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THE SPECIAL INQUIRY OFFICER:

Very well. And how does the respondent plead to the charge of deportability as contained in the Order to Show Cause? Does he admit or desy deportability as charged?

MR. COOMS:

With regard to the allegation of deportability, the respondent denies deportability.

THE SPECIAL INQUIRY OFFICER TO RESPONDENT:

- Q Mr. Sirhan, in the event that you are finally found to be deportable and ordered deported, to what country do you desire to be sent?
- 12 A At this time I decline to name any country.
- 13 Q Of what country are you a citizen?
- 14 A I have no personal knowledge of what country I am a citizen of, so I

  15 don't know what country I will choose or what will be chosen. Of what

  16 country I am a citizen, I don't know.
  - O Hr. Sirhan, I have before me a certified court record of the Superior Court of California for the County of Los Angeles in the matter of The People of the State of California, Plaintiff, v. MUNIR BISHARA SALAMER SIRHAN, and I present this through your attorney. And upon the basis of your admission of allegation of fact No. (5), I ask you if this is the record covering that same conviction which you have already admitted. In other words, are you the defendant in this record of proceedings, and does it relate to the conviction stated in allegation of fact No. (5), and I present it through your attorney, Mr. Coons?

A 10 711 879

BY MR. COOMS:

- 3 -

1/24/67



The respondent is the person named in this court record. This appears to be a true copy of the court record, and it is so stipulated.

THE SPECIAL INQUITY OFFICER TO MR. COORS:

Any objection, Mr. Coons, to the receipt in avidence of the said court record?

#### MR. COONS:

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No objection to its receipt in evidence.

#### THE SPECIAL INQUIRY OFFICER:

The said record is collectively entered in swidence as Exhibit No. 2.

In view of the respondent's denial of the allegations contained in paragraph No. 2 of the Order to Show Cause and his denial of the deportation charge, it will be necessary to request the appearance of a Trial Attorney in this matter to represent the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Therefore, the matter will at this time be continued by me without data certain but subject to my further call, and it is suggested that command confer with the Government's Trial Attorney as to a date, place, and time that is mutually satisfactory and permitted by my calendar. Is that agreeable, Mr. Cooms?

#### MR. COONS:

That's agreeable.

#### THE SPECIAL INQUIRY OFFICER:

Any evidence desired to be submitted on behalf of the respondent at this time?

### MR. COONS:

Not at this time, but at the further hearing we may submit evidence.

THE SPECIAL INQUIRY OFFICER:

A 10 711 879

1/24/67

Very well, then, the hearing in this matter is hereby continued.

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# UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Immigration and Naturalization Service

MATTER OF	FILE A 10 711 879 - Los Angeles				
Munir Bishara Salaneh Siehan	IN <b>DEPORTATION</b> PROCEEDINGS TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING				
Respondent					
Before Special Inquiry Officer	jamin G. Myrca				
CONTINUED hearing held on _February 14, 1967	Los Angeles County Jail at Los Angeles, California				
Recorded by Gray Kaynoter Machine					
Official Interpreter	Clerk-Transcriber Language Roslish				
IN BEHALF OF SERVICE:	IN BEHALF OF RESPONDENT:				
Trial Attorney	_215 West 5th Street				
Station	Los Angeles, Californie 90013				
I hereby certify that to the best of my knowledge	ge and belief the following pages numbered				
through are a complete and ac	curate transcript of the use				
	Signature				
	JAN 2 2 1968				

THE SPECIAL INQUIRT OFFICER TO RESPONDENT: 1 Q Mr. Sirban, you speak and understand English, do you not? 2 3 Tes, I do. This is a continued hearing in deportation proceedings for the purpose 4 of giving you an opportunity to show cause shy you should not be de-6 ported from the United States. Do you understand? 7 Yes, I do. 8 There is presently with you at this hearing Attorney David C. Marcus. Is it your desire that Mr. Marcus represent you at this proceeding? 9 10 Yes. 11 Now I note from the file that you were previously represented by 12 Attorney Jerry Coons. Does Mr. Goons still represent you? 13 A No. 14 Then Mr. Marcus is representing you now in place of Mr. Goons. Is that 15 correct? 16 A Correct. 17 THE SPECIAL INQUIRY OFFICER TO MR. MARCUS: Very well. Mr. Marcus, as you are aware, you will have a reasonable 18 opportunity to examine and to object to the evidence against the re-19 20 spondent, to present evidence in his behalf, and to cross-examine any witnesses that may be presented by the Government. Are you ready to 21 22 proceed? 23 MR. MARCUS: 24 I am not ready to proceed, sir. 25 THE SPECIAL INDUIRY OFFICER: And why are you not ready to proceed, Mr. Marcus? 26 2/14/67

A 10 711 879

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	ı		_
	ı	MR.	MARCHIS
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I was retained on Saturday last. This is my first interview with the respondent. I intend to take certain proceedings in the Superior Court relating to the charges upon which the Order to Show Cause is predicated. I would ask that the matter be placed off calendar at this time until I have completed the proceedings that I intend to take in the Euperior Court.

THE SPECIAL INQUERY CUPICER:

How long do you anticipate that those proceedings will take, Mr. Marcus?

MR. MARGUS:

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Within the next 30 days.

THE SPECIAL INQUIRY COFFICER:

Well, I will not take the case off calendar, but I will adjourn it without date and the case will be notified for hearing the next time hearings are held at the County Jail here. I auticipate that that will be a matter of several weeks or possibly a month or more.

MR. MARCUS TO THE SPECIAL INQUIRY OFFICER:

Sir, may I inquire as to whether or not there is a warrant on this case?

Is there a bail set on the warrant?

THE SPECIAL INQUIRY OFFICER:

Well, Mr. Marcus, that is outside the province of the hearing. You may discuss that with the Trial Attorney after the hearing.

THE SPECIAL INQUIRY OFFICER TO MR. FELDMAN:

Mr. Feldman, there is nothing you want to present at this time is there?

MR. FELDMAN:

No. sir.

A 10 711 879

- 7 -

2/14/67

Superior Court before the Honorable Judge Noble. I would ask, therefore, that these proceedings be continued until that date because, in conversations that I have had with the Court and with the District Attorney, it is my impression that the motion will be granted and it will render these proceedings moot.

### THE SPECIAL INQUIRY OFFICER:

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Before acting upon the motion for continuance I wish to comply with the requirements of the regulations and designate a country for deportation in the event that the respondent is finally ordered deported. The respondent has, I believe I mentioned before, declined to name a country for deportation at the original hearing held on Jenuary 24, 1967.

### THE SPECIAL INQUIEN OFFICER TO RESPONDENT:

- Q Mr. Sirhan, you are informed that if you are finally ordered deported your deportation will be directed to Jordan, the country of nationality shown in the application for your immigrant visa executed by your father before the American Vice Consul at Amman, Jordan, Esptember 22, 1956, which is Exhibit 2 in evidence. Do you understand?
- A Yes, sir.
- Q Do you claim that you would be subject to persecution in Jordan if deported to that country by reason of your race, your religion, or political opinion?
- I wouldn't know what would happen at the time.
- Q You and your attorney, Mr. Marcus, are informed that if you claim that you would be subject to persecution by reason of your race, religion,

or political opinion in Jordan if you are finally ordered deported

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### THE SPECIAL INQUIRY OFFICER:

There being nothing further, I will at this time adjourn this hearing without date. The parties will be advised as to the date for the continued hearing.

### REARING ADJOURNED

A 10 711 879

2/14/67

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## UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Immigration and Naturalization Service

MATTER OF	FILE A 10 711 879 - Los Angales				
MUNIA BISHARA SALAMIN SIRHAN Respondens	IN DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING				
Before Special Inquiry Officer Miche	iel P. Leone				
CONTINUED Hearing held on April 11, 1967	Los Angeles County Cantral Juil at Los Angeles, California 90012				
Recorded by Gray Keynoter Machine	Transcribed by <u>Ida Polsky</u> Clark-Transcriber				
Official Interpreter	Language <b>English</b>				
IN BEHALF OF SERVICE:	IN BEHALF OF RESPONDENT:				
Trial Attorney Los Angeles, California	David C. Miraus, Seq.  215 West 5th Street				
Station	Los Angeles, California 90013				
I hereby certify that to the best of my knowledge	and belief the following pages numbered				
through are a complete and acc	urate transcript of the above-described hearing.  Signature				

Form I-297

Special Inquiry Officer

THE SPECIAL INQUIRY OFFICER TO MR. ECHELL:

Mr. Howell, are you today appearing as Triel Attorney in this matter in place of Sam I. Feldman?

MR. POWKLL:

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Yes, sir.

#### THE SPECIAL LEQUIRY OFFICER:

For your information, in pleading to the Order to Show Cause through his/counsel, Jerry Cooms, the respondent, on January 24, 1967, admitted the truth of allegations numbered (1), (3) and (5) as stated in the Order to Show Cause; denied both parts of allegation number (2) and number (4); and, as to number (4), admitted that he was admitted at the time, but denied that it was as an immigrant and asserts that it was as a refugee and denied the deportation charge. The respondent testified that he had no personal knowledge as to his citizenship and declined to name a country for deportation; and, for lack of avidence of such citizenship or admission of any citizenship by the respondent, no country was specified by me, as Special Inquiry Officer, at that original hearing. At a continued hearing held on February 14, 1967, in my absence from duty, before Special Inquiry Officer Benjamin G. Myron, the hearing of the matter was, upon the request of respondent's present counsel, David C. Mercus, continued for the purpose of affording Mr. Marcus an opportunity to familiarize himself and prepare the respondent's defense.

THE SPECIAL INQUIRY OFFICER TO MR. HOWELL:

You may proceed, Mr. Howell.

MR. HOWELL TO RESPONDENT:

4/11/67

Q For purposes of identification, Mr. Sirhan, I show you an immigrant 2 visa and the application that are combined as one here, relating--(interrupted) 4 BY MR. MARCUS: 5 I will stipulate that it relates to him. 6 MR. HOWELL TO THE SPECIAL INQUIRY OFFICER: I have showed this to counsel and he stipulates that this wise relates to the respondent herein, and so I offer it in evidence to be marked as an Emhibit next in order. 10 MR. MARCUS: No objection. THE SPECIAL INQUIRY OFFICER: 13 There being no objection, the said immigrant visa together with its 14 application and supporting attached documents is received in evidence 15 es Exhibit No. 3. 16 MR. HOWELL: 17 That completes all the evidence that the Government wishes to submit. 18 There are no questions at this time. 19 MR. MARCUS: 20 At this time on the record I am respectfully requesting a continuence 21: of this matter. I have prepared a motion to the Superior Court of 22 the County of los Angeles at Pasadens, requesting a vacation of the 23 trial proceedings had in the Superior Court for the purpose of 24 certifying this matter to the Juvenile Court and because of the age 25 of the respondent at the time of the alleged commission of this offense I have noted the hearing for April 26th, in Department A of the 26 4/11/67 A 10 711 879

The state of the state of the



to that country you will be required to file a written application claiming the benefits of Section 243(b) of the Immigration and Nation-3 .: ality Act within ten calendar days following the next hearing. THE SPECIAL INQUIRY OFFICER TO MR. MARCUS: Is that understood and satisfactory, Mr. Marcus? MR. MARCUS: It is, sir. THE SPECIAL INQUIRY OFFICER TO MR. HOWELL: And Mr. Hovell? 10 MR. HOWELL: Yes, sir. THE SPECIAL INQUIRY OFFICER: Now, Mr. Howell, do you wish to be heard upon the request for a 14 continuance previously made by Mr. Marcus? MR. HOWELL: 16 I will not object to one more continuance for this purpose 17 THE SPECIAL INQUIRY OFFICER: 18 The hearing is this matter will be continued without date certain at this time and subject to my further call on some date subsequent to April 26, 1967. Hearing continued. ADJOURNED BEARING 24

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COTIONAL FORM NO. 10
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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

### Memorandum

To : Regional Counsel

San Pedro, California

FROM : Irving Appleman

Appellate Trial Attorney

SUBJECT: MUNIR BISHARA SALAMEH SIRHAN, A10 711 879, your SW 3.2 dtd

January 25, 1968

Attached for your information is a copy of the order entered by the Board of Immigration Appeals on March 27, 1968.

CO 649-C DATE: March 28,.968

Also attached is the following:

Material transmitted with subject memorandum.

Relating correspondence and memoranda.

The record of proceeding has been sent to the Los Angeles office.

Attachments



#### A-10711879

Respondent is a 20-year-old single male alien, a native of Palestine and a citizen of Jordan, who entered the United States at New York on or about January 12, 1957 at which time he was admitted as an immigrant. Respondent denies that he is deportable as charged.

The record establishes through a certified copy of information, Minutes of October 13, 1966 and Minutes of December 1, 1966 that a criminal action was instituted against the respondent by the filing of an information in the Superior Court of the State of California, for the County of Los Angeles in which the respondent was accused of the crime of violation of Section 11530, Health and Safety Code, committed on or about June 10, 1966 for unlawful possession of marijuana (Count 1) and a violation of Section 11531, Health and Safety Code of California committed on the same day, for unlawfully offering to sell, furnish and give away marijuana (Count 2). The Superior Court on October 13, 1966 found respondent guilty as charged on both counts. On December 1, 1966 the Superior Court suspended the proceedings and the respondent was granted probation for five years, a condition of which was that he spend the first year in the county jail (Exhibit 2).

On May 25, 1967 the court entered a "Minute Order" in the aforementioned criminal action which stated as follows: "Finding of 'Guilty' is vacated and defendant is certified to Juveniel (sic) Court. Remanded" (Exhibit 4).

After the Superior Court certified and remanded the case to the Juvenile Court as aforestated, the Probation Department on July 13, 1967 filed a petition with the Juvenile Court to have respondent adjudged and declared a ward of the court and dealt with as such. On July 14, 1967 the Juvenile Court in a "Findings and Order of Referee" accepted the certification to it of this case and granted the Probation Department's petition to have respondent declared a ward of the Juvenile Court; Neither of these two documents a part of the record of this case.

## Board of Immigration Appeals

rocov

MAR 2 7 1958

File: A-10711879 - Los Angeles

In re: MUNIR BISHARA SALAMEN SIRHAN

IN DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: David C. Marcus, Esq.
215 West Fifth Street
Los Angeles, Calif. 90013
(Case scheduled for oral
argument on February 27,
1968 but counsel failed
to appear)

CHARGES:

Order: Section 241(a)(11), T&N Act (8 USC 1251

(a)(11)) - Conviction of violation

of law relating to illicit posses
sion of marijuana in violation of

Section 11530 of the Health and

Safety Code of the State of Gali
formia

Lodged: None

APPLICATION: Reopen for consideration of termination of proceedings

The case comes forward on appeal from the denial by the special inquiry officer of respondent's motion to reopen the proceedings and vacate his decision of July 11, 1967, under which respondent was found deportable as charged, denied the privilege of voluntary departure, and was ordered deported to Jordan.

### A-10711879

Section 503 of the Welfare and Institutions Code of the State of California provides:

"An order adjudging a minor to be a ward of the Juvenile Court shall not be deemed a conviction of a crime for any purpose, nor shall a proceeding in the Juvenile Court be deemed a criminal proceeding."

Thus, if the legal position of the respondent is that of a ward of the Juvenile Court pursuant to the aforementioned proceedings he would thus not be amenable to deportation under Section 241(a)(11), Immigration and Matienality Act because under the above quoted Section 503 there could be no conviction for a crime by the Juvenile Court.

The Immigration and Naturalization Service contends that the Superior Court was without authority to enter its Minute Order of May 25, 1967 in which the finding of guilty was vacated and the case certified to the Juvenile Court for further action. It is contended that when the Superior Court found respondent guilty on October 13, 1966, and an appeal was not taken within the time stipulated by law, the verdict of guilty became final and could not be vacated or changed some six months later by the Superior Court simply certifying the case to another court. The Service contends that this being the case respondent is deportable as Charged.

After careful consideration of the premises we will reopen the proceedings in order to have introduced into the record the recent proceedings of the Juvenile Court relative to the case certified to it and also to afford the Immigration and Naturalization Service an opportunity to establish that the Superior Court acted without authority when it vacated the finding of guilty and certify the case to the Juvenile Court.

### A-10711879

ORDER: It is ordered that the proceedings be remanded to the special inquiry officer for the purposes stated in the foregoing opinion.

Chairman

### Memorandum

R. A. Vielhaber, Appellate Trial Attorneys: January 31, 1963 Immigration & Naturalization Service


FROM Thos. G. Finucane, Chairman Board of Immigration Appeals

SUBJECT:

Munir Bishara Salameh Sirhan - A-10711879

The above listed case has been recalendared for oral argument at 2:00 p.m. on Tuesday, February 27, 1968.

I'm & Finneaue



### Memorandum

TO R. A. Vielhaber, Appellate Trial Attornmente: January 30, 1968 Immigration & Naturalization Service

FROM Thos. G. Finucane, Chairman Board of Immigration Appeals

SUBJECT:

Munir Bishara Salameh Sirhan - A-10711879

With respect to the above listed case, the hearing has been calendared for oral argument at 2:00 p.m. on Tuesday, February 20, 1968.

Ilm S. Dinneane

### UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE

January 29, 1968

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TO t	Chairman	5	1.,.	F. F. F. F.	* #
,	Board of Immigration Appeals	* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *		- i	,
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FROM 1	Appellate Trial Attorney Office of General Counsel	1	1 1	1 1 2	i 1 <sub>1</sub>
,	Immigration and Naturalization	Service	3	ı	• •
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SUBJECT:	MUNIR BISHARA SALAMEH	SIRHAN.	A10	711 879	9
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	*1	r		, <b>,</b> ,
	Attached is a self-explanatory c the above-named alien.	ommunicatio	n conce	erning the	case of
	Attached is a copy of the order of mentioned case. It is requested an interim decision.				
	It is requested that the Board ex	pedite the su	ıbject c	a3e.	, 1
	The Immigration and Naturalizat at oral argument of this case. P				
ı	and any subsequent changes ther	eof.	1 •	* * * * *	1 4 4
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CO Ferm 63 (Rev. 8-10-65) OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 MAY 1962 EDITION GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

TO

FROM

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

### Memorandum

Gereral Counsel

: Attention: Appellate Trial Attorneys

Board of Immigration Appeals

323 HOLC Building, Washington, D. C.

M. F. Fargione, Deputy Regional Comissioner

Scuthwest Region

SUBJECT: Minir Bishara Salameh Sirban, Alo 711 879.

The respondent is appealing, and is requesting oral argument. He was found deportable under Section 241(a)(11).

The issue involved is whether the respondent may circumvent <u>Matter of A-F-</u>, 8 1&N Dec. 429, by an order of the sentencing court declaring that the "guilty" finding is being vacated and defendant certified to the Juvenile Court. The issue was resolved by the Special Inquiry Officer adversely to the respondent. The issue is a novel one, and it is requested that the Service be represented at oral argument.

Enclosed is a copy of record of proceeding.

Attachment

Request Of RAN 29 68

Bdhasfile 1/29

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

### emorandum

TO

Regional Commissioner, Southwest Region, San Pedro, California

A10 711 879 DATE: November 29, 1967

George K. Rosenberg, District Director, Los Angeles, California

SUBJEĆT:

Munir Bishara Salameh Sirhan - Request for Oral Argument

Attention: Regional Counsel

This case presents the novel question of whether the Service can ignore a court action which it is believed is outside the jurisdiction of the court but which was intended to set aside a conviction upon which an order of deportation is based.

The Special Inquiry Officer in this case has supported and upheld the Government's contention that the Superior Court had acted improperly in setting aside a finding of guilt and remanding the case to the Juvenile Court.

For the reasons set forth above, it is urged that the Appellate Trial Attorney should represent the Service in the appeal before the Board of Immigration Appeals.

Attached is a copy of the record of proceeding for use of the Appellate Trial Attorney.

Attachment

### UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE

IN DEPORTATION

PROCEEDINGS

IN THE MATTER OF:

A- 10 711 879

MENT BISHARA BALAMER SKERMA

Respondent.

TO THE SPECIAL INQUIRY OFFICER:

I waive my right to file a brief in the above-entitled proceeding.

Dated at Los Angales, Calif. this 8th day of November 196

Trial Attorney

#### UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

### Memorandum

TO : William S. Hovell, Trial Attorney,

AlO 711 879 SIB DATE: September 21, 1967

Los Angeles, Calif.

FROM

: Special Inquiry Clerk,
Los Angeles, Calif.

SUBJECT: Service of notice of appeal, Munir Bishara S. Sirhan.

There is served upon you herewith a copy of Form I-290 A, notice of appeal, filed in the above case by counsel.

You are granted to September 26, 1967 to answer the appeal.

### NOTICE OF APPEAL TO THE BOARD OF IMMIGRA

### SUBMIT IN TRIPLICATE TO: IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE

ERANCH LOS ANGELES, CALIF.

300 NORTH LOS ANGELES STRUCK LOS ANGELES. CALIFORNIA 90012

File No. A 10 711 879 STR

SEP 20 1997

In the Matter of: MUTER BYSHAMA SATAMON SYDEAT.

Respondence

- 1. I hereby appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals from the decision, dated 2 3 1967 , in the above entitled case.
- filing a written brief or a written statement with the above Service office within the time allowed for such filing.
- desire oral argument before the Board of Immigration Appeals (do not) in Washington, D.C.
- 4. Briefly, state reasons for this appeal. \* (See attached page)

Bignature of Appellant (or attorney or representative)

September 16, 1967

696 East Howard St. Pasadena, Callf

Address (Number, Street, City, State, Zip Code)

IMPORTANT:

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE SIDE OF THIS NOTICE

Form I-290A (Rev. 6-9-66)

### INSTRUCTIONS

- 1. Fees. This notice of appeal must be accompanied by the prescribed fees: for appeal from a decision in an exclusion or deportation proceeding \$25; for an appeal from any other decision \$10. (Only a single fee need be paid if two or more persons are covered by a single decision.) Attach money order or check, payable to the "Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice." Do NOT send cash. If this form is filed in Guam, make remittance payable to the "Treasurer, Guam;" if filed in the Virgin Islands, make remittance payable to "Commissioner of Finance of the Virgin Islands." The fee is required for filing the appeal and is not returnable regardless of the action taken thereon.
- 2. Counsel. In presenting and presecuting this appeal the appellant may, if he desires, be represented at no expense to the Government by counsel or other duly authorized representatives.
- 3. Briefs. A brief in support of or in opposition to an appeal is not required, but if a brief is filed it shall be in triplicate and submitted to the officer of the Immigration and Naturalization Service having administrative jurisdiction over the case within the time fixed for the appeal or within any other additional period designated by the special inquiry officer or other Service officer who made the decision. Such officer, or the Board for good cause, may extend the time for filing a brief or reply brief. The Board in its discretion may authorize the filing of briefs directly with it, in which event the opposing party shall be allowed a specified time to respond.
- 4. Oral argument. Oral argument in any one case should not extend beyond fifteen (15) minutes, unless arrangements for additional time are made with the Board in advance of the hearing.
  - An appellant will not be released from detention or permitted to enter the United States to present oral argument to the Board but may make arrangements to have someone represent him before the Board, and unless such arrangements are made at the time the appeal is taken, the Board will not calendar the case for argument.
- 5. Summary dismissal of appeals. The Board may deny oral argument and summarily dismiss any appeal in any deportation proceeding in which (i) the party concerned fails to specify the reason for his appeal on the reverse side of this form, (ii) the only reason specified by the party concerned for his Appeal involves a finding of fact or conclusion of law which was conceded by him at the hearing, or (iii) the appeal is from an order that grants the party concerned the relief which he requested.
- 6. Filing of Notice of Appeal. The Notice of Appeal, in triplicate, with the required fee, must be submitted to the Immigration and Naturalization Service office where the case is pending. The Notice of Appeal is not to be forwarded directly to the Board of Immigration Appeals.

### 4. \* Briefly, the reasons for this appeal are:

- 1. The hearing officer erred in holding that the Superior Court of the County of Los Angeles was without jurisdiction to effect a finding of guilt of a minor and his probationary order and certifying the minor to the Juvenile Court of the County of Los Angeles (Page 2 of the Opinion of the Special Inquiry Officer)
- 2. In holding that the minor must establish his "innocence" or produce "evidence" in support of the motion "addressed to the Court that the defendant did not in fact, commit the crime of which he was convicted, which resulted in a miscarriage of fustice". (Page 2 of Opinion of the Special Inquiry Officer).
- 3. The hearing officer erred in finding that the motion and supporting records and documents filed in the Superior Court "cannot therefore be assimilated to a Writ of Corim Nobis for it was not addressed to an area of fact which the motion sought to redress but was addressed solely to a discretionary procedural matter. The issue of guilt was not raised by the motion and is a factual matter." (Page 2 of the Opinion of the Special Inquiry Officer.)
- 4. The hearing officer erred in finding that Section 1203.3 limits the jurisdiction of the Court to act thereunder extends solely to revocation, modification or change of the terms of the sentence imposed.
- 5. The hearing officer erred in holding that "the Superior Court was without jurisdiction to enter its Order dated May 25, 1967 for that order was not effecting the sentence but sought to exert a power which the court did not then possess, to wit, change the finding of guilt."
- 6. The hearing officer erred in holding that the respondent is a deportable alien under the provisions of Section 241(a)(11).
- 7. The hearing officer erred in failing to terminate the proceedings and discharge the respondent.

### DRITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Immigration and Maturalization Service

SEP - 7 1841

Files A 10 711 879 - Los Angelos

In The Matter Of

MUNICA BISHARA SALATH GIRHAN. ) IN DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS

Mespondent

CHARGE:

16N Act - Section 241(a)(11), convicted of violation of law relating to illicit possession of marijuana (Section 11530, Health and Safety Code of California)

APPLICATION: Motion by respondent to vacate decision dated July 11, 1967

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT:

ON BEHALF OF SERVICE:

David C. Marcus Attorney at Law 215 West 5th Street Los Angeles, California 90013 William S. Howell
Trial Attorney
Los Angeles, California 90012

### decision of the special inquiry officer

#### UPON RECONSIDERATION

The facts of this case are fully set forth in the decision entered herein on July 11, 1967, and do not now require repetition.
Respondent now seeks, by his motion dated July 24, 1967, to have
the aforementioned decision vacated and set aside and the finding
of deportability therein reconsidered, presumably for termination
of these proceedings. In support of the present motion, the respondent has submitted copies of the moving papers filed with
the Superior Court in support of the Minute Order of that Court

dated May 25, 1967 (Exhibit 4) in which the court stated that the finding of "guilty" in the criminal proceedings was vacated and the defendant (respondent) was cartified to the Juvenile Court.

In his present motion, respondent's counsel states that his declaration in support of the motion to vacate and the motion itself are in the nature of a writ of coram nobis. Close study of the declaration dated April 17, 1967 in support of the motion to modify terms of probation and sentence, vacate finding of guilt, and certify the defendant (respondent) to the Juvenile Court discloses that nowhere therein is there any assertion of the innoceance of the defendant, nor is there any other evidence attached to the motion addressed to the court that the defendant did not in fact commit the crime of which he was convicted which resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

The said motion in the criminal proceedings cannot therefore be assimilated to a writ of coram nobis for it was not addressed to an error of fact, which the motion sought to redress, but was addressed solely to a discretionary procedural matter. The issue of guilt was not raised by the motion as a factual matter.

In the instant motion, respondent's counsel correctly points out (top, page 7) that California courts retain authority at any time during the time of probation to revoke, modify or change an order of suspension of imposition or execution of sentence (Calif. Penal Code, Section 1203.3). It is clear from the language of Section 1203.3 that jurisdiction of the court to act thereunder extends solely to the revocation, modification or change of the terms of/sentence imposed.

and not the finding of guilt.

The Order to Show Cause herein was issued on January 11, 1967 apon the basis of respondent's conviction on October 12, 1966 in the Superior Court. The motion to the Superior Court for withdrawal of the finding of guilt and modification of the terms of probation and sentence and certification to the Juvenile Court was prepared on April 17, 1967. The Superior Court acted upon the said motion on May 25, 1967, as exer mentioned (Exhibit 4). Respondent's present motion attaches a copy of a petition executed on July 13, 1967 by the probation officer and order dated July 14, 1967 of the Referee of Juvenila Court seeking to establish the pendancy of an action in the latter, that is, Juvenila Court. The said petition and order add nothing to the Superior Court's Minute Order dated May 25. 1967 (Exhibit 4) if in fact, the said Minuta Order was invalid for lack of jurisdiction of the Superior Court to reconsider and set aside the finding of guilty entered on October 13, 1965 (Maibit 2). It is concluded that the Superior Court was without jurisdiction to enter its order dated May 25, 1967 for that order was not effeeting the sentence but sought to exert a power which the court did not then possess, to wit, change the finding of guilt.

Court on December 1, 1966, ordered that the proceedings be suspended and respondent was granted probation for five years, a condition of which was that he spend the first year in the county jail. It has been held both administratively and judicially that the judg-

ment of a California court, after a finding of guilt, that the proceedings be suspended and probation granted, constitutes a "conviction" within the meaning of Section 241(1)(11) of the Imagnation and Nationality Act. Cantter of A. F., 8 ISN Dec. 429, Attorney General, 1959; Arellano-Flores vs Rosenberg, 9 Cir. 1958, 262 F. 2d 667, cert. denied 362 U. S. 921, 1960).

After careful consideration and upon review of the entire record of these proceedings and the matters set forth in respondent's present motion to vacate decision, including the exhibits attached therete, and of the Trial Attorney's brief dated August 18, 1967, it is concluded that respondent's motion should be decied and that no change should be made in the decision heretofore entered on July 11, 1967.


ORDER: IT IS OFFERED that the respondent's motion dated July 24, 1967 to vacate and set aside the decision dated July 11, 1967, be, and the same is hereby, denied.

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Michael F. Leone

Special Inquiry Officer

NI:0027. Au



### UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Immigration and Naturalization Service

TO:

Michael F. Locae, Special Inquiry Officer

Los Angeles, California

5 FILE:

AlO 711 879 - Los Angeles

6 In re:

Munir Bishara Salameh Sirhan

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IN DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS

IN BEHALF OF RESPONDENT:

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David C. Marcus, Esq. 215 West Fifth Street

Los Angeles, California

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IN BEHALF OF THE SERVICE:

William S. Howell

Trial Attorney

Los Angeles, California 90012

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CHARGE:

APPLICATION:

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I & N Act - Section 241(a)(11), convicted of violation of law relating to illicit possession of marijuana (Section 11530, Health and Safety Code of California)

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Termination of proceedings

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We have carefully examined the Brief In Response To Motion To Vacate Decision of Special Inquiry Officer and the argument which lists five propositions of law with cited authority in support of his propositions that the Superior Court was without jurisdiction to vacate the defendant's plea of guilty and certify the proceedings to the Juvenile Court.

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The general propositions quoted in the trial attorney's argument are not applicable or apropo to the instant proceedings, and the authorities which he cite do not support his position. remembered that proceedings in the case at bar were suspended after a finding of guilt and the defendant was place on probation. Under his argument, which we shall label Point 1, the trial attorney suggests where the sentence has been pronounced and the defendant has begun serving the sentence, the court is without jurisdiction to add to or

in any manner modify the sentence originally pronounced and cites, People vs. McAllister, 15 Cal 2d 519, and People vs. Reimringer, 116 Cal App. 2d 332. Neither of these cases are in point. In McAllister the defendant was convicted of a felony and the court imposed a fine payable in monthly installments. Later in the day the court, in the presence of the defendant and his attorney provided that in the event the installment payments were not paid, defendant was to be confined in the County Jail. The Supreme Court held that the modified sentence was proper. It is to be noted that this was not a probationary sentence and the change was proper and effected on the same day the original fine was imposed.

In Reimringer, it is completely beside the point. This, likewise, is not a probationary matter and the question is whether the court had authority under the Provisions of \$1193 Sub 1 of the Penal Code in the absence of the defendant to prescribe whether a sentence was to run concurrently or consecutively. In making certain counts upon which the defendant was found guilty to run consecutively the District Court of Appeal held ... "That the court had the power to make the modification in the manner it did."

Was without power to set aside the Judgment on motion not made on statutory or court recognized grounds and cites, <u>People vs. Behrmann</u>, 34 Cal 2d 459. This case was not a probationary matter in which a sentence was suspended but his authority for the proposition of law that an oral notice of appeal does not comply with Rule 31 of Rules On Appeal, though a later written notice of appeal is filed, and the court was without jurisdiction or in the absence of a "Motion or showing of facts to support a motion to vacate the Judgment."

In Point 3, he suggests that Coram Nobis lies only to vacate or correct a judgment for errors of fact which if known would have prevented the rendition and entry of the judgment questioned, and cites <u>People vs. Reid</u>, 195 Cal 249, and People vs. McCoy, 115 Cal App 2d 565.

Neither of these cases are in point as they do not deal with probationary sentences where the defendant is under the jurisdiction of the court. In Reid, Coram Nobis was invoked long after defendant had begun serving his sentence, after a conviction on a charge of murder. After imposition of the death penalty the court held that the matters sought to be raised in Coram Nobis could not have been raised by appeal or on motion for a new trial, and that the denial of the Writ was proper. This was no probationary matter.

In People vs. McCoy, the defendant in this case filed a motion to vacate the judgment committing him by reason of insanity to the Mendicino State Hospital on several grounds, after trial and he was found guilty by the court; that he was insane at the time of the commitment of the offense.

of the motion, although determined by the court to be "In the nature of a Coram Nobis, there was no merit in defendant's contention that the judgment is to be set aside because only a single trial was the on his plea of not guilty and not guilty by reason of imacric; and that this testimony given on the advice of his attorney may have influenced the court's determination that he was income; and although doctors were unverified did not constitute grounds to vanish the judgment, and that no doctor testified under oath at the trial was in error. This case has not application to the instant matter.

The remaining points and cases in support thereof are like-wise without merit as none involved a suspended and probationary sentence. The remedy of Coram Nobis has been well briefed and argued in our previously supplied Memorandum to the Hearing Officer. We again reiterate that the court was with jurisdiction to vacate the Finding of guilt and to certify the defendant to the Juvenile Court.

Respectfully submitted.

DAVID C. MARCUS Attorney for Respondent

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Emigration and Naturalization Service AUG 1 8 1087 Michael F. Lome, Special Inquiry Cfficer Los Angeles, California A10 711 879 - Los Angeles MUNIR BISHARA SALAMEH SIRHAN In re: IN DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS IN BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: David C. Marcus, Esq. 215 West Fifth Street Los Angeles, California IN BEHALF OF THE SURVICE: William S. Howell Trial Attorney Los Angeles, California 90012 CHARGE: I & N Act - Section 241(a)(11), convicted of violation of law relating to illicit possession of marijuana (Section 11530, Realth and Safety Code of California) APPLICATION: Termination of proceedings BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO MOTION TO VACATE DECISION OF SPECIAL INQUIRY OFFICER On July 11, 1967 the Special Inquiry Officer entered his decision in this matter in which he rejected the decision of the Superior Court, State of California on May 25, 1967 vacating the finding of "guilty" and certifying the case to the Juvenila Court presumably under Section 604(5) of the Welfare and Institutions Code, State of California (Exhibit 44). Now comes the respondent and makes a Motion to the Special Inquiry Officer to vacate his decision and to reconsider the initial decision, presumably looking toward a termination of the proceedings. The Service is opposed to the Motion to vacate the decision and supports the findings of the Special Inquiry Officer. 2025 RELEASE UNDER E.O. 14176

ISSUR

Did the Special Inquiry Officer err in his finding that the order of the Superior Court satting aside the judgment of "guilty" be vacated and the Defendant certified to Juvenile Court (Case No. 324984, Superior Court, State of California)?

The rule in California is that where sentence has been legally pronounced and it has been entered in the mimites or the defendant has begun serving the sentence or has been restrained by reason thereof the Court is without jurisdiction to vacate, add to, or in any manner modify the scatence originally pronounced.

It is also a general rule in California that the Court is without power to set aside the judgment on a Motion to Vacate not made on statutory or court recognized grounds.2/

Counsel for the respondent is attempting to argue that in effect the doctrine of Coram Nobis has been exercised in this matter and that the court was, therefore, possessed with jurisdiction to make such an order vacting the judgment. Assuming for the sake of argument that the counsel's proof that a Motion to Vacata is tantamount to a petition for Coram Nobis it must be pointed out that Coram Nobis lies only to vacate or correct a judgment for errors of fact which if known would have prevented the rendition and entry of the judgment questioned. 3

Coram Nobis is available merely to declare as false a fact previously determined to be true.4/

The remedy of Coram Nobis does not lie to enable the court to correct errors of law, allegedly made at the trial, or to redress irregularities at the trial that could have been corrected on motion for a new trial or by appeal.

People va McAllister, 15 Cal 2d 519, 102 P 2d 1072; People va Reimringer, 115 Cal App. 2d 332, 253 P 2d 756 2/ People vs Behrmann, 34 Cal 2d 459 3/ People vs Reid, 195 Cal 249, 232 P 457, and People vs McCoy, 115 Cal App.

<sup>2</sup>d 565, 252 P 2d 371

<sup>4/</sup> In ra Dyer, 85 Cal App. 2d 394, 193 P 2d 69

<sup>5/</sup> People vs Dale, 239 Cal App. 2d 634, and People vs Miller, 219 Cal App. 2d 124 6/ People vs Gatewood, 182 Cal App. 2d 724, 6 Cal Aptr. 447

In the instant case it must be presumed that the court was mude aware that the respondent berein and defendant in that criminal proceeding was ever the age of 18 years at the time of the commission of the crime for which he was charged and that the court exercised its proper discretion in determining under its authority contained in Section 604(b) of the Welfard and Institutions Code whether the proceeding should be suspended and to certify the case to the Juvenile Court. It appears from the Motion to Vacate that respondent's counsel simply raised a collected matter which had no bearing upon the determination effecting the guilt or innocence of the respondent of the original charge. There is no showing that as to the issues of fact in this case that the Superior Court had erred in the first instance. If instead of a finding of guilt by the court there had been such a finding by a jury would the court have, some five months later, entered an order setting eside the guilty verdict without a showing of errors of fact which would be determinative of a finding of guilt, but not relating to collateral matters which have no relation to the fact of conviction? Such is very unlikely and for these reasons it must be concluded the court was without proper authority to vacate the finding of guilt. It must be concluded that the conviction in this case is final and that the order of the Superior Court, State of California, dated May 25, 1967 in criminal matter No. 324984 re Munir Bishara Salameh Sirhan be disregarded. On the basis of the foregoing it is urged that the decision of the Special Inquiry Officer be allowed to stand. oficeran Strowelf WILLIAM S. HOWELL Trial Attorney Immigration and Naturalization Service United States Department of Justice Los Angeles, California 2025 RELEASE UNDER E.O. 14176

DAVID C. MARCUS
Attorney at Law
215 West Fifth Street
Los Angeles; California 90013
Telephone: 628-4788
Attorney for Respondent



## BEFORE THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

File: A 10 711 879 - Los Angeles

In the Matter of

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MUNIR BISHARA SALAMEH SIRHAN,

Respondent

IN DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS

MOTION TO VACATE DECISION OF SPECIAL INQUIRY OFFICER AND FOR RECONSIDERATION

COMES NOW the respondent, MUNIR BISHARA SALAMEH SIRHAN, in the above entitled proceedings and does hereby respectfully move the Special Inquiry Officer to vacate and set aside his decision dated July 11, 1967.

This motion is based upon the errors and conclusions of law appearing on the face of the decision.

## STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Respondent was charged in an information filed by the District Attorney of Los Angeles County in the Superior Court of Los Angeles for the State of California, of a violation in Count I of Section 11530 of the Mealth and Baraty Code of the State of

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of respondent and on December 1, 1966, proceedings were suspended and respondent was placed on probation to the court for a period of five years, one condition being that he spend the first year in the County Jail.

On July 13, 1967, respondent, through counsel, filed a motion with the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, supported by the declaration of his attorney, to vacate the finding of guilt and to remand respondent to the Juvenile Court of the Los Angeles Superior Court for further proceedings. On May 25, 1967, the finding of guilt was vacated and the respondent was certified to the Juvenile Court of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. On July 13, 1967, a petition was filed in the Juvenile Court of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County by the Probation Department of the Superior Court, alleging that Munir Sirhan, a minor of the age of nineteen years, came within the provisions of Section 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code for the violation of Sections 11530 and 11531 of the Health and Safety Code of the State of California, praying that he be adjudged and declared a ward of the Juvenile Court and dealt with as such.

The matter coming on regularly for hearing on July 14, 1967, before a Referee of the Juvenile Court who accepted the certification from the Los Angeles County Superior Court of the State of California, was continued for disposition to July 31, 1967.

On January 11, 1967, an order was issued by the District Director of the Immigration Department at Los Angeles to show cause why the respondent should not be deported from the United States, on the grounds that he had been convicted of the offense of violation of Section 11530 of the Health and Safety Code of the State of California, A hearing was conducted before Special Inquiry Officer and June 4, 1907, and on July 11, 1967, the Special Inquiry officer rendered his decision ordering the respondent's deportation from the United States.

At the hearing before the Immigration Service, a certified copy of the Order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, dated May 25, 1967, vacating the finding of guilt of said court and certifying the respondent to the Juvenile Court was received in evidence. No other documents were filed on respondent's behalf. The respondent does herewith attach to this motion the following certified copies of the record of the Superior Court of the County of Los Angeles and of the Juvenile Court thereof, to supplement the Immigration record on behalf of the respondent:

- 1. The April 27, 1967, Notice of Motion and Motion to Modify Terms of Probation and Sentence, Vacate Finding of Guilt, and Certify Defendant to Los Angeles County Juvenile Court and Declaration of David C. Marcus in Support thereof.
- 2. The affidavit of service on the Los Angeles County District Attorney.
- 3. The April 27, 1967, Minute Order of the Superior Court, continuing said proceeding until May 11, 1967.
- 4. The May 12, 1967 Minute Order of the Superior Court, referring the matter to Juvenile Court and continuance to May 18, 1967.
- 5. The May 18, 1967, Minute Order of the Superior Court continuing the matter to May 25, 1967.
- 6. The May 25, 1967, Minute Order of the Superior Court providing that the finding of "Guilty" be vacated and the defendant certified to Juvenile Court.
- 7. Petition of July 13, 1967, certifying the respondent as a ward of the Juvenile Court.
- 8. Findings and Order of Referee dated July 14, 1967, accepting certification and continuing the matter until July 31, 1967, for disposition.

ERRORS IN THE DECISION OF THE SPECIAL INQUIRY OFFICER

The Decision of the Special Inquiry Officer recites:

"... The record indicates that the criminal case against the respondent was not 'pending' on May 25,

1967 but appears to have become a final judgment upon the expiration of 10 days after the rendition of the judgment, aforementioned, on October 13, 1966 without notice of appeal having been filed therein, as provided by Rule 31, Judicial Council (California Penal Code, Section 1247k)."

The order suspending the proceeding and requiring the condition of one year's penal servitude is appealable. Penal Code, Section 1237, provides,

"An appeal may be taken by the defendant: 1.

From a final judgment of conviction . . . a sentence or <u>Order granting probation</u> shall be deemed to be a final judgment within the meaning of this Section . . . . "

(Emphasis added.)

Pursuant to the foregoing penal provision, the court, in People v. Goldstein, 136 Cal. App. 2d 778, 793 (1955), stated:

"Probation having been granted and the proceedings thereupon suspended, there was in fact no judgment, and this is true notwithstanding the requirement that defendant pay a fine and make certain restitution as conditions of probation. (People v. Wallach, 8 Cal.App.2d 129, 133 [47 P.2d 1071]; In re Marquez, 3 Cal.2d 625, 627 [45 P.2d 342]) An appeal may now be taken from a probation order (Pen. Code, § 1237), and it is established that where probation has been granted and no judgment entered an appeal which purports to be taken from the judgment may be treated as an appeal from the probation order..."

In a footnote directive, People v. Kraps, 238 Cal. App.

2d 675, 676 (1965), the court offered an explanation applicable to the instant case:

of the trial court. However, the record discloses that following defendant's conviction the proceedings in the instant case were suspended without imposition of sentence and probation was granted pursuant to defendant's motion. Thus, there was in fact no judgment entered in the instant action. However, under the 1951 amendment to Penal Code, section 1237, subdivision 1, an order granting probation is deemed to be a final judgment for purposes of appeal. Since that amendment it has been held that an appeal which purports to be taken from the judgment may be treated as an appeal from the probation order and that for purposes of appeal the two are interchangeable terms..."

Based on the foregoing, it must be deemed proper to effect an appeal from the Order of December 1, 1966, granting probation, as said Order shall be construed a "Final Judgment."

The Declaration in support of the motion to vacate and the motion itself are in the nature of a writ of coram nobis.

"The non-statutory motion to set aside the judgment is the equivalent of a writ of error coram nobis." People v. O'Brien, 97 Cal. App. 2d 391, 392 (1950). California law permits both the writ of coram nobis and motion to vacate and set aside the judgment to be used interchangeably when there exist matters unknown to the defendant at trial, and which are subsequently asserted, on exercise of "due diligence." People v. Del Campo, 174 Cal. App. 2d 217 (1959).

"A motion to vacate a judgment is an application for relief in the nature of a writ of error coram nobis." People v. McCoy, 115 Cal. App. 2d 565, 567 (1953); People v. Wilson, 106 Cal. App. 2d 710, 718 (1951).

In <u>People v. Harincar</u>, 49 Cal. App. 2d 594, 595-596 (1942), the court said,

"Although defendant's motion to vacate the judgment, it is in legal effect under the practice of this state a Petition for a Writ of Error Coram Nobis. In People v. Vernon, 9 Cal. App. 2d 138 (1935), it is held that a Writ of Error Coram Nobis, 'is nothing more nor less than a motion to vacate a judgment,' and that the remedy provided by the Writ could be designated by 'the more simple and appropriate name of a motion to vacate a judgment.'"

A motion in the nature of coram nobis may be made at any time after judgment, or time for appeal has passed, and no such limitation governs the application of said remedy. The court, in <a href="People">People v. Martinez</a>, 88 Cal. App. 2d 767, 773 (1948), instructed, "... an appeal for a Writ of Error Coram Nobis should be made within a reasonable time. Diligence is required. A convicted person is not permitted to allow years to pass during which witnesses die, disappear or forget, and his own imagination grows and expands."

The major criteria for determining whether or not the writ has been exercised under the circumstances of "due diligence" includes a showing that the matter was not apparent to the defendant at trial and upon its ascertainment he acted promotly in its assertion.

possessed with jurisdiction to make such order as the cause was still "pending." By virtue of the Order, suspending proceedings and placing the defendant on probation for a period of five years, the court's jurisdiction over the respondent continued during the entirety of probation. The court could, during such time interval, revoke, alter, change, or modify its order of suspension, imposition or execution of sentence.

Section 1203.3 of the Penal Code provides, in part,
"The court shall have (1) authority at any time during the term of
probation to revoke, (2) modify or change its order of suspension
its order of suspension of imposition or execution of sentence."
(Emphasis added.) California clearly holds that the court maintains
complete and exhaustive jurisdiction over a probation during the
term of said probation.

"... the jurisdiction of the trial court over the probationer is not exhausted when it imposes the original conditions of probation; but on the contrary, at all times during the probationary period, it may exercise control over him...." <u>People v. Roberts</u>, 136 Cal. App. 709, 712 (1934).

"The court, during the term of probation may modify its original order." In re Marcus, 11 Cal. App. 2d 359 (1936); People v. McClean, 130 Cal. App. 2d 439, 444 (1955); People v. Marin, 147 Cal. App. 2d 625, 627 (1957).

In <u>People v. Brown</u>, lll Cal. App. 2d 406, 408 (1952), the court said, "when the term of probation <u>expired</u> the court lost jurisdiction to vacate its former order." (Emphasis added.)

The foregoing is settled law of the state, and no collateral attack, by a purely administrative department of the federal government can impeach, affect, or attack the jurisdiction exercised by a duly constituted court of the state administering its inherent powers and discretion in probationary criminal proceedings.

The Special Inquiry Officer concludes in the following solution:

"In view of the recency of respondent's conviction, on which he is still confined and serving the aforementioned term of probation, it is concluded that the respondent is ineligible for any form of discretionary relief from deportation. .."

The sole issue stressed in the Decision of the Special Inquiry Officer is,

"...what effect, if any, was hade upon the judgment of conviction entered on October 13, 1966 (Exhibit 2) by the Minute Order entered by another judge of the same Superior Court on May 25, 1967 vacating the finding of 'guilty' and certifying the case to the Juvenile Court, presumably under the provisions of Section 604(b), Welfare and Institutions Code. (Exhibit 4). The said section permits the discretionary certification to the juvenile court 'whenever a case is pending in any court.'"

As stated earlier, his conclusions are clearly erroneous and the Minute Order of May 25, 1967, remains proper under the circumstances herein. The suspension of proceedings and granting of probation maintained the court's jurisdiction, rendering the defendant's case as "pending." Because of the lack of finality, the subsequent certification, on May 25, 1967, to the Juvenile Court, was in conformity and compliance with California precedent.

Section 503 of the Welfare and Institutions Code of the State of California provides:

"An order adjudging a minor to be a ward of the juvenile court shall not be deemed a conviction of a crime for any purpose, nor shall a proceeding in the juvenile court be deemed a criminal proceeding."

## CONCLUSION

The Superior Court had jurisdiction to vacate its finding of guilt and remand the minor defendant to the Juvenile Court under Section 503 of the Welfare and Institutions Code of the State of California. The adjudication of a minor to be a ward of the Juvenile Court is not to be deemed the conviction of a crime for any purpose nor shall the proceedings in the Juvenile Court be deemed criminal proceedings. It therefore must be determined that the respondent

1s not a deportable alien.

Respondent therefore moves to vacate the Decision of the Special Inquiry Officer and, alleging the foregoing, urges that immediate reconsideration is both necessary and proper.

DATED: July 24, 1967.

/8/ David C. Marcus DAVID C. MARCUS

Attorney for Respondent

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\* DAVID C. MARCUS 1 Attorney at Law 215 West Fifth Street 2 Los Angeles, California 90013 3 Telephone: 628-4788 4 Attorney for Defendant 5 6 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 8 FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 9 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, 10 Plaintiff, 11 12 MUNIR SHIRHAN, 13 Defendant. 14 15 16 17 18 therefore alleges: 19 20 21 22

No. 354784

MOTION TO MODIFY TERMS OF PROBATION AND SENTENCE VACATE FINDING OF GUILT, AND CERTIFY DEFENDANT TO LOS ANGELES COUNTY JUVENILE COURT AND DECLARATION OF DAVID C. MARCUS IN SUPPORT THEREOF

DAVID C. MARCUS does hereby certify:

That he is the attorney for the defendant in the above entitled proceedings. That he is informed and believes and

That Defendant Munir Sirhan, born July 15, 1947, in Palestine, was charged by an information filed by the District Attorney of Los Angeles County of a violation of section 11530 of the Health and Safety Code of the State of California; that at the time of the commission of the alleged offense, the defendant was a minor, eighteen years of age.

In proceedings had before the above entitled court the defendant was found guilty of the charge, and on December 1, 1966, his sentence was suspended and he was placed on probation for five years on the condition that he serve one year in the County Jail. That defendant is presently confined at the Sheriff's Wayside Honor Farm pursuant to the provisions of the judgment of said court.

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On behalf of defendant Munir Shirhan, declarant further recites:

That at the time of the establishment of the Israeli Government, when defendant was eight years of age, defendant, his father, mother and family, consisting of four brothers and one sister, who were non-Jews, were forced to flee, as refugees, the country of their birth and journeyed to Jordan and resided in that country; that while residing in Jordan the Sirhan family was subjected to great hardship and deprivation. That on September 24, 1956, the United States Consulate at Amman, Trans-Jordan, issued its visas to the Sirhan family, granting them a 4A(4) Non-Quota visa PH203 upon Trans-Jordanian passport for travel purposes. That on January 12, 1957, the Sirhan family was admitted as permanent residents to the United States of America in New York, New Defendant was then nine years of age. That the Sirhan family then journeyed to California, establishing their home and residence in Pasadena, California, where defendant attended grade and high schools. All of the defendant's family are now permanent residents of the United States, residing at 696 East Howard, Pasadena, California.

That during the trial proceedings had before the above entitled court, the defendant was represented by an attorney. However, his counsel was not cognizant of the statutes, laws, and regulations of the Immigration and Nationality Act of the United States nor the interpretation of the United States courts of the grounds of deportation as related to one found guilty of the possession of narcotics in any form by an alien.

That subsequent to the finding of guilt and during the defendant's incarceration as aforesaid, the Immigration Department ascertained that the defendant was an alien and had been found guilty of the illegal possession of marijuana, and thereupon and on January 11, 1967, caused to be issued its Order to Show Cause अभृतिकार हातो सुन्ताः . שים בחולה בכל בספר

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and Notice of Hearing in Deportation under the provisions of section 242 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, in the matter entitled "In the Matter of Munir Bishara Salameh Sirhan, Respondent," bearing number Alo 711 879, charging that the defendant was a citizen of Jordan who last entered the United States in New York on January 12, 1957, and at the time of his entry was admitted as an immigrant; and that on October 12, 1966, in the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles was convicted for the offense of unlawful possession of marijuanz in violation of section 11530 of the Health and Safety Code of the State of California; and that on the basis of his alienage and conviction he became a deportable alien pursuant to the provisions of section 241(a)(11) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. That hearings have been conducted before said Immigration Service and the defendant has now become subject to deportation.

That defendant stands to be deported and banished from the United States to be separated from his father, mother, and family, to a country strange and unknown to him, and to a penalty and hardship much worse than death.

Your declarant has been advised by defendant's attorney of record that if he had known of the provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act at the time of his representation of the defendant before the above entitled superior court, he would have sought to have the defendant certified to the Juvenile Court and prosecuted as a juvenile.

Your declarant alleges that if the defendant had been certified to the Juvenile Court and charged and prosecuted as a juvenile, he would not have become amenable to the harsh and extreme penalties of deportation under the Immigration and Nationality Act as the statute is not applicable to minors when prosecuted as juveniles.

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