

SECRET

memorandum

DATE: 8 April 1985

REPLY TO  
ATTN OF:

SUBJECT: Operational Readiness of the SUN STREAK Prototype  
Operational Group (C)

TO: DT

1. (S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) The recommended strength of 12 personnel for the DIA SUN STREAK Project (DSSP) Prototype Operational Group as contained in the FY 86 CBJB (identified as DRACON ABSORB) is the minimum strength necessary to collect quality intelligence information using psychoenergetics (Remote Viewing). This figure is the result of a review of INSCOM's psychoenergetic activity (CENTER LANE) operational experiences since 1979 and lengthy discussions on individual and unit operational readiness.

SG1J

SG1J

2. (S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) [redacted] and I have discussed the concept of operational readiness several times over the past nine months. Those discussions, along with the need to provide written rationale for the number of spaces requested, prompted me to formalize earlier thought processes. [redacted] and [redacted] prepared a concept paper that discusses operational readiness and provides rationale for the recommended minimum manning level of the DSSP Prototype Operational Group (encl 1).

SG1J

3. (S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) The concept paper is not intended to be an operational plan, but will serve as the basis for that section of the operational plan which will discuss capabilities. This paper also provides rationale for acceptance of limited tasking in response to intelligence requirements/problems.

*Brian Buzby*  
BRIAN BUZBY  
LTC, USA

1 Encl -  
Concept Paper

SG1J

CF:  
DT-5A [redacted]

CLASSIFIED BY: DIA/DT  
DECLAS: OADR

SG1J

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

WARNING NOTICE: SENSITIVE  
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND  
METHODS INVOLVED

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10  
(REV. 1-80)  
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6  
5010-114

SECRET

PRODUCED TO [redacted] & JACK  
Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002100130001-4  
85  
1.54 for 246

This document is made available through the declassification efforts  
and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of:

# The Black Vault



The Black Vault is the largest online Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)  
document clearinghouse in the world. The research efforts here are  
responsible for the declassification of hundreds of thousands of pages  
released by the U.S. Government & Military.

**Discover the Truth** at: <http://www.theblackvault.com>

**SECRET**

## SUN STREAK

## OPERATIONAL READINESS

April 1985

## SUMMARY

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) Individual readiness, which is the foundation for unit/organizational readiness, has at its core individual training in structured perception and accurate, reliable reporting. Modifying this training aspect are the elements of practice, personal motivation, and physical/mental conditioning. Training is most important, but because remote viewers function as "equipment and operator" fused in one, the impact of other factors and personal inclemencies must be dealt with as well.

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) Since individual readiness is the lowest common denominator of unit readiness, it is evident that a lack of individual readiness coupled with a lower-than-acceptable manning level would significantly decrease the unit's capability. In an intelligence collection activity where operative personnel are the fundamental means of collection (SUN STREAK), a basic organizational "critical mass" must be maintained to mitigate the effects of incomplete training, personal inclemency, etc., and provide a viable viewer/interviewer mix to allow a satisfactory complement of both discrete and joint collection operations. Sufficient operational manning is necessary, further, to provide for independent verification and corroboration of remote viewing accuracy in highly volatile or nebulous collection situations. Ultimately, the proposed 12-person organization is the minimum acceptable to insure reliable and uninterrupted operational readiness and timely, accurate intelligence production.

Classified by: DIA/DT  
Declass: OADR

**SECRET**

WARNING NOTICE: SENSITIVE  
INFORMATION, METHODS AND  
MATERIALS INVOLVED

SUN STREAK

OPERATIONAL READINESS

April 1985

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) Though application of the aspect of psychoenergetics known as remote viewing (RV) as an intelligence collection tool poses unique challenges that have no analogues in other intelligence disciplines, many elements of the field can be illumined by comparison with other, longer established programs. The matter of operational readiness is one such topic. But, as with other concerns in the various applications of RV, guidelines, judgmental and evaluation criteria, and effectiveness standards must be determined in order to define the parameters of what readiness is. Before these can be established, however, certain understandings must be arrived at concerning the nature of RV operations and how they do and do not differ from standard collection disciplines.

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) Regarding the above, two areas must be considered: individual operational readiness of remote viewers and unit operational readiness. These two areas are interdependent but are also significantly different one from another. Since the readiness of any unit or organization follows directly from the readiness of the individuals who make it up, individual readiness will be the first topic discussed below.

Individual Readiness

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) In any collection operation training of individual operatives is extremely important. SIGINT personnel must be trained in any of a number of skills and concepts, such as language, radio propagation, equipment operation, equipment repair, analysis, pattern recognition, etc. HUMINT personnel have their training requirements as well, i.e., agent-handling, language, tradecraft, clandestine communications, tech-services, recruitment, etc. Personnel involved in IMINT require training in optics, photography, shape and pattern recognition, OB, etc. In the intelligence discipline which has informally been designated PSIINT, PE operatives and analysts must variously be trained in geo-orientation, signal recognition, noise suppression, structure execution, interview techniques, session analysis, alternative target acquisition, etc. Many of these trained skills overlap with those of other disciplines. For example, PE intelligence analysis involves principles identical to analysis in SIGINT, HUMINT, and IMINT; signal recognition and noise suppression are very similar in principle to those involved in radio propagation; and much of the interviewing and

reporting techniques rely heavily on similar skills used in HUMINT. One major difference exists, however. Unlike other fields where the collector exists separate from his means of collection (for example, a radio intercept operator uses a radio receiver and other equipment to accomplish his mission), a remote viewer is both the operator and the equipment. Therefore, defining individual operational readiness in this situation must involve criteria modified to take into account aspects both of personnel and equipment preparedness. Specific categories that have direct bearing on individual readiness are as follows:

- a. Proper training
- b. Self discipline

Factors that effect the "equipment" aspects of readiness are:

- a. Geomagnetism
- b. Extremely low frequency (ELF) electromagnetic radiation
- c. Solar fluctuations
- d. Physical/health concerns (sickness, injury, convalescence, metabolism, "biorhythm")
- e. Mental preparation (attitude, degree of distraction, over-training/over-tasking)
- f. Outside pressures (family, financial, professional, social)

Several of these categories are inter-related. Self discipline may, for example, have direct bearing on how well one copes with outside pressures and physical/health concerns; proper training can have major impact on mental preparation and self discipline.

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) The single most important factor in developing the highest possible level of individual readiness is, of course, proper training. PE training provides development in both the "personnel" and "equipment" aspects of the discipline. Properly executed, the training program presently in use is designed not only to acquire the site and develop information of intelligence interest from it, but to significantly increase the accuracy and reliability of this information by raising the threshold of distraction and providing a means to channel extraneous noise, confusion, and the negative effects of personal inclemency out of the "system."

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) The first component of individual

**SECRET**

readiness, then, is successful completion of the training program. However, as in many other fields, an individual actually has limited ability or effectiveness some time before any given training program is completed. A linguist, for example, often is able to communicate at least rudimentarily in his target language long before conclusion of the training. So it is with the remote viewing component of PSIINT. Site-relevant information with potential intelligence value begins to be acquired long before actual completion of the training protocol. Nevertheless, as with any other acquired "hard" skill, continued practice and further training can only enhance the quality of remote viewing. Experience over the past decade has shown that the more practice a given individual has in remote viewing, the more precise and controlled is the information he produces. However, limited readiness is achieved at some point before final matriculation from the formal portion of the training program.

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) As mentioned above, training is not the only factor impinging on individual readiness. Since we must consider the individual operative in this situation to be functioning somewhat as a "biological machine," we must remember that factors effecting the emotions, mentality, or physical status quo of the individual must be taken into account in evaluating that individual's readiness posture, much as one would evaluate the physical/electronic condition of a MLQ-24 or AN/TSQ-112 ("Trailblazer") emitter locator to determine readiness of a tactical SIGINT system. As noted, appropriate training can serve to mitigate individual systemic factors, allowing normal RV functioning to take place in spite of various personal inclemencies. When such problems are either severe or complicated by a combination of factors, accuracy may be affected and satisfactory functioning may be degraded or altogether precluded. In effect, the human collector's "system" is "down," and the session must be terminated at the discretion of either the interviewer or the viewer himself.

#### UNIT READINESS

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) At this point it becomes appropriate to discuss unit readiness criteria. As with any other intelligence organization, readiness of a PSIINT collection unit must ultimately be based on the readiness of the individuals assigned. Obviously, though readiness of the collectors is highly important, all the other individuals that contribute to the unit mission must be ready as well. In a SIGINT unit the intercept operators are central to making the unit mission capable. But traffic and OB analysts, transcribers, and command, control, logistics and repair personnel must all be prepared as well or the unit readiness can be severely degraded or even altogether destroyed.

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) In PSIINT, the remote viewer functions of course as the collector. But there must exist as well a supporting infrastructure to provide command and control, a logistical base, and tasking, evaluation, formulation and dissemination of the data received. In the DIA SUN STREAK Project (DSSP), this has taken the form of a proposed 12-person organization which can be subdivided into two elements: managerial and operational. Directing the administrative element is the group commander/manager, whose duties differ very little from those in any other intelligence organization at the same echelon. Supporting the commander is the admin specialist, who provides essential secretarial and administrative expertise and assistance. Finally, the technical assistant/admin specialist provides filing, transcription, data base management, and other support for training and operations.

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) Core of the operational element are three three-person collection and analysis teams, consisting of two remote viewers and one interviewer/analyst (who also directs in-house training for his viewers) per team. Successful execution of a remote viewing session requires a two-person effort. In the nature of remote viewing, the viewer necessarily must suppress as much as possible the linear, analytic functionings of the "left brain," and rely almost exclusively on the global, gestaltic processes associated with right-brain activity. The task of the interviewer/analyst is to provide targeting data as required by the viewer, assist the viewer in assuring session structure integrity, and provide necessary analytic direction in determining session flow. Experience has shown that one monitor/interviewer is able to optimally support two to three viewers. The three-team concept and current physical plant allow up to three two-person sessions to be conducted simultaneously. These sessions may be conducted as a joint effort on a critical large-scale collection project, or they may be conducted independently to satisfy individual collection tasks. Additionally, a six-viewer, three-interviewer pool allows intelligence collection operations to continue at an acceptable level even in the face of illness, annual leave, family emergency, or other personal inclemency, as well as TDY for advanced training for either viewer or interviewer. In the event of an intense or extended collection operation, it also allows an interviewer to alternate between viewers to allow for viewer recuperation/recovery time.

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) The three-team concept is further important operationally for several reasons. First, it allows verification and cross-checking of viewer accuracy. In those collection efforts in which little directive feedback is available (a large percentage of all taskings), several independent sessions must be run to provide independent confirmation of the accuracy and dependability of session

**SECRET**

results. A second advantage of this organizational approach is that, just as traditional HUMINT collectors have long recognized, different observers have a natural tendency to report on different aspects of a target site or event, i.e. witnesses each give a different version according to their perspective. Each perspective may be correct, but it is necessary to correlate information to form a clear and complete picture of the site or event. Thirdly, as with HUMINT sources, PSIINT operatives have differing talents and abilities; one viewer may have affinity for a particular style of targeting methodology or is perhaps especially accurate in collecting against certain types of intelligence, i.e. complex technology, structural layout, spatial and/or temporal location ("search" mode), etc.; a second viewer may be strong in other areas than those of the first, while a third may be proficient in areas that are difficult for either of the first two to deal with, and so forth. In the concept of "all-source intelligence," traditional intelligence disciplines are used together to complement each other and cover each others' weaknesses. In remote viewing the same idea exists, if presently on a smaller scale.

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) Ultimately, unit readiness would be significantly degraded by either a smaller organization or lower manning levels. Though on-hand personnel are presently approaching operational effectiveness in their training program, even when they are fully trained the project could expect intermittent interruptions in operational capability. Simply because the six-viewer/three-interviewer threshold has not yet been achieved periods will inevitably occur when either no viewers or no interviewers are available. When all factors are considered, it is apparent that the proposed 12-person organization is the minimum acceptable in insuring effective, uninterrupted operational readiness for a PSIINT collection project. For the sake of dependable, quality operational capability it is recommended that the organization be approved at this minimum acceptable level. In the interim, DSSP will continue to function as an intelligence collection effort using available resources.