

**SECRET**

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# memorandum

DATE: 12 December 1990

REPLY TO  
ATTN OF: DT

S-490/DT

SUBJECT: Project SUN STREAK (U)

TO:

1. (S/NF) The attached assessments focus on both the DB and DT-S responses to questions posed by the DD; the DB assessment of the DT-S responses; the overall assessment; and actions required to more fully evaluate the DB/DT-S inputs (enclosures 1 - 8). This process was designed to maximize objectivity and reduce/eliminate subjectivity.

2. (S/NF) Overall, the evaluation of the data presented is mixed. The accuracy of the assessment and the value assigned to the DT-S responses are, in some cases, inconsistent. In order to more fully evaluate the DT-S response, recommendations, where necessary, have been made at each enclosure for DB/DT-S follow-on action.



SG1J

9 Enclosures:

1.-8. Assessments (S/NF), 1 Cy

9. Evaluation Summary  
(S/NF), 1 Cy

Project Officer  
Directorate for Scientific  
and Technical Intelligence

Classified by Multiple Sources  
Declassify on OADR

**NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS**

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10  
(REV. 1-80)  
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6  
5010-114

**SECRET**

This document is made available through the declassification efforts  
and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of:

# The Black Vault



The Black Vault is the largest online Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)  
document clearinghouse in the world. The research efforts here are  
responsible for the declassification of hundreds of thousands of pages  
released by the U.S. Government & Military.

**Discover the Truth** at: <http://www.theblackvault.com>

SG1C

Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP96-00789R003000230002-2

Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP96-00789R003000230002-2

**SECRET**

**KEY INTELLIGENCE ASSUMPTION (KIA)**

1. (S/NF) KIA: An Iraqi preemptive attack is not anticipated in the near future (next 3-4 weeks).

A. Is the assessment accurate? (Circle response.)

(1) Yes

(2) No

(3) Unsure

B. What is the value of the KIA? (Circle response.)

(1) Major Significance

(2) High Value

(3) Of Value

(4) Low Value

(5) No Value

C. Provide additional comments/rationale, if desired. (Optional)

*Iraq might preemptively attack allied forces in a striking attack if Baghdad felt an allied offensive were imminent.*

D.

NAME \_\_\_\_\_

OFFICE \_\_\_\_\_

**NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS**

**SECRET**

*Appendix A to Enc 1*

SG1A

Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP96-00789R003000230002-2

Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP96-00789R003000230002-2

**SECRET**

2. (S/NF) KIA: Terrorist activity against U.S. and coalition forces is not anticipated for the near future.

A. Is the assessment accurate? (Circle response.)

(1) Yes

(2) No

(3) Unsure

B. What is the value of the KIA? (Circle response.)

(1) Major Significance

(2) High Value

(3) Of Value

(4) Low Value

(5) No Value

C. Provide additional comments/rationale, if desired. (Optional)

Terrorist activity is a tool used by many players in the Middle East  
Some of these players including Saddam Hussein and the PLC may be looking  
for the opportunity to strike at any time.

D.

NAME \_\_\_\_\_

OFFICE \_\_\_\_\_

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

**SECRET**

*Appendix A to Enc 2*

SECRET

3. (S/NF) KIA: There may be terrorist support/development activity, or possibly some type of future staging in vicinity of Biji - Tikrit - Al Fatha (NW of Baghdad). Activity has:

- chemical association
- cylindrical objects/equipment involved
- sensing/detection equipment involved.

A. Is this assessment accurate? (Circle response.)

(1) Yes

(2) No

(3) Unsure

B. Are the activities listed above accurate? (Circle response.)

(1) Yes

(2) No

(3) Unsure

C. What is the value of the KIA? (Circle response.)

(1) Major Significance

(2) High Value

(3) Of Value

(4) Low Value

(5) No Value

D. Provide additional comments/rationale, if desired. (Optional)

E.

NAME \_\_\_\_\_

OFFICE \_\_\_\_\_

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

SECRET

*Appendix B to Enc 2*

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

TASK C  
OFS (OBJ A)

SECRET

4. (S/NF) KIA: Use of chemical weapons by Iraq against U.S. and coalition forces in Saudi Arabia will NOT OCCUR in the near future (3-4 weeks).

A. Is the assessment accurate? (Circle response.)

(1) Yes

(2) No

(3) Unsure

B. What is the value of the KIA? (Circle response.)

(1) Major Significance

(2) High Value

(3) Of Value

(4) Low Value

(5) No Value

C. Provide additional comments/rationale, if desired. (Optional)

*Whereas Iraq is probably not planning a major offensive they certainly are planning a strong defense which would include the use of CW. Therefore any significant combat will likely experience CW usage by Iraq.*

*for the near future*

*✓  
comment →*

D. \_\_\_\_\_  
NAME

\_\_\_\_\_  
OFFICE

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

SECRET

*Appendix A to Enc 3*

Next 10 Page(s) In Document Exempt

**SECRET**

8. (S/NF) KIA: Hostages have been neither tortured nor well-treated.

A. Is the assessment accurate? (Circle response.)

(1) Yes

(2) No

(3) Unsure

B. What is the value of the KIA? (Circle response.)

(1) Major Significance

(2) High Value

(3) Of Value

(4) Low Value

(5) No Value

C. Provide additional comments/rationale, if desired. (Optional)

D.

NAME \_\_\_\_\_

OFFICE \_\_\_\_\_

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

**SECRET**

*Appendix A to Enc 5*

**Next 6 Page(s) In Document Exempt**

**SECRET**

13. (S/NF) KIA: Fuel-air explosives will not be used in the near future (i.e., next 3-4 weeks).

A. Is the assessment accurate? (Circle response.)

(1) Yes

(2) No

(3) Unsure

B. What is the value of the KIA? (Circle response.)

(1) Major Significance

(2) High Value

(3) Of Value

(4) Low Value

(5) No Value

C. Provide additional comments/rationale, if desired. (Optional)

*They can be presumed to use FAE as well as other ordnance as soon as hostilities commence*

D.

NAME \_\_\_\_\_

OFFICE \_\_\_\_\_

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

**SECRET**

*Appendix A to Enc 7*

SECRET

14. (S/NF) KIA: There are indications that the Iraqis will possibly use fuel-air explosives in the 8 November 1990 time frame.

A. Is the assessment accurate? (Circle response.)

(1) Yes

(2) No

(3) Unsure

B. What is the value of the KIA? (Circle response.)

(1) Major Significance

(2) High Value

(3) Of Value

(4) Low Value

(5) No Value

C. Provide additional comments/rationale, if desired. (Optional)

It is now 9 Nov

D.

NAME \_\_\_\_\_

OFFICE \_\_\_\_\_

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

SECRET

Appendix B to Enc 7

SG1C

Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP96-00789R003000230002-2

Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP96-00789R003000230002-2

**SECRET**

OTHER TASK RESPONSES

By  
DT-S

(S/NF) **Other Data:** On 22 October 1990, the following information was provided that may be of interest, although not directly related to tasking:

- a. Egypt will play a significant role in future peace negotiations.
- b. The U.N. will continue to increase its role in negotiations.
- c. A name "Camaru/Kamaru" is important (presumably in regard to peace negotiations).
- d. More hostages will be released during November 1990.

(U) **DB Assessment and DT-3 Evaluation Response:** (Appendices A thru D.)

Classified by Multiple Source  
Declassify on OADR

**NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS**

**SECRET**

*Enc 8*

SECRET

16. (S/NF) KIA: Egypt will play a significant role in future peace negotiations.

A. Is the assessment accurate? (Circle response.)

(1) Yes

(2) No

(3) Unsure

B. What is the value of the KIA? (Circle response.)

(1) Major Significance

(2) High Value

(3) Of Value

(4) Low Value

(5) No Value

C. Provide additional comments/rationale, if desired. (Optional)

*Should be obvious to observers of the Mideast situation*

D.

NAME \_\_\_\_\_

OFFICE \_\_\_\_\_

(U) Evaluation: Confirmed.

(U) Follow-on Action: None.

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

SECRET

*Appendix A to Enc 8*

SECRET

17. (S/NF) KIA: The UN will continue to increase its role in negotiations.

A. Is the assessment accurate? (Circle response.)

(1) Yes

(2) No

(3) Unsure

B. What is the value of the KIA? (Circle response.)

(1) Major Significance

(2) High Value

(3) Of Value

(4) Low Value

(5) No Value

C. Provide additional comments/rationale, if desired. (Optional)

D.

NAME \_\_\_\_\_

OFFICE \_\_\_\_\_

(U) Evaluation: Confirmed.

(U) Follow-on Action: None.

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

SECRET

*Appendix B to Enc 8*

SECRET

18. (S/NF) KIA: A name "Camaru/Kamaru" is important (presumably in regard to peace negotiations).

A. Is the assessment accurate? (Circle response.)

(1) Yes

(2) No

(3) Unsure

B. What is the value of the KIA? (Circle response.)

(1) Major Significance

(2) High Value

(3) Of Value

(4) Low Value

(5) No Value whatsoever

C. Provide additional comments/rationale, if desired. (Optional)

D.

NAME \_\_\_\_\_

OFFICE \_\_\_\_\_

(U) Evaluation: Unconfirmed.

(U) Follow-on Action: None.

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

SECRET

*Appendix C to Enc 8*

**SECRET**

19. (S/NF) KIA: More hostages will be released during November 1990.

A. Is the assessment accurate? (Circle response.)

(1) Yes

(2) No

(3) Unsure

B. What is the value of the KIA? (Circle response.)

(1) Major Significance

(2) High Value

(3) Of Value

(4) Low Value

(5) No Value

C. Provide additional comments/rationale, if desired. (Optional)

D.

NAME \_\_\_\_\_

OFFICE \_\_\_\_\_

(U) Evaluation: Confirmed.

(S/NF) Follow-on Action: DT-S should be requested to update and to focus on the release of U.S. hostages prior to 15 January 1991 deadline for Iraq to leave Kuwait.

**NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS**

**SECRET**

*Appendix D to Enc 8*

SG1C

Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP96-00789R003000230002-2

Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP96-00789R003000230002-2