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MR. JOHN GREENEWALD, JR. 27305 W. LIVE OAK RD SUITE #1203 CASTAIC, CA 91384	DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY 9800 SAVAGE ROAD FORT MEADE MARYLAND 20755-6000 ATTN: RAMSEY,VICKI LYNN SUITE: 6881	This transmittal may NOT be downgraded upon removal of the enclosure(s). This transmittal may NOT be declassified upon removal of the enclosure(s).

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SIGNATURES

Serial: MDR-113290
14 November 2022

Mr. John Greenewald, Jr.
27305 W. Live Oak Rd.
Suite #1203
Castaic, Ca. 91384

Dear Mr. Greenewald:

This responds to your request of 07 December 2021 to have the following document reviewed for declassification: Robert J. Hanyok, "The First Round: NSA's Effort against International Terrorism in the 1970s," Cryptologic Almanac, November – December 2002. The material has been reviewed under the Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) requirements of Executive Order (E.O.) 13526 and is enclosed. We have determined that some of the information in the material requires protection.

Portions deleted from the article were found to be currently and properly classified in accordance with E.O. 13526. The information denied meets the criteria for classification as set forth in Section 1.4 subparagraph (c) and remains classified TOP SECRET and SECRET as provided in Section 1.2 of E.O. 13526.

Section 3.5 (c) of E.O. 13526, allows for the protection afforded to information under the provisions of law. Therefore, information that would reveal NSA functions and activities have been protected in accordance with Section 6, Public Law 86-36 (50 U.S. Code 3605, formerly 50 U.S. Code 402 note).

Since your request for declassification has been denied you are hereby advised of this Agency's appeal procedures. Any person denied access to information may file an appeal to the NSA MDR Appeal Authority. **The appeal must be postmarked no later than 60 calendar days after the date of the denial letter.** The appeal shall be in writing addressed to the NSA MDR Appeal Authority (P133), National Security Agency, 9800 Savage Road, STE 6881, Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6881. The appeal shall

reference the initial denial of access and shall contain, in sufficient detail and particularity, the grounds upon which the requester believes the release of information is required. The NSA MDR Appeal Authority will endeavor to respond to the appeal within 60 working days after receipt of the appeal.

Sincerely,

Jacqueline M. Amacher
Chief
Declassification Services

Encl: a/s

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(U) Cryptologic Almanac 50th Anniversary Series

~~(S//SI)~~ The First Round: NSA's Effort against International Terrorism in the 1970s

(U) As far back as the late 19th century, terrorism has been the tool used by many national, ethnic, political, or religious groups or movements to further their aims. Historical examples include the Irish Republican Army (known once as the Irish Republican Brotherhood), the Serbian Black Hand, and the Zionist Irgun Zvai Leumi, and a variety of anarchist groups. However, there is a problem of perception. No doubt that many movements have committed acts that can be interpreted as "terrorist." More often, though, criteria, such as politics, propaganda, and ethnic or religious sympathies, were more important when it came to labeling a group terrorist. One important characteristic of these many groups was that usually they confined their terrorist acts within the borders of the nation or territory in which they existed, and that national military or security forces dealt with them, if not always successfully.

(U) However, by the early 1970s, terrorism had gone international. This change was due probably to a number of changes in the political climate, advances in technology, and the perception by terrorist groups that acts committed outside their country would attract attention to their cause and pressure their opponents into concessions. The number of terrorist incidents nearly doubled from 1968 to 1970. Thereafter they grew by 25 percent each year until 1972. In that year occurred one of the most infamous acts of international terrorism - the seizure of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics by members of the Palestinian Black September group. Terrorists from many countries now moved across borders to carry out acts of violence. Groups as diverse as the Japanese Red Army, the IRA, the Basque separatist ETA, the Italian Red Brigade, and numerous Palestinian groups carried out attacks all over the world.

EO 1.4.(c)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

~~(TS//SI)~~ NSA was slow to take up the problem, and its overall approach was rather haphazard. The reason usually given was that the nature of the terrorist SIGINT target was unusual and that it defined the resulting NSA organizational response. In terms of traditional SIGINT, terrorist communications were different than the conventional military or National Diplomatic Communications (NDC). For the most part, terrorist groups lacked dedicated communications systems. So NSA was confronted with the prospect of picking out the needles of terrorist transmissions in the haystack of [   ]
[   ] But the volume of traffic was so high, and the nature of terrorist communications so subtle that finding anything transmitted by terrorists was problematic. Another SIGINT source, the communications of [   ]

[REDACTED] organizations was not usually helpful. Information gathered from these sources was mixed in with unverifiable rumors, speculation, and just plain wrong data. Some observers pejoratively called these sources "COMINT HUMINT."

(TS//SI) The difficult collection problem also defined the NSA's organizational response. Traditionally, NSA analytic centers were organized around emitter types and defined target entities. In A Group, this approach could be fine tuned to the point where various communications modes of a single unit, such as [REDACTED] were analyzed (and usually reported) by separate teams within a branch. In the G Group of the 1970s, a county's internal communications usually were handled in a completely separate division from one that analyzed its [REDACTED] complex. However, the [REDACTED] target represented a difficult organizational problem. In some cases where a country's [REDACTED] the problem could be assigned to the appropriate target analytic desk. However, some targets, such as international trade and finance, resisted this easy categorization. In 1973 G Group established a division-level organization, G77, titled, "Designated Topics." These included nuclear proliferation, advanced technology, arms trade, energy issues, and international finance. Within the division, a branch, G772, was organized to handle some special projects, one of which was international terrorism.

(TS//SI) G77 had no collection targets and resources of its own. Analysis and reporting were difficult because intercepted terrorist transmissions often were collected from sources such as [REDACTED] Responsibility for these COMINT sources belonged to other G Group offices. These offices would have to approve any G77 reporting based on their sources. This situation probably hampered G772's overall productivity. By 1976, probably as part of the general NSA post-Vietnam retrenchment, G77 was cut back and the terrorism problem was dropped. The effort was not a complete wash, though. A few successes were claimed. In 1973 a Black September bomb plot against Israeli offices and property in New York City was thwarted by a joint-NSA-CIA-FBI effort. In 1974 a plot to assassinate Secretary of State Henry Kissinger during a visit to Damascus, Syria, was broken up when a warning, based on intercept from USN-16 in Cyprus, was sent to the Secret Service detail. Secretary Kissinger's itinerary was changed while Syrian police found a bomb on the original route. Also, [REDACTED] communications, on which a number of terrorist groups could be heard, were being exploited regularly by G6 analysts, and this source provided much information on their activity.

(TS//SI) In 1976 a new organization, G11, the Synthesis Reporting Division, started publishing a weekly Summary of International Terrorist Activity (SITA). This reporting vehicle culled all G Group reports for items dealing with terrorist activity. The SITA continued into the early 1990s. Interestingly, the SITA excluded terrorist tactics used by liberation movements [REDACTED] It also excluded [REDACTED] From the SITA series, an interesting trend in terrorist activity in the later years of the 1970s was that many terrorist acts were directed against so-called moderate Arab countries [REDACTED]

These attacks were carried out by terrorists who, in turn, were backed by the more radical regimes

(S//SI) By the end of the decade, the political landscape had changed to the point where the U.S. intelligence community, under the direction of the Director Central Intelligence (DCI), was re-examining the international terrorism problem. The DCI sponsored a review of intelligence requirements, and international terrorism was raised in priority. Two requirements -- R-880 for international terrorism, and R-871, executive protection - replaced the previous single one. Interestingly, NSA responded to the new requirements by pointing to the same problems it had encountered in 1973. The usual SIGINT attack on a problem, it noted, emphasized a country or emitter, while terrorism was a transnational target that utilized mostly ▢ A new approach in requirements and organization was needed that took into account the peculiarities of the terrorism problem.

(S//SI) However, despite the higher prioritization of international terrorism by the DCI, NSA would not create a new analytic center until 1982. This came as a result of the 1981 kidnapping of American Brigadier General James Dozier by the Italian Red Brigade. In the aftermath of Dozier's rescue by Italian police, a critical review of the SIGINT system's support revealed that it had been woefully unprepared ▢ ▢ it was distracted by misleading intercept and lacked the proper linguistic support. A decade's worth of inconsistent effort revealed a system unprepared to handle a crisis.

[(U//FOUO) Robert J. Hanyok, Center for Cryptologic History, rjhanyo, 972-2893s]

Almanac 50th Anniversary Series

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