


(S/NF/LIMDIS) TASK (91004): What are the political/military indicators, and possible location of indicators, that would precede an imminent Iraqi attack, if any?

(S/NF/LIMDIS) BACKGROUND: This tasking was responded to by Sources 018 (A), 025 (B), 049 (C), 052 (D), and 079 (E).

S/NF/LIMDIS) DT-S RESPONSE: Appendix A provides the DT-S response.

(S/NF/LIMDIS) DB ASSESSMENT OF THE DT-S RESPONSE: Appendix B provides this assessment.



SG1H

In sum, the DB (OICC) assessment was marginal at best, and the feedback provided as to the rationale for the assessment was less than satisfactory. On the other hand, it is difficult to evaluate predictive responses with time frames. In some cases the predictive response may have been reality at the time it was made; however, there may have been mitigating circumstances as to why an event did or did not occur. The value of the DT-S response is that of a tip-off for collectors, somewhat akin to indications and warning. In other words, because a predictive event did not occur does not make the response invalid.

Referral Review by NIMA/DoD

This document is made available through the declassification efforts  
and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of:

# The Black Vault




The Black Vault is the largest online Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) document clearinghouse in the world. The research efforts here are responsible for the declassification of hundreds of thousands of pages released by the U.S. Government & Military.

**Discover the Truth** at: <http://www.theblackvault.com>

**SECRET**

**DT-S-1025-SL**



**DEFENSE  
INTELLIGENCE  
AGENCY**

**SUMMARY REPORT (U)**

**PROJECT 91004**

**24 January 1991**

**NOFORN  
SECRET  
LIMDIS**

*Appendix A*

**SECRET**

Approved For Release 2003/09/04 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002900240001-4

PROJECT 91004

REPRODUCTION REQUIRES APPROVAL OF  
ORIGINATOR OR HIGHER DOD AUTHORITY.  
FURTHER DISSEMINATION ONLY AS DIRECTED  
BY DT OR HIGHER DOD AUTHORITY.

24 JANUARY 1991

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

CLASSIFIED BY: DIA/DT  
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

Approved For Release 2003/09/04 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002900240001-4

**SECRET**

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>PAGE</u>
I     PURPOSE	1
II    BACKGROUND	1
III   TASK	1
IV    CAVEATS	1
V     RESPONSES	1
VI    REMARKS	4

SECRET

PROJECT 91004

I. (U) PURPOSE:

(U) This report documents follow on to project 90104, task A.

II. (U) BACKGROUND:

(S/NF/LIMDIS) Project 90104 initiated a series of tasks concerning the Iraqi situation. One of these, task A, requested political/military indicators, and possible location of indicators, that would precede an imminent Iraqi attack, if any. Previous reporting on task A occurred on 30 October 1990.

(U) Preliminary data from this task for some of the sources was presented in an MFR on 15 Jan 91.

(U) Task completion was delayed due to higher priority tasking received on 15 Jan 91.

III. (U) TASK:

(U) Tasking was presented as a direct question as identified in the above request.

(U) This task will be updated frequently.

IV. (U) CAVEATS:

(S) Predictive aspects of this task should be updated frequently (i.e., in 1-2 week periods).

V. (U) RESPONSES:

a. (U) SOURCE 018:

(1) (U) DATE OF INFORMATION (DOI): 16 Jan 91.

(2) (S/NF/LIMDIS) DATA SUMMARY:

- Preemptive Iraqi strikes are not anticipated in the near future (1-2 weeks).

- Weather (rainstorms) will be a problem in the southern area in 3-5 days (19-21 Jan).

SECRET Notform

- Some heavy equipment movement (east to west) is anticipated in near term in Kuwait (area A on FIG 1).
- Within 1-3 days (i.e., 17-19 Jan 91), Iraq will launch missiles (into S Arabia areas):
  - o Front line troops will not advance.
- Future potential strikes may occur in area B, FIG 1.
- Iraq may have two "special" weapons:
  - o Some type of "interference" device that causes electronic/mechanical equipment to "freeze up" or (lose effectiveness).
  - o Some type of energetic/beam-type device may be located in the sand in area C, FIG 1.

b. (U) SOURCE 025:

(1) (U) DOI: 16 Jan 91.

(2) (U) DATA SUMMARY:

- Iraqi preemptive action is not anticipated until after February 1991:
  - o A surprise attack may occur from the Kuwait side in early February.
- This conflict will result in a new Iraq leader by the April time frame.

c. (U) SOURCE 049:

(1) (U) DOI: 15 Jan 91.

(2) (S/NF/LIMDIS) DATA SUMMARY:

- There will be considerable aircraft activity (North, toward Turkey border):
  - o Some old, slow (transport-like) aircraft are involved.
- Large groups of objects, now buried in the sand, will be uncovered.
- Something like communications, or command and control, with lower ranking individuals will be shutdown (or turned off):



**SECRET**

- o Sense of disbelief (by high level people).
  - o Some sort of abandonment occurs (in many areas).
  - SCUD missile launches will be used as a distractor:
    - o Outskirts of RIYADA is one target area.
  - Aircraft carriers and hospital ships are targets (via aircraft suicide runs, missiles).
  - Some type of "activity" is planned in vicinity of MECCA.
  - Hussein's attitude is ruthless; not concerned about world opinion.
- d. (U) SOURCE 052:
- (1) (U) DOI: 15 Jan 91.
  - (2) (S/NF/LIMDIS) DATA SUMMARY:
    - Iraq may initiate preemptive attack into Saudi Arabia (vicinity of 30°20'N/43°15'E). Time frame unclear, though some type of activity (indicator) may occur night of 14 Jan 91:
      - o Considerable aircraft activity will precede.
      - o Some type of "light beam/heat" may be associated with the possible assault.
- e. (U) SOURCE 079:
- (1) (U) DOI: 16 Jan 91.
  - (2) (S/NF/LIMDIS) DATA SUMMARY:
    - Hussein will not back out of Kuwait.
    - Hussein will not move politically or militarily in near future.
    - Saudi Arabia oil wells are targeted:
      - o Terrorist activity anticipated against Shell Oil Co.
    - Attacks (Iraq or US) not anticipated (in near future).

**SECRET** **Notorn**

SECRET

VI. (U) REMARKS:

a. (S/NF) Sources generally indicate that near term (1-2 weeks) preemptive strikes will not occur.

b. (S/NF) Sources are mixed as to possible long term preemptive strike areas; candidate areas include central south Kuwait border, or a central area along the Iraq/Saudi Arabia border.

c. (S/NF) Two sources anticipates special (surprise) weapons; another anticipates near term SCUD strikes into Saudi Arabia as well as suicide strikes against allied ships.

d. (S/NF) The most experience source does not a anticipate Iraqi backing out of Kuwait.

SECRET Notom