

SUMMARY REPORT
STAR GATE OPERATIONAL TASKING AND EVALUATION

1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

From 1986 to the first quarter of FY 1995, the DoD paranormal psychology program received more than 200 tasks from operational military organizations requesting that the program staff apply a paranormal psychological technique know as "remote viewing" (RV) to attain information unavailable from other sources. The operational tasking comprised "targets" identified with as little specificity as possible to avoid "telegraphing" the desired response.

In 1994, the DIA Star Gate program office created a methodology for obtaining numerical evaluations from the operational tasking organizations of the accuracy and value of the products provided by the Star Gate program. By May 1, 1995, the three remote viewers assigned to the program office had responded, i.e., provided RV product, to 40 tasks from five operational organizations. Normally, RV product was provided by at least two viewers for each task.

Ninety-nine accuracy scores and 100 value scores resulted from these product evaluations by the operational users. On a 6-point basis where "1" is the most accurate, accuracy scores cluster around "2's" and "3's" (55 of the entries) with 13 scores of "1". Value scores, on a 5-point basis with "1" the highest, cluster around "3's" and "4's" (80 of the entries); there are no "1's" and 11 scores of "2".

After careful study of the RV products and detailed analysis of the resulting product evaluations for the 40 operational tasks, we conclude that the utility of RV for operational intelligence collection cannot be substantiated. The conclusion results from the fact that the operational utility to the Intelligence Community of the information provided by this paranormal RV process simply cannot be discerned. Furthermore, this conclusion is supported by the results of interviews conducted with representatives of the operational organizations that provided tasking to the program. The ambiguous and subjective nature of the process actually creates a need for additional efforts of questionable operational return on the part of the intelligence analyst. Assuming that the subjective nature of the psychic process cannot be eliminated, one must determine whether the information provided justifies the required resource investment.

2.0 GENERIC DESCRIPTION OF OPERATIONAL TASKING

Over the period from 1986 to first quarter of FY 1995, the Star Gate program received more than 200 tasks from operational military organizations. These tasks requested that the program staff apply their paranormal psychological technique know as "remote

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FIGURE 2-1

TASKING SHEET

SOURCE NO: 079

DATE: 18 Jul 94

SUSPENSE: 18 Jul 94

1600 Hrs

1. PROJECT NUMBER: 94-252-0

2. METHOD/TECHNIQUE: Method of Choice

3. BACKGROUND: _____

4. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION: _____
Access and describe target.


5. COMMENTS: _____

Twenty-six (26) of the 40 operational tasks originated from DIA in support of two joint Task Forces, Org. B and Org. C, (see Section 4.0). Typical tasking targets for these organizations comprised the name of a person or thing (e.g., vessel) with a generic request to describe the target, his/her/its activities, location, associations, etc. as appropriate. No specific information (e.g., what is the height/weight/age of the target?) was requested in the tasking. As noted above, the identity of the supported organizations also was provided. For these tasks that identification provides the RV's with knowledge regarding the specific operational interests of these organizations. Thus, any information provided by the RV's which describes or relates to those interests "could be" relevant; and, therefore, could be interpreted by the evaluators as having some level of "accuracy" and "value" depending upon the information described and the evaluator's interests and beliefs.

The tasking provided by the organization denoted as Org. A comprised targets that were "places" visited by "beacons", i.e., an individual from Org. A who visited and "viewed" the site of interest to assist the RV in "visualizing" and describing the site. Targets could be a general vista in or around a particular location, a particular facility at a selected location or, perhaps, a particular item at a location (in the one case where this type of target was used, the item was a particular kind of boat). Usually, no specifics regarding the type of target or its location were provided.

Tasking by Org. D comprised two generic types of targets that related to military interests/concerns current at the time of the tasking, e.g., North Korean (NK) capabilities and leadership. The first type of target focused upon then-current military concerns while the second type required "precognitive" (predictive) capabilities since it required a prognoses of future intentions and actions.³

The tasking from Org. E was similar in scope, albeit quite different in context, from the tasks noted earlier for Org. B and Org. C, i.e., describe a person, his activities, location, etc..

SG1B As mentioned at the beginning of this section, the descriptions noted above relate to operational tasks that were numerically scored. 

SG1B 

of the results from these tasks was in narrative form only; discussion regarding this narration is presented at the end of Section 3.0.

³ Some operational tasks from the period Oct. 1990 to Jan 1991 regarding Middle East issues were of a similar types, albeit these were not numerically evaluated. They would provide some data for an after-the-fact check of the accuracy of the RV predictions - see Section 7.0 for a discussion of this possibility.

3.0 EVALUATION MEASURES

The numerical evaluation measures that were given to the evaluators of the tasking organizations to score the accuracy and value of the Star Gate inputs were extracted from the Defense Intelligence Agency Manual (DIAM) 58-13. These measures are shown in Table 3-1. Most of the stipulated measures include modifiers such as "may", "possibly", "high", "low", etc. which are subjective and open to individual interpretation by each evaluator. The DIAM 58-13 definitions for the ratings under "Value" are presented in Table 3-2; whether the individual evaluators reviewed these definitions prior to their scoring is unknown. There was no clarification of what was intended by the generic headings of "Accuracy" and "Value", e.g., in the evaluator's estimation how much of the RV's response to the tasking had to qualify for a particular measure, 1%, 10%, 90%, to be granted the related score?

<u>Table 3-1 Numerical Evaluation Measures</u>	
<u>Category</u>	<u>Score</u>
Accuracy - Is the information accurate?	
Yes (true)	1
May be true	2
Possibly true	3
No	4
Possibly not true ⁴	5
Unsure	6
Value - what is the value of the sources' information?	
Major significance	1
High value	2
Of value	3
Low value	4
No value	5

As noted in Section 2.0, one series of tasks were evaluated by a narrative discussion only. While much of the final narrative evaluation for this series was complimentary, it lacked any real specifics regarding the usefulness or relevance of the Star Gate inputs and much of the narrative was replete with modifiers and other hedges. A sanitized extract from the final evaluation report for these tasks is presented in Appendix A illustrating the subjective, "uncertain" nature of the comments.

⁴ Note that Accuracy scores 5 and 6 actually rank "higher" than 4 since both imply that there may be something accurate in the information. Changing the scoring order to accommodate this observation causes insignificant changes to both the averages and the standard deviations shown on Table 4-1.

Table 3-2 - Value Rating Definitions from DIAM 58-13

MAJOR SIGNIFICANCE - Intelligence Information Report (IIR) provided information which will alter or significantly influence national policy, perceptions, or analysis; or provided unique or timely indications and warning of impending significant foreign military or political actions having a national impact.

HIGH VALUE - IIR(s) was best report to date or first report on this important topic, but did not significantly influence policy or change analyses.

OF VALUE - IIR(s) provided information which supplements, updates, confirms, or aids in the interpretation of information in data bases, intelligence production, policy research and analysis, or military operations and plans; most DoD HUMINT System reporting falls into this category.

LOW VALUE - IIR was not a good report because the information was not reported in a timely manner, or was of poor quality/of little substance. Nevertheless, it satisfied some of the consumer's informational needs.

NO VALUE - IIR provided no worthwhile information to support data base maintenance, intelligence production, policy research and analysis, or military operations and planning; or its information had no utility, was erroneous, or misleading.

4.0 EVALUATION SUMMARY AND COMMENTS

Thirty-nine (39) of the 40 numerically evaluated, operational tasks were performed in 1994 and one in 1995. The information provided by the Star Gate RV's for each task was evaluated by staff of the tasking organization. The complete compilation of evaluated scores is presented in Table 4-1 which includes a designation of the tasking organization and, where known, a numerical designator for the individual from that organization who signed the response to the evaluation request (in some instances, this was also an evaluator). Also presented are the individual and collective scores for Accuracy (A) and Value (V) for each of the three RV's and the related average and standard deviations for the compiled scores. (Note that the total number of scoring entries for either Accuracy or Value is not equal to the maximum of 120, i.e., 3x40, since all three RV's did not participated in all tasks). Table 4-2 presents the same scoring data by tasking organization.

Histograms of the scores from Table 4-1 are shown below. Note that "Accuracy" scores tend to cluster around 2's and 3's (55 of the 99 entries) while "Value" scores cluster around 3's and 4's (80 of the 100 entries). This is not too surprising as the nonspecific, nebulous nature of the individual task/target requests permits the RV to "free associate" and permits the evaluator to pick and choose from the RV commentary

OPERATIONAL TASKS THAT HAVE NUMERICAL EVALUATIONS

1	Doc.	Date	Tasking	Evaluator	Remote Viewer & Scores						Totals	
					Org.	No.	1A	1V	2A	2V	3A	3V
3	250	7/13/94	Org. A	1	3.0	3.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0		
4	264	9/6/94	Org. A	2			2.0	3.0	5.0	4.0		
5	270	11/3/94	Org. B	3	5.0	4.0			5.0	4.0		
6	271	11/3/94	Org. B	3	3.0	4.0			5.0	4.0		
7	273	11/3/94	Org. B	3	4.0	5.0	5.0	4.0	4.0	5.0		
8	267	11/3/94	Org. B	3	3.0	4.0			3.0	4.0		
9	268	11/3/94	Org. B	3	3.0	4.0	4.0	3.0	5.0	4.0		
10	269	11/3/94	Org. B	3			3.0	3.0	5.0	5.0		
11	272	11/3/94	Org. B	3				3.0				
12	258	8/3/94	Org. C	4	1.0	3.0	2.0	3.0				
13	257	8/1/94	Org. C	4	3.0	5.0			3.0	5.0		
14	256	7/28/94	Org. C	4	2.0	3.0			5.0	4.0		
15	249	7/11/94	Org. D	5	1.0	4.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	4.0		
16	248	7/6/94	Org. D	5	3.0	3.0	2.0	2.0	1.0	4.0		
17	245	6/24/94	Org. D	5	3.0	3.0			1.0	4.0		
18	252	7/18/94	Org. C	4	4.0	4.0			2.0	3.0		
19	251	7/15/94	Org. C	4	2.0	3.0	1.0	3.0	2.0	3.0		
20	243	5/31/94	Org. C	4	3.0	3.0	5.0	4.0	1.0	4.0		
21	242	5/25/94	Org. C	4	1.5	3.0			1.5	3.0		
22	244	6/6/94	Org. A	1	4.0	5.0	2.0	3.0	1.0	2.0		
23	239	6/12/94	Org. A	6	2.0	2.0	1.0	2.0	2.0	2.0		
24	230	4/1/94	Org. A	7	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	1.0	2.0		
25	240	5/17/94	Org. C		2.0	3.0			3.0	4.0		
26	235	4/18/94	Org. C	8	3.0	4.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	4.0		
27	234	4/14/94	Org. C	8	2.0	3.0	5.0	3.0	6.0	5.0		
28	233	4/11/94	Org. C	8	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0		
29	229	3/29/94	Org. C	4	2.0	4.0	2.0	4.0	5.0	4.0		
30	228	3/28/94	Org. C	4	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	3.0	3.0		
31	227	3/24/94	Org. C	4	3.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	3.0	3.0		
32	226	3/22/94	Org. C	4	5.0	4.0	5.0	4.0	2.0	3.0		
33	225	3/21/94	Org. C	4	2.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	2.0	3.0		
34	232	4/11/94	Org. E	9	2.0	4.0	5.0	4.0	5.0	4.0		
35	236	4/26/94	Org. E	9	6.0	4.0			6.0	2.0		
36	237	4/26/94	Org. E	9	5.0	4.0	5.0	4.0				
37	241	4/27/94	Org. E	9	3.0	4.0			2.0	4.0		
38	247	6/29/94	Org. D	10/11	1.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0		
39	265	7/6/94	Org. D	10/11	1.0	3.0	2.0	3.0	2.0	4.0		
40	259	7/15/94	Org. C	4	5.0	4.0			2.0	2.0		
41	262	8/23/94	Org. C	4(?)	6.0	4.0			4.0	5.0		
42	287	4/3/95	Org. C	12	2.0	4.0			1.0	4.0		
43				Score sums =	106.5	130	76.0	83.0	113.5	135.0	296	348
44				Number of en1ies =	37	37	25	26	37	37	99	100
45				Avg score =	2.9	3.5	2.9	3.2	3.1	3.6	3.0	3.5
46				Std.Deviation =	1.4	0.8	1.3	0.7	1.6	0.9	1.4	0.8

TABLE 4-1

OPERATIONAL TASKS THAT HAVE NUMERICAL EVALUATIONS

1	Doc.	Date	Tasker	Evaluator	Remote Viewer & Scores						Totals	
					Org.	No.	1A	1V	2A	2V	3A	3V
2												
3												
4	<u>By Tasking Organization</u>											
5	<u>Org. C</u>											
6	258	8/3/94	Org. C	4	1.0	3.0	2.0	3.0				
7	257	8/1/94	Org. C	4	3.0	5.0			3.0	5.0		
8	256	7/28/94	Org. C	4	2.0	3.0			5.0	4.0		
9	252	7/18/94	Org. C	4	4.0	4.0			2.0	3.0		
10	251	7/15/94	Org. C	4	2.0	3.0	1.0	3.0	2.0	3.0		
11	243	5/31/94	Org. C	4	3.0	3.0	5.0	4.0	1.0	4.0		
12	242	5/25/94	Org. C	4	1.5	3.0			1.5	3.0		
13	240	5/17/94	Org. C		2.0	3.0			3.0	4.0		
14	235	4/18/94	Org. C	8	3.0	4.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	4.0		
15	234	4/14/94	Org. C	8	2.0	3.0	5.0	3.0	6.0	5.0		
16	233	4/11/94	Org. C	8	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0		
17	229	3/29/94	Org. C	4	2.0	4.0	2.0	4.0	5.0	4.0		
18	228	3/28/94	Org. C	4	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	3.0	3.0		
19	227	3/24/94	Org. C	4	3.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	3.0	3.0		
20	226	3/22/94	Org. C	4	5.0	4.0	5.0	4.0	2.0	3.0		
21	225	3/21/94	Org. C	4	2.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	2.0	3.0		
22	259	7/15/94	Org. C	4	5.0	4.0			2.0	2.0		
23	262	8/23/94	Org. C	4(?)	6.0	4.0			4.0	5.0		
24	287	4/3/95	Org. C	12	2.0	4.0			1.0	4.0		
25				Score sums=	52.5	65.0	36.0	39.0	51.5	65.0	140	169
26				No. of entries=	19	19	11	11	18	18	48	48
27				Avg score=	2.8	3.4	3.3	3.5	2.9	3.6	2.9	3.5
28	<u>Org. B</u>											
29	270	11/3/94	Org. B	3	5.0	4.0			5.0	4.0		
30	271	11/3/94	Org. B	3	3.0	4.0			5.0	4.0		
31	273	11/3/94	Org. B	3	4.0	5.0	5.0	4.0	4.0	5.0		
32	267	11/3/94	Org. B	3	3.0	4.0			3.0	4.0		
33	268	11/3/94	Org. B	3	3.0	4.0	4.0	3.0	5.0	4.0		
34	269	11/3/94	Org. B	3			3.0	3.0	5.0	5.0		
35	272	11/3/94	Org. B	3				3.0				
36				Score sums=	18.0	21.0	12.0	13.0	27.0	26.0	57	60
37				No. of entries=	5	5	3	4	6	6	14	15
38				Avg score=	3.6	4.2	4.0	3.2	4.5	4.3	4.1	4.0

Table 4-2

OPERATIONAL TASKS THAT HAVE NUMERICAL EVALUATIONS

1	Doc.	Date	Tasker Org.	Evaluator No.	Remote Viewer & Scores						Totals	
					1A	1V	2A	2V	3A	3V	A	V
3												
4	<u>By Tasking Organization</u>											
5	<u>Org. D</u>											
6	249	7/11/94	Org. D	5	1.0	4.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	4.0		
7	248	7/6/94	Org. D	5	3.0	3.0	2.0	2.0	1.0	4.0		
8	245	6/24/94	Org. D	5	3.0	3.0			1.0	4.0		
9	247	6/29/94	Org. D	10/11	1.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0		
10	265	7/6/94	Org. D	10/11	1.0	3.0	2.0	3.0	2.0	4.0		
11				Score sums=	9.0	16.0	9.0	10.0	9.0	19.0	27	45
12				No. of entries=	5	5	4	4	5	5	14	14
13				Avg score=	1.8	3.2	2.2	2.5	1.8	3.8	1.9	3.2
14												
15	<u>Org. A</u>											
16	102	7/13/94	Org. A	1	3.0	3.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0		
17	101	9/6/94	Org. A	2			2.0	3.0	5.0	4.0		
18	82	6/6/94	Org. A	1	4.0	5.0	2.0	3.0	1.0	2.0		
19	81	6/12/94	Org. A	6	2.0	2.0	1.0	2.0	2.0	2.0		
20	79	4/1/94	Org. A	7	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	1.0	2.0		
21				Score sums=	11.0	12.0	9.0	13.0	13.0	15.0	33	40
22				No. of entries=	4	4	5	5	5	5	14	14
23				Avg score=	2.8	3.0	1.8	2.6	2.6	3.0	2.4	2.9
24												
25	<u>Org. E</u>											
26	232	4/11/94	Org. E	9	2.0	4.0	5.0	4.0	5.0	4.0		
27	236	4/26/94	Org. E	9	6.0	4.0			6.0	2.0		
28	237	4/26/94	Org. E	9	5.0	4.0	5.0	4.0				
29	241	4/27/94	Org. E	9	3.0	4.0			2.0	4.0		
30				Score sums=	16.0	16.0	10.0	8.0	13.0	10.0	39	34
31				No. of entries=	4	4	2	2	3	3	9	9
32				Avg score=	4.0	4.0	5.0	4.0	4.3	3.3	4.3	3.8
33												
34												
35												
36	<u>Comparison - Average Scores by Organization</u>											
37				Organization	Average Scores							
38				Org. C	2.8	3.4	3.3	3.5	2.9	3.6		
39				Org. B	3.6	4.2	4.0	3.2	4.5	4.3		
40				Org. D	1.8	3.2	2.2	2.5	1.8	3.8		
41				Org. A	2.8	3.0	1.8	2.6	2.6	3.0		
42				Org. E	4.0	4.0	5.0	4.0	4.3	3.3		

Table 4-2

between the RV(s) and the evaluator:

- has a very narrow information bandwidth, i.e., the RV-derived information cannot be embellished by a dialogue with the evaluator without substantially telegraphing the evaluator's needs and interests, thereby biasing any RV information subsequently derived ,
- and - is extremely "noisy" as a result of the unidentifiable beliefs, intentions, knowledge, biases, etc. that reside in the subconsciousness of the RV(s) and/or the evaluator .

As a result, the potential for self-deception on the part of the evaluator exists, i.e, he/she "reads" into the RV information a degree of validity that in truth is based upon fragmentary, generalized information and which may have little real applicability to his/her problem. The relevant question in the overall evaluation process is who and what is being evaluated, i.e., is the score a measure of the RV's paranormal capabilities or of the evaluators views, beliefs and concepts?

One of the RV's expressed a concern to the author that the protocols that were followed in conducting the RV process in response to the operational tasking were not consistent with those that are generally specified for the study of paranormal phenomena. Whether the claimed discrepancy was detrimental to the information derived by the RV's, or to its subsequent evaluation or use cannot be determined from the available data.

SG1B

[REDACTED] required precognitive abilities on the part of the RV's provides an opportunity for a post-analysis by comparing the RV predictions against subsequent realities. Additional comparative data of this type is available from operational tasking during the period 11/90 through 1/91 regarding the Middle East situation (this tasking was not numerically evaluated).

6.0 SUMMARY FROM USER INTERVIEWS (U)

Subsequent to the review and analysis of the numerically scored tasking described in the previous sections of this report, the author participated in interviews with representatives of all of the tasking organizations presented in Table 4-1 except Org. D. Only a brief summary of the results from those interviews is presented here; more detailed synopses are presented in Appendix B. In all cases except for Org. C, the interviewees were the actual personnel who had participated directly in the tasking and evaluation of the Star Gate program. For Org. C, the sole interviewee was the Chief of the Analysis Branch; the staff who defined the tasking and performed the evaluations was comprised of his lead analysts.

A brief summary of the salient points which appeared consistently throughout these interviews follows:

- the principal motivation for using Star Gate services was the hope that something useful might result; the problems being addressed were very difficult and the users were justifiably (and admittedly) "grasping at straws" for anything that might be beneficial.
- the information provided by the Star Gate program was never specific enough to cause any operational user to task other intelligence assets to specifically corroborate the Star Gate information.
- while information that was provided did occasionally contain portions that were accurate, albeit general, it was - without exception - never specific enough to offer substantial intelligence value for the problem at hand.
- two of the operational user organizations would be willing to pay for this service if that was required and if it was not too expensive (although one user noted that his organization head would not agree). However, the fact that Star Gate service was free acted as an incentive to obtain "it might be useful - who knows" support for the program from the user organizations.

The reader is referred to Appendix B for additional information resulting from these interviews. However, two inconsistencies noted during the discussion of the numerical evaluations in Section 4.0 were supported by information obtained from the interviews.

On the average, the Org. C evaluators scored higher than those of Org. B. One cause for this discrepancy may be due to the fact that the Org. B evaluators were, in general, skeptical of the process while the lead person at Org. C claimed to be a believer in parapsychology and, in addition, had the last say in any evaluations that were promulgated back to the Star Gate PM. This comment is in no way intended to impugn the honesty or motivation of any of these personnel, merely to point out that this difference in the belief-structure of the staff at these two organizations may have resulted in the perceived scoring bias. As noted above, the subjectivity inherent in the entire process is impossible to eliminate or to account for in the results.

The higher average scoring, especially Accuracy scores, from the Org. A evaluators appears to be explained by the procedure they used to task and evaluate the experiments they were performing with the Star Gate program. Namely, they used a staff member as a "beacon" to "assist" the RV's in "viewing" the beacon's location. Subsequently, the same Org. A staff member evaluated the RV inputs. However, since he/she had been at the site, he/she could interpret anything that appeared to be related to the actual site as accurate. When asked if the information from the multiple RV's was sufficiently accurate and consistent such that a "blind" evaluator, i.e., one who did not know the characteristics of the site, would have been able to identify information from the RV inputs that they could interpret to be accurate, they all answered in the negative and agreed that the score would have been lower. Again the subjectivity of

the process appears - the evaluator could interpret the admittedly general comments from any RV that seemed to relate to the actual site as "accurate", e.g., consider an RV input "there is water nearby", the evaluator knows this is true of almost anyplace especially if one does not or cannot define what kind of water, i.e., is it a lake, a water line, a commode, a puddle?

7.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 Conclusions

The single conclusion that can be drawn from an evaluation of the 40 operational tasks is that the value and utility to the Intelligence Community of the information provided by the process cannot be readily discerned. This conclusion was initially based solely upon the analysis of the numerical evaluations presented in Section 4.0, but strong confirmation was provided by the results of the subsequent interviews with the tasking organizations (Ref. Section 6.0 and Appendix B). While, if one believes the validity of parapsychological phenomena, the potential for value exists in principal, there is, none-the-less, an alternative view of the phenomenology that would disavow any such value and, in fact, could claim that the ambiguous and subjective nature of the process actually creates a need for additional efforts with questionable operational return on the part of the intelligence analyst.

Normally, much of the data provided by the RV(s) is either wrong or irrelevant although one cannot always tell which is which without further investigation. Whether this reality reduces or eliminates the overall value of the totality of the information can only be assessed by the intelligence analyst. It clearly complicates his/her problem in two ways: 1) it adds to the overburden of unrelated data which every analyst already receives on a daily basis, i.e., the receipt of information of dubious authenticity and accuracy is not an uncommon occurrence for intelligence analysts, and 2) since the analyst does not normally know which information is wrong or irrelevant, some of it is actually "disinformation" and can result in wasted effort as the analyst attempts to verify or discount those data from other sources.

The review of the operational tasking and its subsequent evaluation does not provide any succinct conclusions regarding the validity of the process (or the information provided by it). First and foremost, as discussed in Section 5.0, the entire process, from beginning to end, is highly subjective. Further, as noted in Section 3.0, the degree of consistency in applying the scoring measures, any guidance or training provided to the evaluators by any of the tasking organizations and/or the motivation of the evaluators are either unknown or, in the case of the latter, may be highly polarized (see Appendix B). The lack of information regarding these items could account for some of the variability in the scores across organizations noted in Table 4-2, but this cannot be certified and is, at most, a suspicion.

Whether the information provided by the Star Gate source is of sufficient value to overcome the obvious detriment of accommodating the irrelevant information included therein is an open question? More precisely, whether the Star Gate information is of sufficient value to continue this program - vis-a-vis other sources of information and other uses of resources - is an important question for the Intelligence Community to address, irrespective of one's personal views and/or beliefs regarding this field of endeavor, i.e., does the information provided justify the required resource investment?

One method that might assist this evaluation is to develop a means for scoring the complete input from the RV process, i.e., evaluate all information and determine how much is truly relevant, how much is of undeterminable value and how much is completely irrelevant. One could then analyze how much information is being handled to achieve the relevant information (along with some measure of the relevancy) and make judgments on its value vis-a-vis the investment in time and money. Other, less technical methods, for adjudicating this issue also exist.

7.2 Recommendations

Considering the statements above, the only sensible recommendation in this author's mind is to bring some "scientific method" into this process (if it is continued). As evidenced by more than 20 years of research into paranormal psychology, much of it done by institutions of higher education or others with excellent credentials in related fields, validation of parapsychological phenomena may never be accredited in the sense that is understood in other scientific and technical fields of endeavor. Control in any rigorous scientific sense of the multitude of human and physical variables which could, and probably do, influence this process is difficult - perhaps impossible - for any except the most mundane types of experiments, e.g., blind "reading" of playing cards. Even these restricted experiments have led to controversy among those schooled in the related arts.

One of the foundation precepts of scientific endeavor is the ability to obtain repeatable data from independent researchers. Given the subjective nature of RV activities, it is difficult to believe that this aspect of parapsychology will ever be achieved. As an admitted neophyte in this area of endeavor, I categorize the field as a kind of religion, i.e., you either have "faith" that it indeed is something real, albeit fleeting and unique, or you "disbelieve" and attribute all positive results to either chicanery or pure chance¹⁰.

Thus, one must recognize at the start that any attempt to bring scientific method into the operational tasking aspects of this project may not succeed. Others with serious

¹⁰ Practitioners in the field, including those funded under government contracts, would argue with these observations, perhaps vehemently; some would argue further that the phenomenology has been verified beyond question already. This reviewer disagrees; albeit, these observations are not intended to discard the possibility of such phenomena.

motives and intentions have attempted to do this with the results noted above. However, as a minimum, one could try to assure that the scoring measures are succinctly defined and promulgated such that different organizations and evaluators would have a better understanding of what is intended and, perhaps could be more consistent in their scoring. The use of independent, multiple evaluators on each task could aid in reducing some of the effects of the subjective nature of the evaluation process and the possible personal biases (intentional or otherwise) of the evaluators.

Since, according to some parapsychologists, the time of the remote viewing is not relevant to the attainment of the desired information, controlled "blind tests" could be run by requesting tasking for which the accurate and valuable information is already known to determine statistics on RV performance (clearly one key issue in such tests is what information is given to the RV in the task description to avoid any semblance of compromise, not a casual problem). Controlled laboratory experiments of parapsychology have done this type of testing and the results, usually expressed in terms of probability numbers that claim to validate the parapsychological results, have done little to quell the controversy that surrounds this field. Thus it may be naive and optimistic to believe that such additional testing would help resolve the question of the "value of the process" (or its utility for operational intelligence applications), but it might assist in either developing "faith" in those who use it, or conversely "disbelief".

Before additional operational tasks are conceived, some thought could be given to how and what one defines as a "target". Broad generic target descriptions permit unstructured discourse by the RV which - especially if there is a knowledge (or even a hint) of the general area of interest - leads to data open to very subjective, perhaps illusory, interpretation regarding both accuracy and value. If some specificity regarding the target could be defined such that the relevance and accuracy of the RV-derived data could be evaluated more readily, some of the uncertainties might be eliminated. In this context, note that the cases where targets were more specific, e.g., the North Korean targets, the resulting scores were generally higher.

Finally, it was noted in Section 5.0 that some of the RV information obtained from operational tasks regarding North Korea (and others concerning the Middle East) depended upon the precognitive ability of the RV's in predicting events yet to occur. These data provide an opportunity for a post-analysis of the accuracy of these predictions by making a comparison with subsequent information regarding actual events (some data for this comparison might require access to classified information from other sources). Such a post-analysis would provide data for evaluating the ability of the RV's to perform precognitive tasks and of the related operational value of the predictions. Performance of this post-analysis lies beyond the scope of this paper, but is a topic for a subsequent study if any sponsor is interested.