two beams (see the actual experimental photograph in Figure 13 where the beam-splitter BS and the Delay Line are shown). We have theoretically demonstrated that the intensity dependences of the two detector intensities $I_1(\psi)$ and $I_2(\psi)$ as a function of the phase delay ψ provides enough information to recover both $A(k_1)$ and $A(k_2)$.




Figure 12. (Left): Schematic for 2-Beams/2-Detectors Interferometric Measurement. (Right): Numerical Simulation: intensity on the two detectors as a function of the phase delay between beams A and B produced by the interference between the zeroth and first diffractive orders of the bottom diffractive grating (numerical simulation). The second detector provides the necessary second data point which is necessary for separating the contributions of different diffractive orders.

Two sets of experiments demonstrating the feasibility of the concept are conducted. None of these experiments constitutes imaging per se. However, without demonstrating the two key milestones described below, proper imaging experiments cannot be attempted.

The first milestone involves demonstrating that IPM indeed supports propagating (non-evanescent) sub-diffraction waves. Figure 11 shows the experimental schematic (left panel) and experimental results. The bottom grating "imprints" its Fourier components (zeroth, first, second, third, and so forth) onto the incident laser pulse thereby generating electromagnetic waves that are launched into the SiC-based IPM. The zeroth harmonic is inside the radiation zone (that is, it is not sub-diffraction), while the first, second, and so forth sub-diffraction. These EM waves scatter off the top grating having a slightly different period and are released into the far field. Because the direction in which waves are released depend on the Fourier harmonic's number, we can experimentally separate and measure them. Clearly, the relative magnitudes of these diffractive orders dramatically vary as a function of the laser wavelength. For example, the zeroth diffraction order clearly dominates in the $\varepsilon_{\perp} < 0, \varepsilon_{\parallel} > 0$ frequency range.

However, in the $\varepsilon_{\perp} > 0, \varepsilon_{\parallel} < 0$ frequency range the first diffractive order becomes larger

than the zeroth one. This confirms the recently predicted effect that for IPMs one can indeed observe a very counterintuitive effect: sub-diffraction waves can indeed propagate with less loss than the diffraction-limited ones.

The second milestone involves demonstrating the possibility of observing the interference of sub-diffraction electromagnetic waves inside the IPM using the two-beam/two-detector technique. Figure 10 demonstrates this interference pattern which reveals the phase advance of the sub-diffraction waves inside the IPM. While we have so far demonstrated the interference between the first Fourier component of the grating (sub-diffraction) and the zeroth Fourier component, we see the possibility of interfering even more sub-diffraction waves (2nd and 3rd).




Figure 13. (Left): Experimental Setup for 2-Beams/2-Detectors Interferometric Measurement in Our Lab. (Right): Preliminary Experimental Results: infrared intensity on two detectors (red and black lines) are (i) different from each other; (ii) have a sinusoidal dependence on the delay line position (in microns), which is equivalent to the phase delay between the two beams; (iii) are shifted in phase by the amount equal to twice the phase difference between the 1st order (sub-diffraction) and 0th order (radiation zone) Fourier components of the bottom grating. Measurements taken at $\lambda = 10.8 \mu\text{m}$ and $\lambda = 11.3 \mu\text{m}$.

With these two milestones established, it is now possible to conduct true sub-wavelength imaging experiments using two (or more) far-field detectors and jointly processing their inputs.

Applications to Circuits and Waveguide Miniaturization: Slowing Down and Manipulating Electromagnetic Pulses (EMP) Using Advanced Metamaterials

Given the space constraints of an advanced aerospace platform and the amount of the useful payload that has to be carried, it is very important that every optical and microwave component be as small as possible. Because of the very large speed of light, there is a natural limit to how small such components can be made. Any structure capable of processing EMPs (be those optical, THz, or microwave) of temporal duration τ must be at least $L = c\tau$ long. For example, a 1 ns microwave pulse can be manipulated inside a device that is at least 1 ft long. Pulse manipulation can be understood very broadly by pulse compression, frequency shifting, harmonics generation, or other. For aerospace communications systems, it may be very desirable to have the ability to manipulate the format of EMPs, (that is, to change their frequency, duration, and repetition rate). Slowing down or even stopping the EMP can circumvent the length requirement if the group velocity is reduced to $v_g \ll c$, and thus the required length is $L = v_g \tau$.




Figure 14. Schematic of Pulse Compression in Magnetized Plasma. A radiation pulse with initial frequency ω_0 and duration T slows down in the plasma to a group velocity $v_{g0} \ll c$. Adiabatic spatially uniform variation of the magnetic field changes the radiation frequency to ω_1 and increases the group velocity to $v_{g1} \gg v_{g0}$. The emerging pulse is compressed to $T_1 = T v_{g0} / v_{g1}$. (Reference 29)

An example of the pulse slowing down and subsequent manipulation is first discussed in Reference 29 in the somewhat esoteric context of magnetized plasma. Pulse duration, frequency, and (for multiple pulses) repetition rate can be controlled by storing (or slowing down) electromagnetic waves and subsequently changing the system's parameters. The essence of the compact pulse manipulator is shown in Figure 14. The pulse is slowed down inside the compact plasma device and manipulated by changing the magnitude of the magnetic field. The advantage of slowing the pulses down is three-fold. First, the device can be made smaller, resulting in size savings. Second, the temporal scale on which the system has to be manipulated is lengthened because the pulse is moving slowly. Finally, the potentially large ratio between $v_{g1} \gg v_{g0}$ results in the more dramatic dynamic range of possible pulse compression ratios. Plasma-based

devices may not be appropriate in the aerospace context because of their large size, power requirements, large magnetic coils, and so forth.

Fortunately, metamaterials offer some exciting opportunities for slowing down electromagnetic waves as has been recently recognized (Reference 30). Specifically, the authors have theoretically demonstrated that an axially varying heterostructure with a metamaterial core of negative refractive index can be used to efficiently and coherently bring light to a complete standstill. One of the most remarkable aspects of the approach is that it works for relatively broadband pulses. The broadband capability is achieved through "tapering" (or axial variation) of a metamaterial's parameters such as the effective ϵ and μ . Due to tapering, each frequency component of the wave packet is stopped at a different guide thickness, leading to the spatial separation of its spectrum and the formation of a 'trapped rainbow'. In Reference 30, the authors have actually opted for a physical tapering of the waveguide (that is, reducing the thickness of the NIM waveguide along the length of the waveguide), although other approaches such as varying ϵ and μ will also work.




Figure 15. Trapped Rainbow: A Waveguide with Negative Index Core Can Stop Light. A guided wave packet is efficiently injected from the ordinary waveguide to the left-handed heterostructure LHH (see also Figure 4), inside which it propagates smoothly owing to the slow (adiabatic) reduction in the thickness of the core. The smallest (red) frequency components of the wave are stopped at the smallest core thicknesses of the LHH, while the largest (blue) components stop at correspondingly larger core thicknesses. (Reference 30)

The schematic of the light-stopping structure based on the waveguide with a negative index core (dubbed left-handed heterostructure, or LHH, in Reference 30) is shown in Figure 14. Although light stopping is possible in other guided configurations that do not necessarily require μ to be negative (for example, a metal-dielectric-metal waveguide would suffice), the key here is that perfect impedance matching can be achieved for the metamaterials-based waveguides with the negative index core. That is very important for maximizing the coupling efficiency from the regular waveguide to the LHH. Although Reference 30 does not present any specific ideas as to what could be done with the

slowed down and/or stopped light, the schematic shown in Figure 13 provides some key ideas. Moreover, the prospect of producing a low-loss negative index material in the optical domain still remains somewhat distant. Therefore, it may be worthwhile to examine other approaches to slowing down light that have emerged in the past few years.

Stopping and/or slowing down light is an old idea originating from the atomic concept of Electromagnetically Induced Transparency (EIT). The phenomenon has been considered to be purely quantum mechanical until several groups have demonstrated that it has some classical analogies (Reference 31). Remarkably, at least one group has demonstrated in the past year that EIT can be achieved using plasmonic metamaterials (Reference 32). The idea is to create a plasmonic "molecule" consisting of a radiative element coupled with a subradiant (dark) element. The plasmonic molecule showed electromagnetic response that closely resembles the electromagnetically induced transparency in an atomic system. Because of its subwavelength dimension, this electromagnetically induced transparency-like molecule was shown to be suitable as a building block to construct a "slow light" plasmonic metamaterial. The specific design of the plasmonic molecule is shown in Figure 15.




Figure 16. "Plasmonic Molecule" Exhibiting EIT. Left: Radiative element (metal strip) by itself gets strongly polarized by the incident EM wave, resulting in weak transmission/strong reflection. Right: Radiative element coupled to the "dark" element (two strips). Dark element possesses a non-radiative quadrupole resonance which is excited by the radiative element and de-polarizes the radiative element. The result: vanishing reflection, high transmission. Color bar: $\left| \frac{E}{E_0} \right|$ normalized to the incident laser field at $\lambda = 700$ nm. (Reference 32)

This specific plasmonic molecule consists of the "dark state" (two parallel plasmonic antennas oriented perpendicular to the incident vertical electric field) and the "radiative state" (single plasmonic antenna oriented parallel to the electric field). The quality factor of the "dark antenna" state is an order of magnitude higher than that of the "radiative" antenna. When the "radiative" antenna is spatially separated from the "dark" antenna (or when the dark antennas are not present at all), all or most of the incident radiation is reflected from an array of "radiative" antennas whenever the resonance frequency of the antenna coincides with that of the laser. In this example, the long antenna is 128 nm long, and the resonance wavelength is at $\lambda = 700$ nm. The key effect here is that the resonance of the "dark" antenna should be at the same wavelength.

Because the exploited resonance has a quadrupole nature, it is slightly red-shifted. For that reason, the length of the "dark" antenna is 100 nm. When the two antennas are brought together, the radiative antenna polarizes the dark antenna, which, in turn, depolarizes the radiative antenna. As a result, the dipole moment of the coupled system is drastically reduced, the reflection drops and transmission increases to almost 100 percent (limited only by losses). Most of the energy is now stored inside the non-radiative (dark) antenna.

If multiple layers of dark/bright antennas are employed as shown in Figure 16, then one can achieve one of the most important manifestations of EIT; "slow" light. Slow light can have many interesting technological applications because (a) slow light is easy to manipulate by changing the structure's parameters (as described in the section on tunable metamaterials), and (b) slow light has a high field intensity (enhanced by the ratio of the free-space propagation speed to the slow propagation speed), therefore, all nonlinear processes are enhanced for slow light. Such nonlinear processes may include harmonics generation, optical diode action (see the section on non-reciprocal optical elements), and many others.




Figure 17. True Multi-Layer Metamaterial With a Unit Cell Shown in Figure 15: radiative antenna (single metal strip) coupled to a dark antenna (two perpendicular metal bars). Such metamaterial exhibits "slow" light propagation along the incidence direction (slowed down by a factor 30 or more). (Reference 32)

It is important to realize that the geometry suggested in Reference 32 is not unique. For example, the dark and radiative antennas need not reside in the same plane. Nor is the effect of EIT (and the related phenomenon of slow light) limited to the optical domain. Both infrared and microwave-range designs have started emerging. These frequency domains are likely to be of greater use for advanced aerospace platforms than the visible range targeted by most studies.

Metamaterials for Energy Harvesting

One of the most important applications of metamaterials is related to developing “perfect absorbers” of infrared electromagnetic radiation, be it in the mid-to-long infrared part of the spectrum (making it relevant for night vision, harvesting of the Earth glow mid-infrared radiation, and so forth) or in the near-to-mid-IR spectrum (making it relevant for day-time infrared photography of the earth terrain). For example, day-time infrared photography relies on the different sunlight reflectivities of surfaces (for example, snow, brick walls, concrete walls, grass, and so forth), and can easily distinguish between those surfaces. This reflectivity differential tends to be the greatest between 2-3 microns, and rapidly decays toward longer wavelengths. Open sky contains very little infrared radiation which explains why infrared imaging/photography is very important for aerial and satellite surveys. Because light scattering in the atmosphere scales as λ^{-4} , imaging through the atmosphere in the visible range is impossible, and infrared imaging becomes important. This is especially true for the $1 < \lambda < 4 \mu\text{m}$ range. For longer wavelengths ($\lambda > 10 \mu\text{m}$) this brightness differential is largely gone because the emission spectrum is dominated by thermal emission. In fact, the Earth glow maximum is around $\lambda > 10 \mu\text{m}$, with most of the energy contained in the $3 \mu\text{m} < \lambda < 14 \mu\text{m}$ range. This longer wavelength (mid-to-far IR) spectral range is also very important. It can be used for night-time energy scavenging by high-altitude satellites and other aerospace platforms.

There has been a surge of activity in this area, first in the microwave/THz part of the electromagnetic spectrum (References 33, 34), and subsequently in mid-to-far infrared (Reference 20). The concept of narrow-band metamaterials-based absorbers introduced in Reference 33 has the potential for developing highly efficient bolometer arrays. When applied to the infrared part of the spectrum, it can be used for space navigation, especially when weak infrared signals from specific stellar objects need to be picked up and discriminated from other radiation sources. For such applications, the narrow-band “perfect” absorption is highly suitable. An array of such bolometers would reject (reflect) all undesirable frequencies and focus on the single wavelength characteristic of the source of interest. Moreover, if an array of different (for example, tuned to different frequencies) narrow band detectors can be deployed, then the hyper-spectral imaging capability could bring additional benefits. For example, absolute temperatures of a radiation source (that is, stellar bodies) could be accurately determined, and could improve the accuracy of space navigation further.




Figure 18. “Perfect” Narrow-Band Microwave Absorber. (a-c): Unit cell design. Right panel: simulated absorption/transmission/reflection. (Reference 33)

One possible design for the microwave frequency band is shown in Figure 17. High absorption is accomplished by reducing reflections to zero. This is accomplished by choosing metamaterials parameters such that $\epsilon_{eff}(\omega_r) = \mu_{eff}(\omega_r)$ at the resonant frequency ω_r . Note that both the real and imaginary parts of the permittivity and permeability must be equal to each other, and that the imaginary parts don't necessarily need to be small for absorber applications. In fact, it is desirable that they are not too small, thereby enabling 100 percent absorption within a single layer of metamaterial. The above design can be scaled down to the THz range, as was later demonstrated in Reference 34. It is difficult to find strongly absorbing materials at THz frequencies that are compatible with standard photolithography. Thus, a potential application of these metamaterial structures is as absorbing elements in thermal detectors. A strong absorption coefficient is also necessary to have a small thermal mass. This is important for optimizing the temporal response of thermal detectors. The metamaterial presented here has a 6 micron thick film (that is, $\lambda/50$ thickness for THz radiation) and 70 percent absorptivity, which yields an absorption coefficient of 2000 cm^{-1} .

One drawback of the original design was the narrow angular range of the absorber. The absorption dropped dramatically when the incidence angle was as small as 20 degrees. The reason for that is a relatively large unit cell of the metamaterial. In fact, when the unit cell size is larger or comparable to $\lambda/2n$, where n is the refractive index of the substrate, it is inappropriate to call such structure a "metamaterial". A true impedance-matched metamaterial would, in fact, always have a very broad angular response.




Figure 19. Wide-Angle Plasmonic Absorber Based on Negative Index Metamaterial. Right panel: schematic of an absorption-measuring experiment. A generic metamaterial with $\epsilon_{yy} = \mu_{zz} = -1 + i$, $\mu_{xx} = 1$ is assumed. Left panel: angular dependence of the absorption for a generic and specific (shown in the inset) metamaterial. Both exhibit wide-angle absorptivity. (Reference 20)

This fact can be expressed by a simple formula for the absorption coefficient A (Reference 20):

$$A = 1 - \frac{\left| \cos \theta - \sqrt{\epsilon_{yy} / \mu_{zz} - \sin^2 \theta / (\mu_{xx} \mu_{zz})} \right|^2}{\left| \cos \theta + \sqrt{\epsilon_{yy} / \mu_{zz} - \sin^2 \theta / (\mu_{xx} \mu_{zz})} \right|^2} \quad (4)$$

where we've assumed that, for normal incidence, this metamaterial is impedance-matched: $\epsilon_{yy} = \mu_{zz} = -1 + i$. Equation 4 can be simplified under the assumption

of $|\epsilon_{yy}| \gg 1, \mu_{xx} = 1$: $A \approx 1 - \tan^4(\theta/2)$, implying that $A \approx 0.97$ even for $\theta = \pi/6$. The challenge, if course, is to design a true impedance-matched optical metamaterial. Success has been achieved in designing such a metamaterial (Reference 20).

The recently published design is shown in Figure 19. The unit cell consists of two layers of plasmonic antennas; the cut-wire antenna that imparts magnetic (as well as some electric) response to this metamaterial, and the continuous-wire antennas that impart a purely electric response. It is found that the wide-angle capability could be very important for several applications. Wide-angle power absorption efficiency is desirable for miniaturizing photodetectors or microbolometers down to the wavelength size.




Figure 20. Specific Design of a Wide-Angle Plasmonic Absorber Based on Negative Index Metamaterial Operating at $\lambda=1550$ nm. Left panel: Schematic of the silver-based plasmonic structure. Right panel: Extracted permittivity and permeability for the normal incidence demonstrate impedance matching: $\epsilon_{yy} = \mu_{zz} = -1 + i$. (Reference 20)

For example, to focus light on a wavelength-sized photodetector or micro-bolometer requires high-NA optics (a $NA=0.5$ or higher). Therefore, a photodetector should be able to absorb light incident at 30 degree angle. For advanced aerospace platforms it is easy to envision a scenario where an airborne platform is powered by a high-power infrared laser source located on Earth. If the wavelength falls inside the transparency window of the atmosphere (between 3 and 4 μm , and also around 10 μm), then such a

prospect is not too farfetched because scattering in mid-infrared by atmospheric gases is essentially zero. For such a remote powering scenario to be feasible, one would need a highly efficient absorber at the specific wavelength corresponding to that of the source. Moreover, as the space platform is moving, it is desirable that the absorption remain high even for non-normal incidence angles.

The second application is for thermophotovoltaics (TPV) (Reference 35). Some type of thermophotovoltaic converter will almost undoubtedly be installed on the advanced aerospace platforms of the future. Presently even advanced (experimental) electric cars are using TPV cells to convert the heat from their engines into electricity. Such converters have already been shown to be capable of increasing the range of electric vehicles by a factor of 3. We believe that metamaterials could play an important role in developing highly efficient TPV cells. By virtue of Kirchhoff's law, emissivity of a thermal emitter approaches the blackbody limit only if the absorptivity approaches unity. Moreover, wavelength-selective radiators can dramatically improve the efficiency of current generation in a TPV cell if their emission spectrum is matched to the bandgap of the TPV converter. For example, a typical TPV converter, GaSb, has the bandgap of $E_g = 0.7$ eV that would be ideally suited to a wavelength-selective radiator operating in near infrared around $\lambda = 1.7 \mu\text{m}$.




Figure 21. (Left) Experimental Result, Reflectivity Versus Wavelength, that Inspired the Proposed Effort: A Modestly Absorbing Material (SiC) Turns Into a "Perfect Mid-IR Absorber" When a $\lambda/4$ -Thick SiC Film Is Backed by a Metal Mirror. (Right): Theoretical Plot – Constant Reflectivity Contours Plotted in the $(\text{Real}(n), \text{Imag}(n))$ Space. High material absorptivity $\text{Imag}(n)$ is required to achieve perfect absorption ($R=0$). Posed question: can a metamaterials-based semi-transparent mirror enhance absorption and result in an almost-perfect ultra-thin absorber?

The perfect absorbers shown in Figures 17-19 may be too complex for practical applications. Metamaterials tend to be lossy because of the large field concentration in the metal. Therefore, work has recently started working on a new type of metamaterial (so-called CMMs mentioned in the Introduction), that could potentially make weakly-absorbing semiconductors (that is, Si in the visible) absorb much stronger. The goal here is to make a thin (although not necessarily a very sub-wavelength) absorber backed up by a sheet of CMMs which would prevent reflections and result in a very high absorption. Applications that are considered are essentially the same as for the "perfect" absorbers described above. For example, satellites can use the Earth glow for nighttime battery recharging. The collected power is quite high; 1 m² of black surface at

From: Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA)
To: (b) (6); Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6J
Cc: (b) (6); Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA); (b) (6)
Subject: RE: FOIA UPDATE
Date: Tuesday, February 9, 2021 12:51:01 PM

Acknowledged.

V/r Sandy

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, February 09, 2021 12:48 PM
To: (b) (6); Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6J; Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA)
Cc: (b) (6); Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA); (b) (6)
Subject: FOIA UPDATE

Mr. Bray, Ms. Brown, and (b) (6) :

Learned yesterday that ONI received a FOIA request for all e-mails from and to Jay Stratton with the frequent UAP-related search terms. This is on top of the 12 assigned requests that are in the process of being referred to NIA from ONI. We have not yet received them, but it is only a matter of time before we do. The bottom line is that FOIA requests on this topic remain popular and will likely remain given the attention being given to this subject on the Hill and in the press.

Thus, I am **requesting that you forward all records, including e-mails** (whether as a sender, recipient, or as a CC/BCC) **containing the search terms listed below** that you may hold be forwarded to LT Nikam and me **as soon as possible** so that we can begin processing them under the FOIA. As we are expecting the 12 requests for information related to the TF, we request those be prioritized. As time permits, we request records containing the other search terms be forwarded, as operations permit.

Going forward, **we request that we be cced on all such related e-mails** containing the search items below in order to facilitate FOIA processing. This will save us from coming back to you again with requests like this. We will simply be able to access and review the e-mails in the folder and process accordingly. For now, please use our individual accounts. In the near future, however, we will have a collective N2N6J e-mail to which they can be sent.

Ultimately, to get out of a reactive and repetitive posture of staffing multiple requests for records containing similar search terms, records cleared for release and forwarded to DNS 36 for posting to the Secretary of the Navy's Electronic Reading Room. (<https://www.secnav.navy.mil/foia/readingroom/SitePages/Home.aspx?RootFolder=%2Ffoia%2Freadingroom%2FCaseFiles%2FUFO%20Info&FolderCTID=0x012000CD3AEB341204C14DB4C7B99C57E99B26&View=%7B988EEA5C%2DDDFDB%2D4A5D%2D8414%2D87A63DACECE2%7D>) (I invite your attention to the "UFO fact sheet" dated 11 September 1998 that is posted there.) I was informed yesterday that DNS 36 has just completed its initial scrub of unclassified documents previously forwarded by this office and will be posting them to this page in the weeks ahead.

In closing, I know this is a tedious process, but it is the law. Thank you in advance for your assistance.

Vr (b) (6)

SEARCH TERMS:

"Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force"
"Unidentified Aerial Phenomena" or "UAP"
"Unidentified Flying Object" or "UFO"
Unidentified or unauthorized Unmanned Aerial Systems or "UAS"
"Luis ELIZONDO"
"To the Stars Academy" or "TTSA"
"Tic Tac" or "Tic-Tac"
"Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program" or "AATIP"
"Advanced Aerospace Weapon Systems Applications Program" or "AAWSAP"
"Bigelow Aerospace"
"Robert Bigelow"

From: (b) (6)
To: (b) (6) [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: MEDIA QUERY on "UFO Debris" - SHORT DEADLINE
Date: Wednesday, February 10, 2021 1:04:34 PM

That does make sense.

Simple no comments doesn't work but your proposed para is good.

I'll pass that on.

Thanks

(b) (6)

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b) (6)
Date: Wednesday, Feb 10, 2021, 12:47 PM
To: (b) (6) [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#) (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: MEDIA QUERY on "UFO Debris" - SHORT DEADLINE

(b) (6),
I am reluctant to address what may or may not be in our Foreign Materiel Program inventory as that discussion would very quickly become classified, nor do I think it would lend itself to a simple statement, as desired.

I think a standard "no comment" is the only tenable response.

How about—(b) (5)

Make sense? Happy to discuss more in a classified forum.

V/r,
(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Wednesday, February 10, 2021 9:17 AM
To: (b) (6) [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#) (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: MEDIA QUERY on "UFO Debris" - SHORT DEADLINE

(b) (6) /Scott,

DOD now has an official query on this supposed claim that the Pentagon has admitted it has "UFO Debris"...

DOD has asked us and DIA for any response we can suggest to this question:

Can the Pentagon, or the DIA or the FOIA office chime in on this claim made by the FOIA requester that the US government has "UFO Debris", and also why the responsive records came up with the request worded below? I am hoping to publish clarity on the matter beyond my own experience with FOIA.

If you read through the documents that DIA released... there is nothing to substantiate the claim that there was **A stunning admission by the US government that it possesses UFO debris...**

Might I suggest we provide to (b) (6) something along these lines:

"The UAPTF has no information that would substantiate the claim in recent news reporting that the US government possesses materials from alleged "UFO debris."

Let me know ASAP please....

Regards,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, February 9, 2021 9:24 AM
To: (b) (6) [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#) (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: FW: [Non-DoD Source] Fwd: PENTAGON ADMITS IT HAS UFO DEBRIS, RELEASES TEST RESULTS
Importance: High

(b) (6) /Scott,

A stunning admission by the US government that it possesses UFO debris was recently made in response to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request filed over three years ago by this author. In a reply letter, the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) has ended decades of speculation by verifying that UFO material has indeed been recovered. Now officially referred to as UAP (Unidentified Aerial Phenomena) rather than UFOs, some this material was placed with a defense

contractor for analysis and storage in "specialized facilities." Incredibly, part of the information released discusses material with shape recovery properties, much like the "memory metal" debris found fallen at the Roswell UFO crash in 1947.

From: (b) (6)
To: (b) (6) [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: Updated Briefing Card
Date: Wednesday, February 10, 2021 1:12:48 PM

Roger... I'll pass that on.

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Wednesday, February 10, 2021 1:03 PM
To: (b) (6)
(b) (6) Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I
(b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: RE: Updated Briefing Card

(b) (6),
I'd suggest one small change in the Q&A section.

From:

(b) (5)

To:

(b) (5)

Just because precision in language matters.

V/r,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Wednesday, February 10, 2021 10:53 AM
To: (b) (6)
(b) (6) Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I
(b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: FW: Updated Briefing Card

All,

UNODIR, I am going to reply that we have no issues with this version of the DOD Briefing Card.

Though the language reflects it is the DEPSECDEF responding, the same doc will be used by John Kirby to respond to any queries from the podium during the DOD Press Briefs.

Regards,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Wednesday, February 10, 2021 10:36 AM
To: (b) (6) Cummings, Matthew C
(Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA) (b) (6)

Subject: RE: Updated Briefing Card

Good afternoon,

The request for broader UAPTF-related talking points remains. To streamline the review and close out this tasker, request your review of the attached. If any of the following red lines are violated, please flag.

1. DOD policy violation
2. Legal violation
3. Accuracy

Many thanks,

(b) (6)

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From: (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, February 8, 2021 3:09 PM
To: Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)
(b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: Updated Briefing Card

Importance: High

Gents,

Attached is updated OSD(PA) briefing card, expanded a bit due to ongoing discussions with DEPSECDEF's office. Note that DEPSECDEF intends to have a discussion with new Pentagon Press Secretary John Kirby about it TODAY.

We need to come to agreement on the recommendation for the answer to the first question under the Q&A section. The card currently reflects what we've said in the past.

OUSD(I&S) recommends this instead: (b) (5)

"

Please take a look at the rest, too, but the recommendation for the answer to the first question is really the crux of DEPSECDEF's questions on this before he departs DoD.

Regards,

(b) (6)

From: [Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO \(USA\)](#)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: FW: UAP briefs to Hill
Date: Wednesday, February 10, 2021 7:46:27 PM

From: Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO (USA)
Sent: Wednesday, February 10, 2021 7:46 PM
To: Moran, Michael T VADM USN ASSTSECNAV RDA DC (USA) (b) (6); Greene, Jodi J SES USN (USA) (b) (6)
Cc: Joyner, Sara A RDML USN OLA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
Subject: RE: UAP briefs to Hill

You bet, I think we are getting together soon on this! Vr, JT

From: Moran, Michael T VADM USN ASSTSECNAV RDA DC (USA) (b) (6)
Sent: Wednesday, February 10, 2021 11:04 AM
To: Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO (USA) (b) (6); Greene, Jodi J SES USN (USA) (b) (6)
Cc: Joyner, Sara A RDML USN OLA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
Subject: RE: UAP briefs to Hill

JT,

Would like to see what is being briefed and want to ensure the incorporation of the technical team (b) (6) has established is being shared as that was a key piece in the direction to stand-up the task force.

Thanks,
Mike

From: Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO (USA) (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, February 8, 2021 3:46 PM
To: Greene, Jodi J SES USN (USA) (b) (6)
Cc: Moran, Michael T VADM USN ASSTSECNAV RDA DC (USA) (b) (6); Joyner, Sara A RDML USN OLA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
Subject: RE: UAP briefs to Hill

Copy Ma'am, lots of interest. Scott and (b) (6) briefed Fleet staffs the other day with VCNO.

Big concern is that we have put (b) (6) in charge of the TF now instead of Jay Stratton and folks on the Hill are implying "...he was fired because he tells the TRUTH..." or something....accusing us of low balling. We didn't fire him, we just put someone in place to manage the effort and team, not an analyst that likes to brief. We now have someone that is managing a team and not inciting people with unusual statements...we are in a much better place!

Look forward to next discussion. Vr, JT

From: Greene, Jodi J SES USN (USA) (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, February 8, 2021 3:04 PM
To: Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO (USA) (b) (6)
Cc: Moran, Michael T VADM USN ASSTSECNAV RDA DC (USA) (b) (6); Joyner, Sara A RDML USN OLA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
Subject: UAP briefs to Hill

VADM Trussler –

One issue that came across my desk today post our 0830 discussion was the UAP Task Force and the upcoming briefings on the Hill. Apparently there have been questions from some staffers on overall process and DON leadership in the matter. Hence, I have asked Dr. Jen Obernier and her team to work with Scott Bray and his team to ensure there is a ExComm touchpoint built into the briefing deck and that she join for the next briefing to SASC PSMs on Thursday. I am free to discuss further should you have any questions, but I think this should be an easy add. Meanwhile, we have been trying to work between VADM Moran's and my schedule to set up the next DON sync on the subject in the next couple weeks.

Best, Jodi

From: (b) (6)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N61](#); [Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#); [Chamberlin, Thomas S SES USN ONI \(USA\)](#)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: FW: Draft EXCOM Agenda -- Please Review!
Date: Thursday, February 18, 2021 4:38:00 PM
Attachments: [UAPTF EXCOM Mtg Agenda 24 Feb 2021 \(rev0\) bpm edit.docx](#)

Scott,

(b) (6) asked me to review the draft agenda for the upcoming EXCOM. I've made a few changes in the attached document. I plan on sending these forward as suggested changes unless otherwise directed.

V/r,

(b) (6)

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From: (b) (6)
Sent: Thursday, February 18, 2021 2:02 PM
To: (b) (6)
Subject: Draft EXCOM Agenda -- Please Review!

(b) (6),

DUSN Greene approved the attached agenda for next week's EXCOM. Please review and let me know today if you want to suggest any changes. I'd like to ask the front office to update the meeting invite with this agenda, but will hold off until I get your thoughts.

Vr,

(b) (6)

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(b) (6) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

From: (b) (6)
To: (b) (6)
Cc: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)
Subject: RE: SCHED: UAP Update
Date: Monday, February 22, 2021 10:58:52 AM

Killjoy – Aye. ☺ Thanks! VR, (b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, February 22, 2021 10:34 AM
To: (b) (6)
Cc: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)
Subject: RE: SCHED: UAP Update

(b) (6),

This stuff gets FOIA'd so I typically avoid witty emails---and I know it's hard.

VR,
(b) (6)

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(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, February 22, 2021 10:14 AM
To: (b) (6)
Cc: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)
Subject: SCHED: UAP Update

(b) (6) –

Please schedule a 30 min Aliens, UAP Update with Mr. Bray by 19 March.

Over to Mr. Bray and (b) (6) on whether the Fleets need to be involved, or any additional attendees.

(b) (6) – Please put SIPR email “AAR on UAPTF...” in his RAH binder for this discussion.

Many Thanks!

VR/ (b) (6)

(b) (6)
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From: (b) (6)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N61](#); (b) (6)
Subject: UAPTF Excom
Date: Wednesday, February 24, 2021 7:39:57 AM

Good Morning.

FYI... I've been asked to join this afternoon's Excom (By (b) (6) and CHINFO) as a sub for RDML Charlie Brown, who cannot make it.

I will attend alongside the folks that will be in your office, Scott.

I will let DCNO know during standup.

Regards,

(b) (6)

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From: (b) (6)
To: (b) (6); Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I; (b) (6)
Cc: SD - Meetings; SD - Protocol; SD - DepSecDef SAs & MAs; SD - DSD Read ahead
Subject: RE: [Meeting Announcement] UAP Brief -- Wednesday, 10 MAR, 1400-1500; 3E928 | DSD Conference Room
Date: Monday, March 8, 2021 12:41:19 PM

Major, we truly appreciate it. We would like to request 1300-1400.

Hopefully this is not an inconvenience to the other requested attendees.

V/r

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, March 8, 2021 12:20 PM
To: (b) (6); Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I; (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
Cc: SD - Meetings (b) (6); SD - Protocol (b) (6); SD - DepSecDef SAs & MAs (b) (6); SD - DSD Read ahead (b) (6)
Subject: RE: [Meeting Announcement] UAP Brief -- Wednesday, 10 MAR, 1400-1500; 3E928 | DSD Conference Room

Good afternoon (b) (6),

We could support 1300-1400 or 1500-1600.

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, March 8, 2021 12:06 PM
To: (b) (6); Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I; (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
Cc: SD - Meetings (b) (6); SD - Protocol (b) (6); SD - DepSecDef SAs & MAs (b) (6); SD - DSD Read ahead (b) (6)
Subject: RE: [Meeting Announcement] UAP Brief -- Wednesday, 10 MAR, 1400-1500; 3E928 | DSD Conference Room

(b) (6), good afternoon,

I hate to ask but would it be possible to look into a different time? VCNO has a large group meeting

th

with SECNAV and CNO at 1400-1500 on the 10 . I am able to move around anything that day except for this particular time.

Thank you for the consideration.

V/r

(b) (6)

[REDACTED]

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Monday, March 8, 2021 11:55 AM

To: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)

[REDACTED]

Cc: SD - Meetings (b) (6); SD - Protocol (b) (6); SD - DepSecDef SAs & MAs (b) (6); SD - DSD Read ahead (b) (6)

Subject: [Meeting Announcement] UAP Brief -- Wednesday, 10 MAR, 1400-1500; 3E928 | DSD Conference Room

Good afternoon,

Please see the subject schedule request below and **confirm your Principal's participation – RSVP**

to: (b) (6) .

Subject: UAP Brief

Date: Wednesday, 10 March

Time: 1400-1500 (60 minutes)

Location: 3E928 | DSD Conference Room

Read Ahead materials due 48-hours prior – send to: (b) (6)

Slide Projection: Slides must be hard copy.

Attendees:

- DSD
- DSD COS
- ADM Lescher
- VADM Trussler

- Mr. Scott Bray
- (b) (6)
- DSD SMA – General Lyons

If your Principal requests to bring additional staff, please provide their names and titles for approval prior to the meeting.

V/R

(b) (6)

From: [Obernier, Jennifer A SES USN UNSECNAV DC \(USA\)](#)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#)
Subject: FW: UAP Brief to DSD today
Date: Wednesday, March 10, 2021 9:19:17 AM
Attachments: [image001.jpg](#)

FYSA, if it hasn't already percolated up. I'll take the meeting with (b) (6).

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b) (6)
Date: Wednesday, Mar 10, 2021, 8:34 AM
To: Simon, Martin S (Marty) SES USN UNSECNAV DC (USA)
(b) (6), Obernier, Jennifer A SES USN UNSECNAV DC (USA)
(b) (6)
Cc: Greene, Jodi J SES USN (USA) (b) (6)
Subject: FW: UAP Brief to DSD today

Sir,

Important correspondence to DUSN from UNSECNAV office regarding
UAP posture prep. I will reach out to (b) (6).

V/r

(b) (6)
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(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Wednesday, March 10, 2021 8:30 AM
To: Greene, Jodi J SES USN (USA) (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Subject: UAP Brief to DSD today

DUSN Greene, the USN heard at the DSD CoS standup this am a UAP brief was to be given. He had some concerns and wanted to speak to the briefer prior to going in.

We've tracked down (b) (6) from N2/6 as the briefer and he's coming in at 0930 (pending Posture Prep overspill).

The EA's in SN's office said your team was also involved, so giving a curtesy heads up.

Hope it helps and if (b) (6) or others from your team want any input that's the time we worked last minute here.

V/r

(b) (6)

[REDACTED]



From: (b) (6) on behalf of [SD - DSD Calendar](#)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#); (b) (6)
(b) (6)
[Obernier, Jennifer A SES USN UNSECNAV DC \(USA\)](#); (b) (6)
Cc: [SD - Meetings](#); [SD - Protocol](#); [SD - DepSecDef SAs & MAs](#); [SD - DSD Read ahead](#)
Subject: RESCHEDULED (APR) UDPATE: [Meeting Announcement] UAP Brief -- Wednesday, 10 MAR, 1300-1400; 3E928 | DSD Conference Room
Date: Wednesday, March 10, 2021 10:01:35 AM

Good morning,

Today's UAP Brief is cancelled and will be rescheduled for a later date in April. Thank you for your flexibility.

V/R (b) (6)

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From: (b) (6) On Behalf Of SD - DSD Calendar
Sent: Monday, March 8, 2021 1:06 PM
To: [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#); (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
Cc: SD - Meetings (b) (6); SD - Protocol (b) (6); SD - DepSecDef SAs & MAs (b) (6); SD - DSD Read ahead (b) (6)
Subject: Time UPDATE: [Meeting Announcement] UAP Brief -- Wednesday, 10 MAR, 1300-1400; 3E928 | DSD Conference Room

Good afternoon,

Please see the subject schedule request below and **confirm your Principal's participation – RSVP**

to: (b) (6) .

Subject: UAP Brief

Date: Wednesday, 10 March

Time: 1300-1400 (60 minutes)

Location: 3E928 | DSD Conference Room

Read Ahead materials due 48-hours prior – send to: (b) (6)

Slide Projection: Slides must be hard copy.

Attendees:

- DSD
- DSD COS
- ADM Lescher
- VADM Trussler
- Mr. Scott Bray
- (b) (6)
- DSD SMA – General Lyons

If your Principal requests to bring additional staff, please provide their names and titles for approval prior to the meeting.

V/R

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
To: [Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO \(USA\)](#); [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#)
Cc: [Miller, Christopher A SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#)
Subject: FW: RFI On UA{P
Date: Thursday, March 11, 2021 7:34:08 AM
Attachments: [image001.jpg](#)
[image002.jpg](#)

Gentlemen,

Forwarding for your information – additional context on the canx of the UAP brief to DSD.

V/R

EA

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Wednesday, March 10, 2021 2:47 PM
To: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: RFI On UA{P


Brother, long story but no one in the Secretariat was aware this would occur or what the brief presented. Obviously new front offices all over the place (and our experience so far with new DSD staff has ***much*** different expectations that Mr. Norquist's time). That and the brief was not well received by SN on Friday played into USN rescheduling the UAP brief to DSD. Hopefully that makes sense – (b) (6) took that message back to N2/6 from USN actual – after he presented his brief this AM.

Pls let me know if there is more feedback to the boss.

V/r

(b) (6)

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(b) (6)



From: (b) (6)
Sent: Wednesday, March 10, 2021 10:15 AM
To: (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: RE: RFI On UA{P

My guess is (b) (6) !

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Wednesday, March 10, 2021 8:00 AM

To: (b) (6)

Subject: RFI On UA{P

(b) (6), who's giving the UAP brief to SD today? V/r (b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)


(b) (6)

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(b) (6)

(b) (6)



From: (b) (6)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N61](#)
Subject: FW: UAP Alignment - Request for (b) (6) & his office
Date: Thursday, March 11, 2021 12:40:37 PM
Attachments: [image003.jpg](#)

Boss-

Below is the email chain regarding the Acting SECNAV UAP briefing feedback.

Thanks,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Thursday, March 11, 2021 10:02 AM
To: (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: RE: UAP Alignment - Request for (b) (6) & his office

(b) (6), this is what we are tracking as well – thank you.

We are working that prep-brief in now. USN will be in Dam Neck next Friday but will return around 1430 – hope to shoot for late Friday if that works for everyone/deconflicts with NFOSIS. Over to (b) (6) to orchestrate the varying schedules.

As for USAF – we are on it, good call – spoke to their UNSEC’s office for tipper and will invite them as appropriate – thanks for bringing them in, they are cc’d.

Thanks,

V/r

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



From: (b) (6)

Sent: Thursday, March 11, 2021 8:57 AM

To: (b) (6)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Cc: (b) (6)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Subject: UAP Alignment - Request for (b) (6) & his office

Team –

Kerfluffle this week re: UAP going to DSD.

What I understand from the Under's office:

- A UAP update went to A/SN last week that could have gone better.
- VADM Moran and DUSN Greene are in charge of an ExCom on the same and aren't in a comfortable place.
- Under's office asked DUSN to work with N2N6 on tightening up the current UAP product, getting a review by the Under and A-SN prior to an update to DSD in two weeks.

-

What I have done:

- On SIPR, I have forwarded to the Secretariat ongoing work on UAP, so that they can see what is occurring. The task on SIPR remains germane. Up to the Secretariat on how they want to play.

What we request:

- That the Under's office schedule a UAP update brief, inviting VCNO, N2N6, and N3N5 (rep) as

the pre-brief prior to SecNav. We'll stand-by... please be thoughtful of NFOSES next week as you schedule.

- If N2N6 has any concerns or needs any top-cover prior to this session, please let us know.
- At the Under brief, we'll determine who needs to attend the meeting with A/SN on the same.

Look forward to the following folks aligning at the meeting with Under:

- **Under, VCNO, DUSN, RDA(PMD), N2N6 (and potentially N3N5 re: reporting.** Also recommend reaching out to coordinate with the USAF prior to this meeting).

As a final note, our office took a leadership role in the past because of a perceived need, not because of actual desire. Hoping to help, and potentially back out at the right moment.

Hope that helps... our thanks in advance!

VR/ (b) (6)

[REDACTED]

From: (b) (6)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6](#)
Cc: (b) (6); [Miller, Christopher A SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#)
Subject: FW: UAP Alignment - Sight alignment for upcoming schedule/briefs
Date: Thursday, March 11, 2021 5:48:24 PM
Attachments: [image001.jpg](#)

Mr. Bray,

Ensuring you are tracking the below. Anticipate a brief to UNSECNAV next Friday, 19 Mar.

VR, (b) (6)

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From: (b) (6)
Sent: Thursday, March 11, 2021 5:23 PM
To: (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6); Obernier, Jennifer A SES USN UNSECNAV DC (USA)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: RE: UAP Alignment - Sight alignment for upcoming schedule/briefs

+ N2N6 front office

V/r

(b) (6)
(b) (6)

(b) (6)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Thursday, March 11, 2021 5:06 PM
To: (b) (6)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

Cc: (b) (6)
[Redacted]
[Redacted] Obernier, Jennifer A SES USN UNSECNAV DC (USA)
(b) (6)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

Subject: RE: UAP Alignment - Sight alignment for upcoming schedule/briefs

Sir,

Thank you for the clarification.

V/r

(b) (6)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Thursday, March 11, 2021 5:01 PM
To: (b) (6)
[Redacted]

(b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Obernier, Jennifer A SES USN UNSECNAV DC (USA)

(b) (6)

Subject: RE: UAP Alignment - Sight alignment for upcoming schedule/briefs

(b) (6), the UAP update brief to USN/ large group is next Friday – due to NFOSIS primarily and time for N2/6 DUSN reps and USAF to coordinate. Not tomorrow.

We will work with SN front office to ID best briefing time before the DSD brief.

USN or SN will likely attend the DSD brief – according to USN's desire.

Hope that helps.

V/r

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)


(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)



From: (b) (6)

Sent: Thursday, March 11, 2021 3:46 PM

To: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Obernier, Jennifer A SES USN UNSECNAV DC (USA)

(b) (6)

Subject: UAP Alignment - Sight alignment for upcoming schedule/briefs

All,

There have been a number of emails on UAP today and a number on in-person conversations. To avoid any confusion from overlapping conversations, I would like to confirm the following UAP briefs (for scheduling purposes).

1. Brief to UNSECNAV
 - a. VCNO, N2N6, N3N5, DUSN
 - b. Friday 12Mar (some time after 1430)
 - c. Scheduled by UNSECNAV Office (pending)
2. Brief to SECNAV
 - a. UNSECNAV ?, DUSN, VCNO, N2N6, N3N5
 - b. 15-19 Mar date range
 - c. Scheduled by: ?
3. Brief to DSD
 - a. 22-25 MARCH date range
 - b. Scheduled by: ?

Feel free to correct any incorrect dates/times.

V/r

(b) (6)

(b) (6) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

From: (b) (6)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N61](#)
Subject: FW: UAP Alignment - Request for (b) (6) & his office
Date: Thursday, March 11, 2021 11:57:09 PM

Hi Boss-

Shots fired

(b) (6)

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b) (6)
Date: Thursday, Mar 11, 2021, 8:09 PM
To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: RE: UAP Alignment - Request for (b) (6) & his office

Team,

There has been a misunderstanding of the facts of previous engagements and continued support for the effort that I must correct here.

From the email below:

What I understand from the Under's office:

- A UAP update went to A/SN last week that could have gone better.

The brief to A/SN was well-received. Direct feedback from A/SN and SECNAV CoS. Both the briefing to A/SN on 05 March and the briefing to A/ASN/RDA on 03 March were well received and addressed the recent 01 Feb briefing to DSD and the anticipated briefing to DSD for the week of 08 March.

Bullet on slide 7 is germane.

- VADM Moran and DUSN Greene are in charge of an ExCom on the same and aren't in a comfortable place.

24 Feb EXCOM briefing and discussion was well-received and supportive of TF with minor changes to briefing materials (including direction to insert slide 7 referenced above) recommended for the scheduled briefings to ASN/RDA and A/SN, which occurred on 03 and 05 March respectively.

24 EXCOM included-

DUSN Jodi Greene (co-chair)

VADM Michael Moran (co-chair) (*unable to attend*)

VADM Jeffrey Trussler, N2N6

(b) (6)

BGen William Swan, Asst. DC Air

Mr. Scott Bray, NIA

(b) (6)

RDML Sara Joyner, CLA

(b) (6)

Happy to engage with any and all who are willing to help address DSD and Congressional direction.

V/r,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

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(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Thursday, March 11, 2021 10:02 AM

To: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: RE: UAP Alignment - Request for (b) (6) & his office

(b) (6), this is what we are tracking as well – thank you.

We are working that prep-brief in now. USN will be in Dam Neck next Friday but will return around 1430 – hope to shoot for late Friday if that works for everyone/deconflicts with NFOSIS. Over to Eddie and Blanca to orchestrate the varying schedules.

As for USAF – we are on it, good call – spoke to their UNSEC’s office for tipper and will invite them as appropriate – thanks for bringing them in, they are cc’d.

Thanks,

V/r

(b) (6)

(b) (6)



From: (b) (6)

Sent: Thursday, March 11, 2021 8:57 AM

To: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: UAP Alignment - Request for (b) (6) & his office

Team –

Kerfluffle this week re: UAP going to DSD.

What I understand from the Under's office:

- A UAP update went to A/SN last week that could have gone better.
- VADM Moran and DUSN Greene are in charge of an ExCom on the same and aren't in a comfortable place.
- Under's office asked DUSN to work with N2N6 on tightening up the current UAP product, getting a review by the Under and A-SN prior to an update to DSD in two weeks.

-

What I have done:

- On SIPR, I have forwarded to the Secretariat ongoing work on UAP, so that they can see what is occurring. The task on SIPR remains germane. Up to the Secretariat on how they want to play.

What we request:

- **That the Under's office schedule a UAP update brief, inviting VCNO, N2N6, and N3N5 (rep) as the pre-brief prior to SecNav.** We'll stand-by... please be thoughtful of NFOSES next week as you schedule.
- If N2N6 has any concerns or needs any top-cover prior to this session, please let us know.
- At the Under brief, we'll determine who needs to attend the meeting with A/SN on the same.

Look forward to the following folks aligning at the meeting with Under:

- **Under, VCNO, DUSN, RDA(PMD), N2N6 (and potentially N3N5 re: reporting.** Also recommend reaching out to coordinate with the USAF prior to this meeting).

As a final note, our office took a leadership role in the past because of a perceived need, not because of actual desire. Hoping to help, and potentially back out at the right moment.

Hope that helps... our thanks in advance!

VR/ (b) (6)

[Redacted signature block]

(b) (6)

From: [Chamberlin, Thomas S SES USN ONI \(USA\)](#)
To: (b) (6); [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#)
Subject: RE: UAP feedback
Date: Friday, March 12, 2021 7:51:14 AM

(b) (6),

Very much appreciate the constructive advice. We'll work to sharpen the focus and message for DSD.

Look forward to working with you as we go forward.

Atb,

TC

Thomas S. Chamberlin
Director, Executive Support
Naval Intelligence Activity

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Thursday, March 11, 2021 8:23 PM
To: Chamberlin, Thomas S SES USN ONI (USA); (b) (6); Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)
Subject: UAP feedback

Tom, Scott -

I'm following up on the conversations I had with each of you today. I did speak with the Secretary and got some feedback that was similar to my feedback, though perhaps a little more assertive. Basically, he felt like the "so what?" wasn't clear in the briefing, he felt like "the briefing provided data, but didn't translate it into information." I think that goes to what I was saying about burying the lede...for the DSD brief, it needs to be front and center (1) the scope of the phenomena, (2) likely explanations, and (3) potential implications. The Secretary felt like the briefing was mainly focused on anecdotes rather than analysis, and I have to say I shared that view - it seemed to zero in on a few anecdotes much more than did, say, the briefing to SASC staff a couple weeks earlier.

I hope that's helpful feedback. I'll be happy to help refine if I can before the briefing goes forward - let me know what I can do!

Thanks,

(b) (6)

From: [Chamberlin, Thomas S SES USN ONI \(USA\)](#)
To: (b) (6)
Cc: [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#)
Subject: RE: *** feedback
Date: Monday, March 15, 2021 7:57:49 AM

Looking forward to the stories after you knock it out of the park with DSD.
Stay resolute,
TC

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, March 12, 2021 6:22 PM
To: Chamberlin, Thomas S SES USN ONI (USA) (b) (6)
Cc: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)
Subject: RE: *** feedback

Tom,
Thank you, this is much more helpful than vague statements.

I am always refining and tailoring my approach to the “conversation” based on audience, expected level of awareness, and time constraints. I have stepped into far too many engagements where seniors, in particular, will disavow all knowledge of press attention over the last THREE years... leading directly to the intense congressional interest which hounds me to this day.

Of course, the intended distance folks take to the problem is, in essence, THE problem.

It is also important to note that I had 20 minutes with A/SN and we are expecting 1hr with DSD. Very different briefs.

V/r,
(b) (6)

From: Chamberlin, Thomas S SES USN ONI (USA) (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, March 12, 2021 7:58 AM
To: (b) (6)
Cc: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)
Subject: FW: *** feedback

(b) (6),
Saw you talking with Scott as I left last night so I believe you’re up to date with yesterday’s drama. (b) (6) wrote afterwards with some helpful, if frank, thoughts on how to give the brief more executive punch. Know there are two perspectives to everything, but this is more constructive than ethereal whispers of disappointment that we can’t action.
Over to you,
TC

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Thursday, March 11, 2021 8:23 PM

To: Chamberlin, Thomas S SES USN ONI (USA) (b) (6); Bray, Scott W SES
OPNAV N2N6, N2N6 (b) (6)

Subject: UAP feedback

Tom, Scott -

I'm following up on the conversations I had with each of you today. I did speak with the Secretary and got some feedback that was similar to my feedback, though perhaps a little more assertive. Basically, he felt like the "so what?" wasn't clear in the briefing, he felt like "the briefing provided data, but didn't translate it into information." I think that goes to what I was saying about burying the lede...for the DSD brief, it needs to be front and center (1) the scope of the phenomena, (2) likely explanations, and (3) potential implications. The Secretary felt like the briefing was mainly focused on anecdotes rather than analysis, and I have to say I shared that view - it seemed to zero in on a few anecdotes much more than did, say, the briefing to SASC staff a couple weeks earlier.

I hope that's helpful feedback. I'll be happy to help refine if I can before the briefing goes forward - let me know what I can do!

Thanks,

(b) (6)

V/r

(b) (6)

[REDACTED]



From: (b) (6)

Sent: Tuesday, March 16, 2021 1:26 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: Obernier, Jennifer A SES USN UNSECNAV DC (USA) (b) (6)

[REDACTED]

Subject: Task Force Pre-Brief on Friday

(b) (6),

The latest email (that I received) from the chain we discussed is appended below. Based on this communication, I'd suggest the invitees listed below (but I defer to (b) (6), et. al. on the original intent). Moreover, I recommend that we send the invite today – I'm sure that schedules are filling up.

UNSECNAV

VCNO

DUSN Greene

N2N6

Mr. Bray

(b) (6)

(USAF – not sure where we stand on this)

Vr,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Friday, March 12, 2021 2:11 PM

To: (b) (6)

Subject: RE: UAP Alignment - Request for (b) (6) & his office

(b) (6) – Thanks... will discuss with VCNO at end of day and get back with you. My inclination is towards either:

- 1) A morning meeting next week, or
- 2) Wait until the following Monday.

More to follow!

VR/ (b) (6)

From: [Obernier, Jennifer A SES USN UNSECNAV DC \(USA\)](#)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#)
Cc: [Chamberlin, Thomas S SES USN ONI \(USA\)](#); (b) (6); [Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#); (b) (6)
Subject: RE: Task Force Pre-Brief on Friday
Date: Tuesday, March 16, 2021 8:09:42 PM

Scott,

As a current member of the Intelligence Community, I am well aware of the appropriate boundaries. There has been no and will be no attempt to edit or alter your analysis.

Leadership from the top down is concerned about the briefing being at the appropriate executive level – specifically not lingering on the details of past events and individual collection events, so the focus can be on the analytic findings and contextualizing the way forward for the DSD.

J

From: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, March 16, 2021 7:18 PM
To: Obernier, Jennifer A SES USN UNSECNAV DC (USA) (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6); Chamberlin, Thomas S SES USN ONI (USA) (b) (6); (b) (6); Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
Subject: RE: Task Force Pre-Brief on Friday

Jen -

Just for the record (since there appear to be multiple emails that could be construed as you looking to edit content), I'm happy for (b) (6) to discuss the flow of this briefing with you — but we will not change intelligence content on this or any other briefing or engagement based on edits or guidance from outside the Intelligence Community.

Thanks,
Scott

Scott W. Bray
Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence
Director, Naval Intelligence Activity
(b) (6)

From: Obernier, Jennifer A SES USN UNSECNAV DC (USA) (b) (6)

Date: Tuesday, Mar 16, 2021, 3:52 PM

To: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6 (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6) Chamberlin, Thomas
S SES USN ONI (USA) (b) (6)

Subject: FW: Task Force Pre-Brief on Friday

Scott,

Wanted to make sure that the comms between the UNSECNAV and VCNO MAs are filtering down quickly.

UNSECNAV has directed we engage at the staff level tomorrow to ensure things are moving in the direction he requested. As such, my staff reached out to (b) (6) to request a vector check in the morning, not expecting the briefing would be complete yet.

DUSN/VADM Moran would then have a chance to take a look at the full slide deck Thursday (no in-person requirement). UNSECNAV is concerned that the potentially short amount of time between his pre-brief and the meeting with DSD wouldn't allow for much course correction.

J

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Tuesday, March 16, 2021 2:20 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: Obernier, Jennifer A SES USN UNSECNAV DC (USA) (b) (6)

Subject: RE: Task Force Pre-Brief on Friday

(b) (6), thanks for the follow through – there have been discussions in person with Dr. Obernier, Tom Chamberlain (b) (6) sup) and down with VCNO EA's – as well as USN Geurts.

The DSD front office agreed on a 2 week re-visit - which puts the brief somewhere in the 22-26 MAR timeframe. USN wants a vector check sometime mid-week and then a brief on Friday that works for VCNO and team.

I will work both now through (b) (6). And for everyone's info, (b) (6) is the USAF lead and will attend if available. I've cc'd our AF teammates.

Thank you,

V/r

(b) (6)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]



From: (b) (6)

Sent: Tuesday, March 16, 2021 1:26 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: Obernier, Jennifer A SES USN UNSECNAV DC (USA) (b) (6)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Subject: Task Force Pre-Brief on Friday

(b) (6),

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VCNO

DUSN Greene

N2N6

Mr. Bray

(b) (6)

(USAF – not sure where we stand on this)

Vr,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Friday, March 12, 2021 2:11 PM

To: (b) (6)

Subject: RE: UAP Alignment - Request for (b) (6) & his office

(b) (6) – Thanks... will discuss with VCNO at end of day and get back with you. My inclination is towards either:

- 1) A morning meeting next week, or
- 2) Wait until the following Monday.

More to follow!

VR (b) (6)

From: [Obernier, Jennifer A SES USN UNSECNAV DC \(USA\)](#)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#)
Subject: RE: Task Force Pre-Brief on Friday
Date: Tuesday, March 16, 2021 8:32:36 PM

Hey Scott,

I recognize how aggravating this situation is, but I don't appreciate the insinuation that we are attempting to change your analytic content – particularly made in front of our staffs.

It encourages continued conflict, which is unnecessary and counter to the model of a collegial relationship that I thought we were attempting to set for the workforce. You have an issue, take it up with me. My door is always open for those conversations.

Bottom line, leadership won't accept a repeat of (b) (6) brief to SECNAV and that huge slide deck dropped on Geurtz Friday doesn't give them a warm fuzzy. (b) (6) can either accept some guidance from me or he'll surely get it from Geurtz on Friday.

I'm just the messenger here and really want nothing more than for you guys to find success.

J

From: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, March 16, 2021 7:18 PM
To: Obernier, Jennifer A SES USN UNSECNAV DC (USA) (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6) Chamberlin,
Thomas S SES USN ONI (USA) (b) (6)
(b) (6) Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC
(USA) (b) (6)
Subject: RE: Task Force Pre-Brief on Friday

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Thanks,
Scott

Scott W. Bray

Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence
Director, Naval Intelligence Activity

(b) (6)

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Date: Tuesday, Mar 16, 2021, 3:52 PM
To: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6 (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6) Chamberlin, Thomas
S SES USN ONI (USA) (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: FW: Task Force Pre-Brief on Friday

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To: (b) (6)
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I will work both now through (b) (6). And for everyone's info, (b) (6) is the USAF lead and will attend if available. I've cc'd our AF teammates.

Thank you,

V/r

(b) (6)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]


[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



From: (b) (6)

Sent: Tuesday, March 16, 2021 1:26 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: Obernier, Jennifer A SES USN UNSECNAV DC (USA) (b) (6)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Subject: Task Force Pre-Brief on Friday

(b) (6),

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UNSECNAV

VCNO

DUSN Greene

N2N6

Mr. Bray

(b) (6)

(USAF – not sure where we stand on this)

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- 2) Wait until the following Monday.

More to follow!

VR/ (b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
To: (b) (6) Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I; (b) (6)
Cc: Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA); (b) (6)
Subject: WASHINGTON POST STORY - Thanks to Trump-era covid relief bill, a UFO report may soon be public — and it'll be big, ex-official says
Date: Tuesday, March 23, 2021 7:37:58 AM

FYI... posted at 0700 this morning by the Washington Post...

(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

Thanks to Trump-era covid relief bill, a UFO report may soon be public — and it'll be big, ex-official says

Washington Post, 23 March 2021... by Reis Thebault

Last year's gargantuan \$2.3 trillion appropriations bill did a couple very obvious things: it provided millions of Americans badly needed coronavirus relief aid and it averted an impending government shutdown.

It also dealt with ... UFOs.

The legislation, which President Donald Trump signed into law, was a bureaucratic nesting doll that ran over 5,500 pages and contained the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, which itself carried an unusual provision in its "committee comment" section, beneath the understated heading "Advanced Aerial Threats."

The stipulation mandates that the director of national intelligence work with the secretary of defense on a report detailing everything the government knows about unidentified flying objects — known in agency lingo as "unidentified aerial phenomena" or "anomalous aerial vehicles."

It must be made public, and when it is, it will be big, former intelligence director John Ratcliffe said in a recent interview.

"Frankly, there are a lot more sightings than have been made public," Ratcliffe told Fox News host Maria Bartiromo on Friday.

The report must include "detailed analysis of unidentified aerial phenomena data and intelligence" gathered by the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force and the FBI, the provision reads.

It also calls for “a detailed description of an interagency process” that will ensure that data can be gathered and analyzed across the federal government. The report could document sightings from “all over the world,” Ratcliffe said.

“There are instances where we don’t have good explanations for some of the things that we’ve seen,” he added. “And when that information becomes declassified, I’ll be able to talk a little bit more about that.”

That time could be coming soon.

When Trump approved the spending package on Dec. 27, a 180-day countdown began, giving intelligence officials until June to deliver lawmakers their write-up.

However, two factors might delay the report’s release: agencies have missed similar congressional reporting deadlines in the past; and the provision is not technically binding, as the language was included in the Senate Intelligence Committee’s report on the bill, not the bill itself.

“In other words, it isn’t statute, but the agencies/departments generally treat report language as bill language,” said one senior Senate aide familiar with the legislation.

How angry pilots got the Navy to stop dismissing UFO sightings

The office of Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-Va.), chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, declined to comment on the UFO report. A spokesperson for the intelligence director’s office said “we have nothing to offer.”

Ratcliffe’s pronouncement comes months after the Pentagon released three grainy videos of UFOs recorded by U.S. Navy pilots using infrared cameras. The footage shows the objects moving rapidly across the screen. “My gosh,” one pilot remarks. The videos had been circulating for years but the Defense Department move gave them further official imprimatur.

Former senator Harry M. Reid (D-Nev.), a longtime backer of UFO research, said then that the footage “only scratches the surface of research and materials available.”

“The U.S. needs to take a serious, scientific look at this and any potential national security implications,” he said. “The American people deserve to be informed.”

The increasingly vocal crowd of space watchers is eagerly awaiting the forthcoming intelligence agency report. Some of them say that studying UFOs is essential to the country’s security.

In a July interview with Miami’s CBS4 News, Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.), vice chair of the Intelligence Committee, said the prospect that something otherworldly is behind the flying objects does not concern him as much as the idea that a U.S. adversary could be making secret technological advances.

“The bottom line is if there are things flying over your military bases and you don’t know what they are because they aren’t yours and they are exhibiting — potentially — technologies that you don’t have at your own disposal, that to me is a national security risk and one that we should be looking into,” Rubio said.

Others have argued that the research has been equated with claims of extraterrestrial life and unfairly written off as kooky science fiction.

In the Fox News interview, Ratcliffe described the sightings this way: “We are talking about objects that have been seen by Navy or Air Force pilots, or have been picked up by satellite imagery, that frankly engage in actions that are difficult to explain, movements that are hard to replicate, that we don’t have the technology for or are traveling at speeds that exceed the sound barrier without a sonic boom.”

“There’s actually quite a few of those,” he added. “And I think that that information is being gathered and will be put out in a way the American people can see.”

Christopher Mellon, a former deputy assistant secretary of defense for intelligence, applauded Ratcliffe’s disclosure. Mellon, who now works with former Blink-182 frontman Tom DeLonge’s To the Stars Academy of Arts and Sciences, called it “an important and noteworthy admission.”

One measure of the level of anticipation surrounding the report can be found on the Twitter account of Luis Elizondo, an ex-intelligence officer who also works at To the Stars Academy. Last month, Elizondo asked his followers for “the top three (3) things you would like the 180-Day report to address/say.”

He received more than 850 replies.

“Thank you for the overwhelming response to my question,” he wrote. “Another example of how you all are changing the landscape.”

[Article](#)

From: (b) (6)
To: SD - DSD Calendar; Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I; (b) (6)
(b) (6)
; Obernier, Jennifer A SES USN UNSECNAV DC (USA); (b) (6)
Tipton, Neill T SES
OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA); (b) (6)
Cc: SD - Meetings; SD - Protocol; SD - DepSecDef SAs & MAs; SD - DSD Read ahead; SD - ESC VTC; SD - Cables
Executive Support Officer
Subject: Attendee UPDATE: [Meeting Announcement] UAP Brief -- Thursday, 25 MAR, 1530-1630; 3E928 | DSD
Conference Room
Date: Wednesday, March 24, 2021 6:12:58 PM

Good morning,

Please see the subject schedule request below and **confirm your Principal's participation – RSVP to:** (b) (6).

Subject: UAP Brief

Date: Thursday, 25 March

Time: 1530-1630 (60 minutes)

Location: 3E928 | DSD Conference Room

DSD Team Lead: DSD SMA

Read Ahead materials due 48-hours prior – send to: (b) (6)

Slide Projection: Slides must be hard copy.

Attendees:

- DSD
- A/SECNAV
- DUSN
- DSD COS
- SECNAV COS
- ADM Lescher
- Mr. Scott Bray
- (b) (6)
- DSD SMA – General Lyons
- Mr. Neill Tipton

If your Principal requests to bring additional staff, please provide their names and titles for approval prior to the meeting.

Respectfully,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
To: (b) (6); Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I
Cc: Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA); (b) (6)
(b) (6) Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA)
Subject: RE: News Article: "Military and spy agencies accused of stiff-arming investigators on UFO sightings"
Date: Friday, March 26, 2021 5:21:32 PM

CUI//PRE-DECISIONAL//Exempt from FOIA under (b)(5)

Thanks, (b) (6)

(b) (6)

V/r,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, March 26, 2021 6:41 AM
To: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Cc: Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6); Stratton, John F (Jay)
SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
Subject: News Article: "Military and spy agencies accused of stiff-arming investigators on UFO sightings"
Importance: High

CUI//PRE-DECISIONAL//Exempt from FOIA under (b)(5)

Scott, (b) (6),

(b) (6), (b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

1. (b) (5) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Worth discussing/considering.

Regards,

(b) (6)
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Military and spy agencies accused of stiff-arming investigators on UFO sightings

A public accounting is proving to be an "onerous job of trying get everyone to come clean," one government adviser said.

Politico, 25 March 2021... by Bryan Bender

The truth may be out there. But don't expect the feds to share what they know anytime soon on the recent spate of UFO sightings.

Some military and spy agencies are blocking or simply ignoring the effort to catalog what they have on "unidentified aerial phenomenon," according to multiple current and former government officials. And as a result, the Biden administration will likely delay a much-anticipated public report to Congress.

The Senate Intelligence Committee has asked the director of national intelligence to work with the Defense Department to provide a public accounting by June 25 on unexplained sightings of advanced aircraft and drones that have been reported by military personnel or captured by radar, satellites and other surveillance systems.

The request came after revelations in 2017 that the Pentagon was researching a series of unexplained intrusions into military airspace, including high-performance vehicles captured on video stalking Navy ships.

But those advising the investigations are advocating for significantly more time and resources to retrieve information from agencies that in some cases have shown reluctance, if not outright resistance, to sharing classified information. And they worry that without high-level involvement, it will be difficult to compel agencies to release what they have.

"Just getting access to the information, because of all the different security bureaucracies, that's an ordeal in itself," said Christopher Mellon, a former Pentagon intelligence official who lobbied for the disclosure provision and is continuing to advise policymakers on the issue.

For example, he asserts that a Pentagon task force established last August and led by the Navy has had few personnel or resources and only modest success acquiring reports, video or other evidence gathered by military systems.

The Pentagon task force is expected to be the primary military organization contributing to the wider government report.

"I know that the task force has been denied access to pertinent information by the Air Force and they have been stiff-armed by them," Mellon said in an interview. "That is surprising but not unexpected."

The Air Force, which is historically most associated with UFOs from its investigations during the Cold War, deferred all questions on the subject to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, which has similarly said little publicly about the effort.

"To protect our people, maintain operational security and safeguard intelligence methods, we do not publicly discuss the details of the UAP observations, the task force or investigations," said Pentagon spokesperson Susan Gough, who declined to address the criticism.

The report due to Congress will include "a detailed analysis of unidentified phenomena data collected by" a host of means, including imaging satellites, eavesdropping equipment and human spies.

It also must include "a detailed analysis of data of the FBI, which was derived from investigations of intrusions of unidentified aerial phenomena data over restricted United States airspace." The report must contain "a detailed description of an interagency process for ensuring timely data collection and centralized analysis of all unidentified aerial phenomena reporting for the federal government,

regardless of which service or agency acquired the information."

Gathering such information from across the national security bureaucracy is enormously challenging, Mellon said.

"They have to repeat that painful process with scores of different agencies," he said, citing the Army, CIA, National Reconnaissance Office, National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.

A spokesperson for Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines told POLITICO the report to Congress is in the works, but declined to offer further details. "We are aware of the requirement and will respond accordingly."

Any delay in delivering it is likely to be perceived by a large segment of the public as an attempt by the government to hide what it knows.

But there is growing pressure from Congress for a more organized effort to compile what the government has learned and reveal how it is trying to solve the mysteries.

Sen. Marco Rubio, who was responsible for requesting the report, told Fox News this week that he does not believe military and intelligence agencies have come to any solid conclusions about the origin of the UFOs. But he insisted that the reports demand a more comprehensive intelligence-gathering effort.

"We have to try to know what it is," the Florida Republican said. "Maybe there's a logical explanation. Maybe it's foreign adversaries who made a technological leap?"

Rubio also held up the prospect that agencies will need more time to complete the report. "I'm not sure they are going to come in on time," he said. "I'm not sure by June 1 they have reached a hard conclusion about what they are dealing with and there may be more questions, or new questions, than full answers ..."

"I can tell you it is being taken more seriously now than it ever has been," he added.

The pressure to disclose what the government is doing has only intensified after recent comments from the former top intelligence official.

"We have lots of reports about what we call unmanned aerial phenomenon," John Ratcliffe, who served as director of national intelligence under former President Donald Trump, said in an interview with Fox News last week. "When we talk about sightings, we are talking about objects that have [been] seen by Navy or Air Force pilots, or have been picked up by satellite imagery that frankly engage in actions that are difficult to explain."

He cited "movements that are hard to replicate that we don't have the technology for ... or traveling at speeds that exceed the sound barrier without a sonic boom."

One such recent case, involving a swarm of unidentified "drones" that bedeviled a flotilla of Navy destroyers off the California coast in 2019, was revealed this week by the technology website The Drive.

But there has been enormous resistance inside the bureaucracy to being forthcoming, said Lue Elizondo, who led research on UAPs in the Pentagon until 2017 and publicly resigned in frustration that the issue was not being treated seriously enough.

"You have all the stigma and the taboo that is associated with it," said Elizondo, who serves as an informal adviser to the military. "Organizations whose mission this might fall squarely into are resisting adopting this mission. There's been so much public taboo about this for decades that no one wants to risk their professional careers and that of their bosses on a topic like this without being directed."

He also sees what he called "passive resistance," or "they're just not going to do anything to support it," such as applying resources or personnel to the activity.

Others see a lack of cooperation among different agencies and a desire to protect sensitive information that could benefit adversaries.

"One of the challenges that [the Defense Department] has had in the past is that a lot of these intelligence-gathering organizations, a lot of the military services' organizations that gather data on intrusions, are all extremely stovepiped and federated," said Ellen Lord, who served as undersecretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment until January and was briefed on the Pentagon efforts.

She also said there may be valid reasons not to make it all public. "I think it is sometimes easy ... to go down a rabbit hole for the sci-fi, alien piece of this," she said in an interview. "In reality, there is a lot of technology that has been leveraged by our adversaries and we have ways to deal with that.

"But that is something that is not typically spoken about in public forums. Therein lies the challenge of some of these things," she added.

The secrecy surrounding the effort has been demonstrated by the Pentagon's refusal to even discuss any details of its UAP task force, not even how many personnel are assigned to it or what budget it has been given.

Elizondo believes there is little chance such obstacles can be overcome by June under the current level of effort and is advocating for an interim report that requests more time and resources. "We can do this right or we can do it right now," he said.

"It's certainly not sufficient time to provide a comprehensive, government-wide report that Congress not only expects, but that Congress deserves and frankly, so does the American people," he added.

Mellon thinks it could take months or longer. "In addition to the onerous job of trying get everyone to come clean," he said, "there will be a sensitive and probably difficult process of getting all the players ... to agree on the language and approve it. That process alone could take weeks or months."

Mellon also said the direct involvement of senior executive branch officials, including Haines and Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen Hicks, "is likely to prove necessary to compel the cooperation needed to do the job properly."

The good news," he added, "is the leadership on both sides appear to be taking this issue seriously and are acting in good faith."

(b) (6)

[REDACTED]

From: [Creighton, Kathleen M RADM USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#)
To: [Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO \(USA\)](#); [Mccool, Kelly SES USN DCNO N9 \(USA\)](#); [BryerJoyner, Susan RDML USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#); [Okon, John A RDML USN COMNAVMETOC COM SSC \(USA\)](#); [Barron, Claude E SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#); [Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#); [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#); [Flynn, William A SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#); [Correll, Richard A RADM USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#); [Emery, Gregory K RDML USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#)
Cc: [OPNAV ALL N2N6 Front Office](#); [Miller, Christopher A SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#); [Treat, Michael V CIV USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#); [Reiter, Joshua \(Josh\) SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#)
Subject: RE: Back from TDY
Date: Sunday, March 28, 2021 7:15:40 PM

DCNO, roger.
VR/Kathy

From: Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO (USA) (b) (6)
Sent: Sunday, March 28, 2021 6:20 PM
To: Creighton, Kathleen M RADM USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6); Mccool, Kelly SES USN DCNO N9 (USA) (b) (6); BryerJoyner, Susan RDML USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6); Okon, John A RDML USN COMNAVMETOC COM SSC (USA) (b) (6); Barron, Claude E SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6); Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6); Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I <scott.w.bray@navy.mil>; Flynn, William A SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6); Correll, Richard A RADM USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6); Emery, Gregory K RDML USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)
Cc: OPNAV ALL N2N6 Front Office (b) (6); Miller, Christopher A SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6) >
Subject: Back from TDY

Team,

Back a couple of days early from TDY, in Monday morning. Need a couple of hours to catch up and then will get ahead or catch up with you where needed.

Things interested in at a minimum.

- Cyber day on the Hill
- NGEN status, comms plan, (b) (6) plan, etc
- Oversight Board
- NIF update
- MOC update (Claude I have your notes I am getting through now)
- Extremism training update. I was gone when all was put out, I need to see what I need or ought to do
- Monthly update to CNO
- How could I not want to get up to speed on UAP too and DepSecDef engagement

Glad Spring is here!

Vr, JT

From: (b) (6)
To: (b) (6) [Bray, Scott](#)
[W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: [Non-DoD Source] Request for comment regarding statement by CNO on July 2019 drone incident
Date: Monday, April 5, 2021 7:06:48 PM

Hi (b) (6) –

Sending the below on behalf of Mr. Bray –

Even though this isn't a UAP TF issue (per your note – I'm not stating based on first-hand knowledge), (b) (5)

Thanks,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, April 5, 2021 5:07 PM
To: (b) (6) [Bray, Scott W](#)
[SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#) (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: FW: [Non-DoD Source] Request for comment regarding statement by CNO on July 2019 drone incident

(b) (6)

CNO was asked about the July 2019 story per the note below.

(b) (6) has received the 2 follow on Qs as noted.

We need to provide proposed responses.

How should we respond?

Seems to me that maybe we can/should say something along the lines of “Information on this event was shared with the TF, but the incident and the aircraft identified in the reports fall outside the purview of the TF.”

Would that be accurate? Is it ok to say that?

Since it is not a TF issue, it would fall outside of our standard “we don’t discuss individual sightings “ parameters.

Other thoughts/ideas?

Regards

(b) (6)

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b) (6)
Date: Monday, Apr 05, 2021, 4:33 PM
To: (b) (6)
Subject: FW: [Non-DoD Source] Request for comment regarding statement by CNO on July 2019 drone incident

Hi, (b) (6). So, Jeff Schogol asked CNO about the recent story of a July 2019 incident. You can read below how CNO answered. Adam Kehoe is now asking two questions:

Is the UAPTF involved in examining the incident, and is the UAPTF the repository for analysis that the CNO mentions? [I highlighted below, it’s near the bottom.]

*****CUI//PRE-DECISIONAL//Exempt under (b)(5)

(b) (5)

Regard,

(b) (6)

From: Adam Kehoe (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, April 5, 2021 4:17 PM
To: (b) (6)
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Request for comment regarding statement by CNO on July 2019 drone incident

All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.

(b) (6),

I wanted to ask your comment about the Chief of Naval Operation's comments today in a press briefing. Speaking about our recent coverage of an apparent July 2019 drone incursion in Southern California, the CNO had this exchange with Jeff Schogol:

Q: In July 2019, the USS Kidd saw some unusual unmanned aircraft that were able to loiter for long periods of time. This went on for several days and involved several other ships. Has the Navy determined what these aircraft were and which country or actor they came from?

A: No, we have not. I am aware of those sightings and as it's been reported there have been other sightings by aviators in the air and by other ships not only of the United States but other nations – and of course other elements within the U.S. joint force.

And so, those findings have been collected and they still are being analyzed. I don't have anything new to report, Jeff, on what those findings have revealed thus far. But I will tell you we do have a well-established process in place across the joint force to collect that data and to get it to a separate repository for analysis.

Q: Is there any suspicion they are extraterrestrial?

A: No – I can't, I can't speak to that – I have no indications at all of that.

For reference, here is a link to our original story:

Caution-<https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/39913/multiple-destroyers-were-swarmed-by-mysterious-drones-off-california-over-numerous-nights> < Caution-
<https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/39913/multiple-destroyers-were-swarmed-by-mysterious-drones-off-california-over-numerous-nights> >

Are you able to comment if the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force is involved in investigating this matter, or serving as a repository for analysis?

We really appreciate anything you can add. As I'm sure you can imagine there is a lot of speculation about this story, so we want to be sure we're getting it right. We will likely put out an update today and it'd be great if you can help us understand where this currently sits.

Thanks,
Adam Kehoe

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
To: Gray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6; (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: Photographs Claiming to be US Navy
Date: Thursday, April 8, 2021 7:29:00 AM

Scott, (b) (6),

As mentioned, here's the link to the story that contains the 3 iPhone photos that you are aware of.

Of note... we (b) (6) and I found out about the story and got this link from our favorite FOIA machine... (b) (6) of the Black Vault.

<https://www.mysterywire.com/ufo/new-uap-photographs/>

He asked us: can the US Navy / DOD comment on these new photographs to any extent?

Regards,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#)
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] FW: FYSA: "Images leaked from Pentagon investigation show UFOs swarm above Navy destroyer" (Fox 8)
Date: Friday, April 9, 2021 9:24:42 AM

Scott,

Are you out flying your drones again? ☺

Regards,

(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, April 09, 2021 8:38 AM
To: (b) (6); Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6); (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: Re: FYSA: "Images leaked from Pentagon investigation show UFOs swarm above Navy destroyer" (Fox 8)

Thanks, (b) (6). Pushed to NIM Aviation, Asst DNI for Strategic Comms and ODNI Leg Affairs. Should we expect some high side comms?

(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Date: Friday, April 9, 2021 at 8:05:50 AM
To: "Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I" (b) (6); (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

(b) (6)



Subject: RE: FYSA: "Images leaked from Pentagon investigation show UFOs swarm above Navy destroyer" (Fox 8)

[Here's one of the stories that contains the videos...](#)

Pictures and video show Unidentified Flying Objects moving above U.S. Navy warships

Mystery Wire, 8 April 2021... by George Knapp

Amazing images have been leaked from a secretive Pentagon investigation of UFOs.

The UAP Task Force has been gathering evidence for a comprehensive report for Congress which is due in June that includes photographs and videos of UFO encounters with U.S. military assets, including Navy destroyers off the southern California coast.

Part of the report is to educate other military and intelligence officials about the nature of the UFO mystery.

The new images were gathered by the Task Force and obtained by investigative filmmaker Jeremy Corbell, who confirmed their authenticity. Mystery Wire has independently confirmed that the visual materials are included in the briefing presentation prepared by the UAP Task Force.

Several U.S. warships based in San Diego were repeatedly buzzed by unknown aerial intruders. Stories of strange encounters bubbled to the surface last summer, initially focused on the USS Kidd Navy destroyer.

A month ago, more documentation surfaced in the form of ships logs, which confirmed that aerial intruders were seen by crews aboard multiple warships in restricted waters off the coast of southern California.

The objects were described as drones. But there was not any description where they came from or who might be controlling them.

One remarkable video was recorded in July 2019 by Naval officers using a night vision device, showing what appear to be pyramid shaped objects hovering 700 feet above a Navy destroyer.

"This (video) was taken on deployment from the USS Russell," Corbell said. "It shows what they described as vehicles. And they made a great distinction. They made sure in this classified briefing, they made a great distinction that this is not something that we own either a black project, this is not something of a foreign military, that these were behaving in ways that we did not expect. And that they were you know shaped non aerodynamically. Like pyramids, these are flying pyramids!"

The video is one of several forms of visual evidence gathered by the UAP Task Force to document bizarre encounters reported by the U.S. Navy during the past two years, including photos of three stationary drones of unknown origin, reported earlier this week.

This week, Mystery Wire shared photographs taken by the crew of an F/A-18 off the coast of Virginia in March, 2019.

Some critics think they are simply drones or balloons, but the Navy and the Task Force list them as unknowns. They too are included in the Task Force briefing. The overall report is classified, but the images are not.

Corbell says the briefing lists multiple events involving several ships over a few days. “That was in July 2019. It got increasingly strange,” Corbell said. “The 14th and 15th of July, there were some like drone sightings. And by the way, on the other ships, they had different things that happened. So some were just like lights that did figure-eights and patterns and 90 degree turns. Others were like a different color light, like red.”

Among the other images from the time period is a spherical object photographed by the crew of the USS Omaha as it flew nearby, then descended into the ocean. The Navy called it a trans-medium vehicle.

“Where did they land? Where did they come from? How did they travel the distance?” Corbell asked during a Mystery Wire podcast recording. “How did they have the power source for the lights? How could they evade detection?”

If anyone in the Navy or the UAP Task Force knows, no one is talking on the record.

The mystery drones, the spheres, the flying pyramids, the metallic blimp are considered to be true unknowns.

Mystery Wire has reached out to the Pentagon for comment on these images and video but have not received a response.

[Article](#)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Friday, April 9, 2021 6:26 AM

To: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6 (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Subject: FW: FYSA: "Images leaked from Pentagon investigation show UFOs swarm above Navy destroyer" (Fox 8)

From DOD PA....

Not good.

Regards,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Thursday, April 8, 2021 11:55 PM

To: (b) (6); Cummings,
Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA) (b) (6)

Subject: Fwd: FYSA: "Images leaked from Pentagon investigation show UFOs swarm above Navy destroyer" (Fox 8)

I'm curious as to how an "investigative filmmaker" can confirm authenticity...when we haven't yet.

Plus, you know, it'd be nice if we could plug leaks about the UAPTF.

Sent from my iPhone

From: "OSD Pentagon PA Mailbox Media Analysis"

(b) (6)

Date: Thursday, April 8, 2021 at 10:42:42 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

"OSD Pentagon PA Mailbox Media Analysis"

(b) (6)

Subject: FYSA: "Images leaked from Pentagon investigation show UFOs swarm above Navy destroyer" (Fox 8)

Images leaked from Pentagon investigation show UFOs swarm above Navy destroyer

Fox 8 (Cleveland) | Not Attributed

Amazing images have been leaked from a secretive Pentagon investigation of UFOs.

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One remarkable video was recorded in July 2019 by Naval officers using a night vision device, showing what appear to be pyramid shaped objects hovering 700 feet above a Navy destroyer.

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The video is one of several forms of visual evidence gathered by the UAP Task Force to document bizarre encounters reported by the U.S. Navy during the past two years, including photos of three stationary drones of unknown origin, reported earlier this week.

(b) (6)



From: (b) (6)
To: (b) (6) Bray, Scott
W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: draft responses
Date: Friday, April 9, 2021 10:13:25 AM

Hi (b) (6),

I'm well out of my element here, but what about adding a line to the RTQ that says (b) (5)

(b) (6)

Why wouldn't you want to say that?

V/r

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, April 9, 2021 9:15 AM
To: (b) (6) Bray, Scott W
SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: FW: draft responses

All,

(b) (6), (b) (5)
[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Regards,

(b) (6)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Thursday, April 8, 2021 9:21 PM

To: (b) (6)

Subject: draft responses

(b) (6), it's been a wild afternoon. Per our discussion, here's some drafts for responses to queries on these two matters for you to kick around with your folks.

*****CUI//PRE-DECISIONAL//EXEMPT FROM FOIA UNDER (b)(5) UNTIL FINAL/APPROVED*****

(b) (6), (b) (5)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Regards,

b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
To: (b) (6); Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I; (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
(b) (6); Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA);
(b) (6)
Brown, Charles W RDML USN (USA); Rowell BGen George B IV; (b) (6)
Cummins, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA); (b) (6)
Subject: News Article - Adversary Drones Are Spying On The U.S. And The Pentagon Acts Like They're UFOs
Date: Friday, April 16, 2021 8:10:45 AM

CUI//PRE-DECISIONAL/PORIONS EXEMPT FROM FOIA UNDER (b)(5)

All,

Long article... worth the read.

Probably one of the best we've seen.

(b) (5)

But still, a good effort.

Regards,

(b) (5)

Adversary Drones Are Spying On The U.S. And The Pentagon Acts Like They're UFOs

The U.S. military seems aloof to the fact that it's being toyed with by a terrestrial adversary and key capabilities may be compromised as a result.

The War Zone, 15 April 2021... by Tyler Rogoway

We may not know the identities of all the mysterious craft that American military personnel and others have been seeing in the skies as of late, but I have seen more than enough to tell you that it is clear that a very terrestrial adversary is toying with us in our own backyard using relatively simple technologies—drones and balloons—and making off with what could be the biggest intelligence haul of a generation. While that may disappoint some who hope the origins of all these events are far more exotic in nature, the strategic implications of these bold operations, which have been happening for years, undeterred, are absolutely massive.

Our team here at The War Zone has spent the last two years indirectly laying out a case for the hypothesis that many of the events involving supposed UFOs, or unidentified aerial phenomena (UAP), as they are now often called, over the last decade are actually the manifestation of foreign adversaries harnessing advances in lower-end unmanned aerial vehicle technology, and even simpler platforms, to gather intelligence of extreme fidelity on some of America's most sensitive warfighting capabilities. Now, considering all the news on this topic in recent weeks, including our own major story on a series of bizarre incidents involving U.S. Navy destroyers and 'UAP' off the Southern California coast in 2019, it's time to not only sum up our case, but to discuss the broader implications of these revelations, what needs to be done about them, and the Pentagon's fledgling 'UAP Task Force' as a whole.

A big pill to swallow

Yes, I realize that the idea that an adversary is penetrating U.S. military training areas unmolested, and has been for years, using lowly drone technology and balloons, is a big pill to swallow, but as one of the people who have repeatedly warned about the threat posed by lower-end drones for a decade—warnings that largely were dismissed by the Pentagon until drones made or altered in ramshackle ISIS workshops in a war zone were literally raining down bomblets on U.S. and allied forces in Iraq—it isn't really surprising at all. Nor is the fact that the Defense Department is still playing catch-up when it comes to the realities surrounding the drone threat, and not just to its forces abroad, but also to the homeland overall. The utter lack of vision and early robust interest in regards to this emerging threat will go down as one of the Pentagon's biggest strategic missteps of our time.

The gross inaction and the stigma surrounding unexplained aerial phenomena as a whole has led to what appears to be the paralyzation of the systems designed to protect us and our most critical military technologies, pointing to a massive failure in U.S. military intelligence. This is a blind spot we ourselves literally created out of cultural taboos and a military-industrial complex that is ill-suited to foresee and counter a lower-end threat that is very hard to defend against.

Before I move forward, I must state that just because I believe the evidence is compelling that many of the bizarre encounters with mysterious objects in the sky as of late, and especially those that the U.S. military is experiencing, emanate from peer-state competitors, not another dimension or another solar system, there are certainly well-documented cases of seemingly unexplainable events that have nothing to do with this type of capability. In other words, our conclusions do not come even close to answering the question of UAPs or UFOs as a whole, especially in terms of the many unexplained incidents in decades past. What they do is highlight an alarming new capability set and tactics that seem to have been allowed to be exploited with little response for years while the Pentagon scratched its head and shrugged, or even worse, turned largely a blind eye toward it.

And that brings us to one of the biggest problems with this topic, as a whole—people expect one blanket and grand explanation for the entire UFO mystery to one day emerge. This is flawed thinking at its core. This issue is clearly one with multiple explanations due to the wide range of events that have occurred under a huge number of circumstances. This thinking must be changed as it limits our ability to solve some mysteries in the hopes of coming up with some fantastical monolithic explanation for every related mystery. So, accepting that there is likely a wide array of explanations to this notoriously abused topic will be absolutely key to successfully studying it and destigmatizing it in our culture, and especially within U.S. military and intelligence circles.

With that in mind, I also believe America's prevailing cultural issues and the general stigma surrounding UFOs was successfully targeted and leveraged by our adversaries, which helped these activities to persist far longer than they should have. In fact, I believe that those in power who snicker about credible reports of strange objects in the sky and stymie research into them, including access to classified data, have become a threat to national security themselves. Their lack of imagination, curiosity, and creativity appears to have built a near-perfect vacuum that our enemies could exploit and likely have exploited to an astonishing degree.

A very enticing target

Nearly two years ago, I wrote a widely circulated piece that addressed my thoughts on the Pentagon's sudden willingness to talk about UFOs and its potential implications. I went through the possibilities as I saw them, but above all else, it was clear that this wasn't some over-hyped myth. Something strange was indeed going on.

Soon after, we were the first to connect key technologies that had emerged around the time that sightings of certain types of mysterious UAPs began to accelerate amongst military personnel—in particular, Navy fighter pilots. This was largely based around new air defense data-fusion and networking capabilities being installed on Navy warships and aircraft, as well as the proliferation of Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radars on Navy fighters and airborne early warning and control planes. We also noted that the most remarkable appearances of these objects seemed to correlate with major Navy exercises where these advances in air defense capabilities were being fully integrated across a Carrier Strike Group. In other words, it seemed that these mysterious craft had a very keen interest in America's latest and greatest operational counter-air capabilities.

We then got clarification from pilot witnesses on key claims about what they and their squadron mates had experienced before pursuing what was an inconvenient hypothesis for many—that at least some of what these aircrews and vessels were encountering were not an exotic unexplained phenomenon at all, but were in fact adversary drones and lighter-than-air platforms (balloons) meant to stimulate America's most capable air defense systems and collect extremely high-quality electronic intelligence data on them. And this is critical data, incidentally, that is very hard to reliably obtain otherwise.

These radar emissions, and the datalink communications that go along with them, underpin highly networked counter-air architectures that are unmatched anywhere on earth. By gathering comprehensive electronic intelligence information on these systems, countermeasures and electronic warfare tactics can be developed to disrupt or defeat them. Capabilities can also be accurately estimated and even cloned and tactics can be recorded and exploited. The very signatures of these waveforms alone can be used to identify, classify, and geolocate them by adversary platforms during a time of war, providing a big leg-up when it comes to battlespace awareness.

We are talking about everything from common operating frequencies to highly-sensitive low-probability of intercept

emissions tactics, to datalink encryption, to distinct radar modes and employment procedures here. In other words, this is among the most critical intelligence a peer-state enemy can obtain and there aren't many easy ways of doing it. Even in a war zone, where aircraft and their systems are operating potentially in the same general area as adversary intelligence-collection systems, using their full combat capabilities may be restricted to maintain the secrets of those critical capabilities. Proximity to the emitters in question and how long their emissions are exposed to an intelligence-gathering system is a major limitation, as well. Traditional espionage is another way adversaries look to gain information on these critical systems, as well, but nothing beats going out and actually sucking up the electronic signatures as best you can. Actually becoming the target of their interest takes the quality of intelligence collected to a whole other level.

Historic precedent

The beginning of making the case for drones and balloons being the culprit for much of the recent UAP activity came when we posted an entire historical precedent for very similar operations dating back to the development of the A-12 Oxcart spy plane and the advent of modern electronic warfare itself. In essence, during the early 1960s, the CIA launched radar reflectors on balloons off Cuba's coastline via a U.S. Navy submarine and employed an electronic warfare system called PALLADIUM that would trick the latest Soviet radar systems into showing their operators that enemy aircraft were rushing toward Cuban shores or doing all types of crazy maneuvers. This coaxed the Cuban air defense system and its radars to light up and spurred rapid communications between air defenders on the island.

The balloon-borne radar reflectors of different sizes also showed up on the Soviet radars, and by monitoring the targets that the radar operators concentrated on, and thus could detect, it was determined how sensitive their Soviet radar systems actually were. This provided critical information on the survivability of the Mach 3+ and somewhat stealthy A-12, but beyond that, it set a precedent of how electronic warfare and airborne targets could be used to prod an enemy's air defenses so that critical intelligence as to their capabilities could be determined—all without actually putting a pilot in the air at risk.

That was just the start of these types of operations. As the decades went by, far more complex and capable integrated air defenses began proliferating throughout the globe, placing a greater need on collecting this type of critical information. From what we understand, PALLADIUM evolved and subsequently spiraled into a far wider electronic intelligence gathering ecosystem, much of which is still highly secretive in nature and exists to this day.

The U.S. has extremely capable standoff electronic intelligence-gathering aircraft, such as the U.S. Air Force's manned RC-135 Combat Sent and Rivet Joint, as well as the Navy's EP-3E Aries and P-8A Poseidon, not to mention U-2S Dragon Lady and unmanned RQ-4 Global Hawk, that are all capable of building up a picture of the enemy's electronic order of battle from a distance. Even America's top fighter aircraft are increasingly equipped with digital electronic warfare suites including highly advanced electronic support measures (ESM) that can provide tactical electronic intelligence of very high quality. Other countries, such as Russia and China, possess electronic intelligence (ELINT) gathering aircraft types, as well, albeit without the same level of capabilities or, in some cases, the same international reach and persistence.

While the United States also has very advanced, stealthy assets that can penetrate into enemy airspace to collect electronic intelligence data of a totally different fidelity, right near the emitters themselves and over long periods, America's adversaries do not, at least not yet. They have also historically lagged behind the U.S. government in

space-based ELINT systems, which offer another way to scoop up emissions coming out of denied areas, and do so discreetly. This leaves America's potential foes to have to get more creative in order to obtain this critical information.

So, for the time being, even though exquisite stealth unmanned aircraft may be out of their reach, swarms of lower-end drones and other less-advanced unmanned airborne platforms certainly are not. And regardless of America's own stealth capabilities, one would be remiss if they were to believe that clandestine operations, such as the one using PALLADIUM 60 years ago, aren't still going on today. In fact, we know the use of balloons strapped with payloads to collect vital intelligence continued throughout the Cold War.

While manned overflights of the Soviet Union ended with the U-2 crisis in May 1960, high-altitude balloons continued to float across Soviet and Warsaw Pact borders for decades to follow. Unsurprisingly, this activity was conducted covertly, but continued even after the advent of spy satellites. For the Soviet Air Defense Forces in particular, the balloons were a significant menace, proving especially hard to defeat. There is evidence that at least some Soviet fighter units maintained gun-armed interceptors at round-the-clock readiness specifically to shoot down the intruding balloons and one aircraft, the M-17 Mystic, was even developed to carry out this particular mission, although it never entered service in this role. The Russians surely took note of this unique intelligence-gathering application.

Fast forward to the 21st Century, and revolution in lower-end unmanned aircraft has provided the perfect attritable platform—one robust enough to carry out the task, but low-cost enough so that it wouldn't matter if it got lost in the process—for just such a mission set. And, as we explained in great detail, so are balloons carrying radar reflectors and expendable electronic intelligence and even electronic warfare payloads. Whereas 60 years ago, electronic warfare systems may have required an entire plane or a large pod on a plane, today totally expendable electronic warfare systems that can wreak havoc on radars and other air defense nodes can be dropped out of a chaff and flare dispenser or be housed in the tip of a small missile—or flown on a balloon or lower-end drone.

Preconceived notions

In our investigative pieces on PALLADIUM, we also detailed how radar reflector balloons can be made in many configurations and we even discovered a patent dating back to well before PALLADIUM for a radar reflector balloon that is an exact visual match for the initially totally bizarre-sounding "cube inside a sphere" objects that Navy pilots had reported seeing off the east coast. We also discovered that initial reports that pilots visually saw these craft moving erratically were incorrect. In fact, when physically encountered, they were floating in the air and acting exactly as balloons would.

While balloons can look like virtually anything, drones can also look very strange due to the huge amount of configurations that exist. When most people think of drones they picture a small fixed-wing airplane or quadcopter type setup. That may be true for the heart of the burgeoning civilian market, but there are far more configurations, some of which look downright alien and perform unlike a traditional fixed-wing aircraft or quadcopter. These include everything from triangle-shaped flying wings to hybrid rotor/fixed-wing aircraft or even a vertical tube with a rotor at each end. There are even drones that launch smaller parasite drones and act as their mothership.

Drones can also be networked together and fly in formation. They may not all look the same, either. For instance,

smaller drones may be accompanied by a larger drone that carries computing hardware and communications gear, such as a basic satcom terminal or line-of-sight data-link, working as the command and control and communications router for the swarm. Or they may not have any man-in-the-loop communications at all, instead, they can be programmed to fly a pre-planned course or be equipped with programming for them to seek out certain stimuli in their environment, such as particular radar emissions, and to fly certain preplanned programs near those emitters. In fact, some of the biggest leaps in lower-drone technology came from Israel decades ago when they developed drone systems suited for seeking radar emitters and confusing or destroying them.

They can also have surprisingly long range. Iran has many small and relatively cheap fixed-wing drones that can fly very long distances running on efficient, small gasoline motors, for instance. These drones can travel hundreds of miles and loiter for hours while still carrying a relevant payload and have been thoroughly weaponized and used repeatedly in offensive operations. This has led to dystopian warnings to Americans visiting or living in one of the world's most highly defended capital cities.

When it comes to drone configurations, there are a huge number of them being operated or developed around the globe by nefarious actors. The delta-wing design is among the most popular for lower-end militarized drones as it provides high efficiency for long range, a wide operational envelope, and has good stability. It also has a perfect area to install a radiation seeker, optical sensor, electronic warfare payload, or a warhead.

These are just some general parameters that are the actual reality when it comes to unmanned systems, and they differ drastically from the assumptions most people make about smaller drones in general. I often hear "oh they can't fly that way" or "they can't fly that long, the battery would run out" or "they couldn't be jammed so there is no way they are drones." These statements are blatantly wrong, not just when it comes to the capabilities of a peer competitor, but even a less capable country or even a non-state actor.

Small weaponized drones, especially those that carry an explosive charge, have become a cheap asymmetric linchpin capability and, just as I predicted years ago, are rapidly evolving into becoming game-changers on the modern battlefield. They are also becoming a big business and their use as assassination tools has migrated to drug cartels and other organized crime syndicates. Even their development has devolved down to individuals and small rogue groups operating far from war zones.

Simply put, when it comes to lower-end drones, most people's assumptions seem to be pulled out of thin air or from what they have seen at the electronics section at big box stores. As such, these preconceived notions are indicators of why relatively simple drones and their unique configurations and performance characteristics can seem unfamiliar, even to experienced fighter pilots or observers on the ground that have never been really trained on these threats and all the different ways that can manifest themselves.

The swarm is not science fiction

When it comes to the U.S. Navy, it is using swarms of lower-end networked drones, submarines, ships, unmanned underwater vehicles, and more, to convince the enemy to think they are seeing ghost fleets and aerial armadas that aren't really there. You don't have to take our word for it, the Navy has a program of record for just this—that being Netted Emulation of Multi-Element Signature against Integrated Sensors, or NEMESIS.

The War Zone was the first to report on this program, which you can read all about [here](#), but, suffice to say, it lays

out an architecture that represents a quantum leap in electronic warfare. Yet none of its components are all that exquisite; it's just the networking of them together and being able to combine their effects cooperatively with highly agile computing and software that is. Swarming drones working together to decoy, jam, and distract the enemy? That is not a high-end capability. Unifying those effects with ships, other aircraft, submarines, and more in real-time to make multiple enemy sensors in disparate locations see the same thing? That is revolutionary.

After we posted the NEMESIS piece, many were asking our opinion if it was what Navy pilots had encountered off America's eastern seaboard. I am comfortable stating that I don't believe those incidents were all secret American tests of elements of what could be incorporated into NEMESIS. Quite the contrary, I believe it was largely a foreign power actively using what could be described as some components similar to what could be found in the NEMESIS ecosystem to collect critical intelligence on America's most advanced sensor systems and more. Once again, this doesn't mean everything aircrews saw off the east coast during this period were these capabilities, but it seems like a glaringly obvious explanation for most of them, and it is far more so now than it was when we first reported on those incidents.

Also, many of the strange high-performance characteristics ships and planes sometimes detect by radar at beyond visual range during these incidents can and likely are the result of electronic warfare. In fact, things like rapid accelerations in speed and sudden drops in altitude on radar represent very basic tenets of electronic warfare tactics. In the case of the east coast events, for instance, as far as we have been told, the high-performance capabilities of these objects were never visually observed, but they were seen on radar. The visual encounters describe balloon-like objects doing balloon-like things—not moving fast at all—while other objects feature performance more similar to drones than anything else.

Months after reporting on NEMESIS, we acquired the Naval Safety Center incident reports spanning most of the 2010s regarding anomalous objects that fighter pilots encountered off the eastern seaboard of the United States. What we found was stunning. While there were only a limited number of reports, and there were very likely other reports never filed with the safety center and instead filed as classified intelligence events, the ones that were there didn't describe alien craft at all. Instead, they described jet-powered, missile-like drones and other unmanned fixed-wing aircraft flying up in the flight levels, as well as multi-rotor drones hovering at very high altitudes far out to sea. There there are balloon-like objects, the origins of which were all unexplained even after official investigations.

Certainly no civilian is flying cruise missile-like aircraft at high altitude dozens of miles off the east coast. And flying a multi-rotor drone far out to sea at bizarrely high altitudes isn't normal. So, who do these belong to? Well if not us, and they are clearly not of an alien origin, then someone else. And who would want to be flying around in these specific chunks of airspace that are literally designated for use by America's top military aircraft, with the Navy's most capable warships often operating below? America's preeminent adversaries—China and Russia—that's who.

The motive and the opportunity

Those warning areas—airspace that can be set aside for military training—are where America's most advanced sensors blare their powerful radio-frequency communications and sensor systems day in and day out. F-22s, F-35s, F/A-18E/Fs, F-15Es, E-2Ds, and much more, fill those training areas daily. Below them, Aegis Combat System-equipped cruisers and destroyers, and America's supercarriers and amphibious assault ships, push their radar and networking systems to the limit to keep their skills sharp and to train for upcoming deployments. We are talking about the most advanced air defense sensor and networking technology on planet earth all operating in one region

(the counterpart being off the coast of Southern California) as reliably as the office hours at your local bank.

And they are doing so while at home, in areas where, unless intelligence warns them of spy ship activity nearby, their systems are largely being used to their maximum potential. All that potential intelligence zapping through the air, operating as if it is far from prying eyes. Simply put, it is the biggest electronic intelligence target on earth and the lowly drone and balloon, paired with America's strange aversion to taking unusual things in the sky seriously, have provided the perfect medium for which to gobble it up with little to no chance of major repercussions.

In fact, the Navy fighter pilot who has spoken about recent experiences with the UAP issue the most, Ryan Graves, seemed to have inadvertently summed up what I believe has been going on, and not as a secondary 'worst case' possibility as he describes it. Graves stated the following on the Kevin Rose Show:

"If we do have what we would call a 'red threat,' one of our traditional enemies that are using some type of perhaps new technology, or hard to identify technology that is out there in our working areas soaking up our waveforms and our radar and our sensor and our comms, watching our tactics on a daily basis, it's a major, major intelligence failure to have these things out there. And because they look slightly different than what our average threat would look like, everyone wants to ignore it. So if we had a Chinese or Russian fighter jet flying out there watching us it would be a major deal. But because it looks slightly different we want to ignore it."

Once again, it is a hard pill to swallow, but, nevertheless, bingo!

Robots in disguise

As we noted earlier, these drones and the balloons, in particular, could also look very strange to pretty much anyone who encounters them, even like a cube inside a sphere, or a metallic blimp with strange appendages. In fact, the odder they look, the better the cover for ongoing operations. Putting infrared bricks on drones giving them huge IR signatures or making radar reflector balloons look alien in shape would not only confuse the targeted adversary and likely allow for these operations to go on for far longer unchecked than they would otherwise, but they would also massively increase the quality of intelligence data they receive.

With this in mind, making things appear stranger and less threatening than they actually are is likely one tactic the enemy has used for these operations, and this can often come at a very cheap price. We have discussed how sometimes the simplest measures can make the most impactful illusions, and how even similar tricks that Disney uses to skew theme park goers' perceptions could be employed in a guileful manner to confuse an adversary. That seems to be part of the playbook being executed here, and what better passively-reinforced cover story is there in America than UFOs and all the stigma that goes along with it? The fact that pilots have historically refrained from reporting unexplained craft in the skies due to fear of their careers being impacted is all you really need to know when quantifying how relevant and effective such a tactic can be.

With that being said, not only could these things, or other platforms nearby, passively suck up electronic intelligence that presents itself in their vicinity, but the genius of their employment is that they themselves are the targets, and they are not necessarily friend or foe. This makes them flying intelligence 'honey traps' in their own regard. They get aircraft and ships to lock them up directly, likely running through multiple radar modes in the process as they get fully interrogated by various platforms, even at close range. This provides otherwise unthinkable opportunities to record all those signatures and tactics, even ones that may not be used otherwise if there was a known intelligence-

gathering threat present.

To put it another way, their ambiguous origins and the curiosity surrounding their presence sets up a situation in which they can make radar systems work directly against them without restrictions. Their small radar cross-sections and potentially elusive electronic warfare tactics would push those sensor systems and their operators even harder in order to lock them up, thus giving up even more valuable information.

Once again, the operation involving PALLADIUM during the A-12's development worked not just because they could get radar operators searching for something that wasn't there, but because they gave them hard targets to lock up. It seems that we are seeing history repeat itself, but this time it's the other guys putting on the magic show.

It's also worth saying that a campaign like this also has huge information and psychological warfare aspects. Eventually, if it is officially disclosed or outed, it makes the targeted country look horribly impotent in that they couldn't even defend their own airspace or even define a threat to it. Even more embarrassing, they let hollow cultural stigmas provide an open door to enemy intelligence operations. Beyond that, these activities cause confusion and muddy the waters as to what is a threat and what isn't. They can also cause fissures between those in uniform who observe these craft and their less than responsive commands. It even fits into Russia's hybrid warfare playbook, elements of which have been copied by other nefarious actors around the globe, including China.

Clandestine launch platforms

In November 2019, we went on to lay out how submarines can launch their own aerial drones and have been able to do so for far longer than most realize. Fast forward to today, and the Navy is now procuring swarms of drones for its submarines. Keep in mind, this is what they openly discuss, imagine the capabilities that have been in place for some time that have never been disclosed. Russia and China, who are looking for every asymmetric advantage against America's overwhelming technological superiority, certainly had seen the promise that the lowly drone showed for these types of ELINT gathering operations and Russia, in particular, has the submarines to deploy them in the hemisphere in question. Doing so with radar reflector and electronic intelligence gathering payload-carrying balloons is an even lower hanging fruit.

In the mid-2000s, studying and adapting UAV concepts of many sizes for submarine operations was in full swing. America's adversaries didn't just sit and watch, either.

Many naysayers have said that this is impossible because there are no Russian submarines deep in the Atlantic and that the U.S. largely controls this massive body of water. We begged to differ on that point and it turned out that the Navy eventually did too. It is now open knowledge that Russian submarines are operating deep in the Atlantic to the point that the Navy is calling it a contested body of water. And if you think the Navy has a perfect track on those boats at all times, you would be sorely mistaken. So, there is a motive and there is a delivery method, but really, we are probably overthinking it, at least to some degree.

The cold hard truth is that you don't need a submarine to launch a swarm of low-end drones and/or balloons to gather intelligence on an adversary's sensors. They can be launched from any vessel really, and especially from medium to large ones. There is a lot of shipping traffic out there at any given time, with ships flagged all over the globe and operated by an even more diverse roster of operators. A lowly freighter would be an effective delivery platform, and a far more accessible one. In fact, this concept of operations is well established already and

considering the ranges that some of these smaller drones can fly, it is even less of an issue. They can be launched in international waters.

An expanding picture of widespread events

Over the past two years, we have also reported on what appears to be an increasing phenomenon of large drone swarms spotted over the United States, as well as its outlying territories, and especially near strategic installations. The Colorado drone swarm saga seemed like something of a bizarre series of events in which the general consensus couldn't seem to settle on a case of mass hysteria or something actually occurring—this was not helped by really reckless reporting on the issue by one or two major outlets. Our subsequent investigation showed that internal correspondence between federal and local stakeholders pointed to it being anything but some product of mass groupthink.

Then things got even more serious when we uncovered a series of drone swarm events over the massive Palo Verde nuclear plant in Arizona. Subsequent documents showed that this was far from a one-off anomaly, with dozens of drone incursions involving America's nuclear plants having occurred not long before or after. How to protect this highly sensitive infrastructure from threats posed by drones remains a strangely awkward debate. While some claim an attack from small drones may have limited impacts on a nuclear facility—a highly debatable claim—there are other concerns, including those surrounding using drones to find networking security holes and more.

Then, maybe most chilling, we uncovered that drones had taken a very troubling interest in one of the most important U.S. air defense sites on earth—the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-ballistic missile battery on Guam. This is literally the last line of defense against incoming ballistic missiles for America's most important base in the Western Pacific. It is also the home of an AN/TPY-2 radar, one of the most advanced in the world, that provides surveillance and targeting for the THAAD missile interceptors. It isn't hard to imagine how valuable electronic intelligence from that radar and the system's local area and beyond-line-of-sight datalinks would be to an adversary like China, which not only has a huge interest in disabling such a capability during a time of war, but also learning from it to develop its own systems.

While some may brush off the actual destructive capabilities of a relatively small drone, they shouldn't. A drone packing a small charge may not be able to sink a ship or blow up an entire missile site, but it can punch a hole into a radar array and put the entire system out of business for long periods of time. In other words, a mission kill is just as effective at achieving the primary goal of disabling a defensive system as literally blowing it up. And yes, it is ironic that a THAAD battery, one of the most technologically impressive surface-to-air weapon systems ever created, can swat down incoming ballistic missiles but is extremely vulnerable to what could be as simple as a modified hobby drone. Once again, this is in large part a result of the Pentagon's unwillingness to recognize the threat of low-end drones before it materialized and its chronic under-investment in short-range air defenses (SHORAD) that withered on the vine in the decades following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a situation which you can read all about [here](#).

The same can be said for warships. While a swarm of drones couldn't sink a destroyer, they can overwhelm its defenses and neuter it by attacking its sensors, leaving it blind, vulnerable, and useless—the definition of a mission kill. Our report on the events that occurred off Southern California in the summer of 2019 underlined just how troubling the situation has become.

Swarms of drones harassed a number of U.S. Navy destroyers executing combat drills less than 100 miles off Los Angeles. This occurred on multiple nights. The level of documentation in that article alone shows just how palpable this part of the so-called phenomenon has become. You can imagine just how good the intelligence would have been with those ships' sensors and communications systems stimulated by the swarm of unknown origins within the perceived safety of America's own territorial waters. That swarm could have been, and likely was, sucking up, or helping another nearby platform suck up, all that sensitive ELINT data on the most capable warships on earth and at very close range.

Once again, in that case, the drone swarm could have come from a simple cargo vessel and it wouldn't have to be even within line-of-sight of the destroyers, which are easily tracked using open sources during routine training. The drones used in this event appear to have been smaller fixed-wing types similar to those that America's adversaries have built for various missions, like long-range strike, anti-radiation, decoy, and surveillance operations. As noted earlier, they can fly for hours and could easily be programmed to execute a certain route in the vicinity of where the destroyers were operating or even potentially programmed to react to certain RF emissions, at which time they would fly pre-programmed maneuvers near those emissions. This isn't some crazy high-tech thing. These are capabilities that America's primary adversaries possess and are further refining with each day. China, in particular, is far ahead in this regard and already has the operational capability to rapidly deploy large networked swarms that can work cooperatively together. Russia is also in the game and has focused on drone swarms that are electronic warfare enabled.

Uncompelling 'UFO' evidence

Beyond the so-called 'Tic-Tac' video that just looked like a blurry little Tic Tac, I have seen nothing in any government 'UAP' videos that supposedly show unexplainable capabilities or craft that actually portray that. In fact, quite the opposite. I have stated this repeatedly and tried to explain some of the unique dynamics at play with modern targeting pods and other factors, with many being offended by the mere thought that the videos simply are not what many have portrayed them to be. I have talked directly to the folks that design and build the sensor systems themselves. They don't see anything either, which I find quite strange considering these videos are supposedly evidence of flying objects that are unexplained.

Of course, we are only shown snippets of each video. There could be more footage that does show more puzzling maneuvers, but that simply isn't the case at this time. At least when it comes to the 'Go Fast' and 'Gimbal' videos, while the exact origin of the craft shown may not be known, they certainly are not unexplainable.

In recent weeks, more official evidence has come to light. This includes recently released images taken from an F/A-18 cockpit that clearly show balloons, not strange totally unexplainable craft. A video and still images from the incident we reported on that occurred off the California coast in 2019 have also come to light. They seem to show either delta-wing-shaped drones, very similar to the ones we have discussed earlier, or, and far more likely, another type of drone that is obscured by bokeh effect, the result of a bright light source being recorded out of focus through a night-vision scope by another camera. Once again, nothing appears unexplainable here. Quite the opposite, really.

One other leaked set of images, taken by the Los Angeles class attack submarine USS Omaha around the same period of time, shows what some claim is a 'trans-medium craft' disappearing into the ocean. The stills provided

prove nothing of the sort. It looks like a balloon or other object hitting the water as seen through a thermal imaging system. Once again, maybe other data exists that is compelling and truly exotic, but this certainly isn't that.

As for the authenticity of these latest photos and videos, our friend John Greenewald got confirmation that they are indeed authentic from the Office of Secretary of Defense spokesperson on the UAP issue, Susan Gough.

As it sits today, the Navy's top uniformed officer says the craft involved in the 2019 incidents off of Southern California remain unidentified.

When it comes to the reality that drones and balloons appear to be the origin of many of these sightings, I wish it wasn't the case. I would rather have all this be some huge revelation for mankind instead of having to come to terms with the fact that at least one of our adversaries, and possibly two, have played our own cultural norms against us and have executed what may be among the most successful and ingenious intelligence-gathering plays of all time. Meanwhile, it seems that the DoD is either incapable of identifying and evaluating what should no longer be considered an emerging threat—swarming drones and radar target balloons—or they are playing along by acting like they do not know, which could be the case for a number of reasons.

First of all, it's not the Navy's job to protect America's sovereign airspace, it is the Air Force's. That service will say next to nothing about any of this, even when asked very specific questions. Why? Well, at least when it comes to the drone threat, they really don't have the ability to defend against it and have clearly failed in doing so thus far. In fact, if unidentified flying craft are hanging out off of our coasts, why haven't alert fighters scrambled to investigate them repeatedly? Their crews are the ones specially trained and equipped to do so. Maybe they were and we just haven't heard about it, but if it was happening all the time, I find that doubtful. And yes, they do scramble on 'UFOs,' as we exclusively discovered a few years ago.

The truth is the Air Force does know that low radar-cross-section aerial vehicles, such as drones and cruise missiles, are a massive threat. That is one major reason why the Air National Guard has equipped its F-15 fleet, and is now equipping its F-16 fleet, with AESA radars that can better spot these threats. These alert aircraft are also outfitted with targeting pods to identify any aircraft at long range, day or night, in relatively high resolution. The Air Force is also coming up with ideas to deal with large numbers of potential small threat aircraft at one time, such as using laser-guided rockets to swat them down, but those capabilities are still a while off from being operationalized. So there is finally action being taken, but saying "we really have had no way of defending the homeland against these low-end threats" really wouldn't be a good look for the Air Force and it goes against the whole idea of not admitting your strategic weaknesses.

The other possibility is that we are doing the same exact thing, using drones and balloons to gather critical information on enemy air defense capabilities overseas, and thus, we really don't want to delve too deeply into the matter. In fact, we may want it to seem like we are totally stumped by these activities too.

Considering we know efforts like PALLADIUM never really ceased, and considering our submarine drone-launching capabilities, and the fact that submarines are already used to suck up ELINT data clandestinely, this almost seems more likely than not. Don't expect anyone to admit it though. Nobody keeps a secret like the 'Silent Service.' Even the U.S. Army is now actively pursuing balloon systems that will carry powerful sensors, communications systems, and electronic warfare packages, as well as drop swarms of drones deep behind enemy lines.

Sound familiar?

These are just possibilities, but considering the intelligence value up for grabs here, and how hard it can be to obtain that intelligence, they are at least worth pondering and it is really quite possible that a mix of these scenarios could be at play.

An investigation in a bubble

It also seems quite possible, that when it comes to the Pentagon's investigations into these matters, there is a lack of real expertise to properly evaluate the evidence. In all the discussions about this topic and the Pentagon's 'UFO' programs under AAWSAP and later AATIP, it seems that they were working largely external to the sprawling intelligence infrastructure built over 70 years to quantify foreign threats using limited information and even to exploit them.

For instance, the people in the Defense Intelligence Agency's Foreign Material Exploitation apparatus can pull crashed MiGs from swamps and get them flying again under total secrecy and those in the Directorate of Science and Technology are tasked with evaluating complex foreign threats from a distance using all the data the intelligence community has to offer. Somehow, when it comes to UAP, we never hear about this existing ecosystem that is perfectly suited to evaluate the topic. It is as if the whole UAP issue has and continues to live in its own tiny intelligence bubble, walled off from the greater military intelligence environment.

While claims that 'smart people' have looked at the data may be true, we don't know who these people are or what their level of expertise or resources is. Do they even exist inside the DoD and intelligence community's analysis world or are they external to it? How many eyes are actually working on these issues and collaborating to better understand and quantify them? From what we understand, historically very few, at least in regards to the programs that have been disclosed.

From everything I know about the now famed 'UAP task force,' and by others' accounts as well, it is not some powerful inter-agency initiative with a solid mandate from inside the Pentagon and the intelligence community. Far from it. It is a few people in an office with very limited resources that are often hitting walls when trying to obtain critical information from other intelligence stakeholders.

That's a huge strategic problem.

The primary reason for this being so troubling is not a looming threat from space invaders or inter-dimensional beings, or the dream of some all-telling disclosure to the public, it is because the next big threat that surprises us from a foreign adversary will likely look very unfamiliar, at least at first. As it sits now, the current technological threat analysis ecosystem appears to be broken. The fact that drones and balloons have appeared to fool it for years, or even worse, never got its attention, is damning. But once again, knowing the DoD's abysmal track record on the drone threat issue, and the stigma in the DoD around 'UFOs,' a subject that few want to touch, this really isn't at all surprising.

An essential revolution

What is critical to national security now is to transform this little struggling UAP task force into a properly-funded

and internally mandated 'unidentified observed capabilities' fusion and analysis cell that pulls every piece of data the Pentagon and the intel community have to offer to evaluate incidents that involve aspects that don't immediately make sense. This is not just about what happens in the sky either, but also what happens under the sea, where we know anomalous data is encountered but is seemingly tossed into the ether. The same can be said for any anomalous things that are observed in orbit, especially as space continues to rapidly evolve as tomorrow's battlefield.

Because of the extremely sensitive nature of these sources and methods of relevant data collection, the fusion cell would have to be able to deal with highly classified material, not just whatever it can get its hands on and other scraps from the greater intelligence apparatus. The key is bringing all the relevant data under one clearinghouse with access to the best analytical minds that can rapidly disqualify events that are not actually anomalous and work up high-end intelligence products on each observed event that is. That way we can leave the debilitating biases at the door and be quick to recognize and classify emerging threats as they appear, not years after it has become blatantly obvious they exist.

It also has to work both ways. When an incident is observed via a particular sensor system or platform—even those that are highly classified—that data needs to be fed to the fusion cell and it needs to happen under standing orders from the top down. In other words, it can't be just a 'grovel for this or that' after-the-fact scenario, there has to be a mandate to provide this information as soon as possible, not only after it is asked for. Basically, that has us playing with one hand and one leg tied behind our backs.

This is just as much about identifying patterns of operations as it is about looking into individual capabilities and documenting single events with limited resources. What seems to be lacking here is the ability to see the bigger picture. This type of fusion cell would fix that and such an arrangement is not unique. They are created for many other matters, including terrorism and the proliferation of WMD.

We have the model, the question is why aren't we using it?

Nowhere left to hide

The truth of the matter is that, in addition to drone swarms and balloons, if something more exotic is truly out there, it will likely be detected much more frequently in the very near future than it has in the past. In fact, the establishment of the fully supported fusion cell I describe may not end up being a choice due to the changes that are about to occur in sensor technology.

Just as we reported on a big revolution in radar and networking technology that allowed these objects to be discovered more frequently by fighter aircraft and other platforms starting roughly a decade or so ago, an even bigger one is just about to come to pass. Far more sensitive and capable radars will soon equip America's new and potentially even some of its older warships. The U.S. Army is revitalizing its surface-to-air sensor systems with similar radars that are vastly superior to their progenitors, including gallium nitride-based AESA arrays.

In addition, Navy and Air Force fighters will soon be flying with advanced infrared search and track pods daily, giving them a passive form of long-range detection and yet another sensor to bring to bear on low radar cross-section UAP contacts. You can read about how this technology could have a major impact when it comes to detecting and tracking UAP targets in this past post of ours.

The Air Force is building out new sensing layers in space, especially ones that can detect and track hypersonic missiles careening through the atmosphere at extreme speeds. These new remote sensing layers will be able to see and track things we've never seen or tracked consistently before. The massive Long Range Discrimination Radar in Clear, Alaska, will provide radar data of an unprecedented fidelity over a huge area—it's literally capable of reliably verifying ballistic missile countermeasures and decoys from reentry vehicles. U.S. Space Force is contracting out an array of telescopes to optically track objects in orbit and to detect suspicious changes in those objects' activity. On top of all this, new artificial intelligence (AI) enabled software will make automatically detecting and tracking strange targets on all types of sensors easier than ever before.

I could go on and on here. The bottom line is that a lot more people running military sensor systems will be able to detect hard-to-spot targets in the very near future. This will drastically increase the data set on anomalous events and will make many more people aware of this unique problem, which could make it much harder to keep under wraps.

What has Congress really been told?

The Pentagon's nonsense in regards to UFOs appears to have actually threatened national security at the highest level—literally leaving the homeland with an open door to be walked through by lowly drones and our most prized military capabilities being allowed to be toyed with for their intelligence value on their home turf. I have stated on numerous occasions that the next 9/11 will come from swarming low-end drones and this situation further underlines just how plausible that is. But we really don't even need to use our imagination. Just ask Saudi Arabia if that is plausible.

For the enemy, this has been a perfect scenario where they have been able to do the seemingly unimaginable with literally no recourse—whether that is out of cultural stigmas, unwillingness to admit to a strategic weakness, or not wanting to allude in any way to our own operations or capabilities, the result is the same—these actions have become more brazen and the intelligence value being gleaned has become greater.

While it is good that the Senate Select Committee On Intelligence has demanded a report on this issue, the question of exactly the quality of analysis that will go into that report is very real. Even recent leaked documents show things being classified as evidence of unexplained UAP, while even based on our own investigation, it seems pretty clear as to their basic classification. Common optical effects, balloons, and even known aircraft shapes seem to have chronically stumped the Pentagon's UAP investigators.

The same can be said for the now-famous briefings that Congressional members and the President have received on the issue. Who exactly presented this information and the question as to its accuracy and quality of analysis remains very murky. One cannot rely on legislators, even highly interested ones, or their staff to critically analyze data on such a bizarre, complex, and largely misconstrued subject. Are they even getting good, unbiased information at all? If investigators have been fooled on many of these incidents, regardless of the reasons, that means decision-makers in Congress may not be getting good information on this topic.

At the same time, there is still a lot we do not know. It could very well be there are many additional, far stranger, and more compelling events that do not point to drone swarms or balloons as being the culprit. Let's hope so! But that doesn't change the reality that some of them do point overwhelmingly in that direction.

The absolutely horrific communications job by the Department of Defense on this matter, one they themselves largely dragged back into the spotlight, has made the entire topic even more confusing for people to interpret. This must change in order to instill any form of confidence in the answers the government provides on this issue. There is a long and weird history of the U.S. government, and the Pentagon and intelligence community especially, abusing the UFO topic dating back the better part of a century. The media itself could do a way better job too. The fact that it's always framed in an "alien" context when news relating to these events hits major outlets is highly detrimental to a very relevant cause.

So, how do we fix this situation? What should come next?

Plugging the gap

Step one is to admit that we have a major drone problem far closer to home than anyone wants to own up to and that at least one of our adversaries has made a mockery of us and compromised key capabilities using remarkably low-end technology. Simply put, they have won and in an outstandingly ironic and ingenious way. Only once we come to terms with this can move on to solving this problem and confronting who is behind it, although I think it is pretty clear who that could be considering there is a list with really just two names on it.

Step two, we just need to stop the UFO taboo charade and get serious about really looking into every anomalous observed capability, regardless of its cultural connotations. We must fully fund a real intelligence fusion center to work these cases and demand that our military and intelligence apparatus funnel all new ones to the fusion cell. This directive needs to come from the top within the military and the intelligence community. It can't be another stepchild program foisted on the DoD by legislators that may not even be in office in a couple of years. This investigative unit must have unfettered access to every relevant data source and intelligence product the U.S. military and the intelligence community have to offer. If we find out aliens are visiting earth in the process, great! But that is not the point.

Step three, totally change the communications strategy around this topic. Provide information on absolutely everything that you can, even if it is inconvenient, while protecting sources and methods where relevant.

If we don't go down this road, drones spying on our electronic emissions, tactics, and more may be the least of our worries. Those same capabilities can easily be tasked with defeating many of the same platforms they are surveilling. But above all else, it may be drones and balloons now, but we appear to be willfully covering our eyes to what could be our adversary's next major technological breakthrough, which could very well look like it is alien at first glance.

As it sits now, we would probably only find out that it actually isn't once it's too late.

[Article](#)

From: (b) (6)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N61](#)
Cc: [Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\); Chamberlin, Thomas S SES USN ONI \(USA\);](#) (b) (6)
Subject: FW: Marine Corps Brief - Part II
Date: Monday, April 19, 2021 6:55:16 PM

Scott,

Just for your SA. I briefed BGen Rowell (below) last week, which generated some additional requests within USMC. The latest to express interest is ACMC Gen Thomas. Not sure if this will develop into a briefing or not, but thought you should be aware.

V/r,

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From: Rowell BGen George B IV (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, April 19, 2021 6:40 PM
To: (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: Marine Corps Brief - Part II

(b) (6),

Thank you.

Will be back with you soonest. ACMC, Gen Thomas, also expressed interest today.

R/ BGen Rowell

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, April 19, 2021 6:38 PM
To: Rowell BGen George B IV (b) (6)
(b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: RE: Marine Corps Brief - Part II

BGen Rowell,

Friday looks pretty good for me right now, except for 1130-1330. I've also got a developing calendar next week, but have some flexibility right now (some congressional events still to be scheduled).

V/r,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

From: Rowell BGen George B IV (b) (6)

Sent: Monday, April 19, 2021 8:12 AM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Subject: RE: Marine Corps Brief - Part II

Thank you.

(b) (6) ...when able (no rush) would like to have BGen Fulford (Leg Affairs) and MajGen Olson (Staff Director) receive the brief. Please let me know your availability and I'll put everyone's schedulers together.

R/ BGen Rowell

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Monday, April 19, 2021 6:23 AM

To: Rowell BGen George B IV (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Subject: Marine Corps Brief - Part II

Good Morning!

Glad to hear you found it worthwhile.

I've added (b) (6) here so you can coordinate directly.

Have a good week!

Regards,

(b) (6)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

From: Rowell BGen George B IV (b) (6)
Sent: Sunday, April 18, 2021 2:09 PM
To: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: News Article - Adversary Drones Are Spying On The U.S. And The Pentagon Acts Like They're UFOs

Sir,

Thanks for your time on Wednesday, much appreciated.

Would like to have two other Marine General Officers briefed, if possible. Can I coordinate directly with (b) (6) ?

Thank you.

R/ BGen Rowell

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, April 16, 2021 8:11 AM
To: (b) (6) Bray, Scott W
SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Cc: (b) (6)

Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA)

(b) (6)

Brown, Charles W RDML USN (USA) (b) (6)

Cummings, Matthew

C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA) (b) (6)

steven.cantrell@us.af.mil

Subject: News Article - Adversary Drones Are Spying On The U.S. And The Pentagon Acts Like They're UFOs

CUI//PRE-DECISIONAL/PORIONS EXEMPT FROM FOIA UNDER (b)(5)

All,

Long article... worth the read.

Probably one of the best we've seen.

(b) (5)

But still, a good effort.

Regards,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

Adversary Drones Are Spying On The U.S. And The Pentagon Acts Like They're UFOs

The U.S. military seems aloof to the fact that it's being toyed with by a terrestrial adversary and key capabilities may be compromised as a result.

The War Zone, 15 April 2021... by Tyler Rogoway

We may not know the identities of all the mysterious craft that American military personnel and others have been seeing in the skies as of late, but I have seen more than enough to tell you that it is clear that a very terrestrial adversary is toying with us in our own backyard using relatively simple technologies—drones and balloons—and making off with what could be the biggest intelligence haul of a generation. While that may disappoint some who hope the origins of all these events are far more exotic in nature, the strategic implications of these bold operations, which have been happening for years, undeterred, are absolutely massive.

Our team here at The War Zone has spent the last two years indirectly laying out a case for the hypothesis that many of the events involving supposed UFOs, or unidentified aerial phenomena (UAP), as they are now often called, over the last decade are actually the manifestation of foreign adversaries harnessing advances in lower-end unmanned aerial vehicle technology, and even simpler platforms, to gather intelligence of extreme fidelity on some of America's most sensitive warfighting capabilities. Now, considering all the news on this topic in recent weeks, including our own major story on a series of bizarre incidents involving U.S. Navy destroyers and 'UAP' off the Southern California coast in 2019, it's time to not only sum up our case, but to discuss the broader implications of these revelations, what needs to be done about them, and the Pentagon's fledgling 'UAP Task Force' as a whole.

A big pill to swallow

Yes, I realize that the idea that an adversary is penetrating U.S. military training areas unmolested, and has been for years, using lowly drone technology and balloons, is a big pill to swallow, but as one of the people who have repeatedly warned about the threat posed by lower-end drones for a decade—warnings that largely were dismissed by the Pentagon until drones made or altered in ramshackle ISIS workshops in a war zone were literally raining down bomblets on U.S. and allied forces in Iraq—it isn't really surprising at all. Nor is the fact that the Defense Department is still playing catch-up when it comes to the realities surrounding the drone threat, and not just to its forces abroad, but also to the homeland overall. The utter lack of vision and early robust interest in regards to this emerging threat will go down as one of the Pentagon's biggest strategic missteps of our time.

The gross inaction and the stigma surrounding unexplained aerial phenomena as a whole has led to what appears to be the paralyzation of the systems designed to protect us and our most critical military technologies, pointing to a massive failure in U.S. military intelligence. This is a blind spot we ourselves literally created out of cultural taboos

and a military-industrial complex that is ill-suited to foresee and counter a lower-end threat that is very hard to defend against.

Before I move forward, I must state that just because I believe the evidence is compelling that many of the bizarre encounters with mysterious objects in the sky as of late, and especially those that the U.S. military is experiencing, emanate from peer-state competitors, not another dimension or another solar system, there are certainly well-documented cases of seemingly unexplainable events that have nothing to do with this type of capability. In other words, our conclusions do not come even close to answering the question of UAPs or UFOs as a whole, especially in terms of the many unexplained incidents in decades past. What they do is highlight an alarming new capability set and tactics that seem to have been allowed to be exploited with little response for years while the Pentagon scratched its head and shrugged, or even worse, turned largely a blind eye toward it.

And that brings us to one of the biggest problems with this topic, as a whole—people expect one blanket and grand explanation for the entire UFO mystery to one day emerge. This is flawed thinking at its core. This issue is clearly one with multiple explanations due to the wide range of events that have occurred under a huge number of circumstances. This thinking must be changed as it limits our ability to solve some mysteries in the hopes of coming up with some fantastical monolithic explanation for every related mystery. So, accepting that there is likely a wide array of explanations to this notoriously abused topic will be absolutely key to successfully studying it and destigmatizing it in our culture, and especially within U.S. military and intelligence circles.

With that in mind, I also believe America's prevailing cultural issues and the general stigma surrounding UFOs was successfully targeted and leveraged by our adversaries, which helped these activities to persist far longer than they should have. In fact, I believe that those in power who snicker about credible reports of strange objects in the sky and stymie research into them, including access to classified data, have become a threat to national security themselves. Their lack of imagination, curiosity, and creativity appears to have built a near-perfect vacuum that our enemies could exploit and likely have exploited to an astonishing degree.

A very enticing target

Nearly two years ago, I wrote a widely circulated piece that addressed my thoughts on the Pentagon's sudden willingness to talk about UFOs and its potential implications. I went through the possibilities as I saw them, but above all else, it was clear that this wasn't some over-hyped myth. Something strange was indeed going on.

Soon after, we were the first to connect key technologies that had emerged around the time that sightings of certain types of mysterious UAPs began to accelerate amongst military personnel—in particular, Navy fighter pilots. This was largely based around new air defense data-fusion and networking capabilities being installed on Navy warships and aircraft, as well as the proliferation of Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radars on Navy fighters and airborne early warning and control planes. We also noted that the most remarkable appearances of these objects seemed to correlate with major Navy exercises where these advances in air defense capabilities were being fully integrated across a Carrier Strike Group. In other words, it seemed that these mysterious craft had a very keen interest in America's latest and greatest operational counter-air capabilities.

We then got clarification from pilot witnesses on key claims about what they and their squadron mates had experienced before pursuing what was an inconvenient hypothesis for many—that at least some of what these aircrews and vessels were encountering were not an exotic unexplained phenomenon at all, but were in fact

adversary drones and lighter-than-air platforms (balloons) meant to stimulate America's most capable air defense systems and collect extremely high-quality electronic intelligence data on them. And this is critical data, incidentally, that is very hard to reliably obtain otherwise.

These radar emissions, and the datalink communications that go along with them, underpin highly networked counter-air architectures that are unmatched anywhere on earth. By gathering comprehensive electronic intelligence information on these systems, countermeasures and electronic warfare tactics can be developed to disrupt or defeat them. Capabilities can also be accurately estimated and even cloned and tactics can be recorded and exploited. The very signatures of these waveforms alone can be used to identify, classify, and geolocate them by adversary platforms during a time of war, providing a big leg-up when it comes to battlespace awareness.

We are talking about everything from common operating frequencies to highly-sensitive low-probability of intercept emissions tactics, to datalink encryption, to distinct radar modes and employment procedures here. In other words, this is among the most critical intelligence a peer-state enemy can obtain and there aren't many easy ways of doing it. Even in a war zone, where aircraft and their systems are operating potentially in the same general area as adversary intelligence-collection systems, using their full combat capabilities may be restricted to maintain the secrets of those critical capabilities. Proximity to the emitters in question and how long their emissions are exposed to an intelligence-gathering system is a major limitation, as well. Traditional espionage is another way adversaries look to gain information on these critical systems, as well, but nothing beats going out and actually sucking up the electronic signatures as best you can. Actually becoming the target of their interest takes the quality of intelligence collected to a whole other level.

Historic precedent

The beginning of making the case for drones and balloons being the culprit for much of the recent UAP activity came when we posted an entire historical precedent for very similar operations dating back to the development of the A-12 Oxcart spy plane and the advent of modern electronic warfare itself. In essence, during the early 1960s, the CIA launched radar reflectors on balloons off Cuba's coastline via a U.S. Navy submarine and employed an electronic warfare system called PALLADIUM that would trick the latest Soviet radar systems into showing their operators that enemy aircraft were rushing toward Cuban shores or doing all types of crazy maneuvers. This coaxed the Cuban air defense system and its radars to light up and spurred rapid communications between air defenders on the island.

The balloon-borne radar reflectors of different sizes also showed up on the Soviet radars, and by monitoring the targets that the radar operators concentrated on, and thus could detect, it was determined how sensitive their Soviet radar systems actually were. This provided critical information on the survivability of the Mach 3+ and somewhat stealthy A-12, but beyond that, it set a precedent of how electronic warfare and airborne targets could be used to prod an enemy's air defenses so that critical intelligence as to their capabilities could be determined—all without actually putting a pilot in the air at risk.

That was just the start of these types of operations. As the decades went by, far more complex and capable integrated air defenses began proliferating throughout the globe, placing a greater need on collecting this type of critical information. From what we understand, PALLADIUM evolved and subsequently spiraled into a far wider electronic intelligence gathering ecosystem, much of which is still highly secretive in nature and exists to this day.

The U.S. has extremely capable standoff electronic intelligence-gathering aircraft, such as the U.S. Air Force's

manned RC-135 Combat Sent and Rivet Joint, as well as the Navy's EP-3E Aries and P-8A Poseidon, not to mention U-2S Dragon Lady and unmanned RQ-4 Global Hawk, that are all capable of building up a picture of the enemy's electronic order of battle from a distance. Even America's top fighter aircraft are increasingly equipped with digital electronic warfare suites including highly advanced electronic support measures (ESM) that can provide tactical electronic intelligence of very high quality. Other countries, such as Russia and China, possess electronic intelligence (ELINT) gathering aircraft types, as well, albeit without the same level of capabilities or, in some cases, the same international reach and persistence.

While the United States also has very advanced, stealthy assets that can penetrate into enemy airspace to collect electronic intelligence data of a totally different fidelity, right near the emitters themselves and over long periods, America's adversaries do not, at least not yet. They have also historically lagged behind the U.S. government in space-based ELINT systems, which offer another way to scoop up emissions coming out of denied areas, and do so discreetly. This leaves America's potential foes to have to get more creative in order to obtain this critical information.

So, for the time being, even though exquisite stealth unmanned aircraft may be out of their reach, swarms of lower-end drones and other less-advanced unmanned airborne platforms certainly are not. And regardless of America's own stealth capabilities, one would be remiss if they were to believe that clandestine operations, such as the one using PALLADIUM 60 years ago, aren't still going on today. In fact, we know the use of balloons strapped with payloads to collect vital intelligence continued throughout the Cold War.

While manned overflights of the Soviet Union ended with the U-2 crisis in May 1960, high-altitude balloons continued to float across Soviet and Warsaw Pact borders for decades to follow. Unsurprisingly, this activity was conducted covertly, but continued even after the advent of spy satellites. For the Soviet Air Defense Forces in particular, the balloons were a significant menace, proving especially hard to defeat. There is evidence that at least some Soviet fighter units maintained gun-armed interceptors at round-the-clock readiness specifically to shoot down the intruding balloons and one aircraft, the M-17 Mystic, was even developed to carry out this particular mission, although it never entered service in this role. The Russians surely took note of this unique intelligence-gathering application.

Fast forward to the 21st Century, and revolution in lower-end unmanned aircraft has provided the perfect attritable platform—one robust enough to carry out the task, but low-cost enough so that it wouldn't matter if it got lost in the process—for just such a mission set. And, as we explained in great detail, so are balloons carrying radar reflectors and expendable electronic intelligence and even electronic warfare payloads. Whereas 60 years ago, electronic warfare systems may have required an entire plane or a large pod on a plane, today totally expendable electronic warfare systems that can wreak havoc on radars and other air defense nodes can be dropped out of a chaff and flare dispenser or be housed in the tip of a small missile—or flown on a balloon or lower-end drone.

Preconceived notions

In our investigative pieces on PALLADIUM, we also detailed how radar reflector balloons can be made in many configurations and we even discovered a patent dating back to well before PALLADIUM for a radar reflector balloon that is an exact visual match for the initially totally bizarre-sounding "cube inside a sphere" objects that Navy pilots had reported seeing off the east coast. We also discovered that initial reports that pilots visually saw these craft

moving erratically were incorrect. In fact, when physically encountered, they were floating in the air and acting exactly as balloons would.

While balloons can look like virtually anything, drones can also look very strange due to the huge amount of configurations that exist. When most people think of drones they picture a small fixed-wing airplane or quadcopter type setup. That may be true for the heart of the burgeoning civilian market, but there are far more configurations, some of which look downright alien and perform unlike a traditional fixed-wing aircraft or quadcopter. These include everything from triangle-shaped flying wings to hybrid rotor/fixed-wing aircraft or even a vertical tube with a rotor at each end. There are even drones that launch smaller parasite drones and act as their mothership.

Drones can also be networked together and fly in formation. They may not all look the same, either. For instance, smaller drones may be accompanied by a larger drone that carries computing hardware and communications gear, such as a basic satcom terminal or line-of-sight data-link, working as the command and control and communications router for the swarm. Or they may not have any man-in-the-loop communications at all, instead, they can be programmed to fly a pre-planned course or be equipped with programming for them to seek out certain stimuli in their environment, such as particular radar emissions, and to fly certain preplanned programs near those emitters. In fact, some of the biggest leaps in lower-drone technology came from Israel decades ago when they developed drone systems suited for seeking radar emitters and confusing or destroying them.

They can also have surprisingly long range. Iran has many small and relatively cheap fixed-wing drones that can fly very long distances running on efficient, small gasoline motors, for instance. These drones can travel hundreds of miles and loiter for hours while still carrying a relevant payload and have been thoroughly weaponized and used repeatedly in offensive operations. This has led to dystopian warnings to Americans visiting or living in one of the world's most highly defended capital cities.

When it comes to drone configurations, there are a huge number of them being operated or developed around the globe by nefarious actors. The delta-wing design is among the most popular for lower-end militarized drones as it provides high efficiency for long range, a wide operational envelope, and has good stability. It also has a perfect area to install a radiation seeker, optical sensor, electronic warfare payload, or a warhead.

These are just some general parameters that are the actual reality when it comes to unmanned systems, and they differ drastically from the assumptions most people make about smaller drones in general. I often hear "oh they can't fly that way" or "they can't fly that long, the battery would run out" or "they couldn't be jammed so there is no way they are drones." These statements are blatantly wrong, not just when it comes to the capabilities of a peer competitor, but even a less capable country or even a non-state actor.

Small weaponized drones, especially those that carry an explosive charge, have become a cheap asymmetric linchpin capability and, just as I predicted years ago, are rapidly evolving into becoming game-changers on the modern battlefield. They are also becoming a big business and their use as assassination tools has migrated to drug cartels and other organized crime syndicates. Even their development has devolved down to individuals and small rogue groups operating far from war zones.

Simply put, when it comes to lower-end drones, most people's assumptions seem to be pulled out of thin air or from what they have seen at the electronics section at big box stores. As such, these preconceived notions are

indicators of why relatively simple drones and their unique configurations and performance characteristics can seem unfamiliar, even to experienced fighter pilots or observers on the ground that have never been really trained on these threats and all the different ways that can manifest themselves.

The swarm is not science fiction

When it comes to the U.S. Navy, it is using swarms of lower-end networked drones, submarines, ships, unmanned underwater vehicles, and more, to convince the enemy to think they are seeing ghost fleets and aerial armadas that aren't really there. You don't have to take our word for it, the Navy has a program of record for just this—that being Netted Emulation of Multi-Element Signature against Integrated Sensors, or NEMESIS.

The War Zone was the first to report on this program, which you can read all about [here](#), but, suffice to say, it lays out an architecture that represents a quantum leap in electronic warfare. Yet none of its components are all that exquisite; it's just the networking of them together and being able to combine their effects cooperatively with highly agile computing and software that is. Swarming drones working together to decoy, jam, and distract the enemy? That is not a high-end capability. Unifying those effects with ships, other aircraft, submarines, and more in real-time to make multiple enemy sensors in disparate locations see the same thing? That is revolutionary.

After we posted the NEMESIS piece, many were asking our opinion if it was what Navy pilots had encountered off America's eastern seaboard. I am comfortable stating that I don't believe those incidents were all secret American tests of elements of what could be incorporated into NEMESIS. Quite the contrary, I believe it was largely a foreign power actively using what could be described as some components similar to what could be found in the NEMESIS ecosystem to collect critical intelligence on America's most advanced sensor systems and more. Once again, this doesn't mean everything aircrews saw off the east coast during this period were these capabilities, but it seems like a glaringly obvious explanation for most of them, and it is far more so now than it was when we first reported on those incidents.

Also, many of the strange high-performance characteristics ships and planes sometimes detect by radar at beyond visual range during these incidents can and likely are the result of electronic warfare. In fact, things like rapid accelerations in speed and sudden drops in altitude on radar represent very basic tenets of electronic warfare tactics. In the case of the east coast events, for instance, as far as we have been told, the high-performance capabilities of these objects were never visually observed, but they were seen on radar. The visual encounters describe balloon-like objects doing balloon-like things—not moving fast at all—while other objects feature performance more similar to drones than anything else.

Months after reporting on NEMESIS, we acquired the Naval Safety Center incident reports spanning most of the 2010s regarding anomalous objects that fighter pilots encountered off the eastern seaboard of the United States. What we found was stunning. While there were only a limited number of reports, and there were very likely other reports never filed with the safety center and instead filed as classified intelligence events, the ones that were there didn't describe alien craft at all. Instead, they described jet-powered, missile-like drones and other unmanned fixed-wing aircraft flying up in the flight levels, as well as multi-rotor drones hovering at very high altitudes far out to sea. There there are balloon-like objects, the origins of which were all unexplained even after official investigations.

Certainly no civilian is flying cruise missile-like aircraft at high altitude dozens of miles off the east coast. And flying a multi-rotor drone far out to sea at bizarrely high altitudes isn't normal. So, who do these belong to? Well if not us,

and they are clearly not of an alien origin, then someone else. And who would want to be flying around in these specific chunks of airspace that are literally designated for use by America's top military aircraft, with the Navy's most capable warships often operating below? America's preeminent adversaries—China and Russia—that's who.

The motive and the opportunity

Those warning areas—airspace that can be set aside for military training—are where America's most advanced sensors blare their powerful radio-frequency communications and sensor systems day in and day out. F-22s, F-35s, F/A-18E/Fs, F-15Es, E-2Ds, and much more, fill those training areas daily. Below them, Aegis Combat System-equipped cruisers and destroyers, and America's supercarriers and amphibious assault ships, push their radar and networking systems to the limit to keep their skills sharp and to train for upcoming deployments. We are talking about the most advanced air defense sensor and networking technology on planet earth all operating in one region (the counterpart being off the coast of Southern California) as reliably as the office hours at your local bank.

And they are doing so while at home, in areas where, unless intelligence warns them of spy ship activity nearby, their systems are largely being used to their maximum potential. All that potential intelligence zapping through the air, operating as if it is far from prying eyes. Simply put, it is the biggest electronic intelligence target on earth and the lowly drone and balloon, pored with America's strange aversion to taking unusual things in the sky seriously, have provided the perfect medium for which to gobble it up with little to no chance of major repercussions.

In fact, the Navy fighter pilot who has spoken about recent experiences with the UAP issue the most, Ryan Graves, seemed to have inadvertently summed up what I believe has been going on, and not as a secondary 'worst case' possibility as he describes it. Graves stated the following on the Kevin Rose Show:

"If we do have what we would call a 'red threat,' one of our traditional enemies that are using some type of perhaps new technology, or hard to identify technology that is out there in our working areas soaking up our waveforms and our radar and our sensor and our comms, watching our tactics on a daily basis, it's a major, major intelligence failure to have these things out there. And because they look slightly different than what our average threat would look like, everyone wants to ignore it. So if we had a Chinese or Russian fighter jet flying out there watching us it would be a major deal. But because it looks slightly different we want to ignore it."

Once again, it is a hard pill to swallow, but, nevertheless, bingo!

Robots in disguise

As we noted earlier, these drones and the balloons, in particular, could also look very strange to pretty much anyone who encounters them, even like a cube inside a sphere, or a metallic blimp with strange appendages. In fact, the odder they look, the better the cover for ongoing operations. Putting infrared bricks on drones giving them huge IR signatures or making radar reflector balloons look alien in shape would not only confuse the targeted adversary and likely allow for these operations to go on for far longer unchecked than they would otherwise, but they would also massively increase the quality of intelligence data they receive.

With this in mind, making things appear stranger and less threatening than they actually are is likely one tactic the enemy has used for these operations, and this can often come at a very cheap price. We have discussed how sometimes the simplest measures can make the most impactful illusions, and how even similar tricks that Disney

uses to skew theme park goers' perceptions could be employed in a guileful manner to confuse an adversary. That seems to be part of the playbook being executed here, and what better passively-reinforced cover story is there in America than UFOs and all the stigma that goes along with it? The fact that pilots have historically refrained from reporting unexplained craft in the skies due to fear of their careers being impacted is all you really need to know when quantifying how relevant and effective such a tactic can be.

With that being said, not only could these things, or other platforms nearby, passively suck up electronic intelligence that presents itself in their vicinity, but the genius of their employment is that they themselves are the targets, and they are not necessarily friend or foe. This makes them flying intelligence 'honey traps' in their own regard. They get aircraft and ships to lock them up directly, likely running through multiple radar modes in the process as they get fully interrogated by various platforms, even at close range. This provides otherwise unthinkable opportunities to record all those signatures and tactics, even ones that may not be used otherwise if there was a known intelligence-gathering threat present.

To put it another way, their ambiguous origins and the curiosity surrounding their presence sets up a situation in which they can make radar systems work directly against them without restrictions. Their small radar cross-sections and potentially elusive electronic warfare tactics would push those sensor systems and their operators even harder in order to lock them up, thus giving up even more valuable information.

Once again, the operation involving PALLADIUM during the A-12's development worked not just because they could get radar operators searching for something that wasn't there, but because they gave them hard targets to lock up. It seems that we are seeing history repeat itself, but this time it's the other guys putting on the magic show.

It's also worth saying that a campaign like this also has huge information and psychological warfare aspects. Eventually, if it is officially disclosed or outed, it makes the targeted country look horribly impotent in that they couldn't even defend their own airspace or even define a threat to it. Even more embarrassing, they let hollow cultural stigmas provide an open door to enemy intelligence operations. Beyond that, these activities cause confusion and muddy the waters as to what is a threat and what isn't. They can also cause fissures between those in uniform who observe these craft and their less than responsive commands. It even fits into Russia's hybrid warfare playbook, elements of which have been copied by other nefarious actors around the globe, including China.

Clandestine launch platforms

In November 2019, we went on to lay out how submarines can launch their own aerial drones and have been able to do so for far longer than most realize. Fast forward to today, and the Navy is now procuring swarms of drones for its submarines. Keep in mind, this is what they openly discuss, imagine the capabilities that have been in place for some time that have never been disclosed. Russia and China, who are looking for every asymmetric advantage against America's overwhelming technological superiority, certainly had seen the promise that the lowly drone showed for these types of ELINT gathering operations and Russia, in particular, has the submarines to deploy them in the hemisphere in question. Doing so with radar reflector and electronic intelligence gathering payload-carrying balloons is an even lower hanging fruit.

In the mid-2000s, studying and adapting UAV concepts of many sizes for submarine operations was in full swing. America's adversaries didn't just sit and watch, either.

Many naysayers have said that this is impossible because there are no Russian submarines deep in the Atlantic and that the U.S. largely controls this massive body of water. We begged to differ on that point and it turned out that the Navy eventually did too. It is now open knowledge that Russian submarines are operating deep in the Atlantic to the point that the Navy is calling it a contested body of water. And if you think the Navy has a perfect track on those boats at all times, you would be sorely mistaken. So, there is a motive and there is a delivery method, but really, we are probably overthinking it, at least to some degree.

The cold hard truth is that you don't need a submarine to launch a swarm of low-end drones and/or balloons to gather intelligence on an adversary's sensors. They can be launched from any vessel really, and especially from medium to large ones. There is a lot of shipping traffic out there at any given time, with ships flagged all over the globe and operated by an even more diverse roster of operators. A lowly freighter would be an effective delivery platform, and a far more accessible one. In fact, this concept of operations is well established already and considering the ranges that some of these smaller drones can fly, it is even less of an issue. They can be launched in international waters.

An expanding picture of widespread events

Over the past two years, we have also reported on what appears to be an increasing phenomenon of large drone swarms spotted over the United States, as well as its outlying territories, and especially near strategic installations. The Colorado drone swarm saga seemed like something of a bizarre series of events in which the general consensus couldn't seem to settle on a case of mass hysteria or something actually occurring—this was not helped by really reckless reporting on the issue by one or two major outlets. Our subsequent investigation showed that internal correspondence between federal and local stakeholders pointed to it being anything but some product of mass groupthink.

Then things got even more serious when we uncovered a series of drone swarm events over the massive Palo Verde nuclear plant in Arizona. Subsequent documents showed that this was far from a one-off anomaly, with dozens of drone incursions involving America's nuclear plants having occurred not long before or after. How to protect this highly sensitive infrastructure from threats posed by drones remains a strangely awkward debate. While some claim an attack from small drones may have limited impacts on a nuclear facility—a highly debatable claim—there are other concerns, including those surrounding using drones to find networking security holes and more.

Then, maybe most chilling, we uncovered that drones had taken a very troubling interest in one of the most important U.S. air defense sites on earth—the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-ballistic missile battery on Guam. This is literally the last line of defense against incoming ballistic missiles for America's most important base in the Western Pacific. It is also the home of an AN/TPY-2 radar, one of the most advanced in the world, that provides surveillance and targeting for the THAAD missile interceptors. It isn't hard to imagine how valuable electronic intelligence from that radar and the system's local area and beyond-line-of-sight datalinks would be to an adversary like China, which not only has a huge interest in disabling such a capability during a time of war, but also learning from it to develop its own systems.

While some may brush off the actual destructive capabilities of a relatively small drone, they shouldn't. A drone packing a small charge may not be able to sink a ship or blow up an entire missile site, but it can punch a hole into a radar array and put the entire system out of business for long periods of time. In other words, a mission kill is just as effective at achieving the primary goal of disabling a defensive system as literally blowing it up. And yes, it is ironic

that a THAAD battery, one of the most technologically impressive surface-to-air weapon systems ever created, can swat down incoming ballistic missiles but is extremely vulnerable to what could be as simple as a modified hobby drone. Once again, this is in large part a result of the Pentagon's unwillingness to recognize the threat of low-end drones before it materialized and its chronic under-investment in short-range air defenses (SHORAD) that withered on the vine in the decades following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a situation which you can read all about [here](#).

The same can be said for warships. While a swarm of drones couldn't sink a destroyer, they can overwhelm its defenses and neuter it by attacking its sensors, leaving it blind, vulnerable, and useless—the definition of a mission kill. Our report on the events that occurred off Southern California in the summer of 2019 underlined just how troubling the situation has become.

Swarms of drones harassed a number of U.S. Navy destroyers executing combat drills less than 100 miles off Los Angeles. This occurred on multiple nights. The level of documentation in that article alone shows just how palpable this part of the so-called phenomenon has become. You can imagine just how good the intelligence would have been with those ships' sensors and communications systems stimulated by the swarm of unknown origins within the perceived safety of America's own territorial waters. That swarm could have been, and likely was, sucking up, or helping another nearby platform suck up, all that sensitive ELINT data on the most capable warships on earth and at very close range.

Once again, in that case, the drone swarm could have come from a simple cargo vessel and it wouldn't have to be even within line-of-sight of the destroyers, which are easily tracked using open sources during routine training. The drones used in this event appear to have been smaller fixed-wing types similar to those that America's adversaries have built for various missions, like long-range strike, anti-radiation, decoy, and surveillance operations. As noted earlier, they can fly for hours and could easily be programmed to execute a certain route in the vicinity of where the destroyers were operating or even potentially programmed to react to certain RF emissions, at which time they would fly pre-programmed maneuvers near those emissions. This isn't some crazy high-tech thing. These are capabilities that America's primary adversaries possess and are further refining with each day. China, in particular, is far ahead in this regard and already has the operational capability to rapidly deploy large networked swarms that can work cooperatively together. Russia is also in the game and has focused on drone swarms that are electronic warfare enabled.

Uncompelling 'UFO' evidence

Beyond the so-called 'Tic-Tac' video that just looked like a blurry little Tic Tac, I have seen nothing in any government 'UAP' videos that supposedly show unexplainable capabilities or craft that actually portray that. In fact, quite the opposite. I have stated this repeatedly and tried to explain some of the unique dynamics at play with modern targeting pods and other factors, with many being offended by the mere thought that the videos simply are not what many have portrayed them to be. I have talked directly to the folks that design and build the sensor systems themselves. They don't see anything either, which I find quite strange considering these videos are supposedly evidence of flying objects that are unexplained.

Of course, we are only shown snippets of each video. There could be more footage that does show more puzzling maneuvers, but that simply isn't the case at this time. At least when it comes to the 'Go Fast' and 'Gimbal' videos,

while the exact origin of the craft shown may not be known, they certainly are not unexplainable.

In recent weeks, more official evidence has come to light. This includes recently released images taken from an F/A-18 cockpit that clearly show balloons, not strange totally unexplainable craft. A video and still images from the incident we reported on that occurred off the California coast in 2019 have also come to light. They seem to show either delta-wing-shaped drones, very similar to the ones we have discussed earlier, or, and far more likely, another type of drone that is obscured by bokeh effect, the result of a bright light source being recorded out of focus through a night-vision scope by another camera. Once again, nothing appears unexplainable here. Quite the opposite, really.

One other leaked set of images, taken by the Los Angeles class attack submarine USS Omaha around the same period of time, shows what some claim is a 'trans-medium craft' disappearing into the ocean. The stills provided prove nothing of the sort. It looks like a balloon or other object hitting the water as seen through a thermal imaging system. Once again, maybe other data exists that is compelling and truly exotic, but this certainly isn't that.

As for the authenticity of these latest photos and videos, our friend John Greenewald got confirmation that they are indeed authentic from the Office of Secretary of Defense spokesperson on the UAP issue, Susan Gough.

As it sits today, the Navy's top uniformed officer says the craft involved in the 2019 incidents off of Southern California remain unidentified.

When it comes to the reality that drones and balloons appear to be the origin of many of these sightings, I wish it wasn't the case. I would rather have all this be some huge revelation for mankind instead of having to come to terms with the fact that at least one of our adversaries, and possibly two, have played our own cultural norms against us and have executed what may be among the most successful and ingenious intelligence-gathering plays of all time. Meanwhile, it seems that the DoD is either incapable of identifying and evaluating what should no longer be considered an emerging threat—swarming drones and radar target balloons—or they are playing along by acting like they do not know, which could be the case for a number of reasons.

First of all, it's not the Navy's job to protect America's sovereign airspace, it is the Air Force's. That service will say next to nothing about any of this, even when asked very specific questions. Why? Well, at least when it comes to the drone threat, they really don't have the ability to defend against it and have clearly failed in doing so thus far. In fact, if unidentified flying craft are hanging out off of our coasts, why haven't alert fighters scrambled to investigate them repeatedly? Their crews are the ones specially trained and equipped to do so. Maybe they were and we just haven't heard about it, but if it was happening all the time, I find that doubtful. And yes, they do scramble on 'UFOs,' as we exclusively discovered a few years ago.

The truth is the Air Force does know that low radar-cross-section aerial vehicles, such as drones and cruise missiles, are a massive threat. That is one major reason why the Air National Guard has equipped its F-15 fleet, and is now equipping its F-16 fleet, with AESA radars that can better spot these threats. These alert aircraft are also outfitted with targeting pods to identify any aircraft at long range, day or night, in relatively high resolution. The Air Force is also coming up with ideas to deal with large numbers of potential small threat aircraft at one time, such as using laser-guided rockets to swat them down, but those capabilities are still a while off from being operationalized. So there is finally action being taken, but saying "we really have had no way of defending the homeland against these low-end threats" really wouldn't be a good look for the Air Force and it goes against the whole idea of not admitting

your strategic weaknesses.

The other possibility is that we are doing the same exact thing, using drones and balloons to gather critical information on enemy air defense capabilities overseas, and thus, we really don't want to delve too deeply into the matter. In fact, we may want it to seem like we are totally stumped by these activities too.

Considering we know efforts like PALLADIUM never really ceased, and considering our submarine drone-launching capabilities, and the fact that submarines are already used to suck up ELINT data clandestinely, this almost seems more likely than not. Don't expect anyone to admit it though. Nobody keeps a secret like the 'Silent Service.' Even the U.S. Army is now actively pursuing balloon systems that will carry powerful sensors, communications systems, and electronic warfare packages, as well as drop swarms of drones deep behind enemy lines.

Sound familiar?

These are just possibilities, but considering the intelligence value up for grabs here, and how hard it can be to obtain that intelligence, they are at least worth pondering and it is really quite possible that a mix of these scenarios could be at play.

An investigation in a bubble

It also seems quite possible, that when it comes to the Pentagon's investigations into these matters, there is a lack of real expertise to properly evaluate the evidence. In all the discussions about this topic and the Pentagon's 'UFO' programs under AAWSAP and later AATIP, it seems that they were working largely external to the sprawling intelligence infrastructure built over 70 years to quantify foreign threats using limited information and even to exploit them.

For instance, the people in the Defense Intelligence Agency's Foreign Material Exploitation apparatus can pull crashed MiGs from swamps and get them flying again under total secrecy and those in the Directorate of Science and Technology are tasked with evaluating complex foreign threats from a distance using all the data the intelligence community has to offer. Somehow, when it comes to UAP, we never hear about this existing ecosystem that is perfectly suited to evaluate the topic. It is as if the whole UAP issue has and continues to live in its own tiny intelligence bubble, walled off from the greater military intelligence environment.

While claims that 'smart people' have looked at the data may be true, we don't know who these people are or what their level of expertise or resources is. Do they even exist inside the DoD and intelligence community's analysis world or are they external to it? How many eyes are actually working on these issues and collaborating to better understand and quantify them? From what we understand, historically very few, at least in regards to the programs that have been disclosed.

From everything I know about the now famed 'UAP task force,' and by others' accounts as well, it is not some powerful inter-agency initiative with a solid mandate from inside the Pentagon and the intelligence community. Far from it. It is a few people in an office with very limited resources that are often hitting walls when trying to obtain critical information from other intelligence stakeholders.

That's a huge strategic problem.

The primary reason for this being so troubling is not a looming threat from space invaders or inter-dimensional beings, or the dream of some all-telling disclosure to the public, it is because the next big threat that surprises us from a foreign adversary will likely look very unfamiliar, at least at first. As it sits now, the current technological threat analysis ecosystem appears to be broken. The fact that drones and balloons have appeared to fool it for years, or even worse, never got its attention, is damning. But once again, knowing the DoD's abysmal track record on the drone threat issue, and the stigma in the DoD around 'UFOs,' a subject that few want to touch, this really isn't at all surprising.

An essential revolution

What is critical to national security now is to transform this little struggling UAP task force into a properly-funded and internally mandated 'unidentified observed capabilities' fusion and analysis cell that pulls every piece of data the Pentagon and the intel community have to offer to evaluate incidents that involve aspects that don't immediately make sense. This is not just about what happens in the sky either, but also what happens under the sea, where we know anomalous data is encountered but is seemingly tossed into the ether. The same can be said for any anomalous things that are observed in orbit, especially as space continues to rapidly evolve as tomorrow's battlefield.

Because of the extremely sensitive nature of these sources and methods of relevant data collection, the fusion cell would have to be able to deal with highly classified material, not just whatever it can get its hands on and other scraps from the greater intelligence apparatus. The key is bringing all the relevant data under one clearinghouse with access to the best analytical minds that can rapidly disqualify events that are not actually anomalous and work up high-end intelligence products on each observed event that is. That way we can leave the debilitating biases at the door and be quick to recognize and classify emerging threats as they appear, not years after it has become blatantly obvious they exist.

It also has to work both ways. When an incident is observed via a particular sensor system or platform—even those that are highly classified—that data needs to be fed to the fusion cell and it needs to happen under standing orders from the top down. In other words, it can't be just a 'grovel for this or that' after-the-fact scenario, there has to be a mandate to provide this information as soon as possible, not only after it is asked for. Basically, that has us playing with one hand and one leg tied behind our backs.

This is just as much about identifying patterns of operations as it is about looking into individual capabilities and documenting single events with limited resources. What seems to be lacking here is the ability to see the bigger picture. This type of fusion cell would fix that and such an arrangement is not unique. They are created for many other matters, including terrorism and the proliferation of WMD.

We have the model, the question is why aren't we using it?

Nowhere left to hide

The truth of the matter is that, in addition to drone swarms and balloons, if something more exotic is truly out there, it will likely be detected much more frequently in the very near future than it has in the past. In fact, the establishment of the fully supported fusion cell I describe may not end up being a choice due to the changes that

are about to occur in sensor technology.

Just as we reported on a big revolution in radar and networking technology that allowed these objects to be discovered more frequently by fighter aircraft and other platforms starting roughly a decade or so ago, an even bigger one is just about to come to pass. Far more sensitive and capable radars will soon equip America's new and potentially even some of its older warships. The U.S. Army is revitalizing its surface-to-air sensor systems with similar radars that are vastly superior to their progenitors, including gallium nitride-based AESA arrays.

In addition, Navy and Air Force fighters will soon be flying with advanced infrared search and track pods daily, giving them a passive form of long-range detection and yet another sensor to bring to bear on low radar cross-section UAP contacts. You can read about how this technology could have a major impact when it comes to detecting and tracking UAP targets in this past post of ours.

The Air Force is building out new sensing layers in space, especially ones that can detect and track hypersonic missiles careening through the atmosphere at extreme speeds. These new remote sensing layers will be able to see and track things we've never seen or tracked consistently before. The massive Long Range Discrimination Radar in Clear, Alaska, will provide radar data of an unprecedented fidelity over a huge area—it's literally capable of reliably verifying ballistic missile countermeasures and decoys from reentry vehicles. U.S. Space Force is contracting out an array of telescopes to optically track objects in orbit and to detect suspicious changes in those objects' activity. On top of all this, new artificial intelligence (AI) enabled software will make automatically detecting and tracking strange targets on all types of sensors easier than ever before.

I could go on and on here. The bottom line is that a lot more people running military sensor systems will be able to detect hard-to-spot targets in the very near future. This will drastically increase the data set on anomalous events and will make many more people aware of this unique problem, which could make it much harder to keep under wraps.

What has Congress really been told?

The Pentagon's nonsense in regards to UFOs appears to have actually threatened national security at the highest level—literally leaving the homeland with an open door to be walked through by lowly drones and our most prized military capabilities being allowed to be toyed with for their intelligence value on their home turf. I have stated on numerous occasions that the next 9/11 will come from swarming low-end drones and this situation further underlines just how plausible that is. But we really don't even need to use our imagination. Just ask Saudi Arabia if that is plausible.

For the enemy, this has been a perfect scenario where they have been able to do the seemingly unimaginable with literally no recourse—whether that is out of cultural stigmas, unwillingness to admit to a strategic weakness, or not wanting to allude in any way to our own operations or capabilities, the result is the same—these actions have become more brazen and the intelligence value being gleaned has become greater.

While it is good that the Senate Select Committee On Intelligence has demanded a report on this issue, the question of exactly the quality of analysis that will go into that report is very real. Even recent leaked documents show things being classified as evidence of unexplained UAP, while even based on our own investigation, it seems pretty clear as to their basic classification. Common optical effects, balloons, and even known aircraft shapes seem to have

chronically stumped the Pentagon's UAP investigators.

The same can be said for the now-famous briefings that Congressional members and the President have received on the issue. Who exactly presented this information and the question as to its accuracy and quality of analysis remains very murky. One cannot rely on legislators, even highly interested ones, or their staff to critically analyze data on such a bizarre, complex, and largely misconstrued subject. Are they even getting good, unbiased information at all? If investigators have been fooled on many of these incidents, regardless of the reasons, that means decision-makers in Congress may not be getting good information on this topic.

At the same time, there is still a lot we do not know. It could very well be there are many additional, far stranger, and more compelling events that do not point to drone swarms or balloons as being the culprit. Let's hope so! But that doesn't change the reality that some of them do point overwhelmingly in that direction.

The absolutely horrific communications job by the Department of Defense on this matter, one they themselves largely dragged back into the spotlight, has made the entire topic even more confusing for people to interpret. This must change in order to instill any form of confidence in the answers the government provides on this issue. There is a long and weird history of the U.S. government, and the Pentagon and intelligence community especially, abusing the UFO topic dating back the better part of a century. The media itself could do a way better job too. The fact that it's always framed in an "alien" context when news relating to these events hits major outlets is highly detrimental to a very relevant cause.

So, how do we fix this situation? What should come next?

Plugging the gap

Step one is to admit that we have a major drone problem far closer to home than anyone wants to own up to and that at least one of our adversaries has made a mockery of us and compromised key capabilities using remarkably low-end technology. Simply put, they have won and in an outstandingly ironic and ingenious way. Only once we come to terms with this can move on to solving this problem and confronting who is behind it, although I think it is pretty clear who that could be considering there is a list with really just two names on it.

Step two, we just need to stop the UFO taboo charade and get serious about really looking into every anomalous observed capability, regardless of its cultural connotations. We must fully fund a real intelligence fusion center to work these cases and demand that our military and intelligence apparatus funnel all new ones to the fusion cell. This directive needs to come from the top within the military and the intelligence community. It can't be another stepchild program foisted on the DoD by legislators that may not even be in office in a couple of years. This investigative unit must have unfettered access to every relevant data source and intelligence product the U.S. military and the intelligence community have to offer. If we find out aliens are visiting earth in the process, great! But that is not the point.

Step three, totally change the communications strategy around this topic. Provide information on absolutely everything that you can, even if it is inconvenient, while protecting sources and methods where relevant.

If we don't go down this road, drones spying on our electronic emissions, tactics, and more may be the least of our worries. Those same capabilities can easily be tasked with defeating many of the same platforms they are

surveilling. But above all else, it may be drones and balloons now, but we appear to be willfully covering our eyes to what could be our adversary's next major technological breakthrough, which could very well look like it is alien at first glance.

As it sits now, we would probably only find out that it actually isn't once it's too late.

[Article](#)

From: (b) (6)
To: (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6) [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#); (b) (6)
Subject: RE: NBC Nightly News Further Queries on UAP
Date: Friday, April 23, 2021 3:48:01 PM

Thank you for keeping tabs on the media interest/spin, (b) (6).

V/r,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, April 23, 2021 1:47 PM
To: (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6) [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: FW: NBC Nightly News Further Queries on UAP
Importance: High

(b) (6),

NBC News will be reporting on UAPs on Monday.

Note that Elizondo is providing UAP Briefings to the media... and what he is saying wrt nuclear facilities.

Regards,

(b) (6)

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(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, April 23, 2021 1:32 PM
To: Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)
(b) (6) Carranza, Guillermo R SES OSD OGC (USA)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: FW: NBC Nightly News Further Queries on UAP
Importance: High

Fudgicle!! Proposed response below. Note the proposed addition of text in red underline to our standard statement about not talking about this publicly. This is the standard response OSD(PA) provides when we're asked about intel matters. Thinking it's time to start using it, too, so maybe at least some of the national outlets will understand better why we don't discuss it.

*****DRAFT//PRE-DECISIONAL*****

(b) (6), (b) (5)

Let me know what you think, and if you have any edits to the second paragraph on (b) (6) .

Regards,

(b) (6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, April 23, 2021 10:44 AM
To: (b) (6)
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] NBC Nightly News Further Queries on UAP

Hi there - Nightly News is doing another piece on Monday with Gadi and they have a few more questions - ahead of the piece airing on UAP's.

Let me know if you need any clarifications, thanks!

(b) (6)

+“Have unidentified aerial phenomenon made incursions into nuclear facilities and if so have they disabled or interfered with those systems?”

+This week there was a small “unofficial briefing” on the latest UAP developments between Lue Elizondo and a select number of mainstream outlets. (WaPo, NYT, Fox, NBC, CBS)
Here is one of the comment he made we’d like a response on.

“Lue Elizondo: “I think, for me, the most concerning not most compelling but the most concerning, are those incidents that involve our nuclear equities. There seems to be a very distinct congruency between UAP, associated UAP activity and and our nuclear technology, whether it be propulsion or weapon systems or whatnot. And that’s concerning to the point where we’ve actually had some of our nuclear capabilities disabled by these things. So, you know, again, let’s put this into context of foreign adversarial technology if Russia or China had the ability to disable our nuclear strike capability or defense capability. That’s pretty significant. That’s a concern. For us. It should be.

Our follow up question:

“Just to clarify, you’re saying that our, our nuclear capabilities, whether they’re weapons, or whether it’s, some sort of nuclear power plant, you’re saying that these things have been disabled by something we can’t explain.”

Lue Elizondo response: “There is absolutely evidence that comports to the notion that they have, that UAPs have an active interest in our nuclear technology, and have in the past interfered with some of our nuclear capabilities. That’s fact. Yes.”

+Has the Pentagon has determined whether the images she confirmed have been identified as foreign drones or commercial jets.

(b) (6)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

From: (b) (6)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N61](#)
Cc: [Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\); Chamberlin, Thomas S SES USN ONI \(USA\);](#) (b) (6)
Subject: FW: UAP Brief
Date: Tuesday, April 27, 2021 11:14:35 AM

Scott,

The USMC team is working to schedule the briefing for Gen Gary Thomas (Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps), MajGen Olson (Staff Director, USMC) and BGen Fulford (OLA, USMC).

<https://www.hqmc.marines.mil/acmc/Biography/Article/1671075/general-gary-l-thomas/>

Did you want to participate?

V/r,

(b) (6)

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From: (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, April 27, 2021 7:43 AM
To: (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: RE: UAP Brief

Good morning Sir,

We will start coordinating with the other offices and reach out to schedule a date and time. If there are any dates that do not work for you please let us know. How many people will you need to bring with you for the brief? We are somewhat limited by COVID protocols, so it should be limited to essential briefers.

Thank you sir.

V/R,

(b) (6)

[Redacted]

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Monday, April 26, 2021 6:46 PM

To: (b) (6) Rowell BGen George B IV

(b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

[Redacted]

Subject: RE: UAP Brief

(b) (6),

TS//SCI space will be sufficient for an introductory discussion.

V/r,

(b) (6)

[Redacted]

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Monday, April 26, 2021 1:07 PM

To: Rowell BGen George B IV (b) (6)

[Redacted]

Cc: (b) (6)

[Redacted]

Subject: RE: UAP Brief

Received. Thanks, Sir.

(b) (6), the ACMC is interested in receiving the subject briefing. Are there any specific stipulations or requirements for office space due to classification? The ACMC's office is designated as a TSCIF within which we have been authorized to host briefings up to TS/SCI (including SAP/STO/SCO) material. If the brief can be conducted in the ACMC's office, we can host all other HQMC DVs here.

Upon your response, will have our Front Office reach out to you for coordination.

Thank you.

Vr/ (b) (6)

Semper Fidelis & Very Respectfully,

(b) (6)
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(b) (6)

From: Rowell BGen George B IV (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, April 26, 2021 12:58 PM
To: (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: UAP Brief

(b) (6)

Good afternoon.

As we discussed, (b) (6) (cc'd) is the PoC for the UAP Brief.

Would like to have ACMC, MajGen Olson and BGen Fulford receive it at same time, if possible.

I'll leave it to you to bounce to the schedulers.

R/ GBR

Director, Communication Directorate (CD)
Deputy CHINFO for Marine Corps Matters

(b) (6)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

From: [Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#)
To: (b) (6)
Cc: [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#); (b) (6)
Subject: RE: ONI SPACE
Date: Wednesday, April 28, 2021 3:51:10 PM

No has spoken to (b) (6) about this and (b) (6) need to be consulted.
Please coordinate a response to ONI. (b) (5)

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Wednesday, April 21, 2021 5:43 PM
To: Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
Cc: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: ONI SPACE

Ma'am,

(b) (6) sent the following plan:

(b) (6), (b) (5)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

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(b) (6)

(b) (6)

If you approve he would like to shift personnel soon.

V/R

(b) (6)

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: [Tipton, Neill T SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC \(USA\)](#)
To: [Greene, Jodi J SES USN \(USA\)](#); [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#); (b) (6)
Subject: RE: Project announcement: Evaluation of the DoD's Actions Regarding the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena
Date: Tuesday, May 4, 2021 1:21:07 PM
Attachments: [D2021-DEV0SN-0116.000 Redacted.pdf](#)

With the right Scott Bray this time.
Thanks
Neill

-----Original Message-----

From: Tipton, Neill T SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA)
Sent: Monday, May 3, 2021 9:13 AM
To: 'Greene, Jodi J SES USN (USA)'; 'Bray, Scott L CIV USN (USA),'
(b) (6)

Subject: FW: Project announcement: Evaluation of the DoD's Actions Regarding the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena

Jodi, Scott - FYI in case you're not aware. I have no insight into what generated this.

Thanks
Neill

-----Original Message-----

From: Kozik, David A SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA) (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, May 3, 2021 9:10 AM
To: Tipton, Neill T SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA) (b) (6); Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA) (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: FW: Project announcement: Evaluation of the DoD's Actions Regarding the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena

FYSA... probably a good reminder to never delete anything.

V/R,
DK

David A. Kozik
Director, OUSD(I&S) Congressional Activities / Chief, ASD/LA Intel Team Room (b) (6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, May 3, 2021 9:07 AM
To: Kozik, David A SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA) (b) (6)
Cc: Zola, Michael C SES (USA) (b) (6)

Subject: Project announcement: Evaluation of the DoD's Actions Regarding the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena

Good morning Dave and Happy Monday,
I hope you are doing well.

FYSA, I wanted to let you know that we shared the attached project announcement with the Hill, to include several HPSCI and SSCI staffers.

Very Respectfully,

(b) (6)

A large black rectangular redaction box covers the signature and any accompanying text or contact information.

This e-mail is from the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General {DoD OIG}. It may contain Controlled Unclassified Information {CUI}, including information that is Law Enforcement Sensitive {LES}, subject to the Privacy Act, and/or other privileges and restrictions that prohibit release without appropriate legal authority. Do not disseminate without the approval of the DoD OIG. If received in error, please notify the sender by reply e-mail and delete all copies of this message.

From: (b) (6)
To: (b) (6)
Cc: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I; (b) (6)
Subject: FW: DoD IG story
Date: Wednesday, May 12, 2021 7:22:15 AM
Attachments: [IG Letter on UAP.PDF](#)

Brennan,

Apologies if I'm late to the game, but I have not heard anyone inform DCNO that the Office of the Inspector General would be investigating UAPs. Are you tracking and has there been a response?

Thanks,

V/R

(b) (6)

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From: Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO (USA) (b) (6)
Sent: Wednesday, May 12, 2021 6:57 AM
To: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)
(b) (6); OPNAV ALL N2N6 Front Office
(b) (6); Miller, Christopher A SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA)
(b) (6)
Subject: DoD IG story

https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2021/05/11/what-is-the-military-doing-about-ufos-the-pentagons-internal-watchdog-wants-to-know/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=EBB%2005.12.21&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Early%20Bird%20Brief

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(www.blackberry.com)



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

May 3, 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Evaluation of the DoD's Actions Regarding the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena
(Project No. D2021-DEV0SN-0116.000)

We plan to begin the subject evaluation in May 2021. The objective of this evaluation is to determine the extent to which the DoD has taken actions regarding Unidentified Aerial Phenomena (UAP). We may revise the objective as the evaluation proceeds, and we will consider suggestions from management for additional or revised objectives.

We will perform the evaluation at the Offices of the Secretary of Defense, Military Services, Combatant Commands, Combat Support Agencies, Defense Agencies, and the Military Criminal Investigative Organizations. We may identify additional locations during the evaluation.

Please provide us with a point of contact for the evaluation within **5 days** of the date of this memorandum. The point of contact should be a Government employee or Military Service Member—a GS-15, pay band equivalent, or the military equivalent. Send the contact's name, title, grade/pay band, phone number, and e-mail address to [REDACTED]

You can obtain information about the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General from DoD Directive 5106.01, "Inspector General of the Department of Defense (IG DoD)," April 20, 2012, as amended; and DoD Instruction 7050.03, "Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense Access to Records and Information," March 22, 2013. Our website is www.dodig.mil.

If you have any questions, please contact [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "R. Stone", is located above the name of the Assistant Inspector General.

Randolph R. Stone
Assistant Inspector General for Evaluations
Space, Intelligence, Engineering, and Oversight

DISTRIBUTION:

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AUDITOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
AUDITOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
AUDITOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

From: (b) (6)
To: (b) (6); OPNAV ALL N2N6 Front Office; [Bray, Scott W SES](#)
Cc: OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I; (b) (6)
Subject: RE: UAP Meeting w/USN
Date: Friday, May 14, 2021 7:45:56 AM

LT, thank you.

Have a great weekend.

V/r

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Thursday, May 13, 2021 4:34 PM
To: (b) (6); OPNAV ALL N2N6 Front Office
(b) (6); Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I
(b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: UAP Meeting w/USN

Good Afternoon (b) (6),

Mr. Bray will represent N2N6.

Very Respectfully,

(b) (6)

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From: (b) (6)
Sent: Thursday, May 13, 2021 4:00 PM
To: OPNAV ALL N2N6 Front Office (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Subject: UAP Meeting w/USN

N2N6 team, good afternoon,

VCNO will be TAD on Monday, please advise who will be the rep for VADM Trussler for the UAP prep meeting at 1415 with USN. If VADM Trussler was available we would ask him to be the rep but since he is also TAD your rep will be our rep.

Please advise,

Thank you.

v/r

(b) (6)

[Redacted signature block containing multiple lines of blacked-out text]

From: [Gilday, Michael M ADM USN CNO \(USA\)](#)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#); [Lescher, William K ADM USN VCNO \(USA\)](#); [Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO \(USA\)](#); [Brown, Charles W RDML USN CHINFO WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#)
Cc: [Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#); (b) (6)
Subject: RE: Sunday 60 Minutes Story on UAP
Date: Saturday, May 15, 2021 7:26:26 AM

Thanks Scott. Appreciate the SA. VR Mike

From: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)
Date: Friday, May 14, 2021, 10:30 PM
To: Gilday, Michael M ADM USN CNO (USA) (b) (6), Lescher, William K ADM USN VCNO (USA) (b) (6), Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO (USA) (b) (6), Brown, Charles W RDML USN CHINFO WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
Cc: Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
Subject: Sunday 60 Minutes Story on UAP

CNO / VCNO -

Just a quick note to remind you that the UAP issue will be a feature story on 60 Minutes this Sunday. Two former naval aviators, (b) (6), are the central part of the story. They were the aviators who observed the fast moving "tic tac" object while NIMITZ was operating in SoCal in 2004.

I met with (b) (6) this week (she is on terminal leave and retires shortly). She had engaged with PAO before the 60 Minutes interview. We don't anticipate anything new in this story, but it will highlight the ridicule that she and (b) (6) faced afterwards — and suggest that the Navy didn't take this seriously at the time.

We've come a long way since then. We'll be ready to support PAO on Monday morning....

VR,
Scott

Scott W. Bray

Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence
Director, Naval Intelligence Activity
(b) (6)

From: [Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO \(USA\)](#)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I](#)
Cc: [Miller, Christopher A SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#); [Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#); [Chamberlin, Thomas S SES USN ONI \(USA\)](#); (b) (6)
Subject: RE: 60 Minutes
Date: Sunday, May 16, 2021 11:26:38 PM

Got it, thanks! Just landed SD. Vr, JT

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)
Date: Sunday, May 16, 2021, 4:44 PM
To: Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO (USA) (b) (6)
Cc: Miller, Christopher A SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6), Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6), Chamberlin, Thomas S SES USN ONI (USA) (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: 60 Minutes

Boss -

The 60 Minutes piece on UAP just aired. No surprises — and nothing really new. It says we take UAP seriously now and that we encourage aviators to report observations, unlike in the past. It also built some anticipation of the Report to Congress.

VR,
Scott

Scott W. Bray
Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence
Director, Naval Intelligence Activity
(b) (6)

(b) (6)

Cc: "Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA)" (b) (6)

(b) (6)

"Johnson, Joan L SES USN ASSTSECNAV
RDA DC (USA)" (b) (6), "Moran, Michael T VADM USN
ASSTSECNAV RDA DC (USA)" (b) (6)

Subject: Follow up from UAPTF EXCOM

Sean,

I just attended an EXCOM today that was focused on Unidentified Aerial Phenomenon (UAP's). There is quite a bit of overlap between CsUAS and the UAP discussion, particularly in the area of detection and counter/kill. I believe this is an area where the JCO could help the UAP team. I have CC'd (b) (6) and Joan Johnson to try and link them together. (b) (6) and Joan can certainly share more with the JCO at the appropriate classification level.

There is also some discussion about using the JCO as a receiver to UPL money that would be focused on UAP work since there would likely be some RDTNE overlap or operations money overlap.

V/r,

(b) (6)

RADM Greg "Hyfi" Harris
Director Air Warfare
OPNAV N98

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#); [Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#); [Page, Christopher James \(Chris\) SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#); (b) (6)
Cc: [OPNAV ALL N2N6 Front Office](#)
Subject: FW: HPSCI and SSCI Office Call Read Aheads
Date: Friday, May 21, 2021 10:27:43 AM
Attachments: (b) (6)
Importance: High

Good Morning Team,

Please see below and attached information in support of the upcoming HPSCI and SSCI engagements.

Very Respectfully,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, May 21, 2021 10:25 AM
To: OPNAV ALL N2N6 Front Office (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: HPSCI and SSCI Office Call Read Aheads
Importance: High

N2N6 Front Office-

Please see attached read aheads for DCNO's HPSCI (26 May) and SSCI PSM (27 May) engagements. The attachments include staffer biographies, RFI requests, N2N6/NIA/ONI engagements, and some

areas of interest for FYs 2020 and 2021.

HPSCI Staffers:

(b) (6)
)

SSCI Staffers:

(b) (6)

NOTE: Limited biographical information is available for (b) (6) who is also expected to attend the May 27th office call.

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V/R,

(b) (6)

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From: (b) (6)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#)
Cc: [Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#); [Chamberlin, Thomas S SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#); (b) (6)
Subject: RE: UAP Question
Date: Monday, May 24, 2021 1:29:20 PM

Scott,

We are tracking 27 June as the 180 day mark, but that is a Sunday. 25 June (Friday) is the goal for delivery through ODNI.

V/r,

(b) (6)

From: Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, May 24, 2021 6:51 AM
To: (b) (6)
Cc: Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6); Chamberlin, Thomas S SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6); (b) (6)

Subject: FW: UAP Question

Scott W. Bray

Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence
Director, Naval Intelligence Activity

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Date: Monday, May 24, 2021, 6:47 AM
To: Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)
Subject: UAP Question

Sir,

Being asked when the UAP brief is due to congress. Can you assist?

Very respectfully,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
To: [redacted]
Subject: [redacted]
Date: UAP DOCUMENTS POSTED TO NAVY FOIA ELECTRONIC READING ROOM
Tuesday, May 25, 2021 10:44:47 AM

Admiral Trussler, et. Al.

Documents posted.

<https://www.secnavy.navy.mil/foia/readingroom/SitePages/Home.aspx?RootFolder=%2Ffoia%2Freadingroom%2FCaseFiles%2FUFO%20Info%2FUAP%20DOCUMENTS&FolderCTID=0x012000CD3AEB341204C14DB4C7B99C57F99B268&View=%7B988EEA5C%2DDFDB%2D4A5D%2D8414%2DB7A63DACECE2%7D>

Vr, (b) (6)

[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

From: (b) (6)
To: (b) (6)
Cc: [Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO \(USA\)](#); [Miller, Christopher A SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#); [Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#); (b) (6)
Subject: FW: DON-NAVY-2021-006962
Date: Tuesday, May 25, 2021 1:49:36 PM
Attachments: [006962 Snapshot.pdf](#)

(b) (6),

We have a FOIA request of the rules of engagement for UAPs. Has the task force got around to writing those? Remember, they should undergo a legal review to ensure they are in compliance with the CJCS Standing Rules of Engagement.

R, (b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, May 25, 2021 1:40 PM
To: (b) (6)
Cc: DONFOIA-PA <donfoia-pa@navy.mil>
Subject: DON-NAVY-2021-006962

Good afternoon Sir,

I hope this day finds you well.

I apologize for sending another UAP related request your way, but I was hoping you could help me determine if this fell under N2N6/ONI cognizance in regards to use of force/engagement.

I didn't want to just assign it to ONI without consulting you first.

Standing by for your response.

Very Respectfully,

(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

DONFOIA-PA@navy.mil <mailto:DONFOIA-PA@navy.mil>

NOTICE FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO) - Privacy Act Data - Privacy Sensitive - Any misuse or unauthorized disclosure may result in both civil and criminal penalties.

The information contained in this e-mail is subject to review in accordance with the Department of

the Navy's acceptable use policy. All written communications fall under the records retention policy for official records and should accordingly be archived. If you have any questions regarding this notice, please contact the sender. Thank you.

DON-NAVY-2021-006962 Request Details

Case Phase: Evaluation Case Status: Initial Evaluation Due Date: N/A Clock Days: 0 (Never Started)

Requester Information

Requester	(b) (6)	Tracking Number	DON-NAVY-2021-006962
Organization		Submitted Date	05/24/2021
Requester Has Account	Yes	Received Date	05/24/2021
Email Address	(b) (6)	Perfected Date	
Phone Number		Last Assigned Date	05/24/2021
Fax Number		Assigned To	Chief of Naval Operations
Address	MuckRock News DEPT MR 112784 411A Highland Ave	Last Assigned By	
City	Somerville	Request Track	Simple
State/Province	MA	Fee Limit	\$0.00
Zip Code/Postal Code	02144		

Request Handling

Requester Info Available to the Public	No	Request Type	FOIA
Request Track	Simple	Request Perfected	No
Fee Category	Media	Acknowledgement Sent Date	05/24/2021
Fee Waiver Requested	No	Unusual Circumstances	No
Fee Waiver Status		Litigation	No
Expedited Processing Requested	No	5 Day Notifications	
Expedited Processing Status			

Description

1354/2000

To Whom It May Concern:

Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, I hereby request the following records:

Internal memos, emails, legal briefings, or other documents regarding rules of engagement on use of force against Unidentified Aerial Phenomenon

Date: Jan 1 2010 - May 24 2021

The requested documents will be made available to the general public, and this request is not being made for commercial purposes.

In the event that there are fees, I would be grateful if you would inform me of the total charges in advance of fulfilling my request. I would prefer the request filled electronically, by e-mail attachment if available or CD-ROM if not.

Thank you in advance for your anticipated cooperation in this matter. I look forward to receiving your response to this request within 20 business days, as the statute requires.

Sincerely,

(b) (6)

Upload documents directly: https://https://www.muckrock.comhttps://accounts.muckrock.com/accounts/login/?next=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.muckrock.com%2Faccounts%2Flogin%2F%3Fnext%3D%252Faccounts%252Fagency_login%252Fdepartment-navy-office-general-counsel-5014%252F unidentified-aerial-phenomenon-use-of-force-department-of-the-navy-office-of-the-general-counsel-112784%252F%253Femail%253Drichard.d.zeigler%252540navy.mil&url_auth_token=AAAxirpUlnPE7C7F3RG-mFMnM3M%3A1IINXK%3AE-YilIokFHRWnwFc2kdxqI8IGs

Has Description Been Modified	
Description Available to the Public	No
Short Description	UAP use of force

Additional Information

Case Number	
Name of Local Command	
Contract Number	
Limit Request To Clearly Releasable Info	Select Limit Request To Clearly Releasable Info

Attached Supporting Files

Attachments Available to the Public	No
-------------------------------------	----

Attached File Name	Size (MB)	File Type	Remove
No supporting files have been uploaded.			

Upload Supporting Files

No supporting files have been uploaded.

Drag files here

Upload Supporting Files

From: [Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#)
Subject: FW: ADDITIONAL ATTENDEE: May 21: UAP Brief
Date: Wednesday, May 26, 2021 12:52:01 PM
Attachments: [image001.jpg](#)
Importance: High

From: Chamberlin, Thomas S SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA)

(b) (6)

Sent: Wednesday, May 26, 2021 12:48 PM

To: (b) (6); Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

Subject: FW: ADDITIONAL ATTENDEE: May 21: UAP Brief

Importance: High

Latest from (b) (6).

Stunning that it's addressed to me and not (b) (6).

TC

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Wednesday, May 26, 2021 12:42 PM

To: Chamberlin, Thomas S SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

Subject: FW: ADDITIONAL ATTENDEE: May 21: UAP Brief

Importance: High

Mr. Chamberlin, (b) (6),

As discussed, NSA is not able to move the brief and the direction is to be ready to go at 0900 this Friday 28 MAY. (b) (6), (b) (5)

(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

V/r

(b) (6)

(b) (6)
(b) (6)

(b) (6)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]



From: SD - Meetings (b) (6)

Sent: Friday, May 21, 2021 10:12 AM

To: (b) (6)

[Redacted]

Cc: SECNAV Executive Office (b) (6)

Subject: RE: ADDITIONAL ATTENDEE: May 21: UAP Brief

Navy Team,

Thanks for your help and the runaround yesterday, but, good news is that everyone was approved!

We'll see all four at 1130.

Very respectfully,

(b) (6)

[Redacted]

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Wednesday, May 19, 2021 11:47 AM

To: SD - Meetings (b) (6)

Cc: SECNAV Executive Office (b) (6)

Subject: RE: ADDITIONAL ATTENDEE: May 21: UAP Brief

Good morning,

Attending the meeting are the following:

1. The Hon. Thomas Harker, SECNAV (Acting)
2. The Hon. James Geurts, UNSECNAV (PTDO)

3. Admiral "Bill" Lescher, Vice Chief of Naval Operations
4. Mr. Scott Bray, Deputy Director of Naval intelligence (Briefer)

Very respectfully,

(b) (6)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Saturday, May 15, 2021 9:48 AM
To: SD - Calendar (b) (6); (b) (6)
[Redacted]
[Redacted] SECNAV_Scheduler
(b) (6); 'SECNAV XO' (b) (6)
[Redacted]; OSD Pentagon OUSD Intel - Sec List Front Office
(b) (6)
[Redacted]
Cc: SD - Protocol (b) (6); SD - Meetings (b) (6)
Subject: ADDITIONAL ATTENDEE: May 21: UAP Brief

Good Morning,

Please see the subject schedule request below and confirm your principal's participation to
(b) (6)

Subject: UAP Brief

Date: May 21

Time: 1130-1200

Location: 3E880 | SD Inner Conference Room

Attendees:

- SD
- SECNAV and + 2
- USD I&S

- COS
- SMA
- PMA
- EXECSEC
- SD SA for Policy

If your principal requests to bring additional staff, please provide their names and titles for approval prior to the meeting.

Please let me know if you have any questions.

(b) (6)

[Redacted]

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Friday, May 14, 2021 11:17 AM

To: SD - Calendar (b) (6)

[Redacted]

[Redacted] SECNAV_Scheduler

(b) (6); 'SECNAV XO' (b) (6)

[Redacted]

Cc: SD - Protocol (b) (6); SD - Meetings (b) (6)

Subject: May 21: UAP Brief

Good Morning,

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(b) (6).

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Date: May 21

Time: 1130-1200

Location: 3E880 | SD Inner Conference Room

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- PMA
- EXECSEC
- SD SA for Policy

If your principal requests to bring additional staff, please provide their names and titles for approval prior to the meeting.

Please let me know if you have any questions.

(b) (6)

[Redacted]

From: [Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#)
Subject: FW: White House Brief
Date: Thursday, May 27, 2021 5:36:53 AM
Attachments: [image001.jpg](#)

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO (USA) (b) (6)
Date: Wednesday, May 26, 2021, 4:30 PM
To: Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
(b) (6), Chamberlin, Thomas S SES
USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
Subject: FW: White House Brief

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Wednesday, May 26, 2021 4:09 PM
To: Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO (USA) (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: White House Brief

Admiral,

Vice Chief is tied up in meetings. I had a brief moment to discuss this with him earlier. Of note, he has discussed with Under on the margins of other meetings. Intent is for VADM Moran to brief with (b) (6) accompanying. Under will be in attendance; VCNO likely pending identification of a rep for the CJCS tank.

We are coordinating a 1730 for you to discuss NGEN with VCNO which will provide an opportunity to discuss this as well.

v/r, (b) (6)

(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

(b) (6)

From: Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO (USA) (b) (6)

Sent: Wednesday, May 26, 2021 3:52 PM

To: Lescher, William K ADM USN VCNO (USA) (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: FW: White House Brief

Vice Chief,

In case it has not reached you yet, the UAP brief to National Security Advisor Sullivan was moved to Friday at 0900. Both Scott Bray and I are out of town.

(b) (6), (b) (5)

Vr, JT

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Wednesday, May 26, 2021 12:42 PM

To: Chamberlin, Thomas S SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: FW: ADDITIONAL ATTENDEE: May 21: UAP Brief

Importance: High

Mr. Chamberlin, (b) (6),

As discussed, NSA is not able to move the brief and the direction is to be ready to go at 0900 this Friday 28 MAY. (b) (6), (b) (5)

(b) (6), (b) (5)

V/r

(b) (6)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]



From: SD - Meetings (b) (6)

Sent: Friday, May 21, 2021 10:12 AM

To: (b) (6); SD - Meetings

(b) (6)

Cc: SECNAV Executive Office (b) (6)

Subject: RE: ADDITIONAL ATTENDEE: May 21: UAP Brief

Navy Team,

Thanks for your help and the runaround yesterday, but, good news is that everyone was approved!

We'll see all four at 1130.

Very respectfully,

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Sent: Wednesday, May 19, 2021 11:47 AM

To: SD - Meetings (b) (6)

Cc: SECNAV Executive Office (b) (6)

Subject: RE: ADDITIONAL ATTENDEE: May 21: UAP Brief

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3. Admiral "Bill" Lescher, Vice Chief of Naval Operations
4. Mr. Scott Bray, Deputy Director of Naval intelligence (Briefer)

Very respectfully,

(b) (6)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Saturday, May 15, 2021 9:48 AM
To: SD - Calendar (b) (6); (b) (6)
[Redacted]
[Redacted] SECNAV_Scheduler
(b) (6); 'SECNAV XO' (b) (6)
[Redacted]; OSD Pentagon OUSD Intel - Sec List Front Office
(b) (6)
[Redacted]
Cc: SD - Protocol (b) (6); SD - Meetings (b) (6)
Subject: ADDITIONAL ATTENDEE: May 21: UAP Brief

Good Morning,

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(b) (6)

Subject: UAP Brief

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- EXECSEC
- SD SA for Policy

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Please let me know if you have any questions.

(b) (6)

[Redacted]

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Friday, May 14, 2021 11:17 AM

To: SD - Calendar (b) (6)

[Redacted]

[Redacted] SECNAV_Scheduler

(b) (6); 'SECNAV XO' (b) (6)

[Redacted]

Cc: SD - Protocol (b) (6); SD - Meetings (b) (6)

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[Redacted]

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Cc: (b) (6)
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Admiral,

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[Redacted]

We are coordinating a 1730 for you to discuss NGEN with VCNO which will provide an opportunity to

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v/r, (b) (6)

[REDACTED]

From: Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO (USA) (b) (6)

Sent: Wednesday, May 26, 2021 3:52 PM

To: Lescher, William K ADM USN VCNO (USA) (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: FW: White House Brief

Vice Chief,

In case it has not reached you yet, the UAP brief to National Security Advisor Sullivan was moved to Friday at 0900. Both Scott Bray and I are out of town.

(b) (6), (b) (5)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Vr, JT

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Wednesday, May 26, 2021 12:42 PM

To: Chamberlin, Thomas S SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

(b) (6)

[REDACTED]

Cc: (b) (6)

(b) (6)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

Subject: FW: ADDITIONAL ATTENDEE: May 21: UAP Brief
Importance: High

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[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

V/r

(b) (6)

[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]



From: SD - Meetings (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, May 21, 2021 10:12 AM
To: (b) (6) SD - Meetings
(b) (6)
Cc: SECNAV Executive Office (b) (6)
Subject: RE: ADDITIONAL ATTENDEE: May 21: UAP Brief

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Very respectfully,

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Cc: SECNAV Executive Office (b) (6)
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3. Admiral "Bill" Lescher, Vice Chief of Naval Operations
4. Mr. Scott Bray, Deputy Director of Naval intelligence (Briefer)

Very respectfully,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Saturday, May 15, 2021 9:48 AM
To: SD - Calendar (b) (6); (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6) SECNAV_Scheduler
(b) (6); 'SECNAV XO' (b) (6); (b) (6)
(b) (6); OSD Pentagon OUSD Intel - Sec List Front Office
(b) (6)
Cc: SD - Protocol (b) (6); SD - Meetings (b) (6)
Subject: ADDITIONAL ATTENDEE: May 21: UAP Brief

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Subject: UAP Brief

Date: May 21

Time: 1130-1200

Location: 3E880 | SD Inner Conference Room

Attendees:

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- SECNAV and + 2
- USD I&S
- COS
- SMA
- PMA
- EXECSEC
- SD SA for Policy

If your principal requests to bring additional staff, please provide their names and titles for approval prior to the meeting.

Please let me know if you have any questions.

(b) (6)

[Redacted Signature]

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Friday, May 14, 2021 11:17 AM

To: SD - Calendar (b) (6)

[Redacted]
[Redacted] SECNAV_Scheduler

(b) (6); 'SECNAV XO' (b) (6)

Cc: SD - Protocol (b) (6); SD - Meetings (b) (6)

Subject: May 21: UAP Brief

Good Morning,

Please see the subject schedule request below and confirm your principal's participation to (b) (6)

Subject: UAP Brief

Date: May 21

Time: 1130-1200

Location: 3E880 | SD Inner Conference Room

Attendees:

- SD
- SECNAV and + 2
- COS
- SMA
- PMA
- EXECSEC
- SD SA for Policy

If your principal requests to bring additional staff, please provide their names and titles for approval prior to the meeting.

Please let me know if you have any questions.

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Subject: News Article: White House Takes UFO 'Incursions Into Our Airspace...Very Seriously'

FYI

I love the fact that she used our talking points (see yellow highlights below)!

(b) (6)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

White House Takes UFO 'Incursions Into Our Airspace...Very Seriously'

White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki revealed that a UFO report is coming, but wouldn't commit to its full release.

Vice Motherboard, 26 May 2021... by Matthew Gault

The Office of the Director Of National Intelligence (ODNI) is actively working on a report about UFOs and President Biden supports the effort. That's according to White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki who was asked about UFOs during the White House daily Press Briefing on May 25.

The reporter had previously asked a question about COVID-19 and giggled when transitioning to the question about UFOs. "The giggle gives it away," Psaki said before the question was asked.

"This is quite a serious issue," the reporter said. "There are these unrecognized objects in U.S. airspace, they're also known as unidentified aerial phenomenon," a reporter asked. "Can the Biden administration commit to releasing it in full?"

The Pentagon has declassified a lot of information about strange lights and objects in the sky recently as part of a new era of transparency around what it calls unidentified aerial phenomena. ODNI has an end-of-June deadline for a report detailing what it knows about the issue. "There are a lot more sightings than have been made public," former Director of National Intelligence John Ratcliffe said on Fox News in March.

With the deadline for the report just a few weeks away, journalists and the public are curious about how much of the report might be redacted. Psaki said that it was ODNI's, not the President's, decision to make. "We take reports of incursion into our airspace by any aircraft, identified or unidentified, very seriously and investigate each one," she said. "But ODNI would be working on that report and, in terms of disclosure, that would be up to them."

The reporter then asked a follow up about the President's mood regarding the strange lights in the sky. "I think the fact that we have a team that's actively working on a report—certainly **the safety of our personnel, the security of our operations, our airspace, are of paramount concern**," Psaki said. "Whether that is identified or unidentified aircraft, and we don't discuss that publicly for a range of reasons, but certainly the President supports the ODNI putting together a report and following through on that commitment."

Navy Pilots are the most high profile and credible witnesses of UFOs and several of them recently gave interviews to 60 Minutes where they detailed their experiences. Former President Barack Obama appeared on The Late Show with James Corden last week and Reggie Watts asked him about all the UFO news. "When it comes to aliens, there are some things I just can't tell you on air," Obama said. "But what is true is that there is footage and records of objects in the sky that we don't know exactly what they are. How they move, their trajectory. They did not have an easily explainable pattern."

[Article](#)

From: [Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#); [Chamberlin, Thomas S SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: [DCNO RFI] Summary of EXEC-Level Briefings
Date: Monday, May 31, 2021 9:04:06 AM

(b) (6) is such a slacker.

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, May 28, 2021 7:25 PM
To: (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6); Chamberlin, Thomas S
SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6); Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA
WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: RE: [DCNO RFI] Summary of EXEC-Level Briefings

(b) (6),
I pulled the list below from a larger list of senior level briefings and discussions. There may be a few in here that don't make the cut for your purposes.

V/r,

(b) (6)

Meetings/Briefings in CY21—

DUSN/DASN RDT&E meeting on 07 Jan 2021

NIO S&T meeting 14 Jan 2021

ODNI/NIM-Aviation meeting 15 Jan 2021

DUSN/DASN RDT&E meeting on 26 Jan 2021

SASC/SSCI PSM teleconference 26 Jan 2021

DSD Briefing and Update 01 Feb 2021

VCNO/USFF/CPF/AIRLANT/AIRPAC Briefing 02 Feb 2021

SSCI staff briefing 09 Jan 2021

SASC/SSCI staff briefing 11 Feb 2021

SASC/SSCI personal staff briefing 12 Feb 2021

DoD/NORTHCOM discussion 19 Feb 2021

SECNAV UAPTF EXCOM 24 Feb 2021

UAPTF Briefing to Sen. Ossoff (D-GA) 25 Feb 2021

Meeting with Mr. Andrew Cox (SES), Director, Space Security and Defense Program 01 Mar 2021

SASC/SSCI staff briefing 02 Mar 2021

ASN/RDA briefing 03 Mar 2021

A/SECNAV briefing 05 Mar 2021

VCNO Update/Prep 09 Mar 2021

UNSECNAV (PTDO) brief 10 Mar 2021

INDOPACOM DJ2 meeting 15 Mar 2021

UNSECNAV (PTDO) brief 22 Mar 2021

DSD brief 25 Mar 2021

NIM-Aviation meeting/prep 31 Mar 2021

Director, Defense Digital Service meeting 07 Apr 2021

DNI briefing 07 Apr 2021

BGen Rowell briefing 14 Apr 2021

Representative Gallagher (R-WI) briefing 21 Apr 2021

SASC/SSCI/HASC/HPSCI staff briefing 30 Apr 2021

DASD/A&S(NM) briefing 03 May 2021

ACMC (USMC) briefing 10 May 2021

Deputy Director DARPA and Office Directors briefing 11 May 2021

House Committee on Oversight and Reform, National Security Subcommittee briefing 13 May 2021

UNSECNAV(PTDO) and VCNO pre-brief for SD 13 May 2021

Defense Digital Service meeting 14 May 2021

UNSECNAV(PTDO) pre-brief for SD 17 May 2021

USD/A&S briefing 18 May 2021

COMONI briefing 18 May 2021

BGen Fulford briefing 19 May 2021

SECNAV UAP EXCOM, extended 19 May 2021

SECDEF briefing 21 May 2021 (DDNI delivered)

ADM Grady (USFF) attended internal presentation 25 May 2021

HPSCI staffer update 26 May 2021

CJCS briefing 28 May 2021

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Friday, May 28, 2021 8:44 AM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6) Chamberlin, Thomas S
SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6); Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA
WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

Subject: RE: [DCNO RFI] Summary of EXEC-Level UAP Briefings

(b) (6),

Copy, thank you!

VR, (b) (6)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Thursday, May 27, 2021 8:01 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6) Chamberlin, Thomas S
SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6); Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA
WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

Subject: RE: [DCNO RFI] Summary of EXEC-Level UAP Briefings

Correcting a missing word...

(b) (6),

I ***will*** pull this list together for the boss on Friday (tomorrow).

The list is long.

V/r,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Thursday, May 27, 2021 7:59 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6) Chamberlin, Thomas S
SES USN ONI (USA) (b) (6); Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC
(USA) (b) (6)

Subject: RE: [DCNO RFI] Summary of EXEC-Level UAP Briefings

(b) (6),

I pull this list together for the boss on Friday (tomorrow).

The list is long.

V/r,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Thursday, May 27, 2021 8:38 AM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6) Chamberlin, Thomas S
SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6); Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA

WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

Subject: [DCNO RFI] Summary of EXEC-Level UAP Briefings

Good Morning (b) (6),

Please provide a listing of all executive level (ie. SECNAV, UNSECNAV) briefings given within the last year. The why is data gathering for VADM Trussler.

Thank you.

VR, (b) (6)

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(b) (6)
(b) (6)

From: [Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#)
Subject: FW: [ADDITIONAL DCNO RFI] Summary of EXEC-Level Briefings for CY21
Date: Wednesday, June 2, 2021 10:33:38 AM

This is becoming obnoxious.

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Wednesday, June 02, 2021 10:12 AM
To: (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6); Chamberlin, Thomas S
SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6); Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA
WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
Subject: [ADDITIONAL DCNO RFI] Summary of EXEC-Level Briefings for CY21

(b) (6),

Follow-on request – please add the name of the briefer (s) for each event.

Thank you.

VR, (b) (6)

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(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, June 1, 2021 9:19 AM
To: Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO (USA) (b) (6)
Cc: Miller, Christopher A SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: Summary of EXEC-Level Briefings for CY21

Admiral,

Per your request, below is the listing of executive-level UAP briefings/discussions in CY21. The **bolded** items are the key executive level briefings.

FYI -- The Vice Director of the Joint Staff also requested this information.

January 2021

1. **DUSN/DASN RDT&E meeting on 07 Jan 2021**
2. NIO S&T meeting 14 Jan 2021
3. ODNI/NIM-Aviation meeting 15 Jan 2021
4. **DUSN/DASN RDT&E meeting on 26 Jan 2021**
5. SASC/SSCI PSM teleconference 26 Jan 2021

February 2021

6. **DSD Briefing and Update 01 Feb 2021**
7. **VCNO/USFF/CPF/AIRLANT/AIRPAC Briefing 02 Feb 2021**
8. SSCI staff briefing 09 Jan 2021
9. SASC/SSCI staff briefing 11 Feb 2021
10. SASC/SSCI personal staff briefing 12 Feb 2021
11. DoD/NORTHCOM discussion 19 Feb 2021
12. **SECNAV UAPTF EXCOM 24 Feb 2021**
13. **UAPTF Briefing to Sen. Ossoff (D-GA) 25 Feb 2021**

March 2021

14. Meeting with Mr. Andrew Cox (SES), Director, Space Security and Defense Program 01 Mar 2021
15. SASC/SSCI staff briefing 02 Mar 2021
16. **ASN/RDA briefing 03 Mar 2021**
17. **A/SECNAV briefing 05 Mar 2021**
18. VCNO Update/Prep 09 Mar 2021
19. **UNSECNAV (PTDO) brief 10 Mar 2021**
20. INDOPACOM DJ2 meeting 15 Mar 2021
21. **UNSECNAV (PTDO) brief 22 Mar 2021**
22. **DSD brief 25 Mar 2021**
23. NIM-Aviation meeting/prep 31 Mar 2021

April 2021

24. Director, Defense Digital Service meeting 07 Apr 2021
25. **DNI briefing 07 Apr 2021**
26. BGen Rowell briefing 14 Apr 2021
27. **Representative Gallagher (R-WI) briefing 21 Apr 2021**
28. SASC/SSCI/HASC/HPSCI staff briefing 30 Apr 2021

May 2021

29. **DASD/A&S(NM) briefing 03 May 2021**
30. **ACMC (USMC) briefing 10 May 2021**
31. **Deputy Director DARPA and Office Directors briefing 11 May 2021**
32. House Committee on Oversight and Reform, National Security Subcommittee briefing 13 May 2021
33. **UNSECNAV(PTDO) and VCNO pre-brief for SD 13 May 2021**
34. Defense Digital Service meeting 14 May 2021
35. **UNSECNAV(PTDO) pre-brief for SD 17 May 2021**
36. **USD/A&S briefing 18 May 2021**
37. COMONI briefing 18 May 2021
38. BGen Fulford briefing 19 May 2021
39. **SECNAV UAP EXCOM, extended 19 May 2021**

- 40. **SECDEF briefing 21 May 2021 (DDNI delivered)**
- 41. ADM Grady (USFF) attended internal presentation 25 May 2021**
- 42. HPSCI staffer update 26 May 2021
- 43. CJCS briefing 28 May 2021**

VR, (b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#)
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Fwd: NYT story- UAPs
Date: Thursday, June 3, 2021 9:11:06 PM

Scott - The full story. VR (b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Date: Thursday, June 3, 2021 at 8:18:25 PM
To: (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Cc: "DNI-Media" (b) (6)
Subject: RE: NYT story- UAPs

+ The DNI and DAMA for awareness

(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Thursday, June 3, 2021 8:13 PM
To: (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Cc: DNI-Media (b) (6)
Subject: NYT story- UAPs

Story is out. I didn't have Gen Kruse's lowside in my phone so he's not on this. I'm sure this will get a lot of attention. We won't comment.

Government Finds No Evidence That Aerial Sightings Were Alien Spacecraft

The strange objects witnessed by Navy pilots remain unexplained, but officials briefed on a new study say they are not secret technology from a classified American program.

June 3, 2021, 7:55 p.m. ET

transcript

U.S. Navy Releases Videos of Unexplained Flying Objects

The U.S. Navy has officially published previously released videos showing unexplained objects.

[radio transmission] “Whoa, got it — woo-hoo!” “Roger —” “What the [expletive] is that?” “Did you box a moving target?” “No, I took an auto track.” “Oh, OK.” “Oh my gosh, dude. Wow” “What is that man?” “There’s a whole screen of them. My gosh.” “They’re all going against the wind. The wind’s 120 knots from west.” “Dude.” “That’s not — is it?” “[inaudible]” “Look at that thing.”



The U.S. Navy has officially published previously released videos showing unexplained objects. Department of Defense, via Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

WASHINGTON — American intelligence officials have found no evidence that aerial phenomena witnessed by Navy pilots in recent years are alien spacecraft, but they still cannot explain the unusual movements that have mystified scientists and the military, according to senior administration officials briefed on the findings of a highly anticipated government report.

The report determines that the vast majority of more than 120 incidents over the past two decades did not originate from any American military or other advanced U.S. government technology, the officials said. That determination would appear to eliminate the possibility that Navy pilots who reported seeing unexplained aircraft might have encountered programs the government meant to keep secret.

But that is about the only conclusive finding in the classified intelligence report, the officials said. And while a forthcoming unclassified version, expected to be released to Congress by June 25, will present few other firm conclusions, senior officials briefed on the intelligence conceded that the very ambiguity of the findings meant the government could not definitively rule out theories that the phenomenon observed by military pilots might be alien spacecraft.

Americans’ long-running fascination with U.F.O.s has intensified in recent weeks in anticipation of the release of the government report, which is expected to be presented to Congress this month. Former President Barack Obama further stoked the interest when he was asked last month about the incidents on “The Late Late Show with James Corden” on CBS.

“What is true, and I’m actually being serious here,” Mr. Obama said, “is that there is footage and records of objects in the skies that we don’t know exactly what they are.”

The report concedes that much about the observed phenomenon remains difficult to explain, including their acceleration, ability to change direction and submerge. One possible explanation — that the phenomena could be weather or other research balloons — does not hold up in all cases, the officials said, because of changes in wind speed at the times of some of the interactions.

The final report will also contain a classified annex, the officials said. While that annex will not contain any evidence concluding that the phenomenon are alien spacecraft, the officials acknowledged that the fact that it would remain off limits to the public was likely to continue to fuel speculation that the government had secret data about alien visitations to Earth.

Many of the more than 120 incidents examined in the report are from Navy personnel, officials said. The report also examined incidents involving foreign militaries over the last two decades. Intelligence officials believe at least some of the aerial phenomena could be experimental technology from a rival power, most likely Russia or China.

One senior official briefed on the intelligence said without hesitation that U.S. officials knew it was not American technology. He said there was worry among intelligence and military officials that China or Russia could be experimenting with hypersonic technology.

He and other officials spoke on grounds of anonymity because they were not authorized to speak publicly about the classified findings in the report.

Russia has been investing [heavily in hypersonics](#), believing the technology offers the ability to evade American missile-defense technology. China has also developed hypersonic weaponry, and included it in military parades. If the phenomenon were Chinese or Russian aircraft, officials said it would suggest the two powers’ hypersonic research has far outpaced American military development.

Navy pilots were often unsettled by the sightings. In one encounter, strange objects — one of them like a spinning top moving against the wind — [appeared almost](#) daily from the summer of 2014 to March 2015, high in the skies over the East Coast. Navy pilots reported to their superiors that the objects had no visible engine or infrared exhaust plumes, but that they could reach 30,000 feet and hypersonic speeds.

Lt. Ryan Graves, an F/A-18 Super Hornet pilot who was with the Navy for 10 years, told The New York Times in an interview that “these things would be out there all day.” With the speeds he and other pilots observed, he said, “12 hours in the air is 11 hours longer than we’d expect.”

In late 2014, a Super Hornet pilot had a near collision with one of the objects, and an official mishap report was filed. Some of the incidents were videotaped, including one taken by a plane’s camera in early 2015 that shows an object zooming over the ocean waves as pilots question what they are watching.

The Defense Department [has been](#) collecting such reports for more than 13 years as part of a shadowy, little-known Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program within the Pentagon. The program analyzed radar data, video footage and accounts provided by the Navy

pilots and senior officers.

The program began in 2007 and was largely funded at the request of Harry Reid, the Nevada Democrat who was the Senate majority leader at the time. It was officially shut down in 2012 when the money dried up, according to the Pentagon. But after the publication of a New York Times article in 2017 about the program and criticism from program officials that the government was not forthcoming about reports about aerial phenomena, the Pentagon restarted the program last summer as the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force.

The task force's mission was to "detect, analyze and catalog" sightings of strange objects in the sky that could pose a threat to national security. But government officials said they also wanted to remove the stigma for service members who report U.F.O sightings in the hope that more would be encouraged to speak up if they saw something. The goal, officials said, is to give authorities a better idea of what might be out there.



A video shows an encounter between a Navy F/A-18 Super Hornet and an unknown object. It was released by the Defense Department's Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program. U.S. Department of Defense

Last year, President Donald J. Trump's budget [included a provision](#) inserted by lawmakers that the secretary of defense and director of national intelligence submit an unclassified report on what the government knows about U.F.O.s. That report is the one to be released this month.

Officials briefed on the report said it also examined video that [shows a whitish oval object](#) described as a giant Tic Tac, about the size of a commercial plane, encountered by two Navy fighter jets off the coast of San Diego in 2004.

In that incident, the pilots reported an interaction with the craft, which lasted for several minutes. At one point, the object peeled away, one of the pilots, Cmdr. David Fravor, said in an interview later with The Times. "It accelerated like nothing I've ever seen," he said.

The report studies that incident, including the video that accompanied the interaction. The provenance of the object is still unknown, the officials said.

(b) (6)



From: (b) (6)
To: Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA); (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: Re: [Non-DoD Source] Re: Heads-Up! NYT Story on UAP Report Tomorrow
Date: Thursday, June 3, 2021 9:26:28 PM

You too, Scott.

(b) (6)

From: "Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA)" (b) (6)
Date: Thursday, June 3, 2021 at 9:22:27 PM
To: (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: [Non-DoD Source] Re: Heads-Up! NYT Story on UAP Report Tomorrow

Thanks, (b) (6)! That makes sense! Whew!

Have a great evening,
Scott

Scott W. Bray
Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence
Director, Naval Intelligence Activity
(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Date: Thursday, Jun 03, 2021, 9:19 PM
To: Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA); (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Re: Heads-Up! NYT Story on UAP Report Tomorrow

Correction, Scott. I mentioned that DAMA was planning to reach out to you about this and he indicated he was aware of some backgrounders that occurred before the 60 Minutes piece aired but had not insight on backgrounders ahead of this.

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Date: Thursday, June 3, 2021 at 9:02:29 PM

To: "Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA)" (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: Re: Heads-Up! NYT Story on UAP Report Tomorrow

+ (b) (6)

(b) (6)

From: "Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA)" (b) (6)

Date: Thursday, June 3, 2021 at 8:36:26 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: FW: Heads-Up! NYT Story on UAP Report Tomorrow

(b) (6) -

I see that my name is now associated with the upcoming NYT story. Feel free to give me a call

(b) (6)

Not only have I not had any contact with the press on this matter, I know the statement associated with me to be incorrect. If you have any additional context, I'd be interested.

Many thanks,
Scott

Scott W. Bray

Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence

Director, Naval Intelligence Activity

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Date: Thursday, Jun 03, 2021, 7:31 PM

To: Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)
Subject: FW: Heads-Up! NYT Story on UAP Report Tomorrow

FYI.

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Thursday, June 3, 2021 6:07 PM
To: Kirby, John F SES (USA) (b) (6); Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)

(b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: Heads-Up! NYT Story on UAP Report Tomorrow
Importance: High

BLUF: Julian Barnes, NYT, intends to publish story tomorrow on the UAP report to Congress, based on information he received from multiple "intelligence officials at DoD."

(b) (6), ODNI PA shop, just informed me that Julian Barnes, NYT, contacted her regarding a story he intends to publish tomorrow. His article is based on discussions/information he allegedly received from four intelligence officials in DoD over the last couple days. His story is going to say that the report will say that there is no evidence of alien visitation, but that there are things that the intelligence community can't explain, and that the IC believes most of the 120+ UAP sightings over the last couple decades are of 'weather balloons' or adversary aircraft. Somewhere in the report may also be a line that Scot Bray (Navy) said that he had heard there had been backgrounders provided to CBS "60 Minutes." [the latter is not true; we did not provide any background briefings to CBS "60 Minutes," though we answered multiple queries via email.]

Regards,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#)
Subject: Re: [Non-DoD Source] Fwd: NYT story- UAPs
Date: Thursday, June 3, 2021 9:28:10 PM

That would be great! Good luck tomorrow!!!!

From: "Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA)" (b) (6)
Date: Thursday, June 3, 2021 at 9:21:12 PM
To: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: [Non-DoD Source] Fwd: NYT story- UAPs

Thanks, (b) (6). Fascinating. I have thoughts to share if we can chat while I'm over at LX on Monday.

All the best,
Scott

Scott W. Bray
Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence
Director, Naval Intelligence Activity
(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Date: Thursday, Jun 03, 2021, 9:11 PM
To: Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Fwd: NYT story- UAPs

Scott - The full story. VR Jeff

From: (b) (6)
Date: Thursday, June 3, 2021 at 8:18:25 PM
To: (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Cc: "DNI-Media" (b) (6)
Subject: RE: NYT story- UAPs

+ The DNI and DAMA for awareness

(b) (6)
(b) (6)

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Thursday, June 3, 2021 8:13 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: DNI-Media (b) (6)

Subject: NYT story- UAPs

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But that is about the only conclusive finding in the classified intelligence report, the officials said. And while a forthcoming unclassified version, expected to be released to Congress by June 25, will present few other firm conclusions, senior officials briefed on the intelligence conceded that the very ambiguity of the findings meant the government could not definitively rule out theories that the phenomenon observed by military pilots might be alien spacecraft.

Americans’ long-running fascination with U.F.O.s has intensified in recent weeks in anticipation of the release of the government report, which is expected to be presented to Congress this month. Former President Barack Obama further stoked the interest when he was asked last month about the incidents on “The Late Late Show with James Corden” on CBS.

“What is true, and I’m actually being serious here,” Mr. Obama said, “is that there is footage and records of objects in the skies that we don’t know exactly what they are.”

The report concedes that much about the observed phenomenon remains difficult to explain, including their acceleration, ability to change direction and submerge. One possible explanation — that the phenomena could be weather or other research balloons — does not hold up in all cases, the officials said, because of changes in wind speed at the times of some of the interactions.

The final report will also contain a classified annex, the officials said. While that annex will not contain any evidence concluding that the phenomenon are alien spacecraft, the officials acknowledged that the fact that it would remain off limits to the public was likely to continue to fuel speculation that the government had secret data about alien visitations to Earth.

Many of the more than 120 incidents examined in the report are from Navy personnel, officials said. The report also examined incidents involving foreign militaries over the last two decades. Intelligence officials believe at least some of the aerial phenomena could be experimental technology from a rival power, most likely Russia or China.

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Navy pilots were often unsettled by the sightings. In one encounter, strange objects — one of them like a spinning top moving against the wind — [appeared almost](#) daily from the summer of 2014 to March 2015, high in the skies over the East Coast. Navy pilots reported to their superiors that the objects had no visible engine or infrared exhaust plumes, but that they could reach 30,000 feet and hypersonic speeds.

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The Defense Department [has been](#) collecting such reports for more than 13 years as part of a shadowy, little-known Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program within the Pentagon. The program analyzed radar data, video footage and accounts provided by the Navy pilots and senior officers.

The program began in 2007 and was largely funded at the request of Harry Reid, the Nevada Democrat who was the Senate majority leader at the time. It was officially shut down in 2012 when the money dried up, according to the Pentagon. But after the publication of a New York Times article in 2017 about the program and criticism from program officials that the government was not forthcoming about reports about aerial phenomena, the Pentagon restarted the program last summer as the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force.

The task force’s mission was to “detect, analyze and catalog” sightings of strange objects in the sky that could pose a threat to national security. But government officials said they also wanted to remove the stigma for service members who report U.F.O sightings in the hope that more would be encouraged to speak up if they saw something. The goal, officials said, is to give authorities a better idea of what might be out there.



A video shows an encounter between a Navy F/A-18 Super Hornet and an unknown object. It was released by the Defense Department's Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program. U.S. Department of Defense

Last year, President Donald J. Trump’s budget [included a provision](#) inserted by lawmakers that the secretary of defense and director of national intelligence submit an unclassified report on what the government knows about U.F.O.s. That report is the one to be released this month.

Officials briefed on the report said it also examined video that [shows a whitish oval object](#) described as a giant Tic Tac, about the size of a commercial plane, encountered by two Navy fighter jets off the coast of San Diego in 2004.

In that incident, the pilots reported an interaction with the craft, which lasted for several minutes. At one point, the object peeled away, one of the pilots, Cmdr. David Fravor, said in an interview later with The Times. “It accelerated like nothing I’ve ever seen,” he said.

The report studies that incident, including the video that accompanied the interaction. The provenance of the object is still unknown, the officials said.

(b) (6)



From: [Chamberlin, Thomas S SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#)
To: (b) (6) [Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#)
Cc: [Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#)
Subject: RE: FYSA: "China military uses AI to track rapidly increasing UFOs" (SCMP)
Date: Monday, June 7, 2021 8:05:01 AM

Actually one of the more useful articles on the issue in some time.

- China is observing more UAPs and similarly perplexed.
- China has a UAP TF with a defined methodology that uses AI.
- Will prompt our seniors who read it to ask, “Are we using AI in our approach to solve UAPs?”

TC

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, June 4, 2021 7:08 PM
To: Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)
Cc: Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6); Chamberlin, Thomas S SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
Subject: FW: FYSA: "China military uses AI to track rapidly increasing UFOs" (SCMP)

FYI.

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, June 4, 2021 11:21 AM
To: (b) (6); Cummings, Matthew C
(Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA) (b) (6)
Subject: FW: FYSA: "China military uses AI to track rapidly increasing UFOs" (SCMP)

From: OSD Pentagon PA Mailbox Media Analysis (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, June 4, 2021 11:15 AM
To: OSD Pentagon PA List Press Officers (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
OSD Pentagon PA Mailbox Media Analysis
(b) (6)

Subject: FYSA: "China military uses AI to track rapidly increasing UFOs" (SCMP)

China military uses AI to track rapidly increasing UFOs
South China Morning Post | Stephen Chen

- To the People's Liberation Army they are 'unidentified air conditions' and artificial intelligence is the best way to keep up with them
- Chinese researchers confirm that sighting reports from across the country are on the rise but aliens are unlikely to be responsible

As the Pentagon prepares its report into UFOs, due later this month, Chinese military researchers have turned to artificial intelligence to track and analyse the increasing number of unknown objects in China's airspace.

To the People's Liberation Army, they are "unidentified air conditions" – a phrase which echoes the US military's "unidentified aerial phenomena" – but to the public they are better known as unidentified flying objects, or UFOs.

According to Wuhan-based researcher Chen Li from the Air Force Early Warning Academy, human analysts have been overwhelmed in recent years by the rapidly mounting sighting reports from a wide range of military and civilian sources across the country.

"The frequent occurrence of unidentified air conditions in recent years ... brings severe challenges to air defence security of our country," said Chen, in a 2019 report to a conference of senior information technology scientists in Beijing in 2019.

The PLA's task force dedicated to the unknown objects increasingly relies on AI technology to analyse its data, according to Chen's report, which is in line with several other military studies published in domestic journals, most recently in August last year.

According to Chen, one advantage of AI is that it can "think outside the box" – checking crumbs of information scattered across many data sets created at different times and locations, and drawing links unseen by human eyes – to help determine whether sightings were caused by a hostile country, amateur aviation enthusiasts, nature, or "other reasons", he said.

The question about UFOs which most captures the imagination is whether they are alien spaceships. The US military recently confirmed the authenticity of some leaked video footage captured by navy pilots, in which flying objects appear to move in a manner that cannot be explained by current technology or physical laws.

The Pentagon report – requested by Congress on these sightings and which is expected to be partially released to the public – could be the first time any military has openly discussed the topic.

UFOs are a sensitive issue for any defence force, not only because they could be related to intelligent lifeforms from space, but also, and perhaps more likely, they may be incursions by another country's military.

An intruding enemy drone or aircraft equipped with advanced interference technology, for example, could fool radar or other sensors by creating ghost images that jump around in an inexplicable manner on screen. Such incidents are usually classified for defence reasons, or to avoid embarrassment.

China's only officially confirmed UFO sighting occurred over a military airbase in Cangzhou, Hebei province, on October 19, 1998. According to a report in Hebei Daily – official newspaper of the province which neighbours Beijing – two military jets were ordered to intercept a low-flying object that appeared suddenly above the airbase.

The object looked like a “short-legged mushroom”, with two beams of light shooting down from its belly. When the jets approached, the object climbed with “ghostlike” speed to an altitude of more than 20,000 metres, before disappearing from radar and visual contact.

According to Chen and his colleagues, the PLA has a three-tier reporting system to handle unknown aerial objects. The base level, which includes military radar stations, air force pilots, police stations, weather stations, and Chinese Academy of Sciences observatories, is responsible for gathering as much raw data as possible.

The information is processed in mid-tier by the PLA's regional military command which conducts preliminary analysis and transfers the data to a national database.

With the help of AI, PLA headquarters assigns a “threat index” to each object based on its behaviour, frequency of occurrence, aerodynamic design, radioactivity, possible make and materials, along with any other information.

The AI can pull together other information which may help determine an object's purpose. For instance, if similar unknown objects have a tendency to appear during major political events or military exercises, they are considered more likely to be a man-made device deployed by another country to gather intelligence.

Nature is responsible for a significant proportion of the suspicious activity detected by the military. Ionised particles can be produced by electricity in the atmosphere, creating apparently inexplicable images on radar or other electronic sensors, for example.

Manual verification of these events usually takes time, but AI can quickly identify most natural causes by cross-checking various sources of information, such as weather satellite data, according to the military researchers.

A radar scientist based in Xian, in the northwest province of Shaanxi, said the increasing number of unknown objects in China's air space was “more likely caused by humans than aliens”.

Chinese authorities have gradually loosened control on flight activities in low altitudes over the past few years, while drones have also become relatively cheap and popular, he said.

Meanwhile, increased US military activities in the South China Sea and other sensitive waters near China could also account for the increased appearance of objects that cannot be immediately explained, said the researcher, who asked not to be named because of the sensitivity of the topic.

(b) (6)

[REDACTED]

From: (b) (6)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#)
Cc: [Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#); [Chamberlin, Thomas S SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#); (b) (6)
Subject: RE: [Non-DoD Source] Fwd: RTQ Review
Date: Thursday, June 10, 2021 10:58:05 AM

Scott,
The most recent draft response to allay concerns...

(b) (5)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

I've cc'd (b) (6) on this response so that he can pass along to (b) (6) (OSD/PAO).

V/r,
(b) (6)

[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Thursday, June 10, 2021 10:13 AM
To: Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)
Cc: Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6); Chamberlin, Thomas S SES USN ONI (USA) (b) (6)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
Subject: RE: [Non-DoD Source] Fwd: RTQ Review

Scott,
Short answer is yes. This avenue was used. Good example was outreach to the Google Loon program for questions regarding individual events. More details in the attached correspondence between (b) (6) on the draft language of the response.

V/r,

(b) (6)

[REDACTED]

From: Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)

Sent: Wednesday, June 9, 2021 8:57 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6); Chamberlin, Thomas S SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6); (b) (6)

[REDACTED]

Subject: FW: [Non-DoD Source] Fwd: RTQ Review

(b) (6) -

Please see below. Can you push details to me (on whatever system is appropriate) on Thursday morning?

Thanks,
Scott

Scott W. Bray

Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence
Director, Naval Intelligence Activity

(b) (6)

From: Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)

Date: Wednesday, Jun 09, 2021, 8:52 PM

To: (b) (6)

Subject: RE: [Non-DoD Source] Fwd: RTQ Review

(b) (6)

I'll send details tomorrow morning, but my understanding is that we have indeed worked with the ODNI's Private Sector team for some of outreach to private sector and academia.

All the best,
Scott

Scott W. Bray

Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence
Director, Naval Intelligence Activity

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Date: Wednesday, Jun 09, 2021, 8:38 PM
To: Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Fwd: RTQ Review

Scott - See below. Has this avenue been utilized in the past? VR (b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Date: Wednesday, June 9, 2021 at 8:33:40 PM
To: (b) (6)
Cc: "DNI-Media" (b) (6)
Subject: Re: RTQ Review

This makes it sound like the task force has worked with ODNI to engage with private sector and other outside actors. Has that actually been the case? I worry a bit about making that suggestion and then having to address it in the report coming out later this month. (b) (6)
— what do you think?

From: (b) (6)
Date: Wednesday, June 9, 2021 at 7:43:17 PM
To: (b) (6)
Cc: "DNI-Media" (b) (6)
Subject: Fwd: RTQ Review

(b) (6) - any concerns with the lines below DoD would like to use? No concerns from us.

Thanks!

From: (b) (6)

Date: Wednesday, June 9, 2021 at 7:25:20 PM

To: "DNI-Media" (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: RTQ Review

ODNI,

We've gotten two recently related to the DoD UAP Task Force, regarding working with the private sector, including academic and private institutions. Since our proposed response mentions an ODNI program, I wanted to run it by you, also. Let me know if you're good with this as a response:

(b) (5)

Regards,

(b) (6)

DoD Press Operations

From: (b) (6)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#); (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: CNN Story
Date: Wednesday, June 16, 2021 6:34:24 AM

FYI...

It includes discussions of today's Hill appearance.

Regards,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

"Government UFO report is the product of years of military infighting over whether to take sightings seriously" (CNN)

Government UFO report is the product of years of military infighting over whether to take sightings seriously
CNN | Katie Bo Williams and Zachary Cohen

Members of the House Intelligence Committee will receive a classified briefing on Wednesday morning on one of the most controversial topics circulating in Washington today: UFOs.

The briefing, which was confirmed to CNN by two sources familiar with the committee's plans, comes just weeks before the US intelligence community is scheduled to deliver an unclassified report on the matter for Congress. According to one committee source, Wednesday's briefing will be conducted by the Navy and FBI.

The fact that Congress is receiving briefings and the intelligence community is producing reports on what the Pentagon has labeled UAPs (Unidentified Aerial Phenomenon) is itself extraordinary. After years of Washington infighting, including bureaucratic battles within the Pentagon and pressure from certain members of Congress, the US government finally appears to be taking seriously what has for so long been considered a fringe issue.

Even as sightings of unexplainable objects rose into the hundreds, Pentagon officials wrestled with how much time and resources to devote to investigating them. Interviews with a half-dozen officials as well as documents reviewed by CNN depict a US military and intelligence community that's struggled over how to remove the issue from the world of science fiction and consider its actual national security implications.

Even now, multiple sources told CNN, the government almost certainly wouldn't have moved to produce the report without public pressure from key lawmakers, as both Republicans and Democrats have taken an interest in the matter.

While former senior defense officials with knowledge of the most recent iteration of the department's investigations say the Pentagon took it seriously, some pilots and former officials tasked with investigating the matter say senior Pentagon leaders downplayed or ignored the threat.

"Everyone who's paid enough attention to it understands they need to take it seriously," said former deputy defense secretary David Norquist, who set up a task force in 2020 to investigate UAPs. "But once you go beyond that circle, you get people who don't want to be assumed to have tinfoil hats."

For most serious people inside the Pentagon studying the strange incidents, the former officials said, the investigation is not about proving whether or not aliens are visiting Earth and buzzing Navy pilots. Rather, it's about trying to understand what is behind these otherwise unexplainable encounters in US airspace. In particular, some officials are concerned that they might be some kind of next-gen technology deployed by China or Russia.

"If [these objects] had the flag of Russia on the side, we wouldn't be having this conversation," Norquist said. "Every one of these would be reported; everyone would be on top of it."

The report, which is due to Congress in late June, isn't likely to resolve the debate -- nor is it expected to provide the kind of juicy details UFO-ologists hoped for, like confirming that strange sightings by American Navy pilots were alien spacecraft. One administration official noted that many of the incidents in the Pentagon's database of encounters will likely turn out to have multiple causes -- a strange weather anomaly combined with a weather balloon sighting on the horizon, for example. But some could eventually turn out to be adversaries operating in US airspace, that person said.

For that reason alone, officials are likely to be reluctant to offer too many details of what they've seen in the upcoming report: If any of these incidents are Russia or China or another nation state, the US won't want to show what they know for counterintelligence reasons.

Proof that the US government has made contact with extraterrestrial life -- what UFO-ologists call "the Disclosure" -- will have to wait for another day.

Growing pressure on the Pentagon

The US government has sporadically examined the phenomenon for decades. One iteration began in 2007 when the Defense Department began running an investigation known as the "Advanced Aviation Threat Identification Program." The program was officially shut down in 2012 -- although a former head of the division claims that its work continued part-time at least into 2017.

That same year, the Pentagon confirmed the legitimacy of a Navy video of a 2004 encounter that took off the coast of San Diego, sparking considerable national attention. In the video, two Navy F-18 fighter jet pilots from the aircraft carrier Nimitz chase a white oval object the size

of a commercial plane.

The release of several additional videos in 2018 and 2020, along with consistent advocacy from a small group of former defense officials and several lawmakers who received numerous briefings on the topic -- most notably former Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid -- contributed to "years of build-up around the UFO issue," a congressional aide said.

Luis Elizondo, the former head of the Advanced Aviation Threat Identification Program, resigned in 2017 out of frustration that senior defense leaders weren't taking the issue seriously enough. He argues that skeptical Pentagon leaders ignored the threat, misled the public and damaged his career, according to documents reviewed by CNN, including a complaint Elizondo filed with the Defense Department's Inspector General.

Separately, internal DoD emails, reviewed by CNN, suggest that as recently as last summer, Pentagon officials resisted any attempt to inform the public about UAPs and even issued guidance instructing press officers to "make no comment" when approached with any inquiries related to the issue.

The concern, according to an email from July 2020, was that the "nuances of all this are such that any deviation from the statements DoD makes results in multiple news stories and additional FOIA requests at various levels."

Erasing the stigma

In August 2020, Norquist publicly announced the formation of a task force to study the matter. The goal, he said, was in part to remove the stigma of pilots talking about strange things they saw. Officials wanted to "start educating our pilots and get them to the point where they understand this is credible enough [that] we really need you to report this and you shouldn't be afraid that you're going to get grief from the department because you said this."

At that point, the former official said, the small task force working the issue understood that the data surrounding these encounters -- including radar and other technical information that theoretically couldn't be spoofed or attributed to pilot misperception -- pointed to a real event.

"You sort of had to get the ritual joke out of the way," Norquist said. "But everyone who dealt with it, when they saw the information understood, it is sufficiently credible [and] we need to find out why."

Erasing the stigma surrounding a serious discussion of UFOs was also the goal for lawmakers in 2020 when they passed legislation requiring the Pentagon and intelligence community to provide more information about these UFO encounters, details that have, until recently, largely remained shrouded in secrecy.

"Everyone recognizes when you start talking about this, it's way too easy for it to get weird," said Norquist. "And yet, if there had never been a discussion in the United States about UFOs, we'd want to be all over this."

An inspector general complaint

Restoring some credibility to discussions about UFOs will be a challenge even after the report is submitted to Congress. Elizondo believes his career was derailed because of his enthusiasm

for the program focused on dealing with such encounters.

Others think it's because officials like Elizondo leaned too far into the tantalizing possibility that the objects were from another world, tainting the effort with sci-fi undertones.

"It does not surprise me that somebody could work on this program and come away with that as a possibility and then become frustrated that others aren't pursuing this with the same vigor as other programs that the defense department works on," Norquist said.

In the full version of his inspector general complaint, which was reviewed by CNN, Elizondo says that senior officials dismissed his work on UFOs and he accuses some of actively trying to discredit and undermine him inside the Pentagon and with members of the media.

In his complaint, Elizondo recounts a particularly heated exchange in October 2017, shortly after he submitted his resignation letter, during which a senior DoD official threatened to "tell people you are crazy," noting it could impact his security clearance.

The next month, Elizondo claims he was told that the senior-level official was "coming after (him)," at which time he said he decided to hire legal counsel. CNN's Barbara Starr and Jeremy Herb contributed to this report.

From: (b) (6)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#)
Subject: FW: FYSA: "UFOs could threaten US security, pols say after Capitol Hill briefing" (New York Post)
Date: Thursday, June 17, 2021 12:25:20 PM

PAO comment on NYP article.

V/r,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Wednesday, June 16, 2021 6:09 PM
To: (b) (6)
(b) (6) Cummings, Matthew C
(Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA) (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: FW: FYSA: "UFOs could threaten US security, pols say after Capitol Hill briefing" (New York Post)

Well, that appears to have gone reasonably well. Note how they echo our main talking point on safety and security.

From: OSD Pentagon PA Mailbox Media Analysis (b) (6)
Sent: Wednesday, June 16, 2021 6:02 PM
To: (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6); OSD Pentagon PA Mailbox Media Analysis
(b) (6)
Subject: FYSA: "UFOs could threaten US security, pols say after Capitol Hill briefing" (New York Post)

UFOs could threaten US security, pols say after Capitol Hill briefing
Members of the House Intelligence Committee received a hush-hush sneak preview inside a SCIF, or "sensitive compartmented information facility."
New York Post | Juliegrace Brufke and Aaron Feis

Just in time for Independence Day.

Capitol Hill lawmakers said Wednesday that UFOs could pose a pressing threat to America's national security, as the pols emerged from a highly classified briefing with Navy and FBI officials on the

unexplained phenomena.

Ahead of the release of a highly anticipated Pentagon report on unidentified flying objects before month's end, members of the House Intelligence Committee received a hush-hush sneak preview inside a SCIF, or "sensitive compartmented information facility."

As for the existence of extraterrestrial life, the lawmakers largely left the secrets inside the surveillance-proof room, declining to tell reporters what they learned.

But some did voice concerns that the UFOs — which may be espionage assets controlled by America's foreign adversaries, in a possible explanation just slightly less terrifying than the vanguard of an alien invasion — could pose a danger to national security.

"We take the issue of unexplained aerial phenomena seriously to the extent that we're dealing with the safety and security of US military personnel or the national security interests of the United States, so we want to know what we're dealing with," said Rep. Sean Patrick Maloney (D-NY).

"I think it's important to understand that there are legitimate questions involving the safety and security of our personnel, and in our operations and in our sensitive activities, and we all know that there's [a] proliferation of technologies out there," he continued. "We need to understand the space a little bit better."

Added Rep. Val Demings (D-Fla.), "You know it's always about our safety and security — our national security is [priority] number one — and so that's really the area where we really focused on this morning."

Rep. Adam Schiff (D-Calif.), the committee chairman, implied that the briefing was eye-opening, but also declined to get into specifics ahead of the release of a public report.

"It was an interesting briefing," he said. "I did learn things that were certainly new to me. But I think I'm going to leave it at that."

Rep. Andre Carson (R-Ill.), who has been heading efforts on the UFO inquiry, said Americans should expect an eventual public hearing on the report's findings.

"We're looking forward to having a public hearing at some point," he said. "I mean, there's some national security concerns that we want to take into consideration."

Rep. Mike Quigley (D-Ill.) said that, if anything, the landmark report shows that UFOs are finally being taken seriously.

"The stigma is gone," he said. "Now that's as big a change in policy as I've witnessed about this issue in my lifetime. So the fact that they are taking this sort of thing seriously for the first time, I think, is important."

Referencing the 1997 sci-fi flick "Contact" — adapted from a Carl Sagan novel — Quigley admitted that the report won't have all the answers and that some things remain unexplainable.

"What do they say in 'Contact'? Occam's razor," he said. "I still think that's what's real, and there are things we can't explain."

But with so many mysteries of the universe still beyond human understanding, Quigley cautioned Americans against getting their hopes up for the report.

"If I had to predict how the public will react to this, one word would be 'disappointing,'" he said.

Added a clearly unimpressed Rep. Peter Welch (D-Vt.), "I'm not on the edge of my seat."

(b) (6)



From: [Cummings, Matthew C \(Matt\) SES OSD OUSD INTEL \(USA\)](#)
To: (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6); [Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#); [Simpson, Daniel L \(D-Day\) Maj Gen USAF AF A2-6 \(USA\)](#); [Cantrell, Steven A SES USAF SAF/MG \(USA\)](#); [Kozik, David A SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC \(USA\)](#); (b) (6)
Subject: RE: [Meeting Announcement] UAP Update -- Wednesday, 23 June, 0930-1015; 3E928
Date: Monday, June 21, 2021 2:38:29 PM

(b) (6),

I will send you the latest classified draft of the paper on JWICS along with a few notes. Recommend your office reach out to Navy (Scott Bray) and MG Simpson, requesting their presence for a discussion, along with either Mr. Kirby (PAO) or his lead PAO for this (b) (6). I have cc'd the appropriate offices on this note as a heads up, but they'll need proper invites from you.

Thanks!

Matt

Matthew C. Cummings, DISL

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, June 21, 2021 1:55 PM
To: Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: RE: [Meeting Announcement] UAP Update -- Wednesday, 23 June, 0930-1015; 3E928

Hi Matt,

Very helpful update.

DSD's intent is the more immediate aspect:

1. Understand what is in the report that will go to Congress in advance of SD review
2. Ensure DOD is prepared for coordinated media response – PA, LA looped in

Given these objectives I recommend a fusion of option 2&3 with the draft submission as part of RAH. Do you believe this is possible for Wednesday?

If DSD has specific questions for DNI they can also be addressed during the afternoon trip.

Best,

(b) (6)

[REDACTED]

From: Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)

(b) (6)

Sent: Monday, June 21, 2021 12:28 PM

To: (b) (6)

[REDACTED]

Cc: (b) (6)

[REDACTED]

Subject: RE: [Meeting Announcement] UAP Update -- Wednesday, 23 June, 0930-1015; 3E928

(b) (6)

Here is where we are at:

ODNI has still not identified a briefer for Wednesday, and ODNI staff have speculated that DNI Haines may want to discuss the topic with DSD during the time on Wednesday. I am still trying to nail this down with the ODNI staff.

(b) (6), (b) (5)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

(b) (6), (b) (5)

Please let me know if you have any thoughts or direction.

Thanks!

Matt

Matthew C. Cummings, DISL

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Monday, June 21, 2021 10:35 AM

To: (b) (6)

Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)

(b) (6)

Cc: SD - Meetings (b) (6); SD - Protocol (b) (6); SD - DepSecDef SAs & MAS (b) (6); SD - DSD Read ahead (b) (6); SD - ESC VTC

(b) (6)

Subject: RE: [Meeting Announcement] UAP Update -- Wednesday, 23 June, 0930-1015; 3E928

Thank you (b) (6).

That works for DSD office.

Mr. Cummings is confirming whether ODNI will be prepared to brief and will confirm by COB.

Best,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)
(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Monday, June 21, 2021 9:48 AM

To: (b) (6)

(b) (6)
(b) (6)

Cc: SD - Meetings (b) (6); SD - Protocol (b) (6); SD - DepSecDef SAs & MAs (b) (6); SD - DSD Read ahead (b) (6); SD - ESC VTC (b) (6)
(b) (6)

Subject: RE: [Meeting Announcement] UAP Update -- Wednesday, 23 June, 0930-1015; 3E928

Happy Monday All!

I&S would like to RSVP Mr. Dave Taylor, PTDO DUSD(I&S) and Mr. Matt Cummings as the briefer. Mr. Cummings' is the Deputy Director, Technical Collection and serves as our SME.

Thank you,

(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
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(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Wednesday, June 16, 2021 5:45 PM

To: (b) (6)

(b) (6)
(b) (6) OSD Pentagon
OUSD Intel - Sec List Front Office (b) (6)

Cc: SD - Meetings (b) (6); SD - Protocol (b) (6); SD - DepSecDef SAs & MAs (b) (6); SD - DSD Read ahead (b) (6); SD - ESC VTC (b) (6)

Subject: RE: [Meeting Announcement] UAP Update -- Wednesday, 23 June, 0930-1015; 3E928

Hi I&S team,

Can you please share with the appropriate DNI POCs? We do not have an unclass distro. Thank you.

Best,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Wednesday, June 16, 2021 5:00 PM
To: (b) (6); OSD
Pentagon OUSD Intel - Sec List Front Office (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Cc: SD - Meetings (b) (6); SD - Protocol (b) (6); SD - DepSecDef SAs & MAs (b) (6); SD - DSD Read ahead (b) (6); SD - ESC VTC (b) (6)
Subject: [Meeting Announcement] UAP Update -- Wednesday, 23 June, 0930-1015; 3E928

Good afternoon,

Please see the subject schedule request below and **confirm your Principal's participation – RSVP to:** (b) (6).

Subject: UAP Brief

Date: Wednesday, 23 June

Time: 0930-1015

Location: 3E928 | DSD Conference Room

DSD Team Lead: (b) (6)

Read Ahead Responsibility: I&S

Read Ahead materials due 48-hours prior – send to: (b) (6)

Slide Projection: Slides must be hard copy.

Attendees:

- DSD
- DSD SMA
- DSD COS
- DSD SA, Jack Murren
- I&S Representative
- DNI Briefing Team

If your Principal requests to bring additional staff, please provide their names and titles for approval prior to the meeting.

Respectfully,

(b) (6)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

From: (b) (6)
To: (b) (6); Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA); (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6); Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA); Simpson, Daniel L (D-Day) Maj Gen USAF AF A2-6 (USA); Cantrell, Steven A SES USAF SAF/MG (USA); Kozik, David A SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA); Katz, Brian P CIV (USA); Heier, Rachel M CIV OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA)
Subject: RE: [Meeting Announcement] UAP Update -- Wednesday, 23 June, 0930-1015; 3E928
Date: Tuesday, June 22, 2021 9:25:01 AM

FYSA, I discussed with Mr. Kirby, and he intends to be the one attending this meeting.

Regards,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, June 22, 2021 8:43 AM
To: (b) (6); Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA); (b) (6); >; SD - Meetings (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6); Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA); Simpson, Daniel L (D-Day) Maj Gen USAF AF A2-6 (USA); Cantrell, Steven A SES USAF SAF/MG (USA); Kozik, David A SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA); (b) (6)
Subject: RE: [Meeting Announcement] UAP Update -- Wednesday, 23 June, 0930-1015; 3E928

+ SD – Meetings

That would be great. Thank you. Please see addition below.

Attendees:

- DSD
- DSD SMA, Gen Wortman
- DSD COS, Dr. Plumb
- DSD SA, Jack Murren
- I&S Representative (Mr. Dave Taylor, PTDO DUSD(I&S) and Mr. Matt Cummings)
- PA Representative (Mr. John Kirby or (b) (6))
- LA Representative (Mr. Kozik, Director, OUSD(I&S) Congressional Activities)
- ODNI National Intelligence Manager for Aviation MG Daniel Simpson
- Deputy Director Scott Bray

Senior Intelligence Advisor (b) (6)

Best,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Sent: Monday, June 21, 2021 9:09 PM

To: (b) (6)

(b) (6); Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)

(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

(b) (6)
(b) (6) Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA)

(b) (6)
(b) (6) Cantrell, Steven A SES USAF SAF/MG (USA)

(b) (6) Kozik, David A SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA)

(b) (6)
(b) (6)

Subject: RE: [Meeting Announcement] UAP Update -- Wednesday, 23 June, 0930-1015; 3E928

(b) (6)

Dave Kozik and I spoke about this meeting at the end of the day today. While I don't want to sign him up for any meetings, I believe he intends to join.

R,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Monday, June 21, 2021 7:54 PM

To: (b) (6); Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA) (b) (6); (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA)

Cantrell, Steven A SES USAF SAF/MG (USA)

>; Kozik, David A SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA)

Subject: RE: [Meeting Announcement] UAP Update -- Wednesday, 23 June, 0930-1015; 3E928

Respectfully, LA appears to be missing. If DEPSECDEF's intent is to ensure that PA and LA are both looped in, then recommend that Mr. Kozik, as Director, OUSD(I&S) Congressional Activities, & Chief, OASD(LA) Intel Team, participates.

Regards,

(b) (6)
Defense Press Operations, OSD(PA)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Monday, June 21, 2021 6:45 PM

To: Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)

Cc: (b) (6)

Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA)

Cantrell, Steven A SES USAF SAF/MG (USA)

; Kozik, David A SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA)

Subject: RE: [Meeting Announcement] UAP Update -- Wednesday, 23 June, 0930-1015; 3E928

Thank you very much Matt.

Does this look right? Normally we would just identify offices not specific individuals on the attendee

list. Components/Services should feel free to substitute as you see fit.

Attendees:

- DSD
- DSD SMA, Gen Wortman
- DSD COS, (b) (6)
- DSD SA, (b) (6)
- I&S Representative
- PA Representative (Mr. John Kirby or (b) (6))
- ODNI National Intelligence Manager for Aviation MG Daniel Simpson
- Deputy Director Scott Bray
- Senior Intelligence Advisor (b) (6)

Thank you very much for sharing the draft paper. It is very helpful context, including the still deliberative comments. Please include in final RAH also.

Best,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

From: Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)

(b) (6)

Sent: Monday, June 21, 2021 2:38 PM

To: (b) (6)

(b) (6)
(b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

(b) (6)
(b) (6)

(b) (6) Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA)

(b) (6); Simpson, Daniel L (D-Day) Maj Gen USAF AF A2-6 (USA)

(b) (6); Cantrell, Steven A SES USAF SAF/MG (USA)

(b) (6); Kozik, David A SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA)

(b) (6)
(b) (6)

Subject: RE: [Meeting Announcement] UAP Update -- Wednesday, 23 June, 0930-1015; 3E928

(b) (6),

I will send you the latest classified draft of the paper on JWICS along with a few notes. Recommend

your office reach out to Navy (Scott Bray) and MG Simpson, requesting their presence for a discussion, along with either Mr. Kirby (PAO) or his lead PAO for this (b) (6). I have cc'd the appropriate offices on this note as a heads up, but they'll need proper invites from you.

Thanks!

Matt

Matthew C. Cummings, DISL

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Monday, June 21, 2021 1:55 PM

To: Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)

(b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: RE: [Meeting Announcement] UAP Update -- Wednesday, 23 June, 0930-1015; 3E928

Hi Matt,

Very helpful update.

DSD's intent is the more immediate aspect:

1. Understand what is in the report that will go to Congress in advance of SD review
2. Ensure DOD is prepared for coordinated media response – PA, LA looped in

(b) (5)

If DSD has specific questions for DNI they can also be addressed during the afternoon trip.

Best,

(b) (6)

From: Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)

(b) (6)

Sent: Monday, June 21, 2021 12:28 PM

To: (b) (6)

[Redacted]

Cc: (b) (6)

[Redacted]

Subject: RE: [Meeting Announcement] UAP Update -- Wednesday, 23 June, 0930-1015; 3E928

(b) (6),

Here is where we are at:

(b) (5)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

- [Redacted]

- [Redacted]

- [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Please let me know if you have any thoughts or direction.

Thanks!

Matt

Matthew C. Cummings, DISL

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Monday, June 21, 2021 10:35 AM

To: (b) (6)

(b) (6); Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)

(b) (6)

Cc: SD - Meetings (b) (6); SD - Protocol (b) (6); SD - DepSecDef SAs & MAs (b) (6); SD - DSD Read ahead (b) (6); SD - ESC VTC

(b) (6)

Subject: RE: [Meeting Announcement] UAP Update -- Wednesday, 23 June, 0930-1015; 3E928

Thank you (b) (6).

That works for DSD office.

Mr. Cummings is confirming whether ODNI will be prepared to brief and will confirm by COB.

Best,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Monday, June 21, 2021 9:48 AM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: SD - Meetings (b) (6); SD - Protocol (b) (6); SD - DepSecDef SAs & MAs (b) (6); SD - DSD Read ahead (b) (6); SD - ESC VTC

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

Subject: RE: [Meeting Announcement] UAP Update -- Wednesday, 23 June, 0930-1015; 3E928

Happy Monday All!

I&S would like to RSVP (b) (6), PTDO DUSD(I&S) and Mr. Matt Cummings as the briefer. Mr. Cummings' is the Deputy Director, Technical Collection and serves as our SME.

Thank you,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Wednesday, June 16, 2021 5:45 PM

To: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6) OSD Pentagon

OUSD Intel - Sec List Front Office (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Cc: SD - Meetings (b) (6); SD - Protocol (b) (6); SD - DepSecDef SAs & MAs (b) (6); SD - DSD Read ahead (b) (6); SD - ESC VTC

(b) (6)

Subject: RE: [Meeting Announcement] UAP Update -- Wednesday, 23 June, 0930-1015; 3E928

Hi I&S team,

Can you please share with the appropriate DNI POCs? We do not have an unclass distro. Thank you.

Best,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Wednesday, June 16, 2021 5:00 PM
To: (b) (6)
(b) (6) OSD
Pentagon OUSD Intel - Sec List Front Office (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Cc: SD - Meetings (b) (6); SD - Protocol (b) (6); SD - DepSecDef SAs & MAS (b) (6); SD - DSD Read ahead (b) (6); SD - ESC VTC (b) (6)
Subject: [Meeting Announcement] UAP Update -- Wednesday, 23 June, 0930-1015; 3E928

Good afternoon,

Please see the subject schedule request below and **confirm your Principal's participation – RSVP to:** (b) (6).

Subject: UAP Brief

Date: Wednesday, 23 June

Time: 0930-1015

Location: 3E928 | DSD Conference Room

DSD Team Lead: (b) (6)

Read Ahead Responsibility: I&S

Read Ahead materials due 48-hours prior – send to: (b) (6)

Slide Projection: Slides must be hard copy.

Attendees:

- DSD
- DSD SMA
- DSD COS
- DSD SA, (b) (6)
- I&S Representative
- DNI Briefing Team

If your Principal requests to bring additional staff, please provide their names and titles for approval prior to the meeting.

Respectfully,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
To: (b) (6); [OSD Pentagon](#)
[USCIB Intel - Sec List Front Office](#); (b) (6)
[Bray, Scott W SES](#)
[USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#); [Simpson, Daniel L \(D-Day\) Maj Gen USAF AF A2-6 \(USA\)](#); (b) (6)
Cc: [SD - Meetings](#); [SD - Protocol](#); [SD - DepSecDef SAs & MAs](#); [SD - DSD Read ahead](#); [SD - ESC VTC](#)
Subject: Attendee UPDATE: [Meeting Announcement] UAP Update -- Wednesday, 23 June, 0930-1015; 3E928
Date: Tuesday, June 22, 2021 10:18:21 AM

Good morning,

Please see the subject schedule request below and **confirm your Principal's participation – RSVP to: (b) (6)**.

Subject: UAP Brief

Date: Wednesday, 23 June

Time: 0930-1015

Location: 3E928 | DSD Conference Room

DSD Team Lead: (b) (6)

Read Ahead Responsibility: I&S

Read Ahead materials due 48-hours prior – send to: (b) (6)

Slide Projection: Slides must be hard copy.

Attendees:

- DSD
- DSD SMA
- DSD COS
- DSD SA, (b) (6)
- I&S Representative
- ~~ONI Briefing Team~~
- [ATSD PA \(Mr. John Kirby\)](#)
- [LA Representative \(Mr. Kozik, Director, OUSD\(I&S\) Congressional Activities\)](#)
- [MG Daniel Simpson, ODNI National Intelligence Manager for Aviation](#)
- [Scott Bray, Deputy Director](#)
- (b) (6), [Senior Intelligence Advisor](#)

If your Principal requests to bring additional staff, please provide their names and titles for approval prior to the meeting.

Respectfully,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
To: (b) (6); Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA); (b) (6)
Cummins, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA); (b) (6)
Subject: RE: UAP Brief coord
Date: Tuesday, June 22, 2021 10:53:34 AM

Scott – thanks for the call. You’re all cleared by Secret Service.

See you shortly.

Cheers,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, June 22, 2021 10:16 AM
To: (b) (6); Bray, Scott W
SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)
(b) (6); Cummins, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: FW: UAP Brief coord

(b) (6) – I’m not showing Scott in WAVES. Request you re-submit ASAP.

<https://events.whitehouse.gov/AppointmentRsvpForm?rid=XP69BO3O6G>

Cheers,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, June 22, 2021 10:13 AM
To: (b) (6)
Subject: FW: UAP Brief coord

(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

(b) (6)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Tuesday, June 22, 2021 9:56 AM

To: (b) (6)

Subject: [WARNING: UNSCANNABLE EXTRACTION FAILED]RE: UAP Brief coord

(b) (6),

Scott is planning to attend and his WAVES submission was taken care of yesterday.

See you soon!

V/r,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Tuesday, June 22, 2021 7:24 AM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

[REDACTED]

Subject: Re: UAP Brief coord

Good morning Scott,

Just following up on (b) (6) email, should we expect you over for the brief today?

If so, kindly request the WAVES submission soonest.

Thank you!

V/R

(b) (6)

Sent from my iPhone

(b) (6)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

On Jun 21, 2021, at 9:43 AM, (b) (6) wrote:

Scott - are you still planning to attend? If so, please submit your WAVES per below ASAP.

Matt, (b) (6), and Gen Simpson have all been cleared by USSS.

Cheers,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Thursday, June 17, 2021 9:44 AM
To: CANTRELL, STEVEN A SES USAF HAF AF/A2/6N (b) (6)
(b) (6) Cummings, Matthew C
(Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA) (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6 (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: RE: UAP Brief coord

In reference to your meeting at the White House on Tuesday, Jun 22 from 1130-1230, please see the following for WH Access. Please have all attendees submit their information **NLT Friday, 18 Jun, COB** per the following:

- 1) Register via WAVES for access to the White House Complex at:
<https://events.whitehouse.gov/AppointmentRsvpForm?rid=XP69BQ3Q6G>
- 2) You must accurately enter your full name, DOB, and SSN. Note, this is the MOST important step as Secret Service will not let you into the complex without clearance for this event and an accurate DOB and SSN on file. Your entry window will be good for +/- 1 hour from your appointment time. You must bring a government issued photo ID for entry. (Even if you have visited the WH before, you need to still register for this event per the exact link above.)

- 3) Enter the White House Complex at the 17 Street Visitors Center and Southwest Screening Facility. Show your ID at the Visitors Center and receive a temporary badge. Once cleared by the Secret Service at the subsequent screening facility, make your way into the EEOB and proceed to Room 374 (SMS Exec). Give yourself 10-15 minutes to process through Secret Service. Entrance map is attached.
- 4) When you enter room 374, reference "UAP Brief." Please store phones and electronic devices outside the room – lock boxes are available.

Standing by for questions/concerns.

Cheers,

(b) (6)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

From: CANTRELL, STEVEN A SES USAF HAF AF/A2/6N (b) (6)
Sent: Thursday, June 17, 2021 9:27 AM
To: (b) (6) Cummings,
Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA) (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
[REDACTED]
Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I (b) (6)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
Subject: RE: UAP Brief coord

Gentlemen,

Please include Gen Simpson's new exec, (b) (6) (cc line above) concerning the visit, to include requirements.

Cheers

Steve

Steven A. Cantrell, SES
Director,
National Aviation Intelligence Integration Office (NAI2O) A2/6N
Deputy National Intelligence Manager for Aviation

(b) (6)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Thursday, June 17, 2021 8:40 AM
To: Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)

(b) (6)

Cc: CANTRELL, STEVEN A SES USAF HAF AF/A2/6N (b) (6)

Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6 (b) (6)

Subject: Re: UAP Brief coord

Perfect will do today - thanks Matt!

V/R

(b) (6)

Sent from my iPhone

(b) (6)

On Jun 17, 2021, at 8:38 AM, Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA) (b) (6) wrote:

(b) (6),

Looks like it will be me, Scott Bray, (b) (6) and MG Daniel Simpson (ODMI NIM Aviation).

Please send us the waves link and we'll get squared away on our end.

Thanks!

Matt

From: (b) (6)

Date: Wednesday, June 16, 2021 at 1:26:35 PM
To: "Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)"
(b) (6)
Cc: "Cantrell, Steven A SES USAF SAF/MG (USA)"
(b) (6)
"Bray, Scott
W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I" (b) (6)
Subject: RE: UAP Brief coord

Great, thank you Matt! Will stand by.

V/R

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

From: Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)
(b) (6)
Sent: Wednesday, June 16, 2021 1:08 PM
To: (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Cc: Cantrell, Steven A SES USAF SAF/MG (USA)
(b) (6)
(b) (6) Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6,
N2N6I (b) (6)
Subject: RE: UAP Brief coord

(b) (6),

I can certainly be available. I need to coordinate with Navy and ODNI/NIM Aviation to see if they can support as well. We'll try to get you an answer back today!

Thanks,

Matt

Matthew C. Cummings, DISL

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Wednesday, June 16, 2021 10:01 AM

To: Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)

(b) (6)

Subject: UAP Brief coord

Matt,

Good morning – hope all is well on your end.

I sent you a high-side email yesterday but following up here as well to see if you and the team could make an in-person brief next Tuesday 22 June from 1130-1230, to Senior Directors of Intel, Defense, and the OVP Dep Nat Sec Advisor?

I'll be in today if you have time to talk more, but would like to lock this in if you and the team are available.

Thank you!

V/R

(b) (6)

[Redacted signature block]

From: (b) (6)
To: (b) (6) [Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: Introduction
Date: Thursday, June 24, 2021 4:37:38 PM

Mr. Bray –

As we discussed, I wanted to introduce you to (b) (6) from OSI PJ. He has supported the DAF Rapid Capabilities Office for many years and some of the radar folks mentioned they would be interested in reviewing some of your data and seeing if they could help in any way.

(b) (6) –

Mr. Bray is the Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence; however, is currently leading the UAP “Task Force”. I mentioned to him the RCO’s interest in reviewing some of the data so wanted you to meet Mr. Bray.

Additionally, Maj Gen Caine is asking (b) (6) to detail someone to assist in supporting as a filter mechanism for the “Task Force”. I’ve passed that request to (b) (6); however, more details on another net.

Thanks,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#); (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] FW: UAP Report timeline and documents
Date: Thursday, June 24, 2021 7:34:19 PM
Attachments: [UAP Talking Points.docx](#)
[23-21-ODNI Releases Preliminary Assessment on Unidentified Aerial Phenomena.docx](#)

General Kruse/Scott – FYI below and attached.

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Thursday, June 24, 2021 7:09 PM
To: (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: UAP Report timeline and documents

(b) (6) –

We will move our time of submission to the Hill to 2:30. So here is the rundown:

2:30 – ODNI sends report to the Hill
3:30 – ODNI issues “Fact of Submission to Congress” press release
4 – ODNI posts report
4:15/4:30 – DOD issues press release

I am attaching our talking points document. Also, I am attaching our press release, which hasn’t been cleared yet, but I don’t anticipate major changes.

Thanks,

(b) (6)

[Redacted signature block]

From: (b) (6)
To: (b) (6); Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: [Non-DoD Source] RE: Deep Backgrounders/UAP Report Rollout
Date: Friday, June 25, 2021 8:04:38 AM

If the last time you received a copy was after @5pm last night, then yes. I'm just looking to see if there's an updated version that incorporates some of the edits/comments from the coordination that was done yesterday, even if it's not the final, final. Just let me know, and I'll grab it off the other system before our 0900.

Regards,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, June 25, 2021 7:06 AM
To: (b) (6); 'Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA)'
(b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] RE: Deep Backgrounders/UAP Report Rollout

All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.

We don't have the final, final version yet. Do you want us to send you the last version we received? Happy to do so, but it will be on the other system.

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, June 25, 2021 5:44 AM
To: (b) (6); 'Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA)' (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: Re: Deep Backgrounders/UAP Report Rollout

Good morning, (b) (6)
It would be very helpful if we could have the latest version of the unclassified report by the time we start prep, if possible.

Regards,



Sent with my iPhone

From: (b) (6)
Date: Thursday, June 24, 2021 at 10:08:21 PM
To: (b) (6) "Bray,
Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA)" (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Deep Backgrounders/UAP Report Rollout

TICK TOCK: UAP REPORT ROLLOUT

9:00-11:00 a.m.—Final Prep and Press Deep Backgrounders
2:30 p.m. —ODNI sends report to the Hill
3:30 p.m.—ODNI issues “Fact of Submission to Congress” press release
4:00 p.m. —ODNI posts report
4:15/4:30 —DOD issues press release

DEEP BACKGROUNDER SCHEDULE

Dial In Number

1-866-823-7118, Code: 6360580#

9:00-9:25 a.m.

Final Prep

9:25 a.m. *Ready the conference line for incoming media calls*

9:30-10:00 a.m. Deep Backgrounder #1

New York Times—Julian Barnes
Wall Street Journal—Brett Forrest
Washington Post—Shane Harris
Associated Press—Nomaan Merchant
Reuters—Steve Gorman

10:00-10:25 a.m.

BREAK

10:25 a.m. *Ready the conference line for incoming media calls*

10:30-11:00 a.m.

ABC—Luis Martinez

CBS—David Martin, Nicole Sganga

CNN—Katie Bo Williams

NBC—Courtney Kube

Politico (*pending*)

From: (b) (6)
To: Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA); (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Kruse final
Date: Friday, June 25, 2021 9:11:58 AM
Attachments: [GenKruseFinal.docx](#)

See attached

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
To: (b) (6); [Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#)
Subject: RE: UAPTF Follow-on tasking memo
Date: Friday, June 25, 2021 11:40:46 AM

That should be 'SD concurs.'

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, June 25, 2021 11:38 AM
To: (b) (6)
(b) (6) 'Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA)' (b) (6)
Subject: FW: UAPTF Follow-on tasking memo
Importance: High

DSD has signed the memo! I've also been told that SD approved on the reports.

Regards,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, June 25, 2021 10:40 AM
To: Kozik, David A SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA) (b) (6)
(b) (6) Tipton, Neill T SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA) (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
(b) (6) Schugar, Carolyn K SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)
(b) (6); Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)
(b) (6)
Subject: UAPTF Follow-on tasking memo

Neill, Carolyn, DK, Sue,

Please see attached signed memo from DSD directing us to deliver a plan for formalizing the UAPTF mission

v/r

(b) (6)

(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Friday, June 25, 2021 10:27 AM

To: Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)

(b) (6)

Subject: FW: UAP

Gents,

Signed copy attached. We distro'd a copy to OSD PA.

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Friday, June 25, 2021 9:29 AM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: RE: UAP

(b) (6),

Memo has been signed and sent to Exec Sec so you should see it formally shortly.

Best,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Friday, June 25, 2021 8:13 AM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: RE: UAP

Will do. Thank you (b) (6). It is in for review now.

Best,

(b) (6)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Friday, June 25, 2021 8:07 AM

To: (b) (6)

Subject: UAP

Good morning, (b) (6)! Can you keep me posted on the memo DSD is reviewing today on UAP way ahead? Mr. Kirby is out of the office so just want to make sure our team has the latest as we work products for the rollout. Thanks!

(b) (6)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

From: (b) (6)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#)
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] FW: REVIEW REQUESTED---New York Times Lines from Backgrounder
Date: Friday, June 25, 2021 12:49:37 PM

#2

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, June 25, 2021 12:20 PM
To: (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: REVIEW REQUESTED---New York Times Lines from Backgrounder

Sir,

Request your review for clearance at soonest.

Julian Barnes
New York Times

I would like to attribute the following material to a senior government official or officials. The NYT does not use quoted material from unnamed officials so these are not direct quotes. This will be most useful for our embargoed story so the earlier you might sign off the better!

It was not the purpose of the government's UAP task force to conduct any sort of search for extraterrestrial life, said a senior government official.

That responsibility falls to NASA, the official added.

A senior government official said there were no plans to try and communicate with the UAPs, the military and intelligence communities were focused on making observations of the phenomenon.

Senior government officials said there was no evidence that leads the task force to any of what they call exotic explanations.

A Senior government official said they don't have "any clear indications" that the UAP are part of a foreign intelligence collection program or "a major technological advancement by a potential adversary"

They are unable to confirm that any of the unexplained incidents are part of a U.S. government or defense industry program, a senior official said.

A senior government official said of the 144 reports, 21 of them covering 18 different

incidents, appear to show advanced propulsion or advanced technology. Those incidents show something either moving with no observed propulsion or demonstrating a rate of speed beyond what the U.S. estimates other global powers have developed.

The three Navy videos that have been released remained unexplained, a senior government official said. Analysts have looked closely at the cameras and sensors that recorded the phenomenon to understand what was recorded and how the data was processed, to understand if the sensor is misleading in some way, a senior government official said. The government continues to look at that closely, but there are no clear explanations for the videos they have released, the official said.

The data on those incidents is brief. Additional research could show all of those incidents to be examples of normal propulsion, according to a senior government official.

The relatively small number of incidents, and limited data on each, means the data set is too small, with more data better pattern analysis can be done, said a senior government official.

In addition to new reports, the task force is hoping to look at historical data collected by radar to find other similar incidents, a senior government official said

The government intends to update congress within 90 days on further efforts to categorize or explain the incidents and develop an improved collection strategy, senior government officials said.

The ODNI and the Department of Defense are developing a more robust collection strategy as well as considering research and development programs that could improve data collection, the officials said.

The government wants to expand and standardize the data that is collected on UAP events, and potentially invest in additional collection technology, a senior government official said.

Senior government officials said the task force looked at 144 reports of aerial phenomenon from between 2004 and 2021. All but one of those events remains unexplained, senior officials said.

Regards,

(b) (6)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(b) (6) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

From: (b) (6)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#)
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] FW: REQUEST REVIEW: CBS - quotes/UAP report
Date: Friday, June 25, 2021 12:49:40 PM

#3

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, June 25, 2021 12:29 PM
To: (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: REQUEST REVIEW: CBS - quotes/UAP report

David Martin
CBS

“There’s a wide range of phenomena that we observe that are ultimately put in the UAP category. There is not one single explanation for UAP. It’s rather a series of things.”

“From a safety of flight issue, we absolutely do believe that what we are seeing are not simply sensor artifacts. These are things that physically exist. They are physical objects. And again, as I pointed out before, they’re certainly not all the same thing. It’s a variety of things that we’re observing.”

“Fifth category, our catch all that we can call *other* – Those are observations that either because the data that we have is short in or that we’re unable to characterize it or it is some sort of phenomena that would display characteristics that we were unable to explain because of performance that we were to see from it. Or it could be things that we simply have to advance our scientific knowledge in order to have a good explanation for it.”

“Of the 144 reports that we are dealing with here, we have no clear indications that there’s any exotic explanation for them, that includes that they are non-terrestrial in origin. But again, we will go wherever the data takes us on this.”

“The 144 that we focus on in this report really are the hardest of the hard. These are the ones that we are not able to categorize. We hope that with additional data, with the improved reporting structures we put in place, with the improved guidance that we have on what observers should report, that we’ll be able to over time explain what these are.”

“We do not have any data that indicates that any of these unidentified aerial phenomena are part of a foreign collection program nor do we have any data that is indicative of a major technological advancement by a foreign adversary. Obviously, we continue to watch those things very closely, we continue to monitor for those types of developments, but the data set that we have with the task force simply doesn’t point us to that direction.”

“We don’t see indications that an adversary has made any large, technological leap here that is a surprise. What I would say is there are 18 incidents in the data that we’re working with in which the UAP do appear to have some sort of propulsion or technology that’s not immediately evident, that could be advanced.”

“The report is going to highlight that a significant subset of the report involves observations with multiple sensors, which sort of bolsters our conclusion that these are observations that exist in the real world and therefore potentially pose a safety of flight issue. With regard to the adversary systems, what the report will say is that there is currently no evidence that a foreign government system accounts for any of the events described in these 144 reports. I’d emphasize that this report was not requested as nor is it an assessment of the advance aviation program of an adversary or any other country.”

“I would say that some of these, a small portion of the data set has propulsion we cannot explain, that doesn’t necessarily mean that there is an adversary that is introducing a technological surprise here.”

“Ultimately, we have to increase the volume as well as the quality of the data we have.”

“We need to build a comprehensive mechanism, and potentially invest additional resources if we are to effectively address the challenge of identifying, analyzing, and responding to UAP. Consequently, the report that you see today represents an important step. I would also highlight the report recognizes that historical socio-cultural stigmas associated UAP. Really, that stigma creates an additional challenge to timely and standardized reporting. And we applaud the UAP taskforce’s work in this area as a means towards improving our available datasets and our understanding over time.”

“We want to make clear that we take this issue very seriously here at DNI and the Department of Defense.”

From: (b) (6)
To: (b) (6); [Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#)
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] FW: REQUEST REVIEW: UAP report/cleared lines
Date: Friday, June 25, 2021 1:17:51 PM

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, June 25, 2021 1:17 PM
To: (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: REQUEST REVIEW: UAP report/cleared lines

(b) (6) – These are accurate and should be ok. (b) (5)

VR (b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, June 25, 2021 1:12 PM
To: (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: REQUEST REVIEW: UAP report/cleared lines

Shane Harris
Washington Post

Would like to include the following in our report, which will publish as soon as you release the UAP report online. We'll write thru once we can spend more time w/ it as well, but this seemed like a good high-level explainer for our readers on their initial (ahem) encounter with the material.

But the report does find that not all the UAPs behave in the same way, which led the experts to offer different hypotheses about what they might be. The objects "very clearly demonstrate an array of aerial behaviors," said a senior U.S. government official, who described the report's findings to a group of reporters on the condition of anonymity, because the document hadn't yet been published.

"There is no one answer about what these UAP are," the official said.

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
To: (b) (6) [Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#)
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] RE: REQUEST REVIEW: NBC Quotes
Date: Friday, June 25, 2021 1:51:35 PM

Agreed!

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, June 25, 2021 1:40 PM
To: (b) (6) 'scott.w.bray@navy.mil' (b) (6)
Subject: RE: REQUEST REVIEW: NBC Quotes

(b) (5)

(b) (5)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, June 25, 2021 1:26 PM
To: 'scott.w.bray@navy.mil' (b) (6)
Subject: RE: REQUEST REVIEW: NBC Quotes

Scott / (b) (6) –

(b) (5)

(b) (5)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, June 25, 2021 1:17 PM
To: (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: REQUEST REVIEW: NBC Quotes

Courtney Kube
NBC

Here are the quotes I would like to use, attributed to a senior US government official:

“We quite frankly have a bit of work yet to do in order to truly assess and address the threat posed by UAP.”

“We are quite confident is a safety of flight issue and a potential operational security issue, as well.”

“Not all AUP are the same thing.”

“There is a wide, wide range of phenomena that we observe that are ultimately put into the UAP category. There is not one single explanation for UAP, it’s rather a series of things.”

“We do not have any data that indicates that any of these unidentified air phenomena are part of a foreign collection program nor do we have any data that is indicative of a major technological advancement by a potential adversary.”

Adversary systems, “there is currently no evidence that a foreign government system accounts for any of the events” in the 144 reports

Of the 144 reports that we are dealing with here, “We have found no clear indications that there is any exotic explanation for them To include that they are non-terrestrial in origin.”

From: (b) (6)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#); (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: FOR REVIEW---Print Reporter
Date: Friday, June 25, 2021 2:59:22 PM

(b) (6), by the rules: We said it during the backgrounder, so they can use it – but they can't attribute it to a senior U.S. govt official unless we approve it. I'd strongly caution against giving them alternate verbiage for a quote, as then you would be changing what was said. We can't use this to rewrite what was said verbally unless we're correcting someone misspeaking. You can remove a word, if it doesn't the meaning of what was said, but you can't provide a different word.

Regards,

(b) (6)
OSD(PA)

From: Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, June 25, 2021 2:17 PM
To: (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: RE: FOR REVIEW---Print Reporter

(b) (6) –

(b) (5)

Thanks,
Scott

Scott W. Bray
Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence
Director, Naval Intelligence Activity
(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, June 25, 2021 2:06 PM
To: Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] RE: FOR REVIEW---Print Reporter

Front office just flagged they are not going to clear "exotic."

Scott and (b) (6) – Do you have proposed alternative phrasing?

(b) (6) – Expect in the interest of time we need to clear all the other lines so the reporters can move out. Based on the ground rules, does that mean they can use it but just not attribute it, until we give them alternate verbiage?

VR

(b) (6)

From: Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)

Sent: Friday, June 25, 2021 12:51 PM

To: (b) (6)

Subject: RE: FOR REVIEW---Print Reporter

Thanks, (b) (6) I'm good with all of these – and I'm good with using “exotic,” which I've used with Congress and others. Meriam Webster defines exotic as:

1 : very different, strange, or unusual. 2 : introduced from another country : not native **exotic** plants.

I think it's appropriate here.

All the best,
Scott

Scott W. Bray

Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence

Director, Naval Intelligence Activity

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Friday, June 25, 2021 12:43 PM

To: Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)

Subject: [Non-DoD Source] FW: FOR REVIEW---Print Reporter

Scott – (b) (5)

(b) (6) – (b) (5)

The rest are accurate quotes (Scott and (b) (6), please come up voice quickly if I'm wrong here).

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, June 25, 2021 12:12 PM
To: (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: FOR REVIEW---Print Reporter

Sir,

Below are quotes returned from CNN, Politico and AP for review and attribution to a senior US government official:

Katie Bo Williams, CNN

“Of the 144 repots we are dealing with here, we have no clear indications that there is any exotic explanation, to include that they are non-terrestrial in origin — but we will go wherever the data takes us,” a senior US official said.

“We absolutely do believe what we’re seeing are not simply sensor artifacts. These are things that physically exist,” the official said, noting that 80 of the reported incidents included data from multiple sensors. In 11 cases, investigators believed that there was a “near-miss” collision with US personnel.

Most of the 144 sightings covered in the report were recorded by US Navy pilots, although there were some reports from other U.S. government sources — a clear “reporting bias” in the data set investigators examined, the US official said.

“There is a wide range of phenomena that we observed that we ultimately put into the UAP category,” the official said. “There is not one single explanation of UAP.”

But in the 143 unexplained cases, the US official said, investigators simply lacked the necessary data to categorize the sighting. Some reports included no technical data at all for engineers to examine, but rather were solely verbal recollections by pilots.

Andrew Desiderio, Politico

“Of the 144 data points ... we have no clear indications that there’s any exotic explanation for them, that they’re non-terrestrial in origin. But we will go wherever the data takes us on this.”

“We quite frankly have a bit of work yet to do in order to truly assess and address the threats posed

by UAP.”

“This is limited data that we have, and inconsistencies in the reporting structures. ... These are key challenges to identifying UAP.”

“UAP we’ve documented ... demonstrate an array of aerial behaviors which really emphasizes the point that not all UAP are the same thing.”

“There is not one single explanation for UAPs.”

No **data** showing that these are part of “foreign **collection** program” or “major technological advancement by a foreign adversary.”

“There are 18 incidents in the database in which the UAP do appear to have some sort of propulsion or other technology that’s not immediately evident, that could be advanced.”

On extraterrestrials – “if we had data that took us down that path, we would probably create a different category that would be indicative of that.”

Nomaan Merchant, AP

“It’s clear that we need to improve our capacity to further analyze remaining UAP observations, even as we accept that there are some limits to our capacity to characterize and understand some of the observations that we have.”

What the US needs to improve its understanding of UAPs:

“The most basic thing that we need is a clear reporting structure and a clear understanding that when our operators observe something that they can’t immediately identify, that they report that.”
(With noting that DOD has made “significant strides” in ramping up reporting of potential incidents)

And re: evidence of extraterrestrial life:

“We have no evidence that takes us toward any sort of exotic explanation for this.”

Regards,

(b) (6)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
To: DNI-Media; (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6) [Brav, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#)
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Final RTQ's
Date: Friday, June 25, 2021 3:10:37 PM
Attachments: [UAP Talking Points.docx](#)

All - Please note the highlighted edit to the modified question about the different versions of the report. We also deleted one question from the last section.

(b) (6)



From: (b) (6)
To: (b) (6); [Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#)
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] RE: Reuters Request for Briefing Quotes Clearance from UAP Briefing
Date: Friday, June 25, 2021 3:54:49 PM

Sorry for the double tap. (b) (5)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, June 25, 2021 3:50 PM
To: (b) (6) 'Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA)'
(b) (6)
Subject: RE: Reuters Request for Briefing Quotes Clearance from UAP Briefing

Those all look accurate to me. We use "exotic" twice in what (b) (6) sent, I highlighted in red below.

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, June 25, 2021 3:28 PM
To: (b) (6) 'Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA)'
(b) (6)
Subject: FW: Reuters Request for Briefing Quotes Clearance from UAP Briefing

Any inputs?

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, June 25, 2021 3:24 PM
To: (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: FW: Reuters Request for Briefing Quotes Clearance from UAP Briefing

Sir,

Request review for clearance.

Regards,

(b) (6)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Friday, June 25, 2021 2:34 PM

To: (b) (6); DNI-Media (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: Reuters Request for Briefing Quotes Clearance from UAP Briefing

(b) (6),

Here are the quotes I'd like to obtain clearance to use in my story, recognizing that only those approved by you can be attributed, and then only to a "senior U.S. official."

- 1.) **"anytime there is a safety of flight or counterintelligence concern we take those things very seriously and we will continue to take those things seriously. "(from Scott Bray, I believe)**
- 2.) **"Our approach has been driven by science and data" (from Gen. Cruz)**
- 3.) **"Of data we have, we don't have any clear indications that any of these unidentified aerial phenomena are part of a foreign (intelligence) collection program, and we don't have any clear data that is indicative of a major technological advancement by a potential adversary. ... we continue to put a lot of effort and energy into tracking those types of developments, and we watch that very carefully. Nothing in this data set clearly points us into that direction." (from Scott Bray)**
- 4.) **Similarly, from Michael: "This report is going to note for the 144 reports that it looks at, there is no evidence that foreign government systems account for any of the events described in them."**
- 5.) In response to my question: So the report does not make any findings one way or another about whether any of the documented UAPs might be either extraterrestrial in nature or might have originated from some previously unknown technology of a foreign nation, **Michael replied: "That is correct. None of the 144 are grouped under that rubric."** And he went on to explain: **"We have 144 reports. 143 are unexplained because of a lack of sufficient data."** And he explained the distinction between incidents that are now regarded as "unexplained" and those that might ultimately be categorized as "unexplainable" due to a "lack of scientific understanding on our part."
- 6.) **"Of the 144 reports that this report dealt with, 143 we have NOT been put into a category? "That's correct" (Bray?)**
- 7.) **"We don't have any clear explanations for any of the three videos that we have (previously) released. All three of those .. are captured in the data set of 144 that we are talking about." (Bray)**
- 8.) **" 21 of the reports do show UAP s that appear to have some sort of advanced propulsion or advanced technology," meaning essentiall they appear to lack any means of propulsion or acceleration or exhibit speeds beyond what we believe foreign adversaries possess (Gen. Cruz).**

- 9.) On the possibility of extraterrestrial explanations: **“That’s not the purpose of the task force, to evaluate any sort of search for extraterrestrial life.... that’s not what we were charged with doing. ... We’re just following the data that we have, and haven’t reached any conclusions that are **exotic** in that sort of direction.”** (from Bray) and/or **“We have no evidence that takes us towards some sort of **exotic** explanation for this (when asked about aliens again)**
- 10.) **“A lot of the work that the task force has done to date has been on the de-stigmatization issue, ensuring that those who observing unidentified things are comfortable reporting that and that it’s clear how they should report that. I think DOD has made very significant strikes in recent months in getting the message out on that....”** (Bray)
- 11.) The only one of the 144 documented incidents to be formally placed in one of the five categories described falls into the one called “Airborne clutter” (Gen. Cruz). As already mentioned, the 143 others have not yet placed in any of the five categories – airborne clutter, natural atmospheric phenomena, U.S. Govt or industrial development; Foreign adversary systems; or the catch-all “other” grouping – meaning they can still be defined simply as “unexplained.”

That’s a lot, and I doubt we would use ALL of these in their entirety. There’s a lot of overlap, and much can be paraphrased. but I just want to cover my bases.

Thanks

(b) (6)

[REDACTED]

This e-mail is for the sole use of the intended recipient and contains information that may be privileged and/or confidential. If you are not an intended recipient, please notify the sender by return e-mail and delete this e-mail and any attachments. Certain required legal entity disclosures can be accessed on our website: <https://no-click.mil/>?
<https://www.thomsonreuters.com/en/resources/disclosures.html>

From: (b) (6)
To: (b) (6) Bray, Scott
W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA); Kozik, David A SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA); (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6) Carranza, Guillermo R SES OSD OGC (USA); (b) (6)
Subject: FINAL: DoD Statement on UAP Assessments
Date: Friday, June 25, 2021 4:15:41 PM
Attachments: [20210625 DoD Statement on UAP Report \(FINAL\).docx](#)

Approved by Mr. Kirby.

Regards,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, June 25, 2021 3:24 PM
To: (b) (6); 'Bray, Scott W SES USN
DCNO N2N6 (USA)' (b) (6); Kozik, David A SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6); Carranza, Guillermo R SES OSD OGC (USA)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: RE: HOT - FOR REVIEW: DoD Statement on UAP Assessments
Importance: High

Updated version. Any more comments?

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, June 25, 2021 1:09 PM
To: (b) (6); 'Bray, Scott W SES USN
DCNO N2N6 (USA)' (b) (6); Kozik, David A SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6); Carranza, Guillermo R SES OSD OGC (USA)
(b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

Subject: HOT - FOR REVIEW: DoD Statement on UAP Assessments

Importance: High

First draft. Chop up as needed. Send to others I've forgotten if needed. Need back ASAP, so can send to Mr. Kirby for his approval (he's on leave). This will go out this afternoon, once ODNI posts the UAP report to their webpage.

Updating briefing card next.

Regards,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
To: Carranza, Guillermo R SES OSD OGC (USA); (b) (6)
(b) (6); Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA); Kozik, David A SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA); (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: HOT - FOR REVIEW: DoD Statement on UAP Assessments
Date: Friday, June 25, 2021 4:21:50 PM

Thanks, (b) (6)

From: Carranza, Guillermo R SES OSD OGC (USA) (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, June 25, 2021 3:19 PM
To: (b) (6)
(b) (6); 'Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA)'
(b) (6); Kozik, David A SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: RE: HOT - FOR REVIEW: DoD Statement on UAP Assessments

Thanks (b) (6). That's fine.

r/ (b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, June 25, 2021 2:54 PM
To: Carranza, Guillermo R SES OSD OGC (USA) (b) (6)
(b) (6); 'Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA)'
(b) (6); Kozik, David A SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: RE: HOT - FOR REVIEW: DoD Statement on UAP Assessments

Thanks, Bill. No issues with your changes, except:
Side note/reminder, when we post a press release, we're supposed to use AP Style, the media industry standard, as opposed to DoD Correspondence Style. There are differences between the two for things like capitalization, acronyms, etc.

Regards,

(b) (6)

From: Carranza, Guillermo R SES OSD OGC (USA) (b) (6)

Sent: Friday, June 25, 2021 1:32 PM

To: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6) 'Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA)'

(b) (6); Kozik, David A SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

Subject: RE: HOT - FOR REVIEW: DoD Statement on UAP Assessments

Here are some thoughts (b) (6).

r/ Bill

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Friday, June 25, 2021 1:10 PM

To: (b) (6)

(b) (6) 'Bray, Scott W SES USN

DCNO N2N6 (USA)' (b) (6); Kozik, David A SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6) Carranza, Guillermo R SES OSD OGC (USA)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

Subject: RE: HOT - FOR REVIEW: DoD Statement on UAP Assessments

+ ODNI

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Friday, June 25, 2021 1:09 PM

To: (b) (6)

(b) (6) 'Bray, Scott W SES USN
DCNO N2N6 (USA)' (b) (6); Kozik, David A SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6); Carranza, Guillermo R SES OSD OGC (USA)

(b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

Subject: HOT - FOR REVIEW: DoD Statement on UAP Assessments

Importance: High

First draft. Chop up as needed. Send to others I've forgotten if needed. Need back ASAP, so can send to Mr. Kirby for his approval (he's on leave). This will go out this afternoon, once ODNI posts the UAP report to their webpage.

Updating briefing card next.

Regards,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
To: (b) (6); [Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#)
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] RE: Clearance Review and Question for clarity
Date: Friday, June 25, 2021 4:53:55 PM

Got it. Will send back the correction that none are categorized as "other" and use offer the report extra below. Thanks!

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, June 25, 2021 4:51 PM
To: (b) (6); 'Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA)'
(b) (6)
Subject: RE: Clearance Review and Question for clarity

Apologies again for the double-tap. I see the report is out. The operative language from the report with regard to the "other" category is:

Although most of the UAP described in our dataset probably remain unidentified due to limited data or challenges to collection processing or analysis, we may require additional scientific knowledge to successfully collect on, analyze and characterize some of them. We would group such objects in this category pending scientific advances that allowed us to better understand them. The UAPTF intends to focus additional analysis on the small number of cases where a UAP appeared to display unusual flight characteristics or signature management.

So that should help. With regard to the briefing, I think we may still need to clarify that we said only one report is categorized and it was categorized as a type of airborne clutter. The remaining 143 remain uncategorized.

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, June 25, 2021 4:48 PM
To: (b) (6); 'Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA)'
(b) (6)
Subject: RE: Clearance Review and Question for clarity

CNN language looks okay to me.

On the CBS language he misheard us. I think we need to clarify that what Scott said was that the UAPTF categorized one of the 144 reports as airborne clutter. The remaining 143 reports remain uncategorized.

As I recall, I noted that the UAPTF draws a distinction between things that are currently unexplained (which would include the 143 other reports) and things that may be unexplainable because we currently lack sufficient scientific understanding (the "other" category). Currently none of the reports are categorized under "other".

The UNCLAS report will note in regard to the "other" category that the UAPTF intends to conduct additional analysis on a small subset of cases that appeared particularly unusual.

Scott, did I characterize your remarks correctly?

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, June 25, 2021 4:24 PM
To: (b) (6) 'Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA)'
(b) (6)
Subject: FW: Clearance Review and Question for clarity

Scott / (b) (6) – See the very last bullet, which is backwards. How would you like to clarify? VR (b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, June 25, 2021 4:10 PM
To: (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: Clearance Review and Question for clarity

CNN/Katie Bo Williams:

Another clearance review

- In 143 cases, investigators simply lacked the necessary data to categorize the sighting. Some reports included no technical data at all for engineers to examine, but rather were solely verbal recollections by pilots.
- No evidence sightings are foreign collection or massive jump in foreign adversary technology.

Could you help us respond appropriately to this inquiry?

CBS/David Martin

One point of clarity -- Officials on today's call indicated that 143 of the 144 reports investigated fell into the fifth "other" category. What category did the remaining one report fall into?

Regards,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

From: (b) (6)
To: Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA); (b) (6); OPNAV ALL N2N6 Front Office; (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: Duty Officer; Stratton, John F (Jay) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA)
Date: RE: [Non-DoD Source] ODNI Releases Preliminary Assessment on Unidentified Aerial Phenomena
Friday, June 25, 2021 4:55:01 PM

And... it is released:

<https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/press-releases-2021/item/2223-UAP>

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, June 25, 2021 4:44 PM
To: Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA); (b) (6)
(b) (6) OPNAV ALL N2N6 Front Office
(b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6); Chinfo Duty Officer (b) (6)
Subject: RE: [Non-DoD Source] ODNI Releases Preliminary Assessment on Unidentified Aerial Phenomena

WPost Story link:

https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/ufo-report/2021/06/25/ba323b20-d52c-11eb-ae54-515e2f63d37d_story.html

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, June 25, 2021 4:40 PM
To: Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA); (b) (6)
(b) (6) OPNAV ALL N2N6 Front Office
(b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6); Chinfo Duty Officer (b) (6)
Subject: FW: [Non-DoD Source] ODNI Releases Preliminary Assessment on Unidentified Aerial Phenomena

And we're off!

Step one on the process!

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Friday, June 25, 2021 4:30 PM

To: (b) (6)

Subject: [Non-DoD Source] ODNI Releases Preliminary Assessment on Unidentified Aerial Phenomena



NEWS RELEASE

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

ODNI News Release No. 24-21

June 25, 2021


ODNI Releases Preliminary Assessment on Unidentified Aerial Phenomena

WASHINGTON, D.C. – The Office of the Director of National Intelligence today submitted to Congress a preliminary report regarding Unidentified Aerial Phenomena (UAP) that relays the progress the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force has made in understanding UAP. The release of this report is in response to a requirement in the Intelligence Authorization Act of 2021.

The unclassified version of the report will be posted on dni.gov later today.

###

Connect With ODNI



This email was sent to (b) (6)
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, ODNI, Washington, D.C. 20511, USA
[Unsubscribe](#)

From: [CANTRELL, STEVEN A SES USAF HAF AF/A2/6N](#)
To: [OBRIEN, MARY F Lt Gen HAF HAF/DSI/HAF A2/6](#); [SIMPSON, DANIEL L Maj Gen USAF HAF AF/A2/6](#)
Cc: (b) (6)
Cummins, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)
(b) (6) Bray, Scott W SES USN
DCNO N2N6 (USA); (b) (6)
Subject: Link to unclassified UAP report on ODNI website
Date: Friday, June 25, 2021 4:59:03 PM

Good afternoon—again,

Here is the link to the unclassified UAP report.

<https://www.odni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/Preliminary-Assessment-UAP-20210625.pdf>

Cheers

Steve

Steven A. Cantrell, SES

Director,

National Aviation Intelligence Integration Office (NAI2O) A2/6N

Deputy National Intelligence Manager for Aviation

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
To: (b) (6) [Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#)
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] RE: WSJ Q: Signature management
Date: Friday, June 25, 2021 5:58:11 PM

What I sent back: An object's signature is how it appears to sensors or visual observers. Signature management is taking actions to reduce or modify this signature.

They can figure out the context...

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, June 25, 2021 5:54 PM
To: 'Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA)' (b) (6)
Subject: RE: WSJ Q: Signature management

Scott-

That works for me. I think simpler is better. If we wanted more, then we could say:

(b) (5)

Operative part of the report is:

The UAPTF holds a small amount of data that appear to show UAP demonstrating acceleration or a degree of signature management. Additional rigorous analysis are necessary by multiple teams or groups of technical experts to determine the nature and validity of these data. We are conducting further analysis to determine if breakthrough technologies were demonstrated.

From: Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, June 25, 2021 5:46 PM
To: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: WSJ Q: Signature management

I defer to (b) (6) if he has a better answer, but I think that something along the lines of (b) (5) would be an appropriate response.

Scott W. Bray

Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence
Director, Naval Intelligence Activity
(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, June 25, 2021 5:26 PM
To: Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] FW: WSJ Q: Signature management

Scott / (b) (6) – I could answer this...but I am sure it would be dangerous and not in the precise spirit of what you meant as you wrote the report.

Can I get a sentence or two to clarify the point for WSJ?

VR

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, June 25, 2021 5:19 PM
To: (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: WSJ Q: Signature management

Can you all define “signature management?” What does that mean in the context of the sightings?

Regards,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

visitations.

A total of 143 reports gathered since 2004 remain unexplained, the document released by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence said. Of those, 21 reports of unknown phenomena, involving 18 episodes, possibly demonstrate technological capabilities that are unknown to the United States: objects moving without observable propulsion or with rapid acceleration that is believed to be beyond the capabilities of Russia, China or other terrestrial nations.

There is no evidence that any of the episodes involve secret American weapons programs, unknown technology from Russia or China or extraterrestrial visitations. But the government report did not rule out those explanations.

Instead, government officials outlined a plan to develop a better program to observe and collect data on future unexplained phenomena.

The failure to reach a conclusion on the unexplained episodes raised questions about how seriously the government has taken them and whether it has assembled adequate scientific expertise to examine them.

Too little data exists to draw a conclusion about many of the episodes, officials said. But both scientific experts and enthusiastic amateurs have advanced explanations ranging from the mundane to the otherworldly and the report did little to substantiate or dismiss their theories.

Government officials on Friday were reluctant to acknowledge the potential that the phenomena could be extraterrestrial craft, a signal of how unlikely they view that explanation.

There was no affirmative evidence that the unexplained phenomena are alien spacecraft in the report. But because the government has offered no explanation for so many of the episodes, the new report is sure to fuel the enthusiasm of those who believe they could be.

Among the unexplained incidents are three high-profile videos of aerial phenomenon taken by the U.S. Navy and witnessed by pilots in recent years.

The report released on Friday is an interim report, which is how former officials involved in the Pentagon examination had predicted the government would initially handle the requirement by Congress to submit an unclassified report on what it knows about U.F.O.s.

The government intends to update Congress within 90 days on efforts to develop an improved collection strategy and what officials are calling a technical road map to develop technology to better observe the phenomena, senior government officials told reporters on Friday. Officials said they would provide lawmakers with periodical updates beyond that.

The Pentagon and intelligence agencies have eschewed the term U.F.O. and refer instead to U.A.P., or unidentified aerial phenomena. It has been a bit of rebranding, both to cut down on public enthusiasm and remove the stigma that U.F.O. can carry, in order to encourage pilots to report their

observations and scientists to study them.

The new report laid out five categories of possible explanation for the phenomena: a secret technology developed by an adversarial power like Russia and China, classified cutting-edge American technology, a naturally occurring phenomenon, airborne clutter such as errant weather balloons and a catchall “other” category. That final group could include extraterrestrial technology.

Officials do not have any indications that the unexplained incidents show objects that are part of a foreign intelligence collection program or a major technological advancement by a potential adversary, a senior government official said. They are also unable to confirm that any of those incidents are part of a U.S. government or defense industry program, a senior official said.

Nevertheless, the report does not completely rule out a Russian or Chinese aircraft or an American classified program.

The report is being made public because of a provision inserted by Senator Marco Rubio of Florida, the top Republican on the Senate Intelligence Committee, into a huge spending bill passed by Congress.

“This report is an important first step in cataloging these incidents, but it is just a first step,” Mr. Rubio said in a statement. “The Defense Department and Intelligence Community have a lot of work to do before we can actually understand whether these aerial threats present a serious national security concern.”

Of the incidents examined by the task force, there are “no clear indications that there is any nonterrestrial explanation” for them, said a senior official, adding that the government would “go wherever the data takes us” as the inquiry continued.

The report avoids any real discussion of the possibility the unexplained phenomenon are extraterrestrial in nature. It was not the purpose of the government’s task force to search for extraterrestrial life, a responsibility that falls to NASA, said a senior governmental official.

Perhaps as a result, government officials said that going forward they would only focus on making observations of the phenomena and had no plans to try to communicate with the objects.

Government officials said that on further examination, the 21 reports that show unusual acceleration or movement could prove to have normal explanations. Government analysts have scrutinized the cameras and sensors that recorded the phenomena for potential flaws, a senior government official said.

There are plausible, but dry, explanations for each of the Navy recordings that are more likely than some sort of extraordinary technology, said Mick West, a science writer who focuses on debunking conspiracy theories.

In one video, a sharp movement of the object could be attributable to a shift in the camera’s

movement. In another, an object that appears to be moving fast is shown to be actually moving much more slowly when a relevant trigonometric calculation is applied. An image of a rapidly spinning object skimming over the clouds is caused by infrared glare, Mr. West said.

“If you just say, ‘Oh, it’s aliens,’ that’s actually quite a simple explanation,” Mr. West said. “The actual explanation is kind of complicated, which is why a lot of people miss it. But yet the mundane explanations exist for all of these videos.”

The Pentagon and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence are considering research and development programs that could improve and standardize data collection, the officials said. With more data, better pattern analysis of the episodes could be done, said a senior government official.

The Pentagon is also hoping to look at historical data collected by radar to find other similar incidents, a senior government official said.

Officials said they looked at 144 unexplained incidents and were able to recategorize one as an example of airborne clutter. The failure to make headway on any of the others is a reflection of the lack of data but also a lack of scientific brainpower examining the problem.

Since the late 1960s, most scientists and scholars have steered away from U.F.O. studies. Their reluctance has hampered the government’s ability to put conspiracy theories about aliens to rest.

“Unfortunately, I don’t think that landscape is really going to change,” said Chris Impey, an astronomy professor at the University of Arizona. “It’s still an area where scientists mostly fear to tread.”

(b) (6)

[REDACTED]

From: (b) (6)
To: (b) (6); [Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Re: Deep Backgrounders/UAP Report Rollout
Date: Friday, June 25, 2021 7:03:42 PM

Morning (b) (6),

(b) (6) and I both will be in the office shortly.

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Date: Friday, June 25, 2021 at 5:45:04 AM
To: (b) (6) "Bray,
Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA)" (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: Re: Deep Backgrounders/UAP Report Rollout

Good morning, (b) (6),

It would be very helpful if we could have the latest version of the unclassified report by the time we start prep, if possible.

Regards,

(b) (6)

Sent with my iPhone

From: (b) (6)
Date: Thursday, June 24, 2021 at 10:08:21 PM
To: (b) (6) "Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA)"
(b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Deep Backgrounders/UAP Report Rollout

TICK TOCK: UAP REPORT ROLLOUT

9:00-11:00 a.m.—Final Prep and Press Deep Backgrounders
2:30 p.m. —ODNI sends report to the Hill
3:30 p.m.—ODNI issues “Fact of Submission to Congress” press release
4:00 p.m. —ODNI posts report
4:15/4:30 —DOD issues press release

DEEP BACKGROUNDER SCHEDULE

Dial In Number

1-866-823-7118, Code: 6360580#

9:00-9:25 a.m.

- Final Prep

9:25 a.m. *Ready the conference line for incoming media calls*

9:30-10:00 a.m. Deep Backgrounder #1

- New York Times—Julian Barnes
- Wall Street Journal—Brett Forrest
- Washington Post—Shane Harris
- Associated Press—Nomaan Merchant
- Reuters—Steve Gorman

10:00-10:25 a.m.

- **BREAK**

10:25 a.m. *Ready the conference line for incoming media calls*

10:30-11:00 a.m.

- ABC—Luis Martinez
- CBS—David Martin, Nicole Sganga
- CNN—Katie Bo Williams
- NBC—Courtney Kube
- Politico (*pending*)

From: (b) (6)
To: Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA); (b) (6) [Cummins, Matthew C \(Matt\) SES OSD OUSD INTEL \(USA\)](#)
Subject: Re: Question from Mr. Kirby
Date: Sunday, June 27, 2021 2:02:45 PM

Publicly, agree, we do not discuss the size/staffing of the UAPTF. But can we give Mr. Kirby at least a round number on who works on UAPTF full-time or primarily if not full-time, just for his own background SA, especially in light of DSD memo?
I'm not sure yet If he just wants to know or if he wants to push back at New Yorker.

Sent with my iPhone

From: "Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA)" (b) (6)

Date: Sunday, June 27, 2021 at 1:36:17 PM

To: (b) (6)

"Cummins, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)"

(b) (6)

Subject: RE: Question from Mr. Kirby

(b) (6) -

I'm not sure we want to give a specific number of people assigned to the task force, but any assertion that we only put two part time employees on the task force significantly underplays the actual number of people assigned in a full time capacity. It also underplays the expertise (multiple PhDs assigned full time to the task force) and the seniority of those assigned (including multiple senior civilians).

Thanks,
Scott

Scott W. Bray

Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence

Director, Naval Intelligence Activity

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Date: Sunday, Jun 27, 2021, 1:29 PM

To: (b) (6)

(b) (6), Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6), Cummins, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)

(b) (6)

Subject: Re: Question from Mr. Kirby

Thanks, Brian. Great point on the gap!

Sent with my iPhone

From: (b) (6)

Date: Sunday, June 27, 2021 at 1:11:45 PM

To: (b) (6)

SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA)" (b) (6)

SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)" (b) (6)

Subject: Re: Question from Mr. Kirby

"Bray, Scott W

, "Cummings, Matthew C (Matt)

Thanks, (b) (6).

There are definitely more than two part-time people on the TF. It is also worth noting that there is a big gap between being tasked to write a report and being tasked to determine what the USG knows on the subject.

There were definitely multiple contributors to the report—including from different agencies. Your assertion is also correct that while few people were the main authors, there were a lot more people involved in the writing process.

Your statement on the DSD memo intent is equally accurate.

I'll defer to (b) (6) and Matt regarding statements about all members working on an additional-duty basis. I don't know what we've said about that previously.

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Date: Sunday, June 27, 2021 at 12:49:16 PM

To: (b) (6)

"Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA)" (b) (6)

"Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)"

(b) (6)

Subject: Re: Question from Mr. Kirby

+ OUSD(I) [hit send too soon!]

also fixed typo in first paragraph

Sent with my iPhone

From: (b) (6)

Date: Sunday, June 27, 2021 at 12:36:35 PM

To: (b) (6)

(b) (6), "Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6
(USA)" (b) (6)

Subject: Question from Mr. Kirby

End of second paragraph a New Yorker article on the UAP report:

"This particular report was not, by all accounts, being assembled under the most auspicious circumstances: two people, reportedly working part time, had been given only a hundred and eighty days to determine what, exactly, the federal government did and did not know about U.F.O.s."

Mr. Kirby is interpreting this as saying that the UAPTF only consists of two people, part time, and is asking if that is true?

How do you want me to respond to him? My thoughts:

(b) (5)

Thoughts?

Regards,

(b) (6)

Sent with my iPhone

From: (b) (6)
To: (b) (6) [Bray, Scott](#)
[W SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\); \(b\) \(6\)](#)
[C \(Matt\) SES OSD OUSD INTEL \(USA\)](#) [Cummings, Matthew](#)
Subject: Fwd: UAP Report Roll-up Request
Date: Sunday, June 27, 2021 4:16:59 PM
Attachments: [Compilation UAP Report 25-27 June 2021.docx](#)

The first seven articles are new. The New Yorker article I asked about earlier was in this morning's Defense Media Clips; if you need that, let me know.

Regards,

(b) (6)

Sent with my iPhone

From: "OSD Pentagon PA Mailbox Media Analysis"
(b) (6)
Date: Sunday, June 27, 2021 at 3:52:51 PM
To: (b) (6)
Cc: "OSD Pentagon PA Mailbox Media Analysis" (b) (6)
Subject: RE: UAP Report Roll-up Request

Hi (b) (6),

Attached is an updated compilation of coverage from Friday night through this afternoon. Let us know if you need anything else on this!

v/r,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Friday, June 25, 2021 6:55 PM

To: OSD Pentagon PA Mailbox Media Analysis (b) (6)

Subject: RE: UAP Report Roll-up Request

Thanks, (b) (6)

From: OSD Pentagon PA Mailbox Media Analysis

(b) (6)

Sent: Friday, June 25, 2021 6:53 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: OSD Pentagon PA Mailbox Media Analysis (b) (6)

Subject: RE: UAP Report Roll-up Request

(b) (6),

I've attached a compilation of some of today's coverage. If significant coverage continues into the weekend, we will start compiling a supplement for Monday.

v/r,

(b) (6)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Friday, June 25, 2021 08:45

To: OSD Pentagon PA Mailbox Media Analysis (b) (6)

Subject: UAP Report Roll-up Request

Team,

Sometime this afternoon, ODNI will submit a UAP Report to Congress, release a press release, and then we will release a statement. We expect the media interest to be very high. Please be prepared to do an initial roll-up tonight, and then possibly a broader one at the end of the weekend/Monday if media reports keep coming out.

Regards,

(b) (6)

From: [Cummings, Matthew C \(Matt\) SES OSD OUSD INTEL \(USA\)](#)
To: (b) (6) [Bray, Scott W SES USN](#)
[DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#); (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: Coord for UAP Brief on Tues 6/29
Date: Monday, June 28, 2021 9:12:47 AM

No worries. We stand ready to serve! ☺

Matt

Matthew C. Cummings, DISL

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Sunday, June 27, 2021 6:49 PM
To: Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)
(b) (6)
(b) (6) Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6 (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: Coord for UAP Brief on Tues 6/29

Matt and team,

So...this brief was pulled down again. The Suite let us know Friday night the UAP briefing to APNSA is cancelled for Tuesday as it is "OBE". Unsure if this was due to the unclass reporting or if DNI Haines covered during the IC weekly with NSA Sullivan on Friday evening.

Apologies for the back and forth – so close yet again and thanks for the brief last week to (b) (6)

(b) (6) !

Best,

V/R

(b) (6)

(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

From: Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)

(b) (6)

Sent: Friday, June 25, 2021 5:24 PM

To: (b) (6)

(b) (6); Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I

(b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: Re: Coord for UAP Brief on Tues 6/29

(b) (6),

It will be me from OSD. Navy should let you know who is coming as the briefer and possibly +1.

Matt

From: (b) (6)

Date: Friday, June 25, 2021 at 4:32:49 PM

To: "Cummings, Matthew C (Matt) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)"

(b) (6)

(b) (6) "Bray, Scott W SES OPNAV N2N6, N2N6I" (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: Coord for UAP Brief on Tues 6/29

Matt and Team,

Can you please pass the names/emails for the briefers or other DOD attendees for next week's UAP brief. I have space allotted for 3 x "briefers" but defer to you and the leadership there who you would like to attend.

(b) (6) (cc'd) will send the WAVES link, so an email will be helpful to ensure we make contact and get the WAVES registrations complete with Secret Service prior to end of day on Monday.

Happy to loop in any others that would be helpful, but request your help in coordinating internal to DOD.

Thank you!

V/R

(b) (6)

From: [Chamberlin, Thomas S SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#)
To: (b) (6)
Cc: [Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#); [Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#)
Subject: Nomination for NIA Excellence Award: (b) (6)
Date: Wednesday, June 30, 2021 8:33:21 AM
Attachments: [NIA Awards FY21 \(b\) \(6\) .docx](#)

(b) (6),

Attached please find the nomination for (b) (6) to receive the 2021 NIA Award for Excellence for his leadership role on the TF.

Thanks for your consideration,

TC

From: (b) (6)
To: [Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO \(USA\)](#)
Cc: [Miller, Christopher A SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#); [Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#)
Subject: FW: UAP Member Briefing July 13
Date: Thursday, July 1, 2021 2:46:20 PM

Admiral,

FYSA.

VR, (b) (6)

From: Kozik, David A SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA) (b) (6)

Date: Thursday, Jul 01, 2021, 12:00 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: RE: UAP Member Briefing July 13

(b) (6) —

Invites received all around I believe, and we're all synching on how best to support.

FYSA, we're going to have Maj Gen Simpson do double duty for ODNI and AF—unfortunately, Lt Gen O'Brien is unavailable on 13 July so we will substitute. Additionally, ODNI will bring some additional experts to support the briefing.

I don't foresee any issues with us providing members with all the details we have, but the fact is, we ARE in a transition period now that the report has been issued and distributed to what comes after the Navy's UAPTF. Per the Deputy's direction to USD(I&S), we owe her options on the way ahead, and ODNI is supporting the same. We'll be prepared to talk about the range of COAs under consideration, pros/cons of each, and certainly welcome the members to provide their own thoughts, but until we have provided those COAs to our leadership and they have approved them (ideally late summer/early fall of this year), we're unavoidably limited to hypotheticals two weeks from now.

V/R,
DK

David A. Kozik
Director, OUSD(I&S) Congressional Activities / Chief, ASD/LA Intel Team

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Thursday, July 1, 2021 11:52 AM

To: (b) (6)

(b) (6) Kozik, David A SES
OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA) (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: [Non-DoD Source] UAP Member Briefing July 13

(b) (6) /Dave,

Just wanted to make sure you've received the UAP Invite Letter from us. I believe they were sent Tuesday.

In general, Tommy and I believe useful opening remarks would be:

- MG Simpson leads off with a quick overview of the report
- VADM Trussler provides an update on the UAP TF, recent events since the information cut off of the report, and where the UAP TF is heading
- LTG O'Brien provides an update on USAF's efforts over the past 9 months (new to members)

We expect members to be frustrated with the report and the perceived lack of progress (no one should be shocked). We also believe a good way to address that frustration is if briefers are:

- Forthcoming on details of new incidents (and saying if they don't know what they are),
- Forthcoming on the extent of the issue,
- Focus on a way forward (this is why we're also working with NORTHCOM to have the J3 there) to include current and future resources dedicated in whole or in part to this.

What we'd prefer to avoid is a repeat of our AHI hearing with CIA last month where briefers refused to provide details, continued the same old story about "working on the issue" and obviously didn't take seriously the ongoing attacks against US personnel. UAP's are certainly different – no one is getting attacked – but the members (including Chairman Warner) have already drawn parallels between the two issues.

Happy to set up a call between us all to discuss if helpful.

Thanks,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
To: (b) (6)
Cc: [Cumming, Matthew C \(Matt\)](#) SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA); [Brav, Scott W](#) SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA)
Subject: Good report article
Date: Friday, July 2, 2021 9:56:08 AM

Meanwhile, here's a good article from a scientist commenting that it'd be good to have real scientists begin looking into UAP now that some of the stigma is beginning to lift. Go science & data-driven approach!

<https://no-click.mil/?https://theconversation.com/us-intelligence-report-on-ufos-no-aliens-but-government-transparency-and-desire-for-better-data-might-bring-science-to-the-ufo-world-163059>

Regards,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
To: (b) (6); [Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Wash Post column
Date: Tuesday, July 6, 2021 9:09:43 AM

Where are we on UFOs and national security?

The system is working

By [Daniel W. Drezner](#)

Daniel W. Drezner is a professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and a regular contributor to PostEverything.

July 6, 2021 at 7:00 a.m. EDT

The hard-working staff here at Spoiler Alerts spent last week on a much-needed vacation — but that doesn't mean we stopped [reading technical journals](#). And for good reason — I was eagerly anticipating the [ODNI's congressionally mandated report](#) on unidentified aerial phenomena (UAPs).

I was hardly the only one. The anticipation of the report produced a small cottage industry of longform stories — [60 Minutes](#), [USA Today](#), [Politico](#) and [the New Yorker](#), to name the most obvious ones. The tenor in most of these stories was about how [the existence of unidentified flying objects](#) had previously been a much-maligned idea and now seems to have [gone mainstream](#). There's even [a lobbyist](#).

The [surprisingly bipartisan enthusiasm](#) for the subject of UAPs merits a cautionary warning, and that is exactly what [the Atlantic's Sarah Scoles](#) provided in her preemptive takedown of how the media would cover the report: “Reporters have taken sources at their word without corroborating data, let documented contradictions slide by, and glossed over the motivations of both outside agitators and government insiders. Reports of UFOs always come with a dearth of information; right now, we need to weigh what little we have carefully and stick to the standards of skepticism that we would apply to anything else.”

With all of that ballyhoo, [the actual report](#) was bound to be a letdown. The first tell is that it's only nine total pages and only five pages of actual text. The national security bureaucracy cannot change a towel dispenser in the Pentagon without a 20-page memo, so this is thin by normal standards and ultrathin by federal government standards.

Furthermore, the report did not say “aliens,” “extraterrestrials” or any combination of words to that effect. Instead, the report, while confirming overlapping sensor evidence of UAPs, lists five possible explanations. The first four are: airborne clutter, natural atmospheric phenomena, American high tech and foreign high tech. The last category is “other,” which presumably includes, you know, the aliens.

So what did we learn from this report? A few things:

1) ODNI is practicing decent social science. Props to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence for recognizing that this is not a monocausal story. It states that “there are multiple types of UAP requiring different explanations.” Furthermore, it is smart enough to know what it does not know. The report refuses to assign different UAP sightings into different buckets because, to repeat a theme, the office doesn’t know which bucket each sighting fits into.

2) The overwhelming majority of UAP sightings are not ETs. The report lists 144 events originating from federal government sources, 80 of them with multiple confirmation by independent sensors. Within that data, only 18 cases included instances in which “observers reported unusual UAP movement patterns or flight characteristics.” Don’t get me wrong, 18 is a lot more than zero, and maybe some of the other UAP reports wind up belonging to this category. But we are not talking about a copious amount of data to work from.

3) There will be more data. Yay! The most encouraging sign about the report is the acknowledgment that the task force intends to augment and standardize its data collection. Most of the incidents are from the U.S. Navy, but the report acknowledges that the U.S. Air Force and Federal Aviation Administration are starting to develop procedures for collecting similar incidence reports. The report itself will further reduce the stigma against such reports. Furthermore, the task force, “intends to focus additional analysis on the small number of cases where a UAP appeared to display unusual flight characteristics or signature management.”

So, no, the report is not really a game-changer. But the process of mandating a report has been. The stigmatization of UAP incidents has been dramatically reduced. The national security bureaucracy seems geared up to collect more data. This is an issue where Congress seems keenly interested. Strange as it may sound in 2021, the UFO question appears to be an instance in which the system has worked.

<https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/07/06/where-are-we-ufos-national-security/>

(b) (6)



From: (b) (6)
To: (b) (6)
Cc: [Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#); [Mckernan](#) (b) (6)
Subject: RE: DON-NAVY-2021-008269
Date: Tuesday, July 6, 2021 3:23:12 PM

Sir,

Received, will do.

V/r,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, July 6, 2021 3:17 PM
To: (b) (6)
Cc: [Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#) (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: FW: DON-NAVY-2021-008269

(b) (6)

Can you please triage this request? It is for the report regarding the deflated balloon referenced in the UAP report. Please work with TF members to identify and review subject records.

Thanks.

R/ (b) (6)

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b) (6)
Date: Tuesday, Jul 06, 2021, 10:49 AM
To: (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Cc: DONFOIA-PA <donfoia-pa@navy.mil>
Subject: FW: DON-NAVY-2021-008269

(b) (6)

I am sending this email on behalf of (b) (6). His flank speed is not allowing him to send email.

(b) (6)

"Good morning Sir,

I hope this day finds you well and you were able to enjoy your 4th of July weekend.

I wanted to reach out to ask if you could take a look at this request to help us determine which specific fleet, ship, or office may have generated the report in question so that we may reach out directly to them.

The requester is seeking "copies of any initial report and any associated video and telemetry data [with regard to a UAP object later identified as a deflating balloon]" which was mentioned in a report put out by ODNI

I've attached the items the requester included in their request, one which is a unclass report that is publically available and one which is a FOIA redirect to Navy for the requested information.

Please let me know if I can provide anything else,

Very Respectfully,

(b) (6)

DONFOIA-PA@navy.mil <mailto:DONFOIA-PA@navy.mil>

NOTICE FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO) - Privacy Act Data - Privacy Sensitive - Any misuse or

unauthorized disclosure may result in both civil and criminal penalties.

The information contained in this e-mail is subject to review in accordance with the Department of the Navy's acceptable use policy. All written communications fall under the records retention policy for official records and should accordingly be archived. If you have any questions regarding this notice, please contact the sender. Thank you.

(b) (6)

I am sending this email on behalf of Christian Amarillo. His flank speed is not allowing him to send email.

(b) (6)

"Good morning Sir,

I hope this day finds you well and you were able to enjoy your 4th of July weekend.

I wanted to reach out to ask if you could take a look at this request to help us determine which specific fleet, ship, or office may have generated the report in question so that we may reach out directly to them.

The requester is seeking "copies of any initial report and any associated video and telemetry data [with regard to a UAP object later identified as a deflating balloon]" which was mentioned in a report put out by ODNI

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Please let me know if I can provide anything else,

Very Respectfully,

(b) (6)
[Redacted signature block containing multiple lines of blacked-out text]

The information contained in this e-mail is subject to review in accordance with the Department of the Navy's acceptable use policy. All written communications fall under the records retention policy for official records and should accordingly be archived. If you have any questions regarding this notice, please contact the sender. Thank you.

DON-NAVY-2021-008269 Request Details

Case Phase: Evaluation Case Status: Initial Evaluation Due Date: N/A Clock Days: 0 (Never Started)

Requester Information

Requester	(b) (6)	Tracking Number	DON-NAVY-2021-008269
Organization		Submitted Date	07/01/2021
Requester Has Account	No	Received Date	07/01/2021
Email Address	(b) (6)	Perfected Date	
Phone Number	(b) (6)	Last Assigned Date	07/01/2021
Fax Number		Assigned To	Chief of Naval Operations
Address	(b) (6)	Last Assigned By	
City		Request Track	Simple
State/Province		Fee Limit	\$200.00
Zip Code/Postal Code			

Request Handling

Requester Info Available to the Public	No	Request Type	FOIA
Request Track	Simple	Request Perfected	No
Fee Category	Other	Acknowledgement Sent Date	07/01/2021
Fee Waiver Requested	Yes	Unusual Circumstances	No
Fee Waiver Status	Pending	Litigation	No
Expedited Processing Requested	No	5 Day Notifications	
Expedited Processing Status			

Description

1954/2000

Dear FOIA Officer:

This is a request for records under the Freedom of Information Act.

On 25 June, 2021, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence with the Department of the Navy issued an unclassified "Preliminary Assessment: Unidentified Aerial Phenomena." I am requesting documentation referenced in this report. More specifically, on page 4, paragraph 2, the report states, "We were able to identify one reported UAP with high confidence. In that case, we identified the object as a large, deflating balloon."

As this is the unclassified version of the report, and because the object has been identified as a balloon, I am requesting copies of any initial report and any associated video and telemetry data for this specifically mentioned case. Sanitizing personally identifiable information is acceptable however as the ODNI listed this information in an unclassified report and due to the fact that the object itself was identified as a deflating balloon, there should be no denial due to a pending investigation or to a classification.

Attached to this request is a response from ODNI directing me to petition the DoD directly for this information.

For the purposes of determining what, if any, fees may be assessed in connection with the processing of this request, I am an individual seeking information for personal use and not for commercial use [see § 2411.13(c)(4) for a description of this category].

I request a waiver of all fees for the request. Disclosure of the requested information to me is in the public interest because it is likely to contribute significantly to the public understanding of the operations or activities of the government; and is not primarily my commercial interest.

If you have any questions regarding this request, I can be contacted at: (b) (6)

Sincerely,

Has Description Been Modified

Description Available to the Public

Short Description

No

UAP Initial Report

Additional Information

Case Number

Name of Local Command

Contract Number

Limit Request To Clearly Releasable Info

Select Limit Request To Clearly Releasable Info

Attached Supporting Files

Attachments Available to the Public		No	
Attached File Name	Size (MB)	File Type	Remove
FOIA Denial 1.pdf	0.3134	Adobe PDF Document	

Upload Supporting Files

No supporting files have been uploaded.

Drag files here

Upload Supporting Files

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC

(b) (6)

June 30, 2021

Reference: ODNI Case No. DF-2021-00262

(b) (6)

This letter responds to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request dated 25 June 2021, and received by the Information Management Office of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) on 28 June 2021, in which you seek "...copies of any initial report and any associated video and telemetry data for the object identified as a 'large, deflating balloon'" in the recently released "Preliminary Assessment: Unidentified Aerial Phenomena" report.

While ODNI, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, wrote the report as directed by the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, the Director, Department of Defense Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force (UAPTF) is the official responsible for collection and consolidation of data on UAP. Therefore, ODNI recommends you submit your request directly to DoD to ensure the most efficient handling. As such, we are administratively closing your case.

You may contact me, the FOIA Public Liaison, at dni-foia-liaison@dni.gov or (703) 275-3500 for any further assistance or to discuss any aspect of your request.

Additionally, you are always free to contact our Requester Service Center at dni-foia@dni.gov or (703) 275-1313.

Sincerely,



Sally A. Nicholson
Chief, Information Review &
Release Group
FOIA Public Liaison
Information Management Office

UNCLASSIFIED



OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

Preliminary Assessment: Unidentified Aerial Phenomena

25 June 2021

UNCLASSIFIED

SCOPE AND ASSUMPTIONS

Scope

This preliminary report is provided by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) in response to the provision in Senate Report 116-233, accompanying the Intelligence Authorization Act (IAA) for Fiscal Year 2021, that the DNI, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), is to submit an intelligence assessment of the threat posed by unidentified aerial phenomena (UAP) and the progress the Department of Defense Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force (UAPTF) has made in understanding this threat.

This report provides an overview for policymakers of the challenges associated with characterizing the potential threat posed by UAP while also providing a means to develop relevant processes, policies, technologies, and training for the U.S. military and other U.S. Government (USG) personnel if and when they encounter UAP, so as to enhance the Intelligence Community's (IC) ability to understand the threat. The Director, UAPTF, is the accountable official for ensuring the timely collection and consolidation of data on UAP. The dataset described in this report is currently limited primarily to U.S. Government reporting of incidents occurring from November 2004 to March 2021. Data continues to be collected and analyzed.

ODNI prepared this report for the Congressional Intelligence and Armed Services Committees. UAPTF and the ODNI National Intelligence Manager for Aviation drafted this report, with input from USD(I&S), DIA, FBI, NRO, NGA, NSA, Air Force, Army, Navy, Navy/ONI, DARPA, FAA, NOAA, NGA, ODNI/NIM-Emerging and Disruptive Technology, ODNI/National Counterintelligence and Security Center, and ODNI/National Intelligence Council.

Assumptions

Various forms of sensors that register UAP generally operate correctly and capture enough real data to allow initial assessments, but some UAP may be attributable to sensor anomalies.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The limited amount of high-quality reporting on unidentified aerial phenomena (UAP) hampers our ability to draw firm conclusions about the nature or intent of UAP. The Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force (UAPTF) considered a range of information on UAP described in U.S. military and IC (Intelligence Community) reporting, but because the reporting lacked sufficient specificity, ultimately recognized that a unique, tailored reporting process was required to provide sufficient data for analysis of UAP events.

- As a result, the UAPTF concentrated its review on reports that occurred between 2004 and 2021, the majority of which are a result of this new tailored process to better capture UAP events through formalized reporting.
- Most of the UAP reported probably do represent physical objects given that a majority of UAP were registered across multiple sensors, to include radar, infrared, electro-optical, weapon seekers, and visual observation.

In a limited number of incidents, UAP reportedly appeared to exhibit unusual flight characteristics. These observations could be the result of sensor errors, spoofing, or observer misperception and require additional rigorous analysis.

There are probably multiple types of UAP requiring different explanations based on the range of appearances and behaviors described in the available reporting. Our analysis of the data supports the construct that if and when individual UAP incidents are resolved they will fall into one of five potential explanatory categories: airborne clutter, natural atmospheric phenomena, USG or U.S. industry developmental programs, foreign adversary systems, and a catchall “other” bin.

UAP clearly pose a safety of flight issue and may pose a challenge to U.S. national security. Safety concerns primarily center on aviators contending with an increasingly cluttered air domain. UAP would also represent a national security challenge if they are foreign adversary collection platforms or provide evidence a potential adversary has developed either a breakthrough or disruptive technology.

Consistent consolidation of reports from across the federal government, standardized reporting, increased collection and analysis, and a streamlined process for screening all such reports against a broad range of relevant USG data will allow for a more sophisticated analysis of UAP that is likely to deepen our understanding. Some of these steps are resource-intensive and would require additional investment.

AVAILABLE REPORTING LARGELY INCONCLUSIVE

Limited Data Leaves Most UAP Unexplained...

Limited data and inconsistency in reporting are key challenges to evaluating UAP. No standardized reporting mechanism existed until the Navy established one in March 2019. The Air Force subsequently adopted that mechanism in November 2020, but it remains limited to USG reporting. The UAPTF regularly heard anecdotally during its research about other observations that occurred but which were never captured in formal or informal reporting by those observers.

After carefully considering this information, the UAPTF focused on reports that involved UAP largely witnessed firsthand by military aviators and that were collected from systems we considered to be reliable. These reports describe incidents that occurred between 2004 and 2021, with the majority coming in the last two years as the new reporting mechanism became better known to the military aviation community. We were able to identify one reported UAP with high confidence. In that case, we identified the object as a large, deflating balloon. The others remain unexplained.

- **144** reports originated from USG sources. Of these, **80** reports involved observation with multiple sensors.
 - Most reports described UAP as objects that interrupted pre-planned training or other military activity.

UAP Collection Challenges

Sociocultural stigmas and sensor limitations remain obstacles to collecting data on UAP. Although some technical challenges—such as how to appropriately filter out radar clutter to ensure safety of flight for military and civilian aircraft—are longstanding in the aviation community, while others are unique to the UAP problem set.

- Narratives from aviators in the operational community and analysts from the military and IC describe disparagement associated with observing UAP, reporting it, or attempting to discuss it with colleagues. Although the effects of these stigmas have lessened as senior members of the scientific, policy, military, and intelligence communities engage on the topic seriously in public, reputational risk may keep many observers silent, complicating scientific pursuit of the topic.
- The sensors mounted on U.S. military platforms are typically designed to fulfill specific missions. As a result, those sensors are not generally suited for identifying UAP.
- Sensor vantage points and the numbers of sensors concurrently observing an object play substantial roles in distinguishing UAP from known objects and determining whether a UAP demonstrates breakthrough aerospace capabilities. Optical sensors have the benefit of providing some insight into relative size, shape, and structure. Radiofrequency sensors provide more accurate velocity and range information.

But Some Potential Patterns Do Emerge

Although there was wide variability in the reports and the dataset is currently too limited to allow for detailed trend or pattern analysis, there was some clustering of UAP observations regarding shape, size, and, particularly, propulsion. UAP sightings also tended to cluster around U.S. training and testing grounds, but we assess that this may result from a collection bias as a result of focused attention, greater numbers of latest-generation sensors operating in those areas, unit expectations, and guidance to report anomalies.

And a Handful of UAP Appear to Demonstrate Advanced Technology

In **18** incidents, described in **21** reports, observers reported unusual UAP movement patterns or flight characteristics.

Some UAP appeared to remain stationary in winds aloft, move against the wind, maneuver abruptly, or move at considerable speed, without discernable means of propulsion. In a small number of cases, military aircraft systems processed radio frequency (RF) energy associated with UAP sightings.

The UAPTF holds a small amount of data that appear to show UAP demonstrating acceleration or a degree of signature management. Additional rigorous analysis are necessary by multiple teams or groups of technical experts to determine the nature and validity of these data. We are conducting further analysis to determine if breakthrough technologies were demonstrated.

UAP PROBABLY LACK A SINGLE EXPLANATION

The UAP documented in this limited dataset demonstrate an array of aerial behaviors, reinforcing the possibility there are multiple types of UAP requiring different explanations. Our analysis of the data supports the construct that if and when individual UAP incidents are resolved they will fall into one of five potential explanatory categories: airborne clutter, natural atmospheric phenomena, USG or industry developmental programs, foreign adversary systems, and a catchall “other” bin. With the exception of the one instance where we determined with high confidence that the reported UAP was airborne clutter, specifically a deflating balloon, we currently lack sufficient information in our dataset to attribute incidents to specific explanations.

Airborne Clutter: These objects include birds, balloons, recreational unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), or airborne debris like plastic bags that muddle a scene and affect an operator’s ability to identify true targets, such as enemy aircraft.

Natural Atmospheric Phenomena: Natural atmospheric phenomena includes ice crystals, moisture, and thermal fluctuations that may register on some infrared and radar systems.

USG or Industry Developmental Programs: Some UAP observations could be attributable to developments and classified programs by U.S. entities. We were unable to confirm, however, that these systems accounted for any of the UAP reports we collected.

Foreign Adversary Systems: Some UAP may be technologies deployed by China, Russia, another nation, or a non-governmental entity.

Other: Although most of the UAP described in our dataset probably remain unidentified due to limited data or challenges to collection processing or analysis, we may require additional scientific knowledge to successfully collect on, analyze and characterize some of them. We would group such objects in this category pending scientific advances that allowed us to better understand them. The UAPTF intends to focus additional analysis on the small number of cases where a UAP appeared to display unusual flight characteristics or signature management.

UAP THREATEN FLIGHT SAFETY AND, POSSIBLY, NATIONAL SECURITY

UAP pose a hazard to safety of flight and could pose a broader danger if some instances represent sophisticated collection against U.S. military activities by a foreign government or demonstrate a breakthrough aerospace technology by a potential adversary.

Ongoing Airspace Concerns

When aviators encounter safety hazards, they are required to report these concerns. Depending on the location, volume, and behavior of hazards during incursions on ranges, pilots may cease their tests and/or training and land their aircraft, which has a deterrent effect on reporting.

- The UAPTF has 11 reports of documented instances in which pilots reported near misses with a UAP.

Potential National Security Challenges

We currently lack data to indicate any UAP are part of a foreign collection program or indicative of a major technological advancement by a potential adversary. We continue to monitor for evidence of such programs given the counter intelligence challenge they would pose, particularly as some UAP have been detected near military facilities or by aircraft carrying the USG's most advanced sensor systems.

EXPLAINING UAP WILL REQUIRE ANALYTIC, COLLECTION AND RESOURCE INVESTMENT

Standardize the Reporting, Consolidate the Data, and Deepen the Analysis

In line with the provisions of Senate Report 116-233, accompanying the IAA for FY 2021, the UAPTF's long-term goal is to widen the scope of its work to include additional UAP events documented by a broader swath of USG personnel and technical systems in its analysis. As the dataset increases, the UAPTF's ability to employ data analytics to detect trends will also improve. The initial focus will be to employ artificial intelligence/machine learning algorithms to cluster and recognize similarities and patterns in features of the data points. As the database accumulates information from known aerial objects such as weather balloons, high-altitude or super-pressure balloons, and wildlife, machine learning can add efficiency by pre-assessing UAP reports to see if those records match similar events already in the database.

- The UAPTF has begun to develop interagency analytical and processing workflows to ensure both collection and analysis will be well informed and coordinated.

The majority of UAP data is from U.S. Navy reporting, but efforts are underway to standardize incident reporting across U.S. military services and other government agencies to ensure all relevant data is captured with respect to particular incidents and any U.S. activities that might be relevant. The UAPTF is currently working to acquire additional reporting, including from the U.S. Air Force (USAF), and has begun receiving data from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).

- Although USAF data collection has been limited historically the USAF began a six-month pilot program in November 2020 to collect in the most likely areas to encounter UAP and is evaluating how to normalize future collection, reporting, and analysis across the entire Air Force.
- The FAA captures data related to UAP during the normal course of managing air traffic operations. The FAA generally ingests this data when pilots and other airspace users report unusual or unexpected events to the FAA's Air Traffic Organization.
- In addition, the FAA continuously monitors its systems for anomalies, generating additional information that may be of use to the UAPTF. The FAA is able to isolate data of interest to the UAPTF and make it available. The FAA has a robust and effective outreach program that can help the UAPTF reach members of the aviation community to highlight the importance of reporting UAP.

Expand Collection

The UAPTF is looking for novel ways to increase collection of UAP cluster areas when U.S. forces are not present as a way to baseline “standard” UAP activity and mitigate the collection bias in the dataset. One proposal is to use advanced algorithms to search historical data captured and stored by radars. The UAPTF also plans to update its current interagency UAP collection strategy in order bring to bear relevant collection platforms and methods from the DoD and the IC.

Increase Investment in Research and Development

The UAPTF has indicated that additional funding for research and development could further the future study of the topics laid out in this report. Such investments should be guided by a UAP Collection Strategy, UAP R&D Technical Roadmap, and a UAP Program Plan.

APPENDIX A - Definition of Key Terms

This report and UAPTF databases use the following defining terms:

Unidentified Aerial Phenomena (UAP): Airborne objects not immediately identifiable. The acronym UAP represents the broadest category of airborne objects reviewed for analysis.

UAP Event: A holistic description of an occurrence during which a pilot or aircrew witnessed (or detected) a UAP.

UAP Incident: A specific part of the event.

UAP Report: Documentation of a UAP event, to include verified chains of custody and basic information such as the time, date, location, and description of the UAP. UAP reports include Range Fouler¹ reports and other reporting.

¹ U.S. Navy aviators define a “range fouler” as an activity or object that interrupts pre-planned training or other military activity in a military operating area or restricted airspace.

APPENDIX B – Senate Report Accompanying the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021

Senate Report 116-233, accompanying the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, provides that the DNI, in consultation with the SECDEF and other relevant heads of USG Agencies, is to submit an intelligence assessment of the threat posed by UAP and the progress the UAPTF has made to understand this threat.

The Senate Report specifically requested that the report include:

1. A detailed analysis of UAP data and intelligence reporting collected or held by the Office of Naval Intelligence, including data and intelligence reporting held by the UAPTF;
2. A detailed analysis of unidentified phenomena data collected by:
 - a. Geospatial Intelligence;
 - b. Signals Intelligence;
 - c. Human Intelligence; and
 - d. Measurement and Signatures Intelligence
3. A detailed analysis of data of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which was derived from investigations of intrusions of UAP data over restricted U.S. airspace;
4. A detailed description of an interagency process for ensuring timely data collection and centralized analysis of all UAP reporting for the Federal Government, regardless of which service or agency acquired the information;
5. Identification of an official accountable for the process described in paragraph 4;
6. Identification of potential aerospace or other threats posed by the UAP to national security, and an assessment of whether this UAP activity may be attributed to one or more foreign adversaries;
7. Identification of any incidents or patterns that indicate a potential adversary, have achieved breakthrough aerospace capabilities that could put U.S. strategic or conventional forces at risk; and
8. Recommendations regarding increased collection of data, enhanced research and development, additional funding, and other resources.

From: (b) (6)
To: (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Fwd: UAP encounter near Arvonion, VA Navy test facility in the early 2000s
Date: Tuesday, July 27, 2021 2:13:00 PM
Attachments: [Hi-Test Labs testing capabilities and line of sight hover height estimations math.pdf](#)
[Layout Google Earth map and kinematics.pdf](#)

Mr. Stratton and Mr. Bray,

My name is (b) (6) and I am currently an administrator for a defense think tank and formerly an Operations Specialist Second Class in the United States Navy. I am forwarding to you an account in which UAP activity was observed near a USN test facility in the early 2000s. I emailed this to Lue Elizondo previously but did not hear back. I did watch the UAP briefing that ONI put together and got your email addresses from that video. Since it involved UAP near a test facility, I felt compelled to also share this account with you.

You will find two attachments above. One is a layout print-off from Google Earth with markup indicating measurements of the event. The other is a print-to-pdf of the Hi-Test Labs site in Arvonion, Virginia detailing what types of testing they do there for the Navy and other branches or agencies.

I hesitated for years in terms of telling anyone beyond family and other cleared individuals my account but I am forwarding the below and the attachments to you now in the hopes that it will do some good. I believe the reticence for many people, military and civilian alike, is declining post the 2017 NYT article and further follow-on articles and releases from both the media and the U.S. government. If the UAPTF can do some good with this information, especially since it was around a test facility, all the better. I know this account is in hindsight and that you may not believe it. However, it is something that I will never forget and it had two witnesses - both myself and my sister. We were younger then, I was between 11 and 13, but I will remember this sighting until the day I die.

Please let me know if there is anything that I can do to help amplify the details given in the email and in the attachments. Thank you for what you are doing with the task force. Hopefully, Congress will provide dedicated funding for a full-time effort that gets to the bottom of what these are and what is going on in our skies, with our warfighters, and in general.

Respectfully,

(b) (6)

SIPR email available upon request

----- Forwarded message -----

From: (b) (6)
Date: Fri, Jun 4, 2021 at 7:38 PM
Subject: UAP encounter near Arvonion, VA Navy test facility in the early 2000s
To: (b) (6)

Mr. Elizondo,

First, let me say that I received your email address from a highly regarded researcher in the field of UAP. While he wanted to remain anonymous, as someone that also highly regards my privacy, if this is inappropriate, please let me know and I will delete this email from my account. I felt, however, that it was incredibly important that I reach out to you, given your background and immense experience with the subject matter. I have only shared this experience to fewer people than can be counted on one hand, the good majority active-duty at the time or to one vet with a very high clearance and an interest in the subject - people I know I can trust.

My name is (b) (6) and I am a U.S. Navy veteran, serving aboard the USS Vandegrift after college from 2012 until her decommissioning in 2015 and as a staff OS in COMPHIBRON ONE, aboard the USS Boxer from 2015-2016. I left the Navy in August of 2016 as an Operations Specialist Second Class (E-5). I currently work as an administrator at a defense think tank. I still hold and maintain a U.S. Secret clearance.

The story I would like to relay to you may seem far-fetched, not too much given your experience, but with hindsight not always being 20/20 and issues around memory recall, I can understand a possible reluctance on your part to believe it. Trust me when I say that those moments were, and still are, unforgettable and ingrained in my mind even to this day. I will endeavor to relay the entire picture as it happened, although given my age at the time, I am giving a year range based upon when my family moved to that location. I honestly cannot remember the exact month and year.

On a clear night between the years 2000 and 2002 in Arvon, Virginia, I witnessed a whitish-yellowish UAP hovering silently above the treeline roughly 100 to 120 feet behind my family's house at the time. I was between 11 and 13 years old at the time. It had no flaps, ailerons, rotors, rotorwash, nor any noise or exhaust of any kind, only a shimmering, solid, and absolutely silent aspect. I would estimate that it was between 8 and 15 feet in width, maybe 5 or so feet possibly more in height. It hovered silently there for a couple of minutes. I was able to view it through the blinds on my bedroom window - as we were living in a rural area, I frequently did this at night to spot any animal life quite prevalent in the area.

After initially being frozen in fear or shock, I was able to call in my youngest sister, who was still quite young, between 6 and 9 years of age at the time, who was able to look at it as well. I felt it was important that I was not the only witness. It was later very useful when she confirmed it to our mother who was, suffice it to say, very reluctant to believe more for some time. Two was better than one, especially when trying to convince a parent of something that happened.

During the encounter, I would estimate after a couple of minutes of hovering above the treeline, it popped up a few feet, then instantaneously sped off within a blink of an eye or [helpful to snap here] within a finger snap to the north/northeast and was gone. There was no exhaust, nor any sonic booms as you expect with a craft that accelerated that fast. The only thing I can think of that could explain it simply would be a jump to lightspeed from Star Wars, Star Trek, or Stargate - it was that fast. Literally blink and miss it. The UAP could have been over Charlottesville in seconds, possibly to Washington, D.C within a little more, although I have no way of knowing.

Suffice it to say it shook me and threw everything I had thought of about aircraft and my perception of the world at that young age upside down. Even more so recently when I learned about the facility that this craft/object may have been reconnoitering. Behind the houses and trailer homes in the area are two major installations to the small town, the Buckingham Slate Company mine <https://www.buckinghamslate.com/about/> and Hi-Test Labs <https://hittestlabs.com/>. I knew about both but only recently found out that that site conducts various shock and hardness testing on Navy assets and equipment. Therefore, this incident would have been, although I didn't realize it at the time, yet another encounter of UAP at or near testing facilities for our military, except over land and not ocean as the other more recent accounts have seen. Multiple people at my current company have been to Hi-Test to conduct system operational test experiments over the years.

The fact that this was near a test facility has encouraged me to research more on this topic and reach out to people who investigate these matters thoroughly, one of whom was kind enough to lend me this email so I could contact you. In fact, he highly encouraged me to do so. I have been reluctant but given the news in the past few years, and upcoming UAPTF report to Congress, I felt I had an obligation to tell my account to someone who would take it seriously, especially as a fellow veteran to another.


I want to thank you immensely for your military service, service on AATIP, and continued service to the nation in getting (and continuing to push the bounds for more) transparency surrounding this issue. I know there will be tremendous roadblocks along the way, but with people like yourself, Chris Mellon, and others, government officials will continue to have no choice but to listen and take this matter seriously. Your devotion to duty and getting it right, no matter what the "it" is, compelled me to tell you. I have attached supplementary scans of a Google Earth layout chart with ranges and hover station and flight path kinematics, as well as a sheet giving mathematical estimations for the encounter, and site content from the Hi-Test website regarding the types of testing they do there.

Please feel free any time to reach out to me to discuss this matter and I would be happy to discuss and engage with any comments or questions you may have. Should you want to do a video call, I do have a Signal account which I may use for private discussion. My cell number is available to you upon request.


Keep on fighting the great fight!

Respectfully,


(b) (6)



2500
14,400



$$c = \sqrt{a^2 + b^2} = \sqrt{120^2 + 120^2} = 169.7056$$



20 ft
138 ft
= Object @ 138 ft

Slate quarry ~ 1600 ft to center of pit

Hi-Test Labs
~ 3,845 ft from site



Cut/Drill Hole at mine then 1-2 min. instantaneous N/E accel., no sonic boom

~ 2000-2002 Arvonia, VA

From: [Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#)
Subject: Re: Contact Information
Date: Friday, July 30, 2021 2:49:27 PM

Were you aware of this inspection?

Sandy

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, July 30, 2021 1:42 PM
To: (b) (6)
Cc: Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA)
Subject: FW: Contact Information

Sir,

Attached is a memo that I received from DODIG pertaining to their evaluation of actions taken by DOD regarding UAP.

This was brought to my attention this morning when ONI Front Office inquired if DODIG personnel visiting on Monday were part of my ONI Inspection team.

Given the significant interest with UAP and some historical concerns with those who have represented the program in the past, I wanted to ensure that you had visibility of DODIG's visit/actions.

(b) (6)



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From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, July 30, 2021 1:35 PM
To: NIA_IG_Internal (b) (6)
Subject: FW: Contact Information

FYSA – Attached is the memo pertaining to DODIG's ONI visit on Monday. I'll forward this memo to Director Bray for his information and discuss with NAVINSGEN; just in case they were in receipt of the memo as stated by DODIG.

(b) (6)

A large rectangular area of the document is completely redacted with a solid black box. The redaction covers several lines of text.

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From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, July 30, 2021 1:33 PM
To: (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: RE: Contact Information

(b) (6)

Thanks for the info and for looping me in on this effort.

I truly appreciate being added to your contact list for IG matters and coordination related to the Naval Intelligence Enterprise.

As stated earlier, I wanted to introduce myself to you all as I assumed you were unaware that we have an office at ONI and because there was confusion amongst ONI leadership due to my inbound

SMEs coming in on Monday to assist with our inspection of ONI.

Also, with respect to this initiative, I want to ensure that the Director of Naval Intelligence Activity (Scott Bray) is tracking this initiative, given his direct involvement with said topic and the high interest that this topic has garnered.

If you have any questions or need to reach me for any reason, please do not hesitate to contact me via any of the means provided below.

Respectfully,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

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From: (b) (6)

Sent: Friday, July 30, 2021 1:24 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Subject: RE: Contact Information

(b) (6),

Attached is our announcement memo. We had entrance conferences with the identified POCs back in late June. We've also recently send out data calls to the Services and intelligence agencies.

We'll add your contact info for applicable data calls or meetings.

V/r,

b) (6)

[REDACTED]

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, July 30, 2021 9:41 AM
To: (b) (6)
Subject: Contact Information

Per our conversation.

(b) (6)

[REDACTED]

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From: (b) (6)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#)
Cc: [Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#); [Chamberlin, Thomas S SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#)
Subject: FW: DoD OIG Data Call - Data and Document Request for the Evaluation of the DoD's Actions Regarding the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena (Project No. D2021-DEV0SN-0116.000)
Date: Monday, August 9, 2021 6:52:38 PM
Attachments: [Data Request Intelligence Agencies- Evaluation of UAP - 07 28 21.pdf](#)
[Announcement Memo - D2021-DEV0SN-0116.000.pdf](#)

Scott,
Provided FYI. The DoDIG is continuing its project and is requesting data from responsive organizations within 15 days of the receipt of this message. We are working the response.

V/r,

(b) (6)

[Redacted]

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, August 9, 2021 11:06 AM
To: (b) (6)

[Redacted]

Cc: (b) (6)

[Redacted]

Subject: DoD OIG Data Call - Data and Document Request for the Evaluation of the DoD's Actions Regarding the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena (Project No. D2021-DEV0SN-0116.000)

Good morning,
The DoD IG is conducting an evaluation of DoD actions regarding

Unexplained Aerial Phenomena (UAP). Please see the attached data call for this evaluation to determine if your organization has any information responsive to this RFI.

Please confirm receipt of this request for your organization within 5 days, and provide all responsive information within 15 days of receipt of this message.

Thank you in advance,

(b) (6)



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INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

May 3, 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Evaluation of the DoD's Actions Regarding the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena
(Project No. D2021-DEV0SN-0116.000)

We plan to begin the subject evaluation in May 2021. The objective of this evaluation is to determine the extent to which the DoD has taken actions regarding Unidentified Aerial Phenomena (UAP). We may revise the objective as the evaluation proceeds, and we will consider suggestions from management for additional or revised objectives.

We will perform the evaluation at the Offices of the Secretary of Defense, Military Services, Combatant Commands, Combat Support Agencies, Defense Agencies, and the Military Criminal Investigative Organizations. We may identify additional locations during the evaluation.

Please provide us with a point of contact for the evaluation within **5 days** of the date of this memorandum. The point of contact should be a Government employee or Military Service Member—a GS-15, pay band equivalent, or the military equivalent. Send the contact's name, title, grade/pay band, phone number, and e-mail address to (b) (6).

You can obtain information about the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General from DoD Directive 5106.01, "Inspector General of the Department of Defense (IG DoD)," April 20, 2012, as amended; and DoD Instruction 7050.03, "Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense Access to Records and Information," March 22, 2013. Our website is www.dodig.mil.

If you have any questions, please contact (b) (6)


A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "R. Stone", is located above the name of the Assistant Inspector General.

Randolph R. Stone
Assistant Inspector General for Evaluations
Space, Intelligence, Engineering, and Oversight


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UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY
COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND
COMMANDER, U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND
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AUDITOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
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AUDITOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE


(b) (3) 10 U.S.C. § 130a




(b) (3) 10 U.S.C. § 130a



(b) (3) 10 U.S.C. § 130a



(b) (3) 10 U.S.C. § 130a



From: [Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO \(USA\)](#)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#)
Subject: FW: [Non-DoD Source] It's time to stop UFO mania - The Washington Post
Date: Thursday, August 12, 2021 6:41:56 AM

From: Jeff Trussler (b) (6)
Sent: Thursday, August 12, 2021 6:34 AM
To: Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO (USA) (b) (6)
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] It's time to stop UFO mania - The Washington Post

It's time to stop UFO mania - The Washington Post

<https://www.washingtonpost.com/magazine/2021/08/11/stop-ufo-mania-no-evidence-of-aliens/>
https://www.washingtonpost.com/magazine/2021/08/11/stop-ufo-mania-no-evidence-of-aliens/?fbclid=IwAR3IrZnSFjJc8WY8HbGM03Kf2sv_-0kr_C-Qv3BdtRnXqfuFG64D0-xmaIk

From: (b) (6)
To: (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6) [Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#)
Subject: RE: UAPTF Report
Date: Thursday, August 12, 2021 7:38:41 PM

(b) (6),

I believe your team got the information it needed from me. My phone numbers are below and my personal cell is (b) (6).

(b) (6) (cc'd) can assist with Mr. Bray's information.

V/r,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)
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(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Thursday, August 12, 2021 3:40 PM
To: (b) (6)
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] UAPTF Report

Hello Brennan,

I hope you are well. I wanted to find out who on your end will be attending this briefing. We will need all attendees last 4 digits of their SSN as this is a TS/SCI Level meeting. Will any attendees need parking? Please also send everyone's phone numbers for security.

Best,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: (b) (6)
Date: Wednesday, August 18, 2021 5:54:27 PM

Scott,
Draft note included below.

Johnson, Joan L SES USN ASSTSECNAV RDA DC (USA) (b) (6)

V/r,
(b) (6)

+++

JJ,
(b) (6), (b) (5)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Best,
Scott

Scott W. Bray
Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence
Director, Naval Intelligence Activity

(b) (6)

[REDACTED]

From: [Johnson, Joan L SES USN ASSTSECNAV RDA DC \(USA\)](#)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#); joan.johnson@navy.mil
Cc: [Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#)
Subject: RE: (b) (6)
Date: Thursday, August 19, 2021 10:45:17 AM

Scott,

Thank you for the feedback relative to (b) (6). I share your perspectives that he and the team are a critical contributor to the UAPTF, and am pleased to hear their efforts have had a positive impact. I will reach out to NAVAIR / NAWCAD leadership regarding next steps for (b) (6) and his engagement with the UAPTF.

Great visit to ONI yesterday! Many thanks to the entire team who carved out their afternoon to engage in very productive discussion and to get me up to speed on many of their efforts and capabilities. I am all-in on the tech warrant idea – please let me know when you'd like to follow-up.

v/r,
JJ

From: Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)
Sent: Thursday, August 19, 2021 9:23 AM
To: (b) (6)
Cc: Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)
Subject: (b) (6)

JJ –

First, I want to thank you for your leadership and contributions to the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force and its work. We've made great progress with Navy leading the way.

(b) (6) has been a key part of this success, particularly in the integration of research, development, test, and evaluation activities into the work of the UAPTF to address important safety and security issues. Without his work, we would not have been able to meet critical deadlines and expectations at all levels and branches of government. Thank you for identifying and lending the team his useful talents and expertise.

I understand that you and the leadership team are reviewing (b) (6) future tasks and expectations heading into the next fiscal year and I'd like you to consider a continued role for (b) (6) in the Task Force and its successor organization. The Secretary of Defense will soon make a decision on the future of the Task Force, to include organization, resources, and contributions from across the DoD. I think (b) (6) can play an important role in ensuring continued Navy leadership within the Task Force and across the Department on issues that will directly shape the future of testing and training.

Please don't hesitate to reach out on anything of which I can be of assistance, and thank you again for your time and consideration.

All the Best,
Scott

PS – I heard that your visit to ONI went well yesterday – and I really like the “tech warrant” idea. I'd love to discuss more with you, (b) (6), and Sandy Brown.

Scott W. Bray

Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence

Director, Naval Intelligence Activity

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
To: (b) (6) [Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#); (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: News Article: Emerging Tech Key to Unraveling....
Date: Thursday, August 19, 2021 7:45:24 PM

Thanks for forwarding, (b) (6).

V/r,
(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Thursday, August 19, 2021 9:35 AM
To: Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: News Article: Emerging Tech Key to Unraveling....

FYI...

Regards,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

Emerging Tech Key to Unraveling UFO/UAP Mysteries, Officials Say

MeriTalk, 18 August 2021... by Lisbeth Perez

Further use of emerging technologies marks the path forward for the intelligence community to uncover more compelling evidence of unidentified flying objects (UFO), and to learn more about their meaning and intent, former Federal government officials said at NextGov's technology summit on August 17.

Lue Elizondo, former director of the Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program (ATTIP) at the Department of Defense (DoD), explained that gathering hard data from a variety of sensors has provided a crucial bridge in the government's approach to studying UFOs – also referred to as unidentified aerial phenomena (UAP).

In addition to eyewitness UFO/UAP testimony, Elizondo said, Federal government personnel can utilize ground-based sensors, sea-based sensors, airborne sensors, and now space-based sensors to provide compelling reports to Congress on the issue.

"On top of eyewitness testimonies from trained observers, we have data from sensors as another layer of information that is all corroborating the same information at the same time and place under the same circumstances. That is very compelling," said Elizondo.

A recent preliminary assessment from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence on Unidentified Aerial Phenomena reported that 80 out of 144 sight reports involved observation with multiple sensors that captured enough real data to allow initial assessments.

While Federal agencies have compiled enough data to present compelling evidence of UAPs, former Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, D-Nev., said at the August 17 event that the government must continue working on the most important questions – what are UAPs, and what do they represent.

According to Reid, it would be negligent – and even become legislative malpractice – if the Federal government does not go further to find out more about UAPs. That's mainly because UAPs are a matter of national security concern.

"We have evidence of these multiple sightings. But I think it's essential that we continue trying to find out what these things are," said Reid.

For a subject once relegated mainly to the province of science fiction, the Federal government has come a long way in recent months in acknowledging the validity of UAP sighting data. And a June 2020 vote by the Senate Intelligence Committee requires U.S. intelligence agencies and the DoD to compile an unclassified report covering all data collected on UAPs.

Elizondo explained that transparency on the issue by the Federal government – not just within the classified space but also with the public – is vital because democracy cannot work for the interests of the American people if the government is not truthful, especially with national security concerns.

"There's someone, somewhere with some technology that can come in unimpeded any time they want to at will and undetected over our sensitive facilities," Elizondo said of UAPs. "That's a problem."

[Article](#)

From: (b) (6)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: Re: [Non-DoD Source] Fwd: UAP encounter near Arvonja, VA Navy test facility in the early 2000s
Date: Monday, August 23, 2021 11:56:00 PM

Sir,

We analyzed the PDF attachments and the links within the documents. The content is safe for download and distribution.

V/r

(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

From: Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA)
Sent: Friday, August 13, 2021 9:22 AM
To: (b) (6)
Subject: FW: [Non-DoD Source] Fwd: UAP encounter near Arvonja, VA Navy test facility in the early 2000s

Scott W. Bray
Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence
Director, Naval Intelligence Activity

(b) (6)
(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, July 27, 2021 2:08 PM
To: (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Fwd: UAP encounter near Arvonja, VA Navy test facility in the early 2000s

Mr. Stratton and Mr. Bray,

My name is (b) (6) and I am currently an administrator for a defense think tank and formerly an Operations Specialist Second Class in the United States Navy. I am forwarding to you an account in which UAP activity was observed near a USN test facility in

the early 2000s. I emailed this to Lue Elizondo previously but did not hear back. I did watch the UAP briefing that ONI put together and got your email addresses from that video. Since it involved UAP near a test facility, I felt compelled to also share this account with you.

You will find two attachments above. One is a layout print-off from Google Earth with markup indicating measurements of the event. The other is a print-to-pdf of the Hi-Test Labs site in Arvonnia, Virginia detailing what types of testing they do there for the Navy and other branches or agencies.

I hesitated for years in terms of telling anyone beyond family and other cleared individuals my account but I am forwarding the below and the attachments to you now in the hopes that it will do some good. I believe the reticence for many people, military and civilian alike, is declining post the 2017 NYT article and further follow-on articles and releases from both the media and the U.S. government. If the UAPTF can do some good with this information, especially since it was around a test facility, all the better. I know this account is in hindsight and that you may not believe it. However, it is something that I will never forget and it had two witnesses - both myself and my sister. We were younger then, I was between 11 and 13, but I will remember this sighting until the day I die.

Please let me know if there is anything that I can do to help amplify the details given in the email and in the attachments. Thank you for what you are doing with the task force. Hopefully, Congress will provide dedicated funding for a full-time effort that gets to the bottom of what these are and what is going on in our skies, with our warfighters, and in general.

Respectfully,

(b) (6)

SIPR email available upon request

----- Forwarded message -----

From: (b) (6)

Date: Fri, Jun 4, 2021 at 7:38 PM

Subject: UAP encounter near Arvonnia, VA Navy test facility in the early 2000s

To: (b) (6)

Mr. Elizondo,

First, let me say that I received your email address from a highly regarded researcher in the field of UAP. While he wanted to remain anonymous, as someone that also highly regards my privacy, if this is inappropriate, please let me know and I will delete this email from my account. I felt, however, that it was incredibly important that I reach out to you, given your background and immense experience with the subject matter. I have only shared this experience to fewer people than can be counted on one hand, the good majority active-duty at the time or to one vet with a very high clearance and an interest in the subject - people I know I can trust.

My name is (b) (6) and I am a U.S. Navy veteran, serving aboard the USS Vandegrift after college from 2012 until her decommissioning in 2015 and as a staff OS in COMPHIBRON ONE, aboard the USS Boxer from 2015-2016. I left the Navy in August of 2016 as an Operations Specialist Second Class (E-5). I currently work as an administrator at a defense think tank. I still hold and maintain a U.S. Secret clearance.

The story I would like to relay to you may seem far-fetched, not too much given your experience, but with hindsight not always being 20/20 and issues around memory recall, I can understand a possible reluctance on your part to believe it. Trust me when I say that those moments were, and still are, unforgettable and ingrained in my mind even to this day. I will endeavor to relay the entire picture as it happened, although given my age at the time, I am giving a year range based upon when my family moved to that location. I honestly cannot remember the exact month and year.

On a clear night between the years 2000 and 2002 in Arvon, Virginia, I witnessed a whitish-yellowish UAP hovering silently above the treeline roughly 100 to 120 feet behind my family's house at the time. I was between 11 and 13 years old at the time. It had no flaps, ailerons, rotors, rotorwash, nor any noise or exhaust of any kind, only a shimmering, solid, and absolutely silent aspect. I would estimate that it was between 8 and 15 feet in width, maybe 5 or so feet possibly more in height. It hovered silently there for a couple of minutes. I was able to view it through the blinds on my bedroom window - as we were living in a rural area, I frequently did this at night to spot any animal life quite prevalent in the area.

After initially being frozen in fear or shock, I was able to call in my youngest sister, who was still quite young, between 6 and 9 years of age at the time, who was able to look at it as well. I felt it was important that I was not the only witness. It was later very useful when she confirmed it to our mother who was, suffice it to say, very reluctant to believe more for some time. Two was better than one, especially when trying to convince a parent of something that happened.

During the encounter, I would estimate after a couple of minutes of hovering above the treeline, it popped up a few feet, then instantaneously sped off within a blink of an eye or [helpful to snap here] within a finger snap to the north/northeast and was gone. There was no exhaust, nor any sonic booms as you expect with a craft that accelerated that fast. The only thing I can think of that could explain it simply would be a jump to lightspeed from Star Wars, Star Trek, or Stargate - it was that fast. Literally blink and miss it. The UAP could have been over Charlottesville in seconds, possibly to Washington, D.C within a little more, although I have no way of knowing.

Suffice it to say it shook me and threw everything I had thought of about aircraft and my perception of the world at that young age upside down. Even more so recently when I learned about the facility that this craft/object may have been reconnoitering. Behind the houses and trailer homes in the area are two major installations to the small town, the Buckingham Slate Company mine <https://www.buckinghamslate.com/about/> and Hi-Test Labs <https://hitestlabs.com/>. I knew about both but only recently found out that that site conducts various shock and hardness testing on Navy assets and equipment. Therefore, this incident would have been, although I didn't realize it at the time, yet another encounter of UAP at or near testing facilities for our military, except over land and not ocean as the other more recent accounts have seen. Multiple people at my current company have been to Hi-Test

to conduct system operational test experiments over the years.

The fact that this was near a test facility has encouraged me to research more on this topic and reach out to people who investigate these matters thoroughly, one of whom was kind enough to lend me this email so I could contact you. In fact, he highly encouraged me to do so. I have been reluctant but given the news in the past few years, and upcoming UAPTF report to Congress, I felt I had an obligation to tell my account to someone who would take it seriously, especially as a fellow veteran to another.

I want to thank you immensely for your military service, service on AATIP, and continued service to the nation in getting (and continuing to push the bounds for more) transparency surrounding this issue. I know there will be tremendous roadblocks along the way, but with people like yourself, Chris Mellon, and others, government officials will continue to have no choice but to listen and take this matter seriously. Your devotion to duty and getting it right, no matter what the "it" is, compelled me to tell you. I have attached supplementary scans of a Google Earth layout chart with ranges and hover station and flight path kinematics, as well as a sheet giving mathematical estimations for the encounter, and site content from the Hi-Test website regarding the types of testing they do there.

Please feel free any time to reach out to me to discuss this matter and I would be happy to discuss and engage with any comments or questions you may have. Should you want to do a video call, I do have a Signal account which I may use for private discussion. My cell number is available to you upon request.

Keep on fighting the great fight!

Respectfully,

(b) (6)

From: [Johnson, Joan L SES USN ASSTSECNAV RDA DC \(USA\)](#)
To: [Obernier, Jennifer A SES USN UNSECNAV DC \(USA\); \(b\) \(6\)](#) [Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: WARNO: UNSECNAV UAP Brief
Date: Wednesday, September 1, 2021 2:04:00 PM

Thanks Jen. Any chance we can get (b) (6) invited? If not, we will certainly want his inputs on the technical efforts prior to that meeting.

v/r,
JJ

From: Obernier, Jennifer A SES USN UNSECNAV DC (USA) (b) (6)
Sent: Wednesday, September 1, 2021 11:31 AM
To: (b) (6) Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA)
(b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: WARNO: UNSECNAV UAP Brief

Joan and Scott,

I wanted to give you a heads up that the Under has requested a briefing on UAP within the next two weeks. We are working a DTG and hope to have that confirmed immediately after the holiday. The intended invite list, pending recommendations from you, is VADM Morley, (b) (6), the 3 of us and (b) (6). That said HPCON B+ is about to descend on us, so we may have to set up a SVTC with 3 outstations...

The agenda will be as follows, anticipating an hour long brief:

1. Introduction of the issue – Secretariat (DUSN/RDA)
 - a. Requirement levied on SECNAV last year
 - b. Role of DUSN/RDA in supporting Under/SECNAV (ie EXCOM, R&E efforts)
 - c. OSD players and expected next steps in the CFT
2. UAP TF brief – N2N6
 - a. Existing TF structure
 - b. Major LOEs
 - c. Findings

The Under is looking at the CFT package now, so will have some limited baseline background, but indications are she is not knowledgeable beyond what is in that package/open press.

Regards,
J

(b) (6)



Copley, R Curt RADM USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA);

Subject: RE: ***Notification of SIPR Email***

Date: Tuesday, September 7, 2021 5:14:06 PM

Got it, just saw it. Vr, JT

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Tuesday, September 7, 2021 4:55 PM

To: (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6) Copley, R Curt RADM USN ONI

WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

Subject: *Notification of SIPR Email*****

VADM Trussler,

The Watch sent you an email on SIPR regarding a UAP event.

Standing by for questions, comments, or concerns.

Very Respectfully,

(b) (6)

(b) (6) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

From: [Berger, Meredith A HON \(USA\)](#)
To: [Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO \(USA\)](#)
Cc: [Simon, Martin S \(Marty\) SES USN UNSECNAV DC \(USA\)](#); [Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#); [Correll, Richard A RADM USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#); [Miller, Christopher A SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#); [Chamberlin, Thomas S SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#); (b) (6); [Copley, R Curt RADM USN ONI WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#)
Subject: Re: Performing the Duties of the Under Secretary of the Navy
Date: Tuesday, September 7, 2021 6:51:59 PM

VADM Trussler,

I appreciate the note and additional information — very helpful. Look forward to working with you.

Thanks,

Meredith

From: Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO (USA) (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, September 6, 2021 11:28 AM
To: Berger, Meredith A HON (USA)
Cc: Simon, Martin S (Marty) SES USN UNSECNAV DC (USA); Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA); Correll, Richard A RADM USN DCNO N2N6 (USA); Miller, Christopher A SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA); Chamberlin, Thomas S SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA); (b) (6); [REDACTED]; Copley, R Curt RADM USN ONI WASHINGTON DC (USA)
Subject: Re: Performing the Duties of the Under Secretary of the Navy

Welcome aboard Ma'am!

Some notes below that are probably too detailed for your time but a reference if needed and for your team to pull from as they support you.

vr, JT

VADM Jeff Trussler

DCNO for IW (OPNAV N2N6)/Director, Naval Intelligence

There are a few areas where you will occasionally deal with me, my Deputy Chris Miller, or my team in my N2N6 role. In most of these you are supported by the DUSN's office that Marty Simon is leading now.

- I am the executive secretary for a special oversight board that you are a member. I believe that a quarterly meeting is coming this month so you will get a read in and backgrounder from the flag officer that works that program.
- Insider Threat programs, User Activity Monitoring
- Unidentified Aerial Phenomenon (UAP) task force

- Navy-NRO semi-annual summit
- Other sensitive programs' oversight

Specifically for intelligence support, our team would normally provide you a once a week Operational Intelligence (Op Intel) brief with our folks from CNO-IP. Frequency of that can be every day or a lot less dependent on your desire. Some deep dive briefs that have been in high demand by the staffs and have been proposed to SECNAV are listed below. We can get you whatever you need or are just curious about:

- Defense Industrial Base (DIB) cybersecurity
- PRC: military status, recent exercises and trends, shipbuilding, etc
- Russia: many undersea topics, strategic weapons, Pacific 2025
- Civil maritime activity around the world

Some key players you will see from our Intel team:

- Mr. Scott Bray-Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence (DDNI). He was previously the National Intelligence Manager (NIM) for East Asia for Directors of National Intelligence Clapper and Coats. He is one of the Intelligence Community and DoD's experts on PRC.
- Mr. Tom Chamberlain - He runs Executive Support for our Naval Intelligence team. the CNO-IP team work under him and he will arrange for deep dive briefs and updates as desired. He was previously Deputy NIM for Iran at ODNI before coming here. ((I mention Scott and Tom specifically like this to highlight the expertise we have from the broader intelligence community at our disposal))
- CDR Ed "Doc" McLellan - He runs our CNO-IP and the team that does the daily Op Intel briefings and provides the Intel IPADs for review. He and his team technically work for Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) but are placed here under Tom Chamberlain for executive support to the Navy and Secretariat staffs.
- RADM Curt Copley - Commander of Office of Naval Intelligence (COMONI) located in Suitland. It would be a worthwhile half day or full day to spend over there once you get settled in here at the Pentagon. This is where our around the world monitoring occurs and where our deep expertise lies. If you get a brief from Navy Intelligence, usually coming from ONI, you will get CIA, NSA, DIA inclusive information...they sort all of that out for us and present a complete picture as the entire intelligence community knows it.

From: Berger, Meredith A HON (USA)

Sent: Friday, September 3, 2021 3:26 PM

To: Berger, Meredith A HON (USA)

Cc: Del Toro, Carlos HON (USA)

Subject: Performing the Duties of the Under Secretary of the Navy

Colleagues,

As I begin performing the duties of the Under Secretary of the Navy, I wanted to reach out to

update everyone and introduce myself to those whom I have not met. I look forward to working together, I am eager to collaborate with you, and please know that you have an open line of communication with me and my team.

Have a safe and enjoyable holiday weekend.

Sincerely,

Meredith

Meredith Berger

Performing the Duties of the Under Secretary of the Navy

Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Energy, Installations and Environment)

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
To: (b) (6); Simpson, Daniel L (D-Day) Maj Gen USAF AF A2-6 (USA); (b) (6); Tipton, Neill T SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA); Cantrell, Steven A SES USAF SAF/MG (USA); (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6); OSD Pentagon OUSD
Subject: Intel - Sec List CSP Front Office
Date: Re: Need a synch tomorrow
Wednesday, September 8, 2021 8:11:42 AM

If 1000-1030 work for Lieutenant General Kruse and Brennan, we can use our Tandberg bridge. Thank you!

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Date: Wednesday, September 8, 2021 at 7:41:35 AM
To: (b) (6); "Simpson, Daniel L (D-Day) Maj Gen USAF AF A2-6 (USA)" (b) (6); "Tipton, Neill T SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA)" (b) (6); "Cantrell, Steven A SES USAF SAF/MG (USA)" (b) (6); "Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA)" (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6); "OSD Pentagon OUSD Intel - Sec List CSP Front Office" (b) (6)
Subject: RE: Need a synch tomorrow

Ma'am,

Maj Gen Simpson is available from 1000-1030, but I can make the 0900-100 times work if needed. Added (b) (6) to email.

v/r

(b) (6)

(b) (6)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Wednesday, September 8, 2021 7:35 AM
To: SIMPSON, DANIEL L Maj Gen USAF HAF AF/A2/6 (b) (6)
[Redacted]; Tipton, Neill T SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA)
(b) (6); CANTRELL, STEVEN A SES USAF HAF AF/A2/6N
(b) (6)
[Redacted] Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA)
(b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
[Redacted] OSD Pentagon OUSD Intel - Sec List CSP Front
Office (b) (6)
[Redacted]
Subject: Re: Need a synch tomorrow

(b) (6),

Throwing out a few options for discussion. Looking for 30 minutes. Thank you!

0900-1000
1000-1030

(b) (6)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

From: "SIMPSON, DANIEL L Maj Gen USAF HAF AF/A2/6" (b) (6)
Date: Wednesday, September 8, 2021 at 7:19:54 AM
To: (b) (6) "Tipton, Neill T SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA)" (b) (6) "Cantrell, Steven A SES USAF SAF/MG (USA)"

(b) (6)
"Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA)"
(b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
"OSD Pentagon
OUSD Intel - Sec List CSP Front Office" (b) (6)
Subject: RE: Need a synch tomorrow

Happy to synch. (b) (6) will reach out to help w/ juggling the schedules.

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Wednesday, September 8, 2021 5:41 AM
To: Tipton, Neill T SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA) (b) (6); SIMPSON, DANIEL
L Maj Gen USAF HAF AF/A2/6 (b) (6); CANTRELL, STEVEN A SES USAF HAF
AF/A2/6N (b) (6)
Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA)
(b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
OSD Pentagon OUSD Intel - Sec List CSP Front
Office (b) (6)
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Re: Need a synch tomorrow

+ the correct Scott Bray

From: (b) (6)
Date: Wednesday, September 8, 2021 at 5:23:06 AM
To: "Tipton, Neill T SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA)" (b) (6)
"Simpson, Daniel L (D-Day) Maj
Gen USAF AF A2-6 (USA)" (b) (6)
"Cantrell, Steven A SES USAF
SAF/MG (USA)" (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
"OSD Pentagon
OUSD Intel - Sec List CSP Front Office" (b) (6)
Subject: Re: Need a synch tomorrow

Happy to join in if you can find a time. VR (b) (6)

From: "Tipton, Neill T SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA)"
(b) (6)
Date: Tuesday, September 7, 2021 at 6:30:43 PM

To: (b) (6) "Simpson, Daniel
L (D-Day) Maj Gen USAF AF A2-6 (USA)" (b) (6)
"Cantrell, Steven A SES USAF SAF/MG (USA)" (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

"OSD Pentagon OUSD Intel - Sec List CSP
Front Office" (b) (6)

Subject: RE: Need a synch tomorrow

Fixing (b) (6) email address.

From: Tipton, Neill T SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA)

Sent: Tuesday, September 7, 2021 6:27 PM

To: (b) (6) SIMPSON,
DANIEL L Maj Gen USAF HAF AF/A2/6 (b) (6);
Cantrell, Steven A SES USAF SAF/MG (USA) (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

OSD Pentagon OUSD Intel - Sec List CSP
Front Office (b) (6); Kruse,
Jeffrey A Lt Gen USAF ODNI DNI (USA) (b) (6)

Subject: Need a synch tomorrow

Importance: High

Scott, (b) (6),

Would like to do a synch tomorrow morning on the UAP update scheduled for DNI and DSD tomorrow evening. ODNI leadership is always invited if they can attend also.

Scott, your calendar has been the hardest to synch recently – is there a 30 minute or hour block you have available Wednesday morning?

I will make myself available basically anytime tomorrow morning.

Want to make sure we're synched for the update and that we are all aligned on the subject matter and status for the various issues. For various reasons, this meeting was not well prepared for and I hope to make sure it's a positive engagement.

Thanks,
Neill

DDI, Collection and Special Programs
OUSD(I&S)
(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#)
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] RE: Today — my apologies
Date: Wednesday, September 8, 2021 11:50:24 AM

Roger. (b) (6) will knock it out of the park. ☺ Hope you feel better. I hear time outside, perhaps in the sunshine and with a cool breeze, say perhaps on a golf course, is very therapeutic for coughs.

VR (b) (6)

From: Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)
Sent: Wednesday, September 8, 2021 10:05 AM
To: (b) (6)
Subject: Today — my apologies

(b) (6) -

Sorry that I won't be there today. I have a persistent cough — which I'm sure is nothing — but I'll be responsible and stay away from people until it's all clear.

I'm available on my cell if you need me.

All the best,
Scott

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Wednesday, September 8, 2021 at 5:23:06 AM
To: Tipton, Neill T SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA); Simpson, Daniel L (D-Day) Maj Gen USAF AF A2-6 (USA); Cantrell, Steven A SES USAF SAF/MG (USA); (b) (6)
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Re: Need a synch tomorrow

+ the correct Scott Bray

From: (b) (6)
Date: Wednesday, September 8, 2021 at 5:23:06 AM
To: "Tipton, Neill T SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA)" (b) (6); "Simpson, Daniel L (D-Day) Maj Gen USAF AF A2-6 (USA)" (b) (6); "Cantrell, Steven A SES USAF SAF/MG (USA)" (b) (6); (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6); (b) (6); "OSD Pentagon OUSD Intel - Sec List CSP Front Office" (b) (6)
Subject: Re: Need a synch tomorrow

Happy to join in if you can find a time. VR (b) (6)

From: "Tipton, Neill T SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA)"

(b) (6)

Date: Tuesday, September 7, 2021 at 6:30:43 PM

To: (b) (6)

"Simpson, Daniel L (D-Day) Maj Gen USAF AF A2-6 (USA)"

(b) (6)

, "Cantrell, Steven A SES USAF
SAF/MG (USA)" (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

"OSD Pentagon OUSD Intel - Sec
List CSP Front Office" (b) (6)

Subject: RE: Need a synch tomorrow

Fixing (b) (6) email address.

From: Tipton, Neill T SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA)

Sent: Tuesday, September 7, 2021 6:27 PM

To: (b) (6)

SIMPSON, DANIEL L Maj Gen USAF HAF AF/A2/6

(b) (6)

; Cantrell, Steven A SES USAF
SAF/MG (USA) (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

OSD Pentagon OUSD Intel - Sec
List CSP Front Office (b) (6)

Subject: Need a synch tomorrow

Importance: High

Scott, (b) (6),

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scheduled for DNI and DSD tomorrow evening. ODNI leadership is
always invited if they can attend also.

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a 30 minute or hour block you have available Wednesday morning?

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aligned on the subject matter and status for the various issues. For
various reasons, this meeting was not well prepared for and I hope to
make sure it's a positive engagement.

Thanks,
Neill

DDI, Collection and Special Programs
OUSD(I&S)

(b) (6)

From: [Page, Christopher James \(Chris\) SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#)
To: [Summe, Jack Nail SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#); [Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#); [Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#); (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: Recommendation Needed -- FW: EEMSG - Incoming Email Blocked Due to Restricted File Type
Date: Thursday, September 9, 2021 5:12:22 PM

Sir,

I just spoke via telephone to the Watch Officer at Navy Cyber Defense Operations Center (NCDOC) in Suffolk. He's standing-by to assist with looking into the details to ensure we're not dealing with an incident of spear-phishing or whaling. The best bet is to forward the original note to the watch team at (b) (6). They can open it in the sandbox Jack mentioned and determine whether the need exists for further action.

V/R

Chris

-----Original Message-----

From: [Summe, Jack Nail SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#)

(b) (6)

Sent: Thursday, September 9, 2021 4:48 PM

To: [Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#); (b) (6);

[Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#)

(b) (6)

Cc: [Page, Christopher James \(Chris\) SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#)

(b) (6)

Subject: RE: Recommendation Needed -- FW: EEMSG - Incoming Email Blocked Due to Restricted File Type

DDNI,

From my days with cyber policy it looks like someone

(b) (6)

tried to send you a couple of files that are now prohibited on DoD networks (zip files). (I know I'm stating the obvious...) The problem with zip files is the potential for embedded malware. If you don't recognize the sender it could be a spam attack against a great number of recipients or it could be a legitimate e-mail ("invoices" lends an air of credibility). But the act of quarantining is not necessarily because the network folks found malware, its likely just

because
of the file type. I would check your home e-mail account and see if you got
anything similar from a legitimate source. If not, we might want the IT
folks
to open the zip files in a secure sandbox and take a look. We certainly
want to
know if someone is threatening you. And your name has been tied to the UAP
study, so this might just be some unsolicited assistance... Chris Page
might
have some insight.
v/r
Jack

Jack N. Summe
Defense Intelligence Senior Level
Director, Security and Insider Threat
Naval Intelligence Activity (NIA N7)

(b) (6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)

Sent: Thursday, September 9, 2021 3:29 PM

To: Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA)

(b) (6)

Summe,

Jack Nail SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

Subject: Recommendation Needed -- FW: EEMSG - Incoming Email Blocked Due to
Restricted File Type

I'm not sure what this is, but it doesn't look good.... Could be someone
trying to report wrong doing by a senior official; could be someone trying
to blackmail me (for the record, I have no idea what this is); could be a
malware attack; could be random spam mail. In either of the first three
cases, I think we'd want to be aware.

Looking for recommendations on what to do. I could ask the network folks to
see if they can review the email for malware and perhaps get an image of the
files to us. Not sure what's doable, but I could ask.

Recommendations?

Thanks,
Scott

Scott W. Bray
Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence
Director, Naval Intelligence Activity

(b) (6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Thursday, September 9, 2021 10:18 AM
To: (b) (6)
Subject: EEMSG - Incoming Email Blocked Due to Restricted File Type

An email addressed to you has been quarantined by Department of Defense (DoD) Email Security policy preventing specific file types from being delivered to DoD Email addresses. If you believe this action was done in error, contact the email sender to resend the message. Any additional questions or concerns, please open a ticket with your local service desk for resolution.

Date: 09 Sep 2021 14:18:13 -0000
From: (b) (6)
To: (b) (6)
Subject: Fw: Swift message and Invoice

One or more of the following files is/contains a restricted file: TT
copy.zip, Invoices.zip

From: (b) (6)
To: (b) (6) [Brav. Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#)
Cc: (b) (6)
[Stratton, John F \(Jay\) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#)
Subject: FYSA: "Former Pentagon UFO Official Luis Elizondo to Reveal "Shocking Details" in New Book" (Hollywood Reporter)
Date: Tuesday, September 14, 2021 6:29:07 AM

FYI...

From: "OSD Pentagon PA Mailbox Media Analysis" (b) (6)

Date: Monday, September 13, 2021 at 8:40:33 AM

Subject: FYSA: "Former Pentagon UFO Official Luis Elizondo to Reveal "Shocking Details" in New Book" (Hollywood Reporter)

Former Pentagon UFO Official Luis Elizondo to Reveal "Shocking Details" in New Book
The former head of the U.S. government's secretive UFO program will pen a book for HarperCollins that includes "profound implications for humanity."
Hollywood Reporter | James Hibberd

The former director of a secretive U.S. government UFO program is ready to tell his full story.

Luis Elizondo, who headed the Pentagon's Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program's effort to study UFOs around the world, has signed a book deal with William Morrow, an imprint of HarperCollins, after a competitive bidding war.

The memoir "promises to reveal shocking never-before-shared details regarding what Elizondo has learned about UFOs and the profound implications for humanity, all of which will escalate what is already a hot-topic globally."

In May, Elizondo was featured on CBS' 60 Minutes segment on the UFO phenomena which has racked up 10 million views on YouTube, making it the show's fourth most-watched segment on the streaming service.

Former president Barack Obama added on The Late Late Show in May, "What is true, and I'm actually being serious here, is that there are, there's footage and records of objects in the skies, that we don't know exactly what they are. We can't explain how they moved, their trajectory. They did not have an easily explainable pattern. And so, you know, I think that people still take seriously trying to investigate and figure out what that is."

In June, the Pentagon released a long-awaited report on UFOs (which have been re-dubbed Unidentified Aerial Phenomena – UAPs) that contained limited information about the task force's findings. The report focused on 143 sightings by military aviators made since 2004 of objects that seemed to defy traditional classification and some of which seemed to break the laws of physics as well. The report offered five possible conclusions about what objects could be that ranged from the ultra mundane (birds, plastic bags), to the rather worrisome (top secret technology from U.S. adversaries like Russia and China), to the rather eyebrow raising

(“Other”). Most significantly to UFO buffs, the report did not rule out aliens and concluded more study was needed.

Said Elizondo in a statement: “The American people now know a small portion of what I and my colleagues in the Pentagon have been privy to: That these UAP (unidentified aerial phenomenon) are not secret U.S. technology, that they do not seem to belong to any known allies or adversaries and that our intelligence services have yet to identify a terrestrial explanation for these extraordinary vehicles. This conversation is only just beginning.”

Elizondo was a former U.S. Army Counterintelligence Special Agent and helped hunt drug traffickers, terrorists and spies. In 2008, he was asked to be part of the Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program, a \$22 million program sponsored by then-Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid to study UFOs. In 2010, he was made director of the program. In 2017, he resigned from his position in protest of excessive government secrecy regarding UFOs. Elizondo was also involved in To the Stars Academy of Arts & Sciences from 2017 to 2020, and was on History Channel’s Unidentified: Inside America’s UFO Investigation. In 2019, a Pentagon spokesperson attempted to cast doubt on Elizondo’s leadership role within the AATIP, but Reid issued a counter-statement firmly vouching for Elizondo’s position.

Elizondo’s book deal was brokered by Dan Farah of Farah Films & Management and Yfat Reiss Gendell of YRG Partners in Literary & Media with Mauro DiPreta, senior vp and executive editor at William Morrow.

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Freedman, Joshua A SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA)

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Subject:

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$$v/r$$

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Response	Percentage
Yes, the U.S. should take action to address climate change	95%
No, the U.S. should not take action to address climate change	5%

UNCLASSIFIED

CATMS ID CATMS30092021YE3ZHZ				STAFF SUMMARY SHEET				☐ SEQUENTIAL COORDINATION ☒ SIMULTANEOUS COORDINATION	
	TO	ACTION	SIGNATURE (Surname) AND DATE		TO	ACTION	SIGNATURE (Surname) AND DATE		
1	DDI/CL&S	Coord	Mr. Garry Reid	6	EXECSEC	Coord			
2	A/DDI/ISPR	Coord	Mr. Kevin Sherman	7	PTDO USD(I&S)	Coord	Mr. Dave Taylor		
3	DDI/WS	Coord	Maj Gen Aaron Prupas	8	USD(I&S)	Sign	HON Ronald Moultrie		
4	DDI/C&SP	Coord	Mr. Neill Tipton	9					
5	OGCI	Coord	Mr. Bill Carranza	10	External	Coord	See Attached		
SURNAME OF ACTION OFFICER			SYMBOL/MAIL STOP	PHONE 703-695-4422		TYPIST'S INITIALS		SUSPENSE DATE	
(b) (6)			DDI C&SP/TC	SECURE		bck		4 Oct 2021	
SUBJECT								DATE	
Airborne Object Identification and Management Synchronization Group (AIMSG) Establishment								29 Sep 2021	
SUMMARY 1. Purpose. To obtain the Deputy Secretary's approval to establish the Airborne Object Identification and Management Synchronization Group (AIMSG) as the successor to the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force (UAPTF). 2. Background. The Department of the Navy has run the UAPTF since August 2020. However, the recent report on UAP by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence highlighted that the scope of the problem extends significantly beyond the purview of the Navy, and warrants a broader approach. In June 2021, Deputy Secretary Hicks requested USD(I&S) deliver a plan to formalize the mission of the UAPTF into an enduring activity. 3. Discussion. The Establishment Memo and Terms of Reference at TAB A answers that request and would establish a tri-level organization, focused on a core team of full-time personnel assigned to the AIMSG from the OUSD(I&S), Joint Staff, Services and OSD/R&E. The AIMSG orchestrates and synchronizes mission execution along five Lines of Effort (LOEs) by designated LOE owners. An Executive Committee (AIMEXEC), chaired by the USD(I&S), Director, Joint Staff, and the PDDNI, provides senior-level oversight of the AIMSG on behalf of the Deputy Secretary. 4. Recommendation. USD(I&S) sign the FACING Action Memo, recommending creation of the AIMSG and forwarding the Establishment Memo and Terms of Reference at TAB A to the Deputy Secretary for approval.									
						Mark Elliott Acting Director, Technical Collection			
Attachments: FACING: Action Memo for DepSecDef TAB 1: DSD Memo - 25 June 2021 TAB A: Establishment Memo and Terms of Reference TAB B: Coordination Sheet									

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STAFF SUMMARY SHEET

SUMMARY (cont)

(b) (5)

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INTELLIGENCE
AND SECURITY

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
5000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-5000

ACTION MEMO

FOR: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Ronald S. Moultrie, Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security

SUBJECT: Airborne Object Identification and Management Synchronization Group (AIM SG)
Establishment (U)

(U) BACKGROUND: In June, you directed OUSD(I&S) to develop a plan to formalize the mission currently performed by the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force (UAPTF) (TAB 2), recognizing that the mission of the UAPTF expanded significantly beyond the purview of the Secretary of the Navy, where it currently resides.

(U) DISCUSSION: I recommend the creation of the Airborne Object Identification and Mitigation Synchronization Group (AIMSG) as the primary replacement to the current UAPTF. The AIMSG concept relies on a proactive airspace awareness posture to improve our ability to collect more and better data, remove bureaucratic stigma associated with UAP, and leverage the broader defense enterprise to handle UAP in a standardized and routine fashion.

(U) The attached Establishment Memorandum and Terms of Reference establish the AIMSG, the AIMEXEC, assigns LOE Owners to each of the LOEs, and establishes responsibilities.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: (U) Recommend DSD approve and sign the AIM SG Establishment Memo and Terms of Reference at TAB A.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Other _____

Ronald S. Moultrie

Attachments:
As stated

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(b) (6), (b) (2)

From: (b) (6)
To: (b) (6)
Cc: Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA); NIA Front Office; (b) (6)
Treat, Michael V SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA); (b) (6)
Miller, Christopher A
SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA); (b) (6)
Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA
WASHINGTON DC (USA); (b) (6)
Subject: FY22 NDAA Senate Floor Amendment: Anomaly Surveillance and Resolution Office
Date: Thursday, November 18, 2021 2:13:30 PM
Attachments: [FY22 NDAA SA 4737 Gillibrand UAP 11.17.2021.pdf](#)

Admiral,

As you are aware, the UAPTF Director was called to the Hill to speak with Sen. Gillibrand (D-NY) a few days ago.

During that conversation, we learned Sen. Gillibrand's UAP floor amendment has been continually revised and garnished bi-partisan support from the Armed Services Committee, Intelligence Committee and other members.

In particular, the latest version, Senate Amendment 4737 (S.A. 4737) has been proposed for inclusion in the FY22 NDAA. It was co-sponsored by Sen. Rubio (R-FL), Sen. Heinrich (D-NM), Sen. Blunt (R-MO) and Sen. Graham (R-SC).

The FY22 NDAA is currently in debate on the Senate Floor. Of note, this amendment is expected to pass.

Attached is the text excerpt of the amendment. In particular, it calls for:

- Establishment of the "Anomaly Surveillance and Resolution Office" and the disestablishment or subordination of the UAPTF
- Annual and quarterly reporting from the office
- Assignment of "UAP" within the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF)
- Creation of the "Aerial and Transmedium Phenomena Advisory Board"

We will continue to monitor all proposed amendments for the NDAA. Should this amendment be included in the final bill, I would expect most of it to carry forward in the conferenced version. Should it not, there will still be House and Senate debate on the topic, since Rep. Gallego (D-AZ) similarly proposed disestablishment of the UAPTF in the House FY22 NDAA.

V/r,

(b) (6)

[Redacted signature block]

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(d) **EFFECTIVE DATE.**—The amendments made by this section shall take effect on the day that the Secretary of Defense prescribes regulations under subsection (c).

(e) **PROGRESS REPORT.**—Not later than 240 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives a report on the status of the implementation of chapter 89 of title 10, United States Code, as added by subsection (a)(1)(A), and the implementation of section 986 of such title, as added by subsection (a)(1)(B).

SA 4736. Mr. COTTON submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 3867 submitted by Mr. REED and intended to be proposed to the bill H.R. 4350, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2022 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the appropriate place in title II, insert the following:

SEC. ____ . UNDERWATER LAUNCH TESTING OF CONVENTIONAL PROMPT STRIKE WEAPON SYSTEM.

(a) **TESTING REQUIRED.**—Not later than September 30, 2024, the Secretary of the Navy shall commence underwater launch testing for the Conventional Prompt Strike weapon system to facilitate capability deployment on a Virginia-class submarine before September 30, 2027.

(b) **ADDITIONAL FUNDING.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—The amount authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2022 by section 201 for research, development, test, and evaluation is hereby increased by \$50,000,000, with the amount of the increase to be available for New Design SSN (PE 0604558N).

(2) **AVAILABILITY.**—Of the amount made available under paragraph (1), \$50,000,000 shall be available to accelerate Conventional Prompt Strike weapon system integration on Virginia-class submarines.

(c) **OFFSET.**—The amount authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2022 by section 301 for operation and maintenance is hereby decreased by \$50,000,000 with the amount of the decrease to be taken from amounts available as specified in the funding table in section 4301 for the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, Afghan Air Force Sustainment.

SA 4737. Mrs. GILLIBRAND (for herself, Mr. RUBIO, Mr. HEINRICH, Mr. BLUNT, and Mr. GRAHAM) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 3867 submitted by Mr. REED and intended to be proposed to the bill H.R. 4350, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2022 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the appropriate place in title XV, insert the following:

SEC. ____ . ESTABLISHMENT OF STRUCTURE AND AUTHORITIES TO ADDRESS UNIDENTIFIED AERIAL PHENOMENA.

(a) **ESTABLISHMENT OF ANOMALY SURVEILLANCE AND RESOLUTION OFFICE.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,

the Secretary of Defense shall, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, establish an office within an appropriate component of the Department of Defense, or within a joint organization of the Department of Defense and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, to assume—

(A) the duties of the Unidentified Aerial Phenomenon Task Force, as in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act; and

(B) such other duties as are required by this section.

(2) **DESIGNATION.**—The office established under paragraph (1) shall be known as the “Anomaly Surveillance and Resolution Office” (in this section referred to as the “Office”).

(3) **TERMINATION OR SUBORDINATION OF PRIOR TASK FORCE.**—Upon the establishment of the Anomaly Surveillance and Resolution Office, the Secretary shall terminate the Unidentified Aerial Phenomenon Task Force or subordinate it to the Office.

(b) **FACILITATION OF REPORTING AND DATA SHARING.**—The Director and the Secretary shall each, in coordination with each other, require that—

(1) each element of the intelligence community and the Department, with any data that may be relevant to the investigation of unidentified aerial phenomena, make such data available immediately to the Office; and

(2) military and civilian personnel employed by or under contract to the Department or an element of the intelligence community shall have access to procedures by which they shall report incidents or information, including adverse physiological effects, involving or associated with unidentified aerial phenomena directly to the Office.

(c) **DUTIES.**—The duties of the Office established under subsection (a) shall include the following:

(1) Developing procedures to synchronize and standardize the collection, reporting, and analysis of incidents, including adverse physiological effects, regarding unidentified aerial phenomena across the Department and in consultation with the intelligence community.

(2) Developing processes and procedures to ensure that such incidents from each component of the Department and each element of the intelligence community are reported and incorporated in a centralized repository.

(3) Establishing procedures to require the timely and consistent reporting of such incidents.

(4) Evaluating links between unidentified aerial phenomena and adversarial foreign governments, other foreign governments, or nonstate actors.

(5) Evaluating the threat that such incidents present to the United States.

(6) Consulting with other departments and agencies of the Federal Government, as appropriate, including the Federal Aviation Administration, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Department of Homeland Security, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and the Department of Energy.

(7) Consulting with allies and partners of the United States, as appropriate, to better assess the nature and extent of unidentified aerial phenomena.

(8) Preparing reports for Congress, in both classified and unclassified form, as required by subsections (h) and (i).

(d) **EMPLOYMENT OF LINE ORGANIZATIONS FOR FIELD INVESTIGATIONS OF UNIDENTIFIED AERIAL PHENOMENA.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—The Secretary shall, in coordination with the Director, designate line organizations within the Department of De-

fense and the intelligence community that possess appropriate expertise, authorities, accesses, data, systems, platforms, and capabilities to rapidly respond to, and conduct field investigations of, incidents involving unidentified aerial phenomena under the direction of the Office.

(2) **PERSONNEL, EQUIPMENT, AND RESOURCES.**—The Secretary, in coordination with the Director, shall take such actions as may be necessary to ensure that the designated organization or organizations have available adequate personnel with requisite expertise, equipment, transportation, and other resources necessary to respond rapidly to incidents or patterns of observations of unidentified aerial phenomena of which the Office becomes aware.

(e) **UTILIZATION OF LINE ORGANIZATIONS FOR SCIENTIFIC, TECHNOLOGICAL, AND OPERATIONAL ANALYSES OF DATA ON UNIDENTIFIED AERIAL PHENOMENA.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—The Secretary, in coordination with the Director, shall designate one or more line organizations that will be primarily responsible for scientific, technical, and operational analysis of data gathered by field investigations conducted under subsection (d), or data from other sources, including testing of materials, medical studies, and development of theoretical models to better understand and explain unidentified aerial phenomena.

(2) **AUTHORITY.**—The Secretary and the Director shall promulgate such directives as necessary to ensure that the designated line organizations have authority to draw on special expertise of persons outside the Federal Government with appropriate security clearances.

(f) **INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS PLAN.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—The head of the Office shall supervise the development and execution of an intelligence collection and analysis plan on behalf of the Secretary and the Director to gain as much knowledge as possible regarding the technical and operational characteristics, origins, and intentions of unidentified aerial phenomena, including the development, acquisition, deployment, and operation of technical collection capabilities necessary to detect, identify, and scientifically characterize unidentified aerial phenomena.

(2) **USE OF RESOURCES AND CAPABILITIES.**—In developing the plan required by paragraph (1), the head of the Office shall consider and propose, as appropriate, the use of any resource, capability, asset, or process of the Department and the intelligence community.

(g) **SCIENCE PLAN.**—The head of the Office shall supervise the development and execution of a science plan on behalf of the Secretary and the Director to develop and test, as practicable, scientific theories to account for characteristics and performance of unidentified aerial phenomena that exceed the known state of the art in science or technology, including in the areas of propulsion, aerodynamic control, signatures, structures, materials, sensors, countermeasures, weapons, electronics, and power generation, and to provide the foundation for potential future investments to replicate any such advanced characteristics and performance.

(h) **ASSIGNMENT OF PRIORITY.**—The Director, in consultation with, and with the recommendation of the Secretary, shall assign an appropriate level of priority within the National Intelligence Priorities Framework to the requirement to understand, characterize, and respond to unidentified aerial phenomena.

(i) **AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**—There is authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out the work of the Office, including—

(1) general intelligence gathering and intelligence analysis; and

(2) strategic defense, space defense, defense of controlled air space, defense of ground, air, or naval assets, and related purposes.

(j) ANNUAL REPORT.—

(1) REQUIREMENT.—Not later than October 31, 2022, and annually thereafter until October 31, 2026, the Secretary in consultation with the Director, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on unidentified aerial phenomena.

(2) ELEMENTS.—Each report under paragraph (1) shall include, with respect to the year covered by the report, the following information:

(A) An analysis of data and intelligence received through reports of unidentified aerial phenomena.

(B) An analysis of data relating to unidentified aerial phenomena collected through—

(i) geospatial intelligence

(ii) signals intelligence;

(iii) human intelligence; and

(iv) measurement and signals intelligence.

(C) The number of reported incidents of unidentified aerial phenomena over restricted air space of the United States.

(D) An analysis of such incidents identified under subparagraph (C).

(E) Identification of potential aerospace or other threats posed by unidentified aerial phenomena to the national security of the United States.

(F) An assessment of any activity regarding unidentified aerial phenomena that can be attributed to one or more adversarial foreign governments.

(G) Identification of any incidents or patterns regarding unidentified aerial phenomena that indicate a potential adversarial foreign government may have achieved a breakthrough aerospace capability.

(H) An update on the coordination by the United States with allies and partners on efforts to track, understand, and address unidentified aerial phenomena.

(I) An update on any efforts to capture or exploit discovered unidentified aerial phenomena.

(J) An assessment of any health-related effects for individuals who have encountered unidentified aerial phenomena.

(K) The number of reported incidents, and descriptions thereof, of unidentified aerial phenomena associated with military nuclear assets, including strategic nuclear weapons and nuclear-powered ships and submarines.

(L) In consultation with the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, the number of reported incidents, and descriptions thereof, of unidentified aerial phenomena associated with facilities or assets associated with the production, transportation, or storage of nuclear weapons or components thereof.

(M) In consultation with the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the number of reported incidents, and descriptions thereof, of unidentified aerial phenomena or drones of unknown origin associated with nuclear power generating stations, nuclear fuel storage sites, or other sites or facilities regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

(N) The names of the line organizations that have been designated to perform the specific functions imposed by subsections (d) and (e) of this section, and the specific functions for which each such line organization has been assigned primary responsibility.

(3) FORM.—Each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(k) SEMIANNUAL BRIEFINGS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act

and not less frequently than semiannually thereafter until December 31, 2026, the head of the Office shall provide the classified briefings on unidentified aerial phenomena to—

(A) the Committee on Armed Services and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Armed Services and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

(2) FIRST BRIEFING.—The first briefing provided under paragraph (1) shall include all incidents involving unidentified aerial phenomena that were reported to the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force or to the Office after June 24, 2021, regardless of the date of occurrence of the incident.

(3) SUBSEQUENT BRIEFINGS.—Each briefing provided subsequent to the first briefing described in paragraph (2) shall include, at a minimum, all events relating to unidentified aerial phenomena that occurred during the previous 180 days, and events relating to unidentified aerial phenomena that were not included in an earlier briefing due to delay in an incident reaching the reporting system or other such factors.

(4) INSTANCES IN WHICH DATA WAS NOT SHARED.—For each briefing period, the Chairman and Vice Chairman or Ranking Member of the Committee on Armed Services and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives shall receive an enumeration of any instances in which data related to unidentified aerial phenomena was denied to the Office because of classification restrictions on that data or for any other reason.

(l) AERIAL AND TRANSMEDIUM PHENOMENA ADVISORY COMMITTEE.—

(1) ESTABLISHMENT.—(A) Not later than October 1, 2022, the Secretary and the Director shall establish an advisory committee for the purpose of—

(i) advising the Office in the execution of the duties of the Office as provided by this subsection; and

(ii) advising the Secretary and the Director regarding the gathering and analysis of data, and scientific research and development pertaining to unidentified aerial phenomena.

(B) The advisory committee established under subparagraph (A) shall be known as the “Aerial and Transmedium Phenomena Advisory Committee” (in this subparagraph the “Committee”).

(2) MEMBERSHIP.—(A) Subject to subparagraph (B), the Committee shall be composed of members as follows:

(i) 20 members selected by the Secretary as follows:

(I) Three members selected from among individuals recommended by the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

(II) Two members selected from among individuals recommended by the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration.

(III) Two members selected from among individuals recommended by the President of the National Academies of Sciences.

(IV) Two members selected from among individuals recommended by the President of the National Academy of Engineering.

(V) One member selected from among individuals recommended by the President of the National Academy of Medicine.

(VI) Three members selected from among individuals recommended by the Director of the Galileo Project at Harvard University.

(VII) Two members selected from among individuals recommended by the Board of Directors of the Scientific Coalition for Unidentified Aerospace Phenomena Studies.

(VIII) Two members selected from among individuals recommended by the President of the American Institute of Astronautics and Aeronautics.

(IX) Two members selected from among individuals recommended by the Director of the Optical Technology Center at Montana State University.

(X) One member selected from among individuals recommended by the president of the American Society for Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing.

(ii) Up to five additional members, as the Secretary, in consultation with the Director, considers appropriate, selected from among individuals with requisite expertise, at least 3 of whom shall not be employees of any Federal Government agency or Federal Government contractor.

(B) No individual may be appointed to the Committee under subparagraph (A) unless the Secretary and the Director jointly determine that the individual—

(i) qualifies for a security clearance at the secret level or higher;

(ii) possesses scientific, medical, or technical expertise pertinent to some aspect of the investigation and analysis of unidentified aerial phenomena; and

(iii) has previously conducted research or writing that demonstrates scientific, technological, or operational knowledge regarding aspects of the subject matter, including propulsion, aerodynamic control, signatures, structures, materials, sensors, countermeasures, weapons, electronics, power generation, field investigations, forensic examination of particular cases, analysis of open source and classified information regarding domestic and foreign research and commentary, and historical information pertaining to unidentified aerial phenomena.

(C) The Secretary and Director may terminate the membership of any individual on the Committee upon a finding by the Secretary and the Director jointly that the member no longer meets the criteria specified in this subsection.

(3) CHAIRPERSON.—The Secretary shall, in coordination with the Director, designate a temporary Chairperson of the Committee, but at the earliest practicable date the Committee shall elect a Chairperson from among its members, who will serve a term of 2 years, and is eligible for re-election.

(4) EXPERT ASSISTANCE, ADVICE, AND RECOMMENDATIONS.—(A) The Committee may, upon invitation of the head of the Office, provide expert assistance or advice to any line organization designated to carry out field investigations or data analysis as authorized by subsections (d) and (e).

(B) The Committee, on its own initiative, or at the request of the Director, the Secretary, or the head of the Office, may provide advice and recommendations regarding best practices with respect to the gathering and analysis of data on unidentified aerial phenomena in general, or commentary regarding specific incidents, cases, or classes of unidentified aerial phenomena.

(5) REPORT.—Not later than December 31, 2022, and not later than December 31 of each year thereafter, the Committee shall submit a report summarizing its activities and recommendations to the following:

(A) The Secretary.

(B) The Director.

(C) The head of the Office.

(D) The Committee on Armed Services and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

(E) The Committee on Armed Services and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

(6) RELATION TO FACA.—For purposes of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.), the Committee shall be considered an

advisory committee (as defined in section 3 of such Act, except as otherwise provided in the section or as jointly deemed warranted by the Secretary and the Director under section 4(b)(3) of such Act.

(7) **TERMINATION OF COMMITTEE.**—The Committee shall terminate on the date that is six years after the date of the establishment of the Committee.

(m) **DEFINITIONS.**—In this section:

(1) The term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(A) the Committee on Armed Services, the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(2) The term “intelligence community” has the meaning given such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).

(3) The term “transmedium objects or devices” means objects or devices that are observed to transition between space and the atmosphere, or between the atmosphere and bodies of water, that are not immediately identifiable.

(4) The term “unidentified aerial phenomena” means—

(A) airborne objects that are not immediately identifiable;

(B) transmedium objects or devices; and

(C) submerged objects or devices that are not immediately identifiable and that display behavior or performance characteristics suggesting that they may be related to the subjects described in subparagraph (A) or (B).

SA 4738. Mr. MENENDEZ (for himself and Mr. RUBIO) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 3867 submitted by Mr. REED and intended to be proposed to the bill H.R. 4350, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2022 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the end of title XII, add the following:

Subtitle H—U.S.-Greece Defense and Interparliamentary Partnership Act of 2021

SEC. 1291. SHORT TITLE.

This subtitle may be cited as the “U.S.-Greece Defense and Interparliamentary Partnership Act of 2021”.

SEC. 1292. FINDINGS.

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The United States and Greece are strong allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and have deepened their defense relationship in recent years in response to growing security challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean region.

(2) Greece participates in several NATO missions, including Operation Sea Guardian in the Mediterranean and NATO's mission in Kosovo.

(3) The Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act (title II of division J of Public Law 116-94), authorized new security assistance for Greece and Cyprus, lifted the United States prohibition on arms transfers to Cyprus, and authorized the establishment of a United States-Eastern Mediterranean Energy Center to facilitate energy cooperation among the United States, Greece, Israel, and Cyprus.

(4) The United States has demonstrated its support for the trilateral partnership of Greece, Israel, and Cyprus through joint engagement with Cyprus, Greece, Israel, and the United States in the “3+1” format.

(5) The United States and Greece have held Strategic Dialogue meetings in Athens, Washington D.C., and virtually, and have committed to hold an upcoming Strategic Dialogue session in 2021 in Washington, D.C.

(6) In October 2019, the United States and Greece agreed to update the United States-Greece Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement, and the amended agreement officially entered into force on February 13, 2020.

(7) The amended Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement provides for increased joint United States-Greece and NATO activities at Greek military bases and facilities in Larissa, Stefanovikio, Alexandroupolis, and other parts of central and northern Greece, and allows for infrastructure improvements at the United States Naval Support Activity Souda Bay base on Crete.

(8) In October 2020, Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias announced that Greece hopes to further expand the Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement with the United States.

(9) The United States Naval Support Activity Souda Bay serves as a critical naval logistics hub for the United States Navy's 6th Fleet.

(10) In June 2020, United States Ambassador to Greece Geoffrey Pyatt characterized the importance of Naval Support Activity Souda Bay as “our most important platform for the projection of American power into a strategically dynamic Eastern Mediterranean region. From Syria to Libya to the chokepoint of the Black Sea, this is a critically important asset for the United States, as our air force, naval, and other resources are applied to support our Alliance obligations and to help bring peace and stability.”.

(11) The USS *Hershel “Woody” Williams*, the second of a new class of United States sea-basing ships, is now based out of Souda Bay, the first permanent United States naval deployment at the base.

(12) The United States cooperates with the Hellenic Armed Forces at facilities in Larissa, Stefanovikio, and Alexandroupolis, where the United States Armed Forces conduct training, refueling, temporary maintenance, storage, and emergency response.

(13) The United States has conducted a longstanding International Military Education and Training (IMET) program with Greece, and the Government of Greece has committed to provide \$3 for every dollar invested by the United States in the program.

(14) Greece's defense spending in 2020 amounted to an estimated 2.68 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP), exceeding NATO's 2 percent of GDP benchmark agreed to at the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales.

(15) Greece is eligible for the delivery of excess defense articles under section 516(c)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j(c)(2)).

(16) In September 2020, Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis announced plans to modernize all three branches of the Hellenic Armed Forces, which will strengthen Greece's military position in the Eastern Mediterranean.

(17) The modernization includes upgrades to the arms of all three branches, including new anti-tank weapons for the Hellenic Army, new heavy-duty torpedoes for the Hellenic Navy, and new guided missiles for the Hellenic Air Force.

(18) The Hellenic Navy also plans to upgrade its four MEKO 200HN frigates and purchase four new multirole frigates of an undisclosed type, to be accompanied by 4 MH-60R anti-submarine helicopters.

(19) The Hellenic Air Force plans to fully upgrade its fleet of F-16 jets to the F-16 Viper variant by 2027 and has expressed interest in participating in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program.

SEC. 1293. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) Greece is a pillar of stability in the Eastern Mediterranean region and the United States should remain committed to supporting its security and prosperity;

(2) the 3+1 format of cooperation among Cyprus, Greece, Israel, and the United States has been a successful forum to cooperate on energy issues and should be expanded to include other areas of common concern to the members;

(3) the United States should increase and deepen efforts to partner with and support the modernization of the Greek military;

(4) it is in the interests of the United States that Greece continue to transition its military equipment away from Russian-produced platforms and weapons systems through the European Recapitalization Incentive Program;

(5) the United States Government should continue to deepen strong partnerships with the Greek military, especially in co-development and co-production opportunities with the Greek Navy;

(6) the naval partnerships with Greece at Souda Bay and Alexandroupolis are mutually beneficial to the national security of the United States and Greece;

(7) the United States should, as appropriate, support the sale of F-35 Joint Strike Fighters to Greece;

(8) the United States Government should continue to invest in International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs in Greece;

(9) the United States Government should support joint maritime security cooperation exercises with Cyprus, Greece, and Israel;

(10) in accordance with its legal authorities and project selection criteria, the United States Development Finance Corporation should consider supporting private investment in strategic infrastructure projects in Greece, to include shipyards and ports that contribute to the security of the region and Greece's prosperity;

(11) the extension of the Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement with Greece for a period of five years includes deepened partnerships at Greek military facilities throughout the country and is a welcome development; and

(12) the United States Government should establish the United States-Eastern Mediterranean Energy Center as authorized in the Eastern Mediterranean Energy and Security Partnership Act of 2019.

SEC. 1294. FUNDING FOR EUROPEAN RECAPITALIZATION INCENTIVE PROGRAM.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—To the maximum extent feasible, of the funds appropriated for the European Recapitalization Incentive Program, \$25,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026 should be considered for Greece as appropriate to assist the country in meeting its defense needs and transitioning away from Russian-produced military equipment.

(b) **REPORT.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that provides a full accounting of all funds distributed under the European Recapitalization Incentive Program, including—

(1) identification of each recipient country;

(2) a description of how the funds were used; and

(3) an accounting of remaining equipment in recipient countries that was provided by the then-Soviet Union or Russian Federation.

From: (b) (6)
To: [Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO \(USA\)](#)
Cc: [Miller, Christopher A SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#); [Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#); (b) (6)
Subject: DoD Announces the Establishment of the Airborne Object Identification and Management Synchronization Group (AOIMSG)
Date: Wednesday, November 24, 2021 9:47:48 AM

Admiral,

Below the cutline is the news release announcing the establishment of the Airborne Object Identification and Management Synchronization Group that is directed to be the successor to the Navy led UAP Task Force.

V/R,

(b) (6)

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Today, Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks, in close collaboration with the Director of National Intelligence, directed the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence & Security to establish within the Office of the USD(I&S) the Airborne Object Identification and Management Synchronization Group (AOIMSG) as the successor to the U.S. Navy's Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force. The AOIMSG will synchronize efforts across the Department and the broader U.S. government to detect, identify and attribute objects of interests in Special Use Airspace (SUA), and to assess and mitigate any associated threats to safety of flight and national security. To provide oversight of the AOIMSG, the Deputy Secretary also directed the USD(I&S) to lead an Airborne Object Identification and Management Executive Council (AOIMEXEC) to be comprised of DoD and Intelligence Community membership, and to offer a venue for U.S. government interagency representation.

Incursions by any airborne object into our SUA pose safety of flight and operations security concerns, and may pose national security challenges. DOD takes reports of incursions – by any airborne object, identified or unidentified – very seriously, and investigates each one. This decision is the result of planning efforts and collaboration conducted by OUSD(I&S) and other DoD elements at the direction of Deputy Secretary Hicks, to address the challenges associated with assessing UAP occurring on or near DOD training ranges and installations highlighted in the DNI preliminary assessment report submitted to Congress in June 2021. The report also identified the need to make improvements in processes, policies, technologies, and training to improve our ability to understand UAP.

In coming weeks, the Department will issue implementing guidance, which will contain further details on the AOIMSG Director, organizational structure, authorities, and resourcing.

From: [Obernier, Jennifer A SES USN UNSECNAV DC \(USA\)](#)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#)
Subject: UAPTF Transition
Date: Wednesday, December 8, 2021 2:28:08 PM

Hi Scott,

I&S has begun airing with us their plan to transition from UAPTF to AOIMSG. Sent you some details on JWICS. Wanted to touch base on what you see as feasible for your organization in advance of a meeting tomorrow afternoon.

J

From: [Miller, Alexander T SES USARMY HODA DCS G-2 \(USA\)](#)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: AOIMSG link up
Date: Friday, December 10, 2021 4:27:32 PM

Scott, absolutely – do you have some time next week? Can get on a TB.

Alex

From: Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, December 10, 2021 1:44 PM
To: Miller, Alexander T SES USARMY HQDA DCS G-2 (USA) (b) (6)
Subject: RE: AOIMSG link up

Alex –

Sorry for the delay – hope the meeting went okay from your perspective. Happy to sync sometime if you're still interested.

All the best,
Scott

Scott W. Bray
Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence
Director, Naval Intelligence Activity
(b) (6)

From: Miller, Alexander T SES USARMY HQDA DCS G-2 (USA) (b) (6)
Sent: Thursday, December 9, 2021 10:33 AM
To: Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)
Subject: AOIMSG link up

Scott, do you have 15 min to link up by Tandberg ref: UAP way ahead prior to the meeting this afternoon?

Alex

From: (b) (6)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#)
Cc: [Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#); [Chamberlin, Thomas S SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#)
Subject: NDAA
Date: Wednesday, December 15, 2021 5:41:03 PM

Scott,

(<https://www.politico.com/news/2021/12/15/senate-sends-768b-defense-policy-bill-to-biden-524734>)

NDAA language—

SEC. 1683. ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICE, ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE, AND
AUTHORITIES TO ADDRESS UNIDENTIFIED AERIAL PHENOMENA.

(a) Establishment of Office.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, shall establish an office within a component of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, or within a joint organization of the Department of Defense and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, to carry out the duties of the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force, as in effect on the day before the date of enactment of this Act, and such other duties as are required by this section.

(b) Duties.--The duties of the Office established under subsection (a) shall include the following:

(1) Developing procedures to synchronize and standardize the collection, reporting, and analysis of incidents, including adverse physiological effects, regarding unidentified aerial phenomena across the Department of Defense and the intelligence community.

(2) Developing processes and procedures to ensure that such incidents from each component of the Department and each element of the intelligence community are reported and incorporated in a centralized repository.

(3) Establishing procedures to require the timely and consistent reporting of such incidents.

(4) Evaluating links between unidentified aerial phenomena and adversarial foreign governments, other foreign governments, or nonstate actors.

(5) Evaluating the threat that such incidents present to the United States.

(6) Coordinating with other departments and agencies of the Federal Government, as appropriate, including the Federal Aviation Administration, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Department of Homeland Security, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and the Department of Energy.

(7) Coordinating with allies and partners of the United States, as appropriate, to better assess the nature and extent of unidentified aerial phenomena.

(8) Preparing reports for Congress, in both classified and unclassified form, including under subsection (i).

(c) Response to and Field Investigations of Unidentified Aerial Phenomena.--

(1) Designation.--The Secretary, in coordination with the Director, shall designate one or more line organizations within the Department of Defense and the intelligence community that possess appropriate expertise, authorities, accesses, data, systems, platforms, and capabilities to rapidly respond to, and conduct field investigations of, incidents involving unidentified aerial phenomena under the direction of the head of the Office established under subsection (a).

(2) Ability to respond.--The Secretary, in coordination with the Director, shall ensure that each line organization designated under paragraph (1) has adequate personnel with the requisite expertise, equipment, transportation, and other resources necessary to respond rapidly to incidents or patterns of observations involving unidentified aerial phenomena of which the Office becomes aware.

(d) Scientific, Technological, and Operational Analyses of Data on Unidentified Aerial Phenomena.--

(1) Designation.--The Secretary, in coordination with the Director, shall designate one or more line organizations that will be primarily responsible for scientific, technical, and operational analysis of data gathered by field investigations conducted pursuant to subsection (c) and data from other sources, including with respect to the testing of materials, medical studies, and development of theoretical models, to better understand and explain unidentified aerial phenomena.

(2) Authority.--The Secretary and the Director shall each issue such directives as are necessary to ensure that the each line organization designated under paragraph (1) has authority to draw on the special expertise of persons outside the Federal Government with appropriate security clearances.

(e) Data; Intelligence Collection.--

(1) Availability of data and reporting on unidentified aerial phenomena.--The Director and the Secretary shall each, in coordination with one another, ensure that--

(A) each element of the intelligence community with data relating to unidentified aerial phenomena makes such data available immediately to the Office established under subsection (a) or to an entity designated by the Secretary and the Director to receive such data; and

(B) military and civilian personnel of the Department of Defense or an element of the intelligence community, and contractor personnel of the Department or such an element, have access to procedures by which the personnel shall report incidents or information, including adverse physiological effects, involving or associated with unidentified aerial phenomena directly to the Office or to an entity designated by the Secretary and the Director to receive such information.

(2) Intelligence collection and analysis plan.--The head of the Office established under subsection (a), acting on behalf of the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence, shall supervise the development and execution of an intelligence collection and analysis plan to gain as much knowledge as possible regarding the technical and operational characteristics, origins, and intentions of unidentified aerial phenomena, including with respect to the development, acquisition, deployment, and operation of technical collection capabilities necessary to detect, identify, and scientifically characterize unidentified aerial phenomena.

(3) Use of resources and capabilities.--In developing the plan under paragraph (2), the head of the Office established under subsection (a) shall consider and propose, as the head determines appropriate, the use of any resource, capability, asset, or process of the Department and the intelligence community.

(f) Science Plan.--The head of the Office established under subsection (a), on behalf of the Secretary and the Director, shall supervise the development and execution of a science plan to develop and test, as practicable, scientific theories to--

(1) account for characteristics and performance of unidentified aerial phenomena that exceed the known state of the art in science or technology, including in the areas of propulsion, aerodynamic control, signatures, structures, materials, sensors, countermeasures, weapons, electronics, and power generation; and

(2) provide the foundation for potential future investments to replicate any such advanced characteristics and performance.

(g) Assignment of Priority.--The Director, in consultation with, and with the recommendation of the Secretary, shall assign an appropriate level of priority within the National Intelligence Priorities Framework to the requirement to understand, characterize, and respond to unidentified aerial phenomena.

(h) Annual Report.--

(1) Requirement.--Not later than October 31, 2022, and annually thereafter until October 31, 2026, the Director, in consultation with the Secretary, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on unidentified aerial phenomena.

(2) Elements.--Each report under paragraph (1) shall include, with respect to the year covered by the report, the following information:

(A) All reported unidentified aerial phenomena-related events that occurred during the one-year period.

(B) All reported unidentified aerial phenomena-related events that occurred during a period other than that one-year period but were not included in an earlier report.

(C) An analysis of data and intelligence received through each reported unidentified aerial phenomena-related event.

(D) An analysis of data relating to unidentified aerial phenomena collected through--

- (i) geospatial intelligence;
- (ii) signals intelligence;
- (iii) human intelligence; and
- (iv) measurement and signature intelligence.

(E) The number of reported incidents of unidentified aerial phenomena over restricted air space of the United States during the one-year period.

(F) An analysis of such incidents identified under subparagraph (E).

(G) Identification of potential aerospace or other threats posed by unidentified aerial phenomena to the

national security of the United States.

(H) An assessment of any activity regarding unidentified aerial phenomena that can be attributed to one or more adversarial foreign governments.

(I) Identification of any incidents or patterns regarding unidentified aerial phenomena that indicate a potential adversarial foreign government may have achieved a breakthrough aerospace capability.

(J) An update on the coordination by the United States with allies and partners on efforts to track, understand, and address unidentified aerial phenomena.

(K) An update on any efforts underway on the ability to capture or exploit discovered unidentified aerial phenomena.

(L) An assessment of any health-related effects for individuals that have encountered unidentified aerial phenomena.

(M) The number of reported incidents, and descriptions thereof, of unidentified aerial phenomena associated with military nuclear assets, including strategic nuclear weapons and nuclear-powered ships and submarines.

(N) In consultation with the Administrator for Nuclear Security, the number of reported incidents, and descriptions thereof, of unidentified aerial phenomena associated with facilities or assets associated with the production, transportation, or storage of nuclear weapons or components thereof.

(O) In consultation with the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the number of reported incidents, and descriptions thereof, of unidentified aerial phenomena or drones of unknown origin associated with nuclear power generating stations, nuclear fuel storage sites, or other sites or facilities regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

(P) The names of the line organizations that have been designated to perform the specific functions under subsections (c) and (d), and the specific functions for which each such line organization has been assigned primary responsibility.

(3) Form.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(i) Semiannual Briefings.--

(1) Requirement.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and not less frequently than semiannually thereafter until December 31, 2026, the head of the Office established under subsection (a) shall provide to the congressional committees specified in subparagraphs (A), (B), and (D) of subsection (1)(1) classified briefings on unidentified aerial phenomena.

(2) First briefing.--The first briefing provided under paragraph (1) shall include all incidents involving unidentified aerial phenomena that were reported to the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force or to the Office established under subsection (a) after June 24, 2021, regardless of the date of occurrence of the incident.

(3) Subsequent briefings.--Each briefing provided subsequent to the first briefing described in paragraph (2) shall include, at a minimum, all events relating to unidentified aerial phenomena that occurred during the previous 180 days, and events relating to unidentified aerial phenomena that were not included in an earlier briefing.

(4) Instances in which data was not shared.--For each briefing period, the head of the Office established under subsection (a) shall jointly provide to the chairman and the ranking minority member or vice chairman of the congressional committees specified in subparagraphs (A) and (D) of subsection (k)(1) an enumeration of any instances in which data relating to unidentified aerial phenomena was not provided to the Office because of classification restrictions on that data or for any other reason.

(j) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out the work of the Office established under subsection (a), including with respect to--

(1) general intelligence gathering and intelligence analysis; and

(2) strategic defense, space defense, defense of controlled air space, defense of ground, air, or naval assets, and related purposes.

(k) Task Force Termination.--Not later than the date on which the Secretary establishes the Office under subsection (a), the Secretary shall terminate the Unidentified Aerial Phenomenon Task Force.

(l) Definitions.--In this section:

(1) The term "appropriate congressional committees" means the following:

(A) The Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate.

(B) The Committees on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Senate.

(C) The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House

of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

(D) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

(2) The term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning given such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).

(3) The term ``line organization'' means, with respect to a department or agency of the Federal Government, an organization that executes programs and activities to directly advance the core functions and missions of the department or agency to which the organization is subordinate, but, with respect to the Department of Defense, does not include a component of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

(4) The term ``transmedium objects or devices'' means objects or devices that are observed to transition between space and the atmosphere, or between the atmosphere and bodies of water, that are not immediately identifiable.

(5) The term ``unidentified aerial phenomena'' means--

(A) airborne objects that are not immediately identifiable;

(B) transmedium objects or devices; and

(C) submerged objects or devices that are not immediately identifiable and that display behavior or performance characteristics suggesting that the objects or devices may be related to the objects or devices described in subparagraph (A) or (B).

V/r,

(b) (6)

[REDACTED]

From: [Miller, Christopher A SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#)
To: [Barron, Claude E SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\); \(b\) \(6\)](#) [Piret, Ronald J RDML USN COMNAVMETOC SSC \(USA\); Ekstrom, Christopher R SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\); Okon, John A RADM USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\); Treat, Michael V SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\); \(b\) \(6\)](#)
[Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\); Page, Christopher James \(Chris\) SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\); Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\); Bryer-Joyner, Susan RDML USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\); St Pierre, Scott M SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\); Correll, Richard A RADM USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\); Flynn, William A SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\); \(b\) \(6\)](#) [Mccool, Kelly SES USN DCNO N9 \(USA\); \(b\) \(6\)](#)
Cc: [\(b\) \(6\)](#) [Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO \(USA\)](#)
Subject: FW: STEM 2 STERN
Date: Wednesday, December 22, 2021 2:20:40 PM
Attachments: [RDA S2S Slides Dec 2021 R1.pdf](#)

FYI. Not sure how we got left off the invite, but here are the slides for the meeting. Just about everyone has something in it.

v/r

Chris

From: Hogg, Neil W SES USN CNO (USA) [\(b\) \(6\)](#)
Sent: Wednesday, December 22, 2021 11:24 AM
To: Miller, Christopher A SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) [\(b\) \(6\)](#)
Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO (USA) [\(b\) \(6\)](#)
Subject: FW: STEM 2 STERN

Slides from yesterday's Stem-to-Stern

V/R Neil

ADCNO, Integration of Capabilities and Resources (OPNAV N8B)
2000 Navy Pentagon (Room [\(b\) \(6\)](#))
Washington, DC 20350-2000

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From: [Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#)
To: [Trussler, Jeffrey E VADM USN CNO \(USA\)](#); (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6) [Miller, Christopher A SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#)
Subject: RE: End of Day 21 MAR
Date: Tuesday, March 22, 2022 11:16:00 AM

Boss –

The VCNO “refresh” meeting sprung out of a meeting I was in with VCNO earlier in the day; (b) (6) did the talking at the refresh, but he really needed to talk to (b) (6) from N81. We’ve gotten the essential elements of what VCNO was after to him; (b) (6) will talk to VCNO later.

VCNO asked for the “refresh” as he focused on prep for the second “Concepts Roundtable” with DepSecDef, which is happening today. I can give you details when you return. VCNO’s questions were very specific.

VR,
Scott

Scott W. Bray
Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence
Director, Naval Intelligence Activity
(b) (6)

From: Trussler, Jeffrey E (JT) VADM USN CNO (USA) (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, March 21, 2022 4:22 PM
To: (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
(b) (6) Miller, Christopher A SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6); Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)
Subject: Re: End of Day 21 MAR

+Bray

Copy. For Scott with Vice on post ops navy briefing, he was not there. Make sure teams that were there and he link up. Vice must want something very specific based on our discussions, see if you can get context from his office.

All good down under!!

Vr, JT

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Monday, March 21, 2022 3:24 PM

To: Trussler, Jeffrey E (JT) VADM USN CNO (USA) (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Miller, Christopher A SES USN

DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)

Subject: End of Day 21 MAR

Good morning Admiral,

It's been a fairly quiet day here.

- 1) Mr. Miller is at the NCF POM24 Procurement & Divestment this afternoon.
- 2) Mr. Bray has 2 meetings scheduled with VCNO; this afternoon and tomorrow morning.
 - a. Today, to refresh the discussion from the space Post OPS Navy briefing with GEN Thompson
 - b. Tomorrow, to discuss a UAP update and prep for the 4* Board
- 3) CNO will be having breakfast with USSF CSO 28 MAR to discuss space as a warfighting domain. His office has requested a POC for potential RFIs. I & W are working a 1-pgr with updates, including staff talks. Intent is to provide sometime Tuesday.
- 4) N2N6D provided a 1 page executive summary on Crypto Modernization to DON CIO. Ms. Rathbun briefed the Under this morning with no follow-up RFIs.

Standing by.

V/r,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#); [Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#); [Page, Christopher James \(Chris\) SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#); [Sadler, Stephen R SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: 15 Apr OLA Update
Date: Wednesday, April 20, 2022 8:32:29 AM
Attachments: [BILLS-117hr5412rh.pdf](#)

Mr. Bray,

The language was in the PB22 Intelligence Authorization Act. The entire bill is attached, the specific language referred to in the OLA weekly is below.

SEC. 1112. ANNUAL REPORTS ON THE DOMESTIC ACTIVITIES OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

(a) REPORTS.—Not later than January 31 of each year, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report—

(1) identifying all domestic activities undertaken by each element of the intelligence community during the prior fiscal year; and

(2) for each activity identified under paragraph (1), a statement of the legal authority authorizing such activity to be undertaken.

(b) FORM.—Each report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(c) FIRST REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees the first report required under section 1112 of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a).

V/r, (b) (6)

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(b) (6)
(b) (6)

From: Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, April 19, 2022 4:25 PM
To: Trussler, Jeffrey E (JT) VADM USN CNO (USA) (b) (6); BryerJoyner, Susan RDML USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)
Cc: N2N6 Congressional Weekly (b) (6); Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6); (b) (6); (b) (6); NIA Front Office (b) (6)
Subject: Re: 15 Apr OLA Update

Boss -

We're working on tracking down the NDAA language on the "domestic activities" task. It seems to me that it's probably appropriately a task to Naval Intelligence writ large. The good news is that ONI is working its part already for us to fold in. Will get an update to you soonest.

VR,
Scott

From: Trussler, Jeffrey E (JT) VADM USN CNO (USA) (b) (6)
Sent: Sunday, April 17, 2022 9:40 AM
To: (b) (6) Bray, Scott
W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA) (b) (6); BryerJoyner, Susan RDML USN DCNO
N2N6 (USA) (b) (6)
Cc: N2N6 Congressional Weekly (b) (6)
Subject: RE: 15 Apr OLA Update

Copy (b) (6)!

Scott Bray: put eyeballs on this one and determine if it was tasked appropriately:

1. **HPSCI Minority Domestic Activities Letter.** On 5 April, HPSCI Minority Leaders addressed a letter to COMONI highlighting the FY22 Intelligence Authorization Act, Section 1112, Annual Reports on Domestic Activities of the Intelligence Community. The IAA directs the Director of National Intelligence to provide an annual report; the 5 April letter from the HPSCI Minority directs COMONI to provide the first report by 13 June 2022 and annually thereafter.

SBJ: Distro to me, VADM Aeschbach, VADM Myers, and the usual suspects what the answers are to "what have we done with the CRR". I have answers but I want us all to be aligned and specifically with what DON CIO/PCA might also provide. They have a standard set of talking points I believe.

I am seeing the Project OVERMATCH brief as pretty low threat if only those two attending. I know where was a desire to get me or Kelly there based on others attending but comfortable based on what I see in note below.

Tracking ASAP item. Scott/Sandy, just synch with me this week on plan.

Vr, JT

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Saturday, April 16, 2022 8:23 PM
To: Trussler, Jeffrey E (JT) VADM USN CNO (USA) (b) (6)

Cc: N2N6 Congressional Weekly (b) (6)

Subject: FW: 15 Apr OLA Update

Admiral,

Please see below for a highlight of N2N6 equities in last week's Legislative Review and additional ongoing efforts.

Overview:

1. Both chambers will be in recess
1. OMB delivered the top-line PB23 budget on March 28. Budget Rollout Briefings to the Congressional Appropriations Committees, Armed Services Committees, Congressional Research Service, and Congressional Budget Office took place this week. Program briefs will be finalized by April 15. OLA will deliver budget books to the hill on or about April 18. PB23 briefs will then commence. Many PSMs have requested to take budget briefs NLT April 31 in order to draft NDAA legislation in May and June,
1. SASC DOD FY23 Posture Hearing Statements can be found here: <https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/to-receive-testimony-on-the-department-of-defense-budget-posture-in-review-of-the-defense-authorization-request-for-fiscal-year-2023-and-the-future-years-defense-program>

HASC DOD FY23 Posture Hearing Statements can be found here: <https://armedservices.house.gov/2022/4/full-committee-hearing-fiscal-year-2023-defense-budget-request>

1. HASC and SASC DON Posture Hearing is tentatively scheduled for 11 May and 12 May respectively.

Briefs:

1. Cyber Workforce Call with NAVIFOR. On 19 April, VADM Aeschbach will participate in a telecon with cyber PSMs to discuss NAVIFOR's role in manning, training, and equipping the cyber workforce. HASC PSM, Josh Stiefel and SASC PSM, Katie Sutton are expected to attend.
1. HPSCI Staff visit to ONI. Staff from the HPSCI Defense and Intelligence Warfighter Support Subcommittee will include: (b) (6). This visit is intended to provide a command and mission overview and in coordination with the anticipated Congressional Notification of the command reorganization. The event will be rescheduled post budget season. POC: (b) (6)

1. PB23 Cyber Staffer Day Part 2 is scheduled for 20 April. PSMs emphasize budget displays for cyber lines of funding must be tied to the appropriate PE and align with DOD CIO spending. PSMs will transition to a SECNAV CRR discussion with DON PCA and CIO immediately following the staffer day brief. POC: (b) (6)

1. PB23 Enterprise IT / Business Systems Staffer Day is scheduled for 27 April. Format will be via Microsoft Teams. POC: (b) (6)

1. Project Overmatch Brief with HASC TALF PSMs is scheduled for 21 April. (b) (6) have requested an overview of Project Overmatch. RADM Small will deliver the brief via SVTC. Due to simultaneous staffer briefs, other PSMs who expressed interest will likely not attend. POC: (b) (6)

1. PB23 Navy NC3/Strategic Forces Staffer Day is scheduled for 29 April. PSMs requested at least a one hour discussion on TACAMO. POC: (b) (6)

1. **Navy GDIP/MIP FY23 Budget Roll Out.** On 3 May, N2N6 will host committees for the FY23 GDIP/MIP budget roll out. Staff from HPSCI, SSCI, HASC (TBD) and SASC (TBD) plan to attend. VADM Trussler is scheduled to host the event. POC: (b) (6)

1. **HPSCI FY23 DIE Hearing.** On 12 May, the HPSCI Defense Intelligence and Warfighter Support (DIWS) Subcommittee will hold a closed session on the FY23 Defense Intelligence Enterprise budget. USDI and the services will be called as witnesses; You will likely be called to testify as the Director of Naval Intelligence.

1. **SSCI Closed Hearing.** On 18 May, SSCI will hold a Closed Session on Sensitive Naval Activities. We expect you will be called as a witness to testify about special programs.

Deliverables to Congress:

1. PCTE Funding. SASC PSM, (b) (6) has requested information regarding Persistent Cyber Training Environment (PCTE) usage and funding as a follow-up to the SASC Cyber Hearing held on 5 April. Suspense: 19 April. POC: (b) (6)

1. Cyber Additional Lines of Funding. SASC PSM, (b) (6) has requested information regarding adding additional funding to cyber lines of effort. She highlighted AI/ML, zero trust, and cyber S&T but is open to any recommendations. Suspense: 18

April. POC: (b) (6)

1. ASAP. As a result of the classified FY22 NDAA and FY22 Appropriations actions, SASC PSMs requested an update from the ASAP program and Navy leadership as soon as possible. SASC PSMs are concerned about the livelihood of the preexisting ASAP Program Office and intended funding expenditures. Scheduling is in progress, likely for the week of 25 April. POC: (b) (6)
1. Budget Display for Cyber Vulnerability Evaluations and Mitigation Activities For Major Weapons Systems of the Department of Defense / RTC / HR-5515 /. Mandates cyber vulnerability assessments of major weapons systems, mitigation actions, and associated costs of the evaluation and mitigation. SASC PSM, (b) (6) requested a briefing from all military services. Briefing will occur during cyber staffer day part 2 . POC: (b) (6)
1. MQ-4C Triton Quarterly Update, House FY21 IAA. In accordance with the House enacted FY21 Intelligence Authorization Act, a quarterly report to HPSCI on the status of the MQ-4C Triton Multi-Int was delivered on 4 November to SSCI and HPSCI. The FY23 Budget briefing will fulfill the next quarterly update. POC: (b) (6)
1. Cyber Military and Civilian Career Path Study RTC, HR 116-333 / CIMS 27162C3. Directs SECNAV and CNO to conduct a joint study that examines how to improve the cyber career path for uniformed and civilian employees. The civilian study was delivered to Congress and the military study is pending completion at the end of April. SASC PSM, (b) (6) has requested a brief in May after both studies are complete. POC: (b) (6)
1. Congressional Notification of ONI Reorganization. As a follow up to DCNO's engagement with the committee and in anticipation of the formal notification, SSCI has requested engagement with COMONI be postponed until after budget season. Scheduling will resume in April and will likely include an offer for new SSCI staff to tour ONI. POC: (b) (6)
1. (b) (6), Legislative Assistant for Rep Speier's office has submitted an RFI for testing of web-based career services out to sea. He is interested in learning if career marketplace and other web-based career services are functionally tested in an out to sea environment prior to deployment Suspense: May 05. POC: (b) (6)
1. Training cost comparison of cyber workforce and other work roles. SASC Research Assistant, (b) (6) is requesting a comparison product of cyber workforce training costs compared to other work roles which have an equivalent length of training in fields such as nuclear and aviation. Suspense: April 27. POC: (b) (6)

1. USNA IW officer accession. As a follow-up to CNO's office call with Rep. Langevin, there is a due-out of the criteria used for USNA IW officer accession. Rep. Langevin was concerned that the Navy's top USNA talent is not given an opportunity to commission in a designator that conducts cyberspace operations, and that most accessions were from NPQ personnel. Suspense: 19 April. POC: (b) (6)
1. CRS RFI Regarding CH Modernization. Mr. Ron O'Rourke, Congressional Research Service, has requested information regarding Chinese shipbuilding projections for 2030 and 2050. This request is an annual data call used to update his background product entitled, *China Naval Modernization*. ONI has the task for action and is scheduled to complete it by 22 April. POC: (b) (6)
2. Rep Gallagher RFI Regarding CH Modernization. Rep. Gallagher (R-WI)'s office has requested further information regarding a comparison of Chinese naval platforms in 2010, 2015 and 2022. This information will be used in performance of oversight duties. Tasked to ONI, this RFI is scheduled to be complete on 22 April. POC: (b) (6)
3. **HPSCI Minority Domestic Activities Letter.** On 5 April, HPSCI Minority Leaders addressed a letter to COMONI highlighting the FY22 Intelligence Authorization Act, Section 1112, Annual Reports on Domestic Activities of the Intelligence Community. The IAA directs the Director of National Intelligence to provide an annual report; the 5 April letter from the HPSCI Minority directs COMONI to provide the first report by 13 June 2022 and annually thereafter.

Other Ongoing Efforts:

1. Congressional Pizza Briefs. OLA is coordinating "101" hill briefings throughout CY22 via Microsoft Teams or in-person at the SECRET level. Target audiences are new Congressional staffers attached to member offices such as MLAs and legislative directors. PSMs will also be invited. Tentatively, Navy IW 101 is scheduled for July and Project Overmatch/NOA for November. RADM Okon is tentatively scheduled to deliver the IW 101 briefing in July. POC: (b) (6)
1. JADC2 Report To Congress. Joint Staff is scheduling the quarterly RTC for April 20. They have requested information from the services regarding DevSecOps and Zero Trust ISO of the briefing. POC: (b) (6)
1. SECNAV Cybersecurity Readiness Review (CRR) 2019 is scheduled for 20 April. DON PCA and CIO will host a discussion with SASC/HASC PSMs regarding DON's path

forward based on the analysis and recommendations of the CRR. This brief will occur immediately following cyber staffer day part 2. POC: (b) (6)

1. Rep. Mike Gallagher will be visiting the Office of Naval Intelligence for a short orientation program on the morning of 26 April, per request from the HPSCI Staff. POC: (b) (6)
1. FY23 NDAA SASC Draft Language for Removal of Navy CMF Forces on or about 2025. SASC provided draft language to CYBERCOM that proposes SECDEF submit a Report to Congress on Force Generation of CMF Forces. The draft language also considers assigning CMF resourcing to a single military service or the creation of a new department within the DOD. CYBERCOM has requested feedback via the service cyber components (FCC/C10F). POC: (b) (6)

Travel:

1. **STAFFDEL Ravindra to WA/CA.** From 17-19 Apr, (b) (6), SSCI staff, will travel to PACNORWEST and Los Angeles in support of their intelligence oversight responsibilities. (b) (6) plans to support. POC: (b) (6)
1. **STAFFDEL Thurman to WA.** From 20-22 Apr, (b) (6), will travel to PACNORWEST in support of their intelligence oversight responsibilities. (b) (6), National Security Advisor to Rep. McCarthy (R-CA) also plans to attend. (b) (6) plans to support. POC: (b) (6)
1. **STAFFDEL Sutton to San Diego.** SASC PSM, (b) (6) has requested an escort for an aircraft carrier embark from 23-24 April. Additional PSMs include (b) (6) from OLA plan to support. (b) (6) from DON CIO will join the embark during the N6 portion of the tour. POC: (b) (6)

V/r,

(b) (6)

V/r

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

From: Joyner, Sara A RADM USN OLA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6)

Sent: Friday, April 15, 2022 11:00 PM

To: Joyner, Sara A RADM USN OLA WASHINGTON DC (USA) (b) (6); Gilday, Michael M ADM USN CNO (USA) (b) (6)

Cc: Lescher, William K ADM USN VCNO (USA) (b) (6); Caldwell, James F Jr ADM USN (USA) (b) (6); Paparo, Samuel J Jr ADM USN COMPACFLT NO (USA) (b) (6); Caudle, Daryl L ADM USN USFFC (USA)

(b) (6); Haeuptle, Andrew S SES USN DNS (USA)

(b) (6); Nowell, John B Jr VADM USN DCNO N1 (USA)

(b) (6); Kilby, James Wells VADM USN USFFC (USA)

(b) (6); Merz, William Rhode (Bill) VADM USN CNO (USA)

(b) (6); Trussler, Jeffrey E (JT) VADM USN CNO (USA)

(b) (6); Crites, Randy B VADM USN DCNO N8 (USA)

(b) (6); Malloy, James Joseph VADM USN CENTCOM CCCG (USA)

(b) (6); Mewbourne, Dee L VADM USN

TRANSCOM TCDC (USA) (b) (6); Williamson, Ricky Lee VADM USN DCNO

N4 (USA) (b) (6); Houston, William Joseph VADM USN COMSUBLANT

(USA) (b) (6); Hughes, Jeffrey W VADM USN DCNO N7 (USA)

(b) (6); Mustin, John B VADM USN CNO (USA)

(b) (6); Conn, Scott D VADM USN DCNO N9 (USA)

(b) (6); Lindsey, Yancy B VADM USN CNIC WASHINGTON DC (USA)

(b) (6); Chebi, Carl P VADM USN

COMNAVAIRSYSCOM PAX (USA) (b) (6); Galinis, William J VADM USN (USA)

(b) (6); Odom, David L BGen USMC USN DCNO N9 (USA)

(b) (6); Swartz, Matthew H SES USN USFFC (USA)

(b) (6); Waters, James Preston III RADM USN DCNO N1 (USA)

(b) (6); Loiselle, Andrew J RADM USN CNO (USA)

(b) (6); Perry, Douglas G RADM USN COMSUBGRU 9 (USA)

(b) (6); Byrne, William D Jr RADM USN DCNO N7 (USA)

(b) (6); Stamatopoulos, Peter G RADM USN COMNAVSUPSYSCOM PA

(USA) (b) (6); Garvin, Peter A RADM USN NETC PENSACOLA FL

(USA) (b) (6); Gumbleton, John E RADM USN ASSTSECNAV FMC DC (USA)

(b) (6); French, Christopher C RADM USN JS OCJCS (USA)

(b) (6); Wilson, David Garfield RDML USN COMNAVLEGSVCOM DC

(USA) (b) (6); Meier, John F RADM USN COMNAVAIRLANT NOR VA (USA)

(b) (6); Okon, John A RADM USN DCNO N2N6 (USA)

(b) (6); Kern, Erin M SES USN DCNO N4 (USA)

(b) (6); (b) (6)

(b) (6); Darnell, Donald P SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA)

(b) (6); Swartz, Matthew H SES USN USFFC (USA)

(b) (6); Lluy, Paul A SES USN DCNO N9 (USA)

[illegible]

(b) (6)

Subject: 15 Apr OLA Update

CNO,

(Routine // FYSA)

1. Executive Summary:

a. Senate and House Floor Action. None. Both chambers are on a two-week recess and will reconvene the week of 25 Apr. (The Senate will return on Mon, 25 Apr; the House on Tues, 26 Apr.) In the meantime, both chambers are holding twice-weekly pro forma sessions for procedural purposes only.

b. Appropriations Update. The PB23 highlights and justification books are expected to be delivered to the Hill on or about 18 Apr, to be followed by “staffer days” program briefs to defense committee PSMs.

c. Significant Events This Week: NSTR.

d. Significant Events Next Week:

i. Senate and House Floor Action. None. Both chambers will be in recess and will hold only brief pro forma sessions for procedural purposes.

h. Upcoming Events:

i. Next Recesses. The House will recess the week of 2 May for a district work period

and the week of 23 May for a hybrid district/committee work period. Both chambers will recess the week of 30 May for their Memorial Day recesses.

- ii. **PB23 DON Posture Hearings.** The current DON posture hearing schedule is HASC on 11 May, SASC on 12 May, HAC-D on 18 May, and SAC-D on 26 May.

2. Upcoming Engagements/Committee Activities. A copy of the current engagement calendar is attached. Highlights:

SECNAV, UNDER, CNO, CMC, VCNO and ACMC Engagements:

25 Apr	ACMC office call with Rep. Green (R-TN)
26 Apr	SECNAV, CNO, CMC breakfast with HASC staff directors
26 Apr	SECNAV, CNO, CMC office calls with Sen. Inhofe (R-OK), Sen. Tester (D-MT), Sen. Shelby (R-AL), and Rep. Rogers (R-AL)
27 Apr	SECNAV office calls with Rep. Courtney (D-CT) and Rep. Wittman (R-VA)
27 Apr	SECNAV, CNO, CMC office call with Sen. Reed (D-RI)
27 Apr	CNO breakfast with SASC staff directors
28 Apr	SECNAV, CNO, CMC office call with Rep. Smith (D-WA)
29 Apr	VCNO office call with Rep. Garamendi (D-CA)
03 May	CNO breakfast with Sens. Gillibrand (D-NY) and Tillis (R-NC)
10-12 May	Modern Day Marine Convention (CMC)
17 May	SECNAV office call with Rep. Moulton (D-MA)
23 May	SECNAV visit to PAX with Sen. Van Hollen (D-MD)
19 Jul	CNO barge cruise

Upcoming Committee Activities:

26 Apr	SASC-SP PB23 shipbuilding investments hearing (ASN RDA, N9 and CD&I)
27 Apr	SASC-P Service Personnel Chief posture hearing (CNP; DC, M&RA)
27 Apr	SASC-SF nuclear forces hearing (SSP, NNSA, USAF)
27 Apr	HASC-TALF aviation programs hearing (ASN RDA, DCA, N98)
27 Apr	HASC-SPF shipbuilding hearing (ASN RD&A, N9, CD&I))
10 May	SASC-SP and -R joint hearing on "SIOP" (witnesses TBD depending on scope)
11 May	HASC DON posture hearing (SN, CNO, CMC)
11 May	HASC-R all-Service readiness hearing (Service Vice Chiefs)
12 May	SASC DON posture hearing (SN, CNO, CMC)
12 May	HPSCI defense intelligence hearing (N2N6, DCI)
12 May	HASC-CITI science and technology hearing (DASN RDT&E)
17 May	HASC-SF nuclear forces hearing (SSP, NNSA, USAF)
18 May	HAC-D DON posture hearing (SN, CNO, CMC)
18 May	HAC-M installations and QoL (ASN (EI&E), N4, DC I&L, MCPON, SMMC)
18 May	SAC-M FY23 Budget Hearing (OPNAV N4, DC I&L)
24 May	HAC-D Guard and Reserve hearing (CNR/MARFORRES)
26 May	SAC-D DON posture hearing (SN, CNO, CMC)
26 May	HAC-D DHP hearing (Navy SG)

3. Committee Activities This Week: None.**4. Navy OLA Engagements This Week:**

- a. SECNAV Visit to NB Kitsap with Rep. Strickland (D-WA) and Aides to Rep. Larsen (D-WA).** On 12 Apr, SECNAV visited the NB Kitsap Missile Assembly Building with Rep. Strickland, Mr. Ryan Casey (district director to Rep. Larson) and Mr. Christopher Dingle (community liaison to Rep. Larsen).
- b. CNO Visit to NAS Fallon with Rep. Lamborn (R-CO).** On 12 Apr, CNO visited NAS Fallon with HASC RDY Ranking Member Lamborn.
- c. Private/Public Shipyard Maintenance Discussions w/Rep. Garamendi (D-CA) Staff.** On 12 and 14 Apr, three new members of Rep. Garamendi's personal and committee staff – Ms. Elle Ekman (MLA), LCDR Marley Cassels (Defense Fellow) and Ms. Melanie Harris (HASC RDY PSM) – met with SEA21 and SEA04 for an overview of the Navy's maintenance planning processes.
- d. SECNAV Visit to NS Great Lakes with Rep. Schneider (D-IL).** On 14 Apr, SECNAV visited NS Great Lakes with Rep. Schneider.
- e. Shipboard Communication Capability Brief w/Rep. Speier (D-CA) MLA.** On 15 Apr, representatives from N2N6 and NAVWAR briefed Mr. Brian Collins (Rep. Speier MLA) on shipboard communication capabilities. Mr. Collins requested the brief as a follow-on to the TF1N brief, which indicated Sailors had difficulty accessing web-based career services out to sea.
- f. HASC SPF PSM Synch Session with ASN RD&A, N9, and CD&I.** On 15 Apr, HASC PSF PSMs conducted a synchronization session with ASN RD&A, N9, CD&I) in preparation for HASC SPF's PB23 DON shipbuilding hearing.
- g. STAFFDEL Ravindra to Germany.** From 9-15 Apr, SSCI PSMs Mr. Arjun Ravindra, Mr. Chad Tanner, Mr. Rafi Martina, and Ms. Bethany Poulos visited Germany in support of their intelligence oversight responsibilities.
- h. STAFFDEL Wilcoxon Embark on USS GERALD R FORD.** On 13-14 Apr, Mr. Matts Wilcoxon (MLA to Rep. Horsford (D-NV)), Mr. Sean O'Keefe (SASC PSM), Ms. Katie Magnus (SASC PSM), Mr. Colby Kuhns (NSA to Sen. Cramer (R-ND)), and Ms. Celia Morte (MLA to Sen. Cramer) visited Norfolk for a CVN embark.
- i. STAFFDEL Anderson to Norfolk.** From 11-15 Apr, Ms. Hannah Anderson (energy and commerce policy director to Rep. Crenshaw (R-TX)), Mr. Andrew Furman (senior LA to Rep. Pence (R-IN)) and Ms. Elise Krekorian (senior LA to Rep. Duncan (R-SC)) visited Naval

Reactors and NS Norfolk to discuss energy sources and fuels used by the Navy.

6. USMC Engagements This Week:

- a. **NODEL Levin to MCB Camp Pendleton.** On 11 Apr, NODEL Levin traveled to MCB Camp Pendleton.
- b. **Sen. Reed (D-RI) and Sen. Hirono (D-HI) MARFORPAC Visit w/ CG, MARFORPAC.** On 13 Apr, CG, MARFORPAC met with Sens. Reed and Hirono (D-during a visit to MARFORPAC).
- c. **DC I&L Call with Rep. Kahele (D-HI).** On 13 Apr, DC I&L had a call with Rep. Kahele.
- d. **CODEL McCarthy to Poland and Romania.** From 7-13 Apr, CODEL McCarthy traveled to Poland and Romania.
- e. **CODEL Connolly (NATO PA) to Greece.** From 7-11 Apr, CODEL Connolly traveled to Greece.
- f. **CODEL Kelly (HDP) to Peru, Ecuador, Columbia.** From 7-14 Apr, CODEL Kelly traveled to Peru, Ecuador, and Columbia.
- g. **CODEL Carbajal (HASC) to Italy, Greece, Spain.** From 8-16 Apr, CODEL Carbajal is traveling to Italy, Greece, and Spain.
- h. **CODEL Hagerty to Japan.** From 8-15 Apr, CODEL Hagerty traveled to Japan.
- i. **CODEL Gallego to Philippines, Papua New Guinea.** From 8-15 Apr, CODEL Gallego traveled to the Philippines and Papua New Guinea.
- j. **CODEL Hoyer to Denmark, Germany, Poland, Greenland.** From 9-15 Apr, CODEL Hoyer traveled to Denmark, Germany, Poland and Greenland.

7. FMBE Engagements This Week:

- a. **CODEL Graham to the Western Pacific.** From 7-18 Apr, Sens. Graham (R-SC), Burr (R-NC), Menendez (D-NJ), Portman (R-OH), and Sasse (R-NE) as well as Rep. Jackson (R-TX) traveled to Hawaii, Australia, Taiwan, and Japan to visit with officials on matters pertaining to national security and foreign policy.
- b. **CODEL Shelby to Middle East.** From 10-20 Apr, Sens. Shelby (R-AL), Fischer (R-NE), Marshall (R-KS), and Tuberville (R-AL) as well as Reps. Granger (R-TX) and Carl (R-AL) traveled to Israel, Jordan, Egypt, and Turkey to visit with officials on matters pertaining to national security and foreign policy.
- c. **CODEL McCollum to Europe.** From 10-14 Apr, Reps. McCollum (D-MN), Kaptur (D-OH), Womack (R-AR), and Carter (R-TX) traveled to Germany and Poland to visit with officials on

matters pertaining to national security and foreign policy.

- d. **STAFFDEL Gondek CVN Embark.** On 11 Apr, Mr. Derek Gondek (Senate Budget Committee PSM) visited Norfolk for a CVN embark.
- e. **STAFFDEL Forbes CVN Embark.** On 14 Apr, Mr. John Forbes (SAC-D PSM) visited Norfolk for a CVN embark.

8. Upcoming Navy OLA Engagements of Note:

- a. **STAFFDEL Ravindra to WA and CA.** From 17-19 Apr, SSCI PSMs Mr. Arjun Ravindra and Mr. Chad Tanner will travel to PACNORWEST and Los Angeles in support of their intelligence oversight responsibilities.
- b. **CNO Visits to Bath Iron Works (BIW) with ME Delegation Members/Staff.** On 18 Apr, CNO will visit BIW with Sen. Collins (R-ME), Rep. Golden (D-ME) and a district aide to Rep. Pingree (D-ME).
- c. **N96 Brief to SASC SP PSMs on DDG FLTIIA AMDC Plans.** On 18 Apr, RDML Schlise (N96) will brief SASC SP PSMs on the Navy's plans to outfit some DDG FLTIIAs with Air and Missile Defense Commander capability.
- d. **HASC SPF PB23 Program Briefs.** On 18 Apr, HASC SPF PSMs will receive DON PB23 seapower related aviation program briefs.
- e. **HASC/SASC PB23 Science and Technology Briefs.** On 19 Apr, PSMs from the HASC and SASC Cyber, Emerging Threats and Seapower Subcommittees will receive DON PB23 science and technology overview briefs.
- f. **DECOM Cost Brief to SASC SP PSMs.** On 19 Apr, N801 will brief SASC SP PSMs on cost details of the PB23 DECOM decision.
- g. **HASC/SASC PB23 Carrier Program Briefs.** On 19 April, PEO Carriers will provide PB23 program briefs to SASC and HASC PSMs.
- h. **NAVIFOR Cyber Workforce Discussion with HASC/SASC PSMs.** On 19 Apr, VADM Aeschbach will participate in a discussion with cyber PSMs regarding NAVIFOR's role in manning, training, and equipping the cyber workforce.
- i. **HASC/SASC PSMs Virginia Class Submarine (VCS) Scheduling Update.** On 19 Apr, PEO-SSN will provide a VCS scheduling update to HASC and SASC Seapower PSMs.
- j. **N96 Brief to HASC-SPF PSMs on DDG FLTIIA AMDC Plans.** On 19 Apr, RDML Schlise (N96) will brief HASC SPF PSMs on the Navy's plans to outfit some DDG FLTIIAs with Air and Missile

Defense Commander capability.

- k. Offensive Mining Brief to SASC PSMs.** On 19 Apr, RDML Moton (PEO USC) and CAPT Jackson (N95) will brief SASC PSMs on the maritime mining programs.
- l. DECOM Cost Brief to HASC SPF PSMs.** On 20 Apr, N801 will brief HASC SPF PSMs on cost details of the PB23 DECOM decision.
- m. HASC TALF PB23 Program Briefs.** On 20 Apr, PSMs from HASC TALF will receive DON PB23 tactical aviation program briefs.
- n. Pre-Hearing Meeting with Rep. Wittman (R-VA).** On 20 Apr, ASN RDA, N9 and CD&I will meet with HASC SPF Ranking Member Wittman in preparation for the PB23 DON shipbuilding hearing.
- o. HASC/SASC Cyber PB23 Program Briefs.** On 20 Apr, HASC and SASC PSMs will receive DON PB23 cyber program briefs.
- p. HASC/SASC DoN Cyber Readiness Review.** On 20 Apr, DON PCA will participate in a DON Cyber Readiness Review with HASC and SASC PSMs.
- q. STAFFDEL Thurman to WA.** From 20-22 Apr, HPSCI PSMs Mr. Aaron Thurman, Mr. Nick Ciarlante, and Ms. Amanda Rogers Thorpe will travel to PACNORWEST in support of their intelligence oversight responsibilities. Mr. Allen Souza (NSA to Minority Leader McCarthy (R-CA)) will participate.
- r. HASC/SASC and N81 Force Structure Assessment Timeline Discussion.** On 20 Apr, RADM Verissimo will speak with HASC and SASC PSMs on the timeline and way ahead for Force Structure Assessments.
- s. Project Overmatch Brief to HASC PSMs.** On 21 Apr, RADM Doug Small will deliver a classified Project Overmatch “101” brief to HASC-TALF PSMs. PSMs from other HASC subcommittees will likely attend.
- t. SASC and HASC PB23/Q2 Program Briefs.** On 21 Apr, F-35 JPO will provide SASC and HASC PSMs with PB-23/Q2 update briefs.
- u. Pre-Hearing Meeting with Rep. Courtney (D-CT).** On 21 Apr, ASN RDA, N9 and CD&I will meet with HASC SPF Chairman Courtney in preparation for the PB23 DON shipbuilding hearing.
- v. Pre-Hearing Synch Session with SASC-SP PSMs.** On 21 Apr, SASC SP PSMs will synchronize preparations with ASN RDA, N9 and CD&I for the SASC SP PB23 DON investment hearing.

- w. SASC-SP PB23 Program Briefs.** On 22 Apr, SASC SP PSMs will receive DON PB23 aviation program briefs.
- x. LCU 1700 Update to Sen. Kennedy (R-LA) and Rep, Higgins (D-NY) MLAs.** On 22 Apr, RDML Anderson (PEO SHIPS) will speak by phone with Mr. Max Huntley (Sen Kennedy MLA) and Mr. Turner Bridgforth (Rep Higgins MLA) to discuss the LCU 1700 program.
- y. STAFFDEL Sutton, San Diego/CVN Embark.** From 22-25 Apr, SASC PSMs will travel to San Diego to participate in a CVN embark and receive briefs specific to their cyber portfolio. The trip will include a tour of an OSD 5G testbed at Naval Base Coronado on 22 Apr.
- z. HASC/SASC PEO IWS PB23 Program Briefs.** On 25 Apr, HASC and SASC PSMs will receive PB23 PEO IWS program briefs.
- aa. VCNO Phone Call with HASC RDY PSMs.** On 25 Apr, ADM Lescher will meet with HASC RDY PSMs in preparation for the 11 May all-Service HASC RDY PB23 posture hearing.
- bb. HASC SPF PB23 USC/SEA 21 Program Briefs.** On 26 Apr, HASC SPF PSMs will receive DON PB23 USC/SEA 21 program briefs.
- cc. CODEL Gallagher to ONI.** On 26 Apr, Rep. Gallagher (R-WI) will visit ONI to receive classified briefings.
- dd. Manker v. Del Toro Brief to SASC Majority Counsel.** On 26 Apr, Navy briefers from M&RA and OJAG will brief SASC majority counsel on the terms of the settlement in the *Manker v. Del Toro* case regarding bad paper discharges.
- ee. HASC/SASC PB23 IT Program Briefs.** On 27 Apr, HASC and SASC PSMs will receive DoN PB23 IT program briefs.
- ff. HASC/SASC PB23 Readiness Program Briefs.** On 27 Apr, HASC and SASC PSMs and MLAs will receive PB23 “Readiness Day” program briefs.
- gg. STAFFDEL Richardson to Norfolk.** On 27 Apr, Mr. Scott Richardson (SASC minority general counsel) will travel to Norfolk to familiarize himself with the JAG Corps mission areas and to visit with SOF forces.
- hh. HASC/SASC PB23 NC3/Strat Forces PB23 Program Briefs.** On 29 Apr, HASC and SASC PSMs will receive DON PB23 NC3 and Strategic Forces program briefs.
- ii. HASC/SASC PEO SHIPS PB23 Program Briefs.** On 29 Apr, HASC and SASC PSMs will receive DON PB23 PEO SHIPS program briefs.

- jj. SSP Classified Briefing to House Hypersonics Caucus Staff.** On 29 Apr, VADM Wolfe will provide a classified briefing on the status of the hypersonics program to personal aides to members of the House Hypersonics Caucus.
- kk. Navy GDIP/MIP PB23 Budget Roll Out.** On 3 May, N2N6 will conduct a PB23 GDIP/MIP budget roll out brief for PSMs from HPSCI, SSCI, (T) HASC. and (T) SASC.
- ll. STAFFDEL Trunkey to Newport News.** On 4 May, Dr. Derek Trunkey, Dr. Ed Keating, and Ms. Kathryn McGinnis from CBO will travel to Newport News to meet with private industry leaders to discuss submarine maintenance and to visit submarines in maintenance, including the USS BOISE.
- mm. SASC Counsels Lunch with Navy GC.** On 6 May, Mr. Sean Coffey will host Mr. Gary Leeling and Mr. Scott Richardson (SASC counsels) for an introductory lunch.
- nn. SASC-Seapower PB23 Program Briefs.** On 9 May, SASC SP PSMs will receive DON PB23 USC/SEA 21 program briefs.
- oo. PEO USC / SEA 21 Program Briefs with CRS / CBO.** On 10 May, RDML Moton and RDML Ver Hage will deliver PB23 program briefs to Mr. Ron O'Rourke (CRS) and Dr. Eric Labs (CBO).
- pp. EOD Day on the Hill.** On 11 May, representatives from Service EOD organizations will participate in the Congressional EOD Caucus Day on the Hill.
- qq. CNR Meeting with Rep. Langevin (D-RI).** On 18 May, RADM Selby (Chief of Naval Research) will meet with Rep. Langevin to provide an outline Office of Naval Research experimentation efforts.

Upcoming USMC Engagements of Note:

- a. STAFFDEL Greene (HASC) to Qatar, Jordan.** From 17-22 Apr, STAFFDEL Green will travel to Qatar and Jordan.
- b. CODEL Shaheen to Serbia, Kosovo, Bosnia.** From 18-25 Apr, CODEL Shaheen will travel to Serbia, Kosovo, and Bosnia.
- c. CODEL Coons to France, Georgia, Romania, Italy.** From 18-25 Apr, CODEL Coons will travel to France, Georgia, Romania, and Italy.
- d. NODEL Youngkim to MCB Camp Pendleton.** On 19 Apr, NODEL Youngkim will travel to MCB Camp Pendleton.
- e. DC, CD&I, PEO Land Systems, and MARCORSYSCOM Ground Staffer Day.** On 22 Apr, DC, CD&I, PEO Land Systems, and MARCORSYSCOM will provide HASC TALF and SASC Airland PMs with program briefs on ground equipment.

- f. **DC, A Aviation Staffer Day.** On 22 Apr, DC, A and NAVAIR will provide SASC Airland PMs with aviation program briefs.
- g. **DC, CD&I brief to Rep Ruppertsberger (D-MD) MLA.** On 22 Apr, DC, CD&I will brief Rep. Ruppertsberger on Force Design 2030.
- h. **DC I Cyber Staffer Day Part 2.** On 25 Apr, DC I will host Cyber Staffer Day Part 2 with HASC and SASC PSMs.
- i. **DC I EIT Staffer Day.** On 26 Apr, DC I will host EIT Staff Day with HASC and SASC PSMs.
- j. **DC I MIP/NIP Staffer Day.** On 28 Apr, DC I will host MIP/NIP Staffer Day with HPSCI and SSCI PSMs.
- k. **DC, CD&I/DCA Section 1072 Brief with HASC PSMs.** On 2 May, DC, CD&I and DCA will deliver a section 1072 brief to HASC PSMs.
- l. **MCIOC Visit.** On 10 May, HASC PSMs will travel to MCB Quantico for a MCIOC visit.
- m. **CODEL Gallego (HASC) to Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania.** From 21-29 May, CODEL Gallego will travel to Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania.
- n. **CODEL Duckworth to South Korea, Taiwan.** From 8 May – 15 June, CODEL Duckworth will travel to South Korea and Taiwan.

Upcoming FMBE Engagements of Note:

- a. **STAFFDEL Käufer to PACNORWEST.** On 20 Apr, Ms. Kate Käufer (SAC-D PSM) will lead a STAFFDEL to Seattle, Washington to visit Puget Sound, industry and SUBASE Bangor.
- b. **FY23 MILCON Budget Staffer Day Briefing to SAC-M.** On 20 Apr, Mr. James Balocki (PDASN EI&E) and directors from N4 and DCI&L will brief SAC-M PSMs on PB23 MILCON/FH/BRAC.
- c. **FY23 MILCON Budget Staffer Day Briefing to HAC-M.** On 21 Apr, Mr. James Balocki (PDASN EI&E) and directors from N4 and DCI&L will brief PSMs from HAC-M on PB23 MILCON/FH/BRAC.
- d. **SECNAV Visit to Pax River with Sen. Van Hollen (D-MD).** On 25 Apr, SECNAV will visit NAS Patuxent River with Sen. Van Hollen.
- e. **CNR Office Call with Rep. Kirkpatrick (D-AZ).** On 26 Apr, VADM Mustin (CNR) will conduct an office call with Rep. Kirkpatrick (D-AZ) regarding status of the Reserve Force.

- f. **CNR Office Call with Sen Boozman (R-AR).** On 26 Apr, VADM Mustin (CNR) will conduct an office call with Sen. Boozman (R-AR) regarding status of the Reserve Force.
- g. **Pre-Hearing Tri Call with Sen. Tester (D-MT).** On 26 Apr, SECNAV, CNO and CMC will meet with SAC-D Chairman Tester in advance of the SAC-D DON posture hearing.
- h. **Pre-Hearing Tri Call with Sen. Shelby (R-AL).** On 26 Apr, SECNAV, CNO and CMC will meet with SAC-D Ranking Member Shelby in advance of the SAC-D DON posture hearing.
- i. **CNR Office Call with Rep. Luria (D-VA).** On 28 Apr, VADM Mustin (CNR) will conduct an office call with Rep. Luria (D-VA) regarding status of the Reserve Force.
- j. **CVN Embark.** From 30 Apr - 1 May, Senate personal staff members will embark on USS CARL VINSON (CVN-70) in San Diego, CA.
- k. **Modern Day Marine Expo.** From 10-12 May, CMC and various Deputy Commandants will host Congressional staff at the 2022 Modern Marine Day Expo.
- l. **Modern Day Marine Congressional Breakfast.** On 10 May, (TBD) Deputy Commandants will host a breakfast reception for Members and Congressional staff to begin the 2022 Modern Day Marine Expo.
- m. **NPS Annual Acquisition Research Symposium.** On 11 May, Ms. Kate Käufer (SAC-D PSM) will attend NPS's Virtual 19th Annual Acquisition Research Symposium.
- n. **CODEL Wasserman Schultz to INDOPACOM.** From 28 May - 6 Jun, HAC-M Chair Wasserman Schultz (D-FL) will lead a HAC-M CODEL to Hawaii, Guam, Tinian, Australia and Palau to meet with defense officials, and senior government leaders.

Very Respectfully,
Clutch & BP

RADM Sara "Clutch" Joyner, USN

(b) (6)

Scott W. Bray
Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence
Director, Naval Intelligence Activity

(b) (6)

From:

[Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#)

To:

(b) (6); [Bentley, Keith A SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#); [Borland, Michael R SES \(USA\)](#); (b) (6); [Darnell, Donald P SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#); [Eikowitz, Brian P SES USN \(USA\)](#); (b) (6); [Eisenwold, Diane K SES USN NAVCYBWARDEFVGRU \(USA\)](#); [Herbert, Bradley F SES USN DCNO NZN6 \(USA\)](#); (b) (6); [Lea, A Lyston II SES ODNI DNI \(USA\)](#); [Lochli, Andrew J SES USN NAVCRIMINVSERV DC \(USA\)](#); [McIlwain, Carol J SES USN \(USA\)](#); (b) (6); [Pedersen, Eric D SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#); [Rider-Riojas, Cristin J SES USN FARRAGUT TECANALCEN \(USA\)](#); (b) (6); [Stratton, John F \(Jay\) SES USN ONI WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#); (b) (6); [Treat, Michael V SES USN DCNO NZN6 \(USA\)](#); (b) (6); [Winkeljohn, Jeffrey A SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#); (b) (6)

Cc:

(b) (6)

Subject:

SEI: 28 APR Event - Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force (UAPTF) Overview

Date:

Thursday, April 7, 2022 4:24:16 PM

SEI,

Please join me on Thurs, 28 APR, at 1300 for an overview of the Navy-led Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force (UAPTF) with Brennan McKernan (NIA-N2) and his team.

On Aug. 4, 2020, the Deputy Secretary of Defense established the UAPTF under Navy leadership, and under the oversight of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security.

The UAPTF built upon work begun under Navy leadership in response to a number of reports of unauthorized and/or unidentified aircraft entering various military-controlled training ranges and designated air space in recent years. The U.S. Navy and the DOD take these reports very seriously as any incursion into our training ranges and operating areas by any aircraft, identified or not identified, is problematic from both a safety and security concern. Safety of our aircrews is paramount. Unauthorized and unidentified aircraft pose a risk to flight safety. Additionally, it is vital we maintain the security of our operations.

While some may have heard bits in the news or around the office about the UAPTF, this is a chance to hear firsthand about the unique and important work this office is doing for the Navy and the DoD. Bring your questions!

This event will be held via JWICS TB/VTC. Details will be forthcoming via Outlook invitation.

Hope to see you there.

V/r,
Sandy

Sandra I Brown
Assistant Deputy Director Naval Intelligence
Deputy Director Naval Intelligence Activity
Director, N2N6Q Intelligence Division

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
To: Simpson, Daniel L (D-Day) Maj Gen USAF AF A2-6 (USA); (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6); Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA); (b) (6)
Subject: RE: [URL Verdict: Neutral][Non-DoD Source] Preliminary UAP Report Interest: Black Vault Release and Vice Motherboard Story/ODNI MDR Tracking No. DEOM-2021-00006
Date: Thursday, March 24, 2022 5:33:41 PM

Indeed. ODNI FOIA Team plans to post the document to the public website within the next week. I forwarded it to you both on the High side.

Regards,

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From: SIMPSON, DANIEL L Maj Gen USAF HAF AF/A2/6 (b) (6)
Sent: Thursday, March 24, 2022 4:35 PM
To: (b) (6)
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Cc: (b) (6)
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(b) (6); Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 (USA)
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Subject: RE: [URL Verdict: Neutral][Non-DoD Source] Preliminary UAP Report Interest: Black Vault Release and Vice Motherboard Story/ODNI MDR Tracking No. DEOM-2021-00006

(b) (6) –

Appreciate the insight now the article has finally come out. I am certain that it will stir up more interest.

(b) (6)

DANIEL L. SIMPSON, Maj Gen, USAF
Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, ISR (A2/6)
National Intelligence Manager - Aviation

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Thursday, March 24, 2022 2:55 PM

To: SIMPSON, DANIEL L Maj Gen USAF HAF AF/A2/6 (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: [URL Verdict: Neutral][Non-DoD Source] Preliminary UAP Report Interest: Black Vault Release and Vice Motherboard Story/ODNI MDR Tracking No. DEOM-2021-00006

Gentlemen,

John Greenewald published at [Black Vault](#) the redacted document provided by IMO in response to his June 2021 request for a declassification review of the classified version of the "Preliminary Assessment [of] Unidentified Aerial Phenomena ... that was given to Congress/Senate on or around June 25, 2021." As expected, the posting is stirring some interest among enthusiasts and recurring requestors. I'll follow up as need arises to address new queries.

Black Vault Release: June 2021 Classified UAP / UFO Report Given to Congress Partially Released

The Black Vault. 23 March 2022... by John Greenewald

With a small triumph in the effort to get transparency on a hot topic issue, The Black Vault has secured the partial release of the classified report on Unidentified Aerial Phenomena (UAPs) given to Congress in June of 2021.

This effort by The Black Vault is the result of a Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) case filed under 32 CFR § 1704 (not the usual Freedom of Information Act [FOIA] cases generally filed under 5 U.S.C. § 552) less than 24 hours after the public version of the same was released.

The case mandated that the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), in conjunction with ALL agencies and military branches that contributed to the report, review their respective contributions, and in the end, release the unclassified/declassified/non-

exempt portions.

The below is the result of that case. Today, the ODNI released the portions of the report that are no longer able to be withheld from the public. You can download that release below.

[Article](#)

Vice Motherboard: Activist Publishes Redacted Version of Classified Military UFO Report

The classified version of the much-hyped UFO report describes the “shapes” of UFOs, is far more interesting than the one released to the public.

Vice Motherboard, 23 March 2022... by Jason Koebler

Last June, the Department of Defense released a long-awaited and much-hyped document called “Preliminary Assessment: Unidentified Aerial Phenomena,” detailing the government’s knowledge of UFOs and its programs trying to detect and catalog them. Many UFOlogists hoped that the “UFO report” would be a watershed moment in the field, showing that the government was taking UFOs seriously and, perhaps, explaining what the government thought they were.

Unfortunately, the nine-page report was pretty underwhelming; for the most part it revealed things we already knew, and read primarily like a plea from the DoD for more funding.

Tantalizingly, we were told that members of Congress received a classified briefing with more information that would likely never be released to the public.

John Greenewald, the government transparency virtuoso behind the Black Vault, however, has a gift for us today: A redacted version of the classified report, obtained by filing a mandatory declassification review. This version of the report is longer and much more interesting—detailing, for example, the most “common shapes” of UFOs spotted by the military.

Certain sections of the classified report, such as one called “And a Handful of UAP Appear to Demonstrate Advanced Technology,” have far more detail on specific incidents that the Department of Defense cannot explain and that are not mentioned in the public report, including seemingly two different incidents witnessed by multiple pilots and officers in the Navy. A section called “UAP Probably Lack a Single Explanation” seemingly attempts to go into greater depth exploring what those explanations could be, and also has an extra redacted paragraph about what the DoD believes could be attributed to “Foreign Adversary Systems.” Most interestingly, redacted figures, images, and diagrams in the classified reports explain what the DoD believes to be the most “common shapes” of UFOs, as well as “less common/irregular shapes.” These sections are completely omitted in the public report and are unfortunately redacted in the version of the report obtained by Greenewald.

The classified report also explains that the FBI has investigated and will continue to investigate UFOs in an attempt to ascertain the causes of the phenomena; a redacted section seems to explain which instances it has investigated. “Given the national security implications associated with potential threats posed by UAP operating in close proximity to sensitive military activities, installations, critical infrastructure, or other national security sites, the FBI is positioned to use its investigative capabilities and authorities to support deliberate DoD and interagency efforts to determine attribution,” the report reads.

[Article](#)

Regards,

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[REDACTED]

WEST 2022

COMMUNICATION NAVIGATION **BRIEF**

2022

FEBRUARY 16-18

TOPLINE MESSAGES

- 1** The security and prosperity of our nation depend on the integration of the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard maintaining our advantage at sea.
- 2** Preserving our military advantage, and upholding the rules-based international order depend on strong integration with our Joint Force, Allies, and partners.
- 3** To prevail in any environment, we need to generate a fully integrated, adaptable fleet that includes undersea, surface, air power, unmanned, and land forces.
- 4** Predictable and dependable funding is required to ensure our security, preserve our military advantage, and develop the capabilities we need to keep pace with China.

Generate Integrated All-Domain Naval Power. We must produce a more competitive, more ready total force.


- The U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard provide a flexible, mobile force that influences events abroad, contributes to regional stability, and expands our military advantage at sea.
- Together we deliver a ready, competitive, and lethal force to Combatant Commanders with the confidence and resolve to win any future contest.
- Our strategic competitors intimidate and coerce other nations. They ignore international law. China and Russia are expanding their use of maritime forces to assert their own influence and weaken international rules. Integrated naval power counters these competitors.

Strengthen Alliances and Partnerships. The power of like-minded nations is a key strategic advantage over rivals. We must invest in these relationships.

- All nations benefit from free and open access to the maritime domain. We will foster a united, global effort to safeguard this access.
- We strengthen our alliances and partnerships through development of interoperable capabilities, combined operations, theater security cooperation, and capacity-building efforts. Together we defend sovereignty from authoritarian influence and coercion.

Modernize the Future Force. We will develop a modernized naval force with sufficient size and capability to compete effectively, deter aggression, and, if required, decisively win in conflict.

- This design is consistent with the findings of recent naval force studies (including the Future Naval Force Study and the Integrated Naval Force Structure Assessment).
- By integrating investments and innovations, we will build a force more effective in daily competition and more lethal during conflict. We will prioritize investments in emerging technologies and promote a competitive, agile and modern maritime industrial base.
- As we organize, man, train, and equip today's force, we are designing a future force that will expand our military advantage.



SPEAKING AT THE WEST 2022 SYMPOSIUM

CONFERENCE THEME: ARE WE COMMITTING TO NEW CAPABILITIES RAPIDLY ENOUGH TO MEET FUTURE CHALLENGES?



THE BALANCE NEEDED FOR DISCUSSING CAPABILITIES

We must communicate to compete. In order to get the most from every event, speakers and attendees should be thoughtful and deliberate in their discussions. Selective discussion of future concepts, operations, and capabilities can encourage our partners in industry and help deter potential adversaries. Yet sharing too much detail can allow adversaries to gain a competitive advantage. All communication should demonstrate how the Navy contributes to national defense without revealing information that could adversely affect security.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS & OPSEC GUIDANCE

While speaking publicly and in discussions with media, balance the need to communicate with the need to safeguard sensitive details of emerging concepts and capabilities.

Any public communication about our forces, their operations, and their abilities should be thoughtful, coordinated, and purposeful.

To help ensure OPSEC, remarks and intended themes should be vetted through public affairs officers, command security managers and program subject matter experts. Additionally, speakers should understand the programs and topics to carefully navigate during the question and answer portions of their panels

STAY FAIR IN THE CHANNEL

In general, avoid sharing the following information during West 2022, without prior coordination:

- Specific emergent capabilities
- Platform vulnerabilities
- Specific test schedules of emergent technologies
- Threats and gaps



GENERAL STEERING DIRECTIONS

AVOID THE SHOALWATER



- **AVOID** Specifics on DoD budget apportionment and yearlong CR anomalies
- **USE** "Those are policy decisions for the President and SECDEF, and ultimately funding decisions for Congress, but from my perspective there is no doubt we are focused on balancing readiness for today, modernization for tomorrow and investment in the future -- given the resources allotted. OSD is reviewing yearlong anomalies. We'd much rather have an appropriation to fund the Navy."

See page 7 for additional talking points.

- **AVOID** Specifics TTPs
- **USE** "We maintain advantage by having some technologies and tactics that are unknown to our adversaries."
- **AVOID** speaking outside your lane
- **USE** "I am not the person to speak to that, but what I can say..." OR "We'll look into it, and my PAO will get back to you on that."
- **AVOID** providing timelines and specifics
- **USE** "I'm not going to get into specifics on that program timeline, but I can tell the importance of the program..."

- **AVOID** Specific capabilities or CONOPs
- **USE** "I'm not going to get into specific capabilities in XXX domain, but I can tell you that we are aware of the challenges we face there, we are developing innovative CONOPs and capabilities to prevail against those challenges, and I'm confident that if we continue to press forward we will maintain our qualitative advantage."
- **AVOID** Specifics on emergent technologies
- **USE** "I'm not going to get into all specific capabilities, but I can tell you that we are developing some innovative CONOPs, and I'm confident that if we continue to press forward we will maintain our qualitative advantage."
- **AVOID** Specific areas of current degraded readiness
- **USE** "We have challenges in a number of areas related to that, and we are addressing them, but I don't want to get into the specifics of operational impacts in an open forum."





TALKING POINTS

- **CNO NAVPLAN:** As part of the Joint Force, the U.S. Navy will meet this challenge by deploying forward—alongside our Allies and partners—to deter aggression and preserve freedom of the seas.
- **INDO-Pacific:** The sea services continue to invest in our relationships with Allies and partners to advance our vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific region composed of nations that adhere to the international rules-based order.
 - Rim of the Pacific
 - Pacific Partnership
 - Carat
 - Talisman Sabre
 - Cobra Gold
 - Pacific Reach (Submarine Rescue)
- **China and Russia:** Our strategic competitors intimidate and coerce other nations. They ignore international law. China and Russia are expanding their use of maritime forces to assert their own influence and weaken international rules. Integrated naval power counters these competitors.
 - FONOPs
- **Arctic:** The Joint Force must operate more assertively across the Arctic Region with our Arctic partners to prevail in day-to-day competition as we protect the homeland, keep Arctic seas free and open, and deter coercive behavior and conventional aggression.
 - Ice Exercise
 - Northern Edge
 - Nanook
 - Arctic Specialists
 - Northern Challenge
- **Russia/Ukraine:** I am not the appropriate person to speak on the matter, I'd refer you to the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
- **Distributed Maritime Operations:** DMO is a warfighting concept developed by the sea services to address the challenges of maritime operations against great power adversaries through integration. DMO envisions a distributed but integrated joint force that can operate and maneuver in and through all domains (i.e., space, cyberspace, air, maritime, and land) with improved lethality and survivability.
- **Maritime Interdiction:** The sea services cooperate with government agencies to combat transnational organized crime and take prudent steps to safeguard freedom of navigation and maritime security.
- **Cyber Security:** Cyber security is a constant threat to the Joint Force, you are a target. This is an all-hands effort and a Commander's responsibility.
- **Project Overmatch:** Our operating concepts require platforms, weapons, and sensors connected in a robust Naval Operational Architecture (NOA) that integrates with Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2).
 - Project Overmatch is the Navy's contribution to JADC2 and aligns resources and expertise to field the NOA. It will provide the U.S. Navy a decision advantage over our adversaries and help us deliver a more lethal and better-connected Joint Force far into the future.



TALKING POINTS



- **Yearlong Continuing Resolution:** The CR creates a smaller, less-ready, less-capable, less-lethal force. It will have significant impacts to readiness, modernization, and shipbuilding...and even worse – our people.

Do not comment on yearlong anomalies.

- **Strategic Impacts**
 - A yearlong CR will yield a smaller, less-ready, less-capable, and less-lethal United States Navy.
 - The impacts of a yearlong CR will further erode our ability to credibly deter our adversaries.
 - The CR will have significant impacts to readiness, modernization, and shipbuilding.
- **People**
 - The CR will reduce new accessions by 75 percent and will delay or cancel change of station moves by more than 50 percent.
 - We will withhold reenlistment bonuses and special incentive bonuses that keep our best Sailors and their families in the United States Navy.
 - We will exacerbate a say-do gap that risks breaking trust that further risks breaking trust with Sailors and their families.
- **Industrial Base**
 - It will hurt shipbuilders, aircraft manufacturers, and small innovative high-tech companies that have made significant investments on their own in both infrastructure and their workforce to make us a stronger, more capable military.
 - The CR would needlessly harm an already COVID-impacted supply chain.

- **Fiscal Year 2022 Funding:** Until an Appropriations Bill is enacted by Congress, we will not comment on Fiscal Year 2022 funding.

- **FY22 Ship Decommissionings:** No final decisions or actions to decommission the ships identified in the Department of the Navy's Fiscal Year 2022 President's Budget Request will occur until an Appropriations Bill is enacted by Congress.
- **FY22 President's Budget Request:** The Navy and Marine Corps will strike the right balance between modern and legacy platforms and systems to ensure we maintain our competitive military advantage at sea.

- **30-Year Shipbuilding Plan:** The shipbuilding plan is about more than numbers of ships. It is about equipping our future joint force with the capabilities that allow enduring defense of our nation.

- **FY23 President's Budget Request:** The Fiscal Year 2023 President's budget request is pre-decisional. We will not comment on future budgetary decisions until the budget request is submitted to Congress later this year.

- **AUKUS:** We are embarking on an 18-month trilateral effort to explore an optimal pathway for the delivery of nuclear submarine capability.



TALKING POINTS



► **IMEX 2022:** International Maritime Exercise/Cutlass Express 22 enables the integration of unmanned systems and artificial intelligence into maritime training events to enhance shared capabilities and understand better ways to work cooperatively in the maritime domain.

► **Centennial of U.S. Navy Aircraft Carriers:**

- Carriers are a powerful exhibition of the American Navy's legacy of innovation, technological evolution, and maritime dominance.
- Aircraft carriers provide unique capabilities and survivability.
- Our aircraft carriers are always evolving and support the most powerful naval force in the world.

► **Competitive Edge:**

- The Competitive Edge recognizes the need for the Surface Force to be ready for future challenges. The paper lays out Commander's Intent to face current and future Force challenges and maintain the Surface Force's warfighting advantage in the decade ahead.
- LOEs
 - Develop the Leader, Warrior, Mariner, and Manager
 - Produce More, Ready Ships
 - Achieve Excellence in Fleet Introduction
 - Create Clear and Innovative Operational Concepts
 - Establish Infrastructure for the Future Force

► **NGAD:** We are focused on developing the next generation air dominance capabilities to provide advanced carrier-based power projection capabilities. The Navy is committed to developing new technology to project power, sustain sea control, bolster deterrence, and maintain our enduring commitments worldwide.

► **Unmanned:** Unmanned systems have and will continue to play a key part in future integrated Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO), and there is a clear need to field affordable, lethal, scalable, and integrated capabilities.

► **Hypersonic Weapons:** The Navy is on track to develop and field Conventional Prompt Strike Weapon System capability on DDG 1000 and later on Virginia Payload Module equipped submarines.

► **Climate Resilience:** Climate resilience is an important component of installation mission readiness. The sea services works to ensure installations and infrastructure are resilient to a wide range of challenges, including extreme weather events and temperature, water scarcity, sea-level rise (SLR), recurrent flooding, land degradation, wildfires, and other environmental considerations/threats.





TALKING POINTS

► Get Real, Get Better

- Get Real Get Better and Charge of Command principles make our Navy more ready for competition and combat.
- Get Real Get Better is the formula consistently used by our best performers, informed by multiple years of Navy learning in enterprise improvement efforts, strategic evaluations, and deckplate best practices from all Navy communities.
- This approach empowers our people – to find and fix problems and innovate at their level, from the deckplate to senior leaders – instead of burdening them with extra requirements, policies, or bureaucracy.

► **Mental Health:** All of us are responsible for promoting mental health by removing barriers to seeking help, increasing awareness of resources, and taking appropriate action when a fellow Sailor, Marine, or civilian is in need.

► **Extremism:** Some behaviors are antithetical to our values, undermine our readiness, and put our effectiveness at risk but are alive within our Joint Force. We will not tolerate extremist behavior of any kind.

► COVID-19 CCDA:

- The Navy requires immunizations for all Sailors based on its compelling interest in mission accomplishment and the health and safety of the military workforce.
- Sailors must be prepared to execute their mission at all times, in places throughout the world, including where vaccination rates are low and disease transmission is high.
- Service members refusing the COVID vaccination, without a pending or approved exemption, will be processed for administrative separation.

► **Warrior Toughness:** The warrior mind-set is the linchpin of the mind, body, and soul framework. It comprises four elements: commitment, preparation, execution, and reflection.

► **Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion:** Diversity makes our sea services stronger, our servicemembers better warfighters—our goal is to have the best and most capable fighting Joint Force.



From: [Brown, Sandra SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#)
To: [Bray, Scott W SES USN DCNO N2N6 \(USA\)](#); [Dane, Megan E SES USN NIA WASHINGTON DC \(USA\)](#); (b) (6)
Subject: NIA Talking Points
Date: Friday, February 11, 2022 6:46:07 AM
Attachments: [WEST 2022 Nav Brief 20220902.pdf](#)

Maybe we need classified talking points on a few topics for our senior representatives attending our Navy/IC meetings?

Potential topics:

UAP

SSW

Funding priorities

JWICS Mod

ELCA/ORCA

CIVPAY Shortage

V/r Sandy

Sandra I Brown
Assistant Deputy Director Naval Intelligence
Deputy Director Naval Intelligence Activity
Director, N2N6Q Intelligence Division

(b) (6)